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User profiles for author:"Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn"

Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn

UCLA
Verified email at econ.ucla.edu
Cited by 134

The limits of ex post implementation

[PDF] from ucl.ac.uk
Full text - MIT Libraries
P Jehiel, M Meyer‐ter‐Vehn, B Moldovanu… - …, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
The sensitivity of Bayesian implementation to agents' beliefs about others suggests the use
of more robust notions of implementation such as ex post implementation, which requires
that each agent's strategy be optimal for every possible realization of the types of other ...
Cited by 63 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 38 versions

Mixed bundling auctions

[PDF] from ucl.ac.uk
Full text - MIT Libraries
P Jehiel, M Meyer-ter-Vehn… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
We study multi-object auctions where agents have private and additive valuations for
heterogeneous objects. We focus on the revenue properties of a class of dominant strategy
mechanisms where a weight is assigned to each partition of objects. The weights ...
Cited by 29 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 27 versions

[PDF] Reputation for quality

[PDF] from msu.edu
S Board… - Report, UCLA.[821], 2010 - econ.msu.edu
Abstract We propose a new model of firm reputation where product quality is persistent and
depends stochastically on the firm's past investments. Reputation is then modeled directly as
the market belief about quality. We analyze how investment incentives depend on the ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 33 versions

Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials

[PDF] from ucl.ac.uk
Full text - MIT Libraries
P Jehiel, M Meyer-ter-Vehn… - Economic Theory, 2008 - Springer
Abstract We introduce several notions of potentials for mechanism design problems with
interdependent values, and relate them to implementation in ex-post equilibrium. Whereas
ex-post implementation is closely linked to the ordinal concept of best-alternative ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - All 16 versions

[PDF] A Conversational War of Attrition

[PDF] from 62.75.170.205
K Bognar, M Meyer-ter-Vehn… - 2009 - 62.75.170.205
Abstract We explore a model of costly dynamic deliberation in which two partially informed
jurors with common interests aggregate their information by coarse binary communication to
arrive at a common verdict. The model yields three key predictions on equilibrium ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 17 versions

[PDF] Relational Contracts in Competitive Labor Markets

[PDF] from ucla.edu
S Board… - 2011 - econ.ucla.edu
Abstract This paper characterizes the distribution of jobs in a relational contracting model
where both employed and unemployed workers compete for jobs. In equilibrium, identical
firms offer a continuous distribution of contracts, with some firms offering high-wage, high- ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 6 versions

The robustness of robust implementation

[PDF] from princeton.edu
M Meyer-ter-Vehn… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2011 - Elsevier
We show that a mechanism that robustly implements optimal outcomes in a one-
dimensional supermodular environment continues to robustly implement ε-optimal outcomes
in all close-by environments. Robust implementation of ε-optimal outcomes is thus robust ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 10 versions

[PDF] Reputational Incentives and Dynamics

[PDF] from nyu.edu
S Board… - 2009 - econ.as.nyu.edu
Abstract We study a dynamic moral hazard model, where a firm can invest into the quality of
its product which, in turn, is imperfectly observed by consumers. We analyse how investment
incentives depend on the firm's reputation and the information structure of consumer ...
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[PDF] Posterior Implementation versus Ex-Post Implementation

[PDF] from ucla.edu
P Jehiel, M Meyer-ter-Vehn… - UCLA Economics …, 2005 - econ.ucla.edu
In contrast to most other notions of implementation, posterior implementation is defined with
respect to the information released by the mechanism. It requires that agents' strategies are
optimal against others' strategies, given the precise information made available by the ...
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Posterior implementation vs ex-post implementation

[PDF] from ucla.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
P Jehiel, M Meyer-ter-Vehn, B Moldovanu… - Economics Letters, 2007 - Elsevier
Posterior implementation is a weaker concept than ex-post implementation. It requires that
agents' strategies are optimal against others' strategies, given the precise information made
available by the mechanism. Whereas ex-post implementation is generically impossible, ...
Related articles - All 17 versions

DP5566 Mixed Bundling Auctions

P Jehiel, M Meyer-Ter-Vehn… - 2006 - cepr.org
We study multi-object auctions where agents have private and additive valuations for
heterogeneous objects. We focus on the revenue properties of a class of dominant strategy
mechanisms where a weight is assigned to each partition of objects. The weights ...
Cached - All 3 versions

An optimal Voting System when Voting is costly

[PDF] from uni-muenchen.de
K Bognar, T Börgers… - 2010 - mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
We consider the design of an optimal voting system when voting is costly. For a private
values model with two alternatives we show the optimality of a voting system that combines
three elements:(i) there is an arbitrarily chosen default decision and non-participation is ...
Related articles - All 7 versions

[PDF] A Reputational Theory of Firm Dynamics

[PDF] from ucla.edu
S Board… - econ.ucla.edu
Abstract We study the lifecycle of a firm who sells a product of uncertain quality,
characterizing the optimal investment and exit decisions and the resulting firm dynamics. We
investigate two model variations. If the firm shares the market's uncertainty, it learns about ...
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[CITATION] An Impossibility Result

M Meyer-ter-Vehn - 2003
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[PDF] We Can't Argue Forever, But We Should Argue As Long As Possible

[PDF] from ucdavis.edu
K Bognar, M Meyer-ter-Vehn… - 2008 - econ.ucdavis.edu
Abstract We explore a model of costly dynamic deliberation in which two partiallyinformed
jurors with common interests try to arrive at a common binary verdict by coarse binary
communication. They can only communicate their information through a dynamic voting ...
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[CITATION] Mixed Bundling Auctions

M Meyer-ter-Vehn - 2006
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[CITATION] Ex-post Implementation: Impossibility, Characterizations and Mixed Bundling Auctions

M Meyer-ter-Vehn - 2003 - Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms- …
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