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American Economic Review: Vol. 103 No. 2 (April 2013)

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Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games: A General Approach

Article Citation

Lauermann, Stephan. 2013. "Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games: A General Approach." American Economic Review, 103(2): 663-89.

DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.2.663

Abstract

Dynamic matching and bargaining games are models of decentralized markets with trading frictions. A central objective is to investigate how equilibrium outcomes depend on the level of frictions. In particular, does the trading outcome become Walrasian when frictions become small? Existing specifications of such games provide divergent answers. This paper presents a new characterization result for competitive allocations in quasilinear economies. The characterization result is used to investigate what causes these differences and to generalize insights from the analysis of specific matching and bargaining games. (JEL C73, C78, D82, D83)

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Authors

Lauermann, Stephan (U MI)

JEL Classifications

C73: Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
C78: Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
D83: Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief


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