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Mathematical properties of the Banzhaf power index

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P Dubey… - Mathematics of Operations Research, 1979 - JSTOR
The Banzhaf index of power in a voting situation depends on the number of ways in which
each voter can effect a" swing" in the outcome. It is comparable-but not actually equivalent-to
the better-known Shapley-Shubik index, which depends on the number of alignments or" ...
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Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium1

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P Dubey, J Geanakoplos… - econometrica, 2005 - Wiley Online Library
This work is supported in part by NSF Grant DMS-87-05294 and SES-881205. The first
version of this paper (Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (1990)) appeared in 1990. That
version, containing essentially the basic model and Theorems 1 and 2 from this paper, ...
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Inefficiency of Nash equilibria

P Dubey - Mathematics of Operations Research, 1986 - JSTOR
= 1,. ., n, where S' is the strategy-set and u' the payoff function of player i. Our result states that
if the functions u' are C2, then generically (for an open dense set of payoffs): (a) the set of NE
is finite, (b) if an NE is efficient, then at least one player is on a vertex of his strategy-set, ...
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[PDF] A theory of money and financial institutions. 28. The noncooperative equilibria of a closed trading economy with market supply and bidding strategies

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P Dubey… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1978 - dido.wss.yale.edu
In several previous papers Shubik [1], Shapley [2], and Shapley and Shubik [3] have
proposed and investigated a model of exchange in many markets with the manner of price
formation completely formulated and with trade utilizing a money.
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Value theory without efficiency

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P Dubey, A Neyman… - Mathematics of Operations Research, 1981 - JSTOR
A semivalue is a symmetric positive linear operator on a space of games, which leaves the
additive games fixed. Such an operator satisfies all of the axioms defining the Shapley
value, with the possible exception of the efficiency axiom. The class of semivalues is ...
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Efficiency properties of strategies market games: An axiomatic approach

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P Dubey, A Mas-Colell… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1980 - Elsevier
Abstract The paper investigates the conditions under which an abstractly given market game
will have the property that if there is a continuum of traders then every noncooperative
equilibrium is Walrasian. In orther words, we look for a general axiomatization of Cournot's ...
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Price-quantity strategic market games

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P Dubey - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1982 - JSTOR
THIS PAPER IS yet another in a rapidly growing series (eg [2]-[11]) on strategic approaches to
economic equilibrium. Our aim here is to make precise the remark implicitly due to Bertrand
[1 or 10, Ch. 4, 5] that if the agents in an economy use price-setting strategies then the ...
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The revelation of information in strategic market games: A critique of rational expectations equilibrium

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P Dubey, J Geanakoplos… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1987 - Elsevier
Abstract We criticize the REE approach to asymmetric information general equilibrium
because it does not explain how information gets 'into'the prices. This leads to well-known
paradoxes. We suggest a multiperiod game instead, where the flow of information into and ...
Cited by 118 - Related articles - All 10 versions

[PDF] Default and efficiency in a general equilibrium model with incomplete markets

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P Dubey, J Geanakoplos… - Research paper, 1990 - dido.econ.yale.edu
Abstract: We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets
(GEI) to allow for default. Default can be either strategic, or due to ill-fortune. Agents who
default are penalized to a degree proportional to the size of their default and to penalty ...
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Noncooperative general exchange with a continuum of traders: two models

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P Dubey… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1994 - Elsevier
Abstract Price formation and trade in a large exchange economy is modelled as a non-
atomic strategic game in two contrasting forms.(1) The 'pay-later'form uses paper money or
IOUs which the players must redeem at the final accounting or face overdraft penalties.(2) ...
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Competitive pooling: Rothschild-stiglitz reconsidered

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P Dubey… - The Quarterly Journal of …, 2002 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We build a model of competitive pooling, which incorporates adverse selection and
signaling into general equilibrium. Pools are characterized by their quantity limits on
contributions. Households signal their reliability by choosing which pool to join. In ...
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Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games

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P Dubey, O Haimanko… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2006 - Elsevier
We show that games of strategic complements, or substitutes, with aggregation are “pseudo-
potential” games. The upshot is that they possess Nash equilibria in pure strategies (NE),
even if the strategy sets are not convex; and that various dynamic processes converge to ...
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The value of money in a finite horizon economy: a role for banks

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P Dubey… - … analysis of markets: Essays in honor …, 1992 - books.google.com
Frank Hahn (1965), among others, has argued that it is difficult to prove, or even to justify, a
positive price for fiat (ie, paper) money in economic equilibrium. The problem is particularly
serious when there are only a finite number of time periods. In the last period nobody will ...
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Inside and outside fiat money, gains to trade, and IS-LM

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P Dubey… - Economic Theory, 2003 - Springer
Summary. We build a one-period general equilibrium model with money. Equilibrium exists,
and fiat money has positive value, as long as the ratio of outside money to inside money is
less than the gains to trade available at autarky. We show that the nominal effects of ...
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[BOOK] Default in a general equilibrium model with incomplete markets

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P Dubey, J Geanakoplos, M Shubik… - 2000 - 128.36.236.35
Abstract We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets (GEI)
to allow for default. The equilibrating variables include aggregate default levels, as well as
prices of assets and commodities. Default can be either strategic, or due to ill0fortune. It ...
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The Shapley Value as Aircraft Landing Fees--Revisited

P Dubey - Management Science, 1982 - JSTOR
We examine the axiomatic basis of the Shapley value when applied to the problem of
allocating the cost of a runway among different-sized users. Our approach is to begin with a
model of airport-problems and then to list-within the model-certain natural properties ...
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Noncooperative exchange with a continuum of traders

P Dubey… - 1977 - rand.org
Price formation and trade in a large exchange economy is modeled as a nonatomic
noncooperative game in two contrasting ways:(1) with fiat money, with borrowing and
bankruptcy permitted, and (2) with a commodity money and no borrowing. Results relating ...
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Bankruptcy and optimality in a closed trading mass economy modelled as a non-cooperative game

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P Dubey… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1979 - Elsevier
Abstract In this paper we establish the existence of (a) an optimal bankruptcy rule which
enables us to describe the Walrasian trading economy as a game with trade in fiat money;
and (b) non-cooperative equilibrium points of this game which (in terms of prices and the ...
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[PDF] Nash Equilibria of Market Games: Finiteness and Inefi"| ciency

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P Dubey - J. Econ. Theory, 1980 - cowles.econ.yale.edu
In this paper we make good the promise [6, Sect. 9] that, under appropriate conditions, the
Nash Equilibria of finite-player strategic market games are generically inefficient. Our
conditions are:(a) the dimension of each trader's strategy set is at most I—l, where l is the ...
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A strategic market game with price and quantity strategies

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P Dubey… - Journal of Economics, 1980 - Springer
The noncooperative game theoretic approach to exchange, in contrast with general
equilibrium theory requires the complete specification of the market mechanism through
which trade is conducted. Elsewhere several different market mechanisms have been ...
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[CITATION] Default, collateral and derivatives

P Dubey, J Geanakoplos… - Yale University, 1995
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Information patterns and Nash Equilibria in extensive games: 1

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P Dubey… - Mathematical Social Sciences, 1984 - Elsevier
Abstract In this paper we explore the relation between information patterns and Nash
Equilibria in extensive games. By information we mean what players know about moves
made by others, as well as by chance. For the most part we confine ourselves to pure ...
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Monetary equilibrium with missing markets

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P Dubey… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2003 - Elsevier
We add inside and outside money to the standard GEI model. If there enough gains to trade
via money, then monetary equilibrium (ME) exists and money has positive value, even when
GEI fails to exist. The nonexistence of GEI shows up as a liquidity trap in terms of the ME. ...
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[PDF] A CLGSED ECONOMIC SYSTENI WITH PRQDUQTION AND EXCHANGE MODELLED AS A GAME Of? STRATEGY

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P Dubey… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1977 - cs112-b.cs.yale.edu
Models of a closed economic system with production and exchange have been studied both
by methods of general equilibrium analysis and cooperative game theory. The conditions for
the existence of a price system which clears all markets and is etficient have been ...
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Grading in Games of Status: Marking Exams and Setting Wages

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P Dubey… - Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper …, 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We introduce grading into games of status. Each player chooses effort, producing a
stochastic output or score. Utilities depend on the ranking of all the scores. By clustering
scores into grades, the ranking is coarsened, and the incentives to work are changed.
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Inefficiency of smooth market mechanisms

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P Dubey… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1990 - Elsevier
Abstract We examine the efficiency properties of an abstractly given market mechanism. This
consists of a smooth map from traders' strategy-choices to their net trades. When the number
of traders is finite (the oligopolistic case), it is shown that Nash equilibria 'tend to be' ...
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From Nash to Walras via Shapley–Shubik

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P Dubey… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2003 - Elsevier
We derive the existence of a Walras equilibrium (WE) directly from Nash's theorem on
noncooperative games. No price player is involved, nor are generalized games. Instead we
use a variant of the Shapley–Shubik trading-post game.
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Grading Exams: 100, 99,..., 1 or A, B, C? Incentives in Games of Status

P Dubey… - Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, 2004 - ideas.repec.org
We show that if students care primarily about their status (relative rank) in class, they are
best motivated to work not by revealing their exact numerical exam scores (100, 99,..., 1), but
instead by clumping them in broad categories (A, B, C). If their abilities are disparate, the ...
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Payoffs in nonatomic economies: An axiomatic approach

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P Dubey… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1984 - JSTOR
IT HAS BEEN OFTEN REMARKED that different solution concepts become equivalent in the
setting of" perfectly competitive" economies (ie, to use the modern idiom [2], economies in
which the agents form a nonatomic continuum). The conjecture that the core and ...
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Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort

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P Dubey… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2001 - Elsevier
We consider a principal who is keen to induce his agents to work at their maximal effort
levels. To this end, he samples n days at random out of the T days on which they work, and
awards a prize of B dollars to the most productive agent. The principal's policy (B, n) ...
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When less competition induces more product innovation

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P Dubey… - Economics letters, 2002 - Elsevier
Consider firms which engage in Cournot competition over a common product, but can
undertake innovation to improve the quality of their product. In this scenario it can often
happen that innovation is discouraged by too much or too little competition, and occurs ...
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[PDF] Liquidity and bankruptcy with incomplete markets: Pure exchange

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P Dubey, J Geanakoplos… - 1989 - cowles.econ.yale.edu
ABSTRACT We enlarge the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets
(GEI), to incorporate liquidity constraints as well as the possibil-ity of bankruptcy and default.
A new equilibrium results, which we abbrev-iate GELBI (general equilibrium with liquidity, ...
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Optimal scrutiny in multi-period promotion tournaments

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P Dubey… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2003 - Elsevier
Consider a principal who hires heterogeneous agents to work for him over T periods, without
prior knowledge of their skills, and intends to promote one of them at the end. In each period
the agents choose effort levels that influence their outputs, and are fully informed of the ...
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Determinacy with nominal assets and outside money

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P Dubey… - Economic Theory, 2006 - Springer
Summary. We build a finite horizon model with inside and outside money, in which interest
rates, price levels and commodity allocations are determinate, even though asset markets
are incomplete and asset deliveries are purely nominal.
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Strategic market games: a survey of some results

P DuBEY - NATO ASI SERIES D BEHAVIOURAL AND SOCIAL …, 1994 - books.google.com
Suppose there are n individuals who wish to trade amongst themselves in m commodities.
Two possible mechanisms for accomplishing such trade have been suggested by Shapley-
Shubik [SS],[Sh] and Shapley [SY] 2. The purpose of this section is to establish an ...
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Repeated trade and the velocity of money

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P Dubey, S Sahi… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1993 - Elsevier
Abstract There are two sources of inefficiency of strategic equilibria (SE) in market
mechanisms. The first is the oligopolistic effect, which occurs when an agent can single-
handedly influence prices. With a continuum of agents we get 'perfect competition'and this ...
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Trade and prices in a closed economy with exogeneous uncertainty, different levels of information, money and compound futures markets

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P Dubey… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1977 - JSTOR
1 This work is related to Department of the Navy Contract N00014-76-C-0085 issued by the
Office of Naval Research under Contract Authority NR 047-006. However, the content does
not necessarily reflect the position or the policy of the Department of the Navy or the ...
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Information conditions, communication and general equilibrium

P Dubey… - Mathematics of Operations Research, 1981 - JSTOR
It is shown that if the information sets of one game are a refinement of the information sets of
the other, then the set of pure strategy equilibrium points of the game with less information is
contained within the set of pure strategy equilibrium points of the game with more ...
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[CITATION] Bankruptcy and efficiency in a general equilibrium model with incomplete markets

P Dubey, J Geanakoplos, M Shubik… - 1988 - Yale University
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[BOOK] Inefficiency of Nash equilibria

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P Dubey, JD Rogawski… - 1982 - cowles.econ.yale.edu
1. Introduction The main theme of this paper and its sequel ([5]) is that Nash equilibria (NE)
are generally inefficient (in the Pareto sense). Suppose that a game with n players is given
by n maps ll ni and n maps u1: Y+ K, where S. is the strategy set, Y the outcome space, ...
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[PDF] Revelation of information in strategic market games: A critique of rational expectations

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P Dubey, J Geanakoplos… - Cowles Foundation Discussion …, 1982 - iiasa.ac.at
Consider an economy in which agents have different levels of information concerning
exogenous random events. How does the pooled information of the agents get revealed in
the process of exchange? In particular what is the role played in this by the price system? ...
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Asymptotic semivalues and a short proof of Kannai's theorem

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P Dubey - Mathematics of Operations Research, 1980 - JSTOR
Generalizations of the Shapley value, called semivalues, are introduced. We consider their
asymptotic behavior for sequences of games that approach a nonatomic game, and show
that limiting semivalues exist on pNA. In the process a short proof of Kannai's asymptotic ...
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Finiteness and inefficiency of Nash equilibria

P Dubey - 1978 - DTIC Document
Abstract: Our aim is to explore efficiency, as well as strongness, of the Nash Equilibria (NE)
of finite-person noncooperative games in strategic form. We show that--with smooth strategy
sets and payoff functions--it is almost always the case that the NE are finite in number; ...
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An equivalence principle for perfectly competitive economies

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P Dubey… - journal of economic theory, 1997 - Elsevier
Four axioms are placed on a correspondence from smooth, non-atomic economies to their
allocations. We show that the axiomscategorically determinethe (coincident) competitive-
core-value correspondence. Thus any solution is equivalent to the above three if, and only ...
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[CITATION] Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games

P Dubey, O Haimanko, A Zapechelnyuk… - 2004 - en.scientificcommons.org
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[CITATION] Probabilistic Generalizations of the Shapley Value

P Dubey - Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, 1976 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks.
Probabilistic Generalizations of the Shapley Value. Pradeep Dubey (). No 440, Cowles Foundation
Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University. ...
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Grading exams: 100, 99, 98,… or A, B, C?

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P Dubey… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2010 - Elsevier
We introduce grading into games of status. Each player chooses effort, producing a
stochastic output or score. Utilities depend on the ranking of all the scores. By clustering
scores into grades, the ranking is coarsened, and the incentives to work are changed. We ...
Cited by 11 - Related articles - All 4 versions

Competing for customers in a social network: The quasi-linear case

P Dubey, R Garg… - Internet and Network Economics, 2006 - Springer
There are many situations in which a customer's proclivity to buy the product of any firm
depends not only on the classical attributes of the product such as its price and quality, but
also on who else is buying the same product. We model these situations as games in ...
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Competing for customers in a social network

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P Dubey, B De Meyer… - 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: There are many situations in which a customer's proclivity to buy the product of any
firm depends not only on the classical attributes oft he product such as its price and quality,
but also on who else is buying the same product. We model these situations as games in ...
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Outsourcing induced by strategic competition

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Y Chen, P Dubey… - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2011 - Elsevier
We show that intermediate goods can be sourced to firms on the “outside”(that do not
compete in the final product market), even when there are no economies of scale or cost
advantages for these firms. What drives the phenomenon is that “inside” firms, by ...
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Insurance contracts designed by competitive pooling

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P Dubey… - 2001 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We build a model of competitive pooling and show how insurance contracts
emerge in equilibrium, designed by the invisible hand of perfect competition. When pools
are exclusive, we obtain a unique separating equilibrium. When pools are not exclusive ...
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Compound voting and the Banzhaf index

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P Dubey, E Einy… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2005 - Elsevier
We present three axioms for a power index defined on the domain of simple (voting) games.
Positivity requires that no voter has negative power, and at least one has positive power.
Transfer requires that, when winning coalitions are enhanced in a game, the change in ...
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Is gold an efficient store of value?

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P Dubey, J Geanakoplos… - Economic Theory, 2003 - Springer
Summary. Gold and tobacco have both been used as commodity money. One difference
between the two is that gold yields utility, on account of its beauty, without diminishing its
quantity. Tobacco yields utility when it is consumed. If this were the only difference,
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Signalling and Default: Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered

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P Dubey… - 2001 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: In our previous paper we built a general equilibrium model of default and
punishment in which equilibrium always exists and endogenously determines asset
promises, penalties, and sales constraints. In this paper we interpret the endogenous ...
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Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games--II

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P Dubey… - Mathematical Social Sciences, 1985 - Elsevier
Abstract In Part I of this paper we introduced extensive games with a non-atomic continuum
of players. It was shown that the Nash plays (outcomes) are invariant of the information
patterns on the game, provided that no player's unilateral change in moves can be ...
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[BOOK] Information about moves in extensive games: I

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P Dubey, M Kaneko… - 1982 - cowles.econ.yale.edu
The extensive game model is of fundamental importance and captures the interplay
between information and decision-making. Yet we find that its definition, as set forth by Kuhn
in [6], is insufficient from certain points-of—view. It is unable to incorporate games with a ...
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PRIZES VERSUS WAGES WITH ENVY AND PRIDE*

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P Dubey, J Geanakoplos… - Japanese Economic …, 2005 - Wiley Online Library
We show that if agents are risk-neutral, prizes outperform wages if and only if there is
sufficient pride and envy relative to the noisiness of performance. If agents are risk-averse,
prizes are a necessary supplement to wages (as bonuses).
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[CITATION] Trade and prices in a closed economy with exogenous uncertainty, different levels of information, money and special futures markets

P Dubey… - CFDP 4l0 (Revised), 1976
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[CITATION] Inefficiency of Nash equilibria in strategic market games

P Dubey, JD Rogawski… - 1985 - College of Commerce and Business …
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A note on an optimal garnishing rule

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P Dubey… - Economics Letters, 1988 - Elsevier
Economics Letters 27 (1988) 56 5 NorthHolland A NOTE ON AN OPTIMAL GARNISHING RULE
P. DUBEY and M. SHUBIK Yale University, New Haven, CT 065202125, USA Received 16 December
1987 A low information, optimal bankruptcy rule is described and analyzed for an ...
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A closed economy with exogenous uncertainty, different levels of information, money, futures and spot markets

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P Dubey… - International Journal of Game Theory, 1977 - Springer
AMoney Game is a model of trade (and production) in which there is a distinguished
commodity (real or fiat) which is used as a money; and in which complete rules for the
formation of price, as a result of individual strategies, are given.
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Learning with perfect information

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P Dubey… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2004 - Elsevier
For extensive form games with perfect information, consider a learning process in which, at
any iteration, each player unilaterally deviates to a best response to his current conjectures
of others' strategies; and then updates his conjectures in accordance with the induced ...
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Price-mediated trade with quantity signals: an axiomatic approach

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P Dubey… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2003 - Elsevier
We consider a mechanism in which individuals send signals, indicating how much of each
commodity they are willing to put up for trade. The mechanism produces prices and
redistributes the commodities. We require that the map from signals to trades and prices, ...
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[CITATION] A Strategic Market Game with Price and Quantity Strategies

P Dubey… - Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, 1979 - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of
further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site ...
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Real Determinacy with Nominal Assets

P Dubey… - Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper …, 2003 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We build a finite horizon model with inside and outside money, in which interest
rates, price levels and commodity allocations are determinate, even though asset markets
are incomplete and asset deliveries are purely nominal.
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[BOOK] Is Gold an Efficient Store of Value?

P Dubey, J Geanakoplos, M Shubik… - 1992 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract Gold and tobacco have both been used as commodity money. One difference
between the two is that gold yields utility, on account of its beauty, without diminishing its
quantity. Tobacco yields utility when it is consumed. If this were the only difference, ...
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[CITATION] A theory of money and financial institutions

P Dubey… - Part 36: The money rate of interest, 1977
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Grading Exams: 100, 99, 98,... Or A, B, C?

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P Dubey… - 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We introduce grading into games of status. Each player chooses effort, producing a
stochastic output or score. Utilities depend on the ranking of all the scores. By clustering
scores into grades, the ranking is coarsened, and the incentives to work are changed.
Cited by 3 - Related articles - All 19 versions

[CITATION] A theory of money and financial institutions. 28. The noncooperative equilibria of a closed trading economy with market supply and bidding strategies

D Pradeep… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1978
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[BOOK] Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort

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P Dubey, C Wu… - 2000 - dido.econ.yale.edu
Abstract We consider a principal who is keen to induce his agents to work at their maximal
effort levels. To this end, he samples n days at random out of the T days on which they work,
and awards a prize of B dollars to the most productive agent. The principal's policy (B, n) ...
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Perfect competition in strategic market games with interlinked preferences

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P Dubey… - Economics Letters, 1985 - Elsevier
Economics Letters 17 (1985) 34 3 NorthHolland PERFECT COMPETITION IN STRATEGIC MARKET
GAMES WITH INTERLINKED PREFERENCES Pradeep DUBEY and Martin SHUBIK Cowles
Foundation for Research in Economics, New Haven, CT 06520, USA Received 4 June ...
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[CITATION] Default in General Equilibrium with Incomplete Markets

P Dubey, J Geanakoplos… - 2000 - CFDP
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[CITATION] Debapriya Sen, 2009,'Outsourcing Induced by Strategic Competition,'

Y Chen… - working paper
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A Theory of Money and Financial Institutions. Part 24. Trade and Prices in a Closed Economy with Exogenous Uncertainty, Different Levels of Information, Money and …

P Dubey… - 1976 - DTIC Document
Abstract:; Contents: The competitive equilibrium; A related trading game; Trade with
exogenous uncertainty; The existence of a noncooperative equilibrium with nonsymmetric
information; An example; Convergence of the equilibrium with replication; Futures markets ...
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Money and production, and liquidity trap

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P Dubey… - International Journal of Economic …, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
We prove the existence of monetary equilibrium in a finite horizon economy with production.
We also show that if agents expect the monetary authority to significantly decrease the
supply of bank money available for short-term loans in the future, then the economy will ...
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[PDF] A Theory of Money and Financial Institutions. Part 35. Bankruptcy and Optimality in a Closed Trading Mass Economy Modelled as a Noncooperative Game

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P Dubey… - Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, 1977 - dido.econ.yale.edu
The construction suggested here raises several questions concerning the uniqueness of
competitive equilibria, the role of a money rate of interest in providing reserves against
bankruptcy and the information needed by a banking system to influence a market ...
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[PDF] Nash Equilibria of Market Games: II. Finiteness

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P Dubey - 1978 - cowles.econ.yale.edu
2 ties are С then for" almost all" market games the set of Nash Equilibria is finite. Needless to
say we take our cue from the analogous results obtained for the Walras Equilibria of markets
by Debreu [2] and Smale [5]. However, despite our focus on market games, we can cull ...
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[BOOK] On'On the Foundations of the Theory of Monopolistic Competition'.

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P Dubey, M Shubik… - 1978 - cowles.econ.yale.edu
In a brief stimulating paper John Roberts and Hugo Sonnenschien survey various attempts
to embed monopolistic competition into a general equilibrium model [1]. These include
Arrow and Hahn [2], Fitzroy [3], Gabszewicz and Vial [4], Laffont and Laroque [5], Negeshi ...
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[CITATION] Offshore outsourcing induced by domestic providers

Y Chen, P Dubey… - 2005 - Working paper
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[BOOK] Strategic substitutes and potential games

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P Dubey, O Haimanko, A Zapelchelnyuk… - 2002 - econ.bgu.ac.il
Abstract We show that games of strategic substitutes (or complements) with aggregation are
“pseudo-potential” games. The upshot is that they possess Nash equilibria in pure strategies
(NE), even if the strategy sets are not convex; and that various dynamic processes ...
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Liquidity and Bankruptcy with Incomplete Markets: Pure Exchange

J Geanakoplos… - Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, 1989 - ideas.repec.org
We enlarge the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete market (GEI), to
incorporate liquidity constraints as well as the possibility of bankruptcy and default. A new
equilibrium results, which we abbreviate GELBI (general equilibrium with liquidity, ...
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[CITATION] Nash Equilibria of Market Games: I. Existence and Convergence

P Dubey - Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, 1977 - econpapers.repec.org
... Nash Equilibria of Market Games: I. Existence and Convergence. Pradeep Dubey () Additional
contact information Pradeep Dubey: SUNY. No 475, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University. ...
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[CITATION] Envy and the Optimality of Tournaments

P Dubey, O Haimanko… - 2001 - Hebrew University of Jerusalem, …
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Credit cards and inflation

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J Geanakoplos… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2010 - Elsevier
The introduction and widespread use of credit cards increases trading efficiency but, by also
increasing the velocity of money, it causes inflation, in the absence of monetary intervention.
If the monetary authority attempts to restore pre-credit card price levels by reducing the ...
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[CITATION] Editorial Management Molly Gamborg Business Operations Editor Ed Zintel Contributing Editors

DH Albonesi, P Bose, K Ebcioglu, M Flynn, RB Lee… - 2011 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
......................................................................................................................................... EDITOR IN CHIEF
Erik R. Altman Thomas J. Watson Research Center ealtman@us.ibm.com ..................................
..... ADVISORY BOARD David H ... ... EDITORIAL STAFF Editorial Management Molly ...
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[CITATION] A Theory of Money and Financial Institutions. Part 28. The Noncooperative Equilibria of a Closed Trading Economy with Market Supply and Bidding …

M Shubik… - 1976 - YALE UNIV NEW HAVEN CONN …

Teacher-Student Relationships and Interactions on Self-Development and Motivation

J DUTTA… - Quality Education - books.google.com
Page 184. Teacher-Student Relationships and Interactions on Self-Development and
Motivation JOYDEEP DUTTA & PRADEEP K. DUBEY The Selfhas been recognized
as playing a critical role in motivation and learning. Current ...
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Repeated Trade and the Velocity of Money

M Shubik, P Dubey… - Cowles Foundation Discussion …, 1989 - ideas.repec.org
There are two sources of inefficiency of strategic equilibria (SE) in market mechanisms. The
first is the oligopolistic effect, which occurs when an agent can single-handedly influence
prices. With a continuum of agents we get" perfect competition" and this effect is, of course, ...
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[PDF] COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH Ш ECONOMICS AT YALE UNIVERSITY

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P Dubey… - 1976 - cowles.econ.yale.edu
1. INTRODUCTION Models of a closed economic system with production and exchange
have been studied both by methods of general equilibrium analysis and cooperative game
theory. The conditions for the existence of a price system which clears all markets and is ...
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[PDF] or MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION

[PDF] from 128.36.236.35
P Dubey… - 1978 - 128.36.236.35
The work noted by Roberts and Sonnenschien is criticized by them because" the properties
thus assumed are not derived from hypotheses on the fundamental data of preferences,
endowments and technology." They in particular criticize as an ad hoe assumption that the ...
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[CITATION] Value Theory without Efficiency

RJ Weber, P Dubey… - 1979 - YALE UNIV NEW HAVEN CT …
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[PDF] COWLES FOUNDATION PAPER NO. 1302

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P DUBEY… - Games and Economic …, 2010 - cowles.econ.yale.edu
Examiners typically record scores on a precise scale 100, 99,..., 1. Yet when they report final
grades, many of them nowadays tend to clump students together in broad categories A, B, C,
discarding information that is at hand. Why? Many explanations come to mind. Less ...
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Perfect competition in an oligopoly (including bilateral monopoly)

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P Dubey… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2009 - Elsevier
We show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then strategic (Nash) equilibria of
the double auction mechanism yield competitive (Walras) allocations. It is not necessary to
have competitors on any side of any market: smooth trading is a substitute for price wars. ...
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[PDF] COMPETITIVE POOLING

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RS RECONSIDERED, P DUBEY… - …, 2002 - cowles.econ.yale.edu
We build a model of competitive pooling, which incorporates adverse selection and
signaling into general equilibrium. Pools are characterized by their quantity limits on
contributions. Households signal their reliability by choosing which pool to join. In ...
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[CITATION] A celebration of Robert Aumann's achievements on the occasion of his 80th birthday

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P Dubey, E Maskin… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2010 - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of
further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site ...
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[CITATION] General equilibrium and the foundations of the theory of monopolistic competition

P Dubey - Rivista internazionale di scienze economiche e …, 1986

[BOOK] A Theory of Money and Financial Institutions. Part 37. The Profit Maximizing Firm: Managers and Stockholders

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P Dubey, M Shubik… - 1978 - dido.wss.yale.edu
In general equilibrium theory consumers are presented as individual maximizers of utility
whereas firms are run by shadowy automata who can best be regarded as selfless
fiduciaries whose only goal is to maximize profits which are then flowed through to ...
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[PDF] A Theory of Money and Financial Institutions. 28. The Non-cooperative Equilibria ofa Closed Trading Economy with Market Supply and Bidding Strategies

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P DUBEY… - 1978 - cs112-b.cs.yale.edu
The basic model analyzed previously, Was extremely simple; in some ways not completely
satisfactory and certainly not unique in its portrayal of price formation. Shapley and Shubik
[4] and Shubik [5] have suggested several alternative models. This paper is devoted to ...
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[PDF] A THEORY OF MONEY AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS PART 3?

[PDF] from 128.36.236.35
P Dubey… - 1978 - 128.36.236.35
In order to begin to investigate the necessary and sufficient conditions we must go to a level
of microeconomic modelling which is usually not indulged in. Essentially all the rules of the
game must be specified. In other words a complete description of individual goals and ...
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[CITATION] The Money Rate of Interest: A Multiperiod Nonatomic Trading and Production Economy with Outside Money and Optimal Bankruptcy Rules

P Dubey… - 1977 - Yale University, Cowles Foundation …
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