P Bajari… - Review of Economics and Statistics, 2003 - MIT Press
We develop an approach to identify and test for bid rigging in procurement auctions. First,
we introduce a general auction model with asymmetric bidders. Second, we study the
problem of identification in our model. We state a set of conditions that are both necessary ...
H Yang… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
In many retail markets, prices rise faster than they fall. We develop a model of search with
learning to explain this phenomenon of asymmetric price adjustments. By extending our
static game analysis to the dynamic setting, we demonstrate that asymmetric price ...
L Ye - Games and Economic Behavior, 2007 - Elsevier
Motivated by the practice of indicative bidding, which is commonly used in sales of complex
and valuable assets, this paper develops a theory of two-stage auctions based on the
assumption that learning valuation is costly. In various cases that characterize what can ...
L Ye - Contributions in Theoretical Economics, 2004 - degruyter.com
We consider a single object, independent private value auction model with entry. Potential
bidders are ex ante symmetric and randomize about entry. After entry, each bidder incurs a
cost, then learns her private value and a set of signals that may lead to updated beliefs ...
H Cai, J Riley… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
In a general auction model in which bidders' signals are affiliated, we characterize the
unique separating equilibrium in which the seller can use reserve prices to credibly signal
her private information. When the buyers' signals are independent, the optimal reserve ...
D Levin, J Peck… - The Journal of Industrial Economics, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
We analyze costly quality disclosure with horizontally differentiated products under duopoly
and a cartel, and characterize the effect of competition on disclosure and welfare. We show
that expected disclosure is higher under a cartel than under duopoly, and the welfare ...
H Yang… - Theoretical Economics, 2008 - econtheory.org
Abstract This paper considers a nonlinear pricing framework with both horizontally and
vertically differentiated products. By endogenizing the set of consumers served in the
market, we are able to study how increased competition affects nonlinear pricing, in ...
P Bajari… - 2001 - time.dufe.edu.cn
Abstract In this research, we develop an approach to the problem of identification and testing
for bid-rigging in procurement auctions that tightly integrates economic theory and
econometric practice. First, we introduce a general auction model with asymmetric bidders ...
J Kagel, S Pevnitskaya… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2008 - Elsevier
Indicative bidding is a practice commonly used in sales of complex and very expensive
assets. Theoretical analysis shows that efficient entry is not guaranteed under indicative
bidding, since there is no equilibrium in which more qualified bidders are more likely to be ...
A Arya, J Glover,
B Mittendorf… - Journal of Management …, 2005 - link.aip.org
Despite the influx of measures which can be customized to the demands of each business
unit (eg, customer satisfaction surveys and quality indices), many firms have been dogged in
their reliance on standardized measures (eg, conventional financial metrics) in ...
HP Marvel… - International Economic Review, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
We develop an infinite-horizon, overlapping-generations model of reputation in which
consumers base willingness to pay for agent services on past performance summarized by a
trademark. We show that when trademarks can be sold, successful firms capture the full ...
D Levin, J Peck… - Journal of Industrial …, 2005 - economics.sbs.ohio-state.edu
Abstract We analyze costly quality disclosure with horizontally differentiated products under
duopoly and monopoly, and characterize the effect of competition on disclosure and welfare.
Expected disclosure is higher under monopoly than under duopoly. A duopolist faces ...
L Ye - 2000 - Citeseer
Abstract In auctions of complex and valuable assets and in some procurement auctions, a
two stage procedure is commonly used. In the first stage, bidders make non-binding
“indicative bids” that are used to separate serious candidates. Then, after an information ...
H Cai, J Riley… - Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming, 2002 - econ.ohio-state.edu
In the standard private value auction model, the seller's profit maximizing strategy is to set a
reserve price above her own valuation. In so doing, additional revenue is captured
whenever there is only one buyer with a valuation much higher than her own. 1 Moreover, ...
JH Kagel, S Pevnitskaya… - Economic Theory, 2007 - Springer
Abstract Dynamic clock auctions with drop-out information typically yield outcomes closer to
equilibrium predictions than do comparable sealed-bid auctions. However, clock auctions
require congregating bidders for a fixed time interval, which has limited field applicability ...
H Yang… - Unpublished paper, e Ohio State University, 2006 - econ.ohio-state.edu
Abstract This paper studies how increased competition affects nonlinear pricing, in particular
the variety of contracts offered by firms. We present a model with both horizontally and
vertically differentiated products, with the set of consumers served in the market being ...
M Morelli, H Yang… - American Economic Journal: …, 2012 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: In an economy where agents have different productivities and mobility, we
compare a unified nonlinear optimal taxation with the equilibrium taxation that would be
chosen by two competing tax authorities if the same economy were divided into two states. ...
D Levin… - Economics Letters, 2008 - Elsevier
We examine hybrid auctions with affiliated private values and risk-averse bidders, and show
that the optimal hybrid auction trades off the benefit of information extraction in the
ascending-bid phase and the cost of reduced competition in the sealed-bid phase.
D Levin, J Peck… - Economics Letters, 2007 - Elsevier
In an English auction with multi-dimensional signals, a “reversal” may arise: an earlier
dropout may be better news to the seller than a later dropout, and the expected revenue can
be decreasing over some range of clock prices.
H Yang… - 2006 - economics.sbs.ohio-state.edu
Abstract This paper studies how increased competition affects nonlinear pricing, in particular
the number of contracts offered by firms. We present a model with both horizontally and
vertically differentiated products, with the set of consumers served in the market being ...
H Cai, J Riley… - 2007 - econ.ohio-state.edu
Abstract In this paper we study equilibrium refinement in signaling models. We propose a
Local Credibility Test (LCT) that is somewhat stronger than the Cho and Kreps Intuitive
Criterion but weaker than the refinement concept proposed by Grossman and Perry. ...
L Ye, X Su… - Campus-Wide Information Systems, 2009 - emeraldinsight.com
Purpose–This paper aims to present a picture of the past and the present status of the
Distance Education College (DEC) of East China Normal University (ECNU). It describes
what the DEC has achieved in each phase, and probes into some essential problems that ...
[CITATION] Optimal Auctions with Endogenous Entry
Y Lixin - 2002 - Ohio State University working paper, …
[CITATION] kNonlinear Pricing
H Yang… - Market Coverage, and Competition. l Theoretical …, 2008
X Xu, D Levin… - International Journal of Game Theory, 2010 - Springer
Abstract We study a sequential auction of two objects with two bidders, where the winner of
the package obtains a synergy from the second object. If reselling after the two auctions
occurs, it proceeds as either monopoly or monopsony take-it-or-leave-it offer. We find that ...
J Lu… - 2010 - econ.ohio-state.edu
Abstract In auctions with private information acquisition costs, we completely characterize
efficient and optimal two-stage selling mechanisms, with the first stage being the pre-
screening or entry right allocation mechanism, and the second stage being the traditional ...
L YE… - Open Education Research, 2008 - en.cnki.com.cn
The instructional design of online courses includes contents design and form design. This
paper outlines a framework composed of four important steps to design contents of online
courses: defining the learning objective of the specific online course, clarifying and ...
[CITATION] Competitive Versus Collusive Bidding: Identification and Testing
P Bajari… - 2000 - Working Paper, Stanford University
X Xu, D Levin… - 2010 - econ.ohio-state.edu
Abstract We study how resale affects auctions with costly entry in a model where bidders
possess twodimensional private information signals: entry costs and valuations. We
establish the existence of symmetric entry equilibrium and identify sufficient conditions ...
A Arya, J Glover,
B Mittendorf, L Ye… - … Research, Vol. 17, …, 2005 - econ.ohio-state.edu
Abstract Despite the influx of measures which can be customized to the demands of each
business unit (eg, customer satisfaction surveys and quality indices), many firms have been
dogged in their reliance on standardized measures (eg, conventional financial metrics) in ...
JHKОS Pevnitskaya… - econ.ohio-state.edu
Abstract Dynamic clock auctions with drop-out information typically yield outcomes closer to
equilibrium predictions than do comparable sealed-bid auctions. However, clock auctions
require congregating bidders for a fixed time interval, which has limited field applicability ...
L Ye - 2007 - econ.ohio-state.edu
Abstract In auctions with costly entry, the entry process matters. This paper compares
expected revenues generated by different entry processes. It is shown that an auction with
deterministic entry usually generates more expected revenue than that with stochastic ...
L Ye, J Kagel… - Econometric Society 2004 North …, 2004 - ideas.repec.org
Ascending price clock auctions with drop-out information typically yield outcomes closer to
equilibrium predictions than do comparable sealed-bid auctions. However clock auctions
require congregating all bidders for a fixed time interval, which has limited field ...
W Baumol, K Arrow, S Athey, J Baker, C Bazelon… - 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: The signatories to this document are economists who have studied
telecommunications, auctions, and competition policy. While we may disagree about the
stimulus package, we believe that it is important to implement mechanisms that make ...
Y Hu, J Kagel… - 2008 - webmeets.com
Abstract In this paper we study the effect of negative externalities on bidding strategies and
auction outcome in a model with one special bidder and two regular bidders. If the special
bidder wins, both regular bidders incur a loss; otherwise the two losing bidders receive ...
J Lu… - Proceedings of the Behavioral and Quantitative Game …, 2010 - webmeets.com
Abstract In auctions with private information acquisition costs, we completely characterize
efficient and optimal two-stage selling procedures, with the first stage being the pre-
screening or entry right allocation mechanism, and the second stage being the traditional ...
XLY Fei - New Technology of Library and Information Service, 2009 - en.cnki.com.cn
Because of the problems of regional information integration and data integration of intercity
e-Government system, this paper proposes a new model of data integration based on
deeply analyzing and researching the technology of topic map and Relational DataBase ...
X Xu, D Levin… - 2010 - econ.ohio-state.edu
Abstract We study how resale affects auctions with costly entry in a model where bidders
possess twodimensional private information signals: entry costs and valuations. We
establish the existence of symmetric entry equilibrium and identify sufficient conditions ...
L YE… - fed.cuhk.edu.hk
Abstract With the guidance of the ideas of “Education Informationalization” and “Integrating
Information Technology (IT) into Curriculum”, IT has been permeated into primary and
secondary school classrooms and activities of teaching and learning. But there appears ...
Y Lixin - Journal of Urumqi Vocatioal University, 2002 - en.cnki.com.cn
By analyzing the same tendeucy of the works written by those born in 1960's and 1970's,
thearticle claims that the present literature are made up of the words such as appetence,
grownth, sex, city, cool showing, rebellion and their representing forms, points owt that the ...
Y Hu, J Kagel, X Xu… - 2011 - mpacc.sjtu.edu.cn
Abstract We investigate a model in which a single bidder (the tentrantu), on winning the
auction, imposes a negative externality on two tregularubidders. In an ascending price clock
auction, in equilibrium when all bidders are active a regular bidder free rides, dropping out ...
J Shen, H Yang… - 2011 - econ.ohio-state.edu
Abstract We analyze markets with both horizontally and vertically differentiated products
under both monopoly and duopoly. In the base model with two consumer types, we identify
conditions under which entry prompts an incumbent to expand or contract its low end of ...
[CITATION] College of Life Sciences, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310012, China; 2 School of Life and Environmental Science, Wenzhou Normal College, …
X YANG, M YU, B DING, S XU…
L Ye - 美中经济评论: 英文版, 2005 - cqvip.com
Apr. 2005, Volume 4, No. 4 (Serial No. 22) China-USA Business Review, ISSN 1537-1514,
USA Probe into the Perfection of Property Right System of Joint Stock Commercial Banks
LixinYe Nanjing UniversityofScienceandTechnology Abstract: Joint stock commercial ...
YE Lixin - en.cnki.com.cn
Based on both the trainees' own reflection and the training program organizer's observation
to trainees during the implementation of the Trainer Training Program under the National
Teacher Training Program sponsored by China Ministry of Education and Ministry of ...
Y Lixin - Journal of Guangdong Institute For Nationalities, 2002 - en.cnki.com.cn
This article points out that Qiu Huadong's works has not only the common features that of
other new generation of writers the infatuation for material comforts, but also has self
examination spitits. This kind of seemly contradictory mental state truly expresses the ...
L Ye… - 2001 - en.scientificcommons.org
Publikationsansicht. 44780586. Auctions with costly entry / (2001). Ye, Lixin. Abstract. Submitted
to the Department of Economics.. Copyright by the author.. Thesis (Ph. D.)--Stanford University,
2001. Details der Publikation. Download, http://worldcat.org/oclc/81844328. ...
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