R Amir - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2000 - Elsevier
We provide an extensive comparison of the well-known R&D models of d'Aspremont-
Jacquemin and Kamien-Muller-Zang, exposing full or partial conflict in key conclusions and
policy prescriptions. Using a mix of formal and/or intuitive criteria, we argue that the first ...
R Amir - Games and Economic Behavior, 1996 - Elsevier
We reconsider the Cournot oligopoly problem in light of the theory of supermodular games.
Invoking the recent ordinal version of this theory proposed by Milgrom and Shannon, we
generalize Novshek's existence result, derive the associated uniqueness result, give an ...
R Amir… - Review of Economic Studies, 2000 - Wiley Online Library
In the framework of symmetric Cournot oligopoly, this paper provides two minimal sets of
assumptions on the demand and cost functions that imply respectively that, as the number of
firms increases, the minimal and maximal equilibria lead to (i) decreasing industry price ...
R Amir, I Evstigneev… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2003 - Elsevier
This paper deals with a general version of a two-stage model of R&D and product market
competition. We provide a thorough generalization of previous results on the comparative
performance of noncooperative and cooperative R&D, dispensing in particular with ex- ...
R Amir - Southern Economic Journal, 2005 - JSTOR
The literature on supermodular optimization and games is surveyed from the perspective of
potential users in economics. This methodology provides a new approach for comparative
statics based only on critical assumptions, and allows a general analysis of games with ...
R Amir… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2000 - Elsevier
We consider a two-period duopoly characterized by a one-way spillover structure in process
R&D and a very broad specification of product market competition. We show that a priori
identical firms always engage in different levels of R&D, at equilibrium, thus giving rise to ...
R Amir… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1999 - Elsevier
We reconsider Stackelberg's classical critique of the Cournot duopoly, in the framework of
endogenous timing for two-player games. For quantity duopoly we provide different sets of
minimal conditions, directly on the demand and cost functions, yielding respectively the ...
R Amir, S Sahi, M Shubik… - Journal of economic theory, 1990 - Elsevier
Abstract An exchange economy is modeled as a strategic market game with all pairwise
markets available. Existence of noncooperative equilibria is proved. It is shown that if
resources are distributed in a skewed manner, in equilibrium prices may not satisfy the no ...
R Amir… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2006 - Elsevier
We consider the issue of first-versus second-mover advantage in differentiated-product
Bertrand duopoly with general demand and asymmetric linear costs. We generalize existing
results for all possible combinations where prices are either strategic substitutes and/or ...
R Amir, LJ Mirman… - International Economic Review, 1991 - JSTOR
We consider a one-sector nonclassical model of optimal economic growth, characterized by
a convex-concave production function. We provide, in a dynamic programming context a
characterization of all local (interior) maximum of the maximand of the Bellman equation. ...
R Amir - Journal of mathematical economics, 1996 - Elsevier
This paper develops several comparative dynamics results for Ramsey-type
multidimensional dynamic optimization problems in economics. We provide sufficient
conditions for the value function to be monotone and supermodular, and for the extremal ...
R Amir… - Journal of Economics & Management …, 1999 - Wiley Online Library
With one-way spillovers, the standard symmetric two-period R&D model leads to an
asymmetric equilibrium only, with endogeneous innovator and imitator roles. We show how
R&D decisions and measures of firm heterogeneity—market shares, R&D shares, and ...
R Amir - Games and Economic Behavior, 1996 - pascal.iseg.utl.pt
One of the emerging trends in the expanding relationship between game theory and
economics is the application of dynamic/stochastic games in a variety of settings. Early
studies initiated this development via specific examples where equilibria are computable ...
R Amir… - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2001 - Elsevier
This paper assesses the view that Bertrand equilibrium is intrinsically more competitive than
Cournot equilibrium. We consider an oligopoly model with linear demand, and a mixture of
substitute and complementary products. Our results provide support for the conventional ...
R Amir… - Journal of Economics, 1998 - Springer
We consider a model in which firms first choose process R&D expenditures and then
compete in an output market. We show the symmetric equilibrium under R&D competition is
sometimes unstable, in which case two asymmetric equilibria must also exist. For the latter ...
R Amir, IV Evstigneev, T Hens… - Journal of Mathematical …, 2005 - Elsevier
The paper analyzes the process of market selection of investment strategies in an
incomplete market of short-lived assets. In the model under study, asset payoffs depend on
exogenous random factors. Market participants use dynamic investment strategies taking ...
R Amir - Games and Economic Behavior, 1995 - Elsevier
This note relates to the study of Hamilton and Slutsky ((1990) Games Econ. Behav. 2, 29-46)
on endogenous timing (with observable delay). It shows, via counterexample, that
monotonicity of the best-reponse functions in a two-player game is not sufficient to derive ...
R Amir… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2003 - Elsevier
An infinite-horizon, stochastic model of entry and exit with sunk costs and imperfect
competition is constructed. A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the general dynamic
stochastic game is shown to exist as a limit of finite-horizon equilibria. This equilibrium has ...
M Amir, R Amir… - Economic theory, 2000 - Springer
Summary. We compare simultaneous versus sequential moves in R&D decisions within an
asymmetric R&D/Cournot model with linear demand (for differentiated products), general
R&D costs, and spillovers. Simultaneous play and sequential play (with and without a ...
R Amir - 2003 - papers.ssrn.com
performance-profits, social welfare and price-cost margins-of exogenously changing the
number of firms in Cournot markets. This includes an in-depth exploration of the well-known
trade-off between competition and production efficiency. Most conventional beliefs ...
R Amir - Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 1997 - Elsevier
We consider the discounted optimal growth model under uncertainty, and model the
stochastic technology as a transition probability mapping inputs into random outputs. This
formulation allows for weaker assumptions of monotonicity and convexity on the ...
R Amir… - The Review of Economics and Statistics, 2008 - MIT Press
Abstract Four rankings of economics departments worldwide in terms of graduate education
are constructed. The central methodological idea is that the value of a department is the sum
of the values of its PhD graduates, as reflected in the values of their current employing ...
R Amir - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics ( …, 2000 - JSTOR
A two-period symmetric Cournot duopoly with linear demand and costs is analyzed under
linear (or more general) returns to scale in process R&D. Subgameperfect equilibrium may
call for one firm to fully innovate while the other firm remains just as before. The outcome ...
R Amir, E Diamantoudi… - International Journal of Industrial …, 2009 - Elsevier
In view of the uncertainty over the ability of merging firms to achieve efficiency gains, we
model the post-merger situation as a Cournot oligopoly wherein the outsiders face
uncertainty about the merged entity's final cost. At the Bayesian equilibrium, a bilateral ...
R Amir - CORE Discussion Papers, 2002 - ideas.repec.org
We provide a simple theoretical foundation, based on the theory of Markov chains, for the
objective empirical procedure for journal ranking devised by Liebowitz and Palmer. An
elementary characterization is derived that substantially clarifies the meaning, scope and ...
R Amir - Games and Economic Behavior, 2005 - Elsevier
While ordinal complementarity is more general than cardinal complementarity, the
corresponding global sufficient conditions placed on the primitives of a constrained
optimization problem are generally not comparable. We explore this issue in detail for the ...
R Amir - Annals of Operations Research, 2002 - Springer
We consider discounted stochastic games characterized by monotonicity, supermodularity
and diagonal dominance assumptions on the reward functions and the transition law. A
thorough novel discussion of the scope and limitations of this class of games is provided. ...
R Amir, E Diamantoudi, L Xue… - 2003 - econ.ku.dk
Abstract In view of the uncertainty over the ability of merging firms to achieve efficiency
gains, we model the post-merger situation as a Cournot oligopoly wherein the outsiders face
uncertainty about the merged entity's final cost. At the Bayesian equilibrium, a bilateral ...
R Amir, JY Jin… - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2008 - Elsevier
This paper explores economically meaningful forms of cost functions for process research
and development in the presence of imperfect appropriability of inventive output. We
propose, as a central criterion to be satisfied by the knowledge production process, that a ...
R Amir - Economic Theory, 1996 - Springer
Summary This note reconsiders the well-known model of strategic bequest/altruistic growth,
but with stochastic production satisfying a strong convexity condition: The probability that the
next stock exceeds any given level is concave in investment. Existence of a Markov- ...
R Amir… - 2001 - webdoc.sub.gwdg.de
Abstract This survey provides an extensive account of research in economics based on the
stochastic games paradigm. Its area-by-area coverage is in the form of an overview, and
includes applications in resource economics, industrial organization, macroeconomics, ...
Abstract We study two-person extensive form games, or “matches,” in which the only
possible outcomes (if the game terminates) are that one player or the other is declared the
winner. The winner of the match is determined by the winning of points, in “point games.” ...
[CITATION] Comparative statics in strategic market games
R Amir, F Bloch… - 2003 - Universites d'Aix-Marseille II et III
R Amir… - Games and economic behavior, 2009 - Elsevier
This paper investigates the effects of entry in two-sided markets where buyers and sellers
act strategically. Applying new tools from supermodular optimization/games, sufficient
conditions for different comparative statics results are obtained. While normality of one ...
R Amir… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2000 - Elsevier
In this paper, we analyze probability distributions associated with stochastic equilibrium
paths of economic dynamics. We consider sums of random variables (aggregate rewards or
utilities) depending on successive states of the equilibrium paths. We describe conditions ...
R Amir… - Economic Theory, 2003 - Springer
Summary. For Bertrand duopoly with linear costs, we establish via a single (counter-)
example that:(i) A new monotone transformation of the firms' profit functions may lead to the
supermodularity of transformed profits when the standard log and identity transformations ...
R Amir, M Germain… - Journal of Public …, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
2. The authors are grateful to John List and an anonymous referee for helpful feedback. This
paper is an extended version of Germain and van Steenberghe (2005). Earlier versions of
this paper were completed and submitted independently of the related work by Bauman et ...
R Amir… - 2001 - Citeseer
Abstract This chapter considers a recent trend in the application of stochastic games to
economics characterized by the use of the lattice-theoretic approach to capture the
monotonic properties of Markovian equilibria. The topics covered are:(i) a general ...
R Amir… - Environmental and Resource Economics, 2005 - Springer
Abstract Studies of optimal second-best environmental regulation of identical polluting
agents have invariably ignored potentially welfare-improving asymmetric regulation by
imposing equal regulatory treatment of identical firms at the outset. Yet, cost asymmetry ...
R Amir, IV Evstigneev, T Hens… - Mathematics and Financial …, 2012 - Springer
Abstract The paper examines a game-theoretic evolutionary model of an asset market with
endogenous equilibrium asset prices. Assets pay dividends that are partially consumed and
partially reinvested. The investors use general, adaptive strategies (portfolio rules), ...
R Amir, I Grilo… - International Game Theory Review, 1999 - elibrary.ru
Аннотация This paper provides general conditions on the direct demand functions in a
Bertrand duopoly with differentiated substitute products and constant marginal costs, that
allow an unambiguous ranking of firms' equilibrium payoffs between sequential play (with ...
R Amir, N Nannerup, A Stepanova… - The Manchester …, 2002 - Wiley Online Library
In the standard two-stage framework of R&D/product market competition, this paper provides
a performance comparison between monopoly and the cartelized research joint venture,
using two well-known models based on different versions of the R&D spillover process. ...
R Amir, F Garcia… - CORE Discussion Paper No. 2006/8, 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper is an attempt to develop a unified approach to endogenous
heterogeneity by constructing general class of two-player symmetric games that always
possess only asymmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria. These classes of games are ...
R Amir - 2005 - cob.calpoly.edu
Abstract This paper considers a general class of discounted Markov stochastic games
characterized by multidimensional state and action spaces with an order structure, and one
$ period rewards and state transitions satisfying some complementarity and monotonicity ...
R Amir, I Maret… - Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, 2004 - JSTOR
This paper investigates the pass-through of an excise tax imposed on a monopoly firm with
constant marginal cost. The optimal price increases as tax increases for any demand
function. Tax pass-through is globally under or in excess of 100% according as the direct ...
R Amir… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2011 - Elsevier
This paper analyzes oligopolistic markets with network externalities. Exploiting a minimal
complementarity structure on the model primitives that allows for pure network goods, we
prove existence of non-trivial fulfilled-expectations equilibrium. We formalize the concept ...
R Amir, F Garcia… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2010 - Elsevier
This paper is an attempt to develop a unified approach to symmetry-breaking in strategic
models arising in industrial organization by constructing two general classes of two-player
symmetric games that always possess only asymmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria. ...
R Amir, A Stepanova… - 2000 - cerge-ei.cz
Abstract We consider the issue of first versus second-mover advantage in differentiated-
product Bertrand duopoly with general demand and asymmetric linear costs. We generalize
existing results for the cases where prices are either strategic substitutes and/or ...
R Amir… - 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: An objective ranking of economics departments worldwide in terms of graduate
education is derived. The central idea is that the value of a department is the sum of the
values of its PhD graduates, as reflected in the values of their current employing ...
[CITATION] Modelling imperfectly appropriable R&D via spillovers International
A Rabah - Journal of Industrial Organization, 2000
R Amir, C Halmenschlager… - International Journal of Industrial …, 2011 - Elsevier
We consider the standard two-stage game of R&D and Cournot competition with ex ante
identical firms but depart from the literature in assuming that R&D is characterized by mildly,
instead of strongly, decreasing returns to scale. We establish that only extreme R&D levels ...
R Amir - Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, 1987 - dido.econ.yale.edu
ABSTRACT A general model for noncooperative extraction of common-property resource is
considered. The main result is that this sequential game has a Nash equilibrium in stationary
strategies. The proof is based on an infinite dimensional fixed-point theorem, and relies ...
[CITATION] VMarket Structure
R Amir - Scale Economies and Industry Performance, V CORE, 2003
R Amir - CORE Discussion Papers, 1991 - econpapers.repec.org
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. ...
Related works: Journal Article: Sensitivity analysis of multisector optimal economic dynamics
(1996) This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the ...
[CITATION] forthcoming.“Equilibrium Play in Matches: Binary Markov Games.”
M Walker, J Wooders… - Games and Economic Behavior
R Amir, IV Evstigneev… - Swiss Finance Institute …, 2008 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: The paper examines a game-theoretic model of a financial market in which asset
prices are determined endogenously in terms of short-run equilibrium. Investors use
general, adaptive strategies depending on the exogenous states of the world and the ...
R Amir… - 1995 - opengrey.eu
R&D Returns, Endogenous Firms Heterogeneity and Research Joint Ventures. Rabah Amir,
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Marktprozess
und Unternehmensentwicklung Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, 1995.
R Amir… - Stackelberg Lecture” presented at the 2007 …, 2007 - econ.uiuc.edu
Abstract The nature of competition is quite different in network industries as compared to the
other, more traditional, ones. The purpose of the present paper is to thoroughly examine the
implications of these differences as reflected in the dependence of equilibrium outputs, ...
[CITATION] VComparative Statics of Nash Equilibria
R Amir - V Unpublished, 2008
R Amir… - Journal of Bioeconomics, 2006 - Springer
Synopsis This paper considers the well-known Levhari-Mirman discrete-time model of
resource extraction, and investigates the effects of the information structure of the dynamic
game–open-loop, Markovian or history-dependent–on the equilibrium consumption path ...
[CITATION] Stackelberg versus Cournot/Bertrand Equilibrium
R Amir… - Universite Catholique de Louvain CORE Discussion …, 1994
R Amir, I Evstigneev… - 2008 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: The paper examines a game-theoretic evolutionary model of a financial market
with endogenous equilibrium asset prices. Assets pay dividends that are partially consumed
and partially reinvested. The traders use general, adaptive strategies (portfolio rules), ...
R Amir… - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2007 - Elsevier
Amir and Lambson (Amir, R. and VE Lambson (2003), Entry, Exit, and Imperfect Competition
in the Long Run, Journal of Economic Theory, 110, 191–203) developed a general infinite-
horizon, stochastic model of endogenous entry and exit by integer numbers of firms facing ...
R Amir… - Macroeconomic Dynamics, 1999 - Cambridge Univ Press
The paper examines a stochastic analogue of the Polterovich model of economic dynamics.
The study focuses on the asymptotic properties of equilibrium paths. The main results are
stochastic turnpike theorems with exponential estimates of the convergence rate. ...
[CITATION] Stackelberg vs Cournot equilibrium
A Rabah… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1999
J Bierbaum, V Grimm, WTR Amir… - Fixed Price.” Review of …, 2006 - Citeseer
Abstract We analyze the problem of selling shares of a divisible good to a large number of
buyers when demand is uncertain. We characterize equilibria of two popular mechanisms, a
fixed price mechanism and a uniform price auction, and compare the revenues. While in ...
M Amir, R Amir… - CIE Discussion Papers, 1999 - ideas.repec.org
We compare simultaneous versus sequential moves in R&D decisions within an asymmetric
R&D/Cournot model with linear demand (for differentiated products), general R&D costs,
and spillovers. Simultaneous play and sequential play (with and without a specified leader ...
R Amir… - 1994 - ideas.repec.org
Did you know? IDEAS also indexes book chapters. ... No abstract is available for this item. ...
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there
are three options: 1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of ...
R Amir, RJ Aumann, J Peck… - Games and Economic …, 2009 - econpapers.repec.org
By Rabah AMIR, Robert J. Aumann, James Peck and Myrna Wooders; Introduction to the Special
Issue of Games and Economic Behavior in honor of Martin Shubik. ...
R Amir… - 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We prove that the coefficient of absolute prudence is greater than k-times
coefficient of absolute risk aversion for the utility function if and only if the coefficient of
absolute prudence is (3-k) times the coefficient of absolute risk aversion for the inverse ...
R Amir… - Econometric Society World Congress 2000 …, 2000 - ideas.repec.org
We consider the issue of first versus second mover advantage in differentiated-product
Bertrand duopoly with asymmetric linear costs. We provide a generalization of some well-
known results in the cases where prices are strategic substitutes or complements, ...
A Rabah, I GRILO… - Issues, 1999 - worldscinet.com
Abstract: This paper provides general conditions on the direct demand functions in a
Bertrand duopoly with differentiated substitute products and constant marginal costs, that
allow an unambiguous ranking of firms' equilibrium payoffs between sequential play (with ...
R Amir, F Garcia… - The Manchester …, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
Duopoly firms engaged in a standard two-stage game of R&D and Cournot competition are caught
in a prisoner's dilemma for their R&D decisions whenever spillover effects are low. This effect
works to the advantage of consumers and society. This result provides an interesting ...
We study two-person extensive form games, or “matches,” in which the only possible
outcomes (if the game terminates) are that one player or the other is declared the winner.
The winner of the match is determined by the winning of points, in “point games.” We call ...
R Amir, JY Jin… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2010 - Elsevier
Contrary to much of the existing literature, we obtain robust and clear-cut results for the
incentives and welfare effects of information sharing when information is firm-specific. We
show that firms' incentives to share this type of information are aligned with social welfare. ...
[CITATION] Endogenous Sequencing of R&D Decisions in a Two-period Duopoly with Spillovers
M Amir, R Amir, J Jin… - 1999 - Odense Universitet. Det …
[CITATION] Industrial organization: technology, coalitions and product differentiation
R Amir - 2003 - Blackwell Publishing
R Amir, D Encaoua… - 2011 - hal-paris1.archives-ouvertes.fr
This paper explores a licensor's choice between charging a per-unit royalty or a fixed fee
when her innovation is covered by a weak patent, ie a patent that is likely to be invali-dated
by a court if challenged. Using a general model where the nature of competition is not ...
A Rabah, IV EVSTIGNEEV… - Swiss Finance Institute … - warwick.ac.uk
Abstract The paper examines a game# theoretic model of a financial market in which asset
prices are determined endogenously in terms of short# run equilibrium. Investors use
general, adaptive strategies depending on the exogenous states of the world and the ...
R Amir… - Annals of Finance, 2011 - Springer
Abstract Recent deregulation of the banking sector in the US and in Europe allows
commercial banks to hold equity in non-financial firms. We develop a model to investigate
the effects of bank equity stakes in firms on credit market competition. The main result is ...
R Amir - Handbook on Optimal Growth 1, 2006 - Springer
This section provides a general idea of the contents and organization of this survey of a
large body of research in economics and related fields loosely defined by the adoption of the
common methodology of dynamic games. We note at the outset that this class of games ...
R Amir, T Leiber… - International Journal of Economic …, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
1. The authors would like to thank Jim Jin, Cuong Le Van and Gisèle Umbhauer for
discussion and feedback on the general topic of this paper. The authors are also grateful to
the anonymous referee whose comments contributed to significantly improve the overall ...
G De Feo… - 34th Conference of the European …, 2007 - strathprints.strath.ac.uk
This paper addresses the issue of endogenizing the equilibrium solution when a private-
domestic or foreign-firm competes in the quantities with a public, welfare maximizing firm.
Theoretical literature on mixed oligopolies, in fact, provides results and policy implications ...
[CITATION] Special Issue: Evolutionary Game Theory 2000: Selected and Refereed Papers Originally Presented at the Conference Evolutionary Game Theory 2000 …
R Amir, J Bergin… - 2003 - World Scientific
[CITATION] ENDOGENOUS ASYMMETRY IN DUOPOLY MODELS
R Amir, F Garcia… - 2004
[CITATION] First and Second Mover Advantage in Asymetric Price Duopoly
A Stepanova, R Amir, S Universitet… - 2000 - Department of Economics, Faculty of …
R Amir - The Manchester School, 2002 - Wiley Online Library
Over the last quarter century, the¢ eld of industrial organization has undergone a radical
transformation, moving from a traditionally empirical subject relying largely on industry
studies to a fully£ edged part of microeconomics, founded on sophisticated theoretical ...
R Amir… - 2002 - feem-web.it
Abstract In view of the uncertainty over the ability of merging firms to achieve efficiency
gains, we model the post0merger situation as a Cournot oligopoly wherein the outsiders
face uncertainty about the merged entityTs final cost. At the Bayesian equilibrium, a ...
[CITATION] Effects of Mergers on Market Performance
MC Muñoz-Latorre, R Amir… - 2001 - University of Manchester
R Amir, M Germainö… - 2006 - mail.eaer.org
Abstract The literature on the impact of economic instruments (taxes and tradable permits)
on the level of innovation usually proceeds on the presumption that inM novation shifts the
marginal abatement cost curve downwards. This postulate has not been theoretically ...
E Entry, I Competition, R Amir… - econ.ku.dk
Abstract: An infiniteMhorizon, stochastic model of entry and exit with sunk costs and
imperfect competition is constructed. Simple examples provide insights into:(1) the
relationship between sunk costs and industry concentration,(2) entry when current profits ...
GW Bassett,
RW Koenker, KR Kumar, H Thomas… - 1984 - ideals.illinois.edu
[CITATION] Monopoly versus R&D-Integrated Duopoly
E Eguiazorova, N Nannerup, A Stepanova… - 2001
R Amir, RJ Aumann, J Peck… - Games and Economic …, 2004 - ma.huji.ac.il
Martin Shubik has made fundamental contributions to both game theory and economics. His
research has focused on the underlying abstractions of game theory and mathematical
economics combined with an emphasis on understanding actual institutions and ...
R Amir… - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper provides a thorough analysis of oligopolistic markets with positive
demand-side network externalities and perfect compatibility. The minimal structure imposed
on the model primitives is such that industry output increases in a firm's rivals' total output ...
A Rabah, I MARET… - ideas.repec.org
This paper investigates the pass-through of an excise tax imposed on a monopoly firm with
constant marginal cost. The optimal price increases as tax increases for any demand
function. Tax pass-through is globally under or in excess of 100% according as the direct ...
A Rabah, IV EVSTIGNEEV, H Thorsten… - Swiss Finance Institute … - ideas.repec.org
The paper examines a game-theoretic evolutionary model of an asset market with
endogenous equilibrium asset prices. Assets pay dividends that are partially consumed and
partially rein-vested. The investors use general, adaptive strategies (portfo-lio rules), ...
[CITATION] R&D Returns, Shake-outs and Research Joint Ventures
R Amir - 1999 - Department of Economics, Faculty of …
R Amir… - 2008 - southampton.ac.uk
Abstract In this paper we deal with R&D games with two players investing in R&D and
competing in the product market. We consider tournament as well as non&tournament kind
of models. We discover that strate& gic substitutability or complementarity of R&D ...
R AMIR, IV Evstigneev… - The School of Economics …, 2001 - econpapers.repec.org
By Rabah AMIR, Igor V. Evstigneev and John Wooders; Non-cooperative
Versus Cooperative R & D with Endogenous Spillover.
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