Replication data for: History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India

Principal Investigator(s):  View help for Principal Investigator(s) Abhijit Banerjee; Lakshmi Iyer

Version:  View help for Version V1

Name File Type Size Last Modified
LICENSE.txt text/plain 14.6 KB 12/06/2019 10:34:AM
README.pdf application/pdf 12.8 KB 12/06/2019 10:34:AM
crime_app8.do text/plain 1.8 KB 12/06/2019 10:34:AM
crime_sett.dta application/octet-stream 367.1 KB 12/06/2019 10:34:AM
educ_health.do text/plain 2.6 KB 12/06/2019 10:34:AM
ineq_geo_sett.dta application/octet-stream 228.8 KB 12/06/2019 10:34:AM
infmort_sett.dta application/octet-stream 52.6 KB 12/06/2019 10:34:AM
infmort_table7.do text/plain 2.1 KB 12/06/2019 10:34:AM
lit_sett.dta application/octet-stream 1.4 MB 12/06/2019 10:34:AM
literacy_table7.do text/plain 2.2 KB 12/06/2019 10:34:AM

Project Citation: 

Banerjee, Abhijit, and Iyer, Lakshmi. Replication data for: History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2005. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-12-06. https://doi.org/10.3886/E116059V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary We analyze the colonial land revenue institutions set up by the British in India, and show that differences in historical property rights institutions lead to sustained differences in economic outcomes. Areas in which proprietary rights in land were historically given to landlords have significantly lower agricultural investments and productivity in the post-independence period than areas in which these rights were given to the cultivators. These areas also have significantly lower investments in health and education. These differences are not driven by omitted variables or endogeneity problems; they probably arise because differences in historical institutions lead to very different policy choices.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      N45 Economic History: Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation: Asia including Middle East
      P16 Capitalist Systems: Political Economy


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V1 [2019-12-06]

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