Name File Type Size Last Modified
  P2014_1092_data 10/11/2019 10:09:PM
LICENSE.txt text/plain 14.6 KB 10/11/2019 06:09:PM

Project Citation: 

Kreiner, Claus Thustrup, Leth-Petersen, Søren, and Skov, Peer Ebbesen. Replication data for: Year-End Tax Planning of Top Management: Evidence from High-Frequency Payroll Data. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2014. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112772V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary Using Danish high-frequency payroll data and tax reform variation, we detect year-end tax avoidance among top managers. Five to seven percent of top managers exploit year-end tax planning strategies to save taxes. Around 30 percent of the top managers engaging in year-end tax avoidance do so by retiming bonus payments while the rest shift regular wage income. However, bonus timing is most tax-sensitive. When considering all of the top managers receiving a December bonus, we find that more than one-quarter retime the bonus payment, whereas only 5 percent of those not receiving a bonus shift regular wage income.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      H24 Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; includes inheritance and gift taxes
      H26 Tax Evasion and Avoidance
      J31 Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
      J33 Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
      M10 Business Administration: General


Related Publications

Published Versions

Export Metadata

Report a Problem

Found a serious problem with the data, such as disclosure risk or copyrighted content? Let us know.

This material is distributed exactly as it arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.