VP Crawford… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1982 - JSTOR
This paper develops a model of strategic communication, in which a better-informed Sender
(S) sends a possibly noisy signal to a Receiver (R), who then takes an action that
determines the welfare of both. We characterize the set of Bayesian Nash equilibria under ...
JS Banks… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1987 - JSTOR
This paper studies the sequential equilibria of signaling games. It introduces a new solution
concept, divine equilibrium, that refines the set of sequential equilibria by requiring that off-
the-equilibrium-path beliefs satisfy an additional restriction. This restriction rules out ...
J Sobel - Journal of economic literature, 2002 - JSTOR
SOCIAL CAPITAL describes circum-stances in which individuals can use membership in
groups and networks to secure benefits. This formulation follows the definition offered by
Pierre Bourdieu (1986):" Social capital is an attribute of an individual in a social context. ...
J Sobel - Journal of Economic Literature, 2005 - JSTOR
M uch of economic analysis stems from the joint assumptions of rationality and individual
greed. Common sense and experimental and field evidence point to the limits of this
approach. Not everything of interest to economists can be well understood using these ...
J Sobel - The Review of Economic Studies, 1985 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract This paper presents models in which one agent must decide whether to trust
another, whose motives are uncertain. Reliability can only be communicated through
actions. In this context, it pays for people to build a reputation based on reliable behaviour; ...
J Sobel… - The Review of Economic Studies, 1983 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract This paper presents a simple, multistage model of bargaining wherein a seller
makes an offer that can be either accepted or refused. If rejected, the process continues.
How the seller's ability to make commitments affects bargaining outcomes is analysed by ...
KC Border… - The Review of economic studies, 1987 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract A risk neutral principal wishes to exact a payment from a risk neutral agent whose
wealth he does not know, but may verify through a costly auditing procedure. We
characterize efficient schemes for the principal when he is allowed to choose schedules ...
IK Cho… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1990 - Elsevier
Abstract A class of signaling games is studied in which a unique Universally Divine
equilibrium outcome exists. We identify a monotonicity property under which a variation of
Universal Divinity is generically equivalent to strategic stability. Further assumptions ...
J Conlisk, E Gerstner… - The Quarterly Journal of …, 1984 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract In the model of this paper a monopoly seller of a durable good holds periodic sales
as a means of price discrimination. A new cohort of consumers enters the market in each
period, interested in purchasing the good either immediately or after a delay. Within each ...
J Sobel - The Review of Economic Studies, 1984 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract This paper presents a model of intertemporal price discrimination. A fixed number of
sellers produce a homogeneous good. Consumers with different preferences enter the
market in each period and leave when they make a purchase. The sellers typically vary ...
I Sanchez… - Journal of Public Economics, 1993 - Elsevier
Abstract A hierarchical model of tax compliance is studied in which the government selects a
tax policy and then delegates the responsibility to collect taxes to the IRS. There is a fixed
distribution of income in the economy. Individuals differ by their income, which is known ...
YG Kim… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1995 - JSTOR
We add a round of pre-play communication to a finite two-player game played by a
population of players. Pre-play communication is cheap talk in the sense that it does not
directly enter the payoffs. The paper characterizes the set of strategies that are stable with ...
J Sobel - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1991 - JSTOR
This paper analyzes a model of a dynamic monopolist who produces at constant unit cost.
Each period a new cohort of consumers enters the market. Each entering cohort is identical.
Consumers within a cohort have different tastes for the good. My main results are: If ...
U Segal… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
This paper assumes that in addition to conventional preferences over outcomes, players in a
strategic environment have preferences over strategies. It provides conditions under which a
player's preferences over strategies can be represented as a weighted average of the ...
A Blume, K Yong-Gwan… - Games and Economic …, 1993 - econpapers.repec.org
Related works: Working Paper: Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication (2010) Working
Paper: Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication (1992) Working Paper: Evolutionary
Stability in Games of Communication (1993) This item may be available elsewhere in ...
J Sobel - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1981 - JSTOR
Given two agents with von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities who wish to divide n
commodities, consider the two-person noncooperative game with strategies consisting of
concave, increasing von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions as well as rules to break ...
L Santos-Pinto… - American Economic Review, 2005 - JSTOR
This paper suggests a mechanism that describes individuals' positive self-image in
subjective assessments of their relative abilities. The mechanism assumes individuals have
heterogeneous production functions that determine ability as a function of multiple skills; ...
J Sobel - International Economic Review, 1993 - JSTOR
This paper compares the principal's payoff in agency model under different assumptions
about the agent's access to information. The agent may make decisions before (is
uninformed) or after (is informed) learning the state of nature. When there are two possible ...
Y Chen,
N Kartik… - Econometrica, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
There are typically multiple equilibrium outcomes in the Crawford–Sobel (CS) model of
strategic information transmission. This paper identifies a simple condition on equilibrium
payoffs, called NITS (no incentive to separate), that selects among CS equilibria. Under a ...
J Sobel - Law & Contemp. Probs., 1989 - HeinOnline
When bargainers have access to different information, they may find it impossible to reach
agreements without costly impasses. Several people use this insight to build models in
which asymmetrically informed litigants fail to settle disputes, choosing instead to pursue a ...
A Cabrales… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1992 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper provides an analog to the aggregate monotonicity condition introduced
by [9.]] in a study of continuous dynamics. Our condition guarantees that limit points of
discrete selection dynamics are rationalizable strategies. We show that the condition will ...
J Sobel - Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1999 - Wiley Online Library
This paper shows that yardstick competition does not assist a regulator when lump-sum
transfers are not costly and the regulator does not care about the distribution of income.
Yardstick competition may discourage investment that would make efficient operation ...
[CITATION] Disclosure of evidence and resolution of disputes: who should bear the burden of proof?
J Sobel - Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining, Cambridge …, 1985
J Sobel - Journal of Economic Theory, 2000 - Elsevier
Economic theorists have intensively studied learning in games and decisions over the last
decade. This essay puts some of the work in perspective and offers opinions about what still
needs to be learned. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C73, D83.
J Sobel - Economics Letters, 1993 - Elsevier
Economics Letters 42 (1993) 301312 301 01651765 93 06.00 1993 Elsevier Science Publishers
BY. All rights reserved Evolutionary stability and efficiency Joel Sobel* Department of
Economics, D008, University of CaliforniaSan Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093, USA Abstract ...
W Emons… - The Review of Economic Studies, 1991 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract This paper is about accidents involving two risk-neutral parties. Both parties engage
in actions that are profitable but affect the magnitude of possible bilateral accidents. We
analyse how the action choices can be decentralized by liability rules that assign the ...
J Sobel - Journal of Labor Economics, 2006 - JSTOR
This article contrasts supporting partnerships through relational contracting and supporting
partnerships through formal legal institutions. A large population of players interact in
bilateral relationships. Efficiency requires cooperation, but cheating yields a higher short- ...
J Sobel - The Economic Journal, 1992 - JSTOR
People make mistakes. If the mistakes occur in a well understood way, then people can
organise their activities to reduce the cost of making the mistakes. In this paper I look at a
particular repetitive task that must be performed by error-prone agents. The process by ...
J Sobel - Manuscript, Univ. California, San Diego, 2002 - atlas-conferences.com
Experiments, ethnography, and introspection provide evidence economic agents do not act
to maximize their narrowly defined self interest. Expanding the domain of preferences to
include the utility of others provides a coherent way to extend rational choice theory.
A Blume… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1995 - Elsevier
We define communication-proof equilibria in simple games of communication. These
equilibria satisfy a stability condition guaranteeing that they would not be affected if new
opportunities to communicate arose. We look for partitions of possible equilibria into sets ...
J Sobel - University of Cal# ifornia, San Diego, 2006 - adres.ens.fr
Abstract Individuals with identical preferences each receive a signal about the unknown
state of the world and separately decide upon a utilitymaximizing recommendation on the
basis of that signal. The group's decision maximizes the common utility function based on ...
J Sobel - RAND Journal of Economics, 2001 - JSTOR
I study a two-parameter family of rules governing the process of entry into a club. There are
three types of agent: candidates desire to enter the club; judges vote on who should enter;
elite are already in the club. Promotion requires that at least n of N judges agree that a ...
J Sobel - Games and Economic Behavior, 2001 - Elsevier
Given n agents with who wish to divide m commodities, consider the n-person
noncooperative game with strategies consisting of concave increasing utility functions, and
whose outcomes are the relative utilitarian solution. Any constrained equal-income ...
M Rabin… - 1993 - escholarship.org
Abstract Many standard solution concepts rule out those Nash equilibria that are susceptible
to deviations. We propose a framework for considering not only which equilibria are not
susceptible to deviations. but also which equiiibria are likely to persist in the long run ...
M Dufwenberg, P Heidhues… - The Review of …, 2011 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We study competitive market outcomes in economies where agents have other-
regarding preferences (ORPs). We identify a separability condition on monotone
preferences that is necessary and sufficient for one's own demand to be independent of ...
VP Crawford, J Sobel… - American Journal of …, 1984 - ajae.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract This paper proposes a framework for the analysis of optimal strategic reserve policy
when ability to withstand embargoes influences terms of trade in an exhaustible resource
like oil. The mode embodies two stylized facts: competitive forces are not always strong ...
J Sobel - International Economic Review, 2000 - Wiley Online Library
2. Abstract This paper presents a model in which relative standing determines standards.
There are three kinds of agents in the model: candidates who wish to pass a test, members
of the elite who have passed the test, and the judge who decides who passes. In order to ...
U Segal… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2002 - Elsevier
This paper provides characterization theorems for preferences that can be represented by U
(x1,…, xn)= min {xk}, U (x1,…, xn)= max {xk}, U (x1,…, xn)=∑ u (xk), or combinations of
these functionals. The main assumption is partial separability, where changing a common ...
J Sobel - University of California at San Diego, 2007 - econ.ucsd.edu
Abstract The predictions of economic theory in market settings are associated with the
assumption that economic agents act to maximize their material self interest. This paper
demonstrates that the agents will appear to be acting in their material self interest and ...
J Sobel, L Stole… - Journal of economic theory, 1990 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper studies equilibrium refinements in signaling games through an
examination of rationalizability in derived games obtained by replacing the equilibrium path
with a sure outcome that yields the equilibrium payoff to all players. The informed player ...
Y Chen,
N Kartik… - Econometrica, forthcoming, 2007 - webdepot.umontreal.ca
Abstract There are typically multiple equilibrium outcomes in the Crawford-Sobel (CS) model
of strategic information transmission. This note identifies a simple condition on equilibrium
payoffs, called NITS, that selects among CS equilibria. Under a commonly used regularity ...
J Sobel - 2008 - www-personal.umich.edu
Abstract The predictions of economic theory in market settings are associated with the
assumption that economic agents are selfish in the sense that they maximize a utility
function defined on their own consumption. This paper demonstrates that the agents will ...
J Sobel - Econometric Society 10th World Congress, 2010 - webmeets.com
Abstract This paper reviews literature on communication between informed experts and
uninformed decision makers. The research provides some insight into what constitutes a
persuasive statement and under what conditions a decision maker will benefit from ...
J Sobel - Journal of Economic Theory, 1979 - Elsevier
Abstract In an economy with finitely many agents, one renewable resource, and an infinite
horizon, it is shown that there is exactly one maximal allocation corresponding to given
limiting shares of consumption and this allocation converges monotonically. Therefore, if ...
J Sobel - International Review of Economics, 2009 - Springer
Abstract This paper points out that classical competitive outcomes arise in two different
market environments even if agents have non-classical preferences. Consumers with
separable, other-regarding preferences behave as if they have classical preferences in ...
[CITATION] 982.“Strategic Information Transmission.”
VP Crawford… - Econometrica
K Border… - 1995 - students.som.yale.edu
Proposition 0 (The Revelation Principle). Given any mechanism and any set of agent's
optimal responses, there is an incentive compatible direct revelation mechanism which is
equivalent from the point of view of both the principal and the agent, when the agent tells ...
[CITATION] Evolutionary stabiliy in communication games
J Sobel - Economics Letters, 1993
[CITATION] Ichiro Takahashi (1984),“Bargaining, Strategic Reserves, and International Trade in Exhaustible Resources,”
V Crawford… - American Journal of Agricultural Economics
Y Chen,
N Kartik… - forthcoming in Econometrica, 2007 - columbia.edu
Abstract There are typically multiple equilibrium outcomes in the Crawford-Sobel (CS) model
of strategic information transmission. This paper identifies a simple condition on equilibrium
payoffs, called NITS, that selects among CS equilibria. Under a commonly used regularity ...
J Sobel - Typescript, University of California, San Diego, 2002 - clhc.usc.edu
Abstract This paper contrasts supporting partnerships through relational contracting and
supporting partnerships through formal legal institutions. A large population of players
interact in bilateral relationships. Initially, interactions take the form of a prisoner's dilemma ...
D Gale… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1982 - Elsevier
Abstract A resource is owned jointly by m agents, the ith agent's share of the resource being
θ i. The output of the resource, and the utilities of each agent are functions of the state of
nature. An admissible distribution scheme is one which (1) is (Pareto) optimal and which ( ...
[CITATION] Interdependent Preferences and Reciprocity University of California
J Sobel - 2001 - mimeo
KC Border… - Working Papers, 1985 - econpapers.repec.org
... Please update your bookmarks. A Theory of Auditing and Plunder. Kim C. Border and Joel Sobel ().
No 573, Working Papers from California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and
Social Sciences. Date: 1985-05 Track citations by RSS feed. Published: ...
[CITATION] Another view of trust and gossip
J Sobel - Network and Market Models of the Economy, New York …, 1999
[CITATION] Markets Make People Look Selfish
U Segal… - University of California, San Diego Discussion Paper, 2004
J Sobel - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1984 - Elsevier
Abstract The solution of the non-linear pricing problem when consumers are fully rational
price takers is compared to that obtained when consumers act as if prices are linear, with the
price per unit equal to the average price actually paid. I show that for a broad class of ...
[CITATION] Report of the Committee to Review Trends in Promotion to Tenure
AT Scull, PS Churchland, LB Milstein, RL Salmon… - University of California …, 1995
J Sobel, B Counting… - 1996 - Citeseer
Abstract Introduction This essay is an exploratory study of incentives with two-dimensional
output. I consider a model in which workers allocate effort across two dimensions: quality
and quantity. The monitor can observe quantity perfectly and without cost. While quality ...
A Blume… - Working Papers, 1991 - econpapers.repec.org
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. ...
Related works: Journal Article: Communication-Proof Equilibria in Cheap-Talk Games
(1995) This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the ...
[CITATION] The role of other-regarding preferences in competitive markets
P Heidhues, G Kirchsteiger, M Dufwenberg… - 2007 - Technical report, University of …
[CITATION] kTit for Tat: Foundations of Preferences for Reciprocity in Strategic Settings, lUniversity of Western Ontario
U Segal… - Department of Economics, 1999
[CITATION] It's No What You Know, It's Who You Play'
J Sobel - Game equilibrium models II: Methods, morals and …, 1991
[CITATION] lOn the Dynamics of Standards
J Sobel - mRAND Journal of Economics, 2001
J Sobel - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2009 - JSTOR
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2009, 1:2, 60-67 http://www. aeaweb.
org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mic. 1.2.60 ... This paper comments on "On the Potential of
Neuroeconomics: ... Critical [but Hopeful) Appraisal" by B. Douglas Bernheim. (JEL D01, ...
[CITATION] Optimal Non-Linear Prices
J Sobel - University of California, San Diego, 1979
JL Guasch… - European Economic Review, 1983 - Elsevier
Some of the skills that firms require are obtained only through on-the-job-training. This paper
concentrates on the strategic production of skills within the firm. Firms obtain high-quality
workers either by training their own (breeding) or by using the open market to bid away ...
[CITATION] Strategic Considerations in the Stockpiling of Oil
V Crawford… - mimeographed, University of California at San Diego, 1982
[CITATION] Population linkage and the manuscript census'
J Sobel - Hist. Methods Newsl, 1974
[CITATION] For Better or Forever: Informal versus Formal Enforcement
J Sobel - UCSD, May, 2002
J Sobel - Games and Economic Behavior, 2009 - Elsevier
Games and Economic Behavior 66 (2009) 632–642 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Games and Economic Behavior www.elsevier.com/locate/geb ReGale: Some memorable results
✩ Joel Sobel Department of Economics, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA ...
[CITATION] Other-regarding preferences in markets
J Sobel - 2008 - … which equilibria in call markets with …
J Sobel - Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2002 - dss.ucsd.edu
Abstract I argue that Rachlin's notion of self control is imprecise and not well suited to the
discussion of altruism. Rachlin's broader agenda, to improve collective welfare by identifying
behavioral mechanisms that increase altruism, neglects the fact that altruism is neither ...
J Sobel… - University of California at San …, 1991 - en.scientificcommons.org
JL Guasch… - Economics Letters, 1980 - Elsevier
Economics Letters 5 (1980) 8183 NorthHolland Publishing Company MONOPOLY AND PRODUCT
SELECTION J. Luis GUASCH and Joel SOBEL University of California, La Jolla, CA 92093, USA
Received 28 May 1980 It is shown by example that, even if there are fixed costs, a ...
[CITATION] Tit for Tat: Foundations of Preferences for Reciprocity
U Segal, J Sobel… - 1999 - University of California, San Diego
N Kartik, J Sobel… - Econometrica, 2008 - escholarship.org
Abstract: There are typically multiple equilibrium outcomes in the Crawford-Sobel (CS)
model of strategic information transmission. This paper identifies a simple condition on
equilibrium payoffs, called NITS (no incentive to separate), that selects among CS ...
J Sobel - 1996 - Citeseer
... Download as a PDF; Download as a PS. Download Links. [weber.ucsd.edu]. Save to List; Add
to Collection; Correct Errors; Monitor Changes. by Joel Sobel. ... BibTeX. @MISC{Sobel96theoriesof,
author = {Joel Sobel}, title = {Theories of Declining Standards}, year = {1996} }. Bookmark ...
[CITATION] Starting Small and Renegotiation
AG Crawford, B HolmstrÄom, D Pearce, J Sobel… - 1997
J Sobel - 2012 - econ.umd.edu
Abstract Individuals with identical preferences each receive a signal about the unknown
state of the world and decide upon a utility-maximizing recommendation on the basis of that
signal. The group makes a decision that maximizes a common utility function assuming ...
[CITATION] Southwest Economic Theory Conference (2001, Vol. 29, No. 34.)
J Sobel
[CITATION] Immigrants and the Labor Market Immigrants and the Labor Market (pp. 203-233)
JP Smith, A Spitz‐Oener, J Sobel, LD Loury… - Journal of Labor …, 2006 - JSTOR
[CITATION] Preliminary and incomplete. y Department of Economics, Universityof Western Ontario, London N6A 5C2, Canada. E-mail: segal@ sscl. uwo. ca z …
U Segal… - 1998
[CITATION] For Better or Forever: Formal versus Informal
J Sobel - 2002
[CITATION] 188 ANNOUNCEMENTS
D Levine, J Sobel… - … journal of the …, 1989 - Econometrics Society, the University …
M Dufwenberg, P Heidhues, G Kirchsteiger… - 2008 - cepr.org
We study competitive market outcomes in economies where agents have other-regarding
preferences. We identify a separability condition on monotone preferences that is necessary
and sufficient for one's own demand to be independent of the allocations and ...
J Sobel - 1978 - en.scientificcommons.org
Publikationsansicht. 2623673. The urban frontier labor force : structure and persistence in three
nineteenth century Minnesota towns / (1978). Sobel, Joel. Abstract. Thesis--University of
Minnesota.. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 172-181). Details der Publikation. ...
U Segal… - 1999 - Citeseer
Abstract This paper assumes that in addition to the conventional (sel sh) preferences over
outcomes, players in a strategic environment have preferences over strategies. In the
context of two-player games, it provides conditions under which a player's preferences ...
J Sobel - econ.ucsd.edu
4. You can skim quickly looking for results on a specific topic. In my opinion, the first way is
not a good way to learn material. The second way forces you to think about what you are
reading. If you guess the approach correctly, then the body of the paper becomes easy to ...
[CITATION] SAMET, Dov, 190 WAKKER, PETER, 453
S JOEL, D WETTSTEIN, S LARS… - Journal of economic …, 1990 - Academic Press.
J Sobel - Economics, 2009 - econ.ucsd.edu
Objectives: Econ 201 (last half) is an advanced elective in behavioral game theory. The topic
is models of communication with an aim towards understanding conditions under which
strategic informations can (and cannot) effectively exchange information. I hope to discuss ...
[CITATION] Jevons, Marshall. A Deadly Indifference
J Sobel - Journal of economic literature, 1999 - AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOC
JC Ely, EJ Green, BL Lipman, D Ray, S Athey… - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. ...
J Sobel - STICERD-Theoretical Economics Paper Series, 1982 - ideas.repec.org
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J Sobel - GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 1993 - pubmail.dklevine.com
This paper identifies evolutionarily stable outcomes in games in which one player has
private information and the other takes a payoff-relevant action. The informed player can
communicate at little cost. Outcomes satisfying a set-valued evolutionary stability condition ...
J Sobel… - 1990 - en.scientificcommons.org
Publication View. 33989743. It's Not What You Know, It's Who You Are Playing. Joel Sobel.
Publication details. Repository, RePEc (Germany). Type, preprint. ...
J Sobel - IDEA, 2007 - econ.ucsd.edu
General: Good group decisions effectively aggregate the (potentially) heterogeneous
information and preferences of the group membership. When group members have different
information, the ability to deliberate can potentially lead to better decisions. When group ...
YG Kim… - KOREAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2003 - kea.ne.kr
6 THE KOREAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Volume 19, Number 1, Summer 2003 are difficult to capture
in full models of the communication process. The basic reason for the difficulty is that costless
communication can never destroy a Nash equilibrium. If all but one player decides to ...
B Andreas, K Yong-Gwan… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1993 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper identifies evolutionarily stable outcomes in games in which one player
has private information and the other takes a payoff-relevant action. The informed player can
communicate at little cost. Outcomes satisfying a set-valued evolutionary stability condition ...
[CITATION] Fair Division of a Random Harvest: The Finite Case
J SOBEL - General equilibrium, growth, and trade: essays in …, 1979 - Academic Press
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