Social Preferences and Fairness Norms as Informal Institutions: Experimental Evidence
American Economic Review
vol. 101,
no. 3, May 2011
(pp. 509-13)
Abstract
We conduct a series of dictator games in which the status of the dictator relative to other players varies across treatments. Experiments are conducted in a conventional university lab and in villages in rural Kenya. We find that status is an important determinant of dictator game giving, but the relative importance of earned and unearned status differs across cultures.Citation
Jakiela, Pamela. 2011. "Social Preferences and Fairness Norms as Informal Institutions: Experimental Evidence." American Economic Review, 101 (3): 509-13. DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.3.509Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D63 Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
- O18 Economic Development: Regional, Urban, and Rural Analyses; Transportation
- Z13 Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification