 | Professor of Economics, New York University Verified email at nyu.edu Cited by 2503 |
A Bisin… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2001 - Elsevier
This paper studies the population dynamics of preference traits in a model of
intergenerational cultural transmission. Parents socialize and transmit their preferences to
their offspring, motivated by a form of paternalistic altruism (“imperfect empathy”). In such a ...
A Bisin… - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2000 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract This paper presents an economic analysis of the intergenerational transmission of
ethnic and religious traits through family socialization and marital segregation decisions.
Frequency of intragroup marriage (homogamy), as well as socialization rates of religious ...
J Benhabib… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2005 - Elsevier
We provide a new model of consumption–saving decisions which explicitly allows for
internal commitment mechanisms and self-control. Agents have the ability to invoke either
automatic processes that are susceptible to the temptation of 'over-consuming,'or ...
This paper presents an empirical analysis of a choice-theoretic model of cultural
transmission. In particular, we use data from the General Social Survey to estimate the
structural parameters of a model of marriage and child socialization along religious lines ...
A Bisin… - RAND Journal of Economics, 2004 - JSTOR
We study equilibria for economies with hidden action in environments in which the agents'
contractual relationships with competing financial intermediaries cannot be monitored (or
are not contractible upon). We fully characterize equilibrium allocations and contracts for ...
A Bisin… - Journal of Public Economics, 1998 - Elsevier
We study the formation of preferences forsocial status' as the result of intergenerational
transmission of cultural traits. We characterize the behavior of parents with preferences for
status in terms of socialization of their children to this particular cultural trait. We show that ...
A Bisin… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1999 - Elsevier
This paper studies competitive equilibria in economies where agents trade in markets for
standardized, non-exclusive financial contracts, under conditions of asymmetric information
(both of the moral hazard and the adverse selection type). The problems for the existence ...
A Bisin… - Journal of political Economy, 2006 - JSTOR
Do Walrasian markets function orderly in the presence of adverse selection? In particular, is
their outcome efficient when exclusive contracts are enforceable? This paper addresses
these questions in the context of a Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance economy. We identify an ...
J Benhabib,
A Bisin… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2010 - Elsevier
In this paper we elicit preferences for money–time pairs via experimental techniques. We
estimate a general specification of discounting that nests exponential and hyperbolic
discounting, as well as various forms of present bias, including quasi-hyperbolic ...
A Bisin… - European Journal of Political Economy, 2000 - Elsevier
In this paper, we present a model of cultural transmission of preferences on goods, some of
which are provided publicly through simple majority voting. We emphasize the existence of a
two-way causality between socialization decisions and political outcomes. This generates ...
A Bisin… - Economic Theory, 2006 - Springer
Summary. The paper studies the institution of bankruptcy when exclusive contracts cannot
be enforced ex ante, eg, a bank cannot monitor whether the borrower enters into contracts
with other creditors. The institution of bankruptcy enables the bank to enforce its claim to ...
A Bisin,
G Topa… - Rationality and Society, 2004 - rss.sagepub.com
Abstract In this paper, we study an endogenous cultural selection mechanism for
cooperative behavior in a setting where agents are randomly matched in a one-shot
interaction Prisoner's Dilemma, and may or may not have complete information about their ...
A Bisin, P Gottardi… - Journal of the European …, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract Incentive compensation induces correlation between the portfolio of managers and
the cash flow of the firms they manage. This correlation exposes managers to risk and hence
gives them an incentive to hedge against the poor performance of their firms. We study the ...
A Bisin… - The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2005 - nyu.edu
Abstract The economic literature analyzes cultural transmission as the result of interactions
between purposeful socialization decisions inside the family ('direct vertical socialization')
and indirect socialization processes like social imitation and learning ('oblique and ...
A Bisin… - Journal of public Economics, 2006 - Elsevier
We study the role of anonymous markets in which trades cannot be monitored by the
government. We adopt a Mirrlees approach to analyze economies in which agents have
private information and a benevolent government controls optimal redistributive tax policy. ...
A Bisin, U Horst… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2006 - Elsevier
We consider general economies in which rational agents interact locally. The local aspect of
the interactions is designed to represent in a simple abstract way social interactions, that is,
socioeconomic environments in which markets do not mediate all of agents' choices, ...
VV Acharya… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
Suppose risk-averse managers can hedge the aggregate component of their exposure to
firm's cash-flow risk by trading in financial markets but cannot hedge their firm-specific
exposure. This gives them incentives to pass up firm-specific projects in favor of standard ...
Abstract This paper is about ethnic identity. We first develop a model of identity formation
resulting from the interaction of cultural transmission and socialization inside the family, peer
effects and social interactions, and identity choice. We then put the model to data using ...
A Bisin - Journal of Economic Theory, 1998 - Elsevier
The present paper studies a class of general equilibrium economies with imperfectly
competitive financial intermediaries and price-taking consumers. Intermediaries optimally
choose the securities they issue and the bid–ask spread they charge. Financial ...
Abstract Using the UK Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities, we document differences
in integration patterns between Muslims and non-Muslims. We find that Muslims integrate
less and more slowly than non-Muslims. In terms of estimated probability of having a ...
Cultural transmission arguably plays an important role in the determination of many
fundamental preference traits (eg, discounting, risk aversion and altruism) and most cultural
traits, social norms, and ideological tenets (eg, attitudes towards family and fertility ...
A Bisin, J Geanakoplos, P Gottardi, E Minelli… - Journal of Mathematical …, 2001 - unibs.it
Abstract Economies with asymmetric information are encompassed by an extension of the
model of general competitive equilibrium that does not require an explicit modeling of
private information. Sellers have discretion over deliveries on contracts; this is in common ...
J Benhabib… - New York University, Working Paper, 2006 - nber.org
Abstract We study the dynamics of the distribution of wealth in an Overlapping Generation
economy with bequest and various forms of redistributive taxation. We characterize the
transitional dynamics of the wealth distribution as well as the stationary distribution. We ...
A Bisin… - Journal of the European Economic …, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract This paper reviews several issues concerning an empirical analysis of the
endogenous formation of preferences, as well as cognitive and psychological traits. In
particular we show by means of examples how, with existing data, it is possible to identify ...
J Benhabib… - manuscript, Department of …, 2002 - polarizationandconflict.org
Western societies have developed into a historically new stage in the evolution of capitalism,
one which is characterized by corporations exercising monopolistic power and sustaining
demand by advertising through the media. While this theme has been emphasized eg, by ...
A Bisin… - Unpublished Manuscript, New York University, 2004 - nyu.edu
Redistributive policies vary a great deal across countries. In particular European
governments redistribute income by means of progressive fiscal policies, labor market and
general social policies much more than the US government. For instance, transfers and ...
J Benhabib,
A Bisin… - Econometrica, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
We study the dynamics of the distribution of wealth in an overlapping generation economy
with finitely lived agents and intergenerational transmission of wealth. Financial markets are
incomplete, exposing agents to both labor and capital income risk. We show that the ...
A Bisin… - Economics Letters, 2001 - Elsevier
Cultural transmission mechanisms which favor the direct transmission of the parents' traits to
their children may be adaptive to natural selection when opposed to mechanisms in which
the parents choose for the offspring the highest fitness at any time.
V Acharya… - New York University, Working Paper, 2009 - pages.stern.nyu.edu
Abstract The opacity of over-the-counter (OTC) markets–in which a large number of financial
products including credit derivatives trade–appears to have played a central role in the
ongoing financial crisis. We model such OTC markets for risk-sharing in a general ...
We propose a theoretical framework to study the determinants of ethnic and religious identity
along two distinct motivational processes which have been proposed in the social sciences:
cultural conformity and cultural distinction. Under cultural conformity, ethnic identity is ...
J Benhabib… - New York University, 2002 - istituti.unicatt.it
Abstract We study consumption/saving decisions in an environment in which agents face a
conflict between present and future utility which may require self-control for its resolution. We
derive behavioral foundations for our analysis of self-control from the cognitive sciences, ...
We model the opacity of over-the-counter (OTC) markets in a setup where agents share
risks, but have incentives to default and their financial positions are not mutually observable.
We show that this setup results in excess" leverage" in that parties take on short OTC ...
A Bisin,
G Topa… - Journal of Political Economy, 2004 - econ.nyu.edu
Abstract This paper presents an empirical analysis of the intergenerational transmission of
religious traits through family socialization and marital segregation decisions. We estimate
an economic model of marriage and socialization using intragroup and intergroup ...
Incentive compensation exposes managers to the risk of their firms. Managers can hedge
their aggregate risk exposure by trading in financial markets, but cannot hedge their
firmspecific exposure. This gives them an incentive to pass up firm-specific projects in ...
A Bisin… - Working Papers, 1997 - ideas.repec.org
This paper studies competitive equilibria in economies characterized by the presence of
asymmetric information (both of the moral hazard and the adverse selection type). We
consider economies where non-exclusive contracts (securities) with payoffs dependent on ...
A Bisin, P Gottardi… - 1999 - econ.as.nyu.edu
Abstract This paper studies competitive equilibria in economies characterized by the
presence of asymmetric information, where non. exclusive contracts with payoffs dependent
on the agents/private information are traded on compet. itive markets. For such economies ...
We study a general class of models with social interactions that might display multiple
equilibria. We propose an estimation procedure for these models and evaluate its efficiency
and computational feasibility relative to different approaches taken to the curse of ...
J Benhabib,
A Bisin… - New York University …, 2004 - emlab.berkeley.edu
Abstract In this paper we elicit preferences for discounting via experimental techniques. We
then estimate a general specification of discounting that nests exponential and hyperbolic
discounting, as well as various forms of present bias, including quasi% hyperbolic ...
J Benhabib, MO Jackson… - 2010 - books.google.com
How do economists understand and measure normal social phenomena? Identifying
economic strains in activities such as learning, group formation, discrimination, and peer
dynamics requires sophisticated data and tools as well as a grasp of prior scholarship. In ...
Abstract We consider a generic environment with (potentially) multiple equilibria and
analyze conditions that allow for the estimation of both the structural parameters and the
“selected equilibrium”. We focus on a “easy to compute” consistent 2-step estimator and ...
Abstract: Using the UK Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities, we explore the
determinants of religious identity for Muslims and non-Muslims. We find that Muslims
integrate less and more slowly than non-Muslims. A Muslim born in the UK and having ...
VV Acharya… - The Journal of Business, 2005 - JSTOR
We study 2-period pure-exchange Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) economies with
incomplete financial markets and restricted participation. We characterize the optimal
financial-market structure and efficient innovations consisting of both the introduction of ...
[CITATION] Y. Zenou (2008), rAre Muslims Immigrants Different in terms of Cultural Integration? s
A Bisin,
E Patacchini… - Journal of the European Economic Association, …
J Benhabib… - Perspectives on the future of economics: …, 2008 - econ.nyu.edu
Abstract Are models and data on choice processes useful as a complement to revealed
preferences in decision theory? We answer this methodological question in the affirmative.
We also argue, however, that progress in neuroeconomics is likely to require relying more ...
We study the relationship between ethnic identity and labour market outcomes of non-EU
immigrants in Europe. Using the European Social Survey, we find that there is a penalty to
be paid for immigrants with a strong identity. Being a first generation immigrant leads to a ...
A Bisin,
G Topa… - International Journal of Economic …, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
Bisin, A., Topa, G. and Verdier, T.(2009), Cultural transmission, socialization and the
population dynamics of multiple-trait distributions. International Journal of Economic Theory,
5: 139–154. doi: 10.1111/j. 1742-7363.2008. 00098. x
Abstract This paper presents an empirical analysis of a choiceMtheoretic model of cultural
transmission. In particular, we use data from the General Social Survey to estimate the
structural parameters of a model of marriage and children socialization along religious ...
A Bisin, P Gottardi… - 2010 - cadmus.eui.eu
We study a general equilibrium model with production where financial markets are
incomplete. At a competitive equilibrium firms take their production and financial decisions
so as to maximize their value. We show that shareholders unanimously sup-port value ...
A Bisin… - 2009 - mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
In this paper we model a decision maker who must exert costly effort to complete a single
task by a fixed deadline. Effort costs evolve stochastically in continuous time. The decision
maker will then optimally wait to exert effort until costs are less than a given threshold, the ...
Abstract: We develop a dynamic model of identity formation that explains why ethnic
minorities may choose to adopt oppositional identities (ie some individuals may reject or not
the dominant culture) and why this behavior may persist over time. We first show that the ...
A Bisin… - Econometric Society World Congress …, 2000 - econometricsociety.org
Abstract We study competitive economies with adverse selection and fully exclusive
contractual relationships. We consider economies where agents are privately informed over
the probability distribution of their endowments, and trade to insure against this ...
[CITATION] General equilibrium economies with imperfectly competitive financial intermediaries
A Bisin - 1994 - University of Chicago, Department of …
A Bisin, P Gottardi… - 1999 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We examine the conditions under which competitive equilibria can be obtained as
the limit, when the number of strategic traders gets large, of Nash equilibria in economies
with asymmetric information on agents' effort and possibly imperfect observability of ...
Risk-averse managers can hedge the aggregate component of their exposure to firm's cash
flow risk by trading in financial markets, but cannot hedge their firm-specific exposure. This
gives them incentives to pass up firm-specific projects in favor of standard projects that ...
A Bisin, D Guaitoli - 2002 - digital.csic.es
The concept of social capital has been introduced in recent sociological and empirical
economic literature as referring to connections among individuals, social networks and the
norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them. Or, in other words, civic ...
A Bisin, JD Geanakoplos, P Gottardi… - Journal of Mathematical …, 2011 - Elsevier
ABSTRACT: Economies with asymmetric information are encompassed by an extension of
the model of general competitive equilibrium that does not require an explicit modeling of
private information. Sellers have discretion over deliveries on contracts; this is in common ...
A Bisin… - Annales d'économie et de statistique, 2001 - JSTOR
This paper analyzes the dynamics of the distribution of a population of some of the cultural
traits and norms which might be associated to the support for Welfare State as a system for
the provision of public goods and as a redistributive mechanism. Cultural traits and norms ...
A Bisin… - Review of Economic Dynamics, 2003 - Elsevier
This paper studies competitive equilibria in economies characterized by the presence of
asymmetric information, where non-exclusive contracts are traded in competitive markets
and agents may be privately informed over contracts' payoffs. For such economies ...
A Bisin - DELTA Working Papers, 1994 - ideas.repec.org
No abstract is available for this item. ... To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three options: 1. Check below under "Related
research" whether another version of this item is available online. 2. Check on the ...
A Bisin… - 2008 - personeel.unimaas.nl
Abstract In this paper we model a decision maker who must exert costly effort to complete a
single task by a fixed deadline. Effort costs evolve stochastically in continuous time. The
decision maker optimally waits to exert effort until costs are less than a given threshold, ...
A Bisin… - Working Papers, 1998 - econpapers.repec.org
By Alberto Bisin and Thierry A. Verdier; Cultural Transmission, Marriage
and the Evolution of Ethnic and Religious Traits.
Abstract: We study two-period pure-exchange Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
economies with a given degree of incompleteness of financial markets and given degrees of
restricted participation of agents in the markets.
J Benhabib… - 2002 - econ.nyu.edu
Abstract We study consumption/saving decisions in an environment in which agents face a
conflict between present and future utility which may require self-control for its resolution. We
derive behavioral foundations for our analysis of self-control from the cognitive sciences, ...
Abstract This paper studies the population dynamics of preference traits in a model of
intergenerational cultural transmission. Parents socialize and transmit their preferences to
their offspring with endogenous intensities. Populations concentrated on a single cultural ...
[CITATION] OnurOzgur et al.(2004),“Rational Expectations Equilibria of Economies with Local Interactions,”
A Bisin… - Journal of Economic Theory
[CITATION] Exclusive Contracts and the Institution of Bankruptcy New York University Department of Finance Working Paper No. 270
A Bisin… - 2000
Abstract: A Capital Asset Pricing Model of a stock market economy is examined under
different corporate governance structures in which the objectives of managers and
entrepreneurs in choosing the risk composition of their firms' returns are not aligned with ...
[CITATION] Verdier Thierry and Zenou Yves: August 2007.“Are Muslim Immigrants Different in Terms of Cultural Integration?”
A Bisin… - IZA Discussion Paper No
A Bisin… - Unpublished manuscript, Northwestern University …, 2004 - nyu.edu
Abstract Is there a role for anonymous markets in which trades cannot be monitored by the
government? We study an economy in which agents have private information and a
benevolent government controls redistributive tax policy. While unrestricted access to ...
[CITATION] The Economics of Cultural Transmission and Socialization. Handbook of Social Economics, Jess Benhabib, Alberto Bisin, Matt Jackson, eds
A Bisin… - 2010 - North-Holland
[CITATION] At the Roots of Indeterminacy
A Bisin - STUDIES IN RISK AND …, 1997 - KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS
O OZGUR… - 2011 - papyrus.bib.umontreal.ca
Social interactions arguably provide a rationale for several important phenomena, from
smoking and other risky behavior in teens to eg, peer effects in school performance. We
study social interactions in dynamic economies. For these economies, we provide ...
Abstract Social interactions are interactions not fully mediated through markets, in which an
agent's preferences depend on other agents' actions. We are particularly interested in social
and economic phenomena in which agents prefer to conform their actions to the actions of ...
A Bisin… - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, …, 2010 - econ.nyu.edu
ABSTRACT We study a class of moral hazard economies in which a principal interacts with
several agents. In these economies first best allocations can be implemented via full in $
formation extraction when side $ trades between agents can be restricted. When instead ...
M Agranov,
A Bisin… - Available from author, 2010 - cess.nyu.edu
Abstract This paper investigates the impact of the competition for funds in capital markets on
the risk taking behavior of fund managers. In doing this we find what we call an lOther
Peopleks Moneymeffect, or a tendency of people to invest the funds of others in riskier ...
Abstract Using data from the European Social Survey on most EU countries, we look at the
relationship between ethnic identity, segregation and employment prospects, as well as at
the individual characteristics associated with a strong ethnic identity. Different measures of ...
Abstract: We study the role of anonymous markets in which trades cannot be monitored by
the government. We adopt a Mirrlees approach to analyze economies in which agents have
private information and a benevolent government controls optimal redistributive tax policy. ...
J Benhabib,
A Bisin… - portal.hss.ntu.edu.sg
Abstract We study the dynamics of the distribution of wealth in an economy with in% finitely
lived agents, inter% generational transmission of wealth, and redistributive fiscal policy. We
show that investment luck and uncertain lifetime can generate a double Pareto wealth ...
A Bisin, U Horst… - 2002 - econ.kuleuven.be
Abstract We consider general economies in which rational agents interact locally. The local
aspect of the interactions is designed to capture in a simple abstract way social interactions,
that is, socio-economic environments in which markets do not mediate all of agents' ...
Abstract We study competitive economies with adverse selection and fully exclusive
contractual relationships. We show that Walrasian equilibria always exist and are efficient for
the general class of adverse selection insurance economies considered by Prescott and ...
ABSTRACT We study a class of moral hazard economies in which a principal interacts with
several agents. In these economies first best allocations can be implemented via full
information extraction when contracts are exclusive, that is when side-trades between ...
We study two-period pure-exchange Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) economies, for
given degrees of incompleteness of financial markets and given degrees of restricted
participation of agents in the markets. We characterize the optimal financial market ...
M Agranov,
A Bisin… - 2011 - nyu.edu
Abstract In this paper we experimentally investigate the impact that competing for funds has
on the risk $ taking behavior of laboratory hedge fund managers. We construct a simple
laboratory market for capital among hedge funds where each fund offers a contract that ...
Using data from the European Social Survey on most European countries, we look at the
relationship between ethnic identity and employment prospects for immigrants from non-
European countries. We find that a strong attachment to religion is associated with a lower ...
AB NYU, AL NYU… - 2011 - bu.edu
Abstract Behavioral economics presents a mpaternalisticnrationale for government
interven& tion. Current literature focuses on benevolent government. This paper introduces
politicians who may indulge/exploit these behavioral biases. We present an analysis of ...
Y Algan,
A Bisin, A Manning… - 2012 - econpapers.repec.org
The concepts of cultural diversity and cultural identity are at the forefront of the political
debate in many western societies. In Europe, the discussion is stimulated by the political
pressures associated with immigration flows, which are increasing in many European ...
A Bisin - 2005 - econ.nyu.edu
The aim of these lecture notes is to provide an introduction to Asset pricing and Corporate finance
in the context of general equilibrium models. While not standard, this approach is consistent
and related to the practice of macro% economics and it has the advantage of facilitating a ...
Abstract We study competitive economies with adverse selection and fully exclusive
contractual relationships. We show that Walrasian equilibria always exist and are efficient for
the general class of adverse selection insurance economies considered by Prescott and ...
AB NYU, AL NYU… - 2010 - economics.uchicago.edu
Abstract. Behavioral economics presents a ppaternalisticqrationale for government inter&
vention. Current literature focuses on benevolent government. This paper introduces
politicians who may indulge/exploit these behavioral biases. We present an analysis of ...
A Bisin, D Acemoglu, PC Ramada - 1997 - 18.7.29.232
The first essay shows how strategic behavior on the part of agents that possess privileged
information results in existence of equilibria with non fully revealing prices. Furthermore,
such equilibria are found to exist in a set of parameters that is open in the parameter ...
IJ Benhabib, MO Jackson, A Bisin - Sage, 2011 - johnson.cornell.edu
Research: [See my website for an updated list of papers and access to pdf files.]
Publications/Forthcoming: “What Do You Think Would Make You Happier? What Do You Think
You Would Choose?” (2011, with Daniel J. Benjamin, Miles S. Kimball, and Alex Rees- ...
A Bisin… - 2006 Meeting Papers, 2006 - ideas.repec.org
This paper provides a theory of government intervention, such as government ownership,
regulation, mandatory public schooling, subsidies, and industrial policy, as an optimal policy
response due to the inability to commit not to expropriate private investment or bail agents ...
We propose a theoretical framework to study the determinants of ethnic and religious identity
along two distinct motivational processes which have been proposed in the social sciences:
cultural conformity and cultural distinction. Under cultural conformity, ethnic identity is ...
A Bisin - dimension, 2009 - nyu.edu
Proof. The theorem is a deep mathematical result whose proof is clearly beyond the scope of
this class. Let it suffi ce to say that the proof relies crucially on the boundary property of
excess demand. Adventurous reader might want to look at Mas Colell (1985), section 5, 6, ...
Abstract: We first develop a model of identity formation resulting from the interaction of
cultural transmission and socialization inside the family, peer effects and social interactions,
and identity choice. We then put the model to data using the UK Fourth National Survey of ...
We develop a dynamic model of identity formation that explains why ethnic minorities may
choose to adopt oppositional identities (ie some individuals may reject or not the dominant
culture) and why this behavior may persist over time. We first show that the prevalence of ...
AB Nyu - nyu.edu
Letes examine the asset pricing equation (2). If there is no uncertainty, that is if the agent is
able to perfectly insure, so that ct (ct"#, or if he is risk neutral, so that u'c! is a constant, qj t
(ßEtxj t"# and the price of asset j is the net present value of its expected payoff at t" $ ...
Using the UK Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities, we explore the determinants of
religious identity for Muslims and non-Muslims. We find that Muslims integrate less and more
slowly than non-Muslims. A Muslim born in the UK and having spent there more than 50 ...
J Benhabib… - 2010 - econ.nyu.edu
Abstract We examine, with the tools of economics, a fundamental tenet of some of the most
recent theoretical work in sociology, which we refer to as the Postmodernist Critique:
preferences are socially constructed, firms exploit their monopoly power through ...
Abstract We study competitive economies with adverse selection and fully exclusive con0
tractual relationships. We model exclusivity by restricting the agents' consump0 tion
possibility set to the set of incentive compatible bundles. In this set0up, we characterize ...
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