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  3. American Economic Review
  4. June 2005
  5. Conglomerate Entrenchment under Optimal Financial Contracting

Conglomerate Entrenchment under Optimal Financial Contracting

  • Antoine Faure- Grimaud
  • Roman Inderst
American Economic Review
vol. 95, no. 3, June 2005
(pp. 850-861)
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Citation

Grimaud, Antoine Faure-, and Roman Inderst. 2005. "Conglomerate Entrenchment under Optimal Financial Contracting." American Economic Review, 95 (3): 850-861. DOI: 10.1257/0002828054201260

JEL Classification

  • G32 Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
  • G34 Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
  • L22 Firm Organization and Market Structure