Replication data for: Accounting for Crises

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Project Citation:

Nagar, Venky, and Yu, Gwen. Replication data for: Accounting for Crises. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2014. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114301V1

Project Description

Summary: We provide among the first empirical evidence, consistent with recent macro global game crisis models, that shows that the precision of public signals can coordinate crises. In these models, self-fulfilling crises independent of fundamentals can occur only when publicly disclosed signals of fundamentals have high precision; poor fundamentals are the sole driver of crises only in low precision settings. We exploit a key publicly disclosed signal of fundamentals, namely accounting data, for 68 currency and systemic banking crises in 17 countries. We find that precrisis accounting signals of fundamentals are significantly lower only in low-precision countries.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
      E44 Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
      G01 Financial Crises
      G14 Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
      G21 Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
      L25 Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope
      M40 Accounting and Auditing: General

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Published Versions

V1 [2019-10-12]

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