Debt Relief and Debtor Outcomes:
Measuring the Effects of Consumer Bankruptcy Protection
Online Appendix

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Appendix Figure 1 The Geography of Consumer Bankruptcy

Number of Bankruptcy Offices in Each Court

Number of Chapter 13 Judges

Chapter 13 Filings Per Capita

Chapter 13 Discharge Rate

Variation in Chapter 13 Judge Leniency

Notes: These figures display summary statistics by bankruptcy office. The sample includes the 72 bankruptcy courts that allow electronic access to their dockets. The number of Chapter 13 judges is based on 2003 filings. Per capita Chapter 13 filings are calculated using the average annual number of filings between 2000 and 2004 divided by population as reported by the 2000 census. The Chapter 13 discharge rate is calculated across all available years between 1992 and 2005. The Chapter 13 judge leniency sample includes all first-time filings between 1992 and 2005 in the 42 offices that randomly assign cases to judges.

Appendix Figure 2
Distribution of Judge by Office Observations

Notes: This figure displays the distribution of judge by office cell sizes in our estimation sample. The sample consists of all first-time filers between 1992 and 2005 in the 42 offices that randomly assign filings to judges. See text for details.

Appendix Figure 3
Distribution of Chapter 13 Judge Leniency

Notes: This figure displays the distribution of Chapter 13 judge leniency for the estimation sample. The sample consists of all first-time filers between 1992 and 2005 in the 42 offices that randomly assign filings to judges. Judge leniency is defined as the leave-one-out mean rate of granting bankruptcy protection for the assigned judge minus the leave-one-out mean rate of granting bankruptcy protection for the office in the same filing year.

Appendix Figure 4
Persistence of Chapter 13 Judge Discharge Rates

Notes: This figure shows the correlation between judge specific Chapter 13 discharge rates in the current and lagged years. The sample consists of all first-time filers between 1992 and 2005 in the 42 offices that randomly assign filings to judges. See text for details.

Appendix Figure 5
Chapter 13 Judge Leniency by Filer Characteristics

Notes: These figures show the correlation between judge leniency for different groups of filers. The sample consists of all first-time filers between 1992 and 2005 in the 42 offices that randomly assign filings to judges. Judge leniency is defined as the leave-one-out mean rate of granting bankruptcy protection for the assigned judge minus the leave-one-out mean rate of granting bankruptcy protection for the office in the same filing year. We take the average leniency for each group over all available years of data. The solid line shows the best linear fit estimated using OLS relating each judge leniency measure.

Appendix Figure 6
Mean and Median Earnings for Granted and Dismissed Chapter 13 Filers

Notes: These figures plot mean and median earnings for granted and dismissed bankruptcy filers. The sample includes all first-time filings between 1992 and 2005 in the 42 offices that randomly assign cases to judges. Year 0 indicates the year a debtor files for bankruptcy protection. See text for additional details.

Appendix Figure 7
401k Contributions, Disability Insurance, and Supplemental Security Income
for Granted and Dismissed Chapter 13 Filers

Notes: These figures plot average 401k contributions, Disability Insurance, and Sup. Security Income for granted and dismissed bankruptcy filers. The sample includes all first-time filings between 1992 and 2005 in the 42 offices that randomly assign cases to judges. The Sup. Security Income sample includes the subset of filers 65 or older. Year 0 indicates the year a debtor files for bankruptcy protection.

Appendix Figure 8
Chapter 13 Judge Leniency and 401k Contributions,
Disability Insurance, and Supplemental Security Income

Notes: These figures plot 401k contributions, Disability Insurance, and Sup. Security Income vs. our leave-one-out measure of judge leniency. The sample includes all first-time filings between 1992 and 2005 in the 42 offices that randomly assign cases to judges. The Sup. Security Income sample includes the subset of filers 65 or older. Judge leniency is the leave-one-out mean rate of granting Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection for the assigned judge minus the leave-one-out mean rate of granting bankruptcy protection for the court in the same filing year. To construct the binned scatter plot, we first regress each outcome on office by month-of-filing fixed effects and calculate residuals. We then take the mean residual in each judge by year bin, adding the mean discharge rate to each residual to aid in the interpretation of the plot. The solid line shows the best linear fit estimated on the underlying micro data estimated using OLS. The coefficients show the estimated slope of the best-fit line including office by month-of-filing fixed effects, with standard errors clustered at the office level reported in parentheses.

Appendix Figure 9
 IV Estimates of the Impact of Chapter 13 Protection on
 401k Contributions, Disability Insurance, and Supplemental Security Income

Notes: These figures plot two-stage least squares results of the impact of Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection. The earnings and mortality sample includes all first-time filings between 1992 and 2005 in the 42 offices that randomly assign cases to judges. The Sup. Security Income sample includes the subset of filers 65 or older. We instrument for bankruptcy protection using judge leniency and control for gender, race, five-year age effects, baseline employment, baseline earnings, and office by month-of-filing fixed effects. The dashed lines are 95 percent confidence intervals from standard errors clustered at the office level. Year 0 indicates the year a debtor files for bankruptcy protection.

Appendix Figure 10
Job Mobility Outcomes for Granted and Dismissed Chapter 13 Filers

Notes: These figures plot average job mobility outcomes for granted and dismissed bankruptcy filers. The sample includes all first-time filings between 1992 and 2005 in the 42 offices that randomly assign cases to judges that are employed for at least one time period post-bankruptcy. Year 0 indicates the year a debtor files for bankruptcy protection. Same county, state, job, and industry variables are defined relative to the year before filing. Each variable is therefore mechanically equal to one in year -1. See Table 7 for additional details.

Appendix Figure 11
Marginal Treatment Effects for Labor Supply, Mortality, and Home Foreclosure

Notes: These figures plot marginal treatment effects and associated 95 percent confidence intervals. The sample includes first-time filings between 1992 and 2005 in the 42 offices that randomly assign cases to judges. The foreclosure sample includes the subset of those filings originating in county by year bins with foreclosure data coverage. We predict the probability of bankruptcy protection using our leave-one-out measure of judge leniency. We then predict the relationship between each outcome and the predicted probability of receiving bankruptcy protection using a local quadratic estimator with bandwidth 0.069. The estimates of the first derivative of this relationship are then evaluated at each percentile of the predicted probability. Standard errors are calculated using a bootstrap procedure with 250 iterations. All monetary values are expressed in real 2000 dollars divided by 1,000. Earnings information comes from the W-2, and is averaged over the first five post-filing years. Employment is an indicator for non-zero wage earnings on the W-2, and is averaged over the first five post-filing years. Five-year mortality is an indicator for being deceased within the first five post-filing years using information from the Death Master File. Five-year foreclosure is an indicator for a filer's home receiving a notice of default, receiving a notice of transfer or sale, or being transferred to a REO or a guarantor within the first five post-filing years using real estate records from DataQuick.

Appendix Figure 12
 Marginal Treatment Effects for 401k Contributions, Disability Insurance, and Sup. Security Income

Notes: These figures plot marginal treatment effects and associated 95 percent confidence intervals. The sample includes first-time filings between 1992 and 2005 in the 42 offices that randomly assign cases to judges. See Appendix Figure X notes for details on estimation procedure and Table 1 notes for variable definitions.

Appendix Figure 13
Job Mobility Marginal Treatment Effects

Notes: These figures plot marginal treatment effects and associated 95 percent confidence intervals. The sample includes first-time filings between 1992 and 2005 in the 42 offices that randomly assign cases to judges. See Appendix Figure X notes for details on estimation procedure and Table 7 notes for variable definitions.

Appendix Figure 14
Event Study Estimates of Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 Protection

Appendix Figure 14 Continued
Event Study Estimates of Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 Protection

Notes: These figures plot event study results of the impact of Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection. The Judge IV sample includes all first-time filings between 1992 and 2005 in the 42 offices that randomly assign cases to judges. The full sample includes a 10 percent random sample of all first-time filings between 1992 and 2005 in the 72 bankruptcy courts that allow electronic access to their dockets. The foreclosure sample includes all filings originating in county by year bins with foreclosure data coverage. We report the coefficient on an indicator for receiving bankruptcy protection interacted with the specified year. We control for individual, year, and propensity score decile by year fixed effects. The propensity score is using a probit regression of an indicator for discharge on gender, race, five-year age bins, five years of baseline employment entered individually, five years of baseline earnings entered individually, office fixed effects, and filing year fixed effects. We then split the sample into deciles and interact each decile with year indicators for the five years before and after filing, omitting the year prior to filing. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Year 0 indicates the year a debtor files for bankruptcy protection. All monetary values are expressed in real 2000 dollars. Earnings information comes from the W-2. Employment is an indicator for non-zero wage earnings on the W-2. Mortality is an indicator for being deceased in the indicated year using information from the Death Master File. Foreclosure is an indicator for a filer's home receiving a notice of default, receiving a notice of transfer or sale, or being transferred to a REO or a guarantor. See text for additional details.

Appendix Table 1
Bankruptcy Offices in Chapter 13 IV Sample

Court	Office	Years	Judges	Discharge	σ_Z
Northern District of Alabama	Birmingham	1999-2005	3	0.312	0.032
Southern District of Alabama	Mobile	2000-2005	2	0.447	0.006
Eastern District of Arkansas	Little Rock	1996-2001	2	0.467	0.012
Southern District of California	San Diego	1997-2005	4	0.411	0.022
Southern District of Florida	Fort Lauderdale	1994-2005	2	0.335	0.019
Southern District of Florida	Miami	1994-2005	2	0.437	0.012
Northern District of Georgia	Atlanta	2004-2005	8	0.296	0.035
Northern District of Georgia	Rome	2004-2005	2	0.401	0.011
Southern District of Iowa	Davenport	1992-2001	2	0.552	0.019
Southern District of Iowa	Des Moines	1992-2001	2	0.608	0.042
District of Idaho	Boise	1999-2005	2	0.519	0.022
Southern District of Indiana	Indianapolis	2001-2005	3	0.495	0.015
Eastern District of Kentucky	Lexington	1999-2005	2	0.585	0.033
District of Massachusetts	Boston	1995-2003	3	0.344	0.028
Eastern District of Michigan	Detroit	2003-2005	3	0.291	0.007
Western District of Michigan	Grand Rapids	1993-2005	3	0.518	0.023
District of Minnesota	Minneapolis	1992-2005	2	0.462	0.009
District of Minnesota	St. Paul	1992-2005	2	0.485	0.030
Eastern District of Missouri	St. Louis	2003-2005	2	0.405	0.015
Western District of Missouri	Kansas City	2000-2005	3	0.478	0.021
Middle District of North Carolina	Durham	2005	2	0.558	0.017
District of New Mexico	Albuquerque	1999-2005	2	0.315	0.024
District of Nevada	Las Vegas	1996-2005	2	0.396	0.010
Southern District of Ohio	Cincinnati	1997-2005	2	0.598	0.014
Southern District of Ohio	Columbus	1992-2005	3	0.573	0.049
Southern District of Ohio	Dayton	1992-2005	2	0.592	0.030
Northern District of Oklahoma	Tulsa	1997-2005	2	0.486	0.030
District of Oregon	Eugene	1995-2005	2	0.503	0.027
District of Oregon	Portland	2000-2005	3	0.495	0.158
District of South Carolina	Columbia	2003-2005	2	0.751	0.021
Eastern District of Tennessee	Chattanooga	2002-2005	2	0.424	0.017
Middle District of Tennessee	Columbia	2000-2005	3	0.437	0.031
Middle District of Tennessee	Cookeville	2000-2005	3	0.437	0.047
Middle District of Tennessee	Nashville	2000-2005	3	0.467	0.017
Western District of Tennessee	Memphis	1997-2005	3	0.277	0.007
Western District of Texas	San Antonio	1997-2005	2	0.452	0.010
District of Utah	Salt Lake City	2003-2005	3	0.334	0.019
Eastern District of Virginia	Alexandria	2000-2005	2	0.507	0.013
Eastern District of Virginia	Newport News	1997-2005	2	0.523	0.035
Eastern District of Virginia	Norfolk	1997-2005	2	0.551	0.021
Western District of Washington	Tacoma	2000-2005	2	0.503	0.017
Eastern District of Wisconsin	Milwaukee	2003-2005	3	0.456	0.020

Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for the 42 offices in the 31 bankruptcy courts that randomly assign filings to judges in our instrumental variables sample. σ_Z is the standard deviation of leave-one-out measure of judge leniency described in the text.

Appendix Table 2
Robustness of Chapter 13 Results

	Baseline Mean	Judge Leniency					Judge Fixed Effects		
		Leave One Out	Leave Mth. Out	90-day Discharge	Split Sample	2SLS (6)	LIML (7)	Jackknife (8)	
		(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)				
<i>Panel A: Labor Supply</i>									
Earnings	22.115 (17.176)	5.562*** (1.141)	5.602*** (1.065)	9.126*** (1.779)	4.628** (2.020)	4.445*** (1.593)	4.263** (1.912)	4.463** (1.812)	
Employment	0.813 (0.343)	0.068*** (0.013)	0.068*** (0.012)	0.102*** (0.046)	0.024 (0.023)	0.070** (0.030)	0.073** (0.035)	0.072** (0.038)	
<i>Panel B: Mortality</i>									
5-year Mortality	0.000 (0.000)	-0.012** (0.006)	-0.011** (0.005)	-0.025 (0.025)	-0.010 (0.015)	-0.023 (0.021)	-0.023 (0.024)	-0.023 (0.023)	
<i>Panel C: Home Foreclosure</i>									
5-year Foreclosure	0.001 (0.019)	-0.191*** (0.035)	-0.189*** (0.033)	-0.253*** (0.047)	-0.207*** (0.045)	-0.201** (0.081)	-0.242** (0.122)	-0.232** (0.113)	
<i>Panel D: Misc. Outcomes</i>									
401k Contributions	0.316 (0.855)	-0.008 (0.044)	-0.006 (0.040)	-0.069 (0.110)	0.043 (0.100)	-0.067 (0.077)	-0.116 (0.106)	-0.116 (0.104)	
Disability Insurance	0.041 (0.191)	0.012 (0.012)	0.012 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.048)	0.017 (0.028)	-0.041 (0.027)	-0.045 (0.034)	-0.042 (0.035)	
Sup. Security Income	0.006 (0.073)	-0.128* (0.074)	-0.130* (0.071)	-0.184 (0.150)	-0.114 (0.097)	-0.183*** (0.048)	-0.297*** (0.112)	-0.197*** (0.082)	
Observations	490216	490216	490216	490216	245019	490216	490216	490216	

Notes: This table reports two-stage least squares, LIML, and Jackknife IV estimates of the impact of Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection in the first five post-filing years. The sample consists of all first-time filers between 1992 and 2005 in the 42 offices that randomly assign filings to judges. The foreclosure sample includes the subset of those filings originating in county by year bins with foreclosure data coverage (N = 280202). Column 1 reports the mean and standard deviation for dismissed filers. Column 2 reports our preferred estimates from Table 4 using our leave-one-out measure of judge leniency as an instrument for bankruptcy protection. Column 3 uses a leave-month-out measure of judge leniency as an instrument. Column 4 uses a leave-one-out measure of judge leniency measured over the first 90 post-filing days as an instrument. Column 5 uses a randomly selected subset of 50 percent of filers to calculate a leave-month-out measure of judge leniency that is used as an instrument in the mutually exclusive subset of filers. Columns 6 - 8 use judge fixed effects as instruments for judge leniency estimated using two-stage least squares, LIML, and Jackknife IV respectively. All specifications control for gender, race, age, five year averages of baseline employment and baseline earnings, and office by month-of-filing fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the office level. All monetary values are expressed in real 2000 dollars divided by 1,000. See Table 1 for additional details on the data and variable construction. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.

Appendix Table 3
Additional Tests of Randomization

	Baseline	Judge Leniency		F-test
	Mean			p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Number of cases	1118.637 (758.759)	0.000012 (0.000016)		[0.000]
Earnings Decile 2	0.100 (0.300)		-0.000444 (0.000287)	[0.557]
Earnings Decile 3	0.100 (0.300)		-0.000193 (0.000147)	[0.474]
Earnings Decile 4	0.100 (0.300)		-0.000221* (0.000129)	[0.992]
Earnings Decile 5	0.100 (0.300)		-0.000136 (0.000137)	[0.733]
Earnings Decile 6	0.100 (0.300)		0.000084 (0.000259)	[0.285]
Earnings Decile 7	0.100 (0.300)		0.000044 (0.000143)	[0.965]
Earnings Decile 8	0.100 (0.300)		0.000078 (0.000250)	[0.813]
Earnings Decile 9	0.100 (0.300)		0.000355 (0.000350)	[0.039]
Earnings Decile 10	0.100 (0.300)		0.000147 (0.000207)	[0.312]
Joint F-Test		[0.468]	[0.288]	
Observations	490216	490216	490216	

Notes: This table reports reduced form results testing the random assignment of filings to judges. The sample consists of all first-time Chapter 13 filers between 1992 and 2005 in the 42 offices that randomly assign filings to judges. Column 1 reports means and standard deviations for dismissed filers. Columns 2 - 3 report estimates from an OLS regression of judge leniency on the variables listed and office by month-of-filing fixed effects, with standard errors clustered at the office level. Judge leniency is the leave-one-out mean rate of granting bankruptcy protection for the assigned judge minus the leave-one-out mean rate of granting bankruptcy protection for the court in the same filing year. The p-value reported at bottom of columns 2 - 3 is for a F-test of the joint significance of the variables listed in the rows. Each row of column 4 reports a p-value from a separate OLS regression of only the pre-determined variable listed in the corresponding row on judge and office by month-of-filing fixed effects. The p-value is for a F-test of the joint significance of the judge fixed effects. See Table 1 for details on the data and variable construction. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.

Appendix Table 4
Labor Supply, Mortality, and Home Foreclosure for Granted and Dismissed Chapter 13 Filers

Year Relative to Filing	Earnings		Employment		Mortality		Home Foreclosure	
	Granted (2)	Dismissed (3)	Granted (4)	Dismissed (5)	Granted (6)	Dismissed (7)	Granted (8)	Dismissed (9)
-10	20871.66	15052.29	0.795	0.712	—	—	—	—
-9	21532.00	15779.59	0.809	0.732	—	—	—	—
-8	22390.54	16523.13	0.820	0.749	—	—	—	—
-7	23347.02	17433.49	0.831	0.765	—	—	—	—
-6	24311.48	18343.05	0.838	0.778	—	—	—	—
-5	25178.44	19323.27	0.843	0.789	—	—	—	—
-4	25971.66	20264.19	0.843	0.794	—	—	—	—
-3	26498.91	20868.53	0.841	0.795	—	—	—	—
-2	26574.25	20934.64	0.838	0.790	—	—	—	—
-1	26400.98	20314.23	0.836	0.787	—	—	—	—
0	26580.45	19359.44	0.835	0.786	0.001	0.004	0.003	0.024
1	27389.37	18778.57	0.827	0.768	0.004	0.012	0.007	0.074
2	27632.53	18374.64	0.819	0.749	0.007	0.019	0.011	0.106
3	27378.35	18255.57	0.809	0.731	0.011	0.028	0.015	0.127
4	26673.45	17674.69	0.796	0.711	0.016	0.035	0.019	0.140
5	25771.07	17309.49	0.778	0.689	0.021	0.040	0.025	0.149
Observations	219617	270599	219617	270599	219617	270599	115806	164398

Notes: This table reports average labor supply, mortality, and home foreclosure for granted and dismissed bankruptcy filers. The labor supply and mortality sample includes all first-time filings between 1992 and 2005 in the 42 offices that randomly assign cases to judges. The foreclosure sample includes the subset of those filings originating in county by year bins with foreclosure data coverage. Year 0 indicates the year a debtor files for bankruptcy protection. Dollar amounts are expressed in real 2000 dollars. See text for additional details.

Appendix Table 5
Chapter 13 Results for Additional Outcomes

	Baseline	2SLS Results	
	Mean		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Panel A: Labor Supply</i>			
Self Emp. Earnings	0.585 (3.644)	0.290 (0.271)	0.367 (0.299)
Self Employment	0.061 (0.183)	−0.005 (0.016)	0.001 (0.018)
Earnings with no zeros	23.729 (24.307)	7.109*** (2.001)	4.416*** (1.636)
<i>Panel B: Mortality</i>			
Years Alive (out of 5)	5.000 (0.000)	0.057** (0.023)	0.053** (0.021)
<i>Panel C: Home Sales</i>			
5-year Distress Sale	0.001 (0.021)	−0.221*** (0.035)	−0.222*** (0.036)
5-year Any Home Sale	0.001 (0.031)	−0.335*** (0.046)	−0.339*** (0.048)
Controls	–	No	Yes
Observations	490216	490216	490216

Notes: This table reports two-stage least squares results of the impact of Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection. The sample consists of all first-time filers between 1992 and 2005 in the 42 offices that randomly assign filings to judges. The home sample includes the subset of those filings originating in county by year bins with home sales data coverage ($N = 280202$). Column 1 reports the mean and standard deviation for the five years before filing. Columns 2 - 3 instrument for bankruptcy protection using the reduced form measure of judge leniency described in the text. All specifications control for office by month-of-filing fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the office level. Column 3 adds controls for gender, race, age, and the five year average of baseline employment and baseline earnings. All monetary values are expressed in real 2000 dollars divided by 1,000. See Table 1 for additional details on the data and variable construction. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.

Appendix Table 6
Chapter 13 Results for Years 6 - 10

	Baseline	2SLS Results	
	Mean		
<i>Panel A: Labor Supply</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)
Earnings	20.517 (16.147)	8.127*** (1.949)	6.772*** (1.603)
Employment	0.812 (0.340)	0.096*** (0.029)	0.066* (0.035)
<i>Panel B: Mortality</i>			
10-year Mortality	0.000 (0.000)	-0.026 (0.024)	-0.015 (0.028)
<i>Panel C: Home Foreclosure</i>			
10-year Foreclosure	0.000 (0.010)	-0.272*** (0.040)	-0.277*** (0.042)
<i>Panel D: Misc. Outcomes</i>			
401k Contributions	0.221 (0.686)	0.405*** (0.147)	0.298** (0.140)
Disability Insurance	0.033 (0.172)	-0.054*** (0.020)	-0.034* (0.020)
Sup. Security Income	0.004 (0.065)	-0.209** (0.089)	-0.156* (0.088)
Controls	-	No	Yes
Observations	189100	189100	189100

Notes: This table reports two-stage least squares results of the impact of Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection over the sixth through tenth post-filing years. The sample consists of all first-time filers between 1992 and 2000 in the 42 offices that randomly assign filings to judges. The foreclosure sample includes the subset of those filings originating in county by year bins with foreclosure data coverage ($N = 84181$). Column 1 reports the mean and standard deviation for dismissed filers. Columns 2 - 3 instrument for bankruptcy protection using the reduced form measure of judge leniency described in the text. All specifications control for office by month-of-filing fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the office level. Column 3 also includes controls for gender, race, age, and the five year average of baseline employment and baseline earnings. All monetary values are expressed in real 2000 dollars divided by 1,000. See Table 1 for additional details on the data and variable construction. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.

Appendix Table 7
Chapter 13 Job Mobility Results by Wage Garnishment Regulations

	Garnishment in State?		State/Federal Marginal Garnishment Rate				
	No	Yes	0/0	0/25	0/100	25/25	100/100
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Work in Same County	-0.053 (0.077) [0.532]	0.236*** (0.025) [0.582]	0.151 (0.131) [0.275]	-0.033 (0.152) [0.696]	0.351 (0.230) [0.511]	0.236*** (0.022) [0.712]	0.294 (0.227) [0.535]
Work in Same State	-0.012 (0.084) [0.588]	0.157*** (0.026) [0.633]	0.109 (0.158) [0.312]	-0.118 (0.149) [0.762]	0.218 (0.272) [0.609]	0.164*** (0.028) [0.766]	0.059 (0.311) [0.601]
Work in Same Job	0.143* (0.084) [0.462]	0.249*** (0.026) [0.508]	0.206** (0.095) [0.219]	0.207 (0.179) [0.614]	0.252 (0.209) [0.397]	0.251*** (0.025) [0.636]	0.226 (0.202) [0.426]
Work in Same Industry	-0.085 (0.066) [0.515]	0.246*** (0.025) [0.564]	0.218 (0.138) [0.249]	0.067 (0.164) [0.683]	0.379** (0.172) [0.458]	0.245*** (0.025) [0.701]	0.080 (0.172) [0.489]
Job Tenure	1.027 (1.102) [3.333]	0.814*** (0.176) [3.666]	0.217 (0.195) [0.965]	1.355 (1.281) [4.801]	-0.010 (0.498) [2.412]	0.996*** (0.245) [4.900]	2.352*** (0.817) [2.695]
Firm Wages	2.438 (3.343) [16.443]	4.153*** (1.115) [19.496]	-1.004 (1.039) [5.237]	1.565 (4.266) [23.680]	4.994 (5.101) [12.638]	5.836*** (1.384) [26.059]	5.469 (6.029) [13.568]
Observations	62040	428176	135418	38071	10122	277726	28879

Notes: This table reports two-stage least squares results of the impact of Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection interacted with state and federal garnishment laws. The sample consists of all first-time filers between 1992 and 2005 in the 42 offices that randomly assign filings to judges that are employed for at least one time period post-bankruptcy. Columns 1 - 2 interact Chapter 13 with indicators for living in a state that does not allow any wage garnishment and living in a state that does allow wage garnishment. Columns 3 - 7 interact Chapter 13 with indicators for binding garnishment bracket in the filer's state of filing and the non-binding federal bracket. Each column header refers to the marginal garnishment rate in the state/federal system. All specifications control for gender, race, age, and the five year average of baseline employment baseline earnings, and office by month-of-filing fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the office level. All monetary values are expressed in real 2000 dollars divided by 1,000. See Table 1 for additional details on the data and variable construction. Observations refer to the number of bankruptcy filers in the indicated group. The number of observations in each regression is the sum of all columns. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.