Replication data for: Liquidity Constraints and Imperfect Information in Subprime Lending
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) William Adams; Liran Einav; Jonathan Levin
Version: View help for Version V1
Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
---|---|---|---|
LICENSE.txt | text/plain | 14.6 KB | 12/07/2019 07:49:AM |
Liquidity_Bootstrap.do | text/plain | 10.9 KB | 12/07/2019 07:49:AM |
Liquidity_Figures.do | text/plain | 10 KB | 12/07/2019 07:49:AM |
Liquidity_Tables_Default.do | text/plain | 7.4 KB | 12/07/2019 07:49:AM |
Liquidity_Tables_Demand.do | text/plain | 12.8 KB | 12/07/2019 07:49:AM |
Liquidity_Tobit.m | text/plain | 23.5 KB | 12/07/2019 07:49:AM |
Online_Appendix.pdf | application/pdf | 85.6 KB | 12/07/2019 07:49:AM |
Readme.pdf | application/pdf | 25.5 KB | 12/07/2019 07:49:AM |
Project Citation:
Adams, William, Einav, Liran, and Levin, Jonathan. Replication data for: Liquidity Constraints and Imperfect Information in Subprime Lending. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2009. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-12-07. https://doi.org/10.3886/E116303V1
Project Description
Summary:
View help for Summary
We present new evidence on consumer liquidity constraints and the credit market
conditions that might give rise to them. We analyze unique data from a large
auto sales company serving the subprime market. Short-term liquidity appears
to be a key driver of consumer behavior. Demand increases sharply during tax
rebate season and purchases are highly sensitive to down-payment requirements.
Lenders also face substantial informational problems. Default rates rise
significantly with loan size, providing a rationale for loan caps, and higher-risk
borrowers demand larger loans. This adverse selection is mitigated, however,
by risk-based pricing. (JEL D14, D82, D83, G21)
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
View help for JEL Classification
D14 Household Saving; Personal Finance
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
G21 Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
D14 Household Saving; Personal Finance
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
G21 Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Related Publications
Published Versions
Report a Problem
Found a serious problem with the data, such as disclosure risk or copyrighted content? Let us know.
This material is distributed exactly as it arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.