Replication data for: Field Centipedes
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Ignacio Palacios-Huerta; Oscar Volij
Version: View help for Version V1
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20071095_Raw-Data.xls | application/vnd.ms-excel | 57.5 KB | 10/12/2019 05:51:AM |
20071095_ReadMe.pdf | application/pdf | 14.2 KB | 10/12/2019 05:51:AM |
LICENSE.txt | text/plain | 14.6 KB | 10/12/2019 05:51:AM |
Project Citation:
Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio, and Volij, Oscar. Replication data for: Field Centipedes. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2009. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113324V1
Project Description
Summary:
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In the centipede game, all standard equilibrium concepts dictate that the player who decides first must stop the game immediately. There is vast experimental evidence, however, that this rarely occurs. We first conduct a field experiment in which highly ranked chess players play this game. Contrary to previous evidence, our results show that69 percent of chess players stop immediately. When we restrict attention to Grandmasters, this percentage escalates to 100 percent. We then conduct a laboratory experiment in which chess players and students are matched in different treatments. When students play against chess players, the outcome approaches the subgame-perfect equilibrium. (JEL C72, C93)
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