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[BOOK] Welfare economics and social choice theory

A Feldman… - 2006 - books.google.com
Welfare economics, and social choice theory, are disciplines that blend economics, ethics,
political science, and mathematics. Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory, 2nd
Edition, include models of economic exchange and production, uncertainty, optimality, ...
Cited by 297 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 7 versions

Multilateral bargaining

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V Krishna… - The Review of Economic Studies, 1996 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We study a multilateral bargaining procedure that extends Rubinstein's alternating
offer game to the case of n players. The procedure captures the notion of consistency in the
sense familiar in cooperative game theory and we use it to establish links to the axiomatic ...
Cited by 182 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 8 versions

Non-cooperative implementation of the core

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R Serrano… - Social Choice and Welfare, 1997 - Springer
Abstract. The aim of this paper is to examine the non-cooperative basis of the core. We
provide mechanisms that are motivated closely by the very description of the core, and have
the property that their non-cooperative equilibrium outcomes coincide with the core. For ...
Cited by 69 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 14 versions

An economic index of riskiness

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RJ Aumann… - Journal of Political Economy, 2008 - JSTOR
Define the riskiness of a gamble as the reciprocal of the absolute risk aversion (ARA) of an
individual with constant ARA who is indifferent between taking and not taking that gamble.
We characterize this index by axioms, chief among them a “duality” axiom that, roughly ...
Cited by 64 - Related articles - All 26 versions

A noncooperative view of consistent bankruptcy rules

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N Dagan, R Serrano… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1997 - Elsevier
We introduce a game form that captures a noncooperative dimension of the consistency
property of bankruptcy rules. Any consistent and monotone rule is fully characterized by a
bilateral principle and consistency. Like the consistency axiom, our game form, together ...
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Rejecting small gambles under expected utility

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I Palacios-Huerta… - Economics Letters, 2006 - Elsevier
This paper contributes to an important recent debate around expected utility and risk
aversion. Rejecting a gamble over a given range of wealth levels imposes a lower bound on
risk aversion. Using this lower bound and empirical evidence on the range of the risk ...
Cited by 55 - Related articles - All 26 versions

A market to implement the core

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R Serrano - Journal of Economic Theory, 1995 - Elsevier
I present a mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes coincide with the core
of an underlying convex TU game. The mechanism resembles an asset market, in which one
of the players is randomly selected as a broker who centralizes trade. In addition, the rules ...
Cited by 49 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 9 versions

[PDF] Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953-2003

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R Serrano - investigaciones económicas, 2005 - funep.es
Fifty years have passed since the publication of Nash's article “Two Person Cooperative
Games”(Nash (1953)). This important paper set a new entire research agenda that has been
referred to as the Nash program for cooperative games. Much work in the Nash program ...
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A decentralized market with common values uncertainty: Non-steady states

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MR Blouin… - The Review of Economic Studies, 2001 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We analyse a market where (i) trade proceeds by random and anonymous pairwise
meetings with bargaining;(ii) agents are asymmetrically informed about the value of the
traded good; and (iii) no new entrants are allowed once the market is open. We show that ...
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Market power and information revelation in dynamic trading

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P Gottardi… - Journal of the European Economic …, 2005 - Wiley Online Library
We study a strategic model of dynamic trading where agents are asymmetrically informed
over common value sources of uncertainty. There is a continuum of buyers and a finite
number n of sellers. All buyers are uninformed, while at least one seller is privately ...
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Agenda restrictions in multi-issue bargaining

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Y In… - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2004 - Elsevier
We study a bilateral multi-issue bargaining procedure with complete information and
endogenous agenda. In the procedure, proposals must be made on only one issue at a time,
although the proposer can choose which issue to bring to the table. When bargaining ...
Cited by 39 - Related articles - All 7 versions

A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation

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R Serrano - Economics Letters, 1997 - Elsevier
The Nash program for cooperative games is made compatible with the framework of the
theory of implementation. It is shown that the core is the only major cooperative solution that
is Maskin monotonic. The mechanisms in the Nash program are adapted into our model, ...
Cited by 35 - Related articles - Library Search - All 11 versions

Marginal contributions and externalities in the value

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G De Clippel… - Econometrica, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
Our concern is the extension of the theory of the Shapley value to problems involving
externalities. Using the standard axiom systems behind the Shapley value leads to the
identification of bounds on players' payoffs around an “externality-free” value. The ...
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Reinterpreting the kernel

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R Serrano - journal of economic theory, 1997 - Elsevier
The reduced game relevant for the consistency of the prekernel is used to reinterpret this
solution concept in a way that makes it independent of interpersonal utility comparisons.
Based on this reinterpretation, a non-cooperative model is presented that yields in ...
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Axiomatizations of neoclassical concepts for economies

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R Serrano… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1998 - Elsevier
We characterize the Pareto correspondence, the core and the Walras solution using the
axioms of consistency, converse consistency and one-person rationality. Consistency and its
converse are defined with respect to suitably constructed reduced economies for each ...
Cited by 28 - Related articles - All 8 versions

On the failure of core convergence in economies with asymmetric information

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R Serrano, R Vohra… - Econometrica, 2001 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. Ž . Econometrica, Vol. 69, No. 6 November, 2001 , 16851696 ON THE FAILURE OF
CORE CONVERGENCE IN ECONOMIES WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BY ROBERTO
SERRANO, RAJIV VOHRA, AND OSCAR VOLIJ 1 1. INTRODUCTION ...
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Strategic bargaining, surplus sharing problems and the nucleolus

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R Serrano - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1995 - Elsevier
Suppose that n agents are trying to reach an agreement on how to split an estate over which
they have claims. They do so through decentralized negotiations instead of appealing to an
arbitrator. In this context, I study a consistency-based multilateral bargaining game that ...
Cited by 27 - Related articles - All 7 versions

Decentralized information and the Walrasian outcome: a pairwise meetings market with private values

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R Serrano - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2002 - Elsevier
I study a one-time entry market for a single indivisible good, where buyers and sellers,
privately informed regarding their valuation for the good, are randomly matched, bargain,
and in the event of agreement, trade and exit the market. Each agent's search procedure ...
Cited by 26 - Related articles - Library Search - All 12 versions

Information revelation in a market with pairwise meetings: the one sided information case

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R Serrano… - Economic theory, 1993 - Springer
Summary We study a market with pairwise meetings of agents and with a one sided
information asymmetry regarding the state of the world, which may be “low” or “high.” We
characterize the set of equilibria of the model, and study its behavior as the market ...
Cited by 24 - Related articles - All 7 versions

Perfect Equilibria of a Model of n-person Noncooperative Bargaining

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V Krishna… - International Journal of Game Theory, 1995 - Springer
We study the set of subgame perfect equilibria associated with then-person noncooperative
bargaining mechanism proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1992). Our results pertain to
transferable utility games. The set of perfect equilibria depends on the parameter ...
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Some limitations of virtual Bayesian implementation

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R Serrano… - Econometrica, 2001 - Wiley Online Library
Ž Ž.. AS IS WELL KNOWN, Maskin monotonicity Maskin 1977 is a necessary condition for a
social choice correspondence to be Nash implementable. In economic environments with at
least three agents and a private good, this condition is also sufficient for Nash Ž. Ž. ...
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Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games

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N Dagan… - Economics Letters, 1998 - Elsevier
Introducing physical outcomes in coalitional games we note that they and social choice
problems are equivalent (implying that so are the theory of implementation and the Nash
program). This clarifies some misunderstandings (in regard to invariance and randomness ...
Cited by 24 - Related articles - All 12 versions

Multilateral bargaining with imperfect information

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S Baliga… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1995 - Elsevier
We study a multilateral procedure in which responders are told only their own shares. The
proposal becomes common knowledge after the response stage and responders have
optimistic beliefs after off-equilibrium offers. When discounting is high, the set of ...
Cited by 23 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 11 versions

Feasible implementation of taxation methods

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N Dagan, R Serrano… - Review of Economic Design, 1999 - Springer
Abstract. This paper studies implementation of taxation methods in one-commodity
environments in which the incomes of the agents are unknown to the planner. Feasibility out
of equilibrium imposes that the mechanism depend on the environment. We present two ...
Cited by 22 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 11 versions

[CITATION] R. and Volij. O.(1997), A Noncooperative view of consistent bankruptcy rules

NS Dagan… - Games and Economic Behavior
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The evolution of exchange

[PDF] from upi-yptk.ac.id
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A Ben-Shoham, R Serrano… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2004 - Elsevier
Stochastic stability is applied to the problem of exchange. We analyze the stochastic stability
of two dynamic trading processes in a simple housing market. In both models, traders meet
in pairs at random and exchange their houses when trade is mutually beneficial, but ...
Cited by 21 - Related articles - All 22 versions

Bargaining, coalitions and competition

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N Dagan, R Serrano… - Economic Theory, 2000 - Springer
Summary. We study a Gale-like matching model in a large exchange economy, in which
trade takes place through non-cooperative bargaining in coalitions of finite size. Under
essentially the same conditions of core equivalence, we show that the strategic ...
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A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation

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R Serrano… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2005 - Elsevier
We provide a characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation in pure strategies for
environments satisfying no-total-indifference. A social choice function in such environments
is virtually Bayesian implementable if and only if it satisfies incentive compatibility and a ...
Cited by 20 - Related articles - All 24 versions

Bargaining and competition revisited

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T Kunimoto… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2004 - Elsevier
We show the robustness of the Walrasian result obtained in models of bargaining in
pairwise meetings. Restricting trade to take place only in pairs, most of the assumptions
made in the literature are dispensed with. These include assumptions on preferences ( ...
Cited by 20 - Related articles - All 22 versions

Mistakes in Cooperation: The Stochastic Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting*

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R Serrano… - The Economic Journal, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
We analyse a dynamic trading process of coalitional recontracting in an exchange economy
with indivisible goods, where agents may make mistakes with small probability. According to
this process, the resistance of a transition from one allocation to another is a function of ...
Cited by 19 - Related articles - All 18 versions

Agenda restrictions in multi-issue bargaining (II): unrestricted agendas

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Y In… - Economics Letters, 2003 - Elsevier
We study a bilateral multi-issue bargaining procedure with complete information and
endogenous unrestricted agenda, in which offers can be made in any subset of outstanding
issues. We find necessary and sufficient conditions for this procedure to have a unique ...
Cited by 18 - Related articles - All 17 versions

Beyond Nash bargaining theory: the Nash set

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R Serrano… - Journal of economic theory, 1998 - Elsevier
We extend Nash's bargaining theory to non-convex and coalitional problems. This paper
investigates the implications of Nash-like axioms for bilateral problems and the properties of
consistency and converse consistency over multilateral settings. The result is a ...
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Bargaining and bargaining sets

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R Serrano… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2002 - Elsevier
We argue that, in exchange economies, various versions of the bargaining set cannot be
implemented in Nash equilibrium. We then propose an extensive form mechanism that
exactly implements the Aumann–Davis–Maschler bargaining set in subgame perfect ...
Cited by 15 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 11 versions

Welfare analysis of a market with pairwise meetings and asymmetric information

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R Serrano… - Economic Theory, 1996 - Springer
Summary We study the welfare properties of a market with pairwise meetings and
asymmetric information, establishing an equivalence between asymptotically expost
individually rational and asymptotically (ex-ante, interim and ex-post) efficient equilibrium ...
Cited by 14 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 9 versions

Bargaining

R Serrano - Working Papers, 2007 - ideas.repec.org
This article is a survey on bargaining theory. The focus is the game theoretic approach to
bargaining, both on its axiomatic and strategic counterparts. The application of bargaining
theory to large markets and its connections with competitive allocations are also ...
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Marginal contributions and externalities in the value

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G De Clippel… - Economics Working Papers we057339, …, 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: For games in partition function form, we explore the implications of distinguishing
between the concepts of intrinsic marginal contributions and externalities. If one requires
efficiency for the grand coalition, we provide several results concerning extensions of the ...
Cited by 14 - Related articles - All 17 versions

Walrasian allocations without price-taking behavior

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R Serrano… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2000 - Elsevier
Consider an exchange economy where agents are arbitragers, in that they try to upset
allocations imagining plausible beneficial trades. With an introspective algorithm, each
agent constructs an interactive choice set (ICS), ie, a set of bundles that he considers ...
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An economic index of riskiness

[PDF] from unirioja.es
RJ Aumann… - Documentos de Trabajo (CEMFI), 2007 - dialnet.unirioja.es
Resumen: Define the riskiness of a gamble as the reciprocal of the absolute risk aversion
(ARA) of an individual with constant ARA who is indifferent between taking and not taking
that gamble. We characterize this index by axioms, chief among them a¿ duality¿ axiom ...
Cited by 13 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 9 versions

Mistakes in cooperation: the stochastic stability of edgeworth's recontracting

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R Serrano… - … Department of Economics Paper No. 2003-23, 2003 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: In an exchange economyw ith a finite number of indivisible goods, we analyze a
dynamic trading process of coalitional recontracting where agents may make mistakes with
small probability. We show first that the recurrent classes of the unperturbed (mistakefree) ...
Cited by 10 - Related articles - All 19 versions

Decentralized trade, random utility and the evolution of social welfare

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M Kandori, R Serrano… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2008 - Elsevier
We study decentralized trade processes in general exchange economies and house
allocation problems with and without money. The processes are affected by persistent
random shocks stemming from agents' maximization of random utility. By imposing ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - All 12 versions

Information transmission in coalitional voting games

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R Serrano… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
A core allocation of a complete information economy can be characterized as one that would
not be unanimously rejected in favor of another feasible alternative by any coalition. We use
this test of coalitional voting in an incomplete information environment to formalize a ...
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The measurement of intellectual influence: The views of a sceptic

[PDF] from ias.edu
R Serrano - Brown University Department of Economics Paper No …, 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: In an extremely interesting paper, Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004)[PV] introduce
the axiomatic method to the problem of how to rank academic journals on the basis of their
mutual citations. They characterize the invariant method as the only one satisfying a list of ...
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[CITATION] VDecentralized Information and the Walrasian Outcome: A Pairwise Meetings Markets with Private Information

R Serrano - V Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2002
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Bargaining, coalitions and externalities: A comment on Maskin

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G De Clippel… - 2008 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We first observe that two of Maskin's results do not extend beyond three players:
we construct a four-player partition function with nonpositive externalities whose unique
solution is inefficient, as well as a four-player characteristic function that has a unique ...
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A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel

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R Serrano… - Mathematical Social Sciences, 2006 - Elsevier
We propose axiomatic foundations for the average prekernel of NTU games, and compare
them with the existing ones for the prekernel. We characterize the average prekernel as the
unique solution that satisfies a set of Nash-like axioms for two-person games, and ...
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Cooperative games: core and Shapley value

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R Serrano - Documentos de Trabajo (CEMFI), 2007 - dialnet.unirioja.es
Resumen: This article describes the basic elements of the cooperative approach to game
theory, one of the two counterparts of the discipline. After the presentation of some basic
definitions, the focus will be on the core and the Shapley value, two of the most central ...
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Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: Towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms

[PDF] from uc3m.es
A Cabrales… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2011 - Elsevier
We study the classic implementation problem under the behavioral assumption that agents
myopically adjust their actions in the direction of better-responses or best-responses. First,
we show that a necessary condition for recurrent implementation in better-response ...
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A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions

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A Kar, I Ray… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2010 - Elsevier
We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as
an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken
game, that a social choice function that chooses any particular correlated equilibrium ...
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Decentralized trade, random utility and the evolution of social welfare

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M Kandori, S Roberto… - 2004 - repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp
We study decentralized trade processes in general exchange economies and house
allocation problems with and without money. The processes are subject to persistent
random shocks stemming from agents' maximization of random utility. By imposing ...
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[PDF] Implementing the Mas-Colell bargaining set

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R Serrano… - investigaciones económicas, 2002 - funep.es
We provide a mechanism that approximately implements the Mas-Colell bargaining set in
subgame perfect equilibrium. The mechanism is based on the definition of the Mas-Colell
bargaining set, and respects feasibility in and out of equilibrium. Key words: Mas-Colell ...
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Arrow's impossibility theorem: Two simple single-profile versions

[PDF] from imdea.org
A Feldman… - … of Economics Working Paper No. 2006- …, 2008 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: In this paper we provide two simple new versions of Arrow's impossibility theorem,
in a model with only one preference profile. Both versions are transparent, requiring minimal
mathematical sophistication. The first version assumes there are only two people in ...
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[PDF] Multilateral negotiations with private side-deals: a multiplicity example

[PDF] from accessecon.com
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S Baliga… - Economics Bulletin, 2001 - accessecon.com
Abstract We study a multilateral negotiation procedure that allows for" partial agreements" in
which responders are told only their own shares. Applications of our model include
negotiations under" joint and several liability." Unlike previous models of multilateral ...
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Comment on Mclennan and Sonnenschein" Sequential Bargaining as a Noncooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium"

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N Dagan, R Serrano… - Econometrica, 1998 - JSTOR
Two IMPORTANT ARTICLES in the literature on decentralized strategic markets are Gale
(1986) and McLennan and Sonnenschein (1991). McLennan and Sonnenschein
(1991)(henceforth, McLS) claim to have generalized Gale (1986) in several respects. In ...
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[BOOK] Multilateral bargaining

V Krishna… - 1990 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract The authors study a multilateral bargaining procedure that extends A. Rubinstein's
(1982) alternating offer game to the case of n players. The procedure captures the notion of
consistency in the sense familiar in cooperative game theory and they use it to establish ...
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[CITATION] On the impossibility of implementation under incomplete information

R Serrano… - Working Papers, 1999 - econpapers.repec.org
By Roberto Serrano and Rajiv Vohra; On the Impossibility of
Implementation under Incomplete Information.
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Ex-post regret learning in games with fixed and random matching: the case of private values

[PDF] from imdea.org
R Saran… - 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based
on ex-post regret as a guide to understand how to play games of incomplete information
under private values. The conclusions depend on whether players interact within a fixed ...
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[CITATION] Decentralized Markets with Pairwise Meetings: Recent Developments

R Serrano… - JOICE, 1995 - SPRINGER
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[BOOK] Bargaining, Coalitions and Competition

[PDF] from upf.edu
N Dagan, R Serrano… - 1996 - econ.upf.edu
Abstract We study a decentralized matching model in a large exchange economy, in which
trade takes place through non-cooperative bargaining in coalitions of finite size. Under
essentially the same conditions of core equivalence, we show that the strategic ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - View as HTML - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 15 versions

[CITATION] Negotiations with side-deals

S Baliga… - Cambridge Working Papers in …, 1995 - econpapers.repec.org
By Sandeep Baliga and Roberto Serrano; Negotiations with Side-Deals.
Cited by 3 - Related articles - Cached - All 6 versions

A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies

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T Kunimoto… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2011 - Elsevier
We uncover a new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated
strategies by mechanisms that satisfy the “best element property” where for each agent,
there exists a strategy profile that gives him the highest payoff in the mechanism. This ...
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On Watson's Non-Forcing Contracts and Renegotiation

[PDF] from brown.edu
R Serrano - Brown University Economics Working Paper No. …, 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Watson (2002) proposes non-forcing contracts as a way to show the limitations of
the mechanism design program with ex-post renegotiation (Maskin and Moore (1999)). If
one takes a partial implementation approach, as Watson does, we show that non-forcing ...
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[CITATION] Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods

N Dagan, R Serrano… - Working Papers, 1995 - econpapers.repec.org
Related works: Working Paper: Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods (1999) Working
Paper: Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods (1999) Journal Article: Feasible implementation
of taxation methods (1999) This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search ...
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[CITATION] An axiomatization of the prekernel of nontransferable utility games

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R Serrano, KI Shimomura - 2005
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[CITATION] Strategic bargaining, bankruptcy problems and the nucleolus

R Serrano - 1993 - Brown University, Department of …
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Cooperative games with incomplete information: Some open problems

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F Forges… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This is a brief survey describing some of the recent progress and open problems in
the area of cooperative games with incomplete information. We discuss exchange
economies, cooperative Bayesian games with orthogonal coalitions, and issues of ...
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Arrow¿ s impossibility theorem: preference diversity in a single-profile world

[PDF] from unirioja.es
AM Feldman… - Documentos de Trabajo (CEMFI), 2007 - dialnet.unirioja.es
Resumen: In this paper we provide a simple new version of Arrow¿ s impossibility theorem,
in a world with only one preference profile. This theorem relies on a new assumption of
preference diversity, and we explore alternative notions of preference diversity at length.
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The three-legged race: Cooperating to compete

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R Serrano… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1998 - Elsevier
In the prisoners' dilemma contest several couples play the finitely repeated prisoners'
dilemma. Each time a couple cooperates, it scores a point, and a small prize is awarded to
the winners. An analogue of the “folk” theorem for repeated games is obtained with ...
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Stochastically stable implementation

[PDF] from uc3m.es
A Cabrales… - SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic …, 2011 - Springer
Abstract Restricting attention to economic environments, we study implementation under
perturbed better-response dynamics (BRD). A social choice function (SCF) is implementable
in stochastically stable strategies of perturbed BRD whenever the only outcome supported ...
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[CITATION] The New Palgrave: a Dictionary of Economics, chapter Bargaining

R Serrano - McMillian, London, 2008
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[PDF] A Dynamic Theory of Fidelity Networks with an Application to the Spread of HIV/AIDS

[PDF] from unirioja.es
R Pongou… - Documentos de Trabajo (CEMFI), 2009 - dialnet.unirioja.es
Abstract We study the dynamic stability of fidelity networks, which are networks that form in a
mating economy of agents of two types (say men and women), where each agent desires
direct links with opposite type agents, while engaging in multiple partnerships is ...
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[PDF] Agenda Restrictions in Multi-Issue Bargaining

[PDF] from brown.edu
Y In… - Working Papers, 2000 - econ.brown.edu
Abstract We study a bilateral multi-issue bargaining procedure with complete information
and endogenous agenda. In the procedure, proposals must be made on only one issue at a
time, although the proposer can choose which issue to bring to the table. When ...
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The evolution of bidding behavior in private-values auctions and double auctions

[PDF] from unirioja.es
R Saran… - Documentos de Trabajo (CEMFI), 2007 - dialnet.unirioja.es
Resumen: We apply stochastic stability to study the evolution of bidding behaviour in private-
value second-price, first-price and k-double auctions. The learning process has a strong
component of inertia but with a small probability, the bids are modified in the direction of ...
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Entropy and the value of information for investors

[PDF] from archives-ouvertes.fr
A Cabrales, O Gossner, S Roberto - 2011 - halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr
Consider any investor who fears ruin when facing any set of investments that satisfy no-
arbitrage. Before investing, he can purchase information about the state of nature in the form
of an information structure. Given his prior, information structure $\ alpha $ is more ...
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[PDF] On a Controversy Regarding Expected Utility and Risk Aversion: Individuals Accept Small Gambles

[PDF] from palacios-huerta.com
I Palacios-Huerta, R Serrano… - 2004 - palacios-huerta.com
Abstract This paper contributes to a recent debate regarding expected utility and risk
aversion. Based on introspective rejections of small gambles, expected utility has been
deemed incapable of explaining plausible behavior toward risk. We use empirical and ...
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Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions

[PDF] from uc3m.es
I Ray, R Serrano… - 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form
game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-
person Chicken game and a wide class of correlated equilibrium distributions, that a ...
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Equilibrium Blocking in Large Quasilinear Economies

Full text - MIT Libraries
Y Kamishiro… - Mathematics of Operations …, 2011 - mor.journal.informs.org
Abstract We study information transmission in large interim quasilinear economies using the
theory of the core. We concentrate on the core with respect to equilibrium blocking, a core
notion in which information is transmitted endogenously within coalitions, because ...
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[CITATION] Abstract Equilibria, Interactive Choice Sets and Walrasian Allocations

R Serrano, O Volij… - 1997 - Brown University, Department of …
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[PDF] The evolution of exchange

[PDF] from econometricsociety.org
R Serrano, A Ben-Shoham… - Economic theory and …, 2000 - econometricsociety.org
There has been a lot of interest lately in evolutionary game theory. In particular, there have
been some attempts to use evolutionary concepts in order to make a selection among the
set of Nash equilibria. One of these concepts was introduced by Foster and Young (1990) ...
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[PDF] This article was published in Journal of International and Comparative Economics 4,(1995), 223-241. Decentralized Markets with Pairwise Meetings: Recent …

[PDF] from brown.edu
R Serrano… - econ.brown.edu
Abstract We discuss recent developments in the economics of bargaining and search in
markets, and their relation to the older literature on centralized (planned) and decentralized
markets. In particular, we address questions such as delay in trade, equilibrium price ...
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Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games

R Vohra… - … Economics Working Paper No. 2005-01, 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: A core allocation of a complete information economy can be characterized as one
that would not be unanimously rejected in favor of another feasible alternative by any
coalition. We use this test of coalitional voting in an incomplete information environment to ...
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[PDF] Ex-Post Regret Learning in Games with Private Values

[PDF] from unimaas.nl
R Saran… - personeel.unimaas.nl
Abstract In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based
on ex-post regret as a guide to understand how to play games of incomplete information with
private values. Our dynamics has a strong component of inertia but with a small probability ...
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Bargaining and Competition Revisited

R Serrano… - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We show the robustness of the Walrasian result obtained in models of bargaining
in pairwise meetings. Restricting trade to take place only in pairs, most of the assumptions
made in the literature are dispensed with. These include assumptions on preferences ( ...

Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare

R Serrano, O Volij… - Brown University Economics …, 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We study decentralized trade processes in general exchange economies and
house allocation problems with and without money. Such processes are subject to persistent
random shocks stemming from agents' maximization of random utility. By imposing ...
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Information transmission in coalitional voting games

[PDF] from uc3m.es
R Serrano… - Nº.: UC3M Working Paper. Economics …, 2005 - e-archivo.uc3m.es
A core allocation of a complete information economy can be characterized as one that would
not be unanimously rejected in favor of another feasible alternative by any coalition. We use
this test of coalitional voting in an incomplete information environment to formalize a ...
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Axiomatizations of Neoclassical Concepts for Economies

O Volij… - Staff General Research Papers, 1998 - ideas.repec.org
We characterize the Pareto correspondence, the core and the Walras solution using the
axioms of consistency, converse consistency and one-person rationality. Consistency and its
converse are defined with respect to suitably constructed reduced economies for each ...
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Comment on Mclennan and Sonnenschein

O Volij… - Staff General Research Papers, 1998 - ideas.repec.org
Two important articles in the literature on decentralized strategic markets are Gale (1986)
and McLennan and Sonnenschein (1991). McLennan and Sonnenschein (1991) claim to
have generalized Gale (1986) in several respects. In doing so, they introduce mainly two ...
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Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare (" Journal of Economic Theory", 2008, Vol. 140,. No. 1, 328-338.)

M Kandori, R Serrano… - CARF F-Series, 2004 - ideas.repec.org
We study decentralized trade processes in general exchange economies and house
allocation problems with and without money. The processes are subject to persistent
random shocks stemming from agents' maximization of random utility. By imposing ...
Cached - All 3 versions

Royal Economic Society

R Serrano… - The Economic Journal, 2008 - res.org.uk
We analyse a dynamic trading process of coalitional recontracting in an exchange economy
with indivisible goods, where agents may make mistakes with small probability. According to
this process, the resistance of a transition from one allocation to another is a function of ...
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Market Power and Information Revelation in Dynamic Trading

R Serrano… - CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1300, 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We study a strategic model of dynamic trading where agents are asymmetrically
informed over common value sources of uncertainty. There is a continuum of buyers and a
finite number n of sellers. All buyers are uninformed, while at least one seller is privately ...
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Royal Economic Society

R Inderst, E Papaioannou, G Siourounis… - The Economic …, 2008 - res.org.uk
We present a simple model of personal finance in which an incumbent lender has an
information advantage vis-à-vis both potential competitors and households. In order to
extract more consumer surplus, a lender with sufficient market power may engage in' ...
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[PDF] Four Lectures on the Nucleolus and the Kernel Delivered at the hebrew University of Jerusalem 10th Summer School in Economic Theory

[PDF] from brown.edu
R Serrano - 1999 - econ.brown.edu
We begin by defining a non-transferable (NTU) game in coalitional form (N, V), where N={1,
2,..., n} is a finite set of players, and for every S⊆ N, S=∅, V (S)⊆ IR| S|, V (S)=∅. In the
sequel and abusing notation, we shall identify the cardinality of a set with its lower case ...
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[CITATION] Comment on Mclennan and SonnenscheinSequential bargaining as a noncooperative foundation for

Full text - MIT Libraries
R Serrano… - Econométrica, 1998 - dialnet.unirioja.es
... Comment on Mclennan and Sonnenschein `Sequential bargaining as a noncooperative
foundation for. Autores: Roberto Serrano, Nir Dagan; Localización: Econométrica, ISSN
0012-9682, Vol. 66, Nº 5, 1998 , págs. 1231-1233. Fundación Dialnet. Acceso de usuarios ...
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[PDF] On Watson's non-forcing contracts and renegotiation

[PDF] from unirioja.es
R Serrano - Documentos de Trabajo (CEMFI), 2009 - dialnet.unirioja.es
Abstract Watson (2007) proposes non-forcing contracts as a way to show the limitations of
the mechanism design program with ex-post renegotiation (Maskin and Moore (1999)). If
one takes a partial implementation approach, as Watson does, we show that nonforcing ...
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Walrasian Allocations Without Price-Taking Behavior

O Volij… - 2000 - ideas.repec.org
Consider an exchange economy where agents are arbitragers, in that they try to upset
allocations imagining plausible beneficial trades. With an introspective algorithm, each
agent constructs an interactive choice set (ICS), ie, a set of bundles that he considers ...
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Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium Implementation

R Vohra… - Econometric Society 2004 North American …, 2004 - ideas.repec.org
Multiplicity of Mixed Bayesian Equilibria in Mechanisms Roberto Serrano and Rajiv Vohra
The literature on implementation with incomplete information has often left out the
consideration of mixed-strategy equilibria. This is particularly problematic for a research ...
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Market power and information revelation in dynamic trading PDF Logo

[PDF] from econstor.eu
P Gottardi… - 2004 - econstor.eu
Zusammenfassung: We study a strategic model of dynamic trading where agents are
asymmetrically informed over common value sources of uncertainty. There is a continuum of
buyers and a finite number n of sellers. All buyers are uninformed, while at least one seller ...
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[PDF] Department of Economics, Brown University May 2005 (to appear in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, McMillan, London)

[PDF] from dklevine.org
R Serrano - dklevine.org
Abstract: This article is a survey on bargaining theory. The focus is the game theoretic
approach to bargaining, both on its axiomatic and strategic counterparts. The application of
bargaining theory to large markets and its connections with competitive allocations are ...
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[CITATION] We are happy to announce that the PET07 submission website is open. The Association for Public Economic Theory (APET) will hold its eighth …

JP Conley, MH Wooders, R Boadway, Y Chun…

[CITATION] Published in Econometrica, 69,(2001), 1685-1696 On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information

R Serrano, R Vohra…
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A Non-Cooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules

O Volij, N Dagan… - Staff General Research Papers, 1997 - ideas.repec.org
We introduce a game form that captures a noncooperative dimension of the consistency
property of bankruptcy rules. Any consistent and monotone rule is fully characterized by a
bilateral principle and consistency. Like the consistency axiom, our game form, together ...
Cached - All 4 versions

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