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American Economic Review: Vol. 95 No. 4 (September 2005)

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Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting

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Snyder, James M. Jr., Michael M. Ting, and Stephen Ansolabehere. 2005. "Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting." American Economic Review, 95(4): 981-1004.

DOI: 10.1257/0002828054825538

Abstract

Organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting. We analyze this setting using a noncooperative bargaining game based on the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model. Unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory, we find that each voter's expected payoff is proportional to her voting weight. An exception occurs when many high-weight voters exist, as low-weight voters may expect disproportionately high payoffs due to proposal power. The model also predicts that, ex post, the coalition formateur (the party chosen to form a coalition) will receive a disproportionately high payoff. Using data from coalition governments from 1946 to 2001, we find strong evidence of such formateur effects.

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Authors

Snyder, James M. Jr.
Ting, Michael M.
Ansolabehere, Stephen


American Economic Review


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