B Adam… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1993 - Elsevier
Abstract Game-theoretic analysis often leads to consideration of an infinite hierarchy of
beliefs for each player. Harsanyi suggested that such a hierarchy of beliefs could be
summarized in a single entity, called the player′ s type. This paper provides an ...
E Dekel - Journal of Economic Theory, 1986 - Elsevier
Abstract The independence axiom used to derive the expected utility representation of
preferences over lotteries is replaced by requiring only convexity, in terms of probability
mixtures, of indifference sets. Two axiomatic characterizations are proven, one for simple ...
A Brandenburger… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric …, 1987 - JSTOR
We discuss the unity between the two standard approaches to noncooperative solution
concepts for games. The decision-theoretic approach starts from the assumption that the
rationality of the players is common knowledge. This leads to the notion of correlated ...
L Blume, A Brandenburger… - Econometrica: Journal of the …, 1991 - JSTOR
Two properties of preferences and representations for choice under uncertainty which play
an important role in decision theory are:(i) admissibility, the requirement that weakly
dominated actions should not be chosen; and (ii) the existence of well defined conditional ...
E Dekel, BL Lipman… - Econometrica, 2001 - Wiley Online Library
2. Abstract We extend Kreps'(1979) analysis of preference for flexibility, reinterpreted by
Kreps (1992) as a model of unforeseen contingencies. We enrich the choice set,
consequently obtaining uniqueness results that were not possible in Kreps' model. We ...
E Dekel… - ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY MONOGRAPHS, 1997 - books.google.com
The concepts of knowledge and rationality have been explicitly applied by economists and
game theorists to obtain no-trade results and to characterize solution concepts of games.
Implicitly these two concepts underlie much recent work in these fields, ranging from ...
E Dekel, BL Lipman… - Econometrica, 1998 - JSTOR
ONE ASPECT OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY with important economic implications is
unawareness of various possibilities. For example, unforeseen contingencies could prevent
agents from writing the kinds of contracts our models predict. In this paper we explore the ...
E Dekel… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1990 - Elsevier
Abstract The iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies has been advanced as a
necessary requirement for “rational” play. However, this requirement relies on the
assumption that the players have no doubts about their opponents' payoffs. We show that ...
E Dekel… - Journal of Political Economy, 2000 - JSTOR
We explore sequential voting in symmetric two-option environments. We show that the
(informative) symmetric equilibria of the simultancous voting game are also equilibria in any
sequential voting structure. In unanimity games,(essentially) the whole set of equilibria is ...
E Dekel,
JC Ely… - Review of Economic Studies, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
We endogenize preferences using the “indirect evolutionary approach”. Individuals are
randomly matched to play a two-person game. Individual (subjective) preferences determine
their behaviour and may differ from the actual (objective) pay-offs that determine fitness. ...
E Dekel,
D Fudenberg… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2004 - Elsevier
This paper discusses the implications of learning theory for the analysis of games with a
move by Nature. One goal is to illuminate the issues that arise when modeling situations
where players are learning about the distribution of Nature's move as well as learning ...
L Blume, A Brandenburger… - Econometrica: Journal of the …, 1991 - JSTOR
This paper develops a decision-theoretic approach to normal-form refinements of Nash
equilibrium and, in particular, provides characterizations of (normal-form) perfect equilibrium
(Selten (1975)) and proper equilibrium (Myerson (1978)). The approach relies on a theory ...
E Ben-Porath… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1992 - Elsevier
We consider extensions of games where some players have the option of signaling future
actions by incurring costs. The main result is that in a class of games, if one player can incur
costs, then forwards induction selects her most preferred outcome. Surprisingly, the player ...
E Dekel, BL Lipman… - Review of Economic …, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
What behaviour can be explained using the hypothesis that the agent faces temptation but is
otherwise a “standard rational agent”? In earlier work, Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) use a set
betweenness axiom to restrict the set of preferences considered by Dekel, Lipman and ...
E Dekel… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1992 - Elsevier
Abstract We investigate whether replicator dynamics justify “survival of the fittest” when
players inherit pure strategies, mixed strategies, or rules for choosing strategies. A strategy
that never is a best reply can survive replicator dynamics if only pure strategies are ...
E Dekel, BL Lipman… - European Economic Review, 1998 - Elsevier
Many writers have suggested that the nature of contracting, firm structure, and political constitutions
cannot be well understood without taking account of the role of unforeseen contingencies –
loosely, possibilities that the agent does not `think about' at the time he makes a decision. ...
E Dekel… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1999 - Elsevier
A long-standing conjecture is that winner-take-all games such as patent races lead to the
survival of risk-takers and the extinction of risk-averters. In many species a winner-take-all
game determines the males' right to reproduce, and the same argument suggests that ...
E Dekel,
D Fudenberg… - Theoretical Economics, 2007 - econtheory.org
Abstract This paper proposes the solution concept of interim correlated rationalizability, and
shows that all types that have the same hierarchies of beliefs have the same set of interim-
correlated-rationalizable outcomes. This solution concept characterizes common certainty ...
E Dekel, BL Lipman, A Rustichini… - Econometrica, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001)(henceforth DLR) axiomatically characterized three
representations of preferences that allow for a desire for flexibility and/or commitment. In one
of these representations (ordinal expected utility), the independence axiom is stated in a ...
E Dekel, MO Jackson… - Journal of Political Economy, 2008 - JSTOR
We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and
free of stigma. Two parties compete in a binary election and may purchase votes in a
sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign promises ( ...
E Dekel… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1992 - cowles.econ.yale.edu
It is customary in game theory to model a situation of differently informed players in terms of
partitions of a state space. In this paper we study the correlated equilibria (Aumann, 1974,
1987) of games in which players make information processing errors. To do this we ...
E Dekel - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1989 - JSTOR
An important application of the theory of choice under uncertainty is to asset markets and an
important property in these markets is a preference for portfolio diversification. If an investor
is an expected utility maximizer, then (s) he is risk averse if and only if (s) he exhibits a ...
E Dekel,
D Fudenberg… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1999 - Elsevier
In a self-confirming equilibrium, each player correctly forecasts the actions that opponents
will take along the equilibrium path, but may be mistaken about the way that opponents
would respond to deviations. This paper develops a refinement of self-confirming ...
E Dekel, Z Safra… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1991 - Elsevier
Abstract Sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium are given when
preferences may violate the reduction of compound lotteries assumption (RCLA). Without
RCLA decision makers may not be indifferent between compound lotteries which have the ...
E Dekel… - 1997 - Citeseer
Abstract We axiomatically characterize a representation of preferences over opportunity sets
which exhibit a preference for exibility, interpreted as a model of unforeseen contingencies.
In this representation, the agent acts as if she had a coherent prior over a set of possible ...
[CITATION] Coordination and the potential for self sacrifice
E Ben-Porath… - 1988 - Graduate School of Business, …
E Dekel… - Review of Economic Studies, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
We propose a method to test a prediction of the distribution of a stochastic process. In a non-
Bayesian, non-parametric setting, a predicted distribution is tested using a realization of the
stochastic process. A test associates a set of realizations for each predicted distribution, ...
E Dekel, A Wolinsky… - 2000 - execed.kellogg.northwestern.edu
Abstract We consider discrete versions of first-price auctions. We present a condition on
beliefs about players' values such that, with any fixed finite set of possible bids and
sufficiently many players, only bidding the bid closest from below to one's true value ...
E Dekel, MO Jackson… - … Journal of Political …, 2009 - faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu
ABSTRACT We examine the consequences of lobbying and vote buying, assuming this
practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two lobbyists compete for the votes of legislators
by offering up-front payments to the legislators in exchange for their votes. We analyze ...
E Dekel - Journal of Economic Theory, 1990 - Elsevier
Abstract It is shown that the Pareto optimal outcomes in a two period simultaneous move
bargaining model violate forwards induction rationality when the players are sufficiently
patient. This bargaining model describes a situation where a principal is represented by ...
MW Cripps, E Dekel… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2005 - Elsevier
We analyze reputation effects in two-player repeated games of strictly conflicting interests. In
such games, player 1 has a commitment action such that a best reply to it gives player 1 the
highest individually rational payoff and player 2 the minmax payoff. Players have equal ...
E Dekel, MO Jackson… - Tel Aviv University, California …, 2004 - econ.tau.ac.il
Abstract We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed
and free of stigma. Two parties competing in a binary election may purchase votes in a
sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign promises ( ...
E Dekel,
D Fudenberg, S Morris… - 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper proposes the solution concept of interim rationalizability, and shows that
all type spaces that have the same hierarchies of beliefs have the same set of interim
rationalization outcomes. This solution concept characterizes common knowledge of ...
E Dekel,
D Fudenberg… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2002 - Elsevier
In order to model the subjective uncertainty of a player over the behavior strategies of an
opponent, one must consider the player's beliefs about the opponent's play at information
sets that the player thinks have probability zero. This corregendum uses “trembles” to ...
E Dekel… - 2010 - sws1.bu.edu
Abstract We show an unexpected connection between the Gul–Pesendorfer (2001)(GP)
model of temptation and a version of the Strotz (1955) model with uncertainty about the
nature of the temptation that will strike. In particular, any preference over menus with a GP ...
[CITATION] On an axiomatic approach to refinements of Nash equilibrium
A Brandenburger… - Economic Theory Discussion Paper, 1986
L Blume, A Brandenburger… - Annals of Operations Research, 1989 - Springer
Abstract This overview focuses on lexicographic choice under conditions of uncertainty.
First, lexicographic versions of traditional (von Neumann-Morgenstern) expected utility
theory are described where the usual Archimedean axiom is weakened. The role of these ...
BP Elchanan, D Eddie… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1993 - Elsevier
Abstract The paper examines the relationship between the mutation rate and the rate of
growth of the population when the environment is changing. It is shown that while the global
maximum of the growth rate is attained at a non-zero mutation rate, zero is always a local ...
E Dekel… - The American Economic Review, 1990 - JSTOR
When the Exxon Valdez snagged on an underwater mountain in March 1989, and released
11 million gallons of crude oil into Prince William Sound, part of the public outrage was due
to the subsequent rise in gasoline prices. Indeed, it seemed possible that, rather than ...
E Dekel, MO Jackson… - Discussion Papers, 2006 - financialtrustindex.org
Abstract We examine the consequences of lobbying and vote buying, assuming this prac#
tice were allowed and free of stigma. Two jlobbyistskcompete for the votes of legislators by
offering up# front payments to the legislators in exchange for their votes. We analyze how ...
[CITATION] Bayesian rationality in games
A Brandenburger… - Dept. of Applied Economics, Cambridge, MA, 1986
E Dekel… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1990 - Elsevier
Abstract The theory of games (with complete information) in which a single patient longrun
player faces a succession of short-run opponents cannot plausibly be used to justify the
Stackelberg solution concept, because if that player can select which subgame-perfect ...
[CITATION] A. Rustichini (2001),“Representing preferences with a unique subjective state space”
E Dekel… - Econometrica
E Dekel… - Levine's Working Paper Archive, 2010 - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of
further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site ...
[CITATION] Equilibrium refinements and lexicographic probabilities
L Blume, A Brandenburger… - 1989 - Division of Research, Harvard …
E Dekel, MO Jackson… - 2006 - Citeseer
Abstract We study all% pay auctions (or wars of attrition), where the highest bidder wins an
object, but all bidders pay their bids. We consider such auctions when two bidders alternate
in raising their bids and where all aspects of the auction are common knowledge including ...
[CITATION] All-Pay Auctions
E Dekel, MO Jackson… - Manuscript, Northwestern Univ, 2006
E Dekel… - 2004 - econ.tau.ac.il
Abstract We suggest a test for discovering whether a potential expert is informed of the
distribution of a stochastic process. In a non-Bayesian non-parametric setting, the expert is
asked to make a prediction which is tested against a single realization of the stochastic ...
E Dekel… - 2005 - nyu.edu
Abstract In Dekel and Feinberg (2004) we suggested a test for discovering whether a
potential expert is informed of the distribution of a stochastic process. This category test
requires predicting a “small”–category I–set of outcomes. In this paper we show that under ...
E Dekel,
G Ellison, J Horowitz, C Meghir… - …, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
... The Econometric Society Annual Reports Report of the Editors 2002–2003. Eddie Dekel,; Glenn
Ellison,; Joel Horowitz,; Costas Meghir,; Andrew Postlewaite. Article first published online: 10
DEC 2003. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00490.x. Issue. Econometrica. ...
[CITATION] The Econometric Society Annual Reports: Report of the Secretary
R Repullo, E Dekel,
D Levine, C Meghir… - …, 2007 - The Econometric Society
A Brandenburger… - … LIBRARY OF CRITICAL …, 1999 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract The authors discuss the unity between the two standard approaches to
noncooperative solution concepts for games. The decision-theoretic approach starts from
the assumption that the rationality of the players is common knowledge. This leads to the ...
E Dekel - Advances in economic theory: Sixth World Congress, 1995 - books.google.com
[A] unified theory for all non-cooperative games does not seem possible. The only
alternative seems to be... introducing... information referring to personality traits,
psychologies of the players, etc.[E] ven if... examples... throw doubt upon the universality ...
D Eddie… - 1990 - escholarship.org
Abstract The theory of games (with complete information) in which a single patient long-run
player faces a succession of short-run opponents cannot plausibly be used to justify the
Stackelberg solution concept, because if that player can select which subgame-perfect ...
BL Lipman… - 2010 - ideas.repec.org
We study the random Strotz model, a version of the Strotz (1955) model with uncer-tainty
about the nature of the temptation that will strike. We show that the random Strotz
representation is unique and characterize a comparative notion of\ more temp-tation ...
[CITATION] Essays on choices and beliefs in uncertainty and game theory
E Dekel - 1986 - Harvard University
E Dekel-Tabak… - Stanford GSB Research Paper No. …, 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We suggest a test for discovering whether a potential expert is informed of the
distribution of a stochastic process. In a non-Bayesian non-parametric setting, the expert is
asked to make a prediction which is tested against a single realization of the stochastic ...
E Ben-Porath, E Dekel… - 2012 - econ.tau.ac.il
Consider the problem of the head of an organization—say, a dean—who has an indivisible
resource (say, a job slot) that can be allocated to any of several divisions (departments)
within the organization (university). Naturally, the dean wishes to allocate this slot to that ...
[CITATION] Profit Protection in Social Regulation and Licensing: A Normative Theory of Capture
E Dekel, S Scotchmer… - 1989 - … School of Public Policy, University of …
[CITATION] Economic
D Austen-Smith, JS Banks, J Benhahih… - Journal of Economic …, 1976 - Academic Press.
E Dekel, MO Jackson… - econstor.eu
Zusammenfassung: We study all-pay auctions (or wars of attrition), where the highest bidder
wins an object, but all bidders pay their bids. We consider such auctions when two bidders
alternate in raising their bids and where all aspects of the auction are common knowledge ...
E DEKEL… - dklevine.com
Wash equilibrium and its refinements describe situations with little or no “strategic
uncertainty,” in the sense that each player knows and is correct about the beliefs of the other
players regarding how the game will be played. While this will sometimes be the case, it is ...
[CITATION] Economic
Y Balasko, JS Banks, J Benhabib… - Journal of economic …, 1993 - Academic Press.
[CITATION] EDITORIAL BOARD WILLIAM F. LucAs Claremont Graduate School
M MASCHLER, RJ AUMANN, G DEBREU… - Games and economic …, 1994
E Dekel-Tabak,
D Fudenberg… - Harvard Institute of …, 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We define and analyze strategic topologies on types, under which two types are
close if their strategic behavior will be similar in all strategic situations. To operationalize this
idea, we adopt interim rationalizability as our solution concept, and define a metric ...
JC Ely, EJ Green, BL Lipman, D Ray, S Athey… - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. ...
[CITATION] Cho, In-Koo 373 Christie, M. 87 Clapp, RV 31 Clarke, Edward H. 21
R Clower, N Baker, JS Banks… - Recent …, 1993 - Edward Elgar Publishing
[CITATION] The deadline for submissions is January 31, 1998. All abstract submissions received by that date that conform to instructions will be considered by the …
E DEKEL, BL LIPMAN, A RUSTICHINI - Econometrica, 1997 - Econometric Society
Y Feinberg… - Research Papers, 2004 - ideas.repec.org
We suggest a test for discovering whether a potential expert is informed of the distribution of
a stochastic process. In a non-Bayesian non-parametric setting, the expert is asked to make
a prediction which is tested against a single realization of the stochastic process. It is ...
E Dekel… - The Review of Economic Studies, 2012 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We explore how allowing votes to be traded separately of shares may affect the
efficiency of corporate control contests. Our basic set-up and the nature of the questions
continue the work of Grossman and Hart (1980), Harris and Raviv (1988), and Blair, Golbe ...
D Fudenberg… - Working papers, 1987 - econpapers.repec.org
Related works: Working Paper: Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty (2010) Journal
Article: Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty (1990) This item may be available elsewhere
in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title. ... This site is part of RePEc and all ...
A Brandenburger… - Econometrica, 1987 - aida.econ.yale.edu
We discuss the unity between the two standard approaches to noncooperative solution
concepts for games. The decision-theoretic approach starts from the assumption that the
rationality of the players is common knowledge. This leads to the notion of correlated ...
[CITATION] Rationalizable Outcomes of Large Independent Private-value First-price Auctions
E Dekel, A Wolinsky… - 2000 - Center for Mathematical Studies in …
Abstract For many people there is tradeoff between choosing a job that they will enjoy and
one at which they are good and will earn a high income. We embed this observation in a
matching model. Consider then men and women who are a priori identical in the sense ...
MO Jackson, E Dekel… - Working Papers, 2005 - econpapers.repec.org
Related works: Working Paper: Vote Buying (2004) Working Paper: Vote Buying (2005) This
item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title. ... This
site is part of RePEc and all the data displayed here is part of the RePEc data set.
J Hörner, BL Lipman, D Ray, S Athey, T Bergstrom… - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. Wiley Online Library will be disrupted 3
Dec from 10-12 GMT for monthly maintenance. ...
E Dekel, BL Lipman… - Econometrica, 1998 - www-personal.umich.edu
ONE ASPECT OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY with important economic implications is
unawareness of various possibilities. For example, unforeseen contingencies could prevent
agents from writing the kinds of contracts our models predict. In this paper we explore the ...
J Geanakoplos, A Brandenburger… - Cowles Foundation …, 1989 - econpapers.repec.org
We study the" generalized correlated equilibria" of a game when players make information
processing errors. It is shown that the assumption of information processing errors is
equivalent to that of" subjectivity"(ie, differences between the players' priors). Hence a ...
E Dekel… - 2011 - tau.ac.il
Abstract For many people there is tradeoff between choosing a job that they will enjoy and
one at which they are good and will earn a high income. We embed this observation in a
matching model. Consider then men and women who are a priori identical in the sense ...
E Dekel, A Postlewaite, C Meghir, J Horowitz… - …, 2003 - dialnet.unirioja.es
... THE ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY ANNUAL REPORTS. Autores: Eddie Dekel, Andrew Postlewaite,
Costas Meghir, Jeol Horowitz, Glenn Ellison; Localización: Econométrica, ISSN 0012-9682, Vol.
71, Nº 1, 2003 , págs. 435-437. Fundación Dialnet. Acceso de usuarios registrados. ...
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