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Proposal rights and political power

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T Kalandrakis - American Journal of Political Science, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
In a canonical model of sequential collective bargaining over a divisible good we show that
equilibrium expected payoffs are not restricted by players' voting rights or their impatience.
For all monotonic voting rules and discount factors, and for all divisions of the good among ...
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Dynamic legislative policy making

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J Duggan… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2012 - Elsevier
Abstract We prove existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in an infinite-horizon
model of legislative policy making in which the policy outcome in one period determines the
status quo for the next. We allow for a multidimensional policy space and arbitrary smooth ...
Cited by 36 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 20 versions

Majority rule dynamics with endogenous status quo

T Kalandrakis - Wallis Working Papers, 2007 - ideas.repec.org
We analyze a stochastic bargaining game in which a new dollar is divided among committee
members in each of an infinity of periods. In each period, a committee member is recognized
and offers a proposal for the division of the dollar. The proposal is implemented if it is ...
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Regularity of pure strategy equilibrium points in a class of bargaining games

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T Kalandrakis - Economic Theory, 2006 - Springer
Summary. We develop an index theory for the Stationary Subgame Perfect (SSP)
equilibrium set in a class of n-player sequential bargaining games with probabilistic
recognition rules. For games with oligarchic voting rules (a class that includes unanimity ...
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Rationalizable voting

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T Kalandrakis - Theoretical Economics, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
When is a finite number of binary voting choices consistent with the hypothesis that the voter
has preferences that admit a (quasi) concave utility representation? I derive necessary and
sufficient conditions and a tractable algorithm to verify their validity. I show that the ...
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Bicameral winning coalitions and equilibrium federal legislatures

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T Kalandrakis - Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
I analyze the legislative interaction between representatives from big and small states in a
bicameral legislature that decides on the allocation of a fixed resource among the states. I
assume that the two houses are malapportioned and that the big states are ...
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[PDF] A dynamic model of legislative bargaining

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J Duggan… - 2007 - hss.caltech.edu
Abstract We prove existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in an infinite-horizon
model of legislative bargaining in which the policy outcome in one period determines the
status quo in the next. We allow for a multidimensional policy space and arbitrary smooth ...
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[PDF] Minority governments: ideology and office

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T Kalandrakis - APSA Annual Meeting, Boston, August 29œSeptember, 2002 - nyu.edu
Abstract: We offer a theoretical and empirical analysis of the determinants of minority
governments in parliamentary systems. We assume a general bargaining environment for
coalition government formation. Parties care about policy decisions over a ...
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Equilibria in sequential bargaining games as solutions to systems of equations

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T Kalandrakis - Economics Letters, 2004 - Elsevier
No-delay, stationary equilibrium points of sequential bargaining games with history-
dependent random recognition rules and general agreement rules are characterized via a
finite number of equalities and inequalities. Existence of equilibrium is established using ...
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[PDF] A Reputational Theory of Two-Party Competition

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T Kalandrakis - Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2009 - qjps.com
ABSTRACT I study a dynamic game of two-party competition in which party preferences are
private information, exhibit serial correlation, and change with higher probability following
defeat in elections. Assuming partisans care sufficiently about office, extreme policies are ...
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Minimum winning coalitions and endogenous status quo

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T Kalandrakis - International Journal of Game Theory, 2010 - Springer
Abstract I analyze a stochastic bargaining game in which a renewable surplus is divided
among n≥ 5 committee members in each of an infinite number of periods, and the division
implemented in one period becomes the status quo allocation of the surplus in the ...
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[CITATION] Dynamics of majority rule with endogenous status quo: The distributive case

T Kalandrakis - Unpublished manuscript, 2005
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[PDF] Genericity of minority governments: the role of policy and office

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T Kalandrakis - 2003 - aueb.gr
Abstract: We develop a theory for the emergence of minority governments in multi-party
parliamentary systems using a bargaining model in the tradition of Baron and Ferejohn,
1989. We show that generically (ie except for a set of measure zero in the space of the ...
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A Newton collocation method for solving dynamic bargaining games

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J Duggan… - Social Choice and Welfare, 2011 - Springer
Abstract We develop and implement a collocation method to solve for an equilibrium in the
dynamic legislative bargaining game of Duggan and Kalandrakis 2008, unpublished
manuscript. We formulate the collocation equations in a quasi-discrete version of the ...
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[CITATION] Global database of political institutions and economic performance

JA Cheibub… - 2004 - New Haven, CT: Yale Center for …
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[CITATION] Genericity of Minority Governments

T Kalandrakis - Unpublished Manuscript, University of Rochester, 2005
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[PDF] On The Centrality of Policy Outcomes in Dynamic Majoritarian Bargaining Games

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T Kalandrakis - 2002 - kms2.isn.ethz.ch
Abstract We analyze an infinitely repeated divide-the-dollar bargaining game with an
endogenous reversion point. In each session a new dollar is divided among three legislators
according to the proposal of a randomly recognized member {if a majority prefer so {or ...
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Robust rational turnout

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T Kalandrakis - Economic Theory, 2009 - Springer
Abstract We show that equilibria of a class of participation games (Palfrey and Rosenthal in
Public Choice 41 (1): 7–53, 1983; Journal of Public Economics 24 (2): 171–193, 1984)
exhibit minimal heterogeneity of behavior so that players' mixed strategies are ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - All 18 versions

[PDF] A Theory of Minority and Majority Governments

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T Kalandrakis - Wallis Working Papers, 2007 - rochester.edu
Abstract I develop a theory of the emergence of minority and majority governments in
multiparty parliamentary systems. I study a general bargaining environment with a policy
space of arbitrary finite dimension, any number of political parties, and a general class of ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 9 versions

Radical Moderation: Recapturing Power in Two‐Party Parliamentary Systems

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T Kalandrakis… - American Journal of Political …, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
3. We thank the editor and anonymous referees for helpful comments, as well as Claire Lim,
and audiences at Rochester, Binghamton, the MPSA, and APSA. Kalandrakis thanks the
IQSS for hospitality. Supplemental information and replication materials for the analyses ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 12 versions

[PDF] Dynamics of Two Party Competition: Empirical Estimation of a Theoretical Model

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T Kalandrakis… - 2006 - people.fas.harvard.edu
Abstract We estimate the parameters of a stochastic game of two-party competition
(Kalandrakis 2006) using the actual sequence of electoral winners in four countries with two-
party parliamentary systems. We find that moderate parties that lose elections are almost ...
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[PDF] Testing Proposer and Voter Rationality

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T Kalandrakis - 2010 - lse.ac.uk
Abstract Consider data that for each of a finite number of periods record a status quo policy,
a proposal offered by some known committee member (possibly different across periods),
and the votes for or against the proposal by all committee members. Can we refute the ...
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Dynamics of the Presidential Veto: A Computational

J Duggan, T Kalandrakis… - Wallis Working Papers, 2008 - ideas.repec.org
We specify and compute equilibria of a dynamic policy-making game between a president
and a legislature under insitutional rules that emulate those of the US Constitution. Policies
are assumed to lie in a two-dimensional space in which one issue dimension captures ...
Cached - All 4 versions

[PDF] Dynamics of Westminster Parliamentarism

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T Kalandrakis - 2005 Meeting Papers, 2005 - nyu.edu
Abstract: We study policy polarization and electoral dynamics in a two-party parliamentary
system of government modeled as a stochastic game of incomplete information. The parties'
preferred policy (moderate or extreme) is only revealed to the electorate via the ...
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[CITATION] Revisiting the Role of Structure on the Induction of Legislative Equilibrium

T Kalandrakis
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