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Social norms, savings behavior, and growth

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HL Cole, GJ Mailath… - Journal of Political economy, 1992 - JSTOR
We argue that many goods and decisions are not allocated or made through markets. We
interpret an agent's status as a ranking device that determines how well he or she fares in
the nonmarket sector. The existence of a nonmarket sector can endogenously generate a ...
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Asymmetric information bargaining problems with many agents

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GJ Mailath… - The Review of Economic …, 1990 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract A yes or no decision must be made about some issue. All agents must agree. The
“Coase Theorem” asserts that the efficient outcome will always result. Suppose the value
(positive or negative) that an individual attaches to an affirmative decision is privately ...
Cited by 304 - Related articles - Library Search - All 8 versions

The effect of adolescent experience on labor market outcomes: the case of height

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N Persico, A Postlewaite… - 2004 - nber.org
Taller workers receive a wage premium. Net of differences in family background, the
disparity is similar in magnitude to the race and gender gaps. We exploit variation in an
individual's height over time to explore how height affects wages. Controlling for teen ...
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Relative income concerns and the rise in married women's employment

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D Neumark… - 1995 - nber.org
We ask whether women's decisions to be in the labor force may be affected by the decisions
of other women in ways not captured by standard models. We develop a model that
augments the simple neoclassical framework by introducing relative income concerns into ...
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Bank runs as an equilibrium phenomenon

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A Postlewaite… - The Journal of Political Economy, 1987 - JSTOR
A standard demand deposit contract in which individuals are entitled to their full deposit at
any time provided the bank is solvent is analyzed in a context in which there are no
exogenous events on which agents condition their behavior and a unique equilibrium ...
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Strategic information revelation

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M Okuno-Fujiwara, A Postlewaite… - The Review of …, 1990 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We analyze the problem in which agents have non-public information and are to
play an asymmetric information game. The agents may reveal some or all of their information
to other agents prior to playing this game. Revelation is via exogenously specified ...
Cited by 222 - Related articles - All 9 versions

[PDF] Belief-based refinements in signalling games

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GJ Mailath, M Okuno-Fujiwara… - Journal of Economic …, 1993 - ssc.upenn.edu
Many of the refinements mentioned above are based on the idea that some disequilibrium
beliefs are implausible in that they put positive probability on some types of player I which, it
is argued, are unlikely to send this disequilibrium message. Many of these refinements ...
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[PDF] Finite bubbles with short sale constraints and asymmetric information

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F Allen, S Morris… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1993 - princeton.edu
What determines stock prices? Are they determined by expectations about future dividends
so that stocks trade at their" fundamental value," or are they" bubbles" which are determined
by crowd psychology, fads, or some other arbitrary factor? These questions are central to ...
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Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods

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AE Roth… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1977 - Elsevier
Abstract The core of a market in indivisible goods can be defined in terms of strong
domination or weak domination. The core defined by strong domination is always non-
empty, but may contain points which are unstable in a dynamic sense. However, it is ...
Cited by 200 - Related articles - Library Search - All 5 versions

Implementation in differential information economies

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A Postlewaite… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1986 - Elsevier
Abstract We consider the problem of implementation of social choice correspondences in
differential information economies. We provide necessary conditions for implementation and
slightly stronger conditions which are sufficient to guarantee implementation
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Social norms and random matching games

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M Okuno-Fujiwara… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1995 - Elsevier
Nash equilibrium has been tremendously useful in understanding economic problems in
which strategic behavior is important. The theoretical foundations of the solution concept
often include the assumption that the game to be played is common knowledge, an ...
Cited by 202 - Related articles - All 9 versions

The incentives for price-taking behavior in large exchange economies

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DJ Roberts… - Econometrica: journal of the Econometric …, 1976 - JSTOR
This paper investigates the justification for the competitive assumption that consumers will
act as price takers by considering the utility gain an individual can achieve by manipulating
price formation through the use of non-competitive behavior. Although announcing one's ...
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The social basis of interdependent preferences

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A Postlewaite - European Economic Review, 1998 - Elsevier
Most economists are sympathetic to the idea that concerns for relative position are an
important aspect of many economic problems. There has traditionally been a reluctance to
include such concerns primarily because models that included them often allow such a ...
Cited by 185 - Related articles - Library Search - All 13 versions

Confidence-enhanced performance

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O Compte… - American Economic Review, 2004 - JSTOR
There is ample evidence that emotions affect performance. Positive emotions can improve
performance, while negative ones can diminish it. For example, the fears induced by the
possibility of failure or of negative evaluations have physiological consequences (shaking, ...
Cited by 127 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 30 versions

Quality testing and disclosure

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S Matthews… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1985 - JSTOR
Sellers are often more able than consumers to test product quality. We show that whether
such firms will voluntarily test quality and disclose what they learn depends in a paradoxical
way upon the presence of mandatory disclosure rules: only if disclosure is mandatory will ...
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Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions

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SA Matthews… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1989 - Elsevier
Allowing unmediated communication in a two-person double auction dramatically enlarges
the set of equilibrium outcomes. It then consists of all allocation rules that are equilibrium
outcomes of games in which all traders have the power at the end to veto proposed trades ...
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Approximate efficiency of non-Walrasian Nash equilibria

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A Postlewaite… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric …, 1978 - JSTOR
M. SHUBIK HAS RECENTLY introduced a model in which a good is exchanged for money.
Each seller offers a quantity of the good for sale and in exchange receives a proportion of
the total amount of money bid for the commodity equal to the proportion he offered to sell. ...
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Refining cheap-talk equilibria

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SA Matthews, M Okuno-Fujiwara… - Journal of Economic …, 1991 - Elsevier
Abstract Several conceptual points are made concerning communication in games of
asymmetric information. Equilibrium refinements of Sender-Receiver cheap-talk games that
are based on the concept of a putative equilibrium, and which rely on the presence of a ...
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Informational size and incentive compatibility

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R McLean… - Econometrica, 2002 - Wiley Online Library
We examine a general equilibrium model with asymmetrically informed agents. The
presence of asymmetric information generally presents a conflict between incentive
compatibility and Pareto efficiency. We present a notion of informational size and show ...
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Manipulation via endowments

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A Postlewaite - The review of economic studies, 1979 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
A competitive allocation in an exchange economy has several desirable properties; it is (with
minimal assumptions) Pareto optimal and it guarantees that each trader doesn't lose utility in
the trade. Besides these properties of efficiencyand individual rationality, however, there ...
Cited by 95 - Related articles - All 10 versions

[PDF] 14 FEASIBLE NASH IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIAL CHOICE RULES WHEN THE DESIGNER DOES NOT KNOW ENDOWMENTS OR

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L Hurwicz, E Maskin… - The economics of …, 1995 - econ.upenn.edu
The aim of the present paper is to analyze the problem of assuring the feasibility1 of a
mechanism (game form), implementing in Nash equilibrium2 a given social choice rule
abbreviated as (SCR) when the mechanism is constrained as to the way in which it is ...
Cited by 92 - Related articles - All 2 versions

Fact-free learning

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E Aragones, I Gilboa, A Postlewaite… - The American …, 2005 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: People may be surprised to notice certain regularities that hold in existing
knowledge they have had for some time. That is, they may learn without getting new factual
information. We argue that this can be partly explained by computational complexity. We ...
Cited by 88 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 51 versions

[PDF] Incorporating concern for relative wealth into economic models

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HL Cole, GJ Mailath… - Federal Reserve Bank of …, 1995 - mpls.frb.org
Abstract This article develops a simple model that captures a concern for relative standing,
or status. This concern is instrumental in the sense that individuals do not get utility directly
from their relative standing, but, rather, the concern is induced because their relative ...
Cited by 91 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 25 versions

Asymptotic efficiency in large exchange economies with asymmetric information

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F Gul… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1992 - JSTOR
We provide conditions on an exchange economy with asymmetric information that
guarantee that when the economy is replicated sufficiently often, there will be an allocation
which is incentive compatible, individually rational, and nearly efficient. The main theorem ...
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Feasible and continuous implementation

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A Postlewaite… - The Review of Economic …, 1989 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract There has been a great deal of research in recent years investigating the question
of whether or not there exist institutions (game forms) for which the set of equilibria will
coincide with the set of Walrasian equilibria. In this paper we show the existence of a ...
Cited by 81 - Related articles - All 11 versions

Class systems and the enforcement of social norms1

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HL Cole, GJ Mailath… - Journal of Public Economics, 1998 - Elsevier
We analyze a model in which there is socially inefficient competition among people. In this
model, self-enforcing social norms can potentially control the inefficient competition.
However, the inefficient behavior often cannot be suppressed in equilibrium among those ...
Cited by 71 - Related articles - Library Search - All 19 versions

Efficient non-contractible investments in large economies

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HL Cole, GJ Mailath… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2001 - Elsevier
Do investors making complementary investments face the correct incentives, especially
when they cannot contract with each other prior to their decisions? We present a two-sided
matching model in which buyers and sellers make investments prior to matching. Once ...
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[PDF] A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations

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E Kalai, A Postlewaite… - Journal of …, 1979 - ksmb02.kellogg.northwestern.edu
A Group Incentive Compatible Mechanism Yielding Core Allocations by Ehud Kalai, Andrew
Postlewaite and John Roberts Introduction The possibilities for achieving desirable standards
of economic performance in a decentralized, incentive compatible manner have recently ...
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Courts of law and unforeseen contingencies

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L Anderlini, L Felli… - Journal of law, economics, …, 2007 - Oxford Univ Press
Abstract We study a contracting model with unforeseen contingencies in which the court is
an active player. Ex ante, the contracting parties cannot include the risky unforeseen
contingencies in the contract they draw up. Ex post, the court observes whether an ...
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Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write?

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L Anderlini, L Felli… - 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We find an economic rationale for the common sense answer to the question in our
title-courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and
analyse a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. An active court ...
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Probability and uncertainty in economic modeling

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I Gilboa, AW Postlewaite… - The Journal of Economic …, 2008 - ingentaconnect.com
... Finance and Economics, HEC, Paris, France. Andrew Postlewaite is Harry P. Kamen
Professor of Economics and Professor of Finance, University of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. David Schmeidler is Professor at ...
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Workers versus firms: Bargaining over a firm's value

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GJ Mailath… - The Review of Economic …, 1990 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We introduce a distinction between a firm and its network of workers. In a
competitive world, if networks are easily lured away, the workers must receive the entire
value of their contribution to the firm. How then can service firms have equity value? A ...
Cited by 47 - Related articles - Library Search - All 7 versions

Information, Liquidity and Asset Prices

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B Lester, A Postlewaite… - PIER Working Paper Archive, 2008 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We study economies with multiple assets that are valued both for their return and
liquidity. Exchange occurs in decentralized markets with frictions making a medium of
exchange essential. Some assets are better suited for this role because they are more ...
Cited by 43 - Related articles - All 86 versions

Implementation via Nash equilibria in economic environments

A Postlewaite - Social goals and social organization: Essays in …, 1985 - books.google.com
The Walrasian general, equilibrium model of an economy is a basic foundation of economic
theory. It is a simple, elegant model capable of many interpretations. Further, the first welfare
theorem, which states that Walrasian allocations are Pareto efficient, is the basis for the ...
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SOCIAL ASSETS*

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GJ Mailath… - International Economic Review, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
We present a model incorporating both social and economic components and analyze their
interaction. The notion of a social asset, an attribute that has value only because of the
social institutions governing society, is introduced. In the basic model, agents match on ...
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Ambiguity in election games

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E Aragones… - Review of Economic Design, 2002 - Springer
Abstract. We construct a model in which the ambiguity of candidates allows them to increase
the number of voters to whom they appeal. We focus our analysis on two points that are
central to obtain ambiguity in equilibrium: restrictions on the beliefs that candidates can ...
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[CITATION] Laws and authority

G Mailath, S Morris… - Yale University, 2001
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Informational size and efficient auctions

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R McLean… - Review of Economic Studies, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
We develop an auction model for the case of interdependent values and multidimensional
signals in which agents' signals are correlated. We provide conditions under which a
modification of the Vickrey auction which includes payments to the bidders will result in an ...
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[CITATION] Asymmetric information

A Postlewaite - The new palgrave: Allocation, information, and markets, 1989
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[PDF] Disadvantageous syndicates

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A Postlewaite, RW Rosenthal - Journal of …, 1974 - ksmb02.kellogg.northwestern.edu
By organization of economic agents, we refer to formation of a single entity (eg corporation,
union) from several individual agents. From the real world as well as economic theory, one
is familiar with situations in which it is economically advantageous for individuals to ...
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[CITATION] Experimental Consumption and the'Rothschild Effect'

R Kihlstrom, L Mirman… - Bayesian Models of …, 1984 - Amsterdam, Elsevier
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Depth of knowledge and the effect of higher order uncertainty

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S Morris, A Postlewaite… - Economic Theory, 1995 - Springer
Summary A number of recent papers have highlighted the importance of uncertainty about
others' information in models of asymmetric information. We introduce a notion that reflects
the depth of knowledge in an information system. We show how the depth of knowledge ...
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Oligopoly and competition in large markets

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M Okuno, A Postlewaite… - The American Economic Review, 1980 - JSTOR
In this paper we study questions of oligopoly and competition in a general equilibrium
framework. In particular, we consider the Nash equilibria of a model of noncooperative
exchange in the context of a measure space of economic agents which incorporates both ...
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Rationality of belief. Or why Bayesianism is neither necessary nor sufficient for rationality

I Gilboa, A Postlewaite… - 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Economic theory reduces the concept of rationality to internal consistency. The
practice of economics, however, distinguishes between rational and irrational beliefs. There
is therefore an interest in a theory of rational beliefs, and of the process by which beliefs ...
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Investment and concern for relative position

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HL Cole, GJ Mailath… - Review of Economic Design, 2001 - Springer
Abstract. Economists typically analyze individuals' market behavior in isolation from their
nonmarket decisions. While this research strategy has generally been successful, it can lead
to systematic errors when agents' nonmarket behavior affects their market choices. In this ...
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Business strategy, human capital, and managerial incentives

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GJ Mailath, V Nocke… - Journal of Economics & …, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
We posit that the value of a manager's human capital depends on the firm's business
strategy. The resulting interaction between business strategy and managerial incentives
affects the organization of business activities. We illustrate the impact of this interaction on ...
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Aggregation of expert opinions

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D Gerardi, R McLean… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2009 - Elsevier
Conflicts of interest arise between a decision maker and agents who have information
pertinent to the problem because of differences in their preferences over outcomes. We
investigate how the decision maker can extract the information by distorting the decisions ...
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[PDF] Efficient non-contractible investments in finite economies

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HL Cole, GJ Mailath… - Advances in Theoretical …, 2001 - econ.upenn.edu
Abstract Individuals making investments typically do not have incentives to invest efficiently
when they cannot contract prior to their decisions. When they bargain over the surplus
generated by their investments, they will usually not obtain the full fruits of the investment. ...
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[BOOK] Rhetoric and analogies

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E Aragones, I Gilboa, A Postlewaite… - 2001 - econ.tau.ac.il
Abstract The art of rhetoric may be defined as changing other people's minds (opinions,
beliefs) without providing them new information. One technique heavily used by rhetoric
employs analogies. Using analogies, one may draw the listener's attention to similarities ...
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Political reputations and campaign promises

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E Aragonès, A Postlewaite… - Journal of the European …, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract We analyze conditions under which candidates' reputations may affect voters'
beliefs over what policy will be implemented by the winning candidate of an election. We
develop a model of repeated elections with complete information in which candidates are ...
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The social context of economic decisions

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GJ Mailath… - Journal of the European Economic …, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract The social context can have a large impact on economic decisions. The theoretical
challenge is to formulate a model that encompasses both social and economic decisions in
a meaningful manner. We discuss the incorporation of social context into neoclassical ...
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Approximate Walrasian equilibria and nearby economies

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A Postlewaite… - International Economic Review, 1981 - JSTOR
If one coinsiders an economy it is sometimes useful to have a notion of an allocation being"
nearly" Wairasian. Notions of an allocation being approximately Walrasian generally refer to
relaxing the definition of Walrasian equilibrium. For example, an allocation might be called ...
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[PDF] Do children learn to save from their parents

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J Knowles… - Unpublished Manuscript, University …, 2004 - aida.wss.yale.edu
Abstract It is well-known that small differences in discount rates, persisting over generations,
make it much easier to explain US wealth inequality across households as an equilibrium
outcome. At the individual level, recent micro studies suggest that variations in ...
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[BOOK] Efficient non-contractible investments

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HL Cole, GJ Mailath, A Postlewaite… - 1998 - research.mpls.frb.fed.us
ABSTRACT This paper addresses the question of whether agents will invest e. ciently in
attributes that will increase their productivity in subsequent matches with other individuals.
We present a two1sided matching model in which buyers and sellers make investment ...
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Active Courts and Menu Contracts

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L Anderlini, L Felli… - LSE STICERD Research …, 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active
court. The model we analyze is the same as in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006). An
active court can improve on the outcome that the parties would achieve without it. The ...
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Exclusivity clauses and best price policies in input markets

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P DeGraba… - Journal of Economics & …, 1992 - Wiley Online Library
1. We would like to thank Franklin Allen, Thomas Cooper, Dave Crawford, Paul Milgrom, and
Almarin Phillips and several anonymous referees, including two from this journal, for their
helpful comments. Responsibility for any remaining errors rests with the authors. Support ...
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Is It Always Rational to Satisfy Savage's Axioms?'

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I Gilboa, A Postlewaite… - Economics and …, 2009 - Cambridge Univ Press
This note argues that, under some circumstances, it is more rational not to behave in
accordance with a Bayesian prior than to do so. The starting point is that in the absence of
information, choosing a prior is arbitrary. If the prior is to have meaningful implications, it is ...
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Social isolation and inequality

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A Postlewaite… - Journal of Economic Inequality, 2005 - Springer
Abstract There is an increasing interest in the concept of social exclusion and the related
concept of social isolation and their potential role in understanding inequality. We examine
the degree to which voluntary separation from social activities during adolescence affects ...
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Monopolistic quantity rationing

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V Bohm, E Maskin, H Polemarchakis… - The Quarterly Journal of …, 1983 - JSTOR
In this paper we address the question of whether a price-setting monopolist can improve his
welfare by imposing quantity constraints on buyers. We show first that if all buyers are
identical, quantity rations are not useful for the monopolist. We then show by means of an ...
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[PDF] Rationality of belief

[PDF] from tau.ac.il
I Gilboa, A Postlewaite… - Synthese, 2004 - econ.tau.ac.il
Abstract Economic theory reduces the concept of rationality to internal consistency. The
practice of economics, however, distinguishes between rational and irrational beliefs. There
is therefore an interest in a theory of rational beliefs, and of the process by which beliefs ...
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Efficient auction mechanisms with interdependent valuations and multidimensional signals

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R McLean… - 2001 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We develop an auction model for the case of interdependent values and
multidimensional signals in which agents' information is not independent. We show that a
modification of the Vickrey auction which includes payments to the bidders will result in an ...
Cited by 15 - Related articles - All 9 versions

[BOOK] Differential information and strategic behavior in economic environments: A general equilibrium approach

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A Postlewaite… - 1987 - books.google.com
The last three decades have seen the development of what is probably the most general
model in economic theory-—the Arrow-Debreu model of general equilibrium theory. Within
this model it has been possible to prove the existence of equilibrium under very general ...
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Consumption commitments and employment contracts

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A Postlewaite, L Samuelson… - The Review of …, 2008 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We examine an economy in which the cost of consuming some goods can be
reduced by making commitments that reduce flexibility. We show that such consumption
commitments can induce consumers with risk-neutral underlying utility functions to be risk ...
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Consumption, Commitmants and Preferences for Risk

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A Postlewaite, L Samuelson… - 2004 - nber.org
We examine an economy in which the cost of consuming some goods can be reduced by
making commitments to consumption levels independent of the state. For example, it is
cheaper to produce housing services via owner-occupied than rented housing, but the ...
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Rational Expectations and the Measurement of a Stock's Elasticity of Demand

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F Allen… - Journal of Finance, 1984 - JSTOR
Scholes [1] considered the effect of secondary sales of large blocks of stock on the price of
the stock. However, he only looked at price changes occurring just before and just after the
sale took place. It is argued here, using a simple model, that if traders have rational ...
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Information and Liquidity

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B Lester, A Postlewaite… - Journal of Money, Credit …, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
1. We would like to thank Guillaume Rocheteau for an excellent discussion of this paper, as
well as many seminar and conference participants for their input. Postlewaite and Wright
acknowledge support from the National Science Foundation, and Lester acknowledges ...
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Informational size and incentive compatibility with aggregate uncertainty

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RP McLean… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2003 - Elsevier
In McLean and Postlewaite (Econometrica 56, 1992, p. 2421), we analyzed pure exchange
economies with asymmetrically informed agents. We defined a notion of informational size
and showed that, when the aggregate information of all agents resolves nearly all the ...
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Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information

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RP McLean… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2003 - Elsevier
We study the ex ante incentive compatible core, and provide conditions under which the ex
ante incentive compatible core is nonempty when agents are informationally small in the
sense of McLean and Postlewaite (2002a, Econometrica, 70, 2421–2453).
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Core convergence with asymmetric information

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R McLean… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2005 - Elsevier
We analyze the ex ante incentive compatible core for replicated private information
economies. We show that any allocation in the core when the economy is replicated
sufficiently often is approximately Walrasian for the associated Arrow–Debreu economy.
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Response to" Aristocratic Equilibria"

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HL Cole, GJ Mailath… - The Journal of Political Economy, 1995 - JSTOR
A major point of Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992) is that the existence of nonmarket
decisions leads naturally to multiple equilibria and, consequently, the possibility that ex ante
identical societies might exhibit different patterns of economic growth. It was further ...
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Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria

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GJ Mailath, A Postlewaite… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2005 - Elsevier
We examine contemporaneous perfect ɛ-equilibria, in which a player's actions after every
history, evaluated at the point of deviation from the equilibrium, must be within ɛ of a best
response. This concept implies, but is stronger than, Radner's ex ante perfect ɛ- ...
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[CITATION] Disadvantageous monopolies and disadvantageous endowments

JH Dreze, J Gabszewicz… - Journal of Economic …, 1977 - econpapers.repec.org
By Jacques H. Dreze, Jean Gabszewicz and Andrew Postlewaite;
Disadvantageous monopolies and disadvantageous endowments.
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[CITATION] Wealth inequality and parental transmission of savings behavior

J Knowles… - Manuscript, Department of Economics, University of …, 2005
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[PDF] A note on the stability of large cartels

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A Postlewaite… - Econometrica, 1977 - ssc.upenn.edu
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions
of Use, available at http://www. jstor. org/about/terms. html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions
of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not ...
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Pricing in Matching Markets

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G Mailath, A Postlewaite… - 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Different markets are cleared by different types of prices---a universal price for all
buyers and sellers in some markets, seller-specific prices that are uniform across buyers in
others, and personalized prices tailored to both the buyer and the seller in yet others. We ...
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[CITATION] Equilibrium in a Securities Market with a Dominant Trader Possessing Inside Information

R Kihlstrom… - Manuscript. Philadelphia: Univ. Pennsylvania, 1983
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The possibility of recipient-harming, donor-benefiting transfers with more than two countries

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A Postlewaite… - Journal of International Economics, 1984 - Elsevier
The possibility of a commodity transfer among nations which simultaneously benefits the
donor and harms the recipient is examined. An example of a three-country exchange
economy is presented where a transfer may be made which gives the counter-intuitive ...
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Excess functions and nucleolus allocations of pure exchange economies

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RP McLean… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1989 - Elsevier
Abstract Excess functions and nucleolus allocations are defined for pure exchange
economies. These allocations are shown to be a nonempty, compact subset of the efficient
allocations and are contained in the core when the core is nonempty. A special class of ...
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Rationality of belief or: why savage's axioms are neither necessary nor sufficient for rationality

I Gilboa, A Postlewaite… - Synthese, 2012 - Springer
Abstract Economic theory reduces the concept of rationality to internal consistency. As far as
beliefs are concerned, rationality is equated with having a prior belief over a “Grand State
Space”, describing all possible sources of uncertainties. We argue that this notion is too ...
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Ambiguity in election games

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E Aragones… - 2000 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We construct a model in which the ambiguity of candidates allows them to increase
the number of voters to whom they appeal when voters have intense preferences for one of
the alternatives available. An ambiguous candidate may offer voters with different ...
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Information, liquidity, asset prices and monetary policy

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B Lester, A Postlewaite… - The Review of …, 2012 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract What determines which assets are used in transactions? We develop a framework
where the extent to which assets are recognizable determines the extent to which they are
acceptable in exchange–ie, it determines their liquidity. Recognizability and liquidity are ...
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[BOOK] On modeling cheap talk in Bayesian games

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SA Matthews… - 1992 - kellogg.northwestern.edu
The" cheap talk games" studied in this chapter are games in which players with private
information exchange payoff-irrelevant messages. Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Green
and Stokey (1980) introduced the simplest cheap talk games, those in which a" sender" ...
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[PDF] Repeated relationships with limits on information processing

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O Compte… - Levine's Working Paper Archive, 2008 - ssc.upenn.edu
Abstract Many important strategic problems are characterized by repeated interactions
among agents. There is a large literature in game theory and economics illustrating how
considerations of future interactions can provide incentives for cooperation that would not ...
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[PDF] Non-Cognitive Skills, Social Success, and Labor Market Outcomes

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A Postlewaite… - Manuscrito no publicado, 2006 - www-personal.umich.edu
Abstract This paper models the acquisition of non-cognitive, social skills that are valued in
the labor market. Individuals choose whether to participate in costly “social” activities for
which the immediate purpose is not the acquisition of marketable skills. Participation, ...
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The incentive costs of internalizing externalities

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G Mailath, V Nocke… - 2002 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We present a dynamic agency model in which changes in the structure of a firm
affect its value due to altered incentives. There may be disadvantages in merging two firms
even when such a merger allows the internalization of externalities between the two firms. ...
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Strategic firms and endogenous consumer emulation

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P Kircher… - The Quarterly Journal of …, 2008 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract Better-informed consumers may be treated preferentially by firms because their
consumption serves as a quality signal for other customers. For normal goods this results in
wealthy individuals being treated better than poor individuals. We investigate this ...
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[BOOK] Campaign rhetoric: a model of reputation

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E Aragones, A Postlewaite… - 2000 - openstorage.gunadarma.ac.id
Abstract We develop a model of infinitely repeated elections with complete information, and
analyze an equilibrium in which campaign rhetoric plays a role, when the value of the
candidates' reputation is large enough. We show how the existence of future elections ...
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[CITATION] The Disincentive Effects of Internalizing Externalities

GJ Mailath, V Nocke… - 2002 - mimeo, University of Pennsylvania
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Sunk investments lead to unpredictable prices

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G Mailath, A Postlewaite… - 2003 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We study transactions that require investments before trading in a competitive
market, when forward contracts fixing the transaction price are absent. We show that, despite
the market being perfectly competitive and subject to arbitrarily little uncertainty, the ...
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Social arrangements and economic behavior

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A Postlewaite - Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, 2001 - JSTOR
The social organization of society can have an important effect on the economic
organization of that society. By this, we mean that there are not markets to mediate the
determination of all things people legitimately care about from an economic point of view. ...
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Expected-Utility-Maximizing Price Search with Learning

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RM Harstad… - Management Science, 1981 - JSTOR
A considerable literature' analyzes the behavior of an individual who is to buy one unit of a good
in a market with differing prices for the good. The consumer is assumed to sample, at a fixed
cost, from a known probability distribution over a finite set of potential prices, and to ...
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[CITATION] Courts of law, unforeseen contingencies and incomplete contracts

L Anderlini, L Felli… - 2000 - mimeo
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On Price-Taking Behavior in Asymmetric Information Economies

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R McLean, J Peck… - Essays in Dynamic General …, 2005 - Springer
It is understood that rational expectations equilibria may not be incentive compatible: agents
with private information may be able to affect prices through the information conveyed by
their market behavior. We present a simple general equilibrium model to illustrate the ...
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Probabilities in Economic Modeling

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I Gilboa, A Postlewaite… - PIER Working Paper …, 2007 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Economic modeling assumes, for the most part, that agents are Bayesian, that is,
that they entertain probabilistic beliefs, objective or subjective, regarding any event in
question. We argue that the formation of such beliefs calls for a deeper examination and ...
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[PDF] Revelation and implementation under differential information

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A Postlewaite… - 1983 - conservancy.umn.edu
Our goal In this paper is to merge several central ideas in economic theory: strategic
behavior (incentive compatibility), differential (or incomplete) information, and the Arrow-
Debreu model of general equilibrium. By strategic behavior we refer to the literature which ...
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[CITATION] Liquidity, asset prices and monetary policy

B Lester, A Postlewaite… - 2007 - Mimeo. University of Pennsylvania
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Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version

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R McLean, I Obara… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We consider repeated games with private monitoring that are'close'to repeated
games with public/perfect monitoring. A private monitoring information structure is close to a
public monitoring information structure when private signals can generate approximately ...
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Specialization of Labor and the Distribution of Income

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A Matsui… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2000 - Elsevier
We analyze a model in which workers must be allocated to tasks to produce. There are
differences among the workers in absolute ability that are independent of the activity they
perform. We demonstrate a unique competitive equilibrium that determines both wages ...
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Accuracy vs. simplicity: A complex trade-off

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E Aragones, I Gilboa, A Postlewaite… - 2002 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Inductive learning aims at finding general rules that hold true in a database.
Targeted learning seeks rules for the prediction of the value of a variable based on the
values of others, as in the case of linear or non-parametric regression analysis. Non- ...
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[CITATION] Rationality of Belief, or: Why Savage's Axioms are Neither Sufficient nor Necessary for Rationality

I Gilboa, AW Postlewaite… - 2006 - mimeo
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