Replication data for: Political Price Cycles in Regulated Industries: Theory and Evidence
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Rodrigo M. S. Moita; Claudio Paiva
Version: View help for Version V1
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2010_0073 | 10/13/2019 07:24:AM | ||
LICENSE.txt | text/plain | 14.6 KB | 10/13/2019 03:24:AM |
Project Citation:
Moita, Rodrigo M. S., and Paiva, Claudio. Replication data for: Political Price Cycles in Regulated Industries: Theory and Evidence. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2013. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-13. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114815V1
Project Description
Summary:
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The early work of Stigler (1971) treats the regulatory process as the
arbitration of conflicting economic and political interests rather than
a pure welfare-maximizing effort. This paper builds on these ideas
and models the regulatory process as a game where the industry-lobby, consumers-voters, and a regulator-politician interact to define the regulated price, in alternating electoral and non-electoral periods. The equilibrium that emerges consists of a fully rational political price cycle in a regulated industry. Using monthly data for regulated gasoline and electricity prices from Brazil, we find strong evidence pointing towards the existence of electoral price cycles in both markets. (JEL D72, L51, L71, L78, L94, L98, O14)
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
L51 Economics of Regulation
L71 Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Hydrocarbon Fuels
L78 Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction: Government Policy
L94 Electric Utilities
L98 Industry Studies: Utilities and Transportation: Government Policy
O14 Industrialization; Manufacturing and Service Industries; Choice of Technology
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
L51 Economics of Regulation
L71 Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Hydrocarbon Fuels
L78 Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction: Government Policy
L94 Electric Utilities
L98 Industry Studies: Utilities and Transportation: Government Policy
O14 Industrialization; Manufacturing and Service Industries; Choice of Technology
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