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American Economic Review: Vol. 102 No. 1 (February 2012)

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Compulsory Licensing: Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act

Article Citation

Moser, Petra, and Alessandra Voena. 2012. "Compulsory Licensing: Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act." American Economic Review, 102(1): 396-427.

DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.1.396

Abstract

Compulsory licensing allows firms in developing countries to produce foreign-owned inventions without the consent of foreign patent owners. This paper uses an exogenous event of compulsory licensing after World War I under the Trading with the Enemy Act to examine the effects of compulsory licensing on domestic invention. Difference-in-differences analyses of nearly 130,000 chemical inventions suggest that compulsory licensing increased domestic invention by 20 percent. (JEL D45, L24, N42, O31, O34)

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Authors

Moser, Petra (Stanford U)
Voena, Alessandra (Harvard U)

JEL Classifications

D45: Rationing; Licensing
L24: Contracting Out; Joint Ventures; Technology Licensing
N42: Economic History: Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation: U.S.; Canada: 1913-
O31: Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
O34: Intellectual Property Rights


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