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[PDF] Stochastic costly state verification and dynamic contracts

[PDF] from uiowa.edu
L Popov - work, 2007 - myweb.uiowa.edu
Abstract I consider a dynamic costly state verification environment in which a riskaverse
agent enters into a contract with a risk-neutral principal. The agent has random income
which is unknown to the principal but can be verified at a cost. The principal can commit to ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - View as HTML - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 4 versions

[PDF] Enforcement Frictions and Optimal Lending Contracts

[PDF] from virginia.edu
L Popov - 2008 - people.virginia.edu
Abstract I consider an environment in which contract enforcement is a decision variable for
the principal. I construct a model in which entrepreneurs cannot commit to repaying
investors for the capital advanced, but investors can force repayment by spending ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - View as HTML

On financial covenants as incentives to borrowers

[PDF] from virginia.edu
R Elkamhi, L Popov… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We develop a theory of debt covenants that focuses on their incentive effect on
borrowers. We demonstrate that covenants help decrease moral hazard even in the
absence of signaling and we investigate three extensions. First, we allow for adverse ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - All 2 versions

[PDF] Enforcement Frictions and Optimal Lending Contracts (Job Market Paper)

[PDF] from egloos.com
L Popov - 2008 - pds17.egloos.com
Abstract I consider an environment in which contract enforcement is a decision variable for
the principal. I construct a model in which entrepreneurs cannot commit to repaying
investors for the capital advanced, but investors can force repayment by spending ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 2 versions

Essays in dynamic contracting with costly verification and costly enforcement

LA Popov - 2010 - gradworks.umi.com
UMI, ProQuest ® Dissertations & Theses. The world's most comprehensive collection
of dissertations and theses. Learn more... ProQuest, Essays in dynamic contracting
with costly verification and costly enforcement. by Popov ...
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[PDF] The Political Economy of Entry Barriers

[PDF] from virginia.edu
T Mukoyama, L Popov - 2012 - people.virginia.edu
Abstract We study a political economy model of entry barriers. Each period the policymaker
determines whether to impose a high entry barrier on entry, and the special interest groups
try to influence the policymaker's decision. Entry is accompanied by creative destruction— ...
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[PDF] Efficient Capital Accumulation and Distribution in an Economy with Private Information and Commitment

[PDF] from virginia.edu
A Khan, L Popov… - 2011 - virginia.edu
Abstract We introduce capital accumulation into an economy where individuals have private
information with respect to productivity shocks. Efficient, incentive-compatible risk-sharing is
achieved by conditioning current and future payoffs on the history of productivity reports. ...
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