Replication data for: Tournaments and Office Politics: Evidence from a Real Effort Experiment
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Jeffrey Carpenter; Peter Hans Matthews; John Schirm
Version: View help for Version V1
Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
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20071123_TandOP.do | text/plain | 11.5 KB | 10/11/2019 10:35:AM |
20071123_TandOP_Analysis.log | text/plain | 84 KB | 10/11/2019 10:35:AM |
20071123_TandOP_Production.dta | application/octet-stream | 12.9 KB | 10/11/2019 10:35:AM |
20071123_TandOP_ReadMe.pdf | application/pdf | 13.6 KB | 10/11/2019 10:35:AM |
20071123_TandOP_Sabotage.dta | application/octet-stream | 89 KB | 10/11/2019 10:35:AM |
LICENSE.txt | text/plain | 14.6 KB | 10/11/2019 10:35:AM |
Project Citation:
Carpenter, Jeffrey, Matthews, Peter Hans, and Schirm, John. Replication data for: Tournaments and Office Politics: Evidence from a Real Effort Experiment. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2010. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112333V1
Project Description
Summary:
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Tournaments can elicit more effort but sabotage may attenuate the effect of competition. Because it is hard to separate effort and ability, the evidence on tournaments is thin. There is even less evidence on sabotage because these acts often consist of subjective peer evaluation or "office politics." We discuss real effort experiments in which quality adjusted output and office politics are compared under piece rates and tournaments and find that tournaments increase effort only in the absence of office politics. Competitors subvert each other more in tournaments, and as a result, workers produce less because they expect to be sabotaged. (D82, M54)
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
M54 Personnel Economics: Labor Management
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
M54 Personnel Economics: Labor Management
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