Replication data for: Self-Interest through Delegation: An Additional Rationale for the Principal-Agent Relationship
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) John R. Hamman; George Loewenstein; Roberto A. Weber
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Hamman, John R., Loewenstein, George, and Weber, Roberto A. Replication data for: Self-Interest through Delegation: An Additional Rationale for the Principal-Agent Relationship. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2010. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112373V1
Project Description
Summary:
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Principal-agent relationships are typically assumed to be motivated by efficiency gains from comparative advantage. However, principals may also delegate tasks to avoid taking direct responsibility for selfish or unethical behavior. We report three laboratory experiments in which principals repeatedly either decide how much money to share with a recipient or hire agents to make sharing decisions on their behalf. Across several experimental treatments, recipients receive significantly less, and in many cases close to nothing, when allocation decisions are made by agents. (JEL D82)
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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