Replication data for: Price Discrimination and Bargaining: Empirical Evidence from Medical Devices

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Project Citation:

Grennan, Matthew. Replication data for: Price Discrimination and Bargaining: Empirical Evidence from Medical Devices. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2013. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112586V1

Project Description

Summary: Many important issues in business-to-business markets involve price discrimination and negotiated prices, situations where theoretical predictions are ambiguous. This paper uses new panel data on buyer-supplier transfers and a structural model to empirically analyze bargaining and price discrimination in a medical device market. While many phenomena that restrict different prices to different buyers are suggested as ways to decrease hospital costs (e.g., mergers, group purchasing organizations, and transparency), I find that: (i) more uniform pricing works against hospitals by softening competition; and (ii) results depend ultimately on a previously unexplored bargaining effect. (JEL C78, L13, L14, L64)

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
      L13 Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
      L14 Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
      L64 Other Machinery; Business Equipment; Armaments

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V1 [2019-10-11]

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