N Netzer… - Journal of Public Economics, 2007 - Elsevier
We examine optimal taxation and social insurance with adverse selection in competitive
insurance markets. In a previous literature, it has been shown that, with perfect insurance
markets, social insurance improves welfare since it is able to redistribute without creating ...
N Netzer… - Journal of Political Economy, 2010 - JSTOR
In the presence of a time-inconsistency problem with agency contracts, we show that
competitive markets can implement allocations that Pareto-dominate those achieved by a
benevolent government, and they induce more effort. We analyze a model with moral ...
N Netzer… - Economic Theory, 2010 - Springer
Abstract We examine equilibria in competitive insurance markets with adverse selection
when wealth differences arise endogenously from unobservable savings or labor supply
decisions. The endogeneity of wealth implies that high-risk individuals may ceteris paribus ...
F Scheuer - 2009 - stanford.edu
Abstract This paper studies Pareto-optimal risk-sharing arrangements in a private
information economy with aggregate uncertainty and ex ante heterogeneous agents. I show
that any such arrangement has to be such that ratios of expected inverse marginal utilities ...
F Scheuer - 2010 - Citeseer
Abstract This paper analyzes Pareto optimal non-linear taxation of profits and labor income
in a private information economy with endogenous firm formation. Individuals differ in both
their skill and their cost of setting up a firm, and choose between becoming workers and ...
M Kifmann… - CESifo, Venice Summer Institute, 2005 - cesifo-group.de
Abstract We study the efficiency and equity effects of 'balance billing', ie allowing physicians
to charge an additional fee from patients in addition to the fee paid by Medicare. Extending
the efficiency analysis by Glazer and McGuire (1993), we show that the optimal Medicare ...
F Scheuer - 2011 - stanford.edu
Abstract In many countries, taxes on businesses are less progressive than labor income
taxes. This paper provides a justification for this pattern based on adverse selection that
entrepreneurs face in credit markets. Individuals choose between becoming ...
N Netzer… - 2006 - eea-esem.com
Abstract We examine equilibria in competitive insurance markets with adverse selection
when individuals take unobservable labor supply decisions. Optimal responses of labor
supply to risk lead to differences in income and introduce countervailing incentives. ...
M Kifmann… - Health Economics Review, 2011 - Springer
Abstract We study the effects of'balance billing', ie, allowing physicians to charge a fee from
patients in addition to the fee paid by Medicare. First, we show that on pure efficiency
grounds the optimal Medicare fee under balance billing is zero. An active Medicare policy ...
C Rothschild… - 2011 - nber.org
Recent policy proposals have suggested taxing top incomes at very high rates on the
grounds that some or all of the highest wage earners are engaged in socially unproductive
or counterproductive activities, such as externality imposing speculation in the financial ...
N Netzer… - 2005 - econstor.eu
Zusammenfassung: We examine optimal taxation and social insurance if insurance markets
are imperfect. This requires the development of a theory of labor supply under uncertainty.
We show that the case for social insurance is not generally reinforced by adverse ...
[CITATION] When Does Labor Scarcity Encourage Innovation? When Does Labor Scarcity Encourage Innovation?(pp. 1037-1078)
D Acemoglu, N Netzer, F Scheuer, B Knight… - Journal of Political …, 2010 - JSTOR
D Acemoglu, I Werning… - 2010 - dspace.mit.edu
Chapter 1 analyzes Pareto optimal non-linear taxation of profits and labor income in a
private information economy with endogenous firm formation. Individuals differ in both their
skill and their cost of setting up a firm, and choose between becoming workers and ...
N Netzer… - Working Papers of the Research Group …, 2006 - ideas.repec.org
We examine equilibria in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) in competitive
insurance markets when individuals take unobservable labor supply decisions.
Precautionary labor motives introduce countervailing incentives in the insurance market, ...
[CITATION] Essays on Insurance and Taxation
F Scheuer - 2010 - Massachusetts Institute of …
N Netzer… - 2011 - econ.uzh.ch
Abstract We construct a fully specified extensive form game that captures competitive
markets with adverse selection. In particular, it allows firms to offer any finite set of contracts,
so that cross-subsidization is not ruled out. Moreover, firms can withdraw from the market ...
F Scheuer - 2012 - nber.org
This paper studies Pareto-optimal risk-sharing arrangements in a private information
economy with aggregate uncertainty and ex ante heterogeneous agents. I show how to
implement Pareto-optima as equilibria when agents can trade claims to consumption ...
N Netzer… - econstor.eu
Zusammenfassung: We examine equilibria in competitive insurance markets when
individuals take unobservable labor supply decisions. Precautionary labor motives introduce
countervailing incentives in the insurance market, and equilibria with positive profits can ...
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