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Repeated signaling games

[PDF] from berkeley.edu
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A Kaya - Games and Economic Behavior, 2009 - Elsevier
... The informed player plays against a series of uninformed * Address for correspondence:
University of Iowa, Department of Economics, John Pappajohn Business Building, Iowa
City, IA, United States. E-mail address: ayca-kaya@uiowa.edu. ...
Cited by 27 - Related articles - Library Search - All 19 versions

[CITATION] Two-sided matching with private information

A Kaya - 2008 - mimeo
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WHEN DOES IT PAY TO GET INFORMED?*

Full text - MIT Libraries
A Kaya - International Economic Review, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
... All remaining errors are mine. Please address correspondence to: Ayça Kaya,
Department of Economics, University of Iowa, W378 Pappajohn Business Building,
Iowa City, IA 52242. E-mail: ayca-kaya@uiowa.edu. Publication History. ...
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[PDF] Moral hazard and sorting in a market for partnerships

[PDF] from raspopov.net
A Kaya… - 2009 - raspopov.net
... guishing feature of a partnership is that the owners who hold the rights to the commonly
∗Contact: ayca-kaya@uiowa.edu †Contact: galinav@asu.edu 1These findings are consistent
across three different datasets: the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dy- ...
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A Characterization of Solution Concepts That Only Implement Monotonic Social Choice Rules

A Kaya… - Bilkent University, Department of …, 1999 - atlas-conferences.com
Solution concepts which implement only monotonic social choice rules are characterized in
terms of a new notion of monotonicity pertaining to solution concepts. For any given class G
of mechanisms, it turns out that a solution concept S implements only monotonic social ...
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[PDF] Moral hazard and equilibrium matchings in a market for partnerships

[PDF] from ku.edu.tr
A Kaya… - 2009 - network.ku.edu.tr
Page 1. Moral Hazard and Equilibrium Matchings in a Market for Partnerships∗ Ayça Kaya Galina
Vereshchagina University of Iowa Arizona State University Abstract This paper embeds a repeated
partnership game with imperfect monitoring into a matching environment. ...
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[PDF] Price and Advertising Signals of Quality: A Dynamic Approach

[PDF] from au.dk
A Kaya - econ.au.dk
... Preliminary and incomplete. Comments are appreciated. †University of Iowa, Department of
Economics, Iowa City, IA 52242; ayca-kaya@uiowa.edu 1 ... International Journal of Industrial
Organization, 21(3):317–345, 2003. [6] Ayca Kaya. Repeated signaling games. 2004. ...
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[CITATION] Characterization of Solution Concepts that Implement only Monotonic Social Choice Rules

A Kaya… - 1999 - Mimeo: Bilkent University, Ankara
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[PDF] Submission Number: ASSET2009-09-00162

[PDF] from boun.edu.tr
A Kaya… - econ.boun.edu.tr
Abstract This paper embeds a repeated partnership game with imperfect monitoring into a
matching environment. We show that even though the underlying technology of production
exhibits no complementarities with respect to types of the partners, the presence of ...
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[CITATION] A Characterization of Oligarchic Social Choice Rules

A Kaya - 2000
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[PDF] Efficiency of Matching with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information

[PDF] from bilkent.edu.tr
A Kaya - bilkent.edu.tr
... market environment, has a bearing on efficiency when there is heterogeneity ∗Preliminary
and incomplete. Comments are appreciated †Department of Economics, The University
of Iowa, Iowa City IA 52242; ayca- kaya@uiowa.edu 1 Page 2. ...
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[PDF] Endogenous matching predictions in a repeated partnership model with imperfect monitoring

[PDF] from webmeets.com
A Kaya… - webmeets.com
Page 1. Endogenous matching predictions in a repeated partnership model with
imperfect monitoring∗ Ayça Kaya Galina Vereshchagina University of Iowa Arizona
State University Abstract This paper embeds a repeated partnership ...
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[CITATION] Essays on games with asymmetric information

A Kaya - 2005 - en.scientificcommons.org
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