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User profiles for author:"Sourav Bhattacharya"

Sourav Bhattacharya

- Verified email at cs.helsinki.fi - Cited by 58

Sourav Bhattacharya

- Verified email at pitt.edu - Cited by 32

Preference monotonicity and information aggregation in elections

[PDF] from rochester.edu
S Bhattacharya - 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: If voter preferences depend on a noisy state variable, under what conditions do
large elections deliver outcomes" as if" the state were common knowledge? While the
existing literature models elections using the jury metaphor where a change in information ...
Cited by 18 - Related articles - All 22 versions

[PDF] How much to make and how much to buy? An analysis of plural sourcing strategies

[PDF] from pitt.edu
P Puranam, R Gulati… - 2009 - ewi-ssl.pitt.edu
Abstract While many theories of the firm seek to explain when firms make rather than buy, in
practice firms often make and buy the same input-they engage in plural sourcing. We argue
that explaining the mix of external and internal procurement for the same input requires ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 2 versions

SerPens: a tool for semantically enriched location information on personal devices

[PDF] from helsinki.fi
S Bhattacharya, J Kukkonen, P Nurmi… - Proceedings of the ICST …, 2008 - dl.acm.org
Abstract Current mobile phones provide GSM cell information and many devices also
support GPS or WiFi-based location information. A problem with raw location data is that it
does not provide semantic information, which makes it hard to integrate location- ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - All 4 versions

How much to make and how much to buy: An analysis of optimal plural sourcing strategies

P Puranam, R Gulati… - 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: While many theories of the firm seek to explain when firms make rather than buy, in
practice firms often make and buy the same input-they engage in plural sourcing. We argue
that explaining the mix of external procurement and internal sourcing for the same input ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles

[PDF] Preference reversal and information aggregation in elections

[PDF] from usc.edu
S Bhattacharya - 2007 - usc.edu
Abstract I analyse informational effi ciency of two $ candidate elections where the utility of
the voters depends on the realisation of an uncertain state variable. I show that large elec $
tions aggregate information for any voting rule in the unique equilibrium if and only if ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - View as HTML - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 3 versions

[PDF] Selective Denial of Service And Its Impact To Internet Based Information Systems

[PDF] from psu.edu
D Etkin, E Olander… - International Conference Advances …, 2000 - Citeseer
ABSTRACT: Information security has gained critical importance with the growth of Internet
connected computing and business systems. Denial-of-Service (DoS) is a prime concern in
information security, as evidenced by the recent attacks on popular e-commerce sites. In ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 3 versions

[CITATION] received the PhD degree in computer science from the University of Minnesota in 1993 (formally, 1994). Currently, he is an associate professor in the …

S Bhattacharya - His research interests include network security and …
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[CITATION] mPreference Monotonicity and Information Aggrega $ tion in Elections. nUniversity of Pittsburgh mimeo

S Bhattacharya - 2007
Cited by 2 - Related articles

Strategic Information Revelation when Experts Compete to Influence

[PDF] from msu.edu
S Bhattacharya… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We consider a persuasion game where multiple experts with potentially conflicting
self-interests attempt to persuade a decision-maker, or, a judge. The judge prefers to take an
action that is most appropriate given the true state of the world but the experts' preferences ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 8 versions

Campaign Rhetoric and the Hide and Seek Game

[PDF] from pitt.edu
S Bhattacharya - Working Papers, 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: I examine the choice of political rhetoric when one candidate's willingness to
misinform the voter is checked by the other's ability to inform. In the basic model, a debate is
a competition between two candidates in which the" good" candidate wants to reveal ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 20 versions

Resistance to Outside Investment: A Rational Model of Surplus Destruction

[PDF] from ecares.org
S Bhattacharya… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: If a government has ability and willingness to redistribute the surplus created by an
external investor, why do we still observe resistance to such investment, sometimes in the
form of destruction of productive assets? And how does such destructive action affect a ...
Related articles - All 11 versions

[HTML] Robert N. Smith, IEEE Senior Member Yu Chen

[HTML] from computer.org
S Bhattacharya - computer.org
Abstract—Security issues are critical in networked information systems, eg, with financial
information, corporate proprietary information, contractual and legal information, human
resource data, medical records, etc. The theme of this paper is to address such diversity of ...
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Compulsory and Voluntary Voting Mechanisms: An Experimental Study

S Bhattacharya - 2012 - ideas.repec.org
We report on an experiment comparing compulsory and voluntary voting mechanisms.
Theory predicts that these different mechanisms have different implications both for the
sincerity of the voting decisions and for the participation decisions of voters, and we find ...
Cached

[CITATION] A Possibility Theorem on Information Aggregation in Elections

S Bhattacharya, T Feddersen… - Working Papers, 2007 - econpapers.repec.org
... Please update your bookmarks. A Possibility Theorem on Information Aggregation in Elections.
Sourav Bhattacharya, Timothy Feddersen and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (). No 327, Working Papers
from University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics. Abstract: . . . ...
Cached - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 4 versions

[PDF] Conflict and Mobility: Resource Sharing Among Groups

[PDF] from bi.no
S Bhattacharya, J Deb… - 2010 - bi.no
Abstract We study political competition between two groups, where the winner has the
decision rights to allocate resources, like political parties sharing patronage goods. What
factors determine how resources are shared? We highlight an important force that affects ...
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Political institutions and information aggregation

S Bhattacharya - 2008 - gradworks.umi.com
Abstract: In this dissertation, I analyse the effectiveness of various political institutions in
aggregating private information. In the first two chapters, I consider diversity of information
among the voters about given electoral alternatives and examine the conditions under ...
Related articles - Cached - All 3 versions

[CITATION] How Much to Make and How Much to Buy: Explaining Plural Sourcing Strategies

S Bhattacharya, R Gulati… - Working Papers, 2008 - econpapers.repec.org
... Please update your bookmarks. How Much to Make and How Much to Buy: Explaining Plural
Sourcing Strategies. Sourav Bhattacharya, Ranjay Gulati and Phanish Puranam. No 353, Working
Papers from University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics. Abstract: . . . ...
Cached - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 4 versions

[PDF] Compulsory versus Voluntary Voting Mechanisms: An Experimental Study

[PDF] from pitt.edu
S Bhattacharya, J Duffy… - 2011 - ewi-ssl.pitt.edu
Abstract We report on an experiment comparing compulsory and voluntary voting
mechanisms. Theory predicts that these different mechanisms have important implications
both for the sincerity of voting decisions and for the participation decisions of voters, and ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 7 versions

[PDF] Preference Monotonicity: a Simple Investigation

[PDF] from pitt.edu
S Bhattacharya - 2007 - econ.pitt.edu
Abstract Suppose we have two alternatives P and Q and two states A and B, and a voter type
is defined as a pair of iid random variables that denotes the utility difference between the
alternatives P and Q in each state. Each voter receives a private, noisy signal about the ...
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[PDF] Resistance, Redistribution and Investor% friendliness!

[PDF] from pitt.edu
S Bhattacharya… - 2011 - pitt.edu
Abstract Poor communities sometimes resist private investment and destroy economic
surplus even if the government has the willingness and ability to redistribute. We interpret
such acts of resistance as demands for redistribution: destruction contains credible ...
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Conflict and Mobility: Resource Sharing Among Groups

[PDF] from epcs2011.org
J Deb, S Bhattacharya… - 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We study a political competition between two groups, where the winner has the
decision rights to allocate resources, like political parties deciding on sharing of patronage
goods. What factors determine how resources are shared? We highlight an important ...
Related articles - All 9 versions

[CITATION] Raymond A. Paul, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Panelists: CV Ramamoorthy, University of California

A Ghafoor… - Proceedings, 1996 - IEEE Computer Society Press
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Scheduling of jobs in a hypercube processing system

I Khosla, S Bhattacharya… - Journal of the Operational Research …, 1996 - JSTOR
When a job is processed in a hypercube multi-processor, it is allocated a cube of processing
elements of the requisite size. There are three distinct costs involved in the hypercube
scheduling problem: the cost of detecting a free cube (allocation), the cost of migrating ...
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