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Temptation and self‐control

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F Gul… - Econometrica, 2001 - Wiley Online Library
2. Abstract We study a two-period model where ex ante inferior choice may tempt the
decision-maker in the second period. Individuals have preferences over sets of alternatives
that represent second period choices. Our axioms yield a representation that identifies the ...
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The swing voter's curse

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TJ Feddersen… - The American economic review, 1996 - JSTOR
We analyze two-candidate elections in which some voters are uncertain about the
realization of a state variable that affects the utility of all voters. We demonstrate the
existence of a swing voter's curse: less informed indifferent voters strictly prefer to abstain ...
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Convicting the innocent: The inferiority of unanimous jury verdicts under strategic voting

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T Feddersen… - American Political Science Review, 1998 - JSTOR
It is often suggested that requiring juries to reach a unanimous verdict reduces the
probability of convicting an innocent defendant while increasing the probability of acquitting
a guilty defendant. We construct a model that demonstrates how strategic voting by jurors ...
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Voting behavior and information aggregation in elections with private information

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T Feddersen… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric …, 1997 - JSTOR
We analyze two-candidate elections in which voters are uncertain about the realization of a
state variable that affects the utility of all voters. Each voter has noisy private information
about the state variable. We show that the fraction of voters whose vote depends on their ...
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Design innovation and fashion cycles

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W Pesendorfer - The American Economic Review, 1995 - JSTOR
A model of fashion cycles is developed in which designs are used as a signaling device in
a" dating game." A monopolist periodically creates a new design. Over time the price of the
design falls as it spreads across the population. Once sufficiently many consumers own ...
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[PDF] The case for mindless economics

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F Gul… - Foundations of positive and normative …, 2005 - hss.caltech.edu
Abstract Neuroeconomics proposes radical changes in the methods of economics. This
essay discusses the proposed changes in methodology, together with the the
neuroeconomic critique of standard economics. We do not assess the contributions or ...
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Self‐control and the theory of consumption

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F Gul… - Econometrica, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
To study the behavior of agents who are susceptible to temptation in infinite horizon
consumption problems under uncertainty, we define and characterize dynamic self-control
(DSC) preferences. DSC preferences are recursive and separable. In economies with ...
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Abstention in elections with asymmetric information and diverse preferences

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TJ Feddersen… - American Political Science Review, 1999 - JSTOR
We analyze a model of a two-candidate election with costless voting in which voters have
asymmetric information and diverse preferences. We demonstrate that a strictly positive
fraction of the electorate will abstain and that, nevertheless, elections effectively aggregate ...
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The loser's curse and information aggregation in common value auctions

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W Pesendorfer… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric …, 1997 - JSTOR
We consider an auction in which k identical objects of unknown value are auctioned off to n
bidders. The k highest bidders get an object and pay the k+ 1st bid. Bidders receive a signal
that provides information about the value of the object. We characterize the unique ...
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Efficiency and information aggregation in auctions

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W Pesendorfer… - American Economic Review, 2000 - JSTOR
The tension between allocative efficiency and information aggregation is explored in the
context of an auction: k identical objects of unknown quality are auctioned off to n bidders
whose tastes affect their valuation of an object of given quality. Bidders receive a signal ...
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Maintaining a reputation against a long-lived opponent

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M Celetani, D Fudenberg, DK Levine… - Econometrica, 1996 - JSTOR
WE CONSIDER A GAME between a patient player 1 and a nonmyopic but less patient
opponent, player 2. As usual in reputation models, we suppose that the patient player's type
is private information, and that he may be a" commitment ype" who is locked into playing a ...
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Second opinions and price competition: Inefficiency in the market for expert advice

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W Pesendorfer… - Review of Economic Studies, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
We consider a market in which an expert must exert costly but unobservable effort to identify
the service that meets the consumer's need. In our model, experts offer competing contracts
and the consumer may gather multiple opinions. We explore the incentives that a ...
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Harmful addiction

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F Gul… - Review of Economic Studies, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
We construct an infinite horizon model of harmful addiction. Consumption is compulsive if it
differs from what the individual would have chosen had commitment been available. A good
is addictive if its consumption leads to more compulsive consumption of the same good. ...
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Behavioral economics comes of age: a review essay on Advances in Behavioral Economics

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W Pesendorfer - Journal of Economic Literature, 2006 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: Advances in Behavioral Economics contains influential second-generation
contributions to behavioral economics. Building on the seminal work by Kahnemann, Strotz,
Thaler, Tversky, and others, these contributions have established behavioral economics ...
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When are agents negligible?

DK Levine… - The American Economic Review, 1995 - JSTOR
We examine the following paradox: in a dynamic setting, equilibria can be radically different
in a model with a finite number of agents than in a model with a continuum of agents. We
present a simple strategic setting in which this paradox is a general phenomenon. ...
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Financial innovation in a general equilibrium model

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W Pesendorfer - Journal of Economic Theory, 1995 - Elsevier
We develop a model of financial innovation, in which intermediaries can issue new financial
securities against collateral in the form of standard securities. Intermediaries have to market
their innovations and marketing is costly. We show that the equilibrium asset structure may ...
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Self-control, revealed preference and consumption choice

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F Gul… - Review of Economic Dynamics, 2004 - Elsevier
We provide a time-consistent model that addresses the preference reversals that motivate
the time-inconsistency literature. The model subsumes the behavior generated by the time-
inconsistency approach in finite settings but, unlike the time-inconsistent models, allows ...
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The evolution of cooperation through imitation

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DK Levine… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2007 - Elsevier
We study evolutionarily stable outcomes for a class of games that admit cooperation and
conflict as possible Nash equilibria. We make use of two ideas: existing strategies are more
likely to be imitated than new strategies are to be introduced; players are able to identify ...
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Random expected utility

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F Gul… - Econometrica, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
We develop and analyze a model of random choice and random expected utility. A decision
problem is a finite set of lotteries that describe the feasible choices. A random choice rule
associates with each decision problem a probability measure over choices. A random ...
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The revealed preference theory of changing tastes

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F Gul… - The Review of Economic Studies, 2005 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We analyse preferences over finite decision problems in order to model decision-
makers with “changing tastes”. we provide conditions on these preferences that identify the
Strotz model of consistent planning. building on an example given by Peleg and Yaari ( ...
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Elections, information aggregation, and strategic voting

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T Feddersen… - Proceedings of the …, 1999 - National Acad Sciences
Abstract A central role of elections is the aggregation of information dispersed within a
population. This article surveys recent work on elections as mechanisms for aggregating
information and on the incentives for voters to vote strategically in such elections.
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When are nonanonymous players negligible?

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D Fudenberg, D Levine… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1998 - Elsevier
We examine games played by a single large player and a large number of opponents who
are small, but not anonymous. If the play of the small players is observed with noise, and if
the number of actions the large player controls is bounded as the number of small players ...
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Evolution and information in a gift-giving game

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P Johnson, DK Levine… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2001 - Elsevier
We examine the stochastic stability of a process of learning and evolution in a gift-giving
game. Overlapping generations of players are randomly matched to play the game. They
may consult information systems to learn about the past behavior of their opponents. If the ...
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[PDF] Reputation in dynamic games

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M Celentani… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1996 - upi-yptk.ac.id
We consider dynamic games with one larger player and a large number (continuum) of
small players. Large and small players are long lived and their payoffs are affected by state
variables whose evolution is described by a possibly stochastic transition law. As is ...
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Partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters

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F Gul… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2009 - Elsevier
We analyze candidate competition when some voters do not observe a candidate's policy
choice. Voters have a personality preference when both candidates offer the same policy. In
equilibrium, the candidate with a personality advantage may get elected with a partisan ...
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[PDF] The simple theory of temptation and self-control

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F Gul… - … of Economics, Princeton University.[130, 131 …, 2005 - princeton.edu
Abstract We analyze a two period model of temptation for a finite choice setting. We
formalize the idea that temptation depends only on the most tempting alternatives and
provide two representations of such preferences. The representation is an ordinal ...
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Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests

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MW Cripps, E Dekel… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2005 - Elsevier
We analyze reputation effects in two-player repeated games of strictly conflicting interests. In
such games, player 1 has a commitment action such that a best reply to it gives player 1 the
highest individually rational payoff and player 2 the minmax payoff. Players have equal ...
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[PDF] The war of information

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F Gul… - The Review of Economic Studies, 2010 - economie.uqam.ca
Abstract We analyze a model of political campaigns to examine how parties' access to
funding affects outcomes and voter welfare. Two parties with opposing interests provide
costly information to a voter who must choose between two policies. The flow of ...
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Welfare without happiness

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F Gul… - The American economic review, 2007 - JSTOR
Normative analysis asks how we (as a society) should make trade-offs between individuals.
Behavioral welfare economics extends the scope of this analysis to a single individual,
asking how the individual should trade off potential motives. We argue that any faith in ...
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Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions

W Pesendorfer, JM Swinkels… - 1996 - Citeseer
Abstract There is an underlying tension between allocative efficiency and information
aggregation in markets. We explore this in the context of an auction in which k objects are
auctioned off to n bidders. The objects are identical, but of unknown quality. In addition, ...
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Strategic redistricting

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F Gul… - The American Economic Review, 2010 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: Two parties choose redistricting plans to maximize their probability of winning a
majority in the House of Representatives. In the unique equilibrium, parties maximally
segregate their opponents' supporters but pool their own supporters into uniform districts. ...
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[PDF] Interdependent preference models as a theory of intentions

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F Gul… - 2010 - princeton.edu
Abstract We provide a preference framework for situations in which “intentions matter.” A
behavioral type describes the individual's observable characteristics and the individual's
personality. We define a canonical behavioral type space and provide a condition that ...
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[PDF] Evolution through imitation in a single population

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DK Levine… - Levine's Working Paper …, 2000 - levine.sscnet.ucla.edu
Abstract: Kandori, Mailath and Rob [1993] and Young [1993] showed how introducing
random innovations into a model of evolutionary adjustment enables selection among Nash
equilibria. Key to this result is that poorly performing strategies may be introduced in ...
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[BOOK] Reputation in Dynamic Games

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M Celentani, W Pesendorfer… - 1992 - europealumni.kellogg.northwestern. …
Abstract We consider an infinite dynamic game between a large player and a large number
(continuum) of small players in which state variables affect players' payoffs. We analyze the
perturbed game in which with small probability the large player can be one of many ...
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[PDF] Fashion cycles in economics

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PRP Coelho, DB Klein, JE McClure, A ON… - Econ Journal …, 2004 - econjwatch.org
THE RAISON D'ÊTRE FOR SCIENCE, AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN particular, is to
understand and explain observable phenomena. Yet, in an article in the American Economic
Review, Wolfgang Pesendorfer (1995) develops a model of the design cycle of fashion ...
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[BOOK] Sovereign debt: Forgiving and forgetting reconsidered

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W Pesendorfer - 1992 - execed.kellogg.northwestern.edu
Abstract In this note\\'<: Hll ()\ V that eveii if after default a sovereign can innkc deposits on a
Swiss hzmk arcouiit, the exclusion fmui l'uLnre debt is sullicicnt to deter a patient country
[ruin default. lll c0u1. rast to the work by Uuluw and Rogoll (1989) we assume that there is ...
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[PDF] Response to “Fashion Cycles in Economics”

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W Pesendorfer - Econ Journal Watch, 2004 - econjwatch.org
The paper argues that fashion demand is cyclical because of the signaling role of fashion.
Agents use fashion goods to signal their type—eg, their wealth—and to screen the type of
other agents. A fashion good is an effective signal as long as its price is high and only ...
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[PDF] The revealed preference implications of reference dependent preferences

[PDF] from princeton.edu
F Gul… - manuscript, Princeton University, 2006 - princeton.edu
Abstract Köszegi and Rabin (2005) propose a theory of reference dependent utility in which
the ultimate choice also serves as the reference point. They analyze dynamic choice
problems with uncertainty and interpret their model as a description of the individuals ...
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[BOOK] Convicting the innocent: the inferiority of unanimous jury verdicts

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
TJ Feddersen… - 1996 - kellogg.northwestern.edu
Abstract It is oftrn suggested that requiring juries to reach a unanimous verdict reduces the
probability of convicting an innocent defendant while increasing the probability of acquitting
a guilty defendant. We construct a model that demonstrates how strategic voting by jurors ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 12 versions

[BOOK] Evolution and information in a prisoner's dilemma game

[PDF] from dklevine.com
P Johnson, DK Levine, W Pesendorfer… - 1998 - dklevine.com
Abstract: In an environment of anonymous random matching, Kandori [1992] showed that
with a sufficiently rich class of simple information systems the folk theorem holds. We
specialize to the Prisoner's Dilemma and examine the stochastic stability of a process of ...
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[BOOK] Maintaining a reputation against a patient opponent

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M Celentani, D Fudenberg, DK Levine… - 1993 - dklevine.com
ABSTRACT: We analyze reputation in a game between a patient player 1 and a nonmyopic
but less patient opponent, player 2. Player 1's type is private information and he may be a"
commitment type" who is locked into playing a particular strategy. We assume that players ...
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A Comment on Bernheim's Appraisal of Neuroeconomics

F Gul… - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2009 - JSTOR
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2009, 1:2, 42-47 http://www. aeaweb.
org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mic. 1.2.42 ... A Comment on Bernheim's Appraisal of Neuroeconomics1
... This paper comments on "On the Potential of Neuroeconomics: A Critical (but Hopeful) ...
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[CITATION] mThe Swing Voterls Curse. n American Economic Review, 86

T Feddersen… - $424, 1996
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[CITATION] VThe Loserls Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions

W Pesendorfer… - V Economet, 1997
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[CITATION] Forth coming.“The Case for Mindless Economics.”

F Gul… - Perspectives on the future of economics: Positive and …
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[CITATION] Self-control and the theory of consumption, forthcoming in Econometrica

F Gul… - 2004
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[CITATION] Two Alternative Elections With Private and Common Values

TJ Feddersen… - 1996 - Mimeo, Northwestern University,( …
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[PDF] Expected Uncertain Utility and Multiple Sources

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F Gul… - 2010 - Citeseer
Abstract Source preference is the assertion that between two prospects yielding the same
distribution of monetary rewards, decision makers may have a strict preference for one over
the other. Evidence on the home bias reveals source preference strong enough to ...
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[CITATION] Strategic Redistricting

W Pesendorfer… - Levine's Bibliography, 2007 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks.
Strategic Redistricting. Wolfgang Pesendorfer () and Faruk Gul. ...
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[CITATION] The case for mindless economics

G Faruk… - The Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics, 2008
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[CITATION] The Canonical Space for Behavioral Types

W Pesendorfer… - Levine's Bibliography, 2007 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks. The
Canonical Space for Behavioral Types. Wolfgang Pesendorfer () and Faruk Gul. ...
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Report of the Editors 2009–2010

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S Morris, D Acemoglu, W Pesendorfer… - …, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
THE THREE TABLES BELOW provide summary statistics on the editorial process in the form
presented in previous editors' reports. Table I indicates that we received 714 new
submissions this year. This number is the second highest ever, and reffects a growing ...
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[CITATION] Behavioral Competitive Equilibrium

F Gul, W Pesendorfer… - Working Paper, 1969 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks.
Behavioral Competitive Equilibrium. Faruk Gul, Wolfgang Pesendorfer and Tomasz Strzalecki. ...
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Electoral Competition with Imperfectly Informed Voters

W Pesendorfer - Theory workshop papers, 2004 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract Electoral Competition with Imperfectly Informed Voters Faruk Gul and Wolfgang
Pesendorfer Princeton University February Preliminary and Incomplete Abstract explore the
implications voter ignorance policy selection and policy outcomes simple model party ...
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Hirshleifer, Jack Anticipatory Savings Denizer, Cevdet Anxiety Grant, Simon

RM Blank, JE Ligthart, J Cawley, Y Rubinstein… - Cambridge Univ Press
This section contains an index of current working papers by author-supplied keyword. The keyword
is followed by the name of the primary author. Long keywords have been truncated. A complete
bibliographic listing can be found by consulting the corresponding entry for the primary ...

[PDF] Working Papers in Economic Theory No. 99F1

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F Gul… - 1999 - Citeseer
Abstract: In a two period decision problem, we study individuals who, in the second period,
may be tempted by ex ante inferior choices. Individuals have preferences over sets of
alternatives that represent the feasible choices in the second period. Our axioms yield a ...
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[CITATION] Competitive Redistricting

F Gul… - Levine's Bibliography, 2007 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks.
Competitive Redistricting. Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (). ...
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When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?

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W Pesendorfer, D Levine… - Journal of Economic …, 1998 - dash.harvard.edu
We examine games played by a single large player and a large number of opponents who
are small, but not anonymous. If the play of the small players is observed with noise, and if
the number of actions the large player controls is bounded as the number of small players ...
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[CITATION] A Possibility Theorem on Information Aggregation in Elections

S Bhattacharya, T Feddersen… - Working Papers, 2007 - econpapers.repec.org
... Please update your bookmarks. A Possibility Theorem on Information Aggregation in Elections.
Sourav Bhattacharya, Timothy Feddersen and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (). No 327, Working Papers
from University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics. Abstract: . . . ...
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[PDF] Expected Uncertain Utility Theory

[PDF] from psu.edu
F Gul… - 2010 - Citeseer
Abstract We introduce and analyze expected uncertain utility theory (EUU). A prior and an
interval utility characterize an EUU decision maker. The decision maker transforms each
uncertain prospect into an interval-valued prospect that assigns an interval of prizes to ...
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[CITATION] Self-Control and the Theory of Consumption

W Pesendorfer… - Princeton Economic Theory Papers, 1999 - econpapers.repec.org
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. ...
Related works: Journal Article: Self-Control and the Theory of Consumption (2004) This item
may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
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[CITATION] Essays on the theory of financial markets and on the theory of reputation

W Pesendorfer - 1992 - en.scientificcommons.org
Publikationsansicht. 4833867. Essays on the theory of financial markets and on the theory of
reputation / (1992). Pesendorfer, Wolfgang. Abstract. Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California,
Los Angeles, 1992.. Vita.. Includes bibliographical references (leaf 118). ...
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[BOOK] Involuntary Unemployment in a Bargaining Model when Capacity Choice is a Binding Precommitment

[PDF] from ihs.ac.at
W Pesendorfer… - 1988 - ihs.ac.at
Abstract A market is studied where prices are formed through a bilateral bargaining process.
Players on one side of the market have in an initial stage the option to incur at a cost a
binding precommitment which may limit the possible number of trades. It is shown that ...
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Evolution Through Imitation in a Single Population

KL David, P Wolfgang - ukpmc.ac.uk
: Kandori, Mailath and Rob [1993] and Young [1993] showed howintroducing random
innovations into a model of evolutionary adjustment enablesselection among Nash
equilibria. Key to this result is that poorly performingstrategies may be introduced in ...
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[CITATION] THE CASE FOR

F GUL, W PESENDORFER - The foundations of …, 2008 - Oxford University Press, USA
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[PDF] Electoral Competition with Imperfectly Informed Voters

[PDF] from upenn.edu
F Gul… - 2004 - economics.sas.upenn.edu
Abstract We explore the implications of voter ignorance on policy selection and policy
outcomes in a simple model of party competition. For a simple benchmark case, we show
that voter ignorance has no effect on the election outcome if the electorate is large. We ...
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[PDF] Behavioral Competitive Equilibrium and Extreme Prices

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F Gul, W Pesendorfer… - 2011 - princeton.edu
Abstract A behavioral competitive equilibrium restricts households ability to tailor their
consumption to the state of the economy. Compared to standard competitive equilibrium, a
behavioral competitive equilibrium yields more consumption risk and extreme price ...
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