American Economic Review: Vol. 104 No. 5 (May 2014)

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How Sharing Information Can Garble Experts' Advice

Article Citation

Elliott, Matthew, Benjamin Golub, and Andrei Kirilenko. 2014. "How Sharing Information Can Garble Experts' Advice." American Economic Review, 104(5): 463-68.

DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.5.463

Abstract

We model the strategic provision of advice in environments where a principal's optimal action depends on an unobserved, binary state of interest. Experts receive signals about the state and each recommends an action. The principal and all experts dislike making errors in their decision and recommendations, respectively, but may have different costs of different errors. Is it in the principal's interest to let experts share information? Although sharing improves experts' ability to avoid errors, we identify a simple environment in which any principal, regardless of how he trades off the different errors, is worse off if he permits information sharing.

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Authors

Elliott, Matthew (CA Institute of Technology)
Golub, Benjamin (Harvard U)
Kirilenko, Andrei (MIT)

JEL Classifications

D82: Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
D83: Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief


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