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User profiles for author:"Fuhito Kojima"

Fuhito Kojima

Assistant Professor of Economics, Stanford University
Verified email at stanford.edu
Cited by 487

Incentives and stability in large two-sided matching markets

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F Kojima… - The American Economic Review, 2009 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: A number of labor markets and student placement systems can be modeled as
many-to-one matching markets. We analyze the scope for manipulation in many-to-one
matching markets under the student-optimal stable mechanism when the number of ...
Cited by 84 - Related articles - All 36 versions

Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts

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JW Hatfield… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2010 - Elsevier
We consider the matching with contracts framework of Hatfield and Milgrom [20], and we
introduce new concepts of bilateral and unilateral substitutes. We show that the bilateral
substitutes condition is a sufficient condition for the existence of a stable allocation in this ...
Cited by 34 - Related articles - All 15 versions

Asymptotic equivalence of probabilistic serial and random priority mechanisms

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YK Che… - Econometrica, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
The random priority (random serial dictatorship) mechanism is a common method for
assigning objects. The mechanism is easy to implement and strategy-proof. However, this
mechanism is inefficient, because all agents may be made better off by another ...
Cited by 28 - Related articles - All 53 versions

Axioms for deferred acceptance

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F Kojima… - Econometrica, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
The deferred acceptance algorithm is often used to allocate indivisible objects when
monetary transfers are not allowed. We provide two characterizations of agent-proposing
deferred acceptance allocation rules. Two new axioms—individually rational monotonicity ...
Cited by 27 - Related articles - All 12 versions

Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism

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F Kojima… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2010 - Elsevier
The probabilistic serial mechanism (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001 [9]) is ordinally efficient
but not strategy-proof. We study incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism for large
assignment problems. We establish that for a fixed set of object types and an agent with a ...
Cited by 23 - Related articles - All 8 versions

Matching with contracts: Comment

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JW Hatfield… - The American Economic Review, 2008 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) present a unified model of matching with contracts
phrased in terms of hospitals and doctors, which subsumes the standard two-sided matching
and some package auction models. They show that a stable allocation exists if contracts ...
Cited by 23 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 10 versions

Matching and price competition: comment

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F Kojima - The American economic review, 2007 - JSTOR
The theory of two-sided matching markets has interested researchers for its theoretical
appeal and relevance to real-life applications. The matching of medical residents and
hospitals in the United States has been studied extensively by Alvin E. Roth (1984) and ...
Cited by 19 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 12 versions

Matching with couples: Stability and incentives in large markets

F Kojima, PA Pathak… - 2010 - nber.org
Accommodating couples has been a longstanding issue in the design of centralized labor
market clearinghouses for doctors and psychologists, because couples view pairs of jobs as
complements. A stable matching may not exist when couples are present. We find ...
Cited by 17 - Related articles - Library Search - All 7 versions

Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts

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JW Hatfield… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2009 - Elsevier
Hatfield and Milgrom [Hatfield, John William, Milgrom, Paul R., 2005. Matching with
contracts. Amer. Econ. Rev. 95, 913–935] present a unified model of matching with
contracts, which includes the standard two-sided matching and some package auction ...
Cited by 17 - Related articles - All 11 versions

Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures

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F Kojima - Social Choice and Welfare, 2008 - Springer
Abstract The Boston mechanism is a centralized student assignment mechanism used in
many school districts in the US. We investigate strategic behavior of students under the
Boston mechanism when schools may have complex priority structures. We show that a ...
Cited by 13 - Related articles - All 9 versions

Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital–intern markets

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F Kojima - Social choice and Welfare, 2006 - Springer
Abstract We investigate games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets as
proposed by Konishi and Ünver (Soc Choice Welfare, in press). While Konishi and Ünver
(Soc Choice Welfare, in press) show that there may not exist a pure-strategy Nash ...
Cited by 11 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 8 versions

Risk-dominance and perfect foresight dynamics in< i> N</i>-player games

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F Kojima - Journal of Economic Theory, 2006 - Elsevier
In perfect foresight dynamics, an action is linearly stable if expectation that people will
always choose the action is self-fulfilling. A symmetric game is a PIM game if an opponent's
particular action maximizes the incentive of an action, independently of the rest of the ...
Cited by 10 - Related articles - All 13 versions

When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets?--Maximal Domain Results

[PDF] from psu.edu
F Kojima - The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2007 - degruyter.com
In two-sided matching markets, stable mechanisms are vulnerable to various kinds of
manipulations. This paper investigates conditions for the student-optimal stable mechanism
(SOSM) and the college-optimal stable mechanism (COSM) to be immune to ...
Cited by 10 - Related articles - All 11 versions

[PDF] Voter preferences, polarization, and electoral policies

[PDF] from harvard.edu
Y Kamada… - 2009 - people.fas.harvard.edu
Abstract In most variants of the Hotelling-Downs model of election, it is assumed that voters
have concave utility functions. This assumption is arguably justified in issues such as
economic policies, but convex utilities are perhaps more appropriate in others such as ...
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[PDF] Asymptotic Equivalence of Random Priority and Probabilistic Serial Mechanisms

[PDF] from tkfd.or.jp
YK Che… - Econometrica, forthcoming, 2008 - tkfd.or.jp
There is a fixed set of types of goods O, plus the null good (receiving no good) ø. Let O=
O∪{ø}. Each agent i has strict preferences πi over O. A q-economy is composed of q copies
of each (real) good and infinite copies of ø, and Set of agents: we only assume (number of ...
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Robust stability in matching markets

[PDF] from econtheory.org
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F Kojima - Theoretical Economics, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly
stable if it is stable, strategy-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a
student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that is produced by ...
Cited by 7 - Related articles - All 16 versions

[PDF] School choice: Impossibilities for affirmative action

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F Kojima - 2010 - sites.google.com
Abstract. This paper investigates the welfare effects of affirmative action policies in school
choice. We show that affirmative action policies can have perverse consequences.
Specifically, we demonstrate that there are market situations in which affirmative action ...
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The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market

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F Kojima - Economics Letters, 2008 - Elsevier
In the college admission problem, we show that the student-optimal stable matching is
weakly Pareto optimal for students if colleges' preferences satisfy substitutability and the law
of aggregate demand. We also show that both of these properties are important for the ...
Cited by 6 - Related articles - All 8 versions

[PDF] Improving efficiency in matching markets with regional caps: The case of the Japan residency matching program

[PDF] from google.com
Y Kamada… - 2010 - sites.google.com
Abstract. In an attempt to increase the placement of medical residents in rural hospitals, the
Japanese government recently introduced “regional caps” which restrict the total number of
residents matched within each region of the country. To accommodate regional caps, the ...
Cited by 8 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 19 versions

[PDF] Matching and price competition when firms can hire more than one worker

[PDF] from eaer.org
F Kojima - Am Econ Rev (forthcoming), 2006 - mail.eaer.org
Abstract A recent antitrust case against the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP)
sparked discussion about the effect of a centralized matching on wages. Jeremy Bulow and
Jonathan Levin (2006) investigate a matching market with price competition where each ...
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Stability and instability of the unbeatable strategy in dynamic processes

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F Kojima - International Journal of Economic Theory, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
1. I thank Drew Fudenberg for instruction and guidance. I am also grateful to Attila Ambrus,
Ulrich Berger, Eric Budish, William H. Sandholm, Satoru Takahashi, an anonymous referee,
and seminar participants at Harvard University and Tokyo University for helpful comments ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 11 versions

Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms

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F Kojima - Economics Letters, 2010 - Elsevier
Stability is a central concept in matching theory, while nonbossiness is important in many
allocation problems. We show that these properties are incompatible: there does not exist a
matching mechanism that is both stable and nonbossy.
Cited by 6 - Related articles - All 7 versions

Community Enforcement when Players Observe Partners' Past Play,” mimeo

S Takahashi, J Green, F Kojima, G Mailath… - 2008 - Citeseer
Abstract I investigate whether a community can sustain cooperation in the repeated
prisoner's dilemma by having cheaters punished not by their victims but by third parties.
Motivated by systems of credit history reporting, online feedback, and some experimental ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - Cached

[PDF] The 'Boston'School Choice Mechanism

[PDF] from bc.edu
F Kojima… - Boston College Working Papers in Economics, 2010 - fmwww.bc.edu
Abstract The Boston mechanism is a popular student-placement mechanism in school-
choice programs around the world. We provide two characterizations of the Boston
mechanism. We introduce a new axiom, respect of preference rankings. A mechanism is ...
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p-Dominance and perfect foresight dynamics

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F Kojima… - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2008 - Elsevier
We investigate stability of p-dominant equilibria under perfect foresight dynamics. We show
that a strict p-dominant equilibrium with∑ ipi< 1 is globally accessible and absorbing in
perfect foresight dynamics. We also investigate robustness and extensions of this result. ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - All 8 versions

[CITATION] Economics of infanticide

F Kojima - Manuscript, Dept. Econ., Harvard Univ, 2005
Cited by 4 - Related articles

[CITATION] VIncentives and Stability in Large Two'Sided Match'ing Markets. V Forthcoming

F Kojima… - American Economic Review, 2007
Cited by 2 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries

[CITATION] Incentives in the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism, forthcoming

F Kojima… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2008
Cited by 2 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries

[PDF] Matching with contracts: corrigendum

[PDF] from stanford.edu
JW Hatfield… - 2007 - faculty-gsb.stanford.edu
Abstract Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) present a unified model of matching with contracts,
which includes the standard two-sided matching and some package auction models as
special cases. They show that there exists a stable set of contracts if contracts are ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 3 versions

[CITATION] k Voter Preferences

Y Kamada… - Polarization, and Electoral Policies, lmimeo, 2009
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[CITATION] Asymptotic Equivalence of the Random Priority and Probabilistic Serial Mechanisms.” forthcoming

YK Che… - Econometrica, 2008
Cited by 2 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries

[CITATION] Forthcoming. Matching and Price Competition When Firms Can Hire More Than One Worker

F Kojima - American Economic Review
Cited by 2 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries

[PDF] The Equivalence Between Costly and Probabilistic Voting Models

[PDF] from harvard.edu
Y Kamada… - 2011 - people.fas.harvard.edu
Abstract In costly voting models, voters abstain when a stochastic cost of voting exceeds the
benefit from voting. In probabilistic voting models, they always vote for a candidate who
generates the highest utility, which is subject to random shocks. We prove an equivalence ...
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MATCHING AND MARKET DESIGN: AN INTRODUCTION TO SELECTED TOPICS*

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F Kojima… - Japanese Economic Review, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
This paper has been prepared for an invited lecture delivered by Kojima at the 2010 Annual
Meeting of the Japanese Economic Association. A large part of this survey is based on‡)
and) as well as lecture notes from Kojima's lectures (regular classes and mini-lectures) at ...
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The “rural hospital theorem” revisited

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F Kojima - International Journal of Economic Theory, 2012 - Wiley Online Library
In the context of two-sided matching, we propose a new class of preferences called
separable preferences with affirmative action constraints. We demonstrate that the
celebrated “rural hospital theorem” in the matching literature generalizes to this class of ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 2 versions

[CITATION] Matching with Contracts: Corrigendum

F Kojima… - forthcoming in American Economic Review, 2007
Cited by 1 - Related articles

[CITATION] Competitive Claims and Resource Allocation by Deferred Acceptance

F KOJIMA… - 2007
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Promoting School Competition Through School Choice: A Market Design Approach

[PDF] from wustl.edu
J Hatfield, F Kojima… - 2012 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We study the effect of different school choice mechanisms on schools' incentives
for quality improvement. To do so, we introduce the following criterion: A mechanism
respects improvements of school quality if each school becomes weakly better off when- ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - All 29 versions

[PDF] Corrections and updates for fourth printing of Osborne and Rubinstein's “A Course in Game Theory”(MIT Press, 1994) 2005/4/6 We thank the following people …

[PDF] from toronto.edu
RB Ambrus-Lakatos, BP de Bruin, J Dubra, F Kojima… - 2005 - economics.toronto.edu
Page, Line Correction xv Martin J. Osborne's email address is now martin. osborne@
utoronto. ca and his mailing address is Department of Economics, University of Toronto, 150
St. George Street, Toronto, Canada, M5S 3G7. xv Ariel Rubinstein's email address is now ...
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Essays on matching and market design

F Kojima - 2008 - gradworks.umi.com
The first essay, co-authored with Parag Pathak, analyzes the scope for manipulation in many-
to-one matching markets under the student-optimal stable mechanism when the number of
participants is large. Under some regularity conditions, we show that the fraction of ...
Cached - Library Search - All 2 versions

[PDF] Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets

[PDF] from psu.edu
FKPAP Alvin… - 2010 - Citeseer
Abstract Accommodating couples has been a longstanding issue in the design of centralized
labor market clearinghouses for doctors and psychologists, because couples view pairs of
jobs as complements. A stable matching may not exist when couples are present. We find ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 22 versions

[PDF] Comment on the NRMP's “Supplemental Offer and Acceptance Program” Proposed to Replace the Post-Match Scramble

[PDF] from scottkom.com
PA Coles, CR Featherstone, JW Hatfield, F Kojima… - scottkom.com
Historic precedent and economic principles suggest that the Supplemental Offer and
Acceptance Program (SOAP) proposed for the NRMP Scramble will lead to unsatisfactory
outcomes by forcing participants to make unnecessarily difficult decisions and giving them ...
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[PDF] A Generalized Approach to Equilibrium Selection under Perfect Foresight Dynamics

[PDF] from u-tokyo.ac.jp
F Kojima - 2003 - eu-tokyo.ac.jp
Abstract We investigate perfect foresight dynamics, a dynamic process of equilibrium
selection formalized by Matsui and Matsuyama (1995). People are assumed to play random
matching games and make rational decisions. Stability concepts are defined under this ...
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[PDF] Efficient Assignment with Interdependent Values

[PDF] from columbia.edu
YK Che, J Kim… - 2012 - columbia.edu
Abstract: We study the “house allocation” problem in which n agents are assigned n objects,
one for each agent, when the agents have interdependent values. We show that there exists
no mechanism that is Pareto efficient and ex post incentive compatible, and the only ...
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[PDF] Incentive Compatibility in Matching with Contracts

[PDF] from stanford.edu
JW Hatfield… - 2007 - faculty-gsb.stanford.edu
Abstract Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) present a unified model of matching with contracts,
which includes the standard two-sided matching and some package auction models as
special cases. They show that the doctor-optimal stable mechanism is strategy-proof for ...
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[PDF] American Economic Association

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JW Hatfield… - The American Economic Review, 2008 - faculty-gsb.stanford.edu
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover,
use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information
technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For ...
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Bureaucrats or Politicians? Comment

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F Kojima - The American Economic Review, 2008 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: Alesina and Tabellini (2007) investigate the normative criteria for allocating policy
tasks to bureaucrats versus politicians. While they establish criteria with respect to a number
of parameters, they do not give a criterion with respect to the degree of imperfect ...
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[PDF] Corrections and updates for third printing of Osborne and Rubinstein's “A Course in Game Theory”(MIT Press, 1994) 2005/4/6 We thank the following people for …

[PDF] from toronto.edu
JB Ambrus-Lakatos, R Boylan, BP de Bruin… - 2005 - economics.toronto.edu
Page, Line Correction xiii, 4 Instructors using the book in a course may now request the
solutions to the exercises at http://www. economics. utoronto. ca/osborne/cgt/. xv Martin J.
Osborne's email address is now martin. osborne@ utoronto. ca and his mailing address is ...
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[PDF] Appendix to “Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets”

[PDF] from aeaweb.org
F Kojima… - 2009 - aeaweb.org
We first introduce some notation. First, non-strict counterparts of Ps and≻ c are denoted by
Rs and≽ c, respectively. For any pair of matchings µ and µ′ and for any c∈ C, we write µ≻
c µ′ if and only if µ (c)≻ c µ′(c). Similarly, for any s∈ S, we write µPsµ′ if and only if µ ( ...
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[PDF] Random Assignment Mechanisms in Large Markets

[PDF] from hku.hk
F KOJIMA - 2009 - sef.hku.hk
Abstract. The probabilistic serial mechanism (Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001) is ordinally
efficient but not strategy-proof. We study incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism for
large allocation problems. We establish that, for a fixed set of object types and an agent ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 4 versions

[PDF] The Role of p-Dominance in Equilibrium Selection under Perfect Foresight Dynamics

[PDF] from u-tokyo.ac.jp
F Kojima - 2002 - eu-tokyo.ac.jp
Abstract We investigate a dynamic process of equilibrium selection first defined by Matsui
and Matsuyama [8], which is called perfect foresight dynamics. People play random
matching games and make rational decisions. We give sufficient conditions for Nash ...
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A theory of hung juries and informative voting

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F Kojima… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2010 - Elsevier
This paper investigates a jury decision when hung juries and retrials are possible. When
jurors in subsequent trials know that previous trials resulted in hung juries, informative voting
cannot be an equilibrium regardless of voting rules unless the probability that each juror ...
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[PDF] Affirmative action and welfare in matching markets

[PDF] from gtcenter.org
F Kojima - 2006 - gtcenter.org
Abstract This paper investigates welfare property of stable matchings in student-college
matching markets when affirmative action constraints are present. We propose a new class
of preferences called separable preferences with affirmative action constraints. We show ...
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[PDF] A Theory of Hung Jury and Informative Voting

[PDF] from harvard.edu
F Kojima… - 2007 - isites.harvard.edu
Abstract This paper investigates a jury decision when hung juries and retrials are possible.
When jurors in subsequent trials know that previous trials resulted in hung juries, informative
voting can be an equilibrium for some utility parameters if and only if the accuracy of ...
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[CITATION] Random Paths to Stability in Many-To-One Matching with Contracts

F Kojima - 2005
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Excellence in Refereeing Award

VV Acharya, SN Ali, J Apesteguia, P Arcidiacono… - 209.197.108.139
The American Economic Association would like to congratulate its 2010 American Economic
Review Excellence in Refereeing Award recipients. The award recognizes the outstanding
work of those referees whose service and dedication have contributed to the high quality ...
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[CITATION] Paradox of Unemployment Insurance: you gain more from unemployment insurance if you don't suffer from unemployment

F Kojima - 2002
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