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American Economic Review: Vol. 93 No. 3 (June 2003)

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Dynamic Speculative Attacks

Article Citation

Chamley, Christophe. 2003. "Dynamic Speculative Attacks ." American Economic Review, 93(3): 603-621.

DOI: 10.1257/000282803322157007

Abstract

This paper presents a model of rational Bayesian agents with speculative attacks in a regime of exchange rate which is pegged within a band. Speculators learn from the observation of the exchange rate within the band whether their mass is sufficiently large for a successful attack. Multiple periods are necessary for the existence of speculative attacks. Various defense policies are analyzed. A trading policy by the central bank may defend the peg if it is unobserved and diminishes the market's information for the coordination of speculators.

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Chamley, Christophe


American Economic Review


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