Replication data for: When Should Sellers Use Auctions?
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) James W. Roberts; Andrew Sweeting
Version: View help for Version V1
Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
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Programs_AER_2011_0814 | 10/11/2019 06:55:PM | ||
LICENSE.txt | text/plain | 14.6 KB | 10/11/2019 02:55:PM |
Project Citation:
Roberts, James W., and Sweeting, Andrew. Replication data for: When Should Sellers Use Auctions? Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2013. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112659V1
Project Description
Summary:
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A bidding process can be organized so that offers are submitted
simultaneously or sequentially. In the latter case, potential buyers
can condition their behavior on previous entrants' decisions. The
relative performance of these mechanisms is investigated when entry
is costly and selective, meaning that potential buyers with higher
values are more likely to participate. A simple sequential mechanism
can give both buyers and sellers significantly higher payoffs than the
commonly used simultaneous bid auction. The findings are illustrated
with parameters estimated from simultaneous entry USFS timber
auctions where our estimates predict that the sequential mechanism
would increase revenue and efficiency.
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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D44 Auctions
L73 Forest Products
Q23 Renewable Resources and Conservation: Forestry
D44 Auctions
L73 Forest Products
Q23 Renewable Resources and Conservation: Forestry
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