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Multidivisional firms, internal competition, and the merger paradox

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A Creane… - Canadian Journal of Economics/ …, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract. Traditional modelling of mergers has the merged firms (insiders) cooperate and
maximize joint profits. This approach has several unappealing results in quantity-setting
games, for example, mergers typically are not profitable for insiders, but are profitable for ...
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Experimentation with heteroskedastic noise

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A Creane - Economic Theory, 1994 - Springer
Conclusion The direction of information with respect to the choice variable can easily
change under a general class of distributions. The implication is that, when information is a
function of the choice variable, the result of a model may be an outcome of the structure of ...
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The unilateral incentives for technology transfers: Predation (and deterrence) by proxy

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A Creane… - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2009 - Elsevier
Joint production between rival firms often entails knowledge transfers without direct
compensation, leaving the question as to why more efficient firms would give their rivals
such an advantage. We find that such transfers are credible mechanisms to make the ...
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Productivity information in vertical sharing agreements

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A Creane - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2007 - Elsevier
That firms share information with their rivals is both well-known and studied. However, firms
also often share information with their suppliers. The firm's incentive to share productivity
information with both its supplier and its rival is examined. It is found that by sharing ...
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Information and disclosure in strategic trade policy

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A Creane… - Journal of International Economics, 2008 - Elsevier
We relax the standard assumption in the strategic trade policy literature that governments
possess complete information about the economy. Assuming instead that governments must
obtain information from firms, we examine firms' incentive to disclose information to the ...
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An informational externality in a competitive market

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A Creane - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1996 - Elsevier
Consider a (new) competitive market with unknown demand. The market price generated by
incumbents conveys information that firms, including potential entrants, use for future
decisions. Yet the incumbents are not rewarded for their assistance, suggesting that an ...
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Risk and revelation: changing the value of information

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A Creane - Economica, 1998 - Wiley Online Library
A different approach is introduced to determine the value of an information-sharing
agreement: the measure of risk aversion/loving. This approach reveals the relationship
between information-sharing models and the risk literature. It also allows uncertainty ...
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Endogenous learning, learning by doing and information sharing

A Creane - International Economic Review, 1995 - JSTOR
Using the work in experimentation I endogenize the, until now, exogenous information in
information sharing models. I find that agreements to exchange information affect the value
and production of information. With unknown cost, a learning-by-doing like effect also ...
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Ignorance is bliss as trade policy

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A Creane - Review of International Economics, 1998 - Wiley Online Library
2. Abstract Consider domestic consumers that purchase from foreign firms. A presumption
would be that consumers prefer being informed when quality is uncertain and exogenous.
However, in a multifirm framework based on previous models, consumers can be worse ...
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Uncertain product quality, optimal pricing and product development

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A Creane - Annals of Operations Research, 2002 - Springer
A firm is developing a new product. However, the firm is uncertain as to how consumers will
perceive the product's desirability or quality. Using a general model of product quality,
conditions for an increase in uncertainty to increase the optimal price are derived. General ...
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Input suppliers, differential pricing, and information sharing agreements

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A Creane - Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
It is common for firms to systematically share information with their input suppliers. Although
such agreements with horizontal rivals have been analyzed, there has been little work
examining vertical sharing, and that analysis has focused on suppliers that set uniform ...
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Forgoing invention to deter entry

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A Creane… - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2009 - Elsevier
A monopoly facing potential entry may not want to develop an efficient technology even at
zero R&D costs. Such a phenomenon occurs if a new technology is distinct from the existing
one so production uncertainty becomes technology-specific. Then the monopoly can ...
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Note on uncertainty and socially excessive entry

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A Creane - International Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
1. I am grateful to an anonymous referee and the Editor whose comments and suggestions
have greatly improved this paper, as well as seminar participants at the University of
Birmingham, Royal Holloway College, ANU, University of Victoria (Wellington), the ...
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Jamming a Rival′ s Learning

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A Creane - Journal of Economic Theory, 1995 - Elsevier
Can a firm (F) cause a rival (R) to learn less about R? Does F care? I explore F′ s ability
and incentive to affect, or" jam," R′ s private learning about R. The model developed does
not have unobserved actions or ex ante asymmetric information which previous jamming ...
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A note on welfare-improving ignorance about quality

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A Creane - Economic Theory, 2008 - Springer
Abstract Consider a monopolist that is selling a high quality product when the quality is
unknown to a fraction of the consumers. If the quality cannot be signaled and the fraction is
sufficiently large, then the monopolist will offer a low price to induce uninformed ...
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Endogenous Entry in Markets with Adverse Selection

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A Creane… - 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Since Akerlof's (1970) seminal paper the existence of adverse selection due to
asymmetric information about quality is well-understood. Given the negative implications for
trading and welfare, the question arises of how such markets come into existence. We ...
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Foreign direct investment and the welfare effects of cost harmonization

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A Creane… - 2008 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Foreign direct investment (FDI) gives foreign firms access to local labor and inputs,
thereby harmonizing costs between foreign and domestic firms relative to exports. This
paper investigates the welfare effects of such cost harmonization in strategic environments ...
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[PDF] Pattern bargaining as an equilibrium outcome

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A Creane… - 2006 - msu.edu
Abstract: Pattern bargaining is a negotiating strategy that is often employed by industry-wide
unions in oligopolistic industries to set wages. However, formal explanations for its existence
in equilibrium are rare. The conventional wisdom is that pattern bargaining “takes labor ...
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[CITATION] Endogenous Learning, Learning by Doing and Information Sharing

A Creane - Working Papers, 1992 - econpapers.repec.org
Related works: Journal Article: Endogenous Learning, Learning by Doing and Information Sharing
(1995) This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same
title. ... This site is part of RePEc and all the data displayed here is part of the RePEc data ...
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The Unilateral Incentives for Technology Transfers: Predation by Proxy

A Creane… - Working Papers in Economics, 2007 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: In 1984 GM and Toyota began the joint production of automobiles to much
controversy over its anti-competitive effects. The argument for the joint production was the
considerable efficiency gains GM would obtain. Since then, the anti-trust controversy has ...
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Investment in Risky Innovations with Multiple Innovators

A Creane - Papers, 1998 - ideas.repec.org
Consider a market in which firms compete to develop a new product. While most work
focuses on a single firm successfully developing the new product, the emphasis here is on
possibly multiple firms devloping the new product. Thus, a firm has uncertainty about how ...
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[CITATION] Investment and Latent Adverse Selection

A Creane - 2007 - mimeo
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The trade-offs from pattern bargaining with uncertain production costs

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A Creane… - European Economic Review, 2011 - Elsevier
Pattern bargaining is a negotiating strategy that is often employed by industry-wide unions in
oligopolistic industries to set wages. The conventional wisdom is that pattern bargaining
“takes labor out of competition” and therefore softens bargaining between the union and ...
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INFORMATION SHARING IN UNION–FIRM RELATIONSHIPS*

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A Creane… - International Economic Review, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
Large firms often negotiate wage rates with labor unions. When they do, an ex ante
agreement to share information should make it more likely that they will reach an agreement
and capture the gains from trade. However, if the firm refuses to share information, the ...
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Input Suppliers, Differential Pricing and Information Sharing Agreements

A Creane - 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: It is common for firms to systematically share financial and productivity data with
their input suppliers, as well as their rivals. However, there has been a systematic change in
the US policy towards vertical relationships in the past decades: both FTC inaction and ...
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Social Optimal Licensing of Innovations

A Creane - Papers, 1998 - ideas.repec.org
A profit-maximizing monopolist licenses a cost-reducing innovation to downstream firms that
compete strategically. Katz and Shapiro (1986) find the seemingly obvious result that" the
[monopolist's] incentive to disseminate the innovation typically are too low." Instead, the ...
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Goldilocks and the Licensing Firm: Choosing a Partner when Rivals are Heterogeneous

A Creane… - 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Markets are often characterized with firms of differing capabilities with more
efficient firms licensing their technology to lesser firms. We examine the effects that the
amount of the technology transferred, and the characteristics of the partner have on this ...
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Socially excessive dissemination

A Creane - 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Assigning monopoly power to an inventor is usually viewed as a static efficiency
cost needed to obtain the dynamic benefit of increased research and development; public
dissemination is considered to be superior. For example, Katz and Shapiro (1986) find ...
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[PDF] Licensing technology to a rival when firms are heterogeneous

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A Creane… - 2009 - bc.edu
Knowledge and technical know-how is transferred between firms in many ways: through
licensing, acquisition of rivals, joint ventures, etc. 1 For example, in the auto market, the joint
production venture between GM and Toyota was partly motivated by giving GM the ...
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Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and Entry

A Creane… - Papers, 1994 - ideas.repec.org
Firms regularly introduce new, non-patentable products and innovations. When the
possibility of a new product or an innovation arises to a potential seller, the seller faces a risk
in successfully creating and producing a new product that consumers value above its ...
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[PDF] Goldilocks and the licensing firm: Choosing

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A Creane… - Citeseer
Knowledge and technical know-how is transferred between firms in many ways: through
licensing, acquisition of rivals, joint ventures, etc. 1 For example, in the auto market, the joint
production venture between GM and Toyota (NUMMI) was partly motivated by giving GM ...
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[PDF] JEL: D4, L1, L41 Key words: Predation, Technology Transfers

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P by Proxy, A Creane… - msu.edu
In 1984 General Motors (at the time the world's largest automaker) and Toyota (number
three) began joint production of vehicles at the New United Motors Manufacturing
Inc.(NUMMI) in Fremont, California. Into this partnerships GM provided the plant and ...
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[PDF] Export, foreign direct investment, and joint ventures: strategic learning and strategic correlation

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A Creane… - econ.hit-u.ac.jp
Over the last quarter-century multinational activity (measured by production and sales of
foreign affiliates) has grown at much faster paces than GDP and trade (Markusen, 2002).
The spectacular rise in multinational activity has prompted international trade economists ...
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[PDF] JEL: D4, L1, L41 Key words: Entry Deterrence, Predation, Technology Transfers

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A Creane… - bc.edu
In 1984 General Motors and Toyota began the controversial joint production of vehicles at
the New United Motors Manufacturing Inc.(NUMMI) in Fremont, California. 1 The FTC had
narrowly approved the venture (3 to 2), partly defending the approval on the basis of GM ...
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[CITATION] JEL: D83, F12 Key words: Country-specific cost uncertainty, learning, Foreign investment, FDI, Joint ventures

A Creane…
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The Profitable Suppression of Inventions: Technology Choice and Entry Deterrence

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A Creane… - DISCUSSION PAPER-OSAKA …, 2007 - papers.ssrn.com
During the 20th century, AT&T was known both for its development of new technologies and
needless delay in deploying them. For example, AT&T waited for twenty years to introduce
both the handset and dial system and the automatic phone (Dunford 1987). Delayed ...
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[PDF] Choosing a Licensee from Heterogeneous Rivals

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A Creane, CY Ko… - Boston College Working Papers in …, 2011 - fmwww.bc.edu
Abstract We examine a firm that can license its production technology to a rival when firms
are heterogeneous in production costs. We show that a complete technology transfer from
one firm to another always in% creases joint profit under weakly concave demand when at ...
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The Unilateral Incentives for Technology Transfers: Predation by Proxy (and Deterrence)

A Creane… - 2007 - socionet.ru
Joint production between rival firms often entails knowledge transfers without direct
compensation, leaving the question as to why more efficient firms would give their rivals such
an advantage. We find that such transfers are credible mechanisms to make the market ...
Cached - All 2 versions

[CITATION] Jamming Private Valued, Private Signals

A Creane… - Working Papers, 1992 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks.
Jamming Private Valued, Private Signals. Anthony Creane and M. Hall. ...
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The value to a firm of its rival learning

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A Creane - Economics Letters, 1995 - Elsevier
In price competition, a firm (F) reduces its rival's (R) learning about R's cost. In quantity
(price) competition, F wants R (not) to learn about F's cost. I show that in quantity
competition, F wants R not to learn about R's cost.
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Trade policy with risky investment in quality

A Creane - Canadian Journal of Economics, 1999 - JSTOR
Consider a new export market in which firms can invest in quality but may fail to achieve
quality. Quality of the export good, then, varies across firms, having endogenous (whether to
invest) and exogenous (determined by nature) aspects. Previous works suggest that the ...
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[PDF] The welfare effect of international cost harmonization

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A Creane… - Emory Economics, 2011 - economics.emory.edu
Abstract Cost harmonization is said to occur when foreign firms' marginal costs are brought
closer or equalized to domestic firms' costs. It can occur for various reasons, ranging from
foreign direct investment to falling transport cost and policy changes in the foreign country. ...
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The Profitable Suppression of Inventions: Technology Choice and Entry Deterrence

K Miyagiwa… - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: AT&T was known for both funding a world-class research lab and delaying
deployment of useful innovations from the lab. To explain this behavior we consider a model
with an incumbent facing a potential entrant. The incumbent can choose from two ...

[PDF] Consider a monopolist that is selling a high quality product when the quality is unknown to a fraction of the consumers. If the quality cannot be signaled and the …

[PDF] from msu.edu
A Creane - msu.edu
When product quality is unknown, a natural supposition is that informing consumers will
always increase consumer surplus and welfare. Despite this, when a monopolist is selling a
product of unknown and fixed quality and there is a pooling equilibrium, consumer surplus ...
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[PDF] JEL: D8, L1 Key words: productivity, information sharing, vertical relationships I thank Jay Pil Choi, Keith Crocker, Esther Gal-Or, Jennifer Steele and participants …

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A Creane - 2005 - msu.edu
It is well-known that firms systematically share information with their rivals, 1 which has been
thoroughly explored both theoretically and empirically. 2 It is also well-known that firms will
simultaneously share financial and productivity data with their input suppliers. For ...
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Export, Foreign Direct Investment, and Joint Ventures: Learning the Rival's Costs through Propinquity

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A Creane… - DISCUSSION PAPER-OSAKA …, 2007 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We examine the role of cost uncertainty in a firm's choice between exporting and
foreign investment in oligopolistic industry. We consider both foreign direct investment and
an international joint venture, and allow country-specific and firm-specific cost uncertainty. ...
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Socially excessive dissemination of patent licences

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A Creane - … Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d' …, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract Compared with the social optimum, a monopolist usually sells too little. This result
seemingly includes the case of a lab that licences its patented cost innovation: Katz and
Shapiro (1986) find 'conditions under which [the lab] will issue fewer than the socially ...
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The Trade-Offs from Pattern Bargaining

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A Creane… - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Pattern bargaining is a negotiating strategy that is often employed by industry-wide
unions in oligopolistic industries to set wages. The conventional wisdom is that pattern
bargaining" takes labor out of competition" and therefore softens bargaining between the ...
Related articles - All 2 versions

Foreign direct investment and cost uncertainty: Correlation and learning effects

[PDF] from osaka-u.ac.jp
A Creane… - DISCUSSION PAPER-OSAKA …, 2007 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We examine a foreign firm's choice between exporting and foreign direct
investment (FDI) under country-specific cost uncertainty. Unlike exporting, FDI exposes
foreign and home firms to common shocks. This results in a correlation of strategies, ...
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Foreign Direct Investment and the Welfare Effects of Cost Harmonization

K Miyagiwa… - ISER Discussion Paper No. 741, 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Foreign direct investment (FDI) gives foreign firms access to local labor and inputs,
thereby harmonizing costs between foreign and domestic firms relative to exports. This
paper investigates the welfare effects of such cost harmonization in strategic environments ...
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[CITATION] Winners, Losers and Fly-by-Nighters: Trade Policy with Risky Investment in Quality

A Creane… - Working Papers, 1993 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your
bookmarks. Winners, Losers and Fly-by-Nighters: Trade Policy with Risky
Investment in Quality. Anthony Creane and M. Hall. ...
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When more'Informed Consumers' Reduces Welfare

A Creane - 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: When product quality is unknown, a natural supposition is that having more
consumers informed will increase consumer surplus and welfare. However, when a
monopolist is selling a product of unknown quality, welfare can decrease in the fraction of ...
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Endogenous Entry in Markets with Adverse Selection

TD Jeitschko… - 2009 - works.bepress.com
Abstract Since Akerlof's (1970) seminal paper the existence of adverse selection due to
asymmetric information about quality is well-understood. Given the negative implications for
trading and welfare, the question arises of how such markets come into existence. We ...
All 8 versions

[CITATION] Essays on information and uncertainty

AJ Creane - 1991 - en.scientificcommons.org
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