Replication data for: Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Adaptation Costs
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Patrick Bajari; Stephanie Houghton; Steven Tadelis
Version: View help for Version V1
Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
---|---|---|---|
20100396_data_and_code | 10/11/2019 10:03:PM | ||
LICENSE.txt | text/plain | 14.6 KB | 10/11/2019 06:03:PM |
Project Citation:
Bajari, Patrick, Houghton, Stephanie, and Tadelis, Steven. Replication data for: Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Adaptation Costs. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2014. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112757V1
Project Description
Summary:
View help for Summary
Procurement contracts are often renegotiated because of changes
that are required after their execution. Using highway paving contracts
we show that renegotiation imposes significant adaptation
costs. Reduced form regressions suggest that bidders respond strategically to contractual incompleteness and that adaptation costs are an important determinant of their bids. A structural empirical model
compares adaptation costs to bidder markups and shows that adaptation costs account for 7.5-14 percent of the winning bid. Markups
from private information and market power, the focus of much of the
auctions literature, are much smaller by comparison. Implications
for government procurement are discussed.
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
View help for JEL Classification
D44 Auctions
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
D86 Economics of Contract: Theory
H57 National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement
L13 Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L74 Construction
R42 Transportation Economics: Government and Private Investment Analysis; Road Maintenance, Transportation Planning
D44 Auctions
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
D86 Economics of Contract: Theory
H57 National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement
L13 Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L74 Construction
R42 Transportation Economics: Government and Private Investment Analysis; Road Maintenance, Transportation Planning
Related Publications
Published Versions
Report a Problem
Found a serious problem with the data, such as disclosure risk or copyrighted content? Let us know.
This material is distributed exactly as it arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.