Replication data for: Adding a Stick to the Carrot? The Interaction of Bonuses and Fines
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Ernst Fehr; Klaus M. Schmidt
Version: View help for Version V1
Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
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LICENSE.txt | text/plain | 14.6 KB | 10/12/2019 03:57:AM |
P07040forWebFehr-Schmidt_README.pdf | application/pdf | 16.8 KB | 10/12/2019 03:57:AM |
P07040forWebFehr-Schmidt_data.txt | text/plain | 76.9 KB | 10/12/2019 03:57:AM |
P07040forWebFehr-Schmidt_description.pdf | application/pdf | 22.3 KB | 10/12/2019 03:57:AM |
P07040forWebFehr-Schmidt_instructions.pdf | application/pdf | 49.3 KB | 10/12/2019 03:57:AM |
Project Citation:
Fehr, Ernst, and Schmidt, Klaus M. Replication data for: Adding a Stick to the Carrot? The Interaction of Bonuses and Fines. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2007. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113216V1
Project Description
Summary:
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This repository contains data and/or code supplementing the article "Adding a Stick to the Carrot? The Interaction of Bonuses and Fines".
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
D86 Economics of Contract: Theory
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
D86 Economics of Contract: Theory
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