D Gale… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2003 - Elsevier
We extend the standard model of social learning in two ways. First, we introduce a social
network and assume that agents can only observe the actions of agents to whom they are
connected by this network. Secondly, we allow agents to choose a different action at each ...
S Kariv - The American Economic Review, 2004 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: This paper reports an experimental test of how individuals learn from the behavior
of others. By using techniques only available in the laboratory, we elicit subjects' beliefs.
This allows us to distinguish informational cascades from herd behavior. By adding a ...
R Fisman, S Kariv… - Yale Law & Economics …, 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Economic thought has in recent years increasingly departed from the paradigm of
narrow self-interestedness to take up other-regarding preferences. We study one class of
such preferences-individual preferences for giving.
B Çelen… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2004 - Elsevier
We explore Bayes-rational sequential decision making in a game with pure information
externalities, where each decision maker observes only her predecessor's binary action.
Under perfect information the martingale property of the stochastic learning process is ...
S Choi, R Fisman, D Gale… - The American economic …, 2007 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: By using graphical representations of simple portfolio choice problems, we
generate a very rich dataset to study behavior under uncertainty at the level of the individual
subject. We test the data for consistency with the maximization hypothesis, and we ...
D Ahn, S Choi, D Gale… - 2007 - eprints.ucl.ac.uk
We report a laboratory experiment that enables us to estimate four prominent models of
ambiguity aversion—Subjective Expected Utility (SEU), Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU),
Recursive Expected Utility (REU), and α-Maxmin Expected Utility (α-MEU)—at the level of ...
B Çelen… - Economic Theory, 2005 - Springer
Summary. Nearly all observational learning models assume that individuals can observe all
the decisions that have previously been made. In reality, such perfect information is rarely
available. To explore the difference between observational learning under perfect and ...
S Choi, D Gale… - Advances in Applied …, 2005 - emeraldinsight.com
ABSTRACT Networks are natural tools for understanding social and economic phenomena.
For example, all markets are characterized by agents connected by complex, multilateral
information networks, and the network structure influences economic outcomes. In an ...
DM Gale… - The American economic review, 2007 - JSTOR
Networks are natural tools for understanding complex social and economic phenomena.
Examples include technology diffusion, neighborhood effects, financial crises and
contagion, social learning, and globalization. The surveys by Sanjeev Goyal (2005) and ...
B Çelen, S Kariv… - Levine's Bibliography, 2006 - celen.us
ABSTRACT Social learning is the process of individuals learning by observing the actions of
others. In the real world, however, although people learn by observing the actions of others,
they also learn from advice. This paper introduces advice giving into a standard social- ...
S Kariv - 2005 - emlab.berkeley.edu
Abstract This paper combines behavioral economics and social learning. Overconfident
agents overweigh their private information relative to the public information revealed by the
decisions of others. Therefore, when following a herd, they broadcast more of the ...
S Choi, R Fisman, DM Gale… - The American economic review, 2007 - JSTOR
Because uncertainty is endemic in a wide variety of economic circumstances, models of
decision making under uncertainty play a key role in every field of economics. The standard
model of decisions under uncertainty is based on von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected ...
S Choi, D Gale… - WP, May, 2009 - homepages.ucl.ac.uk
Abstract Individuals living in society are bound together by a social network and, in many
social and economic situations, individuals learn by observing the behavior of others in their
local environment. This process is called social learning. Learning in incomplete networks ...
S Choi, D Gale… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2008 - Elsevier
A monotone game is an extensive-form game with complete information, simultaneous
moves and an irreversibility structure on strategies. It captures a variety of situations in which
players make partial commitments and allows us to characterize conditions under which ...
S Choi, D Gale, S Kariv… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2011 - Elsevier
This paper reports the results of an experimental investigation of dynamic games in
networks. In each period, the subjects simultaneously choose whether or not to make an
irreversible contribution to the provision of an indivisible public good. Subjects observe ...
B Çelen, S Kariv… - Mimeo Center for Experimental …, 2003 - elsa.berkeley.edu
Abstract This paper studies how individuals learn by observing the behavior of predecessors
as well as from their advice. What we find is a truly puzzling result that we call the advice
paradox. This paradox can be stated as follows: subjects in a laboratory social learning ...
R Fisman, S Kariv… - Unpublished paper, 2009 - stanford.edu
Abstract We study the impact of exposure to ideology on distributional preferences in the
context of modified Dictator Games that vary the price of giving. We exploiting a natural
experiment in education—random assignment to first-term instructors at the Yale Law ...
R Fisman, S Kariv… - … Paper No. 314, Yale Law School …, 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We report a laboratory experiment that enables us to distinguish preferences for
altruism (concerning tradeoffs between own payoffs and the payoffs of others) from social
preferences (concerning tradeoffs between the payoffs of others). By using graphical ...
DM Gale… - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2009 - JSTOR
This paper reports an experimental study of trading networks. Networks are incomplete in
the sense that each trader can only exchange assets with a limited number of other traders.
The greater the incompleteness of the network, the more intermediation is required to ...
S Choi, S Kariv, W Müller… - 2011 - nber.org
Revealed preference theory offers a criterion for decision-making quality: if decisions are
high quality then there exists a utility function that the choices maximize. We conduct a large-
scale field experiment that enables us to test subjects' choices for consistency with utility ...
[CITATION] nWho Is (More) Rational? oMimeo
S Choi, S Kariv, W Muller… - University of Michigan, 2010
R Fisman, S Kariv… - Yale Law & Economics …, 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper reports a rigorous experimental test of Pareto-damaging behaviors. We
introduce a new graphical representation of dictator games with step-shaped sets of feasible
payoffs to persons self and other on which strongly Pareto efficient allocations involve ...
B Çelen, S Kariv… - 2005 - files.nyu.edu
Abstract Social learning is a process in which individuals learn by observing the actions of
others. The odd aspect of the social learning literature is that, ironically, it is not very social
since in AThis research was supported by the Center for Experimental Social Sciences ( ...
Z Grossman, S Kariv, U Malmendier… - Job Market Paper, 2008 - Citeseer
Abstract Why do people sacrifice to help others in some situations, but not in others?
Besides a direct taste for helping others, I study three additional psychological motivations
that involve beliefs: social-signaling, which holds that a person wants others to think of her ...
[CITATION] Individual Preferences for Giving
F Raymond, S Kariv… - 2006 - mimeo
J Carpenter, S Kariv… - 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Recent experiments show that public goods can be provided at high levels when
mutual monitoring and costly punishment are allowed. All these experiments, however,
study monitoring and punishment in a setting where all agents can monitor and punish ...
S Kariv… - 2008 - escholarship.org
Abstract: Theories of justice in the spirit of Harsanyi and Rawls argue that fair-minded
people should aspire to make choices for society—that is, for themselves and for others—as
if in the original position, behind a veil of ignorance that prevents them from knowing their ...
S Kariv, A Schotter… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Social learning is the process of individuals learning by observing the actions of
others. One odd aspect of the literature on social learning though is that, ironically, learning
is not very social because in the real world, although people learn by observing the ...
S Kariv - Journal of Economic Psychology, 2007 - econpapers.repec.org
By Shachar Kariv; Charles A. Holt, Editor, Markets, Games, and Strategic Behavior,
Addison-Wesley (2006) ISBN 9780321419316 p. xviii +. ... Shachar Kariv. Journal of Economic
Psychology, 2007, vol. 28, issue 3, pages 414-415. Date: 2007 Track citations by RSS feed. ...
R Fisman, P Jakiela… - 2012 - emlab.berkeley.edu
Abstract We compare behavior in modified dictators game during the “Great Recession” to
behavior in otherwise identical experiments conducted amidst the economic boom that
preceded it. The experiments capture both differences in the indexical selfishness (weight ...
S Kariv, S Choi, D Gale… - 2009 - escholarship.org
Abstract: We report a laboratory experiment that enables us to estimate parametric models of
ambiguity aversion at the level of the individual subject. We use two main specifications, a
“kinked” specification that nests Maxmin Expected Utility, Choquet Expected Utility, α- ...
B Celen, S Kariv… - Working Papers, 2007 - ideas.repec.org
Social learning is the process of individuals learning by observing the actions of others. In
the real world, however, although people learn by observing the actions of others, they also
learn from advice. This paper introduces advice giving into a standard social-learning ...
[CITATION] An Experimental Test of Social Learning under Imperfect Information
B Çelen… - 2002
S Kariv… - www-rcf.usc.edu
Page 1. Behind the Veil of Ignorance ∗ Shachar Kariv University of California, Berkeley
William R. Zame University of California, Los Angeles Abstract This paper uses theory
and experiments to study situations in which individuals ...
[CITATION] Experimental Social Science Laboratory (Xlab)
RJ Fisman, S Kariv… - University of California, Berkeley, 2005
S Kariv… - files.nyu.edu
A major controversy in economics and psychology surrounds the rationality of human
behavior. While substantive rationality is considered unrealistic by many if not most
economists, there appears to be little consensus on how to model bounded rationality and ...
S Kariv - 2004 - escholarship.org
Abstract: Individuals living in society are bound together by a social network, the complex of
relationships that brings them into contact with other agents. In many social and economic
situations, individuals learn by observing the behavior of others in their local environment. ...
S Kariv - 2003 - en.scientificcommons.org
Publikationsansicht. 56206148. Theoretical and experimental essays in social learning / (2003).
Kariv, Shachar. Abstract. NY, New York Univ., Dep. of Economics, Diss.--New York, 2003.. Kopie,
ersch. im Verl. UMI, Ann Arbor, Mich. Details der Publikation. ...
S Kariv, S Choi… - Levine's Bibliography, 2007 - econpapers.repec.org
By Shachar Kariv, Syngjoo Choi and Douglas Gale; Social Learning in Networks: A
Quantal Response Equilibrium Analysis of Experimental Data. ... Analysis of Experimental
Data. Shachar Kariv, Syngjoo Choi () and Douglas Gale (). ...
[CITATION] B: ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR-An experimental test of advice and social learning Bc: 130
B Celen, S Kariv… - Operations Research Management Science, 2012
S Durlauf, JV Rios-Rull, E Tamer, J Abbring… - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. ...
J Carpenter, S Kariv… - 2011 - econ.berkeley.edu
Abstract Recent experiments show that public goods can be provided at high levels when
mutual monitoring and costly punishment are allowed. All these experiments, however,
study monitoring and punishment in a complete network where all agents can monitor and ...
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