Replication data for: Auctions with Anticipated Regret: Theory and Experiment
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Emel Filiz-Ozbay; Erkut Y. Ozbay
Version: View help for Version V1
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LICENSE.txt | text/plain | 14.6 KB | 12/07/2019 07:41:AM |
Project Citation:
Filiz-Ozbay, Emel, and Ozbay, Erkut Y. Replication data for: Auctions with Anticipated Regret: Theory and Experiment. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2007. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-12-07. https://doi.org/10.3886/E116289V1
Project Description
Summary:
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This paper demonstrates theoretically and experimentally that in first-price auctions overbidding with respect to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium might be driven from anticipated loser regret (felt when bidders lose at an affordable price). Different information structures are created to elicit regret: bidders know they will learn the winning bid if they lose (loser regret condition); or the second-highest bid if they win (winner regret condition); or they will receive no feedback regarding the other bids. Bidders in loser regret condition anticipated regret and significantly overbid. However, bidders in the winner regret condition did not anticipate regret. (JEL D44)
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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D44 Auctions
D44 Auctions
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