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J Von Neumann, O Morgenstern, A Rubinstein… - 2007 - books.google.com
This is the classic work upon which modern-day game theory is based. What began more
than sixty years ago as a modest proposal that a mathematician and an economist write a
short paper together blossomed, in 1944, when Princeton University Press published ...
A Rubinstein - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1982 - JSTOR
Two players have to reach an agreement on the partition of a pie of size 1. Each has to make
in turn, a proposal as to how it should be divided. After one player has made an offer, the
other must decide either to accept it, or to reject it and continue the bargaining. Several ...
K Binmore,
A Rubinstein… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1986 - JSTOR
This article establishes the relationship between the static axiomatic theory of bargaining
and the sequential strategic approach to bargaining. We consider two strategic models of
alternating offers. The models differ in the source of the incentive of the bargaining parties ...
Abstract: This is theonly book that presents the modern strategic theory of bargaining in
detail and describes, in a consistent framework, a number of recent applications of this
theory to the study of markets. Bargaining and Markets discusses two recent ...
The notion of bounded rationality was initiated in the 1950s by Herbert Simon; only recently
has it influenced mainstream economics. In this book, Ariel Rubinstein defines models of
bounded rationality as those in which elements of the process of choice are explicitly ...
Abstract The paper studies two-person supergames. Each player is restricted to carry out his
strategies by finite automata. A player's aim is to maximize his average payoff and subject to
that, to minimize the number of states of his machine. A solution is defined as a pair of ...
A Rubinstein, A Wolinsky - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric …, 1985 - JSTOR
This paper considers a market where pairs of agents who are interested in carrying out a
transaction are brought together by a stochastic process and, upon meeting, initiate a
bargaining process over the terms of the transaction. The basic bargaining problem is ...
A Rubinstein - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1985 - JSTOR
The paper studies a strategic sequential bargaining game with incomplete information: Two
players have to reach an agreement on the partition of a pie. Each player, in turn, has to
make a proposal on how the pie should be divided. After one player has made an offer, ...
A Rubinstein - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1991 - JSTOR
The paper is a discussion of the interpretation of game theory. Game theory is viewed as an
abstract inquiry into the concepts used in social reasoning when dealing with situations of
conflict and not as an attempt to predict behavior. The first half of the paper deals with the ...
A Rubinstein, A Wolinsky - The Quarterly Journal of …, 1987 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We study a model of a market with three types of agents: sellers, buyers, and
middlemen. Buyers and sellers can trade directly or indirectly through the middlemen. The
analysis focuses on steady state situations in which the numbers of agents of the different ...
D Abreu,
A Rubinstein - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1988 - JSTOR
We study two person infinitely repeated games in which players seek to minimize the
complexity of their strategies. Players' preferences are assumed to depend both on repeated
game payoffs and the complexity of the strategies they use. The model considered is that ...
The paper addresses a paradoxical game-theoretic example which is closely related to the
coordinated attack problem. Two players have to play one of two possible coordination
games. Only one of them receives information about the coordination game to be played. ...
A Rubinstein - Journal of Economic Theory, 1979 - arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il
There are significant differences between the situation of players undertaking to play a
single game, and players who know that they will play the same game repeatedly in the
future. Strategy in the first case is a single play; in the second, it is a sequence of rules, ...
PC Fishburn… - International Economic Review, 1982 - JSTOR
The aim of this paper is to examine the effect of the time of realization of an outcome on the
relative desirability of the outcome. Thrlee situations illustrate the comparisons involved ill
our study. In each situation, which alternative would you choose'?
A Rubinstein - International Economic Review, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
The article questions the methodology of “economics and psychology” in its focus on the
case of hyperbolic discounting. Using some experimental results, I argue that the same type
of evidence, which rejects the standard constant discount utility functions, can just as ...
Arising out of the author s lifetime fascination with the links between the formal language of
mathematical models and natural language, this short book comprises five essays
investigating both the economics of language and the language of economics. Ariel ...
Abstract It is argued that the Allais paradox reveals a certain property of the decision scheme
we use to determine the preference of one lottery over another. The decision scheme is
based on the use of similarity relations on the probability and prize spaces.
A Rubinstein, ME Yaari - Journal of Economic Theory, 1983 - Elsevier
Abstract An attempt is made to account for the frequently observed phenomenon of
insurance companies offering discounts to clients who possess a favorable record of past
claims. We argue that such discounts provide a mechanism which enables both insurer ...
M Piccione,
A Rubinstein - Games and Economic Behavior, 1997 - Elsevier
We argue that in extensive decision problems (extensive games with a single player)
withimperfectrecall care must be taken in interpreting information sets and strategies.
Alternative interpretations allow for different kinds of analysis. We address the following ...
A Rubinstein, A Wolinsky - The Review of Economic …, 1990 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract For a market with a finite number of agents, pairwise matching and bargaining, it is
shown that, even when the market is frictionless, the equilibrium is not necessarily
competitive. It depends on the amount of information agents use. If their behaviour is ...
Chapter 7 NONCOOPERATIVE MODELS OF BARGAINING KEN BINMORE University of Michigan
and University College London MARTIN J. OSBORNE McMaster University ARIEL
RUBINSTEIN* Tel Aviv University and Princeton University Contents 181 182 184 187 Л ...
A Rubinstein, Z Safra… - Econometrica: Journal of the …, 1992 - JSTOR
The paper reexamines the foundations of the axiomatic Nash bargaining theory. More
specifically it questions the interpretation of the Nash bargaining solution and extends it to a
family of non-expected utility preferences. A bargaining problem is presented as ⟨X,D,≧ ...
MJ Osborne… - American Economic Review, 1998 - JSTOR
We study interactive situations in which players are boundedly rational. Each player, rather
than optimizing given a belief about the other players' behavior, as in the theory of Nash
equilibrium, uses the following choice procedure. She first associates one consequence ...
What on earth are economic theorists like me trying to accomplish? This paper dis- cusses four
dilemmas encountered by an economic theorist: The dilemma of absurd conclusions: Should
we abandon a model if it produces absurd conclusions or should we regard a model as a ...
[CITATION] Equilibrium in supergames
A Rubinstein - Center for Research in Mathematical Economics and …, 1977
Abstract An aggregation procedure merges a list of objects into a representative object. This
paper considers the problem of aggregating n rows in an n-by-m matrix into a summary row,
where every entry is an element in an algebraic field. It focuses on consistent aggregators, ...
The paper springs from a position that economic theory is an abstract investigation of the
concepts and considerations involved in real life economic decision making rather than a
tool for predicting or describing real behavior. It is argued that when experimental ...
G Kalai,
A Rubinstein… - Econometrica, 2002 - Wiley Online Library
Imagine that you receive information on the choices made by a decision maker (DM) from all
subsets of some set X. You know nothing about the context of these choices. You look for an
explanation for the DM's behavior. You would probably look first for a single rationale ...
J Glazer,
A Rubinstein - Games and Economic Behavior, 2001 - Elsevier
We view a debate as a mechanism by which an uninformed decision maker (the listener)
extracts information from two informed debaters, who hold contradicting positions regarding
the right decision. During the debate, the debaters raise arguments and, based on these ...
A Rubinstein, A Wolinsky - The American Economic Review, 1992 - JSTOR
This paper explores how the requirement that the implementation of contracts be
renegotiation-proof affects the set of contracts that can be implemented in a seller--buyer
scenario in which the information regarding the agents' valuations is nonverifiable. This ...
A Rubinstein - The Economic Journal, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
This work would not have been possible without the collaboration of Eli Zvuluny who built
the site which served as the platform for the experiments. I thank Michael Ornstein, my
research assistant for this project. I also thank Gur Huberman–the idea of recording ...
A single seller of an indivisible good operates in a market with many consumers who differ in
their ability to process information. The consumers' constraints are modeled in two
submodels: the first in terms of the limits on the number of sets in the partition of the price ...
J Glazer,
A Rubinstein - Econometrica, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
2. We are grateful to Noga Alon of Tel Aviv University for numerous discussions and
assistance regarding Proposition 2. We also thank the co-editor of this journal, two
anonymous referees, Andrew Caplin, and Bart Lipman for valuable comments.
[CITATION] An optimal conviction policy for offenses that may have been committed by accident
A Rubinstein - Readings in games and information, 2001 - Wiley-Blackwell
P Michele… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1993 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper analyzes a two-player game in which each player has to choose an
automaton (machine) which plays an infinitely repeated extensive game. We assume that
the preferences of the player depend both on repeated game payoffs and the number of ...
A Rubinstein - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1979 - JSTOR
THE PARADOX OF VOTING brought many investigators to the search for sufficient
conditions on the preference relations in a decision system with majority rule which would
ensure the non-emptiness of the core (existence of equilibrium points). But works such as [ ...
A Rubinstein - The Economic Journal, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
I thank two individuals who helped me enormously in conducting this research: Eli Zvuluny
(http://www. possibleworlds. co. il/) who constructed and managed the site which served as
the platform for conducting the survey and Michael Ornstein who assisted me in analysing ...
[CITATION] On the Question” Who is a J?”: A Social Choice Approach
A Rubinstein, A Wolinsky - Journal of Economic Theory, 1990 - Elsevier
Abstract The analysis of the “agreeing to disagree” type results is unified by considering
functions which assign to each set of states of nature the value “True” or “False”. We identify
properties of such functions, being preserved under union, under disjoint union and under ...
A Rubinstein, A Wolinsky - Games and Economic Behavior, 1994 - dklevine.com
Static equilibria can be viewed as steady states of recurring play of a game. Such steady
states in which players do not perfectly observe the actions of others need not be Nash
equilibria. This paper suggests a static solution concept, rationalizable conjectural ...
M Piccione,
A Rubinstein - The Economic Journal, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
In the jungle, power and coercion govern the exchange of resources. We study a simple,
stylised model of the jungle that mirrors an exchange economy. We define the notion of
jungle equilibrium and demonstrate that a number of standard results of competitive ...
As the well-known “Paradox of Voting” indicates, a decision system under majority rule does
not necessarily have an equilibrium; that is, it might be that for every alternative there is a
majority preferring another. Many writers, particularly political scientists, thus inferred the ...
A Rubinstein - Game-theoretic models of bargaining, 1985 - books.google.com
The axiomatic approach to bargaining may be viewed as an attempt to predict the outcome
of a bargaining situation solely on the basis of the set of pairs of utilities that corresponds to
the set of possible agreements and to the nonagreement point.
A Rubinstein - Advances in Economic Theory, T. Bewley (ed …, 1987 - arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il
The purpose of this survey is to review the development of the sequential strategic approach
to the bargaining problem, and to explain why I believe that this theory may provide a
foundation for further developments in other central areas of economic theory, John Nash ...
A Rubinstein - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1996 - JSTOR
The aim of this paper is to explain the fact that certain properties of binary relations are
frequently observed in natural language while others do not appear at all. Three features of
binary relation are studied:(i) the ability to use the relation to indicate nameless elements;( ...
J Glazer,
A Rubinstein - Journal of Economic Theory, 1998 - Elsevier
A number of experts receive noisy signals regarding a desirable public decision. The public
target is to make the best possible decision on the basis of all the information held by the
experts. We compare two “cultures.” In one, all experts are driven only by the public motive ...
S Nitzan… - Public Choice, 1981 - Springer
The prime purpose of this paper is to present a characterization result for the Borda rule
which is very much related to the recent axiomatization of the same rule by Young (1974)
and by Hansson and Sahlquist (1976). We prove that, given a f'mite set of alternatives and ...
JA Ordover… - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1986 - JSTOR
The essence of the situation to be studied here is this: two players are involved in a conflict
that can be resolved in only two possible ways. Each player favors a different outcome.
During the bargaining phase, which lasts until some finite time To, each player has the ...
The paper summarizes my experience in teaching an undergraduate course in game theory
in 1998. Students were required to submit two types of problem sets: preclass problem sets,
which served as experiments, and postclass standard problem sets. The separation ...
A Rubinstein - ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY MONOGRAPHS, 2006 - books.google.com
For me, economics is a collection of ideas and conventions that economists accept and use
to reason with. Namely, it is a culture. Behavioral economics represents a transformation of
that culture. Nonetheless, as pointed out by Camerer and Loewenstein (2003), its ...
A Rubinstein - WORKING PAPER-TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY FOERDER …, 2002 - Citeseer
I heard about Rabin's calibration result from Daniel Kahneman and, like him, I was
impressed. Part of the reason is that it does not rely on experiments. It relies instead on a
mental experiment and rings true without the need to be verified. I rushed to add the ...
M Piccione,
A Rubinstein - Journal of the European economic …, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract We model differences among agents in their ability to recognize temporal patterns
of prices. Using the concept of DeBruijn sequences in two dynamic models of markets, we
demonstrate the existence of equilibria in which prices fluctuate in a pattern that is ...
Abstract The paper questions the methodology of" economics and psychology". It focuses on
the case of hyperbolic discounting. Using some experimental results, I argue that the same
sort of evidence which rejects the standard constant discount utility functions can just as ...
A Rubinstein - The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1995 - JSTOR
During the past two decades non-cooperative game theory has become a central topic in
economic theory. Many scholars have contributed to this revolution, none more than John
Nash. Following the publication of von Neumann and Morgenstern's book, it was Nash's ...
J Glazer,
A Rubinstein - Theoretical Economics, 2006 - econtheory.org
Abstract A speaker wishes to persuade a listener to take a certain action. The conditions
under which the request is justified, from the listener's point of view, depend on the state of
the world, which is known only to the speaker. Each state is characterized by a set of ...
Y Salant… - The Review of Economic …, 2008 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We develop a framework for modelling choice in the presence of framing effects. An
extended choice function assigns a chosen element to every pair (A, f) where A is a set of
alternatives, and f is a frame. A frame includes observable information that is irrelevant in ...
M Piccione,
A Rubinstein - Games and Economic Behavior, 1997 - Elsevier
We classify the responses to our paper “On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect
Recall” and address some of the points raised. ... 4. K. Binmore, A Note on Imperfect Recall.
Understanding Strategic Interaction—Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten, ...
[CITATION] Bargaining and markets
A Rubinstein… - 1990 - Academic Press
A Rubinstein - Economics and Philosophy, 2008 - Cambridge Univ Press
Neuroeconomics is examined critically using data on the response times of subjects who
were asked to express their preferences in the context of the Allais Paradox. Different
patterns of choice are found among the fast and slow responders. This suggests that we ...
[CITATION] Comments on behavioral economics
A Rubinstein - Advances in economic theory (2005 World Congress of …, 2006
A Rubinstein… - Levine's Bibliography, 2007 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks.
(A,f) Choice with Frames. Ariel Rubinstein and Yuval Salant. ...
Abstract. We investigate the behavior of players in a two-person competitive game. One
player" hides" a treasure in one of four locations, and the other player" seeks" the treasure in
one of these locations. The seeker wins if her choice matches the hider's choice; the hider ...
A Rubinstein… - Mathematical Social Sciences, 1999 - Elsevier
In many decision scenarios, one has to choose an element from a set S given some
reference point e. For the case where S is a subset of a Euclidean space, we axiomatize the
choice method that selects the point in S that is closest to e.
In most theorems in Social Choice Theory the multi profile approach is adopted. The social
rule is a function F which is defined for every element in a given set of preference profiles M.
The set M is large enough to give substance to some inter-profile axioms which require ...
A Rubinstein, A Wolinsky - Games and Economic Behavior, 1995 - Elsevier
Let Γ be a game in extensive form and G be its reduced normal form game. Let Γ∞(δ) and
G∞(δ) be the infinitely repeated game versions of Γ and G respectively, with common
discount factor δ. This note points out that the set of SPE payoff vectors of Γ∞(δ) might be ...
Abstract A two period choice problem is presented. An individual has to choose in each
period between legal and illegal activities. Two punishment policies are compared:(1) The
maximal punishment is imposed even for a first offense.(2) A new offender gets a reduced ...
[CITATION] Offenses that May Have Been Committed by Accident—An Optimal Policy of Retribution
A Rubinstein - Applied Game Theory, 1979
The paper deals with multiple decision problems, which are similar to the task of guessing
the color outcomes of five independent spinnings of a roulette wheel, 60% of whose slots
are red and 40% white. Each correct guess yields a prize of $1. The guess of 5 Reds ...
The paper presents an approach to selecting among the many subgame-perfect equilibria
that exist in a standard concession game with complete information. We extend the
description of a game to include a specificirrational'(mixed) strategy for each player. ...
A Rubinstein… - Levine's Bibliography, 2006 - arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il
Page 1. Two Comments on the Principle of Revealed Preference Ariel Rubinstein School of
Economics, Tel Aviv University and Department of Economics, New York University and Yuval
Salant Graduate School of Business, Stanford University Abstract. ...
A Rubinstein… - The Foundations of Positive and …, 2008 - kellogg.northwestern.edu
(1) A collection of objects: The manner in which a decision maker perceives an object does
not have to be objective. For example, one decision maker might think about a red triangle
as a triangle while another might think about it as a red object.(2) Mental preferences: ...
C Fershtman,
A Rubinstein - journal of economic theory, 1997 - Elsevier
The paper presents a simple game-theoretic model in which players decide on search
procedures for a prize located in one of a set of labeled boxes. The prize is awarded to the
player who finds it first. A player can decide on the number of (costly) search units he ...
... Behaviour: An Introduction. Ariel Rubinstein, Suntory-Toyota International Centre for
Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science
London School of Economics and Political Science, 1986.
[CITATION] Bargaining and Markets. 1990
MJ Osborne… - 1990 - Academic Press Inc
This book presents Ariel Rubinstein's lecture notes for the first part of his well-known
graduate course in microeconomics. Developed during the fifteen years that Rubinstein
taught the course at Tel Aviv University, Princeton University, and New York University, ...
A Rubinstein - FEEM Working Paper No. 36.2006, 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Lecture audiences and students were asked to respond to virtual decision and
game situations at gametheory. tau. ac. il. Several thousand observations were collected
and the response time for each answer was recorded. There were significant differences ...
MJ Osborne… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2003 - Elsevier
We suggest an equilibrium concept for a strategic model with a large number of players in
which each player observes the actions of only a small number of the other players. The
concept fits well situations in which each player treats his sample as a prediction of the ...
A Rubinstein… - The Review of Economic …, 2012 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract An individual displays various preference orderings in different payoff-irrelevant
circumstances. It is assumed that the variation in the observed preference orderings is the
outcome of some cognitive process that distorts the underlying preferences of the ...
[CITATION] VA course in Game Theory
MJ Osborne… - V MIT press, ISBN 0, 1994
A Rubinstein, KG Binmore, MJ Osborne, U Broll… - 1990 - arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il
Resumen Este trabajo presenta varios modelos que destacan el contraste entre las teorías
de la decisión y de los juegos, por una parte, y la intuición y los datos empíricos y
experimentales, por otra. Estos ejemplos estimulan la adopción del punto de vista de la ...
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks. On the
Interpretation of two Theoretical Models of Bargaining. Ariel Rubinstein (). ...
Abstract The hypothesis of this research project is that actions which are instinctive and
derived from emotional responses should require less response time than actions which
require the use of cognitive power. Thousands of data observations were collected from ...
A Rubinstein… - Journal of the European Economic …, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract Agents who employ non-rational choice procedures are often vulnerable to
exploitation, in the sense that a profit-seeking trader can offer them a harmful transaction
which they will nevertheless accept. We examine the vulnerability of a procedure for ...
JA Ordover… - Working Papers, 1983 - ideas.repec.org
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Abstract This paper studies a decision maker who for each choice set selects a subset of (at
most) two alternatives. We axiomatize three types of procedures:(i) The top two: the decision
maker has in mind an ordering and chooses the two maximal alternatives.(ii) The two ...
A Rubinstein - J.-J. Laffont (ed.)," Advances in Economic Theory. …, 1995 - books.google.com
" The Theory of Repeated Games" has already been surveyed at a previous Econometric
Society World Congress. Mertens and Aumman spoke on repeated games in 1980 in Aix-en-
Provence (see Mertens, 1982). Drew and David's presentations contain far more ...
[CITATION] Bargaining and Markets
MJ Osbome, A Rubinstein - 1990 - Academic Press Inc., San Diego
Abstract The paper presents a notion of rationalizing choice functions that violate the
independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom. We argue that a choice function is
rationalized by a partition of the collection of all choice sets if the choices from all sets in ...
[CITATION] Models of bounded rationality
A Rubinstein - 1998 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
Most legal systems rely heavily on the notion of the reasonable man. Here an attempt is
made to analyze the reasonable man in a social choice model. The main argument is that if
the reasonable man satisfies a certain set of axioms, he essentially coincides with one of ...
[CITATION] Bargaining and markets
O Martin… - 1990 - Academic Press, San Diego, CA
[CITATION] (A, f): Choice with Frames,” Review of Economic Studies, fortcoming
[CITATION] Modeling bounded rationality,(1998)
A Rubinstein - MIT Press
A Arad… - Eitan Fiberglas School of Economics, …, 2010 - pubmail.dklevine.com
Abstract We study experimentally a two-player game which we find ideal for investigating k-
level reasoning. Each player requests an amount of money between 11 and 20 shekels. He
receives the amount that he requests and if he requests exactly one shekel less than the ...
Abstract: We asked subjects to self-select into one of two contests," coin" or" die." The winner
in each of the contests is the person with most correct guesses of 20 coin flips or 20 rolls of a
die, respectively. Most subjects reported that they believed that most people would go to ...
J Glazer,
A Rubinstein - journal of economic theory, 1996 - arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il
Game theory usually interprets a game form as a representation of the physical rules which
govern a strategic interaction. However, one can view a game form more abstractly as a
description of a systematic relationship between players' preferences and the outcome of ...
[CITATION] Modeling bounded rationality
R Ariel - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press
M Piccione,
A Rubinstein… - Journal of economic …, 2004 - econ.tau.ac.il
In strategic situations, being wealthy and powerful is considered to be advan- tageous.
However, imagine a world where being powerful means being able to seize control of the assets
held and accumulated by others. Then, being wealthy might attract the attention of those ...
H Baumol, W Baumol… - Working Papers, 1990 - econpapers.repec.org
By H. Baumol, William Baumol and Ariel Rubinstein; ON THE ECONOMICS OF THE
PERFORMING ARTS IN THE USSR AND THE USA: A PRELIMINARY COMPARISON
OF THE DATA. ... H. Baumol, William Baumol () and Ariel Rubinstein. ...
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