Replication data for: A Change Would Do You Good .... An Experimental Study on How to Overcome Coordination Failure in Organizations
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Jordi Brandts; David J. Cooper
Version: View help for Version V1
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Brandts_and_Cooper_1.dta | application/octet-stream | 1.1 MB | 12/07/2019 03:48:AM |
Brandts_and_Cooper_regression_dofile.do | text/plain | 729 bytes | 12/07/2019 03:48:AM |
Cooper_and_Brandts_NRE.txt | text/x-c | 3.9 KB | 12/07/2019 03:48:AM |
Cooper_and_Brandts_RE.txt | text/x-c | 3.2 KB | 12/07/2019 03:48:AM |
Cooper_and_Brandts_data_tab4.txt | text/plain | 129.8 KB | 12/07/2019 03:48:AM |
LICENSE.txt | text/plain | 14.6 KB | 12/07/2019 03:48:AM |
readme.pdf | application/pdf | 10.9 KB | 12/07/2019 03:48:AM |
Project Citation:
Brandts, Jordi, and Cooper, David J. Replication data for: A Change Would Do You Good .... An Experimental Study on How to Overcome Coordination Failure in Organizations. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2006. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-12-07. https://doi.org/10.3886/E116220V1
Project Description
Summary:
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We study how financial incentives can be used to overcome a history of coordination
failure using controlled laboratory experiments. Subjects' payoffs depend on coordinating
at high effort levels. In an initial phase, the benefits of coordination are
low, and play typically converges to an inefficient outcome. We then explore varying
financial incentives to coordinate at a higher effort level. An increase in the benefits
of coordination leads to improved coordination, but large increases have no more
impact than small increases. Once subjects have coordinated on a higher effort
level, reductions in the incentives to coordinate have little effect on behavior. (JEL
C92, D23, J31, L23, M52)
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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C92 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
D23 Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
C92 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
D23 Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
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