M Yildiz - Econometrica, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
In sequential bargaining models without outside options, each player's bargaining power is
ultimately determined by which player will make an offer and when. This paper analyzes a
sequential bargaining model in which players may hold different beliefs about which ...
M Yildiz - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2004 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract I analyze a sequential bargaining model in which players are optimistic about their
bargaining power (measured as the probability of making offers), but learn as they play the
game. I show that there exists a uniquely predetermined settlement date, such that in ...
Most economic analyses presume that there are limited differences in the prior beliefs of
individuals, as assumption most often justified by the argument that sufficient common
experiences and observations will eliminate disagreements. We investigate this claim ...
J Weinstein… - Econometrica, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
Rationalizability is a central solution concept of game theory. Economic models often have
many rationalizable outcomes, motivating economists to use refinements of rationalizability,
including equilibrium refinements. In this paper we try to achieve a general understanding ...
Abstract: Under the assumption that individuals know the conditional distributions of signals
given the payoff-relevant parameters, existing results conclude that as individuals observe
infinitely many signals, their beliefs about the parameters will eventually merge. We first ...
J Weinstein… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2007 - Elsevier
In some games, the impact of higher-order uncertainty is very large, implying that present
economic theories may rely critically on the strong common knowledge assumptions they
make. Focusing on normal-form games in which the players' action spaces are compact ...
M Yildiz - Games and Economic Behavior, 2003 - Elsevier
Given any two-person economy, consider an alternating-offer bargaining game with
complete information where the proposers offer prices, and the responders either choose
the amount of trade at the offered prices or reject the offer. We provide conditions under ...
M Yildiz - 2000 - en.scientificcommons.org
Publikationsansicht. 34024452. Essays on sequential bargaining / (2001). Yildiz, Muhamet.
Abstract. "December 2000.". Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2000.. Includes bibliographical
references. Details der Publikation. Download, http://worldcat.org/oclc/81192643. ...
D Acemoglu, M Yildiz - Unpublished manuscript, MIT, 2001 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: An agent with a misperception may have an evolutionary advantage when others
recognize his misperception and its behavioral implications. In such situations evolutionary
forces can lead to misperceptions, yielding" irrational behavior," such as the play of strictly ...
M Yildiz - The Review of Economic Studies, 2007 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract Towards developing a theory of systematic biases about strategies, I analyse
strategic implications of a particular bias: wishful thinking about the strategies. I identify a
player as a wishful thinker if she hopes to enjoy the highest pay-off that is consistent with ...
S Izmalkov… - American Economic Journal: …, 2010 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: We consider a general class of games that have been used to model many
economic problems where players' sentiments are believed to play an important role.
Dropping the common prior assumption, we identify the relevant notion of sentiments for ...
M Yildiz - 2001 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We analyze a sequential bargaining model, where players are allowed to hold
different beliefs about which players will make an offer and when. Excessive optimism about
making offers in the future can cause a delay in agreement. Despite this, the main result ...
J Weinstein… - 2003 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: In some games, the impact of higher-order uncertainty is very large, implying that
present economic theories may be misleading as these theories assume common
knowledge of the type structure after specifying the first or the second orders of beliefs. ...
MR Sertel… - Mathematical social sciences, 1998 - Elsevier
J Weinstein… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2011 - Elsevier
We analyze “nice” games (where action spaces are compact intervals, utilities continuous
and strictly concave in own action), which are used frequently in classical economic models.
Without making any “richness” assumption, we characterize the sensitivity of any given ...
A Simsek… - Unpublished, January, 2008 - else.econ.ucl.ac.uk
Abstract Observing that standard assumptions imply extreme discontinuity of bargaining
power in continuous time limit, we develop a model of continuous bargaining power in
continuous time. We formally introduce durability of bargaining power and show that it ...
M Yildiz - Economics Letters, 2011 - Elsevier
I consider a final-offer arbitration model in which the offers are submitted sequentially, the
parties are allowed to accept offers, and the arbitrator maximizes Nash's social welfare
function. I show that backwards induction in this three-period model leads to the subgame- ...
MR Sertel… - Advances in economic design, 2003 - books.google.com
Abstract. Is there a bargaining solution that pays out the Walrasian welfare for exchange
economies? We show that there is none, for there are distinct exchange economies whose
Walrasian equilibrium welfare payoffs disagree but which define the same bargaining ...
J WEINSTEIN, M YILDIZ - 2009 - kellogg.northwestern.edu
Abstract. We show that in any game that is continuous at infinity, if a plan of action ai is
rationalizable for a type ti, then there are perturbations of ti for which following ai for an
arbitrarily long future is the only rationalizable plan. One can pick the perturbation from a ...
E Ofek, M Yildiz… - Management Science, 2007 - utdallas.edu
This paper develops and tests a model of how recall of information from past decisions
affects subsequent related decisions. A boundedly rational individual has to determine her
willingness to pay for a good that she previously considered purchasing at a given price, ...
M Yildiz - Contributions in Theoretical Economics, 2002 - degruyter.com
We analyze the subgame-perfect equilibria of a game where two agents bargain in order to
share the risk in their assets that will pay dividends once at some fixed date. The uncertainty
about the size of the dividends is resolved gradually by the payment date and each agent ...
E Ofek, M Yildiz… - 2002 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper develops and tests a model of sequential decision making where a first
stage of ranking a set of alternatives is followed by a second stage of determining the value
of these same alternatives. The model assumes a boundedly rational Bayesian decision ...
M Yildiz - MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 04- …, 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Under a firm deadline, agreement in bargaining is often delayed until the deadline.
I propose a rationale for this deadline effect that naturally comes from the parties' optimism
about their bargaining power. I then show that the deadline effect disappears if the ...
[CITATION] 'Game Theory-Normal Form Games, Simultaneous Action Games
H Ergin… - MIT Tutorials
[CITATION] Game Theory Lecture Notes
M Yildiz - 2002
G Ellison, M Yildiz, AAD Campbell - 2009 - dspace.mit.edu
Chapter 1 studies the optimal strategies of a monopolist selling a good to consumers who
engage in word of mouth communication. The monopolist uses the price it charges to
influence both the proportion of the population that is willing to purchase the good and the ...
M Yildiz… - 2003 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: It is a common fear in many countries that ideological parties will come to power
through elections but will implement extreme policies and even end the democratic regime.
Many countries cope with this problem by overriding the election results when such ...
M Yildiz - MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 05- …, 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: For a finite set of actions and a rich set of fundamentals, consider the rationalizable
actions on a universal type space, endowed with the usual product topology.(1) Generically,
there exists a unique rationalizable action profile.(2) Every model can be approximately ...
M Yildiz… - Econometric Society 2004 North American …, 2004 - ideas.repec.org
In some games, the impact of higher-order uncertainty is very large, implying that present
economic theories may be misleading as these theories assume common knowledge of the
type structure after specifying the first or the second orders of beliefs. Focusing on normal- ...
M Yildiz, C Rothschild - 2006 - dspace.mit.edu
This dissertation consists of three chapters on adverse-selection type insurance markets.
Chapter 1 develops a model for analyzing non-exclusive insurance markets. It establishes
that the" screening" considerations of models following Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)-long ...
M Sertel… - Working Papers, 1996 - ideas.repec.org
Under certain membership property rights obeying the'liberal ethic'and'approved
entry'axioms, we define three-stage games where the last two stages of non-cooperative
tariff setting game and subsequent Cournotian competition are preceded by the formation ...
J WEINSTEIN, M YILDIZ - 2003 - econ.yale.edu
Abstract. Present economic theories assume common knowledge of the type structure after
specifying the first or the second orders of beliefs. We analyze the set of equilibrium
predictions that can be deduced from the knowledge of equilibrium and players' beliefs at ...
M Yildiz, B Holmström, D Gottlieb - 2009 - dspace.mit.edu
This thesis is a collection of essays on contract theory and behavioral economics. Chapter 1
proposes a model of choice under risk based on imperfect memory and self-deception. The
model assumes that people have preferences over their own attributes and can, to some ...
V Pokladniková… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2009 - Elsevier
It is a common fear in many countries that ideological parties will come to power through
elections but will implement extreme policies. Many countries cope with this problem by
overriding the election results when such parties are elected. We demonstrate that the ...
G Ellison, M Yildiz, K Amaya - 2003 - 18.7.29.232
Chapter 1 analyzes how pre-play communication and evolution together do or do not lead to
socially efficient equilibria in 2 x 2 symmetric coordination games. In our evolutionary
dynamics, there are committed players who can choose only one particular action of the ...
M Yıldız - 2001 - lawweb.usc.edu
Page 1. Bargaining over Risky Assets Muhamet Yıldız1 MIT April 6, 2001 1This paper
is based on my dissertation, submitted to Stanford Graduate School of Business. I thank
my advisor Robert Wilson for his guidance and continuous help. ...
[CITATION] RATIONALIZABILITY AND FINITE-ORDER IMPLICATIONS OF EQUILIBRIUM–PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE–
J WEINSTEIN, M YILDIZ - 2003
JC Ely, EJ Green, BL Lipman, D Ray, S Athey… - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. ...
M Yildiz - Game Theory in the Tradition of Bob Wilson, 2002 - bepress.com
... Game Theory in the Tradition of Bob Wilson. AUTHOR(S): Muhamet Yildiz. TITLE: Preface to
"Bargaining over Risky Assets". SUGGESTED CITATION: Muhamet Yildiz (2002) "Preface to
"Bargaining over Risky Assets"", Game Theory in the Tradition of Bob Wilson Article 39. ...
G Ellison, D Acemoglu, M Yildiz… - 2011 - dspace.mit.edu
The thesis consists of four essays on bargaining and repeated games. The first essay
studies whether allowing players to sign binding contracts governing future play leads to
reputation effects in repeated games with long-run players. Given any prior over ...
AV Banerjee, M Yildiz, SG Chassang - 2007 - dspace.mit.edu
This thesis is a collection of essays on coordination and learning in dynamic cooperation
games. Chapter One begins by establishing results which are required in order to extend the
global games approach to settings where the game structure is endogenous. In particular ...
S Koray… - Review of Economic Design, 2006 - Springer
Page 1. Rev. Econ. Design (2006) 10:165–166 DOI 10.1007/s10058-006-0020-1
EDITORIAL Special Issue in Memory of Murat R. Sertel Semih Koray · Muhamet Yıldız
Published online: 14 November 2006 © Springer-Verlag 2006 ...
MR Sertel… - Mathematical Social Sciences, 1999 - Elsevier
M Yildiz - 2002 - dspace.mit.edu
Analysis of strategic behavior in multi-person economic settings. Introduction to Nash
equilibrium and its refinements: subgame-perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium.
Applications drawn from labor economics, the economics of organization, industrial ...
P Milgrom… - 2002 - bb.ustc.edu.cn
• A coalition Si={1, 2,…, i}• Coalition S–formed in the order {1}→–formed in a random order
where {1, 2}→{1, 2, 3}→…→ each permutation is equally {1, 2,…, i-1}→{1, 2,…, i-1, i}; likely–
there are| S|! Perms.;–the new-comer has all the–the new-comer has all the bargaining ...
M Yildiz - 2010 - ocw.mit.edu
When we define a game we implicitly assume that the structure (ie the set of players, their
strategy sets and the fact that they try to maximize the expected value of the von-Neumann
and Morgenstern utility functions) described by the game is common knowledge. The ...
J Hörner, BL Lipman, D Ray, S Athey, T Bergstrom… - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. Wiley Online Library will be disrupted 3
Dec from 10-12 GMT for monthly maintenance. ...
M Yildiz, GD Ellison, J Weinstein - 2005 - dspace.mit.edu
These four essays concern the theory of games and its application to economic theory. The
first two, closely linked, chapters are an investigation into the foundational question of the
sensitivity of the predictions of game theory to higher-order beliefs. Impact of Higher-Order ...
J WEINSTEIN, M YILDIZ - kellogg.northwestern.edu
Abstract. We show that in any game that is continuous at infinity, if a plan of action ai is
played by a type ti in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, then there are perturbations of ti for
which ai is the only rationalizable plan and whose unique rationalizable belief regarding ...
[CITATION] Signaling and Reputation 14.126 Teoría de juegos
S Izmalkov… - 2001 - Otoño
[CITATION] A Synopsis of Choice Election 14.126 Teoría de juegos
S Izmalkov… - 2001 - Otoño
[CITATION] Economic Applications of Game Theory
YM Yildiz - Journal of Political Economy, 1959
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