American Economic Review: Vol. 104 No. 5 (May 2014)

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Costly Persuasion

Article Citation

Gentzkow, Matthew, and Emir Kamenica. 2014. "Costly Persuasion." American Economic Review, 104(5): 457-62.

DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.5.457

Abstract

We study the design of informational environments in settings where generating information is costly. We assume that the cost of a signal is proportional to the expected reduction in uncertainty. We show that Kamenica & Gentzkow's (2011) concavification approach to characterizing optimal signals extends to these settings.

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Authors

Gentzkow, Matthew (U Chicago)
Kamenica, Emir (U Chicago)

JEL Classifications

D82: Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
D83: Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief


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