Value Solutions in Cooperative Games by Roger A. McCain
Published By: Hackensack, N.J. and Singapore: World Scientific ISBN: 978-981-4417-39-6 Date of Publication: 2013
Book Review Detail
Omer Edhan of University of Manchester
Review DOI: 10.1257/jel.52.1.211.r2 Review Pages: 213-15
Book Review Abstract
Omer Edhan of University of Manchester reviews, "Value Solutions in Cooperative Games" by Roger A. McCain. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: "Presents new concepts for cooperative game theory, with a particular focus on solutions that determine the distribution of a coalitional surplus among the members of the coalition. Discusses value solutions for superadditive transferable utility games in coalition function form; Zeuthen–Nash bargaining; nontransferable utility games and games in partition function form; a Shapley value algorithm for games in partition function form; extension of the nucleolus to nontransferable utility games in partition function form; a core imputation with variable bargaining power; bargaining power biform games; intertemporal cooperative games—a sketch of a theory; and a theory of enterprise. McCain is at Drexel University."