Replication data for: Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments

Principal Investigator(s):  View help for Principal Investigator(s) Claudio Ferraz; Frederico Finan

Version:  View help for Version V1

Name File Type Size Last Modified
LICENSE.txt text/plain 14.6 KB 10/11/2019 11:49:AM
README.pdf application/pdf 110.8 KB 10/11/2019 11:49:AM
convenios_aer.do text/plain 2.6 KB 10/11/2019 11:49:AM
conveniosdata_aer.dta application/octet-stream 182.7 KB 10/11/2019 11:49:AM
corruptiondata_aer.dta application/octet-stream 163.5 KB 10/11/2019 11:49:AM
pelect_aer.do text/plain 663 bytes 10/11/2019 11:49:AM
pelectdata_aer.dta application/octet-stream 559 KB 10/11/2019 11:49:AM
pscoredata_aer.dta application/octet-stream 44.5 KB 10/11/2019 11:49:AM
reelection_aer.do text/plain 12 KB 10/11/2019 11:49:AM

Project Citation: 

Ferraz, Claudio, and Finan, Frederico. Replication data for: Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2011. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112431V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary We show that political institutions affect corruption levels. We use audit reports in Brazil to construct new measures of political corruption in local governments and test whether electoral accountability affects the corruption practices of incumbent politicians. We find significantly less corruption in municipalities where mayors can get reelected. Mayors with reelection incentives misappropriate 27 percent fewer resources than mayors without reelection incentives. These effects are more pronounced among municipalities with less access to information and where the likelihood of judicial punishment is lower. Overall our findings suggest that electoral rules that enhance political accountability play a crucial role in constraining politician's corrupt behavior. (JEL D72, K42, O17)

Scope of Project

Subject Terms:  View help for Subject Terms Corruption
JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
      K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
      O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
Geographic Coverage:  View help for Geographic Coverage Brazil
Time Period(s):  View help for Time Period(s) 2001 – 2004
Universe:  View help for Universe Municipalities in Brazil subject to audits from the Comptrollers Office (CGU)
Data Type(s):  View help for Data Type(s) survey data; other:; text; observational data
Collection Notes:  View help for Collection Notes The audit reports were read and coded by the authors

Methodology

Data Source:  View help for Data Source https://www.gov.br/cgu/pt-br
Unit(s) of Observation:  View help for Unit(s) of Observation Municipalities,

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V1 [2019-10-11]

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