Replication data for: Vendettas
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Friedel Bolle; Jonathan H. W. Tan; Daniel John Zizzo
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Bolle, Friedel, Tan, Jonathan H. W., and Zizzo, Daniel John. Replication data for: Vendettas. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2014. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114418V1
Project Description
Summary:
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Vendettas occur in many real-world settings where rivals compete
for a prize, e.g., winning a competitive promotion or retaining a job,
by engaging in aggressive, retaliatory behavior. We present a benchmark experiment where two players have an initial probability of
winning a prize. Retaliatory vendettas occur and lead subjects to
the worst possible outcomes in 2/3 of cases, counter to self-interest
predictions, with large inefficiencies even in the absence of any
immediate gain from aggression. Negative emotions are important
and interact with the economic setting to produce large social inefficiencies. Allowing cooling off periods reduces aggression.
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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C72 Noncooperative Games
D74 Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
C72 Noncooperative Games
D74 Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
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