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Dynamic matching and bargaining games: A general approach

[PDF] from uni-muenchen.de
S Lauermann - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper presents a new characterization result for competitive allocations in
quasilinear economies. This result is informed by the analysis of non-cooperative dynamic
search and bargaining games. Such games provide models of decentralized markets with ...
Cited by 20 - Related articles - All 17 versions

[BOOK] Price Setting in a Decentralized Market and the Competitive Outcome

[PDF] from econstor.eu
S Lauermann - 2008 - econstor.eu
Abstract This paper studies a decentralized, dynamic matching and bargaining market:
buyers and sellers are matched into pairs. Traders exit the market at a constant rate,
inducing search costs (frictions). All price offers are made by sellers. Despite the fact that ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - View as HTML - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 7 versions

[CITATION] VWhen Less Information is Good for Effi ciency: Pri $ vate Information in Bilateral Trade and in Markets

S Lauermann - 2006 - V Mimeo, University of Michigan
Cited by 4 - Related articles

[PDF] Search with Adverse Selection

[PDF] from google.com
S Lauermann… - Presentation at the Midwest …, 2008 - sites.google.com
Abstract This paper analyzes a search model with asymmetric information of the common
values variety. The basic features of this environment resemble those of a common values
(procurement) auction, except that the searcher in our model, who is the counterpart of the ...
Cited by 7 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 19 versions

The Efficiency of Decentralized Trading

[PDF] from gtcenter.org
S Lauermann - 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This note extends previous convergence results for dynamic matching and
bargaining games to asymmetric information and extreme bargaining power. In a decentral
market heterogeneous traders are pairwise matched and sellers make take-it-or-leave-it ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - All 4 versions

[CITATION] Failures of the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property in Auctions with a Stochastic Number of Bidders

S Lauermann… - University of Bonn Discussion paper, 2006
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[CITATION] VPrice Setting in a Decentralized Market and the Com $ petitive Outcome, V MPI Collective Goods Preprint

S Lauermann - 2008 - No. 6, Mimeo, Bonn
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[PDF] VSequential Common Value Auc& tions with Purely Private Valuations

[PDF] from socialpolitik.de
S Lauermann… - 2006 - socialpolitik.de
Abstract We consider a dynamic auction game in which many units of the same good are
sold sequen0 tially and buyers live for more than one period. The value buyers place on
winning an auction depends on their valuation of the good and on the option value of ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 2 versions

[CITATION] Private Information in Bilateral Trade and in Markets

S Lauermann - 2008 - Mimeo, University of Michigan
Cited by 1 - Related articles

Auctions in Markets: Common Outside Options and the Continuation Value Effect

[PDF] from omniumgemba.com
S Lauermann… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We study auctions with outside options determined through bargaining in an
outside market. We show that auctions with less information revelation to bidders may yield
higher revenues. It is never optimal for the auctioneer to reveal information after the ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - All 14 versions

Asymmetric Information in Bilateral Trade and in Markets: An Inversion Result

[PDF] from acrobatplanet.com
S Lauermann - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: I consider a simple bilateral trading game between a seller and a buyer who have
private valuations for an indivisible good. The seller makes a price offer which the buyer can
either accept or reject. If the seller can observe the valuation of the buyer (if information is ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - All 4 versions

[PDF] How Robust is the Competitive Outcome? On Decentralized Trading with Asymmetric Information and Extreme Bargaining Power

[PDF] from uni-bonn.de
S Lauermann - 2005 - tagung05.uni-bonn.de
Abstract This note extends previous convergence results for dynamic matching and
bargaining games to asymmetric information and extreme bargaining power. In a decentral
market heterogeneous traders are pairwise matched and sellers make take-it-or-leave-it ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 2 versions

[PDF] When Less Information is Good for Efficiency: Private Information in Bilateral Trade and in Markets

[PDF] from sfu.ca
S Lauermann - 2006 - sfu.ca
Abstract We consider a simple bilateral trading game between a seller and a buyer who
have private valuations for an indivisible good. The seller makes a price offer which the
buyer can either accept or reject. If the seller can observe the valuation of the buyer (if ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 3 versions

Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games

S Lauermann - 2007 - nbn-resolving.de
Abstract" Nature makes no jumps," according to a famous saying-but what about
economies? Is economic welfare continuous in the size of the frictions of trading and do the
welfare theorems hold approximately when frictions are small? We will look at a specific ...
Cached - All 4 versions

Learning and Price Discovery in a Search Model

[PDF] from concordia.ca
S Lauermann, G Virag… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We develop a dynamic matching and bargaining game with aggregate uncertainty
about the relative scarcity of a commodity. We use our model to study price discovery in a
decentralized exchange economy: Traders gradually learn about the state of the market ...
Related articles - All 6 versions

[PDF] Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games: Towards a General Perspective

[PDF] from uni-bonn.de
S Lauermann - 2007 - hss.ulb.uni-bonn.de
VNature makes no jumps, V according to a famous saying & but what about economies? Is
economic welfare continuous in the size of the frictions of trading and do the welfare the&
orems hold approximately when frictions are small? We will look at a specific institution & ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 4 versions

[CITATION] A Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Game with Asymmetric Information and Price Offers

S Lauermann - 2006
Related articles

[PDF] Aggregate uncertainty and learning in a search model

[PDF] from webmeets.com
S Lauermann, W Merzyn… - 2009 - webmeets.com
Abstract We present an equilibrium search model with learning about an important
characteristic of the aggregate market, tightness. In a steady state dynamic matching and
bargaining game, the inflow of new buyers (" Demand") can be either high or low, ...
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