Replication data for: History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Abhijit Banerjee; Lakshmi Iyer
Version: View help for Version V1
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LICENSE.txt | text/plain | 14.6 KB | 12/06/2019 10:34:AM |
README.pdf | application/pdf | 12.8 KB | 12/06/2019 10:34:AM |
crime_app8.do | text/plain | 1.8 KB | 12/06/2019 10:34:AM |
crime_sett.dta | application/octet-stream | 367.1 KB | 12/06/2019 10:34:AM |
educ_health.do | text/plain | 2.6 KB | 12/06/2019 10:34:AM |
ineq_geo_sett.dta | application/octet-stream | 228.8 KB | 12/06/2019 10:34:AM |
infmort_sett.dta | application/octet-stream | 52.6 KB | 12/06/2019 10:34:AM |
infmort_table7.do | text/plain | 2.1 KB | 12/06/2019 10:34:AM |
lit_sett.dta | application/octet-stream | 1.4 MB | 12/06/2019 10:34:AM |
literacy_table7.do | text/plain | 2.2 KB | 12/06/2019 10:34:AM |
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Project Citation:
Banerjee, Abhijit, and Iyer, Lakshmi. Replication data for: History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2005. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-12-06. https://doi.org/10.3886/E116059V1
Project Description
Summary:
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We analyze the colonial land revenue institutions set up by the British in India, and show that differences in historical property rights institutions lead to sustained differences in economic outcomes. Areas in which proprietary rights in land were historically given to landlords have significantly lower agricultural investments and productivity in the post-independence period than areas in which these rights were given to the cultivators. These areas also have significantly lower investments in health and education. These differences are not driven by omitted variables or endogeneity problems; they probably arise because differences in historical institutions lead to very different policy choices.
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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N45 Economic History: Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation: Asia including Middle East
P16 Capitalist Systems: Political Economy
N45 Economic History: Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation: Asia including Middle East
P16 Capitalist Systems: Political Economy
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