R Romano… - Journal of Public Economics, 2001 - econ.duke.edu
Abstract Charities frequently announce contributions of donors as they accrue. Doing so
induces donors to play a sequential-move rather than simultaneous-move game. We
examine the conditions under which a charity prefers such sequential play. It is known that ...
H Yildirim - Games and Economic Behavior, 2005 - Elsevier
This paper studies contests where players have the flexibility to add to their previous efforts
after observing their rivals' most recent effort in an intermediate stage. It is found that (1)
contrary to previous findings, the Stackelberg outcome where the underdog leads and the ...
R Romano… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2005 - Elsevier
We characterize equilibria of games with two properties:(i) Agents have the opportunity to
adjust their strategic variable after their initial choices and before payoffs occur; but (ii) they
can only add to their initial amounts. The equilibrium set consists of just the Cournot–Nash ...
CR Taylor… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2010 - Elsevier
We present a theory of voting that predicts that elections are more likely to be close, and
voter turnout is more likely to be high when citizens possess better public information about
the composition of the electorate. These findings suggest that providing more information ...
TR Lewis… - RAND Journal of Economics, 2002 - JSTOR
From experience, regulated monopolists learn to employ cost-reducing innovations. We
characterize the optimal regulation of an innovating monopolist with unknown costs.
Regulatory policy is designed to minimize current costs of service while encouraging ...
TR Lewis… - The American economic review, 2002 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: In many important high-technology markets, including software development, data
processing, communications, aeronautics, and defense, suppliers learn through experience
how to provide better service at lower cost. This paper examines how a buyer designs ...
JS Demski, TR Lewis, D Yao… - Journal of Law, …, 1999 - Oxford Univ Press
Page 1. JLEO, V15 N1 107 Practices for Managing Information Flows Within Organizations
Joel S. Demski University of Florida Tracy R. Lewis University of Florida Dennis Yao
University of Pennsylvania Hüseyin Yildirim University of Florida ...
H Yildirim - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
This paper studies a sequential bargaining model in which agents expend efforts to be the
proposer. In equilibrium, agents' effort choices are influenced by the prize and cost effects.
The (endogenous) prize is the difference between the residual surplus an agent obtains ...
TR Lewis… - International Economic Review, 2005 - Wiley Online Library
This article examines the use of switching costs by long-lived strategic buyers to manage
dynamic competition between rival suppliers. The analysis reveals how buyers may employ
switching costs to their advantage. We show that when switching costs are high, a buyer ...
H Yildirim - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2004 - Elsevier
This paper studies the optimal piecewise procurement of a large-scale project. In the unique
Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) of the dynamic procurement game, it is found that (1)
unlike the static setting, the procurer's optimal strategy depends on the number of ...
H Yildirim - Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
This paper examines dynamic voluntary contributions to a large-scale project. In equilibrium,
contributions are influenced by the interplay of two opposing incentives. While agents prefer
to free ride on others for contributions, they also prefer to encourage others to contribute ...
CR Taylor… - 2006 - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to
view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are
not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
CR Taylor… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2010 - Elsevier
We provide a unified analysis of the canonical rational voting model with privately known
political preferences and costs of voting. Focusing on type-symmetric equilibrium, we show
that for small electorates, members of the minority group vote with a strictly higher ...
C Taylor… - 2008 - Citeseer
Abstract We provide a unified analysis of the canonical rational voting model with privately
known political preferences and costs of voting. Focusing on type-symmetric equilibrium, we
show that for small electorates, members of the minority group vote with a strictly higher ...
HH Yildirim… - International Journal of Testing, 2009 - Taylor & Francis
S Krasteva… - 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: The preference between public and private negotiations for a buyer who
sequentially visits two suppliers is examined. It is shown that the buyer weakly prefers to
conduct private negotiations in order to create strategic uncertainty about the trade history. ...
[CITATION] A characterization of voter turnout in large elections
C Taylor… - 2005 - Duke University Working Paper
TR Lewis… - 2005 - econ.duke.edu
Abstract This chapter examines the optimal strategies in repeated procurement settings by
large power buyers when there are costs to switching suppliers. It is found that buyers can
use switching costs to their advantage. When switching costs are high, a buyer may ...
HH YILDIRIM - 2006 - etd.lib.metu.edu.tr
Page 1. THE DIFFERENTIAL ITEM FUNCTIONING (DIF) ANALYSIS OF
MATHEMATICS ITEMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAMS A
THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF NATURAL AND ...
[CITATION] A theory of charitable fundraising with costly solicitation
A Correa… - 2011 - Working paper
H Yildirim - Public Choice, 2010 - Springer
Abstract I examine a sequential bargaining situation in which agents contest the right to
propose an allocation. The contest can either take place at a pre-bargaining stage, yielding
“persistent recognition” to propose, or recur throughout the bargaining, yielding “transitory ...
R Romano… - Working Papers, 2001 - ideas.repec.org
We characterize equilibria of games with two properties:(i) Agents have the opportunity to
adjust their strategic variable after their initial choices and before payoffs occur; but (ii) they
can only add to their initial amounts. The equilibrium set consists of just the Cournot-Nash ...
H Yildirim - 2001 - econometricsociety.org
Abstract I consider an incomplete information model of voluntary contributions to a long term
public project. While agents can observe the progress of the project and their own costs of
contribution, they have incomplete information about the contribution costs of others. I ...
CR Taylor… - The Review of Economic Studies, 2011 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract The incentive and project selection effects of agent anonymity are investigated in a
setting where an evaluator observes a subjective signal of project quality. Although the
evaluator cannot commit ex ante to an acceptance criterion, she decides up front between ...
HH YILDIRIM, G ÇÖMLEKOĞLU… - efdergi.hacettepe.edu.tr
The Fit Of Ministry Of National Education Private School Examinatıon Data To Item
Response Theory Models. Hüseyin H.YILDIRIM, Gözde ÇÖMLEKOĞLU, Giray
BERBEROĞLU. ABSTRACT: The purpose of this study was to ...
HH Yildirim… - Hacettepe University Journal of Education, 2011 - eric.ed.gov
EJ936735 - Correlates of Communalities as Matching Variables
in Differential Item Functioning Analyses.
S Krasteva… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Evidence suggests that donors have little demand for information before giving to
charity. To understand this behavior and its policy implications, we present a model in which
each individual can acquire costly information about her true value of charity. We observe ...
H Yildirim - Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) …, 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We present a theory of charitable fund-raising in which it is costly to solicit donors.
We fully characterize the optimal solicitation strategy that maximizes donations net of
fundraising costs. The optimal strategy dictates that the fund-raiser target only those ...
H Yildirim - 2011 - liberalarts.iupui.edu
Abstract This paper studies a collective decision problem in which a group of individuals
with interdependent preferences vote whether or not to implement a project of unknown
value. A utilitarian social planner aggregates these votes according to a majority rule; but, ...
EH Mert, MA Kaya, H Yıldırım - Designed …, 2012 - booksandjournals.brillonline.com
Image of brill logo Over three centuries of scholarly publishing. Brill Online. Books and Journals. ...
S Krasteva… - 2008 - econ.vt.edu
Abstract A bargaining situation in which one “buyer” engages in bilateral negotiations with
two “suppliers” is examined. In addition to players' ability to make an offer in each
negotiation, the buyer controls the information flow between negotiations and chooses ...
HH Yıldırım… - Journal of European Social Policy, 2011 - esp.sagepub.com
Page 1. © The Author(s), 2009. Reprints and permissions: http://www.sagepub.co.uk/
journalsPermissions.nav Journal of European Social Policy, 0958-9287; Vol. 19(5): 178–14;
344247; DOI:10.1177/0958928709XXXXXX http://esp.sagepub.com © The Author(s), 2011. ...
CR Taylor… - 2007 - econ.duke.edu
Abstract We investigate the incentive and project screening effects of anonymity in the
peerreview process. If the process is “blind”, then the applicant's (payoff relevant) type is
hidden from the reviewer. If the process is nonblind or “informed”, then the reviewer ...
HH Yıldırım… - Necatibey Faculty of Education, Electronic Journal of … - doaj.org
H Yildirim - 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper studies a collective decision problem in which a group of individuals
with interdependent preferences vote whether or not to implement a public project of
unknown value. A utilitarian social planner aggregates these votes according to a majority ...
H Yildirim - Working Papers, 2002 - ideas.repec.org
This paper deals with the optimal procurement of a long term project whose full return is to
be received upon completion. The project consists of several subprojects to be auctioned off
in a sequence. In equilibrium, I find that:(1) Even though the procurer lacks long term ...
HH Yıldırım, D Hughes… - Health & Social Care in the …, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. ...
[CITATION] Testimony of torture in Turkey: interview with Hüseyin Yildirim, November 1983
H Yildirim - 1983 - Amnesty International, International …
[CITATION] Three essays on regulation, public finance, and game theory
H Yildirim - 2000 - University of Florida
[CITATION] Differential Item Functioning (DIF) Analysis of PISA 2003 Mathematics Items across Gender and SES Groups
ÇET Selda, HH YILDIRIM…
S Krasteva… - 2008 - public.econ.duke.edu
Abstract The preference between public and private negotiations for a buyer who
sequentially visits two suppliers is examined. It is shown that the buyer weakly prefers to
conduct private negotiations in order to create strategic uncertainty about the trade history. ...
S Krasteva… - Levine's Working Paper Archive, 2011 - public.econ.duke.edu
Abstract This paper investigates the sequencing choice of a buyer who negotiates with the
sellers of two complementary objects with uncertain payoffs. We show that the sequencing
matters to the buyer only when equilibrium trade can be inefficient. In this case, the buyer ...
CR Taylor… - Working Papers, 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: A well-known shortcoming of rational voter models is that the equilibrium
probability that an individual votes converges to zero as the population of citizens tends to
infinity. We show that this does not-as is often suggested-imply that equilibrium voter ...
UHH YILDIRIM - absam.net
Page 1. Sağlık Reformları ve Maliyet Sınırlama Stratejileri 1 HHYıldırım Sağlık Reformları
ve Maliyet Sınırlama Stratejiler* Health Reforms and Cost Containment Strategies Uzm.
Hasan Hüseyin YILDIRIM** Özet Dünyadaki ülkelerin ...
HH YILDIRIM… - Elementary Education Online, 2011 - ilkogretim-online.org.tr
Page 1. Elementary Education Online, 10(3), 1112-1123, 2011. İlköğretim Online, 10(3),
1112-1123, 2011. [Online]: http://ilkogretim-online.org.tr On Hypothesis Testing, Confidence
Interval, Effect Size and Noncentral Probability Distributions ...
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