The Role of Proximity in Foreclosure Externalities: Evidence from Condominiums Online Appendix
Fisher, Lambie-Hanson, and Willen

Table 1: Results from Boston repeat-sales analysis: Including short sales in sample.

|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (Main) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Change in number of foreclosures within 0.1 mile... |  |  |  |  |  |
| Single-family | $\begin{gathered} 0.003 \\ (0.006) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.002 \\ (0.006) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.003 \\ (0.006) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.003 \\ (0.006) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.003 \\ (0.006) \end{gathered}$ |
| Multifamily | $\begin{gathered} 0.005 \\ (0.008) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.005 \\ (0.008) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.006 \\ (0.008) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.005 \\ (0.008) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.006 \\ (0.008) \end{gathered}$ |
| Condo | $\begin{gathered} -0.005^{* * *} \\ (0.001) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  |  |
| Different association |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.003^{* *} \\ (0.001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.003^{* *} \\ (0.001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.003^{* *} \\ (0.001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.003^{* *} \\ (0.001) \end{gathered}$ |
| Same association |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.010^{* *} \\ (0.004) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  |
| SA 2 to 3 |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.167^{* * *} \\ (0.046) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.167^{* * *} \\ (0.046) \end{gathered}$ |
| SA 4 to 12 |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.083^{* * *} \\ (0.017) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.083^{* * *} \\ (0.017) \end{gathered}$ |
| SA 13 to 50 |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.023^{* * *} \\ (0.007) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |
| SA 51+ |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.007^{*} \\ & (0.004) \end{aligned}$ |  |  |
| SASA |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.027^{* * *} \\ (0.005) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| SADA |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.004 \\ & (0.003) \end{aligned}$ |  |
| SASA 13 to 50 |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.021^{*} \\ & (0.011) \end{aligned}$ |
| SADA 13 to 50 |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.027^{*} \\ & (0.015) \end{aligned}$ |
| SASA 51+ |  |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.022^{* * *} \\ (0.005) \end{gathered}$ |
| SADA 51+ |  |  |  |  | $\begin{array}{r} -0.003 \\ (0.003) \\ \hline \end{array}$ |
| Controls |  |  |  |  |  |
| Census tract-year | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| Experienced foreclosure dummy | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| Association size | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| Observations (repeat-sales pairs) |  |  | 34,970 |  |  |
| R-squared | 0.669 | 0.669 | 0.671 | 0.670 | 0.672 |

Source: Authors' calculations of Warren Group and City of Boston Assessing Department data. Note: ${ }^{* * *},{ }^{* *}$, and ${ }^{*}$ represent statistical significance at 1,5 , and 10 percent levels, respectively. Model 1 demonstrates that there is a small but statistically significant negative spillover from each additional nearby condo foreclosure. Model 2 breaks these foreclosures down by those in the same association versus those that are located nearby but in different associations, indicating that same-association foreclosures drive the price spillovers. Model 3 shows that these same-association foreclosures are most detrimental in smaller associations. Model 4 shows that same-association foreclosures are harmful when located at the same address. Model 5 further supports this, showing that, in associations of more than 50 units, same-address foreclosures have stronger impacts on prices than different-address foreclosures in the same association.

