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The all-pay auction with complete information

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MR Baye, D Kovenock… - Economic Theory, 1996 - Springer
Summary In a (first price) all-pay auction, bidders simultaneously submit bids for an item. All
players forfeit their bids, and the high bidder receives the item. This auction is widely used in
economics to model rent seeking, R&D races, political contests, and job promotion ...
Cited by 436 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 12 versions

Rigging the lobbying process: an application of the all-pay auction

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MR Baye, D Kovenock… - The American Economic Review, 1993 - JSTOR
Why do politicians frequently" announce" that they have narrowed down a set of potential
recipients of a" prize" to a slate of finalists?'In general, does the slate of finalists comprise
the" best" candidates, and does the best candidate always win? 2 This paper provides ...
Cited by 352 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - BL Direct - All 15 versions

Capital structure and product market behavior: an examination of plant exit and investment decisions.

[PDF] from umd.edu
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D Kovenock… - Review of Financial Studies, 1997 - Soc Financial Studies
Abstract We examine whether sharp debt increases through leveraged buyouts and
recapitalizations interact with market structure to influence plant closing and investment
decisions of recapitalizing firms and their rivals. We take into account the fact that ...
Cited by 266 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 28 versions

Price leadership

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RJ Deneckere… - The Review of Economic …, 1992 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract This paper analyzes duopolistic price-leadership games in which firms have
capacity constraints. We provide a complete characterization of price leader equilibria under
quite general assumptions on demand and for arbitrary capacities. We show that when ...
Cited by 166 - Related articles - Library Search - All 17 versions

The solution to the Tullock rent-seeking game when R> 2: Mixed-strategy equilibria and mean dissipation rates

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MR Baye, D Kovenock… - Public Choice, 1994 - Springer
In Tullock's rent-seeking model, the probability a player wins the game depends on
expenditures raised to the power R. We show that a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium exists when R> 2, and that overdissipation of rents does not arise in any Nash ...
Cited by 134 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 17 versions

Capital structure and product-market rivalry: How do we reconcile theory and evidence?

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D Kovenock… - The American Economic Review, 1995 - JSTOR
Until the mid-1980's, industrial economists had not considered the effects of capital structure
on product-market behavior. Financial economists, on the other hand, had largely ignored
the role of productmarket rivalry in assessing the choice of capital structure. Pioneering ...
Cited by 130 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 22 versions

It takes two to tango: equilibria in a model of sales

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MR Baye, D Kovenock… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1992 - Elsevier
Abstract We show that the Varian model of sales with more than two firms has two types of
equilibria: a unique symmetric equilibrium, and a continuum of asymmetric equilibria. In
contrast, the 2-firm game has a unique equilibrium that is symmetric. For the n-firm case ...
Cited by 90 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 12 versions

Asymmetric information, information externalities, and efficiency: the case of oil exploration

K Hendricks… - The Rand Journal of Economics, 1989 - JSTOR
In this article we examine the effect of private information and information externalities on the
ex post efficiency of investment in oil exploration. We show that too much drilling tends to
occur if firms believe that the area is likely to contain a sizeable pool of oil, and too little ...
Cited by 86 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 12 versions

GATT, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND COOPERATION*

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D Kovenock… - Economics & Politics, 1992 - Wiley Online Library
This paper analyzes GATT and its dispute settlement procedure (DSP) in the context of a
supergame model of international trade featuring both explicit and implicit agreements. An
explicit agreement, such as GATT, may be violated at some positive cost in addition to ...
Cited by 87 - Related articles - Library Search - All 11 versions

A model of price leadership based on consumer loyalty

R Deneckere, D Kovenock… - The Journal of Industrial Economics, 1992 - JSTOR
This paper analyses a duopolistic price setting game in which firms have loyal consumer
segments, but cannot distinguish them from price sensitive consumers. We adapt a variant of
Varian's [1980] simultaneous price setting game to analyse price leader equilibria. The ...
Cited by 82 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 8 versions

Selecting product development projects: Pioneering versus incremental innovation strategies

A Ali, MU Kalwani… - Management Science, 1993 - JSTOR
In this paper, we investigate project selection choices of duopolists facing two alternatives:
undertaking a" pioneering" type project (Type A) aimed to develop a highly innovative
product, or an" incremental innovation" type project (Type B) aimed to develop a less ...
Cited by 78 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - BL Direct - All 9 versions

The symmetric multiple prize all-pay auction with complete information

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Y Barut… - European Journal of Political Economy, 1998 - Elsevier
This paper extends the analysis of the n-player all-pay auction with complete information to
cover the case of m≤ n prizes, valued in weakly decreasing order, but symmetrically across
players. We provide a complete characterization of the Nash equilibrium distributions for ...
Cited by 72 - Related articles - All 8 versions

Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly with unit cost asymmetry

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RJ Deneckere… - Economic Theory, 1996 - Springer
Summary This paper characterizes the set of Nash equilibria in a price setting duopoly in
which firms have limited capacity, and in which unit costs of production up to capacity may
differ. Assuming concave revenue and efficient rationing, we show that the case of ...
Cited by 69 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 6 versions

Multi-battle contests

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KA Konrad… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2009 - Elsevier
We study equilibrium in a multistage race in which players compete in a sequence of
simultaneous move component contests. Players may win a prize for winning each
component contest, as well as a prize for winning the overall race. Each component ...
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Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction‐Theoretic Approach*

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MR Baye, D Kovenock… - The Economic Journal, 2005 - Wiley Online Library
A simple auction-theoretic framework is used to examine symmetric litigation environments
where the legal ownership of a disputed asset is unknown to the court. The court observes
only the quality of the case presented by each party, and awards the asset to the party ...
Cited by 63 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 23 versions

Equilibrium and Efficiency in the Tug-of-War

[PDF] from econstor.eu
K Konrad… - CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1564, 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We characterize the unique Markov perfect equilibrium of a tug-of-war without
exogenous noise, in which players have the opportunity to engage in a sequence of battles
in an attempt to win the war. Each battle is an all-pay auction in which the player ...
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How to sell a pickup truck::[] Beat-or-pay'advertisements as facilitating devices

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MR Baye… - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1994 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper examines the profitability of running an advertisement that promises to
pay damages to customers who can find a (serious) price offer that the firm will not undercut.
We show that such an advertisement can support a collusive price, and furthermore, that ...
Cited by 53 - Related articles - All 6 versions

Capacity precommitment as a barrier to entry: a Bertrand-Edgeworth approach

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B Allen, R Deneckere, T Faith… - Economic Theory, 2000 - Springer
Summary. With few exceptions, the literature on the role of capacity as a strategic entry
deterrent has assumed Cournot competition in the post-entry game. In contrast, this paper
studies a model in which the incumbent and entrant sequentially precommit to capacity ...
Cited by 48 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 9 versions

An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games

[PDF] from econstor.eu
SM Chowdhury, D Kovenock… - Economic Theory, 2009 - Springer
Abstract This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game
with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields
won. The experimental results support the main qualitative predictions of the theory. In the ...
Cited by 48 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 35 versions

Price leadership in a duopoly with capacity constraints and product differentiation

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D Furth… - Journal of Economics, 1993 - Springer
This paper analyzes Stackelberg price leadership in a duopoly in which firms are capacity
constrained and products are imperfect substitutes. Assuming symmetric substitutes, linear
demand, and efficient rationing, we characterize the equilibria with an exogenously ...
Cited by 45 - Related articles - All 8 versions

The incidence of overdissipation in rent-seeking contests

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MR Baye, D Kovenock… - Public Choice, 1999 - Springer
Tullock's analysis of rent seeking and overdissipation is reconsidered. We show that, while
equilibrium strategies do not permit overdissipation in expectation, for particular realizations
of players' mixed strategies the total amount spent competing for rents can exceed the ...
Cited by 45 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 14 versions

Comparative Analysis of litigation systems: an auction-theoretic approach

[PDF] from eur.nl
MR Baye, D Kovenock… - PAPER-INSTITUTE FOR …, 2000 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: A simple auction-theoretic framework is used to examine symmetric litigation
environments where the legal ownership of a disputed asset is unknown by the court. The
court observes only the quality of the case presented by each party, and awards the asset ...
Cited by 37 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 31 versions

A Comparison of Multiple‐Unit All‐Pay and Winner‐Pay Auctions Under Incomplete Information*

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Y Barut, D Kovenock… - International Economic …, 2002 - Wiley Online Library
This article examines the properties of independent-private-value all-pay and winner-pay
auctions when there are multiple units sold. We study bidding behavior, efficiency, and
revenue in a set of 23 experimental sessions. Our data show that the all-pay auction and ...
Cited by 32 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 17 versions

Suicide terrorism and the weakest link

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M Arce, D Kovenock, B Roberson - 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: In this paper we examine a model of terrorism which focuses on the tradeoffs facing
a terrorist organization that has the ability to utilize either or both suicide and conventional
terrorism tactics. The terrorist organization's objective is to successfully attack at least one ...
Cited by 31 - Related articles - All 19 versions

The all-pay auction with complete information

M Baye, D Kovenock… - Center for Economic …, 1990 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract In a (first price) all-pay auction, bidders simultaneously submit bids for an item. All
players forfeit their bids, and the high bidder receives the item. This auction is widelly used
in economics to model rent seeking, R&D races, political contests, and job promotion ...
Cited by 24 - Related articles - Cached - All 8 versions

[CITATION] A general linear model of contests

MR Baye, D Kovenock… - Manuscript, Dept. Econ., Indiana Univ, 1998
Cited by 25 - Related articles

Non-partisan [] get-out-the-vote'efforts and policy outcomes

[PDF] from econstor.eu
D Kovenock… - European Journal of Political Economy, 2011 - Elsevier
This paper utilizes a simple model of redistributive politics with voter abstention to analyze
the impact of nonpartisan 'get-out-the-vote'efforts on policy outcomes. Although such efforts
are often promoted on the grounds that they provide the social benefit of increasing ...
Cited by 22 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 28 versions

A note on the core of the overlapping generations model

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K Hendricks, K Judd… - Economics Letters, 1980 - Elsevier
Abstract In this note it is shown that, without certain restrictions on the coalitions that may
form, the core of the overlapping generations model may be empty. The introduction of
money, while expanding the trading possibilities, does not eliminate the problem.
Cited by 21 - Related articles - All 5 versions

Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions

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E Dechenaux… - The Rand Journal of Economics, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
This article analyzes tacit collusion in infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a
symmetric oligopoly with capacity-constrained firms. Under two popular definitions of the
uniform price, when each firm sets a price-quantity pair, perfect collusion with equal ...
Cited by 20 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 26 versions

[CITATION] de Vries, 1994, The solution to the Tullock rent# seeking game when R> 2: Mixed# strategy equilibria and mean dissipation rates

Full text - MIT Libraries
MR Baye, D Kovenock… - Public Choice
Cited by 21 - Related articles

Competition for FDI with vintage investment and agglomeration advantages

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KA Konrad… - Journal of International Economics, 2009 - Elsevier
Countries compete for new FDI investment, whereas stocks of FDI generate agglomeration
benefits and are potentially subject to extortionary taxation. We study the interaction
between these aspects in a simple vintage capital framework with discrete time and an ...
Cited by 20 - Related articles - Library Search - All 37 versions

Price leadership and asymmetric price rigidity

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D Kovenock… - European Journal of Political Economy, 1998 - Elsevier
In this paper we present a simple price leadership model in which equilibrium behavior
exhibits price rigidity following downward demand shocks and price flexibility after an upturn
in demand. The source of this asymmetric rigidity lies in the fact that leader-follower ...
Cited by 18 - Related articles - Library Search - All 8 versions

[PDF] Coalitional Colonel Blotto games with application to the economics of alliances

[PDF] from econstor.eu
D Kovenock… - WZB Discus (sion Paper SP 2008 (02, 2008 - econstor.eu
This paper examines a multi-player and multi-front Colonel Blotto game in which one player,
A, simultaneously competes in two disjoint Colonel Blotto games, against two separate
opponents, 1 and 2. Prior to competing in the games, players 1 and 2 have the opportunity ...
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Contests with rank-order spillovers

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MR Baye, D Kovenock… - Economic Theory, 2009 - Springer
Abstract This paper presents a unified framework for characterizing symmetric equilibrium in
simultaneous move, two-player, rank-order contests with complete information, in which
each player's strategy generates direct or indirect affine “spillover” effects that depend on ...
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The alliance formation puzzle and capacity constraints

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KA Konrad… - Economics Letters, 2009 - Elsevier
The formation of an alliance in conflict situations is known to suffer from a collective action
problem and from the potential of internal conflict. We show that budget constraints of an
intermediate size can overcome this strong disadvantage and explain the formation of ...
Cited by 16 - Related articles - Library Search - All 21 versions

[CITATION] Terrorism and the optimal defense of networks of targets

D Kovenock… - 2008 - Purdue University, Working Paper
Cited by 14 - Related articles - All 3 versions

Electoral poaching and party identification

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D Kovenock… - Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2008 - jtp.sagepub.com
Abstract This article studies electoral competition in a model of redistributive politics with
deterministic voting and heterogeneous voter loyalties to political parties. We construct a
natural measure ofparty strength'based on the sizes and intensities of a party's loyal voter ...
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[CITATION] A note on takeover bids

D Kovenock - Purdue University, 1984
Cited by 11 - Related articles

Capacity precommitment as a barrier to entry: a Bertrand-Edgeworth approach

B Allen, R Deneckere, T Faith… - Industrial Organization, 1994 - ideas.repec.org
With few exceptions, the literature on the role of capacity as a strategic entry deterrent has
assumed Cournot competition in the post-entry game. In contrast, our model is in the spirit of
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983): the incumbent and entrant sequentially precommit to ...
Cited by 11 - Related articles - Cached - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 10 versions

Multi-stage contests with stochastic ability

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K Konrad… - 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We consider the properties of perfectly discriminating contests in which players'
abilities are stochastic, but become common knowledge before efforts are expended.
Players whose expected ability is lower than that of their rivals may still earn a positive ...
Cited by 12 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 9 versions

Property and income taxation in an economy with an Austrian sector

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D Kovenock - Land Economics, 1986 - JSTOR
This paper examines the effect of land value and income taxation in an economy with an
Austrian sector. Austrian investments are point-input, point-output processes. An investment
at an initial time produces an asset which increases in value as it ages. When the asset is ...
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Fiat exchange in finite economies

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D Kovenock… - Economic Inquiry, 2002 - Wiley Online Library
The state of the art of rendering fiat money valuable is either to impose a boundary condition
or to make the boundary condition unimportant through an infinite sequence of markets so
as to circumvent backward induction. We show fiat exchange may nevertheless arise in ...
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Inefficient redistribution and inefficient redistributive politics

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D Kovenock… - Public Choice, 2009 - Springer
Abstract This paper examines the effect of inefficient redistribution in Myerson's (American
Political Science Review 87: 856–869, 1993) model of redistributive politics. Regardless of
the absolute levels of the efficiency of political parties' transfers to different voter segments, ...
Cited by 11 - Related articles - All 14 versions

An implicit contract approach to employee stock ownership plans

D Kovenock… - Journal of Comparative Economics, 1990 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper analyzes employee stock ownership plans in an implicit contract model
under asymmetric information. Our model assumes that worker compensation schemes
involve wage and stock payments, or wage-share contracts, and treats shares of stock as ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 7 versions

Contests with stochastic abilities

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KA Konrad… - Economic Inquiry, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
We consider the properties of perfectly discriminating contests in which players' abilities are
stochastic, but become common knowledge before efforts are expended. Players whose
expected ability is lower than that of their rivals may still earn a positive expected payoff ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - All 19 versions

[PDF] The optimal defense of networks of targets

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D Kovenock… - Purdue University Economics …, 2010 - economics.missouri.edu
Abstract This paper examines a game-theoretic model of attack and defense of multiple
networks of targets in which there exist intra-network strategic complementarities among
targets. The defender's objective is to successfully defend all of the networks and the ...
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A second note on the core of the overlapping generations model

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D Kovenock - Economics Letters, 1984 - Elsevier
Abstract This note provides an example of an overlapping generations economy with a
Pareto optimal Walrasian equilibrium and an empty core. Then, in the context of the
economy examined by Balasko and Shell (1980) a sufficient condition is provided for a ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - All 5 versions

[CITATION] Fee Allocation of Lawyer SerЛ vices in Litigation

MR Baye, D Kovenock… - 1997 - Mimeo, Indiana University, Princeton …
Cited by 8 - Related articles

Dynamic capacity choice in a Bertrand-Edgeworth frameqork

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D Kovenock… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1998 - Elsevier
We examine the implications of replacing the Cournot market clearing assumption with
Bertrand-Edgeworth behavior when production is time-consuming. The benchmark is
Saloner's result that when two firms simultaneously choose quantities in each of two ...
Cited by 8 - Related articles - Library Search - All 9 versions

[PDF] Endogenous rationing, price dispersion and collusion in capacity constrained supergames

[PDF] from univ-paris1.fr
E Dechenaux… - 2003 - gridauh.univ-paris1.fr
Abstract This paper examines the feasibility of collusion in capacity constrained duopoly
supergames. In each period firms simultaneously set a price-quantity pair specifying the
price for the period and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell at this price. Under ...
Cited by 8 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 23 versions

GATT, dispute settlement and cooperation: a reply

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D Kovenock… - Economics & Politics, 1997 - Wiley Online Library
IN OUR 1992 paper, we analyzed GATT and its dispute settlement procedure (DSP) in the
context of a supergame model of international trade featuring both explicit (GATT) and
implicit (non-GATT) agreements. Our paper departed from the previous economics ...
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[CITATION] de Vries (1992),“It Takes Two to Tango: Equilibria in a Model of Sales,”

MR Baye, D Kovenock… - Games and Economic Behavior
Cited by 7 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries

[PDF] Information sharing in contests

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D Kovenock, F Morath… - Unpublished manuscript, WZB …, 2009 - webmeets.com
Abstract We study the incentives to share private information ahead of con $ tests, such as
markets with promotional competition, procurement contests, or R&D. We consider the cases
where firms have (i) inde $ pendent values and (ii) common values of winning the contest. ...
Cited by 7 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 13 versions

[CITATION] de Vries, 1999, The incidence of overdissipation in rent# seeking contests

Full text - MIT Libraries
MR Baye, D Kovenock… - Public Choice
Cited by 6 - Related articles

Caps on bidding in all-pay auctions: Comments on the experiments of A. Rapoport and W. Amaldoss

[PDF] from memphis.edu
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E Dechenaux, D Kovenock… - Journal of Economic Behavior …, 2006 - Elsevier
In an article published in this journal, Rapoport and Amaldoss [Rapoport, A., Amaldoss, W.,
2000. Mixed strategies and iterative elimination of strongly dominated strategies: an
experimental investigation of states of knowledge. Journal of Economic Behavior and ...
Cited by 6 - Related articles - All 12 versions

[CITATION] The pattern of exit from declining industries

J Hunsaker… - 1995 - ideas.repec.org
There is a FAQ (frequently asked questions). ... No abstract is available for this item. ... To our
knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options: 1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is ...
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A Comment on “David and Goliath: An Analysis on Asymmetric Mixed-Strategy Games and Experimental Evidence”

E Dechenaux, D Kovenock… - Purdue University …, 2003 - ideas.repec.org
In this note, we characterize the full set of Equilibria of the 2-firm patent race analyzed by
Amaldoss and Jain (Management Science, 48 (8), August 2002, pp. 972-991). Contrary to
Amaldoss and Jain's (2002) claim, we show that the equilibrium is not always unique and ...
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Strategic defense and attack for series and parallel reliability systems: comment

D Kovenock… - Purdue University Economics Working …, 2010 - ideas.repec.org
Hausken (2008a) formulates a contest-theoretic model of the attack and defense of a
network of targets. This note identi es a technical error that invalidates Hausken's
characterization of Nash equilibrium for a substantial portion of the parameter space that ...
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The sequencing of union contract negotiations

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D Kovenock… - Managerial and Decision …, 1989 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract In this paper we explore the determination of the sequencing of wage bargains in
an institutional structure consisting of a single firm employing two unions, under two
alternative assumptions about the nature of feasible contracts. If contingent contracts are ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - Library Search - All 8 versions

GATT, Dispute Settlement, and Cooperation

D Kovenock… - Analytical and Negotiating …, 1994 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract This paper analyzes GATT and its dispute settlement procedure (DSP) in the
context of a supergame model of international trade featuring both explicit and implicit
agreements. An explicit agreement, such as GATT, may be violated at some positive cost ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - Cached - All 3 versions

[CITATION] Caps on bidding in all# pay auctions: comments on the ex# periments of A

E Dechenaux, D Kovenock… - Rapoport and W. Amaldoss, Krannert …, 2003
Cited by 3 - Related articles

A model of duopolistic unionism exhibiting downward wage rigidity

D Kovenock, K Widdows… - Canadian Journal of Economics, 1991 - JSTOR
This paper presents a simple model of sequential wage setting by two unions, each of which
is attached to a firm in a duopolistic output market. We find that for a large range of
unanticipated downward demand shocks, the equilibrium exhibits downward wage rigidity ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 7 versions

[CITATION] Quotas and Tariffs with Endogenous Conduct

RJ Deneckere, D Kovenock… - 1991 - ideas.repec.org
All bibliographic data on IDEAS has been put in the public domain by the publishers. ... No abstract
is available for this item. ... To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find
whether it is available, there are three options: 1. Check below under "Related research" ...
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The lifeboat problem

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KA Konrad… - European Economic Review, 2011 - Elsevier
Abstract We study an all-pay contest with multiple identical prizes (“lifeboat seats”). Prizes
are partitioned into subsets of prizes (“lifeboats”). Players play a two-stage game. First, each
player chooses an element of the partition (“a lifeboat”). Then each player competes for a ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 26 versions

Quotas and tariffs with endogenous conduct

RJ Deneckere, D Kovenock… - 2000 - emeraldinsight.com
Abstract: This chapter utilizes the results of Deneckere· & Kovenock (1988, 1989, 1992,
1996) on price setting games with capacity constraints and different unit costs up to capacity
to analyze the effects of quotas and tariffs in a model in which a domestic market for a ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - All 5 versions

[CITATION] Price wars

MR Baye… - 2004 - mimeo
Cited by 2 - Related articles

Localized and non-localized competition in the presence of consumer lock-in

B Banerjee… - 2000 - emeraldinsight.com
Abstract: In this chapter we model localized competition between firms when consumers
exhibit brand lock-in or loyalty. We derive the symmetric equilibrium mixed strategy price
distribution under two alternative models, and compare them to symmetric equilibrium ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - All 6 versions

Free riding in noncooperative entry deterrence with differentiated products

D Kovenock… - Southern Economic Journal, 2005 - JSTOR
We examine free riding and underinvestment in noncooperative entry deterrence in the
Gilbert and Vives (1986) model with differentiated products. Our analysis proves that for
products that are differentiated enough, when both entry allowing and entry deterring ...
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Is the 50-state strategy optimal?

[PDF] from wzb.eu
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D Kovenock… - Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2009 - jtp.sagepub.com
Abstract In 2005, the Democratic National Committee adopted the 50-state strategy in lieu of
the strategy of focusing solely on battleground states. The rationale given for this move is
that campaign expenditures are durable outlays that impact both current and future ...
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[CITATION] The Solution to the Rent-Seeking Game When R> 2

MR Baye, K Dan… - Efficient Rent-Seeking, 2001
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[CITATION] de Vries (1990). The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information

MR Baye, D Kovenock… - 1993 - CentER Working Paper
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[CITATION] A compari# son of multiple# unit all# pay and winner# pay auctions under incom# plete information

Y Barut, D Kovenock… - 1999 - WZB discussion paper FS IV 99# 9
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[CITATION] de Vries. 2005.''

M Baye, D Kovenock… - Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction …
Cited by 2 - Related articles

Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Rejoinder

D Kovenock… - Purdue University Economics Working …, 2012 - ideas.repec.org
In our original comment, we showed that Hausken's characterization of Nash equilibrium is
invalid for much of the parameter space examined and provided necessary conditions for his
solution to hold. Most of the comments in his reply are either tangential or irrelevant. ...
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[CITATION] The all-pay auction with complete information

MR Baye, D Kovenock… - … Economics Working Papers, 1991 - ideas.repec.org
No abstract is available for this item. ... To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three options: 1. Check below under "Related
research" whether another version of this item is available online. 2. Check on the ...
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The Herodotus Paradox

[PDF] from eur.nl
MR Baye, D Kovenock… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2011 - Elsevier
The Babylonian bridal auction, described by Herodotus, is regarded as one of the earliest
uses of an auction in history. Yet, to our knowledge, the literature lacks a formal equilibrium
analysis of this auction. We provide such an analysis for the two-player case with ...
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[PDF] All&Pay Hex: A Multibattle Contest With Complementarities

[PDF] from lsu.edu
D Kovenock, S Sarangi… - 2011 - faculty.bus.lsu.edu
Abstract In this paper, we examine a modified 2× 2 game of Hex in which control of each cell
is determined by a Tullock contest. The player establishing a path of cells within his control
between his two sides wins a fixed prize. Examining the polar cases of all cells being ...
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[CITATION] How To Sell a Pickup Truck:" Beat-or-Pay" Advertisements as Facilitating Devices

MR Baye… - Working Papers, 1990 - econpapers.repec.org
Related works: Working Paper: How To Sell a Pickup Truck: "Beat-or-Pay" Advertisements as
Facilitating Devices (1990) Working Paper: How to Sell a Pickup Truck: "Beat-or-Pay" Adverrtisements
as Facilitating Devices (1992) Working Paper: How to Sell a Pickup Truck; "Beat-or-Pay" ...
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[PDF] Extremism drives out Moderation

[PDF] from uzh.ch
B Klose… - 2011 - econ.uzh.ch
Abstract This article investigates the impact of the distribution of preferences on equilibrium
behavior in conflicts that are modeled as all-pay auctions with identity-dependent
externalities. In this context, we define centrists and radicals using a willingness-topay ...
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[PDF] Multi% battle contests!

[PDF] from uiowa.edu
KAKD Kovenock - 2007 - tippie.uiowa.edu
Abstract We study equilibrium in a multistage race in which players compete in a sequence
of simultaneous move component contests. Players may win a prize for winning each
component contest, as well as a prize for winning the overall race. Each component ...
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[CITATION] Endogenous Rationing and Tacit Collusion in Price-Quantity Supergames

E Dechenaux… - 2003
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DP5205 Equilibrium and Efficiency in the Tug-of-War

KA Konrad… - 2005 - cepr.org
We characterize the unique Markov perfect equilibrium of a tug-of-war without exogenous
noise, in which players have the opportunity to engage in a sequence of battles in an
attempt to win the war. Each battle is an all-pay auction in which the player expending the ...
Cached - All 3 versions

[PDF] Moderating Alliances

[PDF] from tu-berlin.de
B Klose… - finance.tu-berlin.de
Abstract In this article we study endogenous alliance formation in a conflict with identity
dependent externalities. In particular, we consider a three player model in which two players
support opposite radical outcomes and one player favors a centrist outcome. The conflict ...
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[PDF] Fiat Exchange in Finite Economies

[PDF] from suomenpankki.fi
DKCG de Vries - 1995 - suomenpankki.fi
Abstract The state of the art of rendering fiat money valuable is either to impose a boundary
condition, or to make the boundary condition unimportant by using infinities concerning the
sequence of markets and/or the number of agents, so as to circumvent backward induction ...
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[CITATION] Governance and the

D Kovenock…
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[CITATION] Equilibrium AND Efficiency

KA Konrad… - 2005
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[PDF] KRANNERT GRADUATE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT

[PDF] from purdue.edu
D Kovenock… - 2007 - krannert.purdue.edu
Abstract This paper examines a multi-player and multi-front Colonel Blotto game in which
one player, A, simultaneously competes in two disjoint Colonel Blotto games, against two
separate opponents, 1 and 2. Prior to competing in the games, players 1 and 2 have the ...
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[PDF] The all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities

[PDF] from eea-esem.com
B Klose… - 2010 - eea-esem.com
Abstract We show how the presence of identity-dependent externalities invalidates well
established qualitative results concerning the set of equilibria of the first-price all-pay auction
with complete information. With identity-dependent externalities identical players may ...
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DP6740 Competition for FDI with Vintage Investment and Agglomeration Advantages

KA Konrad… - 2008 - cepr.org
Countries compete for new FDI investment, whereas stocks of FDI generate agglomeration
benefits and are potentially subject to extortionary taxation. We study the interaction
between these aspects in a simple vintage capital framework with discrete time and an ...
Cached - All 4 versions

Non-Partisan'Get-Out-The-Vote'Efforts and Policy Outcomes

B Roberson… - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper utilizes a simple model of redistributive politics with voter abstention to
analyze the impact of nonpartisan 'get-out-the-vote'efforts on policy outcomes. Although
such ef-forts are often promoted on the grounds that they provide the social benefit of ...
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DP5844 Multi-Stage Contests with Stochastic Ability

KA Konrad… - 2006 - cepr.org
We consider the properties of perfectly discriminating contests in which players' abilities are
stochastic, but become common knowledge before efforts are expended. Players whose
expected ability is lower than that of their rivals may still earn a positive expected payoff ...
Cached - All 3 versions

A Contest With Complimentarity

S Sarangi, D Kovenock - 2011 - contesttheory.org
Abstract In this paper, we examine a game when two competing sides expend effort to win
control of areas. Each side is attempting to build a path of connected areas between two
given sides of the competition region, in order to obtain a fixed prize. We show that the ...
Cached - All 2 versions

Royal Economic Society

MR Baye, D Kovenock… - The Economic Journal, 2005 - res.org.uk
A simple auction-theoretic framework is used to examine symmetric litigation environments
where the legal ownership of a disputed asset is unknown to the court. The court observes
only the quality of the case presented by each party, and awards the asset to the party ...
Cached - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 2 versions

Endogenous rationing, price dispersion and collusion in capacity constrained supergames

Full text - MIT Libraries
E Dechenaux… - Economic Theory, 2011 - Springer
Abstract This paper examines the feasibility of collusion in capacity constrained duopoly
supergames. In each period firms simultaneously set a price–quantity pair specifying the
price for the period and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell at this price. Under ...
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[PDF] KRANNERT GRADUATE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT

[PDF] from purdue.edu
E Dechenaux, D Kovenock… - 2003 - krannert.purdue.edu
Abstract This paper examines the feasibility of collusion in capacity constrained duopoly
supergames. In each period firms simultaneously set a price-quantity pair specifying the
price for the period and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell at this price. Under ...
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A Blotto game with multi-dimensional incomplete information

D Kovenock… - Economics Letters, 2011 - Elsevier
We examine a multi-dimensional incomplete information Colonel Blotto game in which each
player's n-tuple of battlefield valuations is drawn from a common n-variate joint distribution
function that is uniform on the non-negative orthant of the surface of a sphere.
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DP5645 Multi-Battle Contests

KA Konrad… - 2006 - cepr.org
We study equilibrium in a multistage race in which players compete in a sequence of
simultaneous move component contests. Players may win a prize for winning each
component contest, as well as a prize for winning the overall race. Each component ...
Cached - All 3 versions

DP6741 The Alliance Formation Puzzle and Capacity Constraints

KA Konrad… - 2008 - cepr.org
The formation of an alliance in conflict situations is known to suffer from a collective action
problem and from the potential of internal conflict. We show that budget constraints of an
intermediate size can overcome this strong disadvantage and explain the formation of ...
Cached - All 4 versions

[PDF] KRANNERT GRADUATE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT

[PDF] from purdue.edu
KA Konrad… - 2005 - krannert.purdue.edu
Abstract We characterize the unique Markov perfect equilibrium of a tug-ofwar without
exogenous noise, in which players have the opportunity to engage in a sequence of battles
in an attempt to win the war. Each battle is an all-pay auction in which the player ...
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[CITATION] Localized and Non-Localized Competition in the Presence of Consumer Lock-in

B Bibek… - IIMA Working Papers, 1995 - Indian Institute of Management …
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