Replication data for: Local Institutions and the Dynamics of Community Sorting
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Andrea Robbett
Version: View help for Version V1
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LICENSE.txt | text/plain | 14.6 KB | 10/12/2019 07:42:PM |
Project Citation:
Robbett, Andrea. Replication data for: Local Institutions and the Dynamics of Community Sorting. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2014. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114419V1
Project Description
Summary:
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This paper studies the dynamics by which populations with heterogeneous preferences for public good provision sort themselves into communities. I conduct laboratory experiments to consider which institutions best facilitate efficient self-organization when residents can move freely between locations. I find that institutions requiring all residents of a community to pay equal taxes enable subjects to sort into stable, homogeneous communities. Though sorted, residents often fail to attain the provision level best suited for them. When residents can vote for local tax policies with ballots, along with their feet, each community converges to the most efficient outcome for its population.
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H21 Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
H41 Public Goods
H71 State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
H73 State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H21 Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
H41 Public Goods
H71 State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
H73 State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
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