Replication data for: A Test for the Rational Ignorance Hypothesis: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Brazil
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Fernanda Leite Lopez de Leon; Renata Rizzi
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Lopez de Leon, Fernanda Leite, and Rizzi, Renata. Replication data for: A Test for the Rational Ignorance Hypothesis: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Brazil. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2014. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-13. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114885V1
Project Description
Summary:
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This paper tests the rational ignorance hypothesis by Downs (1957).
This theory predicts that people do not acquire costly information to
educate their votes. We provide new estimates for the effect of voting
participation by exploring the Brazilian dual voting system- voluntary
and compulsory- whose exposure is determined by citizens' date of birth. Using a fuzzy RD approach and data from a self-collected survey, we find no impact of voting on individuals' political knowledge or information consumption. Our results corroborate Downs' predictions and refute the conjecture by Lijphart (1997) that compulsory voting stimulates civic education.
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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D12 Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
O12 Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
D12 Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
O12 Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
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