Replication data for: Intergroup Conflict and Intra-group Punishment in an Experimental Contest Game

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Klaus Abbink; Jordi Brandts; Benedikt Herrmann; Henrik Orzen

Version: View help for Version V1

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Project Citation:

Abbink, Klaus, Brandts, Jordi, Herrmann, Benedikt, and Orzen, Henrik. Replication data for: Intergroup Conflict and Intra-group Punishment in an Experimental Contest Game. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2010. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112331V1

Project Description

Summary: We study how conflict in contest games is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our motivation stems from the analysis of sociopolitical conflict. The theoretical prediction is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and of whether punishment is available. We find, first, that conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are above equilibrium. Second, allowing group members to punish each other leads to even larger conflict expenditures. These results contrast with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency. (JEL C72, D74, H41)

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      C72 Noncooperative Games
      D74 Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
      H41 Public Goods

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V1 [2019-10-11]

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