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[PDF] An Experimental Study of Ambiguity and Vagueness in the Announcement Game

[PDF] from nyu.edu
M Agranov… - 2010 - files.nyu.edu
Abstract In this paper we study the effi ciency properties of natural language used as a
communication device in what we call Announcement Games. An Announcement game is a
cheap) talk game, in which an VAnnouncerV upon privately observing the value of the ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 6 versions

[CITATION] Ambiguity and Vagueness in the Announcement (Bernanke) Game: and Experimental Study of Natural Language

M Agranov… - 2008 - working paper, Department of …
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[PDF] The Process of Choice in Guessing Games

[PDF] from caltech.edu
M Agranov, A Caplin… - California Institute of …, 2010 - wordsmatter.caltech.edu
Abstract This paper employs a new experimental design to provide insight into strategic
choice in one shot games. We incentivize and observe provisional choices in the 2/3
guessing game in the period after the structure of the game has been communicated. ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 13 versions

[PDF] VCoarse Communication and Focal Points: An Ex'perimental Study of Coordination Games with Asymmetric Payoffs

[PDF] from nyu.edu
M Agranov… - 2010 - cess.nyu.edu
Abstract We consider a game where one player, the Announcer, has to communicate the
value of payoff relevant state of the world to a set of other players who play a coordination
game with multiple equilibria. While everyone, the Announcer and the players, agree that ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 3 versions

[PDF] Incentives and Compensation Schemes: An Experimental Study

[PDF] from nyu.edu
M Agranov… - 2011 - cess.nyu.edu
Abstract When the performances of agents are correlated (because of a common random
component) contracts that use information on both the relative and absolute performance of
agents theoretically outperform rank-order tournaments and piece-rate schemes. Although ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 5 versions

What makes voters turn out: the effects of polls and beliefs

[PDF] from caltech.edu
M Agranov, J Goeree, J Romero… - 2012 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We use laboratory experiments to test for one of the foundations of the rational
voter paradigm-that voters respond to probabilities of being pivotal. We exploit a setup that
entails stark theoretical effects of information concerning the preference distribution (as ...
Cited by 1

[PDF] Other PeopleVs Money: An Experimental Study of the Impact of the Competition for Funds

[PDF] from nyu.edu
M Agranov, A Bisin… - Available from author, 2010 - cess.nyu.edu
Abstract This paper investigates the impact of the competition for funds in capital markets on
the risk taking behavior of fund managers. In doing this we find what we call an lOther
Peopleks Moneymeffect, or a tendency of people to invest the funds of others in riskier ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 11 versions

[PDF] Language and Leadership: an Experimental Study of Ambiguity and Vagueness in the Announcement Game

[PDF] from caltech.edu
M Agranov… - 2011 - hss.caltech.edu
Abstract One of the responsibilities of political leaders is to transmit information about states
of the world that he/she observes to their followers in a way that facilitates coordination. This
task is composed of two parts. One is a strategic component in which the leader attempts ...
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[PDF] Markets for Other PeopleVs Money: An Experimental Study of the Impact of the Competition for Funds

[PDF] from nyu.edu
M Agranov, A Bisin… - 2011 - nyu.edu
Abstract In this paper we experimentally investigate the impact that competing for funds has
on the risk $ taking behavior of laboratory hedge fund managers. We construct a simple
laboratory market for capital among hedge funds where each fund offers a contract that ...
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[PDF] Relative Piece-rate, Tournament and Piece-rate schemes: an Experimental study

[PDF] from luiss.it
M Agranov… - 2007 - luiss.it
Abstract Rank-order tournaments are known for their property of filtering out common
shocks. However, the realized payoffs of the agents are discontinuous in the level of exerted
effort. This feature produces complicated behavioral effects that have been studied ...
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[PDF] Flip# Flopping: Contrasting Effects of Intense Primaries and Intense General Elections on the Selection of Candidates

[PDF] from umd.edu
M Agranov - 2010 - econweb.umd.edu
Abstract We present an incomplete information model of two# stage electoral competition in
which candidates can choose different platforms in primaries and general elections. Voters
do not directly observe the chosen platforms, but rather infer the candidatesj ideologies ...
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[PDF] Relative Piece-Rate, Tournament and Independent Piece-Rate Schemes: An Experimental Study

[PDF] from pitt.edu
M Agranov… - 2008 - econ.pitt.edu
Abstract When risk-averse agents' outputs are correlated, using relative performance
information can improve the trade-off between incentives and risk-sharing. The experimental
work that tests this idea has mainly focused on either rank-order tournaments, in which ...
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[PDF] Ignorance is bliss: an experimental study of the use of ambiguity and vagueness in the coordination games with asymmetric payoffs

[PDF] from nyu.edu
M Agranov… - cess.nyu.edu
We consider a game where one player, the Announcer, has to communicate the value of a
payoff relevant state of the world to a set of players who play a coordination game with
multiple equilibria. While the Announcer and the players agree that coordination is ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 2 versions

[PDF] Flip&flopping: contrasting effects of intense primaries and general elections on selection of candidates

[PDF] from pitt.edu
MA NYU - 2009 - econ.pitt.edu
Abstract We present an incomplete information model of two% stage electoral competition in
which can% didates can choose different platforms in primaries and general elections.
Voters do not di% rectly observe the chosen platforms, but rather infer the ...
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Essays on communication in signaling games

[PDF] from umi.com
M Agranov - 2011 - gradworks.umi.com
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing
pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the
deletion. ... UMI 3408345 Copyright 2010 by ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This ...
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