Replication data for: Bureaucratic Minimal Squawk Behavior: Theory and Evidence from Regulatory Agencies
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Clare Leaver
Version: View help for Version V1
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20061229_Figure3.do | text/plain | 1.2 KB | 10/12/2019 05:02:AM |
20061229_ReadMe.pdf | application/pdf | 34.1 KB | 10/12/2019 05:02:AM |
20061229_Table7.do | text/plain | 1.6 KB | 10/12/2019 05:02:AM |
20061229_Table8.do | text/plain | 3.7 KB | 10/12/2019 05:02:AM |
20061229_Tables1and2.do | text/plain | 3.9 KB | 10/12/2019 05:02:AM |
20061229_Tables3and4.do | text/plain | 6.4 KB | 10/12/2019 05:02:AM |
20061229_Tables5and6.do | text/plain | 7 KB | 10/12/2019 05:02:AM |
2006_1229_data.dta | application/octet-stream | 504.5 KB | 10/12/2019 05:02:AM |
LICENSE.txt | text/plain | 14.6 KB | 10/12/2019 05:02:AM |
Table7.log | text/plain | 20.4 KB | 10/12/2019 05:02:AM |
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Project Citation:
Leaver, Clare. Replication data for: Bureaucratic Minimal Squawk Behavior: Theory and Evidence from Regulatory Agencies. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2009. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113300V1
Project Description
Summary:
View help for Summary
This paper develops a model in which a desire to avoid criticism prompts
otherwise public-spirited bureaucrats to behave inefficiently. Decisions
are taken to keep interest groups quiet and to keep mistakes out of the public
eye. The policy implications of this "minimal squawk" behavior are
at odds with the view that agencies should be structured to minimize the
threat of "capture." An empirical test using data from US State Public
Utility Commissions rejects the capture hypothesis and is consistent with
the squawk hypothesis: longer PUC terms of office are associated with
a higher incidence of rate reviews and lower household electricity bills.
(JEL D73, L51, L97, L98)
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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D73 Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
L51 Economics of Regulation
L97 Utilities: General
L98 Industry Studies: Utilities and Transportation: Government Policy
D73 Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
L51 Economics of Regulation
L97 Utilities: General
L98 Industry Studies: Utilities and Transportation: Government Policy
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