American Economic Review: Vol. 104 No. 6 (June 2014)

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Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution: Comment

Article Citation

Heller, Yuval. 2014. "Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution: Comment." American Economic Review, 104(6): 1857-63.

DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.6.1857

Abstract

Demichelis & Weibull (AER 2008) show that adding lexicographic lying costs to coordination games with cheap talk yields a sharp prediction: only the efficient outcome is evolutionarily stable. I show that this result is caused by the discontinuity of preferences rather than by small lying costs per se. Finally, I discuss why discontinuity may not be an appealing assumption in evolutionary models.

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Authors

Heller, Yuval (Nuffield College, U Oxford)

JEL Classifications

C72: Noncooperative Games
C73: Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Z13: Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification


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