Replication data for: The Potential of Social Identity for Equilibrium Selection

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Project Citation:

Chen, Roy, and Chen, Yan. Replication data for: The Potential of Social Identity for Equilibrium Selection. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2011. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112462V1

Project Description

Summary: When does a common group identity improve efficiency in coordination games? To answer this question, we propose a group-contingent social preference model and derive conditions under which social identity changes equilibrium selection. We test our predictions in the minimum-effort game in the laboratory under parameter configurations which lead to an inefficient low-effort equilibrium for subjects with no group identity. For those with a salient group identity, consistent with our theory, we find that learning leads to ingroup coordination to the efficient high-effort equilibrium. Additionally, our theoretical framework reconciles findings from a number of coordination game experiments. (JEL C71, C91, D71)

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      C71 Cooperative Games
      C91 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
      D71 Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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V1 [2019-10-11]

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