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THE VALUE OF U.S. PATENTS BY OWNER AND PATENT CHARACTERISTICS

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The Value of U.S. Patents by Owner and Patent Characteristics

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Abstract: This paper uses renewal data to estimate the value of U.S. patents, controlling for patent and owner characteristics. Estimates of U.S. patent value are substantially larger than estimates for European patents, however, the ratio of US patent value to R&D for firms is only about 3%. Patents issued to small patentees are much less valuable than those issued to large corporations, perhaps reflecting imperfect markets for technology. Litigated patents are more valuable, as are highly cited patents. However, patent citations explain little variance in value, suggesting limits to their use as a measure of patent quality.

Keywords: Technology, patents, innovation, patent value, markets for technology

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Patent value is an interesting economic quantity for several reasons: it informs policy because it is a measure of the reward that the patent system provides inventors; it aids accounting for the value of intangibles; it helps measure the productivity and quality of R&D.

This paper extends the research on patent value by estimating the renewal value of U.S. patents using a rich set of control variables including patent citation statistics, whether the patent was litigated or reissued, the type of patent assignee and technology, and, for a sub-sample of patents issued to publicly listed firms, details of the patent owner's financial and other characteristics, patent portfolio size, R&D, and industry. This extension allows quantitative assessment of the association between patent citations and patent value, more accurate estimation of the subsidy that patents provide to perform R&D, and better understanding of variation in patent value across different types of inventors.

This approach combines two strands of the literature. One strand uses data on patent renewal decisions to estimate the value of holding a patent.¹ The implicit value of a patent is revealed when its owner pays a renewal fee, implying that the patent is worth more than the fee required to keep it in force. Subject to some important assumptions, this approach has been used to obtain dollar estimates of patents. However, most of this research only looks at the aggregate value of patents. Schankerman (1998) and Lanjouw (1998) look at patent value by technology category and nationality of the patentee for French and German patents, respectively. But many other factors that might reasonably influence patent value have not been explored in this context.

The other strand of the literature looks at the relationship between patent value and a variety of patent characteristics with an eye to measuring patent quality, to developing quality-adjusted measures of inventive output and to estimating the contribution of intangibles to firm value. These studies look at correlations between patent characteristics and variables that should be correlated with patent value such as whether a patent is litigated or opposed (Harhoff et al. 2003b, Allison et al. 2004, Lanjouw and Schankerman 2004a, Marco 2005), survey measures of subjective value (Harhoff et al. 1999, 2003a), the number of countries in which the patentee files (Putnam 1996, Lanjouw and Schankerman 2004a), whether the patent is renewed (Harhoff et al. 2003b, Lanjouw and Schankerman 2004a), and firm market value (Hall et al. 2005). Based on such correlations, researchers infer, for example, that the number of citations made to a patent is associated with that patent's value. However, these studies recognize that the relationship between citations and patent value is "noisy" and they have not quantified the actual increase in value associated with an incremental citation received.

¹ See Lanjouw et al. 1998 for a review of this literature. Recent additions include Baudry and Dumont (2006), Gustafsson (2005) and Serrano (2006).

This paper integrates these two approaches. Because a rich set of data is available about U.S. patents, I can combine information about patent renewals with information about the owner and patent characteristics. I model patentees' decisions to renew as a kind of ordered probit—patent renewal fees increase sharply with the age of the patent, sorting the patents by value over time. Variables such as patent citations and firm characteristics can be included on the right hand side of the corresponding regression. The latent variable that represents the patentee's valuation is a linear combination of such characteristics and a stochastic error term. In effect, previous studies have only included a constant and an error term on the right hand side.

There are several advantages to including patent characteristics and owner characteristics in a renewal model of patent value. Using this model, I am able to obtain dollar estimates of the incremental effect of patent citations and other characteristics on patent value. I am also able to estimate how much of the total variance in log patent value is explained by such characteristics. I find, in general, that these characteristics are significantly correlated with patent value but they do not explain much of the overall variation. That is, as other researchers have concluded, these are rather noisy measures of value. Citation statistics may be more informative about the value of the underlying technology than they are about the value of the patent *per se*.

In addition, this approach allows me to measure separately other factors that influence patent value such as the type and firm size of the patentee or the size of the patentee's patent portfolio. I find substantial differences in patent value, for example, between small and large patentees. This has important implications for policy and for what it implies about the market for patent licenses.

This finer-grained information about patent owners also allows me to obtain more accurate estimates of the value that patents provide as incentives to perform R&D. Mark Schankerman (1998) argues that the ratio of patent value to the value of the associated R&D is an "equivalent subsidy rate"—under some assumptions, this ratio represents an upper bound on the subsidy that would be needed to elicit the same level of R&D in a world without patent protection. Several patent renewal studies have estimated this ratio either for the aggregate patents of a nation or by technology class, using highly aggregated data. Because I can closely match the value of patents to the value of R&D on a firm-by-firm basis, I am able to obtain more representative estimates of the equivalent subsidy rate.

Patent renewal data has been used previously to obtain estimates of the value of U.S. patents by Serrano (2006), who obtains preliminary estimates of the value of a subset of U.S. patents using patent renewal and re-assignment data, and by Barney (2002), who reports few details. Kimberly Moore

(2006) reports general features of U.S. patent renewal data.

The paper is organized as follows: the next section presents a model of patent renewal and discusses theoretical issues; Section 2 describes the data, and Section 3 presents results for patents issued in 1991 and for a panel of patents issued to public manufacturing firms from 1985-91. Section 4 compares my estimates with those obtained by other researchers, including estimates relative to R&D spending. Section 4 also discusses the significance of the low patent values for small patentees and Section 5 concludes.

1. Model of Patent Renewal and Value

1.1 Patent Value

Researchers have used measures of patent value for a variety of different purposes, including measuring inventive output, measuring the incentive effect of patents, and measuring the contribution of intangibles to firm value. Different uses can imply different definitions and different methods of measurement, so it is helpful to set out some initial distinctions (see Harhoff et al. 2003b for a different set of distinctions).

I aim to estimate the value of incremental rents that patents earn. Patents can provide their owners a degree of market power that conveys a stream of profits that exceeds the profits they could earn without patents. These profits can be realized either through the ability to exclude others from product markets, in which case product prices rise above the level without patents, or through the ability to exclude others in the markets for technology licensing or sale. This notion of patent value corresponds to the “reward” theory of patents—patent rents are the reward.

The value of patent rents, however, is distinct from the value of the underlying technology. This divergence occurs for two reasons. First, innovators also appropriate value from technology by non-patent means such as lead-time advantage and trade secrecy. The value of patent rents is incremental, that is, it is measured relative to an alternative value appropriated by these other means. In general, not all of the inventions nor all of the technical knowledge of a new technology is protected by a patent, so in general, the value of a technology exceeds the value of the associated patents.

Second, the value of patents is, to some extent, endogenous. Patentees can exert varying degrees of effort in the prosecution of patents and in their enforcement. This effort at patent “refinement” affects the strength of the patent rights and hence the value of the rents derived. For instance, patent applicants can invest more effort in drafting a patent by including more claims (to broaden the scope of

the claims and to make them more resistant to invalidation challenges) and more citations (to immunize the patent against possible prior art). Patent owners can strengthen patent claims by obtaining a re-issued patent. Innovators can also obtain more patents on a technology and related technologies. A larger number of patents may simply reflect that an owner is protecting more inventions with patents, or that owner may be “fencing” off the technology by patenting possible substitute technologies or building a patent “thicket.” Below I find evidence that patentees do increase aggregate patent value through such measures.

This endogeneity means that variation in the value of technologies does not necessarily correspond closely to the variation in patent rents. A firm with highly valuable technology may obtain relatively *more* patents on that technology, so that the average value of rents *per patent* does not entirely reflect the value of the technology. This means that patent value, in the sense used in this paper, does not serve well as a measure of “inventive output.” It will, in general, be less than the value of the underlying technology, although these two measures are likely correlated.

1.2 Patent Renewal

The model I use is a simple variant of the model initially developed by Pakes and Schankerman (1984). Patentees derive rents from their patents only so long as those patents remain in force. If the expected stream of rents is not larger than the fees required to keep the patent in force, patent owners will let the patent expire. This means that patent renewal and expiration decisions implicitly reflect the value of the associated rents. Let $r_i(t)$ be the annual flow of rents for the i th patent at time t .

Following the literature, I assume that this profit flow depreciates at a constant rate, d , so that $r_i(t) = r_i(0) \cdot e^{-dt}$. A patent might depreciate because of technological obsolescence (the underlying invention becomes less valuable) or because competitors are able to “invent around” the patent.

Although constant depreciation is a common assumption, there are several reasons why the actual depreciation pattern might deviate from it. First, there is some evidence of a “learning” effect where patent value actually increases during the first few years after the patent issues. Pakes (1986) and Lanjouw (1998) find evidence of this, however, they also find that this effect is largely complete by the end of the fourth year after issue. Since my first observation occurs at the end of the fourth year, this effect means that my estimates may have a small upward bias. Another deviation may occur because of economic shocks that occur during a given renewal year. For instance, Schankerman (1998) finds evidence of oil shocks in French patent renewal data. To control for such shocks, I run one set of

regressions over panel data with dummies for different cohorts. Finally, some groups of patentees, such as foreign patentees, might experience a different time pattern of depreciation. I discuss this below.

Profit flow may also be a function of observable characteristics of the patent or of the patent's owner. Let X_i be a vector of such characteristics such that

$$(1) \quad \ln r_i(0) = \beta \cdot X_i + \epsilon_i,$$

where ϵ is a normally distributed stochastic error with zero mean and standard deviation σ such that

$\ln r_i(0) \sim N(\beta \cdot X_i, \sigma)$. In most of the renewal literature, X_i is treated as a simple constant.² In this case, three parameters are estimated, d , σ , and the constant mean, and these are sufficient to determine the median and mean values of patents. However, my data permit X_i to also include characteristics of the patents, such as citations received, and characteristics of the owner. Then estimates permit calculation of the direct dollar value effect of citations and these other characteristics.

The assumption of a lognormal distribution is also common, but not uncontroversial. Researchers find that a lognormal generally fits the distribution of invention values well (Harhoff et al. 2003a) and patent renewal data are consistent with a lognormal distribution as well (Pakes and Schankerman 1984). However, much of the total value of patents derives from the upper tail of the distribution. Since the most valuable patents are renewed to full term, their value is not directly registered in the patent expiration data. This means that estimates of mean patent value based on patent renewal data are extrapolations, although estimates of *median* value are typically not. In a related paper (Bessen 2006) I check these estimates of patent renewal value by estimating the contribution of patent rents to the market value of public firms.

1.3 Estimation

The observations in the data set concern patentees' decisions whether to pay renewal fees to keep their patents in force for additional time periods. Patents applied for on or after December 11, 1980, accrue fees after 3.5, 7.5 and 11.5 years in order to remain in force beyond 4 years, 8 years and 12 years, respectively. The fee schedules vary over time and they also depend on whether the assignee has "small entity" status—small firms, individuals and non-profit organizations pay fees that are only half of those paid by "large entities."

As in Europe, the fees increase with the age of the patent, that is, 12th year fees are much larger than 4th year fees. This is important because it means that the patentees' optimal renewal decision rule

² Putnam (1996) and Harhoff et al. (2003b) use a multivariate approach in slightly different contexts.

need only consider the current renewal period. That is, it is straightforward to show that if a patentee finds it unprofitable to renew at year 4, it will be even more unprofitable to renew at years 8 and 12, so an optimal rule will be to renew if and only if it is profitable to renew for the next immediate period. Specifically, if the payment of the fee keeps the patent in force for T more years at time t , then the patentee will renew the i th patent if and only if the present value of profits during those T years exceeds the renewal fee, c_{it} .

The present value of profits from t to $t+T$, is

$$(2) \quad \int_t^{t+T} r_i(\tau) e^{-s\tau} d\tau = r_i(0) z_t, \quad \text{where} \quad z_t = e^{-dt} \frac{1 - e^{-(d+s)T}}{d+s},$$

and s is the discount rate. I follow the literature and use a discount rate of 10% per annum. Then the decision rule is to renew if and only if

$$(3) \quad \ln r_i(0) \geq \ln \frac{c_{it}}{z_t}.$$

Given the lognormal distribution and substituting (1) into (3), the probabilities that a patent will expire at each given year are

$$(4) \quad \begin{aligned} P[\text{patent } i \text{ expires at 4}] &= \Phi\left(\frac{\ln c_{i4}/z_4 - \beta \cdot X_i}{\sigma}\right) \\ P[\text{patent } i \text{ expires at 8}] &= \left[1 - \Phi\left(\frac{\ln c_{i4}/z_4 - \beta \cdot X_i}{\sigma}\right)\right] \Phi\left(\frac{\ln c_{i8}/z_8 - \beta \cdot X_i}{\sigma}\right) \\ P[\text{patent } i \text{ expires at 12}] &= \left[1 - \Phi\left(\frac{\ln c_{i8}/z_8 - \beta \cdot X_i}{\sigma}\right)\right] \Phi\left(\frac{\ln c_{i12}/z_{12} - \beta \cdot X_i}{\sigma}\right) \\ P[\text{patent } i \text{ expires at 17}] &= 1 - \Phi\left(\frac{\ln c_{i12}/z_{12} - \beta \cdot X_i}{\sigma}\right) \end{aligned}$$

where Φ is the cumulative standard normal distribution function. This structure is, in fact, the same as that of an ordered probit, with the additional estimation of d (z is a function of d ; also, σ here provides more than just a scaling constant). I estimate this model by maximizing the likelihood function implied by (4). That is, each patent's contribution to the log likelihood function is the log of the right hand side given in (4) corresponding to that patent's expiration date.

1.4 Calculating Patent Value

To estimate the net present value of patents, I perform a Monte Carlo simulation using the actual data. With estimates of the parameters, $\hat{\beta}$, $\hat{\sigma}$, and \hat{d} , in hand, I first determine bounds on ε_i for the i th observation conditional on observed renewal decisions made for that patent. For example, if the i th patent was allowed to expire after eight years, then

$$(5) \quad \ln \frac{c_{i4}}{z_4(\hat{d})} - \hat{\beta} \cdot X_i \leq \epsilon_i \leq \ln \frac{c_{i8}}{z_8(\hat{d})} - \hat{\beta} \cdot X_i$$

For each observation in each Monte Carlo iteration, I select ϵ_i as a random draw from the lognormal distribution determined by $\hat{\beta}$ and $\hat{\sigma}$, conditional on (5) (or the corresponding bounds for patents with different expiration dates). Given this random draw, I calculate the corresponding $\ln r_i(0)$, and, from this, the present value of the patent at the time of issuance net of the discounted value of renewal fees that will be paid. I repeat the Monte Carlo iterations a sufficient number of times so that the total number of observations exceeds 500,000.

2. Data

2.1 Samples

This study uses two datasets. The first consists of almost all U.S. utility patents issued in 1991 (patents assigned to governments and foreign individuals are excluded). The second is a panel of patents issued from 1985 through 1991 and assigned to publicly listed, R&D-performing firms whose primary line of business is in a manufacturing industry.

I used 1991 as the terminal year because this is the last year for which the final patent renewal decision could be observed (in 2003) when this research began.³ Patents applied for before December 11, 1980 are exempt from renewal fees. Because of this 1985 was the earliest year with few such exempt patents.

I obtained patent expiration data from the website of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).⁴ This data also included the patent's "entity" status at the time each fee was paid. The PTO designates individuals, small businesses and non-profit organizations as "small" entities. For most patents, the renewal fees for small entities were half those for large entities. In addition, the fee schedule was changed regularly and the fee for any given patent also depended on its issue date and, in some cases, on its application date.⁵ Some patents were reissued—a procedure where the patent owner can modify patent claims. I tracked reissues through to their final expiration as well. A small number of patents are reported as having missed a payment, but have petitioned to have the patent reinstated. I

³ Patentees who miss the deadline for paying the fees are given a grace period during which they can pay with a penalty. They can also appeal expirations arising from missed payments.

⁴ <https://ramps.uspto.gov/eram/patentMaintFees.do>

⁵ I obtained the details of the fee schedule over time from the Federal Register and Public Laws. This information is available from the author.

record these as if the last reported payment had been made.

Of the 96,513 patents issued in 1991, I obtained patent expiration information on 94,343. I excluded 1,962 patents issued to governments or foreign individuals. Also, 33 patents were applied for before December 11, 1980 and were thus exempt from renewal fees. This left 175 patents that I could not find in the PTO's database.

In addition to this data for 1991, I assembled a panel of firm data to explore additional variables and to explore the regressions over time. To this end, I assembled a panel of patents owned by publicly listed manufacturing firms from 1985 through 1991. I drew this panel dataset from a larger sample developed for another project (Bessen and Meurer 2005) that matched patent data to firms in the Compustat dataset of firm financial information. The USPTO provides an assignee name for every assigned patent after 1969. To match the USPTO assignee name to the Compustat firm name, we began with the match file provided by the NBER (Hall et al. 2001). To this we added matches on subsidiaries developed by Bessen and Hunt (2004), we manually matched names for large patenters and R&D-performers, and we matched a large number of additional firms using a name-matching program. In addition, using data on mergers and acquisitions from SDC, we tracked patent assignees to their acquiring firms. Since a public firm may be acquired, yet still receive patents as a subsidiary of its acquirer, we matched patents assigned to an acquired entity in a given year to the firm that owned that entity in that year.⁶ The matched group of firms accounts for 96% of the R&D performed by all U.S. Compustat firms, 77% of all R&D-reporting firms listed in Compustat and 62% of all patents issued to domestic non-governmental organizations during the sample period. Sample statistics show that this sample is broadly representative of the entire Compustat sample, although it is slightly weighted toward larger and incumbent firms.

From this larger sample, I selected a panel of firms from 1985 through 1991 that had a primary line of business in a manufacturing industry, that performed R&D, and that had at least four years of non-missing data in key variables. The left me with a sample of 107,364 patents issued during this time period to 1,066 firms.

⁶ This dynamic matching process is different from that used in the original NBER data set which statically matched a patent assignee to a Compustat firm. These data were developed with the help of Megan MacGarvie, to whom I am indebted.

3 Regression Results

3.1 Patent Value by Groups

Table 1 shows summary expiration and renewal data by major groups for the 1991 sample. Overall, only 41.52% of patents were renewed to full term, with roughly equal groups dropping out at each renewal stage. The mean renewal fees were not large, however, increasing from \$814 after four years, to \$1,562 after eight years, to a final mean payment of \$2,327. About 29% of the patents were issued to patentees who were “small entities” at year four. In most cases, these patentees pay fees that are half as large as those paid by large entities.

Among assignee types, patents that were unassigned at issue or issued to individuals had the lowest rate of renewal to term, 22%, while publicly listed U.S. firms had the highest rate, 50%. Relatively few publicly listed U.S. firms and foreign organizations rated as small entities. Similarly, patents awarded to small entities in general were much more likely to expire despite lower fees—only 25% were renewed to full term compared to 48% for patents held by large entities.

Table 1 also shows these variables for six technology categories defined by Hall et al. (2001), based on each patent’s primary technology class as assigned by the PTO. Computer and communications patents had the highest rate of renewal to full term, while “other” technologies had the lowest rate. Drug and medical patents had the highest proportion of small entity patents, many of these from inventors making medical devices.

Table 2, column 1, shows a basic regression for all U.S. patentees (excluding patents assigned to foreigners and governments). Because fees differ sharply depending on the patentee’s entity status and because there may also be important differences between large and small entities, I control for small entity status in all regressions. Of course, entity status can change over time. Small firms grow and, more frequently, valuable patents owned by small patentees are acquired by large firms. These regressions include a dummy variable if the patentee was a small entity in year four, and dummies if the entity status changed (up or down) from year four to year twelve. I also estimate σ and the depreciation rate and I report median and mean net present values for these patents calculated using the Monte Carlo technique described above.

The estimates for σ (1.86) and the depreciation rate (14%) are broadly similar to the corresponding parameters found in studies of European patents. However, the means are quite different, generating much higher patent values. I estimate a mean value for patents granted to US patentees of \$78,168 and a median value of \$7,175, also in 1992 U.S. dollars. In Section 4, below, I

compare these estimates to those obtained by other researchers.

The coefficients on the entity size dummy variables suggest that patents owned by small entities are dramatically less valuable than patents owned by large entities. This is confirmed by separate regressions in columns 2 and 3 for patentees who were small and large entities in year four, respectively, although the difference in the means is not as great as the fivefold difference in the median values or the implied profit flows. Also, the small number of patents that were owned in year four by a small entity but owned by a large entity in year 12 were substantially *more* valuable than most other patents.⁷ This suggests a selection effect: the most valuable patents owned by small entities are acquired by large entities.

A similar selection effect may explain part of the reason small entity patents in year four are less valuable than large entity patents—some patents initially issued to small entities are acquired by large entities by year four. I do not have data on the initial status of each patent. However, the aggregate numbers on small entity patents suggest that this selection effect is not large because relatively few patents are transferred during this interval. At issuance, 30.17% of 1991 patents were owned by small entities while 29.33% were at year four.⁸ Assuming, say, that patents transferred to large entities have a log profit flow that is 3.93 larger (Column 2), then counting the patents that transferred would mean that the log profit flow of small entity patents was only 1.81 less than the log profit flow of large entities at issuance.

In simpler words, patents owned by individuals, small companies and non-profit organizations have much lower values than those owned by large companies even after taking into account a selection effect. This is important because it is sometimes argued that patents are particularly valuable to small patentees, since large firms may have more alternatives to patent protection, such as complementary products or services. These results suggest, instead, that patents do a relatively poorer job of earning returns for small inventors compared to large firms.

I explore this further in Table 3, which looks at regressions by assignee type. Individual assignees, including patents that were not assigned at issue (and therefore owned by the individual inventors by default), have the lowest patent values, \$25,598 in the mean. Patent values from organizational inventors (mostly firms) are larger, as seen in columns 2 and 3. Interestingly, the distribution for non-public organizations appears to be more highly skewed than the distribution for

⁷ Among the 24,015 patents owned by small U.S. entities in year four, 1,309 were owned by large entities in year twelve.

⁸ The latter number comes from Table 1. The former is derived from data on 1991 issuance fees in Lehman (1993). Large entity issuance fees for utility patents collected were \$67,122 and small entity issuance fees, at half the rate, were \$29,004 (in thousands). $29004/(29004 + 67122/2) = .3017$.

public firms, generating a higher mean value despite a lower median value. But the lower values of patents owned by small entities is not just a matter of individual inventors—similar relative values are found across all types of assignees. In Section 4.3 below, I discuss the significance of this apparently robust effect.

Finally, foreign organizations, which were not included in the previous regressions, appear to earn nearly \$3 million per patent (see column 4). Previous estimates based on renewal data have also reported exceptionally high patent value for Japanese patents and a majority of the foreign patents in this sample are from Japanese inventors.⁹ However, there may be a good reason why these estimates may not be reliable. The model assumes a constant rate of depreciation for the profit flow from a patent. It may well be that this assumption does not hold for foreign patenters. For example, foreign patenters may apply for a patent long before they are ready to market the invention in the United States. U.S. priority rules require that a U.S. patent be filed within a year after the invention is used or publicly disclosed, but typically a firm markets an invention first to its domestic market, only later rolling out sales and production to foreign markets. In this case, the pattern of profit flow for foreign patentees may diverge substantially from one with constant depreciation. There is some evidence that the estimate is off in this regard: the estimated depreciation rate in column 4 is nearly twice that of the other regressions. To control for this possibility, I repeat the same regression in column 5, but hold the depreciation rate constant at 15% per annum. With this change, the estimated mean net present value is \$107,906, just modestly larger than the mean present value estimate for U.S. public firms.

Table 4 reports the results of separate regressions for different technology classes, similar to estimates for French technology classes by Schankerman (1998) and estimates for German technology classes by Lanjouw (1998). The technology categories I use were developed by Hall et al. (2001) and are based on the USPTO patent classification system. Contrary to the European studies, I find the highest mean patent values in chemicals and pharmaceuticals and the lowest values in computers, communications and “other.” Schankerman finds that pharmaceuticals and chemicals have the lowest mean values and he attributes this to price regulation for pharmaceuticals in France. Lanjouw finds a middling value for pharmaceutical patents. Note also that although computers and communications patents have the second lowest mean value, they also have the second highest *median* value. This suggests that perhaps the mean values are low because there are just fewer “blockbuster” patents in this technology.

⁹ I also ran regressions by nationality, however, after Japan the numbers were too small to obtain reliable results.

3.2 Patent Value and Patent Characteristics

As noted in the introduction, many researchers have related patent characteristics to patent value. My model permits some of these associations to be quantified. Table 5 includes patent characteristics in the regression. Column 1 shows characteristics that depend on choices made by the patentee. A patentee, aware that some patents are more valuable than others, may take efforts to make sure that the patent is more successfully enforced. These efforts at patent “refinement” include litigating, making more citations and claims in the patent application, and, possibly, re-issuing the patent. A re-issuance procedure permits a patentee to modify claim language, in some cases increasing the scope of the claim.

Each of these actions has a positive and statistically significant coefficient, suggesting that patent value is, to some extent, endogenous. Previous literature has also found positive and significant relationships between patent claims and patent value as reported by survey respondents and between patent citations made and reported value (Harhoff et al. 2003a). Using the coefficients in the Table, I can quantify all of these relationships. The last column of the table reports the percentage increase in profit flow associated with an incremental increase in the variable (e.g., one additional citation). A litigated patent is, all else equal, nearly six times more valuable. At the mean, a litigated patent is worth nearly half a million dollars. This corresponds well with what we know about litigation costs for plaintiffs, since patentees should only litigate those patents that are more valuable than litigation costs. In 1994, according to a survey of intellectual property lawyers (AIPLA 1994), the median cost of a patent lawsuit was \$190,000 through the discovery phase (after which many suits are settled) and \$301,000 through trial (costs have escalated substantially since then). A re-issued patent, all else equal, is nearly three times as valuable as other patents. Each additional citation made increases value about 1% and each claim increases value about 2%.

In column 2, I break out citations made to an assignee’s own patents (self citations) from those made to others’ patents and I add patent citations received. It appears most of the value realized through citations made occurs from citations made to the patentee’s own patents. This may be an indicator of “fencing” or “thicket building” behavior (Hall et al. 2005) where patentees strengthen their patents by also patenting related technologies or alternative technologies. Each self-cite increases patent value about 3%.

Since Trajtenberg (1990), researchers have used the number of citations that a patent receives as an indicator of patent or invention value. Previous research has found correlations between patent

citations received and patent value reported in surveys (Harhoff et al. 2003) and between patent citations received and firm market value (Hall et al. 2005). My coefficient on citations received is significantly associated with patent value and this statistic does seem to have greater statistical significance than the coefficients on citations made and claims. The economic significance of an additional citation received is also greater—an additional citation increases estimated profit flow by about 5% in this specification.

Column 3 drops the litigation and reissue dummies and adds statistics (calculated in the NBER database) for generality and originality. Generality and originality are measures suggested by Trajtenberg et al. (1997) that range from zero to one and capture the technological diversity of citing and cited patents, respectively. If the patents that cite the subject patent come from a large (small) number of technology classes, then generality will be high (low). If patent citations correspond to *use* of the technology in the cited patent, then high generality suggests that the cited invention is a general purpose technology with many applications. Correspondingly, if a patent cites other patents from a large (small) number of technology classes, then it will have a high (low) originality index. Both of these measures have statistically significant coefficients, with a positive coefficient for generality and a negative one for originality.

Column 4 explores non-linearity in the effect of citations received by adding the square of this variable. The negative and significant coefficient on the squared term suggests diminishing returns to this effect. At the sample median (four citations received), an additional patent citation received increases profit flow by about 7% under this specification.

These results confirm general findings about the correlation between citation statistics and patent value in the literature. But my results also suggest that these associations have relatively small economic significance. At the sample mean, for example, an additional patent citation received corresponds to an increase in patent value of between three and five thousand dollars. This is substantially less than the effect suggested by some other research. For instance, Hall et al. (2005) estimate the relationship between firm market value and patent citations. Their results imply that at the sample mean, an additional citation received on a single patent corresponds to an increase in firm value of about \$327,000 (\$512,000 at the sample median).¹⁰ This large difference likely just means that we are measuring different things. Hall et al. measure the relationship between a patent citation and the

¹⁰ They report that an increase of one citation/patent for all the patents a firm owns increases firm market value by 2.7% at the mean. Mean market value is \$916.33m and mean patent stock is 75.72, yielding an increase of \$327,000 in market value with one citation on one patent.

value of the technology to the firm generally; I measure specifically the effect of a patent citation on the value of the rents generated by a patent *per se*. As noted above, the value of the technology may be much greater than the value of the patent.

In addition, my estimates can be used to evaluate the portion of total variance in patent rents that can be “explained” by citation statistics. Given a vector of citation statistics, \bar{X} which are a subset of the right hand variables, X , and given coefficients on these citation statistics of $\bar{\beta}$, the portion of variance accounted for by these statistics is

$$\frac{\text{var}(\bar{\beta} \cdot \bar{X})}{\text{var}(\hat{\beta} \cdot X) + \hat{\sigma}^2}.$$

I calculated this quantity for the various specifications in Table 5 for all of the citation statistics and just for citations received. In no case did the portion of variance explained exceed five percent. In other words, as other researchers have also concluded, patent citation statistics are correlated with patent value, but they are very “noisy signals.” This analysis indicates just how noisy they are.

Another way of looking at this is to examine just the most highly cited patents. Of the top 10 percent of patents ranked by citations received in 1991 (with 15 or more citations), 37% were not renewed to term. Among the top 5 percent (with 21 or more citations), 32% were not renewed to term. Thus even among the most highly cited patents, many are not even worth the full set of renewal fees, after accounting for depreciation.

This analysis emphasizes not only that patent citations are “noisy,” but also that care must be taken in interpreting the meaning of correlations involving citation statistics. Patent citations may be a good (but noisy) indicator of technology value, but they appear to be only weakly related to patent value. For this reason, they are not meaningful as a measure of patent “quality.”

3.3 Estimates for Public Manufacturing Firms

Table 6 reports regressions for the panel of patents granted to public firms from 1985 through 1991. It is important to check estimates over a range of cohorts, to make sure that temporary disequilibria do not affect the estimates. Column 1 shows a simple regression, comparable to those used in the 1991 sample. The coefficients and the value estimates are quite similar to those obtained for large entities in 1991 in Table 2 and for publicly listed firms in 1991 in Table 3. This provides some assurance that temporary effects do not appear to exert much effect on the estimates.

It is also possible that patent values may have changed over time. To test this, I ran the regression

in Column 1 with dummy variables for each grant year and then again with dummies for each application year. These dummy coefficients are shown in Figure 1 (normalized to equal 1 in 1985). These suggest that patent value increased modestly during the mid-1980s and then leveled off. This is consistent with the notion that the creation of a centralized appeals court for patents in 1982 (the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) may have “strengthened” patents, thus increasing their value. This is also roughly contemporaneous with the well-known acceleration in patenting rates, which has been a subject of several studies (Kortum and Lerner 1999, Hall and Ziedonis 2001, Henry and Turner 2005, Sanyal 2005). Unfortunately, estimates of patent value for years before 1983 are unreliable because of sample size and data quality problems.

The remaining columns of Table 6 explore firm characteristics. In Column 2, patent value increases with firm R&D spending. This is consistent with the view that more valuable patents are correlated with more valuable technology. However, the larger the patent stock of the firm, all else equal, the *smaller* the mean patent value. This suggests that there are diminishing returns to patenting—patent values decrease as more patents are obtained, all else equal. Column 2 also includes a dummy variable for “new” firms, that is, firms that have been publicly listed for fewer than 5 years. It is sometimes argued that patents are particularly valuable to new firms, helping them secure financing. This regression does not support that view, finding significantly smaller patent value for new firms.

Column 3 reports industry dummies. Computer and electronics industries have the largest patent value, and “other” (the omitted category) has the lowest.

4 Analysis

4.1 Comparisons to other estimates

Table 7 compares my estimates to those obtained by other researchers for both US and European patents. Based on the above analysis, we should expect substantial differences depending on the particular population of patents being compared. Barney (2002) uses the 1986 cohort of patents granted and obtains slightly smaller estimates. Serrano (2005) estimates of patent value using both renewal and re-assignment data for a group of U.S. organizations that do not patent heavily. In 1992 dollars he obtains a mean value of \$48,000 and a median value of \$17,000. These are smaller, but Serrano’s sample is likely weighted more toward small firms, who, as we have seen, have patents with smaller values.

Putnam (1996) uses a sample of patents that were also filed in one or more other countries. Using

data on international filings (in a model similar to the renewal model), he estimates that patents that were successfully filed in the US in 1974 that were also filed abroad were worth \$188,000 in 1992 dollars. In general, patents that are filed in multiple countries tend to be much more valuable than patents that are not, so it is not surprising that Putnam's mean estimate is substantially higher than the others. Using Putnam's data it is possible to impute the mean value of all US patents, including those that were only filed domestically. This figure is about \$79,000.¹¹ Thus all of these estimates of US mean patent value are roughly consistent.

The estimated value of European patents is also substantially smaller than the US estimates. Converted to 1992 U.S. dollars, the mean values range from about \$2,000 to \$32,000, with an average of about \$16,000. However, it is not surprising that these values are so much larger because the U.S. market is much larger than any of the national European markets. On the other hand, the US estimates are significantly smaller than survey-based estimates of the value of European patents (Harhoff et al., 2003a, Gambardella et al. 2005). However, this may simply reflect that survey respondents may be estimating the value of the technology rather than the value of the patent *per se*.¹²

One concern about estimates of patent value based on renewal data is that patentee renewal decisions do not directly reveal the values of the most valuable patents. All of the most valuable patents in the upper tail of the distribution are renewed to full term. This means that although estimates of median value are based on an observed distribution, estimates of mean patent value are based on an extrapolation, assuming that the distribution observed among expiring patents (in my case, a log normal distribution) is the same distribution among the most highly valued patents. This means that if the true distribution is not log normal, these estimates may be off.

In a separate paper (Bessen 2006), I address the valuation of the upper tail by reviewing estimates of patent value obtained from analysis of firm market value. This analysis suggests that the estimates based on renewal data do not substantially understate patent value for these firms.

11 Putnam (1996) reports that in 1974, 36% of US patents were also filed in another country (Table 3.3). Patents granted in the US that were also filed abroad were worth \$188,000 in 1992 dollars. Putnam also estimates that in aggregate, domestic patents (estimated for Germany) add about 5% to the aggregate value of all international patents held in a country (p. 129). Worldwide rights associated with each US international patent was \$609,600 in 1974. Then the mean value of all patents should be $(\$188,355 + .05*\$609,600)*\text{no. of int'l patents}/\text{total no. of patents} = (\$188,355 + .05*\$609,600)*.36 = \$78,800$. Alternatively, if the domestic-only patents are assumed to be worth \$20,000, then the mean patent value is about \$80,000.

12 Survey questions ask inventors at what value the patent's owner would be willing to part with the patent. However, it may be hard for respondents to mentally separate parting with the patent from parting with the technology, since firms may be unlikely to sell a patent without also selling the technical know how, etc. and since firms may abandon production and sale of the technology themselves when they sell the patent rights.

4.2 Estimates of the Patent Subsidy

Patent rents represent the “reward” that patents afford inventors. Mark Schankerman (1998) suggests that this reward can be considered as equivalent to an R&D subsidy. He asks what subsidy would be needed in order to induce firms to make the same investment in R&D as they are induced to make by patents. He suggests that the ratio of a patentee’s aggregate patent value (= patent rents) divided by the associated R&D expenditure can be considered an upper bound estimate of this “equivalent subsidy rate.”¹³

Several of the studies cited in Table 7 have used those estimates of patent value to calculate equivalent subsidy rates (Pakes 1986, Pakes and Schankerman 1986, Lanjouw 1998, Schankerman 1998). To obtain equivalent subsidy rates, the value per patent listed in Table 7 can be multiplied by the ratio of successful patent applications to dollars of R&D. These studies obtain estimates for patent cohorts from the 1970s that range from 4% to 35% (see Addendum to Table 8), averaging about 18%.

However, these ratios were calculated using aggregate national data (aggregate patent counts and aggregate R&D) pro-rated to the country where the patent was granted (e.g., R&D performed in the US, Germany, etc. is allocated to French patents). Unfortunately, estimates derived from aggregate data may not accurately represent the subsidy that a modern firm can expect to get on its R&D investment. In particular, the ratios of patent grants per R&D dollar used in these studies are quite high (also shown in the addendum to Table 8). For example, Schankerman’s (1998) figures for patents per million dollars R&D (\$92) range from 6 to 12.¹⁴ However, averages for actual patenting rates for Compustat firms are below 0.5, an order of magnitude smaller!¹⁵ There are several reasons why estimates based on aggregate data may be misleading. First, the numerator in these estimates includes patents assigned to individuals and small inventors who are not included in the R&D data.¹⁶ Moreover, these estimates use rather old R&D statistics (mostly from the 1970s) that tend to under-report R&D because accounting regulations did not require reporting and because R&D tax credits did not provide incentives for

13 Schankerman (1998) and Lanjouw (1998) point out that this may be an upper bound estimate for several reasons. There may be diminishing returns to R&D. A cash subsidy may be relatively more valuable to risk averse investors, so they might require a smaller equivalent subsidy. Also, this analysis does not take into account strategic interaction; to the extent each firm’s patents reduce the rents that other firms earn, the subsidy needed in a world without patents would also be less.

14 See Table 6. Mark Schankerman has confirmed in private communication (11/28/2004) that the patents to R&D ratio reported in his table should be 10 times larger than the printed figures.

15 For firms with over \$1 million in R&D spending in 1991, the simple ratio of successful patent applications to deflated R&D has a median of .14, and mean of .40 and a top percentile at 6.0.

16 In the US, for example, individual inventors are not included in NSF surveys and small private companies without separate R&D labs are unlikely to be surveyed, especially in the older surveys used in these studies.

separate reporting.¹⁷ Finally, these studies use *ad hoc* methods to pro-rate R&D spending across countries. Given the limitations of the data, these methods are useful for getting rough estimates that correspond roughly to something like the subsidy provided by *worldwide* patents (not just the patents of the subject country), but the exact nature of what is measured is a bit unclear and the assumptions behind the apportionment methods used are not discussed.

Firm level data permit a more representative calculation that compares the value of the patents a firm obtains in the US to the level of that firm's R&D. Table 8 shows a variety of estimates calculated at different levels of aggregation. The first two rows display aggregate data for all U.S. patentees, using the estimated value per patent from Table 2, Column 1. The aggregate value of patents granted in 1991 to U.S. patentees was about \$4.4 billion in 1992 dollars. I calculated the corresponding R&D investment using data from the National Science Foundation (NSF) survey of U.S. firms. Since the patents granted in 1991 were applied for over many years, Column 4 displays a weighted sum of real R&D spending where the weights are allocated based on the proportion of 1991 patents applied for in each year R&D was performed. Column 6 displays the equivalent subsidy rate. The first row shows the calculation using all industrial R&D, the second row shows the rate using just company-funded R&D. These estimates are within the range of some of the estimates based on European data, but at the bottom of that range.

The remaining rows reports estimates using data on firm R&D spending for publicly listed firms in the Compustat database. These estimates are conditional on firms' choosing to patent (about 15% of R&D is performed by firms that do not patent). The third row reports the calculation for all publicly listed firms matched to patent data in 1991. The R&D figure in Column 4 is a weighted sum of each firm's R&D expenditure for the application year for each patent granted in 1991, the weights apportioning each year's R&D equally across all patents for that year. The patent value comes from Table 3. Even though the value per patent is higher, the estimate of the equivalent subsidy rate is much smaller, 2.9%. The main reason for this is that the ratio of patents to R&D is much lower (see Column 5) because so much more of *measured* R&D is performed by public firms. The fourth row repeats this calculation using the sample of patents from publicly listed manufacturing firms for 1985 – 91, using the mean patent value estimates from Table 6, Columns 1. This estimate of the equivalent subsidy rate is also 2.9%.

Thus firm level data suggests that the equivalent subsidy provided by US patents to public US

¹⁷ U.S. accounting regulations for R&D were introduced in 1974. R&D tax credits were introduced in the U.S. in 1981, in France in 1983 (see Hall and van Reenen 2000, Mansfield 1993).

firms is about 3%. Note that this is the subsidy provided *only* by firms' US patents—they will earn additional subsidies from patents obtained on the same inventions in other countries. Thumbnail calculations (see fn. 11) suggest that the total subsidy provided by worldwide patents may be two or three times larger, somewhat more consistent with the concept measured in the studies by Lanjouw, Pakes and Schankerman.

Arora et al. (2003) also estimate an equivalent subsidy ratio using a structural model incorporating survey data and firm-level R&D data. Their estimate of 17% also represents the return on worldwide patent rights, so it, too, is not directly comparable.

4.3 Small Patentees and the Market for Patents

One surprisingly persistent result is that small patentees—individuals, non-profits and firms with fewer than 500 employees—have patent values that are far smaller on average than the values of patents owned by large firms. In the 1991 sample, the median of large firm patent values was about five times larger; in the panel of manufacturing firms, large firm patent values were nearly three times as large. Moreover, these differences persist across technologies, industries, and assignee types. Arora et al. (2003) also find a large disparity between large and small US firms. Gustafsson (2005) finds a large disparity in patent value between individual and firm patents in Finland. On the other hand, Gambardella et al. (2005) find that individuals and small firms claim higher patent values than large firms in a survey. This, however, may reflect greater optimism on the part of smaller inventors rather than greater actual value.

This finding of sharply lower value for small inventors contradicts a popular view that small patentees have particularly valuable patents. It also contradicts the conclusion of Allison et al. (2004), who argue that since patents need to be valuable in order to be litigated, and since small entity patents are more likely to be litigated, then small entity patents must be more valuable. I find that litigation *is* correlated with patent value, but that small entities still have patents with sharply lower values on average.¹⁸

There are at least three possible explanations for lower value realized by small inventors:

¹⁸ If small size is correlated with litigation and if litigation is correlated with value, it does not logically follow that small size is necessarily correlated with value. The probability of litigation is determined by more than just the value of the patents involved. In a more complete model, large firms obtain more patents, but their probability of disputes with other firms does not go up proportionately, so their rate of litigation per patent is smaller (Bessen and Meurer 2005). Then large firms may have both lower litigation rates per patent and greater value per patent. Note that the substantially higher rate of litigation per patent for small entities also suggests that the value disparity cannot be explained by lower litigation costs for large firms.

1. Small inventors may have greater costs of monitoring and enforcement as Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004b) argue. They may be less able to settle disputes and litigation may be relatively more expensive. Of course, lawyers on contingency and patent litigation firms such as REFAC may alleviate some of this disadvantage, but perhaps small firms still face greater post-issue costs.

However, this does not seem to be an adequate explanation for the lower mean costs of small entity patents for the following reason: faced with larger post-issue costs, small inventors will rationally only patent relatively more profitable inventions. Given a lognormal distribution of patent values, greater post-issue costs should actually *increase* the observed mean patent value even after taking those costs into account.¹⁹ Moreover, a well-functioning market for technology should allow small inventors to sell their patents to firms who have more efficient monitoring and enforcement.

2. Small inventors may patent inventions that are inherently less valuable to society. Individuals may be motivated to patent for non-pecuniary reasons, such as vanity. Macleod et al. (2003) find that British inventors in the 19th century often patented inventions that did not or could not work (e.g., perpetual motion machines), suggesting non-pecuniary motivation. Also, individual inventors may be manipulated by unscrupulous patent agents or they may be risk-loving. And the serendipity of discovery may lead them to make less valuable inventions—e.g., individuals may be more familiar with pets than with petroleum cracking, and pet-related patents may be inherently less valuable.

However, these factors can only explain a portion of the discrepancy. The gap between large and small patentee's values holds for private corporations, public corporations and for all technology classes. Indeed, specialized chemical engineering firms have held some of the important patents on petroleum cracking. Moreover, there are other reasons to expect *a priori* that small patentees should have *more* valuable patents on average rather than less valuable ones. Arora and Merges (2004) argue that stronger “property rights unleash the high-powered incentives of arm's-length contracting.” With well-functioning technology markets, small patentees should have greater incentives than inventors in large integrated firms, therefore they should invent more valuable patents.

¹⁹ With highly skewed distributions of patent value such as the lognormal distribution, an increase in a lower truncation threshold increases the mean value of the truncated distribution by more than the increase in the threshold, as long as the threshold is sufficiently large.

3. Small inventors may not be able to realize as much value from their patents because commercialization often requires substantial complementary assets and the markets for technology do not always work well. Large firms have the R&D labs, the manufacturing facilities and the marketing channels to bring inventions to market. Because of this, large firms can directly realize greater profits from the ability of patents to exclude others from the marketplace. Small inventors lack these complementary assets, however, if technology markets worked well, then small inventors would still be able to realize similar value. They could license or sell their technology to a firm that had the necessary assets or they could raise the funds to acquire these assets themselves.

But contracting over technology is notoriously difficult and markets for technology are notoriously incomplete. These markets face a serious “lemons” problem: buyers often have little information about the quality of the technologies offered for sale or license. Private information can lead to a failure to make mutually beneficial contracts. Although patents may facilitate contracting *at the margin* (Arora and Ceccagnoli 2006, Gans et al. 2002), the general picture of markets for technology may be one where small firms and independent inventors have difficulty capturing the value of their inventions. Indeed, in a large survey of European patentees, Gambardella et al. (2006) find that only 61% of patentees who wanted to license their patents were able to do so. Caves et al. (1983) find that licensors typically realize less than half the value of their technologies.

Thus imperfect technology markets seem to be the explanation that is most consistent with the evidence. Of course, there are distinct industry niches where vertical dis-integration works well and patents may combine with other factors to facilitate arm’s length contracting. Hall and Ziedonis (2001) find evidence that patents played an important role in facilitating the rise of “fabless” semiconductor design firms who outsource all manufacturing. I identified 111 patents issued to these semiconductor design firms in the 1985-1991 panel of public firms.²⁰ Of these, 85% (94) were renewed to full term, suggesting that these were, indeed, valuable patents. But this is the exception that proves the rule. Most small firms (not all of the semiconductor design firms were small) do not realize such value from their patents and so this sort of vertical dis-integration may be atypical, dependent on idiosyncratic features of this industry. Indeed, even in the fabless semiconductor example, technological changes played a

²⁰ Thanks to Rosemarie Ziedonis for sharing her data with me.

role: Hall and Ziedonis note that in addition to patents, MOS (metal oxide semiconductor) production technology facilitated their rise.

If this interpretation is correct, then the low value of small entity patents reflects imperfections in the market for technology. Patents by themselves may only make these markets slightly more efficient and the ability of patents to unleash high-powered incentives may be limited to those niches where patents and technologies combine to facilitate arm's length contracting over technology.

5. Conclusion

I have used U.S. patent renewal data to estimate the value of U.S. patents to different groups of domestic patentees and to analyze some of the determinants of patent value. Among my findings:

- I estimate that patents granted to U.S. patentees in 1991 were worth about \$78,000 in the mean (\$7,000 in the median) to their owners. This is substantially larger than estimates made using similar data for European patents. Estimates for a panel of patents granted to public manufacturing firms were higher, about \$113,000 in the mean and \$18,000 in the median.

- Despite this larger per patent value, I find that the ratio of patent value to R&D—a measure of the subsidy that patents provide to R&D investment—is only about 3%.

Nevertheless, in aggregate, the value of U.S. patents granted to U.S. owners in 1991 was over \$4 billion. This is large, but it is substantially smaller than other government programs to encourage R&D. For example, direct Federal funding of industrial R&D in 1991 was over \$26 billion.

- There are large differences in patent value across different groups of patentees. Small entities—individuals, corporations with fewer than 500 employees and non-profit organizations—have patent values that are on average less than half as large as the values obtained by large corporations. Contrary to lore, patents do not seem to work particularly well for small inventors and this may be evidence of serious imperfections in the market for patents.

- I quantify the association between litigation and patent citation statistics and patent value. A litigated patent is worth nearly six times as much as a non-litigated patent. An additional patent citation received increases patent value by 4-7%. Although patent citations are significantly correlated with patent value, they only explain a small portion of the variance in patent value, so they are not meaningful measures of patent value or patent quality. Patent citation statistics may be more meaningful as measures of the value of the underlying technology.

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Table 1. Summary Statistics

	Percent Expired During			Percent	Percent	Number
	4th Year	8th Year	12th Year	Full term	Small	
ALL	20.21	20.95	17.31	41.52	29.33	94,342
<u>Assignee type</u>						
Unassigned & individuals	36.05	26.14	15.43	22.38	88.24	17,786
Non-public organizations	18.21	20.41	17.00	44.38	45.34	17,229
Publicly listed firms	13.70	19.37	16.58	50.35	9.77	21,904
Foreign organizations	17.43	19.66	18.78	44.13	2.34	37,423
<u>PTO Entity Status</u>						
Small	32.22	25.72	16.66	25.40	100.00	26,768
Large	15.46	19.06	17.57	47.91	0.00	67,574
<u>Technology Category</u>						
Chemical	19.10	21.19	18.63	41.08	15.73	18,175
Computers & communications	11.74	17.46	17.56	53.24	14.51	9,816
Drugs & medical	20.11	20.66	15.13	44.10	36.87	8,288
Electrical & electronic	16.28	19.28	17.45	46.99	18.91	16,481
Mechanical	21.65	21.62	17.72	39.00	31.73	21,561
Other	27.11	23.22	16.34	33.33	51.82	20,021
Mean fee (\$92)	814	1,562	2,327			

Table 2. Regressions for U.S. Patentees by Size Status

	All 1	Small Entities 2	Large Entities 3
Small entity, year 4	-1.92 (0.04)		
Entity change (small to large)	3.78 (0.11)	3.93 (0.14)	
Entity change (large to small)	0.54 (0.10)		0.54 (0.10)
Constant	8.45 (0.09)	6.72 (0.09)	8.37 (0.09)
σ	1.86 (0.05)	1.93 (0.07)	1.88 (0.06)
d	0.14 (0.01)	0.16 (0.01)	0.13 (0.01)
Median net present value	7,174.6	2,942.9	14,310.2
Mean net present value	78,167.7	70,100.2	105,916.2
Number of observations	56,816	24,015	32,801
Log L	-72,444.1	-31,600.7	-40,809.9

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Entity change dummy variables reflect change in status between the fourth year and final year. Patent values in 1992 \$ and discounted at 10%.

Table 3. Regressions by Assignee Type

	U.S. Assignee				
	Unassigned or individual	Non-listed Organization	Publicly Listed Firm	Foreign Organization	Foreign Organization with $d = .15$
	1	2	3	4	5
Small entity, year 4	-1.56 (0.06)	-1.39 (0.06)	-1.27 (0.11)	-1.94 (0.07)	-1.54 (0.04)
Entity change (small to large)	3.91 (0.19)	3.53 (0.20)	2.89 (0.23)	4.55 (0.24)	3.34 (0.13)
Entity change (large to small)	0.83 (0.18)	0.64 (0.16)	0.92 (0.20)	1.61 (0.25)	0.89 (0.16)
Constant	7.87 (0.13)	8.71 (0.22)	8.38 (0.12)	9.93 (0.18)	8.43 (0.01)
σ	1.79 (0.08)	2.06 (0.13)	1.80 (0.07)	2.82 (0.11)	1.93 (0.01)
d	0.14 (0.01)	0.16 (0.02)	0.13 (0.01)	0.27 (0.01)	0.15 --
Median net present value	2,588.9	19,206.3	49,297.7	62,326.5	16,421.5
Mean net present value	25,597.6	206,286.3	90,787.8	2,905,760.7	107,906.3
Number of observations	17,786	17,229	21,904	37,423	37,526
Log L	-23,338.6	-21,770.5	-26,962.9	-48,269.4	-48,443.2

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Column 5 fixes the depreciation rate at 15%. Entity change dummy variables reflect change in status between the fourth year and final year. Patent values in 1992 \$ and discounted at 10%.

Table 4. Estimates for Technological Categories for Patents held by U.S. Patentees

	Median Net Present Value	Mean Net Present Value
Chemical	33,856	497,200
Computers & Communications	21,287	45,247
Drugs & Medical	12,692	120,419
Electrical & Electronic	11,928	68,459
Mechanical	8,171	86,033
Others	4,573	38,626

Note: Technology categories are from Hall et al. (2001). Patent values in 1992 \$ and discounted at 10%.

Table 5. Regressions with Patent Characteristics

	1	2	3	4	Proportional Increase
Small entity, year 4	-1.89 (0.04)	-1.38 (0.04)	-1.84 (0.06)		
Entity change (small to large)	3.65 (0.11)	3.06 (0.12)	3.51 (0.15)	-1.82 (0.03)	
Entity change (large to small)	0.44 (0.10)	0.55 (0.12)	0.38 (0.11)	3.57 (0.10)	
Litigation	1.77 (0.132)	1.36 (0.172)		0.48 (0.09)	487%
Reissued	1.02 (0.179)	0.84 (0.235)			179%
Citations made	0.007 (0.001)		0.004 (0.001)		1%
self citations		0.027 (0.005)			3%
citations to others' patents		0.000 (0.001)			0%
No. of claims	0.017 (0.001)	0.006 (0.001)	0.013 (0.001)		2%
Citations received		0.046 (0.003)	0.039 (0.003)	0.069 (0.003)	4 - 7%
Cites rec' ² / 1000				-0.405 (0.048)	
Generality			0.173 (0.04)		
Originality			-0.106 (0.04)		
Constant	8.13 (0.09)	8.07 (0.11)	7.97 (0.14)	8.05 (0.07)	
σ	1.85 (0.05)	1.85 (0.07)	1.80 (0.09)	1.83 (0.05)	
d	0.14 (0.01)	0.14 (0.01)	0.14 (0.01)	0.14 (0.01)	
Number of observations	56,816	38,236	48,990	56,816	
Log L	-72,014.8	-46,816.4	-60,891.0	-71,331.4	

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Litigation dummy is one for patents that were the main patent in one or more lawsuits filed by 1999 and listed in Derwent's Litalert service. Citation statistics are from the NBER patent database and are described in Hall et al. (2001). Entity change dummy variables reflect change in status between the fourth year and final year.

Table 6. Firm Characteristics for U.S. Public Manufacturing Firms, 1985 - 91

	1	2	3
Small entity	-0.93 (0.05)	-0.99 (0.05)	-0.99 (0.05)
New firm		-0.08 (0.03)	
Ln R&D		0.21 (0.01)	
Ln employment		0.01 (0.01)	
Ln patent stock		-0.29 (0.01)	
<u>Industry</u>			
Pharmaceuticals			0.35 (0.03)
Electrical & instrument			0.34 (0.02)
Electronic & computer			0.85 (0.02)
Metals & transportation			0.08 (0.02)
Constant	8.69 (0.06)	9.04 (0.07)	8.40 (0.05)
σ	1.87 (0.03)	1.85 (0.03)	1.84 (0.03)
d	0.16 (0.00)	0.16 (0.00)	0.16 (0.00)
Median net present value	18,010	17,934	17,786
Mean net present value	113,066	112,695	110,976
Number of observations	107,364	107,364	107,364
Log L	-133,549.7	-132,876.7	-132,387.2

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The new firm dummy is one if the firm has been publicly listed for fewer than 5 years. R&D is deflated R&D stock, employment is in thousands, and patent stock is calculated using the perpetual inventory methods at a 15% depreciation. Patent values in 1992 \$, discounted at 10%.

Table 7. Comparison of Estimates of Patent Value

Study	Patent Issue Year	Patent Country	Group	Patent value (92 \$US)	
				median	mean
This paper	1991	US	All US patentees	7,175	78,168
	1985-91	US	US public firms, manufacturing	18,010	113,067
<u>Other US Studies</u>					
Barney (2002)	1986	US	All	5,849	61,896
Serrano (2005)	1983-2002	US	Small business patentees	17,361	47,456
Putnam (1996)	1974	US	Also filed abroad		188,355
			All (imputed)		78,800
<u>European Studies</u>					
Baudry and Dumont (2006)	2002	France	All		1,656
Gustafsson (2005)	1970-89	Finland	All	27,704	30,833
Lanjouw (1998)	1975	Germany	computers	7,235	13,027
			textiles	4,721	9,695
			engines	18,390	27,571
	1967-80		pharmaceuticals	5,850	15,219
Schankerman (1998)	1970	France	pharmaceuticals	2,607	6,893
			chemicals	2,548	7,942
			mechanical	4,683	24,165
			electronics*	5,049	31,704
Pakes (1986)	1951-79	France	All	853	9,000
	1950-74	UK	All	2,424	11,758
	1952-72	Germany	All	9,993	25,841
Pakes and Schankerman (1986)	1970	UK	All	2,974	11,128
		France	All	1,354	10,638
		Germany	All	9,126	30,564

* In Schankerman (1998) Japanese patents are excluded from the electronics group. In Pakes and Schankerman (1986) the values given are for patents in their fifth year.

Table 8. Equivalent Subsidy Rate


1	2	3	4	5	6
Patentees	Aggregate Patent Value (mill. \$92)	R&D Source (allocated over patent application years)	Deflated R&D (mill. \$92)	Patents / \$ mill. R&D	Equivalent Subsidy Rate
1991 Sample					
All U.S. patentees	\$ 4,441.2	NSF - Total U.S. R&D	\$ 115,891.6	0.49	3.8%
All U.S. patentees	\$ 4,441.2	NSF - U.S. Company R&D	\$ 84,291.2	0.93	5.3%
Publicly listed U.S. Firms	\$ 1,988.6	Firm R&D - Compustat	\$ 69,751.7	0.31	2.9%
1985 - 91 Panel					
Publicly listed U.S. manufacturing firms	\$ 12,757.9	Firm R&D - Compustat	\$ 446,597.1	0.25	2.9%

Addendum: Estimates from European Patents during 1970s

Study	Cohort year	Nation	Industry	Patents / \$m R&D	Reported ESR
Pakes and Schankerman (1986)	1970	UK	All	5.16	26.4%
		France	All	6.44	21.7%
		Germany	All	1.85	15.2%
Lanjouw (1998)	1975	Germany	computers	4.47	10.4%
			textiles	23.26	38.3%
			engines	1.37	5.7%
			1967-80	pharmaceuticals	2.28
Schankerman (1998)	1970	France	pharmaceuticals	5.99	4.1%
			chemicals	9.14	7.2%
			mechanical	12.48	29.9%
			electronics (exc. Japan)	11.22	35.4%
MEAN				7.60	18.3%

Note: Estimates for firms are conditional on firms choosing to patent. Patents per R&D for the European studies is computed from reported (or implied) patent grants per R&D converted to the equivalent ratio for 1992 U.S. dollars. Mark Schankerman has confirmed in private communication (11/28/2004) that the patents to R&D ratio reported in his 1998 paper should be 10 times larger than the printed figures. Estimates for the equivalent subsidy rate for Pakes and Schankerman (1986) have been adjusted to represent value at grant date as described in Schankerman (1998). Equivalent subsidy rates for Schankerman (1998) use only business R&D.

Figure 1. Year Effects



Note: Series are normalized to equal 1 in 1985.