Replication data for: Coalition Formation in a Legislative Voting Game
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Nels Christiansen; Sotiris Georganas; John H. Kagel
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Christiansen, Nels, Georganas, Sotiris, and Kagel, John H. Replication data for: Coalition Formation in a Legislative Voting Game. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2014. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114414V1
Project Description
Summary:
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We experimentally investigate the Jackson and Moselle (2002) model where legislators bargain over policy proposals and the allocation of
private goods. Key comparative static predictions of the model hold with the introduction of private goods, including "strange bedfellow"
coalitions. Private goods help to secure legislative compromise and increase the likelihood of proposals passing, an outcome not
predicted by the theory but a staple of the applied political economy literature. Coalition formation is better characterized by an "efficient
equal split" between coalition partners than the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction, which has implications for stable political party formation.
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H41 Public Goods
C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H41 Public Goods
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