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Bidding into the Red: A Model of Post‐Auction Bankruptcy

[PDF] from ucla.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
S Board - The Journal of Finance, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
This paper investigates auctions where bidders have limited liability. First, we analyze
bidding behavior under different auction formats, showing that the second-price auction
induces higher prices, higher bankruptcy rates, and lower utilities than the first-price ...
Cited by 40 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 12 versions

Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect

[PDF] from ucla.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
S Board - Economic Theory, 2009 - Springer
Abstract When there are two bidders, releasing independent information in an English
auction with private values makes the seller worse off. However, this is no longer true with
more bidders: when there is enough competition, revelation benefits the auctioneer. In ...
Cited by 37 - Related articles - All 9 versions

Durable‐Goods Monopoly with Varying Demand

[PDF] from ucla.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
S Board - Review of Economic Studies, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
This paper solves for the profit-maximizing strategy of a durable-goods monopolist when
incoming demand varies over time. We first characterize the consumers' optimal purchasing
decision by a cut-off rule. We then show that, under a monotonicity condition, the profit- ...
Cited by 28 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 14 versions

Selling options

[PDF] from upi-yptk.ac.id
Full text - MIT Libraries
S Board - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
Contracts often take the form of options: oil fields can be abandoned, planning permission
may go unused, and acquired firms can be liquidated. We consider a seller who auctions a
dynamic option among N agents. After the auction, the economy evolves and the winning ...
Cited by 11 - Related articles - All 10 versions

[PDF] Optimal dynamic auctions for durable goods: posted prices and fire-sales

[PDF] from psu.edu
S Board… - Unpublished working paper, 2010 - Citeseer
Abstract We consider a seller who wishes to sell K goods by time T. Potential buyers enter
IID over time and are patient. At any point in time, profit is maximized by awarding the good
to the agent with the highest valuation exceeding a cutoff. These cutoffs are characterized ...
Cited by 10 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 16 versions

[PDF] Revenue Management with Forward-Looking Buyers

[PDF] from ucla.edu
S Board… - 2010 - econ.ucla.edu
Abstract We consider a seller who wishes to sell K goods by time T. Potential buyers enter
IID over time and are forward-looking, so can strategically time their purchases. At any point
in time, profit is maximized by awarding the good to the agent with the highest valuation ...
Cited by 12 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 4 versions

[PDF] Endogenous competitive bargaining

[PDF] from ucla.edu
S Board… - 2003 - econ.ucla.edu
Abstract We analyze a bargaining game where two agents compete for the right to propose
a split of the pie to the other. This captures the notion that agenda control is a valuable asset
that both bargaining parties covet. In the game, time is finite and agents are endowed with ...
Cited by 8 - Related articles - View as HTML - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 5 versions

[PDF] Reputation for quality

[PDF] from msu.edu
S Board… - Report, UCLA.[821], 2010 - econ.msu.edu
Abstract We propose a new model of firm reputation where product quality is persistent and
depends stochastically on the firm's past investments. Reputation is then modeled directly as
the market belief about quality. We analyze how investment incentives depend on the ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 33 versions

[PDF] Relational contracts and the value of loyalty

[PDF] from ucla.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
S Board - American Economic Review, 2011 - econ.ucla.edu
Abstract This paper characterises the optimal contract for a principal who repeatedly
chooses among a set of potential trading partners (agents) under the threat of holdup. As the
economy evolves, the principal would like to trade with different agents; however, the ...
Cited by 8 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 21 versions

[CITATION] Commitment in Auctions

SA Board - 1999 - University of Oxford
Cited by 5 - Related articles - Library Search

Monopolistic group design with peer effects

[PDF] from econtheory.org
Full text - MIT Libraries
S Board - Theoretical Economics, 2009 - econtheory.org
Abstract In a range of settings, private firms manage peer effects by sorting agents into
different groups, be they schools, communities, or product categories. This paper considers
such a firm, which controls group entry by setting a series of anonymous prices. We show ...
Cited by 6 - Related articles - All 30 versions

[CITATION] Optimal dynamic auctions for durable goods: Posted prices and fire-sales

A Skrzypacz… - 2010 - Working paper
Cited by 2 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries

[PDF] Relational Contracts with On-the-Job Search

[PDF] from usc.edu
S Board - 2007 - www-rcf.usc.edu
Abstract This paper characterises the optimal self–enforcing contracts in a large anonymous
labour market. We show that the introduction of on–the–job search leads otherwise identical
firms to offer different contracts. High–wage firms rarely lose workers and demand a high ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 12 versions

[PDF] Relational Contracts in Competitive Labor Markets

[PDF] from ucla.edu
S Board… - 2011 - econ.ucla.edu
Abstract This paper characterizes the distribution of jobs in a relational contracting model
where both employed and unemployed workers compete for jobs. In equilibrium, identical
firms offer a continuous distribution of contracts, with some firms offering high-wage, high- ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 6 versions

[PDF] Reputational Incentives and Dynamics

[PDF] from nyu.edu
S Board… - 2009 - econ.as.nyu.edu
Abstract We study a dynamic moral hazard model, where a firm can invest into the quality of
its product which, in turn, is imperfectly observed by consumers. We analyse how investment
incentives depend on the firm's reputation and the information structure of consumer ...
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A Survey of Auction Theory

Full text - MIT Libraries
C Avery, A Beggs, S Bikhchandani, S Board… - Economic …, 2004 - mendeley.com
Abstract This chapter provides an elementary, non-technical survey of auction theory, by
introducing and describing some of the critical papers in the subject.(The most important of
these are reproduced in a companion book, Klemperer, Paul (ed.)(2000a) The Economic ...
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[PDF] Eco2102: Topics in Micro Theory I Contract Theory

[PDF] from ucla.edu
S Board - econ.ucla.edu
For those enrolled, there will be three problem sets (15% each) and a final (55%). The
problem sets will be due on 13th October (week 5), 10th November (week 9) and 8th
December (week 13). Later in the term, there will also be opportunities for students to ...
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[PDF] A Note on Ortega Reichert's “A Sequential Game with Information Flow”

[PDF] from ox.ac.uk
S Board… - 1999 - hicks.nuff.ox.ac.uk
Although it was pathbreaking work, Armando Ortega Reichert's (1968) PhD thesis “Models
for Competitive Bidding under Uncertainty” was never published. For reasons of space we
publish just Chapter VIII,“A Sequential Game with Information Flow”, which was a seminal ...
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A Theory of Friendly Boards.......... Renée B. Adams and Daniel Ferreira 217 Adaptive Traders and the Design of Fi-financial Markets.....................

S Pouget, S Board, SR Das, D Duffie, N Kapadia… - 2007 - Wiley Online Library
A Theory of Friendly Boards . . . . . . . . . . Renée B. Adams and Daniel Ferreira 217 Adaptive Traders
and the Design of Fi- nancial Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sebastien Pouget 2835 Bidding
into the Red: A Model of Post- Auction Bankruptcy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Simon Board 1 ...
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[PDF] A Reputational Theory of Firm Dynamics

[PDF] from ucla.edu
S Board… - econ.ucla.edu
Abstract We study the lifecycle of a firm who sells a product of uncertain quality,
characterizing the optimal investment and exit decisions and the resulting firm dynamics. We
investigate two model variations. If the firm shares the market's uncertainty, it learns about ...
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Outside Options and the Failure of the Coase Conjecture

[PDF] from ucla.edu
S Board… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: A buyer wishes to purchase a good from a seller who chooses a sequence of
prices over time. In each period, the buyer can also exercise an outside option such as
moving onto another seller. We show there is a unique equilibrium in which the seller ...
Related articles - All 3 versions

[PDF] Economics 2102: Auctions, Bargaining and Pricing.

[PDF] from ucla.edu
S Board - 2004 - econ.ucla.edu
This course concerns models of auctions, bargaining and pricing. Other than the first year
courses, the primary requirement is an interest in microeconomic theory. You may also find it
useful to know some contract theory. I recommend Salanie (1997), Laffont and Martimort ( ...
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[PDF] Durable-Goods Monopoly with Varying Cohorts

[PDF] from repec.org
S Board - 2005 Meeting Papers, 2005 - repec.org
Abstract This paper solves for the profit maximising strategy of a durable–goods monopolist
when incoming demand varies over time. Each period an additional demand curve enters
the market; these consumers can then choose whether and when to purchase. The ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 5 versions

A Theory of Friendly Boards.......... Renée B. Adams and Daniel Ferreira 217 Adaptive Traders and the Design of Fi-financial Markets.....................

S Pouget, S Board, SR Das, D Duffie, N Kapadia… - 2008 - Wiley Online Library
A Theory of Friendly Boards . . . . . . . . . . Renée B. Adams and Daniel Ferreira 217 Adaptive Traders
and the Design of Fi- nancial Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sebastien Pouget 2835 Bidding
into the Red: A Model of Post- Auction Bankruptcy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Simon Board 2695 ...
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[CITATION] On market power

S Board - 2004 - en.scientificcommons.org
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