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Striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents

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R Fernandez… - 1989 - nber.org
ABSTRACT This paper models the wage—contract negotiation procedure between a union
and a firm as a sequential bargaining process in which the union also decides, in each
period, whether or not to strike for the duration of that period. We show that there exist ...
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Measuring adverse selection in managed health care

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RG Frank, J Glazer… - Journal of Health Economics, 2000 - Elsevier
Health plans paid by capitation have an incentive to distort the quality of services they offer
to attract profitable and to deter unprofitable enrollees. We characterize plans' rationing as a
“shadow price” on access to various areas of care and show how the profit maximizing ...
Cited by 134 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 18 versions

The strategic effects of long-term debt in imperfect competition

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G Jacob - Journal of economic theory, 1994 - Elsevier
Abstract When rival firms issue long-term debt, their product market behavior is driven by
strategic considerations that would not be present if the firms had no debt or if their debt was
short term. It is shown that with limited liability, a firm′ s behavior in product market ...
Cited by 122 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 7 versions

Licensing and the sharing of knowledge in research joint ventures

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S Bhattacharya, J Glazer… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1992 - Elsevier
Abstract We consider a three-stage model of research and development (R & D) to capture
some key elements of research joint ventures (RJVs). In the last of the three stages, firms
compete in the product market. In the second stage, the firms simultaneously choose ...
Cited by 84 - Related articles - Library Search - All 12 versions

Optimal risk adjustment in markets with adverse selection: an application to managed care

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J Glazer, TG McGuire - The American Economic Review, 2000 - JSTOR
It is well known that adverse selection causes distortions in contracts in markets with
asymmetric information. Taxing inefficient contracts and subsidizing the efficient ones can
improve market outcomes (Bruce C. Greenwald and Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1986), although ...
Cited by 84 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 11 versions

Debates and decisions: On a rationale of argumentation rules

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J Glazer, A Rubinstein - Games and Economic Behavior, 2001 - Elsevier
We view a debate as a mechanism by which an uninformed decision maker (the listener)
extracts information from two informed debaters, who hold contradicting positions regarding
the right decision. During the debate, the debaters raise arguments and, based on these ...
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On optimal rules of persuasion

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J Glazer, A Rubinstein - Econometrica, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
2. We are grateful to Noga Alon of Tel Aviv University for numerous discussions and
assistance regarding Proposition 2. We also thank the co-editor of this journal, two
anonymous referees, Andrew Caplin, and Bart Lipman for valuable comments.
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Efficient Allocation of a

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J Glazer… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1989 - Elsevier
Abstract A planner is interested in allocating an indivisible good (a “prize”) to one of many
agents in the economy. His objective is to give the prize to the agent who values it most,
without any payments being made by the recipient. The planner, however, does not know ...
Cited by 69 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 7 versions

Motives and implementation: On the design of mechanisms to elicit opinions

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J Glazer, A Rubinstein - Journal of Economic Theory, 1998 - Elsevier
A number of experts receive noisy signals regarding a desirable public decision. The public
target is to make the best possible decision on the basis of all the information held by the
experts. We compare two “cultures.” In one, all experts are driven only by the public motive ...
Cited by 47 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 15 versions

Setting health plan premiums to ensure efficient quality in health care: minimum variance optimal risk adjustment

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J Glazer, TG McGuire - Journal of Public Economics, 2002 - Elsevier
Risk adjustment refers to the practice of paying health plans a premium per person (or per
family) based on a formula using risk adjusters, such as age or gender, and weights on
those adjusters. One role of risk adjustment is to make sure plans have an incentive to ...
Cited by 46 - Related articles - All 6 versions

Payer competition and cost shifting in health care

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J Glazer, TG McGuire - Journal of Economics & Management …, 1994 - Wiley Online Library
This paper studies a model in which Puo payers contract with one hospital. True costs per patient
are not a possible basis for payment, and contracts can only be zuritten on the basis of allocated
cost. Payers choose a contract that is fully prospective or fully based on cost allocation, or ...
Cited by 38 - Related articles - All 6 versions

Multiple payers, commonality and free-riding in health care: Medicare and private payers

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J Glazer, TG McGuire - Journal of Health Economics, 2002 - Elsevier
Abstract Managed health care plans and providers in the US and elsewhere sell their
services to multiple payers. For example, the three largest groups of purchasers from health
plans in the US are employers, Medicaid plans, and Medicare, with the first two ...
Cited by 38 - Related articles - All 10 versions

A note on Abreu-Matsushima mechanisms

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J Glazer… - Econometrica, 1992 - JSTOR
IN A STIMULATING RECENT PAPER, Abreu and Matsushima (1992)(hereafter AM) show
how a class of social choice functions can be virtually implemented in iteratively
undominated strategies. This work has several important features: the mechanisms used ...
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Sharing productive knowledge in internally financed R & D contests

S Bhattacharya, J Glazer… - The Journal of Industrial …, 1990 - JSTOR
We examine the optimal design of two-stage research and development (R & D) joint
ventures. At the second stage, researchers choose R & D effort levels independently in an
attempt to achieve an innovation. In the first stage, researchers have an opportunity to ...
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A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach

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J Glazer, A Rubinstein - Theoretical Economics, 2006 - econtheory.org
Abstract A speaker wishes to persuade a listener to take a certain action. The conditions
under which the request is justified, from the listener's point of view, depend on the state of
the world, which is known only to the speaker. Each state is characterized by a set of ...
Cited by 35 - Related articles - All 26 versions

Should physicians be permitted to 'balance bill'patients?

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J Glazer, TG McGuire - Journal of Health Economics, 1993 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper studies the efficiency effects of physician fees when the insurer (possibly
the government) pays a fee for each procedure, and the doctor may supplement the fee by
an extra charge to the patient, a practice known as 'balance billing.'Monopolistically ...
Cited by 30 - Related articles - All 9 versions

Managerial incentives and financial signaling in product market competition

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J Glazer… - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1990 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper demonstrates how management compensation schemes can serve as
an inexpensive and sometimes even free signaling mechanism. In the particular example
studied here it is shown how a contract offered to the manager of a monopolistic firm may ...
Cited by 25 - Related articles - All 8 versions

[PDF] Virtual implementation in backwards induction

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J Glazer… - Games and Economic behavior, 1996 - ratio.huji.ac.il
Implementation theory has come a long way since the pioneering contributions of Hurwicz
(1972), Gibbard (1973), Satterthwaite (1975), Maskin (1977), and others. The fundamental
question addressed in this literature is that of which social choice functions are ...
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Private Employers Don't Need Formal Risk Adjustment

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J Glazer, TG McGuire - Inquiry, 2001 - inquiryjournalonline.org
Abstract This paper lays down a set of hypotheses to explain why private employers do not
use formal risk adjustment. The theme running through these hypotheses is simple: private
employers don't need formal adjustment because they have better tools for dealing with ...
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Optimal quality reporting in markets for health plans

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J Glazer, TG McGuire - Journal of health economics, 2006 - Elsevier
Quality reports about health plans and providers are becoming more prevalent in health
care markets. This paper casts the decision about what information to report to consumers
about health plans as a policy decision. In a market with adverse selection, complete ...
Cited by 16 - Related articles - All 9 versions

[CITATION] Optimal risk adjustment of health insurance premiums: an application to managed care

Full text - MIT Libraries
J Glazer, TG McGuire - American Economic Review, 2000
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[CITATION] Price Contracts and Referrals in Markets for Services

J Glazer, TG McGuire - 1996 - Tel Aviv University, Faculty of …
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Pricing and coordination: Strategically stable equilibria

J Glazer… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1990 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper investigates a class of two-period games in which the first-period
interactions have the features of a prisoner's dilemma game and the second-period
interactions have the features of a coordination game. This class of games seems relevant ...
Cited by 12 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 10 versions

Conflicting Preferences and Voluntary Restrictions on Choice

J Glazer… - Economics for an Imperfect World: Essays in …, 2003 - books.google.com
Perhaps the most basic assumption in modern economic theory is that each individual can
be represented by a set of internally consistent (noncontradictory) preferences and
endowments. By internally consistent preferences we mean that people today place ...
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[CITATION] Live and let live: Collusion among oligopolists with long-term debt

J Glazer - Boston University, MA, 1989
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The physician's behavior and equity under a fundholding contract

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J Glazer… - European Economic Review, 1995 - Elsevier
We study the physician's allocation of a fixed budget across patients arriving sequentially at
his office. It is shown that, at any point in time, the resources allocated to the present patient
will depend on the amount of resources already expended on previous patients and on ...
Cited by 12 - Related articles - Library Search - All 7 versions

The scope for collusive behavior among debtor countries

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R Fernandez… - Journal of Development Economics, 1990 - Elsevier
Abstract We examine the possibility for collusive behavior to originate among debtor
countries negotiating their debts with the same bank. The bank punishes a country in each
period in which the latter fails to repay its renegotiated debt. Punishing a country is costly ...
Cited by 10 - Related articles - Library Search - All 11 versions

[CITATION] Why Haven't Debtor Countries Formed a Cartel?

R Fernandez… - Papers, 1988 - ideas.repec.org
No abstract is available for this item. ... To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three options: 1. Check below under "Related
research" whether another version of this item is available online. 2. Check on the ...
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[CITATION] The economics of referrals

J Glazer, TG McGuire - Working Papers, 1991 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks.
The Economics of Referrals. Jacob Glazer and Thomas G. McGuire (). ...
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[PDF] An extensive game as a guide for solving a normal game

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J Glazer, A Rubinstein - journal of economic theory, 1996 - arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il
Game theory usually interprets a game form as a representation of the physical rules which
govern a strategic interaction. However, one can view a game form more abstractly as a
description of a systematic relationship between players' preferences and the outcome of ...
Cited by 6 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 15 versions

Using global ratings of health plans to improve the quality of health care

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J Glazer, TG McGuire, Z Cao… - Journal of health economics, 2008 - Elsevier
Global ratings, such as those based on consumer satisfaction, are a commonly used form of
report on the performance of health plans and providers. A simple averaging of the global
rating by plan members leads to a problem: it gives a plan greater incentives to improve ...
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Addressing the inequity of capitation by variable soft contracts

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A Shmueli… - Health economics, 1999 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract In the search for greater efficiency and cost-containment, many health systems have
introduced the practice of medical care providers operating under a fixed budget, often
referred to as the capitation or fundholding contract. Although the capitation contract ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 8 versions

[CITATION] Motivating Exchange of Knowledge in R&D Ventures: First-Best Implementation

S Bhattacharya, J Glazer… - Bell Communications Research, Technical …, 1987
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[BOOK] Debates and decisions: On a rationale of argumentation rules

[PDF] from usu.edu
J Glazer, A Rubinstein… - 1997 - digital.cs.usu.edu
Abstract We view a debate as a mechanism by which an uninformed decision maker (the
listener) extracts information from two informed debaters, who hold contradicting positions
regarding the right decision. During the debate, the debaters raise arguments and, based ...
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26 Optimal risk adjustment

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J Glazer, TG McGuire - The Elgar companion to health …, 2006 - books.google.com
When a provider is paid using risk adjustment, the price paid to the provider is conditioned
on observable characteristics of the enrollee or patient. For example, if a primary care
physician accepts responsibility for providing all necessary medical services to an ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - All 3 versions

[CITATION] On the Pragmatics of Persuasion: a Game Theoretical Approach

J Glazer, A Rubinstein - Levine's Bibliography, 2005 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks. On the
Pragmatics of Persuasion: A Game Theoretical Approach. Jacob Glazer and Ariel Rubinstein. ...
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[CITATION] The Economics of Quality Indexes

J Glazer, TG McGuire - 2007 - Israel Institute of Business Research
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[CITATION] Thomas G. McGuire Multiple payers, commonality and free-riding in health care: Medicare and private payers. 2002

J Glazer - Journal of Health Economics
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[CITATION] 9602 Can Affirmative Action Be Cost Effective

J Glazer… - An Experimental Examination of Price, 1996
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Why Don't Private Employers Use Risk Adjustment? Conference Overview

Full text - MIT Libraries
J Glazer, TG McGuire - Inquiry, 2001 - inquiryjournalonline.org
Abstract In spite of advice from some researchers, private employers do not use formal risk
adjustment to pay health plans. A conference,“Private Employers and Risk Adjustment,” was
held in February 2000 to consider the meaning of employers' actions. This overview ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 5 versions

[CITATION] McGuire Thomas, 1998 “Measuring Adverse Selection in Managed Health Care”

R Frank… - National Bureau of Economics Research
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[BOOK] What Motives Should Guide Referees?: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions

[PDF] from nyu.edu
J Glazer, A Rubinstein… - 1996 - econ.nyu.edu
Abstract The refereeing process can be conceived of as a mechanism for deciding whether
or not to accept a paper based on information gathered from a number of referees, each of
whom receives a noisy signai regarding the appropriateness of publication. The public ...
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[HTML] Mitigating the Problem of Unmeasured Outcomes in Quality Reports

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J Glazer, T McGuire… - The BE journal of economic …, 2008 - ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
Abstract Quality reports or profiles of health care providers are inevitably based on only a
measurable subset of the “outputs” of the organization. Hospitals, for example, are being
profiled on their mortality in the cardiac area but not in some other areas where mortality ...
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[CITATION] Debates and Decisions, on a Rationale of Argumentation

Full text - MIT Libraries
J Glazer, A Rubinstein - Games and Economic Behavior, 2000
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A Model of Dysfunctional Urges and Addiction with an Application to Cigarette Smoking

J Glazer… - The BE Journal of Economic Analysis & …, 2007 - works.bepress.com
Abstract We model economic decisions as stemming from urges. The magnitude of the urge
is a function of previous consumption. Welfare gains from satisfying an urge vary with the
nature of the urge. An urge is “dysfuntional” if people are willing to incur costs to stop ...
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[CITATION] The Choice of Correlation in Duopoly

J Glazer - 1989 - mimeo, Boston University
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[BOOK] A model of optimal persuasion rules

[PDF] from tau.ac.il
J Glazer, A Rubinstein… - 2003 - econ.tau.ac.il
Abstract A speaker attempts to persuade a listener to accept a certain request. The listener is
not sure that the request is justified. The conditions under which the listener should accept
the request depend on the values of two aspects known only to the speaker. In order to ...
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[CITATION] Simplicity of Solution Concepts: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in Extensive Games vs Iteratively undominated Strategies in Normal games

J Glazer, A Rubinstein - Working Papers, 1993 - econpapers.repec.org
By J. Glazer and Ariel Rubinstein; Simplicity of Solution Concepts: Subgame Perfect
Equilibrium in Extensive Games vs Iteratively undominated.
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Contending with Risk Selection in Health Insurance Markets in Germany

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J Glazer, TG McGuire - Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract: In many countries, competition among health plans or sickness funds raises issues
of risk selection. Funds may discourage or encourage potential enrollees from joining, and
these actions may have efficiency or fairness implications. This article reviews the ...
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[CITATION] The economics of referrals

J Glazer, TG McGuire - 1992 - Industry Studies Program, Dept. of …
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9 A Game Theoretic Approach to the Pragmatics of Debate: An Expository Note

J Glazer, A Rubinstein - 2005 - Citeseer
Abstract In this paper, the term 'debate'refers to a situation in which two parties disagree over
some issue and each of them tries to persuade a third party, the listener, to adopt his
position by raising arguments in his favor. We are interested in the logic behind the ...
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Using performance measures to motivate [] report-averse'and [] report-loving'agents

Full text - MIT Libraries
J Glazer, TG McGuire… - Journal of health economics, 2007 - Elsevier
In designing a quality report, a health plan needs to account for the report's effect on the
doctor, hospital or other provider. This paper proposes a simple model of how quality
reporting affects a health care provider, using the example of a doctor subject to reporting ...
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A welfare measure of “offset effects” in health insurance

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J Glazer, TG McGuire - Journal of Public Economics, 2012 - Elsevier
Changing health insurance coverage for one service may affect use of other insured
services. When improving coverage for one service reduces use of another, the savings are
referred to as “offset effects.” For example, costs of better coverage for prescription drugs ...
Cited by 1

[PDF] A Model of Persuasion with a Boundedly Rational Agent

[PDF] from tau.ac.il
J Glazer, A Rubinstein - Levine's Working Paper Archive, 2011 - arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il
Abstract A new model of mechanism design with a boundedly rational agent is studied. A
speaker presents a request to a listener who would like to accept the request only if certain
conditions are met by the speaker's true case. This persuasion situation is modeled as a ...
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[PDF] Contending with Risk Selection in Competitive Health Insurance Markets

[PDF] from psu.edu
J Glazer, TG McGuire - 2005 - Citeseer
In many countries, residents choose a health plan or sickness fund through which to receive
health insurance benefits. These choices are regulated and at least partially paid for by
governments and employers. Collective financing of health care redistributes the burden ...
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[CITATION] Live and Let Live: Collision among Oligopolists with Long Term Debt

G Jacob - 1989 - Wo~ ing Paper, Boston University. …
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Gold and Silver health plans: Accommodating demand heterogeneity in managed competition

J Glazer, TG McGuire - Journal of Health Economics, 2011 - Elsevier
ABSTRACT: New regulation of health insurance markets creates multiple levels of health
plans, with designations like “Gold” and “Silver.” The underlying rationale for the heavy-
metal approach to insurance regulation is that heterogeneity in demand for health care is ...
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[CITATION] Optimal Risk Adjustment of Health Insurance Premiums for Managed Care

J Glazer, TG McGuire… - 1995 - Tel Aviv University, Faculty of …
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A Prescription for Drug Formulary Evaluation: An Application of Price Indexes

J Glazer, HA Huskamp… - Forum for Health Economics & …, 2012 - degruyter.com
Abstract Existing economic approaches to the design and evaluation of health insurance do
not readily apply to coverage decisions in the multi-tiered drug formularies characterizing
drug coverage in private health insurance and Medicare. This paper proposes a method ...
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[PDF] A Game Theoretic Approach to the Pragmatics of Debate: An Expository

[PDF] from psu.edu
J Glazer, A Rubinstein - Notes on the Contributors - Citeseer
In this paper, the term 'debate'refers to a situation in which two parties disagree over some
issue and each of them tries to persuade a third party, the listener, to adopt his position by
raising arguments in his favor. We are interested in the logic behind the relative strength of ...
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[CITATION] Is the Fundholding Contract Equitable?

A Shmueli… - 1996 - Tel Aviv University, Faculty of …
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[PDF] Who Belongs in Managed Care? Using Premium Policy to Achieve an Efficient Assignment in Medicare

[PDF] from upenn.edu
J Glazer, TG McGuire - 2009 - upenn.edu
Abstract Acknowledgments: The authors are grateful to the National Institute of Aging for
support through P01 AG032952. The Role of Private Plans in Medicare, J. Newhouse, PI.
This paper grew out of discussions with Rhema Vaithianathan. Chris Afendulis, Mike ...
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[CITATION] Faculty of Management Department of Economics Tel Aviv University Boston University and Department of Economics

JGA Weiss - 2002
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[CITATION] The Effects of Rivalry on the Choice of Innovation Projects and Research Techniques

J Glazer - 1986 - Northwestern University
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Inducing Quality from Health Care Providers in the Presence of Adverse Selection

J Glazer, TG McGuire - Financing Health Care, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
In many countries, residents choose a health plan or sickness fund through which to receive
health insurance benefits. These choices are regulated and at least partially paid for by
governments and employers. Collective financing of health care redistributes the burden ...
Related articles - All 2 versions

[CITATION] Why haven't debtor countries formed a cartel?

J Glazer - 1988 - Center for Latin American …
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