Replication data for: Direct Democracy and Public Employees
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) John G. Matsusaka
Version: View help for Version V1
Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
---|---|---|---|
1_LL-AER-.sas | text/plain | 2.2 KB | 10/12/2019 06:10:AM |
2_Emp-summary-AER-.sas | text/plain | 1.8 KB | 10/12/2019 06:10:AM |
3_-Results-AER-.sas | text/plain | 9.8 KB | 10/12/2019 06:10:AM |
LICENSE.txt | text/plain | 14.6 KB | 10/12/2019 06:10:AM |
LL_-20080428-.xls | application/vnd.ms-excel | 330 KB | 10/12/2019 06:10:AM |
ReadMe-20070509.doc | application/msword | 24.5 KB | 10/12/2019 06:10:AM |
ReadMe-20070509.pdf | application/pdf | 10.3 KB | 10/12/2019 06:10:AM |
data2000aer.sas7bdat | application/octet-stream | 12 MB | 10/12/2019 06:10:AM |
Project Citation:
Matsusaka, John G. Replication data for: Direct Democracy and Public Employees. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2009. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113350V1
Project Description
Summary:
View help for Summary
In the public sector, employment may be inefficiently high because of patronage, and wages may be inefficiently high because of public employee interest groups. This paper explores whether the initiative process, a direct democracy institution of growing importance, ameliorates these political economy problems. In a sample of 650+ cities, I find that when public employees cannot bargain collectively and patronage could be a problem, initiatives appear to cut employment but not wages. When public employees bargain collectively, driving up wages, the initiative appears to cut wages but not
employment. The employment-cutting result is robust; the wage-cutting result survives some but not all robustness tests. (JEL D72, J31, J45, J52)
Scope of Project
Subject Terms:
View help for Subject Terms
Census data; Legal provisions
JEL Classification:
View help for JEL Classification
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
J31 Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
J45 Public Sector Labor Markets
J52 Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation; Collective Bargaining
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
J31 Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
J45 Public Sector Labor Markets
J52 Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation; Collective Bargaining
Geographic Coverage:
View help for Geographic Coverage
United States
Time Period(s):
View help for Time Period(s)
2006 – 2006
Data Type(s):
View help for Data Type(s)
census/enumeration data;
other:
Methodology
Data Source:
View help for Data Source
U.S. Census; city charters; NBER
Unit(s) of Observation:
View help for Unit(s) of Observation
Cities,
Related Publications
Published Versions
Report a Problem
Found a serious problem with the data, such as disclosure risk or copyrighted content? Let us know.
This material is distributed exactly as it arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.