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Marginal contributions and externalities in the value

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G De Clippel… - Econometrica, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
Our concern is the extension of the theory of the Shapley value to problems involving
externalities. Using the standard axiom systems behind the Shapley value leads to the
identification of bounds on players' payoffs around an “externality-free” value. The ...
Cited by 33 - Related articles - All 11 versions

Two-person bargaining with verifiable information

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G De Clippel… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2004 - Elsevier
We study Myerson's incomplete information bargaining solution under the assumption of
verifiable types. For the case of an informed principal, in which one individual has all the
bargaining power, we provide exact characterizations both from the non-cooperative and ...
Cited by 24 - Related articles - Library Search - All 15 versions

The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information

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G De Clippel - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
The type-agent core is a new solution concept for exchange economies with asymmetric
information. It coincides with the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes of a simple
competitive screening game. Uninformed intermediaries help the agents to cooperate in ...
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Two remarks on the inner core

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G De Clippel… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2005 - Elsevier
For the case of smooth concave exchange economies, we provide a characterization of the
inner core as the set of feasible allocations such that no coalition can improve on it, even if
coalitions are allowed to use some random plans. For the case of compactly generated ...
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Marginal contributions and externalities in the value

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G De Clippel… - Economics Working Papers we057339, …, 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: For games in partition function form, we explore the implications of distinguishing
between the concepts of intrinsic marginal contributions and externalities. If one requires
efficiency for the grand coalition, we provide several results concerning extensions of the ...
Cited by 14 - Related articles - All 17 versions

An axiomatization of the Nash bargaining solution

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G de Clippel - Social Choice and Welfare, 2007 - Springer
Abstract I prove that 'Disagreement Point Convexity'and 'Midpoint Domination'characterize
the Nash bargaining solution on the class of two-player bargaining problems and on the
class of smooth bargaining problems. I propose an example to show that these two ...
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Reason‐based choice: A bargaining rationale for the attraction and compromise effects

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G De Clippel… - Theoretical Economics, 2012 - Wiley Online Library
Among the most important and robust violations of rationality are the attraction and the
compromise effects. The compromise effect refers to the tendency of individuals to choose
an intermediate option in a choice set, while the attraction effect refers to the tendency to ...
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Equity, envy and efficiency under asymmetric information

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G De Clippel - Economics Letters, 2008 - Elsevier
Varian's (Varian, H., 1974. Equity, Envy and Efficiency. Journal of Economic Theory 9, 63–
91) main results are not valid anymore if the agents are asymmetrically informed at the time
of contracting: 1) envy-freeness and efficiency may be incompatible; 2) there may exist ...
Cited by 11 - Related articles - All 13 versions

Impartial division of a dollar

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G De Clippel, H Moulin… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2008 - Elsevier
For impartial division, each participant reports only her opinion about the fair relative shares
of the other participants, and this report has no effect on her own share. If a specific division
is compatible with all reports, it is implemented. We propose a family of natural methods ...
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Values for cooperative games with incomplete information: An eloquent example

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G De Clippel - Games and Economic Behavior, 2005 - Elsevier
Myerson's [Cooperative games with incomplete information. Int. J. Game Theory 13 (1984)
69–96] extension of the λ-transfer value to cooperative games with incomplete information
focuses among other things on the strength of the incentive constraints at the solution for ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - Library Search - All 16 versions

[PDF] A Comment on “The Veil of Public Ignorance.”

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G de Clippel - 2010 - brown.edu
Nehring (2004) proposes an interesting methodology to extend the utilitarian criterion
defined under complete information to an interim social welfare ordering allowing to
compare acts. The first axiom defining his approach, called “State Independence,” ...
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[PDF] Axiomatic bargaining on economic environments with lotteries

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G de Clippel - 2008 - brown.edu
Abstract Most contributions in axiomatic bargaining are phrased in the space of utilities. This
comes in sharp contrast with standards in most other branches of economic theory. The
present paper shows how Nash's original axiomatic system can be rephrased in a natural ...
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[PDF] Egalitarianism under Incomplete Information

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G de Clippel - 2010 - brown.edu
Abstract The paper aims at extending the egalitarian principle to environments with
incomplete information. The approach is primarily axiomatic, focusing on the characteristic
property of monotonicity: no member of the society should be worse off when more ...
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Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information

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G De Clippel, D Pérez-Castrillo… - Games and Economic …, 2011 - Elsevier
Abstract We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and
Schmeidlerʼs (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible
allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for ...
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No profitable decompositions in quasi-linear allocation problems

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G De Clippel… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2011 - Elsevier
We study the problem of allocating a bundle of perfectly divisible private goods from an
axiomatic point of view, in situations where compensations can be made through monetary
transfers. The key property we impose on the allocation rule requires that no agent should ...
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Cores of combined games

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F Bloch… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2010 - Elsevier
This paper studies the core of combined games, obtained by summing different coalitional
games when bargaining over multiple independent issues. It is shown that the set of
balanced transferable utility games can be partitioned into equivalence classes of ...
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[BOOK] Axiomatizing the Harsanyi value, the symmetric egalitarian solution and the consistent Shapley value

[PDF] from academielouvain.be
G De Clippel… - 2002 - dial.academielouvain.be
Abstract The validity of Hart (1985)'s axiomatization of the Harsanyi value is shown to
depend on the regularity conditions that are imposed on the games. Following this
observation, we propose two related axiomatic characterizations, one of the symmetric ...
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The procedural value for cooperative games with non-transferable utility

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G De Clippel - Mathematical Social Sciences, 2007 - Elsevier
I adapt Raiffa's discrete bargaining solution in order to take the possibility of partial
cooperation into account when there are more than two players. The approach is non-
cooperative. I slightly modify the bargaining procedure proposed by Sjöström for ...
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[PDF] Competitive Equilibria and the Core of Exchange Economies under Asymmetric Information

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G de Clippel - Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer …, 2004 - vanderbilt.edu
Abstract I argue in favor of a competitive screening approach for studying the question of
coalition formation in exchange economies under asymmetric information. I obtain a new
notion of core that refines Wilson (1978)'s coarse core. It is nonempty under the standard ...
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DP7414 Reason-Based Choice: A Bargaining Rationale for the Attraction and Compromise Effects

G de Clippel… - 2009 - cepr.org
This paper proposes a model of boundedly rational choice that explains the well known
attraction and compromise effects. Choices in our model are interpreted as a cooperative
solution to a bargaining problem among an individual's conflicting dual selves. We ...
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[CITATION] Copmment on" The Veil of Public Ignorance"

G Clippel - Working Papers, 2010 - econpapers.repec.org
... Please update your bookmarks. Copmment on "The Veil of Public Ignorance". Geoffroy de Clippel ().
No 2010-3, Working Papers from Brown University, Department of Economics. Date: 2010
References: View reference list Citations Track citations by RSS feed. ...
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DP8262 On the Strategic Disclosure of Feasible Options in Bargaining

G de Clippel… - 2011 - cepr.org
Most of the economic literature on bargaining has focused on situations where the set of
possible outcomes is taken as given. This paper is concerned with situations where decision-
makers first need to identify the set of feasible outcomes before they bargain over which of ...
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DP8724 On the Selection of Arbitrators

G de Clippel, K Eliaz… - 2011 - cepr.org
A key issue in arbitration, which resolves disputes among parties, involves the procedure for
selecting an arbitrator. We take an implementation-theoretic approach and provide
theoretical, empirical and experimental analyses of this problem. Our findings highlight the ...
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DP8733 Premise-Based versus Outcome-Based Information Aggregation

G de Clippel… - 2012 - cepr.org
A group of rational individuals with common interest need to select one of two outcomes.
The optimal decision depends on whether certain premises or pieces of evidence are
established as being true, and each member receives a noisy signal of the truth value of ...
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[PDF] On the Redundancy of the Implicit Welfarist Axiom in Bargaining Theory

[PDF] from brown.edu
G de Clippel - 2011 - econ.brown.edu
Abstract It has long been argued that there is a mismatch between the general motivation
provided for Nash's (1950) axioms and their actual mathematical content because they are
phrased in the space of joint (Bernoulli) utilities. Alternatively, it is easy to rephrase these ...
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Yves Balasko On the number of critical equilibria separating two equilibria................ 163

P Manzini, M Mariotti, M Peski, P Battigalli… - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. Wiley Online Library will be disrupted 14
Jan from 10-12 GMT for monthly maintenance. ...

[CITATION] Disinterested division of a dollar

G De Clippel, H Moulin… - 2005
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Axiomatic Bargaining on Economic Enviornments with Lott

G de Clippel - Working Papers, 2009 - ideas.repec.org
Most contributions in axiomatic bargaining are phrased in the space of utilities. This comes
in sharp contrast with standards in most other fields of economic theory. The present paper
shows how Nash's original axiomatic system can be rephrased in a natural class of ...
Cached - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 3 versions

Copmment on Egalitarianism under Incomplete Information

G Clippel - Working Papers, 2010 - econpapers.repec.org
The paper aims at extending the egalitarian principle to environments with incomplete
information. The approach is primarily axiomatic, focusing on the characteristic property of
monotonicity: no member of the society should be worse off when more collective ...
Cached - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 2 versions

[PDF] Bounded Rationality and Limited Datasets: Testable Implications, Identifiability, and Out-of-Sample Prediction

[PDF] from brown.edu
G de Clippel… - 2012 - econ.brown.edu
Abstract In recent years, several intriguing theories of bounded rationality have been
proposed. This paper aims to understand these theories when the available choice data
may be limited, as is the case in most practical settings. How does one tell if observed ...
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Premise-Based versus Outcome-Based Information Aggregation

[PDF] from brown.edu
G De Clippel… - 2012 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: A group of rational individuals with common interest need to select one of two
outcomes. The optimal decision depends on whether certain premises or pieces of evidence
are established as being true, and each member receives a noisy signal of the truth value ...
Related articles - All 3 versions

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