Replication data for: Are Two Heads Better Than One? Team versus Individual Play in Signaling Games
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) David J. Cooper; John H. Kagel
Version: View help for Version V1
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LICENSE.txt | text/plain | 14.6 KB | 12/06/2019 10:31:AM |
Project Citation:
Cooper, David J., and Kagel, John H. Replication data for: Are Two Heads Better Than One? Team versus Individual Play in Signaling Games. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2005. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-12-06. https://doi.org/10.3886/E116052V1
Project Description
Summary:
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We compare individuals with two-person teams in signaling game experiments. Teams consistently play more strategically than individuals and generate positive synergies in more difficult games, beating a demanding "truth-wins" norm. The superior performance of teams is most striking following changes in payoffs that change the equilibrium outcome. Individuals play less strategically following the change in payoffs than inexperienced subjects playing the same game. In contrast, the teams exhibit positive learning transfer, playing more strategically following the change than inexperienced subjects. Dialogues between teammates are used to identify factors promoting strategic play.
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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C72 Noncooperative Games
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
C72 Noncooperative Games
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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