Replication data for: Paying Not to Go to the Gym
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Stefano DellaVigna; Ulrike Malmendier
Version: View help for Version V1
Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
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DataGymAERMar06.do | text/plain | 40.4 KB | 12/07/2019 03:48:AM |
GymAERSourceData.dta | application/octet-stream | 21.6 MB | 12/07/2019 03:48:AM |
HealthclubsurveyResultsSep02.xls | application/vnd.ms-excel | 34 KB | 12/07/2019 03:48:AM |
LICENSE.txt | text/plain | 14.6 KB | 12/07/2019 03:48:AM |
SimulationCancellation.m | text/plain | 4.1 KB | 12/07/2019 03:48:AM |
Survey-Questionnaire-on-Health-Club-Attendance-Aug2002.doc | application/msword | 32.5 KB | 12/07/2019 03:48:AM |
fun_exp.m | text/plain | 616 bytes | 12/07/2019 03:48:AM |
fun_sop.m | text/plain | 805 bytes | 12/07/2019 03:48:AM |
readme.txt | text/plain | 2.5 KB | 12/07/2019 03:48:AM |
Project Citation:
DellaVigna, Stefano, and Malmendier, Ulrike. Replication data for: Paying Not to Go to the Gym. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2006. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-12-07. https://doi.org/10.3886/E116221V1
Project Description
Summary:
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How do consumers choose from a menu of contracts? We analyze a novel dataset
from three U.S. health clubs with information on both the contractual choice and the
day-to-day attendance decisions of 7,752 members over three years. The observed
consumer behavior is difficult to reconcile with standard preferences and beliefs.
First, members who choose a contract with a flat monthly fee of over $70 attend on
average 4.3 times per month. They pay a price per expected visit of more than $17,
even though they could pay $10 per visit using a 10-visit pass. On average, these
users forgo savings of $600 during their membership. Second, consumers who
choose a monthly contract are 17 percent more likely to stay enrolled beyond one
year than users committing for a year. This is surprising because monthly members
pay higher fees for the option to cancel each month. We also document cancellation
delays and attendance expectations, among other findings. Leading explanations for
our findings are overconfidence about future self-control or about future efficiency.
Overconfident agents overestimate attendance as well as the cancellation probability
of automatically renewed contracts. Our results suggest that making inferences
from observed contract choice under the rational expectation hypothesis can
lead to biases in the estimation of consumer preferences. (JEL D00, D12, D91)
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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D12 Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
D86 Economics of Contract: Theory
L83 Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism
D12 Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
D86 Economics of Contract: Theory
L83 Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism
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