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School choice: A mechanism design approach

[PDF] from duke.edu
A Abdulkadiroğlu… - American Economic Review, 2003 - JSTOR
Page 1. School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach By ATiLA
ABDULKADiROGLU AND TAYFUN SONMEZ* A central issue in school choice is
the design of a student assignment mechanism. Education literature provides ...
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The New York city high school match

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A Abdulkadiroğlu, PA Pathak… - American Economic Review, 2005 - JSTOR
Page 1. PRACTICAL MARKET DESIGN: FOUR MATCHESt The New York City High
School Match By ATiLA ABDULKADiRO6'LU, PARAG A. PATHAK, AND ALVIN E. ROTH*
We assisted the New York City Department of Education ...
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The Boston public school match

[PDF] from harvard.edu
A Abdulkadiroğlu, PA Pathak, AE Roth… - American Economic …, 2005 - JSTOR
Page 1. The Boston Public School Match By ATiLA ABDULKADiROGLU, PARAG
A. PATHAK, ALVIN E. ROTH, AND TAYFUN SLONMEZ* After the publication of
"School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach" by Abdulkadiro ...
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House allocation with existing tenants

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A Abdulkadiroğlu… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1999 - Elsevier
Cited by 178 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 7 versions

Random serial dictatorship and the core from random endowments in house allocation problems

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A Abdulkadiroğlu… - Econometrica, 1998 - JSTOR
Page 1. Ecoiornetrica, Vol. 66, No. 3 (May, 1998), 689-701 NOTES AND COMMENTS RANDOM
SERIAL DICTATORSHIP AND THE CORE FROM RANDOM ENDOWMENTS IN HOUSE
ALLOCATION PROBLEMS BY ATILA ABDULKADIRO6LU AND TAYFUN SONMEZ ...
Cited by 171 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 11 versions

Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in matching with indifferences: redesigning the New York City high school match

[PDF] from duke.edu
A Abdulkadiroglu, PA Pathak… - 2009 - nber.org
The design of the New York City (NYC) High School match involved tradeoffs among
efficiency, stability and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze
a model with indifferences--ties--in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the ...
Cited by 104 - Related articles - Library Search - All 25 versions

Changing the Boston school choice mechanism

[PDF] from duke.edu
A Abdulkadiroglu, P Pathak, AE Roth… - 2006 - nber.org
In July 2005 the Boston School Committee voted to replace the existing Boston school
choice mechanism with a deferred acceptance mechanism that simplifies the strategic
choices facing parents. This paper presents the empirical case against the previous ...
Cited by 64 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 31 versions

College admissions with affirmative action

[PDF] from columbia.edu
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A Abdulkadiroğlu - International Journal of Game Theory, 2005 - Springer
Page 1. College admissions with affirmative action à Atila Abdulkadirog˘lu Department
of Economics, Columbia University, NY10027, New York Abstract. This paper first
shows that when colleges' preferences are substitutable ...
Cited by 53 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 18 versions

Informing the debate: Comparing Boston's charter, pilot and traditional schools

A Abdulkadiroglu, J Angrist, S Cohodes… - Boston, MA: Boston …, 2009 - folio.iupui.edu
Abstract: Assesses the impact of charter and pilot schools on achievement by tracking
students who showed similar academic traits in earlier grades across school types. Also
compares applicants who won the lottery to attend charters or pilots and those who did not.
Cited by 47 - Related articles - Cached - Library Search - All 2 versions

Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments

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A Abdulkadiroglu… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2003 - Elsevier
Using lotteries is a common tool for allocating indivisible goods. Since obtaining preferences
over lotteries is often difficult, real-life mechanisms usually rely on ordinal preferences over
deterministic outcomes. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (J. Econom. Theory 19 (2002) 623) ...
Cited by 41 - Related articles - All 13 versions

Accountability and Flexibility in Public Schools: Evidence from Boston's Charters and Pilots

[PDF] from yetisandbox.com
A Abdulkadiroglu, J Angrist, S Dynarski, TJ Kane… - 2009 - nber.org
Charter schools are publicly funded but operate outside the regulatory framework and
collective bargaining agreements characteristic of traditional public schools. In return for this
freedom, charter schools are subject to heightened accountability. This paper estimates ...
Cited by 40 - Related articles - Library Search - All 22 versions

Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The'Boston'Mechanism Reconsidered

[PDF] from columbia.edu
A Abdulkadiroglu, YK Che… - 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: The Boston mechanism is among the most popular school choice procedures in
use. Yet, the mechanism has been criticized for its poor incentive and welfare performances,
which led the Boston Public Schools to recently replace it with Gale and Shapley's ...
Cited by 25 - Related articles - All 9 versions

Unemployment insurance and the role of self-insurance

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A Abdulkadiroglu, B Kuruscu… - Review of Economic Dynamics, 2002 - Elsevier
This paper employs a dynamic general equilibrium model to design and evaluate long-term
unemployment insurance plans (plans that depend on workers' unemployment history) in
economies with and without hidden savings. We show that optimal benefit schemes and ...
Cited by 24 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 19 versions

Room assignment-rent division: A market approach

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A Abdulkadiroğlu, T Sönmez… - Social Choice and Welfare, 2004 - Springer
Page 1. Abstract. A group of friends consider renting a house but they shall first agree on how
to allocate its rooms and share the rent. We propose an auction mechanism for room
assignment-rent division problems which mimics the market mechanism. ...
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[PDF] Auction design with tacit collusion

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A Abdulkadiroglu… - Mineo, Columbia University, 2003 - Citeseer
Abstract We study an auction design problem where the auctioneer anticipates that bidders
collude tacitly. We model tacit collusion in the following way: whichever auction the
auctioneer announces, it becomes the stage game of a corresponding repeated game, ...
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Expanding “choice” in school choice

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
A Abdulkadiroglu, YK Che… - Duke University, Columbia …, 2008 - works.bepress.com
Abstract: Truthful revelation of preferences has emerged as a desideratum in the design of
school choice programs. Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance mechanism is strategy-proof
for students but limits their ability to communicate their preference intensities. This results ...
Cited by 19 - Related articles - All 60 versions

[PDF] Trust, reciprocity and favors in cooperative relationships

[PDF] from tau.ac.il
A Abdulkadiroglu… - Proceedings of University of Maryland, …, 2005 - econ.tau.ac.il
Abstract We study trust, reciprocity and favors in a repeated trust game with private
information. In our main analysis, players are willing to exhibit trust and thereby facilitate
cooperative gains only if such behavior is regarded as a favor that must be reciprocated, ...
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Accountability and flexibility in public schools: Evidence from Boston's charters and pilots

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A Abdulkadiroğlu, JD Angrist… - … Quarterly Journal of …, 2011 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Skip Navigation. ...
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[PDF] Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in matching with indifferences: Redesigning the NYC high school match

[PDF] from nber.org
A Abdulkadiroglu, PA Pathak… - American Economic Review, 2010 - nber.org
Abstract The design of the New York City (NYC) High School match involved tradeoffs
between incentives and efficiency, because some schools are strategic players that rank
students in order of preference, while others order students based on large priority classes ...
Cited by 16 - Related articles - View as HTML - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 27 versions

[CITATION] Changing the Boston Mechanism: Strategyproofness as Equal Access

A Abdulkadiroglu, P Pathak, E Roth… - Unpublished manuscript, Harvard …, 2006
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[PDF] Dynamic house allocations

[PDF] from cuni.cz
A Abdulkadiroglu… - Working papar, 2007 - cerge.cuni.cz
Abstract We consider the problem of assigning individuals (eg students) to indivisible goods
(schools) when these assignments have to be made repeatedly and when individuals face
uncertainty about the intensity of their future preferences. For the setting with two schools ...
Cited by 12 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 14 versions

[PDF] Controlled school choice

[PDF] from webmeets.com
A Abdulkadiroglu… - 2007 - webmeets.com
Abstract Controlled choice over public schools is a common policy of school boards in the
United States. It attempts giving choice to parents while maintaining the racial and ethnic
balance at schools. None of the papers in education and in school choice describes how ...
Cited by 11 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 6 versions

[PDF] Mechanism design with tacit collusion

[PDF] from cepr.org
A Abdulkadiroglu… - Discussion Papers, 2002 - cepr.org
Abstract In the mechanism design literature, collusion is often modelled as agents signing
side contracts. This modelling approach is in turn implicitly justified by some unspecified
repeated-interaction story. In this paper, we first second-guess what kind of ...
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[CITATION] School Choice: A Mechanism

A Abdulkadiroğlu… - 2003
Cited by 5 - Related articles

[CITATION] Expanding

A Abdulkadiroglu, YK Che… - Choice” in School Choice,” PER Discussion …, 2008
Cited by 5 - Related articles

[PDF] Generalized matching for school choice

[PDF] from duke.edu
A Abdulkadiroglu - 2010 - duke.edu
Abstract The school choice problem is formulated as a one-sided or a twosided matching
problem. However, neither model adequately captures the features of the market design
applications of school choice. In particular, the one-sided matching solution may be ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 3 versions

[CITATION] Forthcoming.“Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match,”

A Abdulkadiroglu, PA Pathak… - American Economic Review
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[PDF] Matching markets: Theory and practice

[PDF] from webmeets.com
A Abdulkadiroglu… - Prepared for the Econometric …, 2010 - webmeets.com
It has been almost half a decade since David Gale and Lloyd Shapley published their
pathbreaking paper “College admissions and the stability of marriage” in American
Mathematical Monthly. It is hard to know whether Gale and Shapley expected the literature ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 5 versions

The Elite Illusion: Achievement Effects at Boston and New York Exam Schools

[PDF] from duke.edu
A Abdulkadiroglu, JD Angrist… - 2011 - nber.org
Talented students compete fiercely for seats at Boston and New York exam schools. These
schools are characterized by high levels of peer achievement and a demanding curriculum
tailored to each district's highest achievers. While exam school students do very well in ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - Library Search - All 10 versions

[CITATION] Forthcoming.“Accountability and Flexibility in Public Schools: Evidence from Boston's Charters and Pilots.”

A Abdulkadiroglu, JD Angrist, SM Dynarski, TJ Kane… - Quarterly Journal of Economics
Cited by 3 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries

[CITATION] YEON-KOO Che et YOSUKE Yasuda,(2008)

A ABDULKADIROĞLU - Expanding “choice” in school choice
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[PDF] The Role of Priorities in Assigning Indivisible Objects: A Characterization of Top Trading Cycles

[PDF] from columbia.edu
A Abdulkadiroglu, YK Che… - 2010 - columbia.edu
Abstract The Top Trading Cycles mechanism emerges as a desirable solution in various
market design applications. Yet recommendations are made without any rigorous foundation
for the role priorities play in assignment. We explain that role by recursive individual ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 3 versions

[PDF] The New York City High School Match

[PDF] from harvard.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
PA Pathak, A Abdulkadiroglu… - American Economic …, 2005 - bachman.hul.harvard.edu
We assisted the New York City Department of Education (NYCDOE) in designing a mech- anism
to match over 90,000 entering students to public high schools each year. This paper makes a
very preliminary report on the design process and the first year of operation, in academic ...
Related articles - All 3 versions

[PDF] Informing the Debate

[PDF] from wacharterschools.org
A Abdulkadiroglu - wacharterschools.org
Page 1. Informing the Debate Comparing Boston's Charter, Pilot and Traditional Schools Authors
Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Duke University Josh Angrist, MIT and National Bureau of Economic
Research Sarah Cohodes, Harvard Graduate School of Education ...
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Dynamic Contracts for Teams

KS Chung… - 2004 Meeting Papers, 2004 - ideas.repec.org
This paper studies repeated moral hazard in teams. Agents' actions are observable to each
other but not to the principal. For any given dynamic contract, agents always select their
favorite subgame perfect equilibrium in the corresponding dynamic game. The optimal ...
Cached - All 4 versions

Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in matching with indifferences: redesigning the NYC high school match

Full text - MIT Libraries
A Abdulkadiroglu, PA Pathak… - American Economic Review, 2009 - aeaweb.org
The design of the New York City (NYC) high school match involved trade-offs among
efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze
a model with indifferences-ties-in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the ...
Cached

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