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[PDF] Political mergers as coalition formation: Evidence from japanese municipal amalgamations

[PDF] from nyu.edu
E Weese - Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series, 2008 - econ.as.nyu.edu
Abstract Political coalition formation games can describe the formation and dissolution of
nations, as well as the creation of coalition governments, the establishment of political
parties, and other similar phenomena. These games have been studied from a theoretical ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 35 versions

[CITATION] Political mergers as coalition formation: Estimates from japanese municipal mergers

E Weese - 2010 - Yale University Working Paper
Cited by 3 - Related articles

[CITATION] Essays on Political Boundaries

EG Weese - 2009 - Massachusetts Institute of …
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[PDF] Political Mergers as Coalition Formation

[PDF] from umn.edu
E Weese - Working Papers, 2011 - ageconsearch.umn.edu
Abstract Political coalition formation games can describe the formation and dissolution of
nations, as well as the creation of coalition governments, the establishment of political
parties, and other similar phenomena. These games have been studied from a theoretical ...
Related articles - View as HTML - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 7 versions

[PDF] Efficiencies of Scale in Local Public Good Provision: Estimation via Coalition Panel Data

[PDF] from princeton.edu
E Weese - 2012 - princeton.edu
Abstract Preferences of players in a coalition formation game can be estimated using a
constrained maximum likelihood approach if there if there is data available for two periods,
where coalitions were formed in only one of these periods due to an exogenous change, ...
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[PDF] Political mergers as a coalition formation game: Evidence from the Heisei municipal mergers

[PDF] from hit-u.ac.jp
E Weese - 2008 - econ.hit-u.ac.jp
Abstract Over time, changes in technology and population distribution make existing political
boundaries inefficient; however, unanimity requirements and an inability to negotiate
transfers result in too few changes being made. This can be shown empirically using the ...
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Essays on political boundaries

[PDF] from mit.edu
D Acemoglu, A Banerjee… - 2009 - dspace.mit.edu
Page 1. Essays on Political Boundaries by Eric Gordon Weese BA, Yale University
(2004) Submitted to the Department of Economics in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Economics at the ...
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