Replication data for: The Political Resource Curse
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Fernanda Brollo; Tommaso Nannicini; Roberto Perotti; Guido Tabellini
Version: View help for Version V1
| Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
|---|---|---|---|
| AER_Political_Resource_Curse_DATA | 10/11/2019 06:54:PM | ||
|
|
text/plain | 14.6 KB | 10/11/2019 02:54:PM |
Project Citation:
Brollo, Fernanda, Nannicini, Tommaso, Perotti, Roberto, and Tabellini, Guido. Replication data for: The Political Resource Curse. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2013. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112657V1
Project Description
Summary:
View help for Summary
This paper studies the effect of additional government revenues
on political corruption and on the quality of politicians, both with
theory and data. The theory is based on a political agency model
with career concerns and endogenous entry of candidates. The data
refer to Brazil, where federal transfers to municipal governments
change exogenously at given population thresholds, allowing us to
implement a regression discontinuity design. The empirical evidence
shows that larger transfers increase observed corruption and reduce
the average education of candidates for mayor. These and other
more specific empirical results are in line with the predictions of the
theory.
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
View help for JEL Classification
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D73 Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
H77 Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
O18 Economic Development: Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D73 Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
H77 Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
O18 Economic Development: Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure
Related Publications
Published Versions
Report a Problem
Found a serious problem with the data, such as disclosure risk or copyrighted content? Let us know.
This material is distributed exactly as it arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.