This setting lets you change the way you view articles. You can choose to have articles open in a dialog window, a new tab, or directly in the same window.
Open in Dialog
Open in New Tab
Open in same window

American Economic Review: Vol. 90 No. 2 (May 2000)

Expand

Quick Tools:

Print Article Summary
Export Citation
Sign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter

Explore:

AER - All Issues

AER Forthcoming Articles

Agents with and without Principals

Article Citation

Bertrand, Marianne, and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2000. "Agents with and without Principals." American Economic Review, 90(2): 203-208.

DOI: 10.1257/aer.90.2.203

Article Full-Text Access

Full-text Article

Authors

Bertrand, Marianne (Princeton U, CEPR, and NBER)
Mullainathan, Sendhil (MIT and NBER)

JEL Classifications

M12: Personnel Management; Executive Compensation


American Economic Review


Quick Tools:

Sign up for Email Alerts

Follow us on Twitter

Subscription Information
(Institutional Administrator Access)

Explore:

AER - All Issues

AER - Forthcoming Articles

Virtual Field Journals


AEA Member Login:


AEAweb | AEA Journals | Contact Us