Replication data for: The Political Economy of the Greek Debt Crisis: A Tale of Two Bailouts
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Silvia Ardagna; Francesco Caselli
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Ardagna, Silvia, and Caselli, Francesco. Replication data for: The Political Economy of the Greek Debt Crisis: A Tale of Two Bailouts. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2014. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114309V1
Project Description
Summary:
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We review the events that led to the May 2010 and July 2011
bailout agreements. We interpret the bailouts as outcomes of
political-economy equilibria. We argue that these equilibria were
likely not on the Pareto frontier, and sketch political-economy arguments for why collective policymaking in the Euro area may lead to suboptimal outcomes.
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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E58 Central Banks and Their Policies
E62 Fiscal Policy
F34 International Lending and Debt Problems
G01 Financial Crises
H61 National Budget; Budget Systems
H63 National Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
E58 Central Banks and Their Policies
E62 Fiscal Policy
F34 International Lending and Debt Problems
G01 Financial Crises
H61 National Budget; Budget Systems
H63 National Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
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