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Project Citation: 

Piketty, Thomas, Saez, Emmanuel, and Stantcheva, Stefanie. Replication data for: Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2014. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-13. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114850V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary This paper derives optimal top tax rate formulas in a model where top earners respond to taxes through three channels: labor supply, tax avoidance, and compensation bargaining. The optimal top tax rate increases when there are zero-sum compensation-bargaining effects. We present empirical evidence consistent with bargaining effects. Top tax rate cuts are associated with top one percent pretax income shares increases but not higher economic growth. US CEO "pay for luck" is quantitatively more prevalent when top tax rates are low. International CEO pay levels are negatively correlated with top tax rates, even controlling for firms' characteristics and performance.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      D31 Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
      H21 Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
      H24 Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; includes inheritance and gift taxes
      H26 Tax Evasion and Avoidance
      M12 Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation


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