L Bouton… - Econometrica, 2012 - Wiley Online Library
This paper shows that information imperfections and common values can solve coordination
problems in multicandidate elections. We analyze an election in which (i) the majority is
divided between two alternatives and (ii) the minority backs a third alternative, which the ...
L Bouton - Unpublished manuscript. Boston University, 2010 - bu.edu
Abstract This paper analyzes the properties of runoff electoral systems when voters are
strategic. I find that runoff elections display equilibria that contradict commonly held beliefs
about these systems. First, I show that runoff elections produce equilibria in which only two ...
L Bouton - 2009 - ecares.org
Abstract A crucial component of Runoff electoral systems is the threshold fraction of votes
above which a candidate wins outright in the first round. I analyze the influence of this
threshold on the voting equilibria in three&candidate Runoff elections. I demonstrate the ...
[CITATION] The Condorcet $ Duverger Trade $ Off: Swing Voters and Voting Equilibria
L Bouton… - Aragonés, E., C.. Beviá, H. Llavador and N. Schofield, …, 2009
[CITATION] mThe Condorcet&Duverger Trade&Off: Swing Voters and Electoral Systems. nin Aragonés
L Bouton… - E., Beviá, C., Llavador, H., Norman, S., Eds., The …, 2009
[CITATION] mThe Ortega Effect: On the Influence of Threshold in Runoff Elections
L Bouton - 2007 - nECARES mimeo, Université Libre …
L Bouton, M Gassner… - European Journal of Political Economy, 2008 - Elsevier
From the literature on decentralization, it appears that the fiscal vertical imbalance (ie the
dependence of sub-national governments on national government revenues to support their
expenditures) is somehow inherent to multi-level governments. Using a stylized model we ...
L Bouton, M Gassner… - ULB Institutional Repository, 2005 - dipot.ulb.ac.be
Abstract It has been suggested that fiscal federalism is a good way to induce decentralized
entities to behave parsimoniously, but this has been largely criticized in the literature, in
particular because of the Common $ Pool problem. In this paper, we present an extra facet ...
L Bouton… - 2011 - cepr.org
Ranking have become increasingly popular on markets for study programs, restaurants,
wines, cars, etc. This paper analyses the welfare implication of such rankings. Consumers
have to make a choice between two goods of unknown quality with exogenous presence ...
LBG Kirchsteiger - bu.edu
Page 1. Good Rankings are Bad $ Why Reliable Rankings can Hurt Consumers!
Laurent Bouton&and Georg Kirchsteiger* First Draft: June 2009§ This Version: October
2011 Abstract Ranking have become increasingly popular ...
L Bouton - 2009 - theses.ulb.ac.be
Abstract: In elections, majority divisions pave the way to focal manipulations and co)
ordination failures, which can lead to the victory of the wrong candidate. This paper shows
how this flaw can be addressed if voter preferences over candidates are sensitive to ...
BULB Laurent, GULB Marjorie, VULB Vincenzo… - 2007 - dipot.ulb.ac.be
Abstract From the literature on decentralization, it appears that the fiscal vertical imbalance
is somehow inherent to multi'level governments. Using a stylized model we show that this
leads to a reduction in the extent of redistributive fiscal policies if the maximal tolerable ...
[CITATION] Redistributing income under fiscal vertical imbalance
V VERARDI, L BOUTON… - 2008
L Bouton… - 2011 - finance.uts.edu.au
Abstract In this paper we study the set of equilibria in runoff elections with three candidates.
The analysis shows that there are always incentives for all the voters to concentrate their
vote on only two candidates. We identify the properties of equilibria where more than two ...
L Bouton… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Ranking have become increasingly popular on markets for study programs,
restaurants, wines, cars, etc. This paper analyses the welfare implication of such rankings.
Consumers have to make a choice between two goods of unknown quality with ...
L Bouton… - 2008 - cepr.org
This paper compares the properties of three electoral systems when voters have imperfect
information. Imperfect information blurs voter decisions and may divorce the electoral
outcome from the true preferences of the electorate. The challenge for electoral design is ...
MC De Moura… - 2012 - ideas.repec.org
This paper shows that information imperfections and common values can solve coordination
problems in multicandidate elections. We analyze an election in which (i) the majority is
divided between two alternatives and (ii) the minority backs a third alternative, which the ...
[CITATION] The tragedy of the commons or the curse of federalism
V VERARDI, L BOUTON… - 2005 - EconWPA
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