Replication data for: Uncertainty and Trade Agreements
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Nuno Limão; Giovanni Maggi
Version: View help for Version V1
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2013_163_replication | 10/12/2019 10:13:PM | ||
LICENSE.txt | text/plain | 14.6 KB | 10/12/2019 06:13:PM |
Project Citation:
Limão, Nuno, and Maggi, Giovanni. Replication data for: Uncertainty and Trade Agreements. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2015. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114325V1
Project Description
Summary:
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We explore conditions under which trade agreements can provide gains by reducing trade policy uncertainty. Given the degree of income risk aversion, this is more likely when economies are more open, export supply elasticities are lower, and economies more specialized. Governments have stronger incentives to sign trade agreements when the trading environment is more uncertain. As exogenous trade costs decline, the gains from reducing tariff uncertainty become more important relative to reducing average tariff levels. We also develop a simple "sufficient statistic" approach to quantify the gains from managing trade policy uncertainty, and examine the impact of ex ante investments on such gains. (JEL D81, F13)
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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D81 Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
F13 Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
D81 Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
F13 Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
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