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[CITATION] Boys don't cry

K Peirce, H Swank, C Sevigny, P Sarsgaard… - 2010 - Twentieth Century Fox Home …
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No-Trade in the Laboratory

[PDF] from ucl.ac.uk
M Angrisani, A Guarino, S Huck… - CESifo Working Paper …, 2008 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We test the no-trade theorem in a laboratory financial market where subjects can
trade an asset whose value is unknown. Subjects receive clues on the asset value and then
set a bid and an ask at which they are willing to buy or to sell from the other participants. In ...
Cited by 19 - Related articles - Library Search - All 40 versions

Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions

[PDF] from ucl.ac.uk
Full text - MIT Libraries
N Larson - Games and Economic Behavior, 2009 - Elsevier
We analyze the value of being better informed than one's rival in a two bidder, second price
common value auction. Standard models of these auctions do not pin down relative bidding
postures, but we show that by adding small amounts of private value information, a unique ...
Cited by 17 - Related articles - All 15 versions

[PDF] In with the New Or Out with the Old? Bottlenecks in Social Learning

[PDF] from virginia.edu
N Larson - 2008 - people.virginia.edu
Abstract We model normal-quadratic social learning with agents who observe weighted
averages of past actions, rather than complete action histories. When agents can choose
these weights, they optimally “screen” for more recent actions. While the precision of ...
Cited by 6 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 4 versions

[PDF] Equilibrium in wholesale electricity markets

[PDF] from ecn.nl
N Larson… - Research Symposium on European Electricity Markets, …, 2003 - ecn.nl
Abstract We develop game theoretic models to evaluate strategic behavior in deregulated
electricity markets, with particular attention given to the market rules in place in California
through the summer of 2000. We prove existence of a Nash equilibrium under two ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - All 9 versions

Match choice and Ghettoization in evolutionary games

[PDF] from ku.dk
Full text - MIT Libraries
N Larson - Journal of Economic Theory, 2004 - Elsevier
I study how having a choice about who to play affects the conventions that arise in a
population playing a 2× 2 common interest game. Match choice allows agents playing
“fragile but efficient” strategies to isolate themselves, raising their returns but making it ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - All 9 versions

[PDF] Endogenous Horizontal Differentiation and Consumer Search

[PDF] from virginia.edu
N Larson - University of Virginia, working paper, 2008 - people.virginia.edu
Abstract We endogenize product differentiation in a model of sequential search with random
firmconsumer match value à la Wolinsky (1986) and Anderson and Renault (1999).
Equilibrium differentiation depends on a feedback loop: when reservation utility is high ( ...
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[CITATION] Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and the modern Russo-Jewish question

ND Larson - 2005 - Ibidem
Cited by 1 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 2 versions

[PDF] Reforming the Customary Land Tenure System in Sierra Leone: A Proposal

[PDF] from theigc.org
OEG Johnson, BK Mkenda, B Van Campenhout… - 2011 - theigc.org
A major institutional change that would help to unleash the vast economic growth potential
of Sierra Leone in tourism, agriculture and industry is the reform of the customary land
tenure system. Such a reform would need to address issues relating to customary law ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 2 versions

Niche products, generic products, and consumer search

[PDF] from uni-muenchen.de
N Larson - Economic Theory, 2011 - Springer
Abstract We endogenize product design in a model of sequential search with random firm-
consumer match value à la Wolinsky (Quart J Econ 96: 493–511, 1986) and Anderson and
Renault (RAND J Econ 30: 719–735, 1999). We focus on a product design choice by ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 8 versions

Procurement auctions with avoidable fixed costs: an experimental approach

[PDF] from virginia.edu
W Elmaghraby, N Larson - 2008 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Bidders in procurement auctions often face avoidable fixed costs. This can make
bidding decisions complex and risky, and market outcomes volatile. If bidders deviate from
risk neutral best responses, either due to faulty optimization or risk attitudes, then ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - All 9 versions

[PDF] Neighbours and Extension Agents in Ethiopia: Who matters more for technology diffusion?

[PDF] from theigc.org
P Krishnan, M Patnam, P Quartey, C Udry… - theigc.org
Abstract Further adoption of fertiliser and improved seeds are key to increased land
productivity in Ethiopian agriculture. However, as in much of sub&Saharan Africa, the
adoption and diffusion of such technologies has been slow. While supply side factors ...
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[CITATION] Relation between staff perceptions and rates of seclusion and restraint

NA Larson - 2000 - University of Indianapolis

[PDF] Tending Nature's Classroom

[PDF] from troygardens.org
NK Larson - 2005 - troygardens.org
Page 1. Tending Nature's Classroom A Qualitative Examination of Motivations and Values of
Educational Place-Makers at Troy Gardens by Nathan K. Larson A thesis submitted in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science (Geography) at the ...
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Essays on equilibrium selection

A Banerjee, G Ellison, NNC Larson - 2001 - dspace.mit.edu
Cached - All 2 versions

[PDF] Symmetric Joint Bidding in Second Price Common Value Auctions

[PDF] from umd.edu
N Larson - 2005 - rhsmith.umd.edu
Abstract We study the effect of joint bidding on revenues in a second price, common value
auction. The effect depends on whether pooling individual bidders into bidding groups
erodes or exacerbates the information gap between the winning and price-setting bids. ...
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Selective observation in social learning

[PDF] from ucl.ac.uk
N Larson - 2003 - eprints.ucl.ac.uk
Social learning is studied when heterogeneous agents can select whom to observe. An
agent learns from the average action in her neighborhood. She may face a tradeoff between
joining a large neighborhood where most agents have different preferences than she ...
Related articles - All 8 versions

Strategic delay and efficiency in global games

[PDF] from ucl.ac.uk
N Larson - 2003 - discovery.ucl.ac.uk
The global games literature shows that perturbing a complete information coordination
game with correlated private information unleashes strategic uncertainty that can act, in
domino fashion, to rule out all but a single dominance-solvable equilibrium. We show (in a ...
Related articles - All 8 versions

Procurement auctions with avoidable fixed costs: an experimental approach

[PDF] from uni-muenchen.de
N Larson, W Elmaghraby - 2008 - mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
Bidders in procurement auctions often face avoidable fixed costs. This can make bidding
decisions complex and risky, and market outcomes volatile. If bidders deviate from risk
neutral best responses, either due to faulty optimization or risk attitudes, then equilibrium ...
Related articles - All 5 versions

[CITATION] Cognitive and Perceptual Space of Psychological Diagnosis

NA Larson - 2005 - University of Indianapolis
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[CITATION] Tending nature's classroom: a qualitative examination of motivations and values of educational place-makers at Troy Gardens

NK Larson - 2005 - en.scientificcommons.org
Publikationsansicht. 38198174. Tending nature's classroom : a qualitative examination
of motivations and values of educational place-makers at Troy Gardens (2005). Larson,
Nathan. Abstract. iii, 98 leaves : ill. ; 29 cm. Details der Publikation. ...
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Inertia in social learning from a summary statistic

[PDF] from uni-muenchen.de
N Larson - MPRA Paper, 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract We model normal-quadratic social learning with agents who observe a summary
statistic over past actions, rather than complete action histories. Because an agent with a
summary statistic cannot correct for the fact that earlier actions influenced later ones, even ...
Related articles - All 7 versions

[PDF] Horizontal Differentiation and Search

[PDF] from umd.edu
N Larson - 2002 - rhsmith.umd.edu
Abstract Although product differentiation and consumer search costs are both prominent
explanations for why firms might be able to price above marginal cost, relatively little is
known about how the two interact. We study a model in which the expected intensity of ...
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Clustering on the same news sources in an asset market

[PDF] from uni-muenchen.de
N Larson - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We study the incentives to acquire information from exclusive news sources versus
information from popular sources in a CARA-normal asset market. Each trader is able to
observe one of a finite number of news sources. Clustering on the most precise source ...
Related articles - All 7 versions

[CITATION] Essays on Equilibrium Selection

NC Larson - 2001 - en.scientificcommons.org
Publikationsansicht. 7789278. Essays on equilibrium selection (2001). Larson, Nathan. Details
der Publikation. Download, http://theses.mit.edu:80/Dienst/UI/2.0/Describe/0018.mit.theses/
2001-273. Herausgeber, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. ...
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