This setting lets you change the way you view articles. You can choose to have articles open in a dialog window, a new tab, or directly in the same window.
Open in Dialog
Open in New Tab
Open in same window

Journal of Economic Perspectives: Vol. 10 No. 4 (Fall 1996)

Expand

Quick Tools:

Print Article Summary
Export Citation
Sign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter

Explore:

JEP - All Issues


Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage

Article Citation

Lundberg, Shelly, and Robert A. Pollak. 1996. "Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(4): 139-158.

DOI: 10.1257/jep.10.4.139

Abstract

The standard economic model of the family is a 'common preference' model that assumes that a family maximizes a single utility function and implies that family behavior is independent of which individuals receive income or control resources. In recent years, this model has been challenged by game-theoretic models of marriage that do not impose 'pooling' and are, therefore, consistent with empirical evidence that income controlled by husbands and wives does have different effects on family behavior. In this paper, the authors review a number of simple bargaining models and relevant empirical evidence, and discuss their implications for distribution within marriage.

Article Full-Text Access

Full-text Article (Complimentary)

Authors

Lundberg, Shelly (U WA)
Pollak, Robert A. (Washington U, St Louis)

JEL Classifications

J12: Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Domestic Abuse

Comments

View Comments on This Article (0) | Login to post a comment


Journal of Economic Perspectives


Quick Tools:

Sign up for Email Alerts

Follow us on Twitter

Subscription Information
(Institutional Administrator Access)

Explore:

JEP - All Issues

Virtual Field Journals


AEA Member Login:


AEAweb | AEA Journals | Contact Us