U Segal… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1990 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper defines a new concept of attitude towards risk. For an actuarially fair
random variable View the MathML source is the risk premium the decisionmaker is willing to
pay to avoid View the MathML source. In expected utility, and as it turns out, in the case of ...
U Segal - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1990 - JSTOR
This paper analyzes preference relations over two-stage lotteries, ie, lotteries having as
outcomes tickets for other, simple, lotteries. Empirical evidence indicates that decision
makers do not always behave in accordance with the reduction of compound lotteries ...
U Segal - International Economic Review, 1987 - JSTOR
The Ellsberg paradox has puzzled economists and psychologists since its presentation
about twenty-five years ago (Ellsberg [1961]). The traditional analysis of decision making
under uncertainty assumed that the decision maker's preferences on prizes (represented ...
U Segal - Annals of Operations Research, 1989 - Springer
Abstract This paper presents axioms which imply that a preference relation over lotteries can
be represented by a measure of the area above the distribution function of each lottery. A
special case of this family is the anticipated utility functional. One additional axiom implies ...
U Segal… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
This paper assumes that in addition to conventional preferences over outcomes, players in a
strategic environment have preferences over strategies. It provides conditions under which a
player's preferences over strategies can be represented as a weighted average of the ...
SH Chew,
LG Epstein… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric …, 1991 - JSTOR
The independence axiom of expected utility theory has recently been weakened to the
betweenness axiom. In this paper an even weaker axiom, called mixture symmetry, is
presented. The corresponding functional structure is such that utility is a betweenness ...
U Segal - The American Economic Review, 1988 - JSTOR
One of the most puzzling paradoxes in decision theory is the preference reversal
phenomenon. This phenomenon seems to contradict the transitivity axiom, for a long time,
one of the cornerstones of utility theory. This paradox is established whenever a decision ...
U Segal - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1987 - Elsevier
Abstract This remark proves that Quiggin's anticipated utility function may solve the Allais
paradox and the common ratio effect. For some generalizations of these it is needed to
assume that the decision-weight function is concave.
LG Epstein… - Journal of Political Economy, 1992 - JSTOR
John Harsanyi has provided an intriguing argument that social welfare can be expressed as
a weighted sum of individual utilities. His theorem has been criticized on the grounds that a
central axiom, that social preference satisfies the independence axiom, has the morally ...
Z Safra… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1998 - Elsevier
Constant risk aversion means that adding a constant to all outcomes of two distributions, or
multiplying all their outcomes by the same positive number, will not change the preference
relation between them. We prove several representation theorems, where constant risk ...
A Harel… - American Law and Economics Review, 1999 - Am Law Econ Assoc
Abstract Criminal sanctions are usually public, stable and predictable. In contrast, the
practices governing the determination of the probability of detection and conviction reinforce
uncertainty. We invoke psychological insights to illustrate that criminals prefer a scheme in ...
U Segal - UCLA Economics Working Papers, 1984 - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of
further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site ...
E Dekel, Z Safra… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1991 - Elsevier
Abstract Sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium are given when
preferences may violate the reduction of compound lotteries assumption (RCLA). Without
RCLA decision makers may not be indifferent between compound lotteries which have the ...
U Segal - Journal of Political Economy, 2000 - JSTOR
This paper shows that a minimal degree of consideration for other people's well-being
enables society to agree that one social policy is the best. I offer axioms that imply that this
best policy maximizes a weighted sum of individual utilities. The weight of each individual ...
Z Safra… - Econometrica, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
Rabin (2000) proved that a low level of risk aversion with respect to small gambles leads to
a high, and absurd, level of risk aversion with respect to large gambles. Rabin's arguments
strongly depend on expected utility theory, but we show that similar arguments apply to ...
G Loomes… - Journal of risk and uncertainty, 1994 - Springer
A decision maker's attitude towards risk is said to be of orderi, i= 1, 2, if for every given riske
with expected value zero, the risk premium the decision maker is willing to pay to avoid the
riskte goes witht to zero at the same order ast i. This article presents an experiment testing ...
U Segal - Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1993 - Springer
Wakker (1991) and Puppe (1990) point out a mistake in theorem 1 in Segal (1989). This
theorem deals with representing preference relations over lotteries by the measure of their
epigraphs. An error in the theorem is that it gives wrong conditions concerning the ...
LR Keller, U Segal… - Theory and decision, 1993 - Springer
Karni and Safra [8] prove that the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism reveals a decision
maker's true certainty equivalent of a lottery if and only if he satisfies the independence
axiom. Segal [17] claims that this mechanism may reveal a violation of the reduction of ...
[CITATION] Axiomatic representation of expected utility with rank-dependent probabilities
U Segal - Annals of Operations Research, 1989
Z Safra, U Segal… - Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1990 - Springer
The Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism is widely used to elicit decision makers' selling
prices of lotteries. This mechanism leads, however, to the preference reversal phenomenon,
which seemed to indicate nontransitive preferences. To solve this puzzle, Karni and Safra ...
U Segal… - Economic Theory, 1997 - Springer
Summary First-order risk aversion happens when the risk premiump a decision maker is
willing to pay to avoid the lottery t ⋅ ̃ ε, E ̃ ε= 0, is proportional, for smallt, tot. Equivalently, ∂
π/∂ t| _ t= 0^+> 0. We show that first-order risk aversion is equivalent to a certain non- ...
KC Border… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1997 - JSTOR
There are several solutions to the Nash bargaining problem in the literature. Since various
authors have expressed preferences for one solution over another, we find it useful to study
preferences over solutions in their own right. We identify a set of appealing axioms on ...
C Border Kim… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1994 - Elsevier
Abstract Machina has proposed a definition of dynamic consistency which admits non-
expected utility functionals. We show that even under this new definition a dynamically
consistent preference relation that is differentiable becomes arbitrarily close to an ...
Z Safra, U Segal… - The American Economic Review, 1990 - JSTOR
The preference reversal phenomenon, first discovered by Sarah Lichtenstein and Paul
Slovic (1971), puzzled economists for a long time, as it seemed to indicate nontransitive
preferences (see David Grether and Charles Plott, 1979). This phenomenon emerges ...
U Segal… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2002 - Elsevier
This paper provides characterization theorems for preferences that can be represented by U
(x1,…, xn)= min {xk}, U (x1,…, xn)= max {xk}, U (x1,…, xn)=∑ u (xk), or combinations of
these functionals. The main assumption is partial separability, where changing a common ...
U Segal - Utility Theories: Measurements and Applications, 1992 - Springer
Since the early 18th Century, expected utility theory became the leading theory in explaining
behavior of decision makers under uncertainty. For most of this time it was used as a purely
descriptive theory. For example, Ramsey (1931) explicitly assumed that people evaluate a ...
U Segal… - European Economic Review, 1989 - Elsevier
This paper presents a theoretical model in which, due to dissolution costs, the rate of growth
of small Firms tends to be higher and more variable than that of larger firms. This model also
predicts that for large firms the rate of growth is fixed, as claimed by Gibrat's Law.
L Makowski, JM Ostroy… - Journal of economic theory, 1999 - Elsevier
Efficient, anonymous, and continuous mechanisms for exchange environments with a finite
number of individuals are dominant strategy incentive compatible if and only if they are
perfectly competitive, ie, each individual is unable to influence prices or anyone's wealth. ...
U Segal - Journal of Risk and Insurance, 1988 - JSTOR
Kahneman and Tversky found that decision makers' reactions toward probabilistic insurance
imply risk loving over the range of negative outcomes. This article proves that the
probabilistic insurance phenomenon is consistent with risk aversion and a concave utility ...
U Segal - Journal of Economic Theory, 1992 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper proves sufficient conditions under which a completely separable order
on non-convex sets can be represented by an additively separable function. The two major
requirements are that indifference curves are connected and that intersections of the ...
U Segal - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1993 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper presents a new axiomatization of the anticipated utility (also known as
the rank-dependent) model for decision making under uncertainty. This axiomatization is
based on the analysis of two-stage lotteries with the compound independence axiom but ...
A Harel, Z Safra… - Journal of Law, Economics, and …, 2005 - Oxford Univ Press
Abstract In any legal system, one finds numerous rules, practices, and constitutional
provisions that are incompatible with utilitarian considerations. It is not merely utilitarianism
that fails to explain a diverse range of rules and practices. Other theories that, like ...
KC Border… - The Economic Journal, 1994 - JSTOR
An oddsmaker who does not update odds in accordance with conditional probability can be
subjected to a sure loss. Such a losing situation is called a Dutch book. This is often
presented as an argument for setting odds in accordance with conditional probability. We ...
U Segal… - Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1988 - Springer
This paper discusses two problems.(a) What happens to the conditional risk premium that a
decision maker is willing to pay out of the middle prize in a lottery to avoid uncertainty
concerning the middle prize outcome, when the probabilities of other prizes change?(b) ...
S Bikhchandani, U Segal… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1992 - Elsevier
Abstract The concept of first-order stochastic dominance defined on distributions is
inadequate in models with learning. We extend this concept to the space of distributions on
distributions. We discuss conditions under which for all common observations one ...
U Segal - Journal of economic theory, 1997 - upi-yptk.ac.id
This note provides a positive answer to the following question. Is it possible to define a set of
preference relations, one for each node of a decision tree, such that these preferences
satisfy the reduction of compound lotteries axiom and dynamic consistency, and yet do not ...
KC Border… - Working Papers, 1990 - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of
further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site ...
Z Safra… - International Economic Review, 1993 - JSTOR
This paper deals with nonexpected utility preferences over multivariate distributions. We
present two equivalent dominance axioms, implying an additively separable structure of the
local utility functions. They also imply that nonexpected utility functionals directly depend ...
SH Chew,
LG Epstein… - Economic Theory, 1994 - Springer
Summary A new axiom for preference orderings over lotteries, called the projective
independence axiom, is formulated. Given suitable continuity and monotonicity
assumptions, the axiom implies that utility is either in the weighted utility class or is ...
L Makowski, JM Ostroy, U Segal… - 1995 - econ.ucla.edu
Abstract For exchange environments with a finite number of individuals, we show that
efficient, dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms must be perfectly competitive,
ie, each individual must be unable to influence prices or anyone's wealth. The ...
D Heyd… - Social Choice and Welfare, 2006 - Springer
Abstract The article suggests a formal model of a two-tier voting procedure, which unlike
traditional voting systems does not presuppose that every vote counts the same. In deciding
a particular issue voters are called in the first round to assign categories of their fellow- ...
Z Safra… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2001 - Elsevier
A key feature of the rank-dependent model for decision making under risk is that the
weighting of an outcome depends on its relative rank. This theory received numerous
axiomatizations, however, all these sets of axioms need to make an explicit reference to ...
U Segal - Economics Letters, 2000 - Elsevier
I disagree with the above analysis. Of course, if the driver is at the first intersection, then with
probability p he will reach the second intersection. However, at this intersection his utility will
not be the one obtained from the lottery S, but the one obtained from the lottery T. The ...
Z Safra… - 2005 - y2008.recanati.tau.ac.il
Abstract Rabin [37] proved that a low level of risk aversion with respect to small gambles
leads to a high, and absurd, level of risk aversion with respect to large gambles. Rabin's
arguments strongly depend on expected utility theory, but we show that similar arguments ...
Z Safra… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2002 - Elsevier
This note shows that MJ Machina's (1982, Econometrica50, 277–323) assumption that
preferences over lotteries are smooth has some economic implications. We show that
Fréchet differentiability implies that preferences represent second order risk aversion (as ...
U Segal - Uncertain decisions: bridging theory and experiments, 1999 - books.google.com
2 DYNAMIC CONSISTENCY AND NON-EXPECTED UTILITY Uzi Segal 2.1 INTRODUCTION
Dynamic consistency of decision making requires a decision maker to abide by de- cisions he
made in the past. Strotz (1956), writing in a different context, offered the following ...
Z Safra… - Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2009 - Springer
Abstract A reasonable level of risk aversion with respect to small gambles leads to a high,
and absurd, level of risk aversion with respect to large gambles. This was demonstrated by
Rabin (Econometrica 68: 1281–1292, 2000) for expected utility theory. Later, Safra and ...
[CITATION] Markets Make People Look Selfish
U Segal… - University of California, San Diego Discussion Paper, 2004
A Horovitz… - NYUJL & Liberty, 2006 - HeinOnline
542 NYU Journal of Law & Liberty [Vol. 2:541 According to this approach, when society is indifferent
between several modes of law enforcement, or between rules that govern criminal
proceedings, it should pick those most detested by potential criminals. Alternatively, if ...
U Segal - … LIBRARY OF CRITICAL WRITINGS IN ECONOMICS, 1996 - econ.ucla.edu
Abstract: This paper analyzes preference relations over two-stage lotteries, ie, lotteries
having as outcomes tickets for other, simple, lotteries. Empirical evidence indicates that
decision makers do not always behave in accordance with the reduction of compound ...
U Segal… - The World Economy, 1998 - Wiley Online Library
WHAT are appropriate penalties to discourage capital flight? Economic punishments can
serve as effective deterrents for economic crimes but the penalties themselves are often
costly to impose and enforce. Good public policy must take these costs into account in ...
KC Border… - Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 2002 - Elsevier
A well-known Dutch book, due to de Finetti, shows how violations of the additivity law of
probability theory (Pr (A∪ B)= Pr (A)+ Pr (B)− Pr (A∩ B)) open the door to a sequence of
bets leading to a sure loss. In this paper we show that in a market environment, when ...
S Bikhchandani… - Theoretical Economics, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
Preferences may arise from regret, ie, from comparisons with alternatives forgone by the
decision maker. We ask whether regret-based behavior is consistent with nonexpected utility
theories of transitive choice and show that the answer is no. If choices are governed by ex ...
[CITATION] kTit for Tat: Foundations of Preferences for Reciprocity in Strategic Settings, lUniversity of Western Ontario
U Segal… - Department of Economics, 1999
U Segal, A Spivak… - Economics Letters, 1988 - Elsevier
Abstract Yaari (1987) proved that within the anticipated utility framework, a risk averse
decision maker will have precautionary saving regardless of the sign of the third derivative of
his utility function. In this note we extend (a modification of) this result for an n-period ...
Z Safra… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1995 - Elsevier
In this paper we suggest a complexity-based taxonomy of some families of preferences over
lotteries. We define the complexity of a given family to be of order n if the question whether
or not a given preference belongs to this family can be determined by comparing lotteries ...
A Stein… - Notre Dame Law Review, 2006 - works.bepress.com
Abstract Ambiguity aversion is a person's rational attitude towards probability's
indeterminacy. When a person is averse towards such ambiguities, he increases the
probability of the unfavorable outcome to reflect that fear. This observation is particularly ...
S Naeh… - Boston College Working Papers in Economics, 2008 - fmwww.bc.edu
Abstract Transitivity is a fundamental requirement for consistency. Legal systems, especially
when composed over time and by different agencies, may encounter nontransitive cycles.
This paper shows that treatments of violations of transitivity already appear in the rabbinic ...
U Segal… - RESEARCH …, 1996 - en.scientificcommons.org
Publikationsansicht. 37640341. Let's Agree That All Dictatorships Are Equally Bad. Uzi
Segal. Details der Publikation. Download, http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve
?JPEv108p569PDF. Archiv, RePEc (Germany). Typ, article. ...
U Procaccia… - Theory and decision, 2003 - Springer
The American and some other constitutions entrench property rights by requiring super
majoritarian voting as a condition for amending or revoking their own provisions. Following
Buchanan and Tullock [The Calculus of Consent, Logical Foundations of Constitutional ...
U Segal - Economics and Philosophy, 2006 - Cambridge Univ Press
Abstract This paper takes a simple, informal suggestion by Broome and another more
explicit suggestion by Kamm for how to deal with asymmetric claims and shows how they
can be interpreted to be consistent with two different social welfare functions: Sum-of- ...
KC Border, P Ghirardato… - Economic Theory, 2008 - Springer
Abstract This note shows that if the space of events is sufficiently rich and the subjective
probability function of each individual is non-atomic, then there is a σ-algebra of events over
which everyone will have the same probability function, and moreover, the range of this ...
[CITATION] Local risk aversion
U Segal, A Spivak… - 1988 - Dept. of Economics and Institute for …
[CITATION] On the Axiomatic Foundations of Prospect Theory
U Segal… - 1984 - University of Pennsylvania, Center …
[CITATION] First Order versus Second Order Risk Aversion Journal of Economic Theory, v51. n1
U Segal… - 1990 - June
U Segal - Mathematical Social Sciences, 1986 - Elsevier
,l,,hcmatlcal Social Sciences 11 (1986) 195199 ,,,, th ttolland 195 NOTE ON LEXICOGRAPHIC
PROBABILITY RELATIONS Uzi SEGAL Department of Economics, Umverstty of Foronto, Toronto
M5S 1A 1, Canada Communicated by FW Roush Received I0 December 1984 Revised 6 ...
[CITATION] Thou Shalt Not Sow Thy Vineyard with Divers Seeds? The Case Against the Harmonisation of Private Law
U Procaccia… - 2003 - Capital Markets and Company Law, …
[CITATION] Multivariate Nonexpected Utility Preferences
Z Safra, U Segal… - 1990 - University of Pennsylvania, Center …
[CITATION] The Independence Axiom: A Survey
M Kulish… - Unpublised Manuscript, Boston College Department of …, 2002
D Heyd… - Boston College Working Papers in Economics, 2002 - ideas.repec.org
The article suggests a formal model of a two-tier voting procedure, which unlike traditional
voting systems does not presuppose that ev-ery vote counts the same. In deciding a
particular issue voters are called in the first round to assign categories of their fellow- ...
KC Border, U Segal… - 1995 - Citeseer
Abstract There are several solutions to the Nash bargaining problem in the literature. Since
various authors have expressed preferences for one solution over another, we nd it useful to
study preferences over solutions in their own right. We identify two sets of appealing ...
U Segal - UCLA Economics Working Papers, 1986 - econpapers.repec.org
... Please update your bookmarks. Stochastic Dominance for Two-Stage Lotteries. Uzi Segal ().
No 416, UCLA Economics Working Papers from UCLA Department of Economics. Date:
1986-07-01 View list of references Track citations by RSS feed. ...
[CITATION] Tit for Tat: Foundations of Preferences for Reciprocity
U Segal, J Sobel… - 1999 - University of California, San Diego
JM Ostroy… - Social Choice and Welfare, 2010 - Springer
Abstract We show that efficient anonymous incentive compatible (dominant strategy)
mechanisms for public goods eliminate externalities, ie, each individual is unable to change
the welfare of anyone else. The characterization is used to derive existence and non- ...
D Dillenberger… - 2012 - economics.sas.upenn.edu
Abstract Machina [2] suggested three situations where ambiguity aversion should be
revealed, but which none of four of the existing models in the literature can accommodate.
We show that the recursive nonexpected utility model of Segal [4] is consistent with all ...
U Segal - 2012 - ideas.repec.org
Preferences may arise from regret, ie, from comparisons with alternatives forgone by the
decision maker. We show that when the choice set consists of pairwise statistically
independent lotteries, transitive regret-based behavior is consistent with betweenness ...
Z Safra… - Boston College Working Papers in Economics, 2008 - fmwww.bc.edu
Abstract A reasonable level of risk aversion with respect to small gambles leads to a high,
and absurd, level of risk aversion with respect to large gambles. This was demonstrated by
Rabin [15] for expected utility theory. Later, Safra and Segal [18] extended this result by ...
A Harel… - 2012 - fmwww.bc.edu
Abstract Since Becker (3), a common argument against asymmetric norms that promote
minority rights over those of the majority is that such policies reduce total welfare. While this
may be the case, we show that there are simple environments where aggregate sum of ...
[CITATION] Preliminary and incomplete. y Department of Economics, Universityof Western Ontario, London N6A 5C2, Canada. E-mail: segal@ sscl. uwo. ca z …
U Segal… - 1998
A Harel, Z Safra… - 2003 - irecanati.tau.ac.il
In any legal system, one finds numerous rules and practices as well as constitutional
provisions which are incompatible with utilitarian considerations. These rules and practices
often grant benefits to an individual whose wellbeing is at risk; yet the costs of these ...
U Segal… - 1999 - Citeseer
Abstract This paper assumes that in addition to the conventional (sel sh) preferences over
outcomes, players in a strategic environment have preferences over strategies. In the
context of two-player games, it provides conditions under which a player's preferences ...
A Rubinstein… - Boston College Working Papers in …, 2011 - arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il
Abstract One problem caused by cycles of choice functions is indecisiveness—decision
makers will be paralyzed when they face choice sets with more than two options. We
investigate the procedure of “random sampling” where the alternatives are random ...
U Segal - 2005 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract Rabin [23] proved that a low level of risk aversion with respect to small gambles
leads to a high level of risk aversion with respect to large gambles. Rabin's arguments
strongly depend on expected utility theory, but we show in this paper that similar ...
JC Ely, EJ Green, BL Lipman, D Ray, S Athey… - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. ...
U Segal - UWO Department of Economics Working Papers, 1996 - econpapers.repec.org
By Uzi Segal; Abstract: This paper discusses two ways in which decision makers facing
sequential choices can make themselves invulnerable to. ... Please update your bookmarks.
How to Escape Dutch Books in Dynamic Choice. Uzi Segal (). ...
[CITATION] Price Stabilization: an Anticipated Utility Approach
U Segal, A Spivak… - 1990 - Dept. of Economics and Institute for …
Z Safra… - UWO Department of Economics Working Papers, 1997 - ideas.repec.org
Constant risk aversion means that adding the same constant to all outcomes of two
distributions, or multiplaying all their outcomes by the same positive constant, will not
change the preformence relation between them. In this paper we prove several ...
A Horovitz… - 2011 - cear.gsu.edu
In contrast to the procedural structure of most European criminal trials, 1 Anglo-American
criminal trials include two separate stages: a first stage, leading up to the verdict, in which
the prosecution attempts to establish the guilt of the defendant; and a second stage, ...
[CITATION] Criminal Law and Behavioral Psychology: Observations on the Neglected Role of Uncertainty in the Deterrence of Crime
A Harel… - 1998 - Faculty of Law, University of Toronto
[CITATION] The Becker-Degroot-Marschak Mechanism and Anticipated Utility: a Testable Approach
Z Safra, U Segal, A Spivak… - 1988 - Dept. of Economics and Institute for …
U Segal - UWO Department of Economics Working Papers, 1996 - ideas.repec.org
A social policy is a rule which assigns each possible set of endowments an allocation of
these endowments among members of society. This paper assumes that individuals have
preferences over private consumption and preferences over all possible social policies.
A Harel… - Boston College Working Papers in Economics, 2011 - econ.tau.ac.il
Abstract We defend the use of asymmetric norms which grant greater privileges to minorities
than to majorities. The norms we discuss include norms facilitating the establishment or
prohibition of minority-only or majority-only institutions, neighborhoods, or associations. ...
U Segal… - econ.ucla.edu
Abstract This paper defines a new concept of attitude towards risk. For an actuarially fair
random variable ë, w (t) is the risk premium the decisionmaker is willing to pay to avoid tè. In
expected utility, and as it turns out, in the case of smooth Fréchet differentiability of the ...
J Hörner, BL Lipman, D Ray, S Athey, T Bergstrom… - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. Wiley Online Library will be disrupted 3
Dec from 10-12 GMT for monthly maintenance. ...
E Zamir, B Medina… - 2012 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Lawyers' Contingent Fee (CF) rates are rather uniform, often one-third of the
recovery. Arguably, this uniformity attests to collusion in the market, resulting in clients
paying supra-competitive fees. This paper challenges this common argument.
U Segal… - Public Choice, 1986 - Springer
The proportional representation voting system 1 has often, been criticized for the instability
that it creates in a parliamentary system and for the excessive bargaining power that it grants
to splinter groups. The single member constituency system 2 brings about a more stable ...
U Segal - INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF CRITICAL …, 1996 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract The paper describes a decision process under which it is rational to prefer a lottery
with known probabilities to a similar ambiguous lottery where the decision maker does not
know the exact values of the probabilities (the" Ellsberg paradox"). This is done by ...
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