WJ Haan, G Ramey… - 1997 - nber.org
We develop and quantitatively implement a dynamic general equilibrium model with labor"
market matching and endogenous job destruction. The model produces a close match with
data on" job creation and destruction. Cyclical fluctuations in the job destruction rate serve ...
[CITATION] Strategy: An introduction to game theory
J Watson - 2008 - WW Norton & Company
J Watson - Journal of economic Theory, 1999 - Elsevier
This paper develops a model of a long-term partnership with two-sided incomplete
information. The partners jointly determine the stakes of their relationship and individually
decide whether to cooperate with or betray each other over time. An equilibrium in which ...
JE Rauch… - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2003 - Elsevier
We design a simple model of a developed country buyer's search for a less developed
country supplier and the subsequent relationship between the two parties. Matched firms
can 'start small'with a trial order to gain information about the ability of the LDC supplier to ...
G Ramey… - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1997 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We develop a theory of labor contracting in which negative productivity shocks lead
to costly job loss, despite unlimited possibilities for renegotiating wage contracts. Such
fragile contracts emerge from firms' trade-offs between robustness of incentives in ongoing ...
A Schwartz… - Journal of Law, Economics, and …, 2004 - Oxford Univ Press
Abstract In most of the contract theory literature, contracting costs are assumed either to be
high enough to preclude certain forms of contracting or low enough to permit any contract to
be written. Similarly researchers usually treat renegotiation as either costless or ...
J Watson - Games and Economic Behavior, 2002 - Elsevier
I study a model of a long-term partnership with two-sided incomplete information. The
partners jointly determine the stakes of their relationship and individually decide whether to
cooperate with or betray each other over time. I characterize the extremal—interim ...
J Bull, J Watson - Journal of Economic Theory, 2004 - Elsevier
We explore the notion of “verifiability” by analyzing a simple model of evidence production in
contractual relationships with complete information. We characterize implementability in
terms of the existence and form of “hard evidence.” We provide results on maximal and ...
WJ Den Haan, G Ramey… - Journal of Monetary Economics, 2003 - Elsevier
This paper develops a macroeconomic model in which funds are channeled to
entrepreneurs through long-term relationships between entrepreneurs and lenders. The flow
of funds to a relationship may be low, causing it to break up due to insufficient liquidity. ...
J Watson - The Review of Economic Studies, 1998 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract I study alternating-offer bargaining games with two-sided incomplete information
about the players' discount rates. For both perfect Bayesian equilibrium and a
rationalizability-style notion, I characterize the set of expected payoffs which may arise in ...
J Watson - Econometrica, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
This paper develops a theoretical framework for studying contract and enforcement in
settings with nondurable trading opportunities and complete but unverifiable information.
The framework explicitly accounts for the parties' individual trade actions. The sets of ...
M Shimoji… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1998 - Elsevier
We propose a notion of conditional dominance for games whose representations designate
information sets. We prove that iterated conditional dominance is equivalent to extensive
form rationalizability. We also conduct a general analysis of these concepts, yielding new ...
JE Rauch… - Journal of Economics & Management …, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
Motivated by evidence on the importance of incomplete information and networks in
international trade, we investigate the supply of network intermediation. We build a general-
equilibrium model in which agents with networks of foreign contacts either can use their ...
J Bull, J Watson - Games and Economic Behavior, 2007 - Elsevier
This paper addresses how hard evidence can be incorporated into mechanism-design
analysis. Two classes of models are compared:(a) ones in which evidentiary decisions are
accounted for explicitly, and (b) ones in which the players make abstract declarations of ...
JE Rauch… - 2002 - nber.org
Motivated by evidence on the importance of incomplete information and networks in
international trade, we investigate the supply of'network intermediation.'We hypothesize that
the agents who become international trade intermediaries first accumulate networks of ...
J Watson - Econometrica, 1993 - JSTOR
THE ECONOMIC LITERATURE concerning agents' reputations has grown steadily since the
seminal work of Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson. 2 Early work focused on how
incomplete information leads to equilibria that are vastly different (but more intuitive) than ...
AG Bower, S Garber… - International Journal of Industrial …, 1997 - Elsevier
G Ramey… - Journal of Law, Economics, and …, 2002 - Oxford Univ Press
Abstract This article analyzes the role of third‐party intermediaries in contract enforcement.
In our model, intermediaries record information about past actions and resolve disputes
when requested to do so by the contracting agents. When the verifiability of information is ...
J Watson - UCSD Economics Discussion Paper No. 2002-04, 2002 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper develops a theoretical framework for studying contract and enforcement
in settings of complete, but unverifiable, information. The main point of the paper is that the
consideration of renegotiation necessitates formal examination of other technological ...
WJ Den Haan, G Ramey, J Watson - Carnegie-Rochester Conference …, 2000 - Elsevier
This paper evaluates a class of endogenous job destruction models based on how well they
explain the observed experiences of displaced workers. We show that pure reallocation
models in which relationship-specific productivity drifts downward over time are difficult to ...
G Ramey… - Contributions in Theoretical Economics, 2001 - degruyter.com
We develop a model of bilateral contracting in a dynamic market setting. Asset owners must
be paired via a matching process in order to form productive relationships involving long-
term investments and ongoing effort. Market frictions shape the owners' incentives to ...
M Klimenko, G Ramey… - Journal of International Economics, 2008 - Elsevier
This paper presents a theory of dynamic trade agreements in which external institutions,
such as the WTO, play a central role in supporting credible enforcement. In our model,
countries engage in ongoing negotiations, and, as a consequence, cooperative ...
[CITATION] Building a relationship
J Watson - University of California at San Diego, …, 1995 - Department of Economics, UC San …
J Watson - Games and Economic Behavior, 1996 - glxy.hfut.edu.cn
It is generally accepted within the literature on information transmission that in sender–
receiver games little or no information will be revealed by the sender as long as the parties
have divergent preferences and certifiable claims cannot be made. I show that this ...
P Battigalli… - Econometrica, 1997 - JSTOR
CONSIDER A REPEATED GAME with incomplete information in which a patient long run
player, whose type is unknown, faces a sequence of short run opponents (as in Fudenberg
and Levine (1989)). The standard" reputation" result is that the patient long run player can ...
J Watson - Games and Economic Behavior, 1996 - Elsevier
I study two-player, infinitely repeated games with no discounting. I examine how
perturbations afford players opportunities to establish reputations and I determine how
potential reputations lead to outcome selection in both equilibrium and non-equilibrium ...
J Brennan, J Watson… - 2002 - kellogg.northwestern.edu
Abstract We study contracting and costly renegotiation in settings of complete but
unverifiable information, using the mechanism-design approach. We show how
renegotiation activity is best modelled in the fundamentals of the mechanismdesign ...
G Ramey, J Watson… - 1996 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract We develop a model of bilateral contracting in a dynamic market setting. Asset
owners must be paired via a matching process in order to form productive relationships
involving long-term investments and ongoing effort. Market frictions shape the owners' ...
J Watson - 2006 - escholarship.org
Abstract: This paper reports the analysis of a general model of contract in multi-period
settings with both external and self-enforcement. In the model, players alternately engage in
contract negotiation and take individual actions. A notion of contractual equilibrium, which ...
A Schwartz, J Watson… - 2000 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper explores how the opportunity to recontract affects investment and trade
in contractual relationships when it is assumed that renegotiation is costly. In this world,
recontracting retains much of the benefit that has been ascribed to it, including the ...
[CITATION] Why did you put that there?: Gender, materialism and tattoo consumption
J Watson - Advances in consumer research, 1998
J Watson - 2006 - escholarship.org
Abstract: This paper presents analysis of contractual settings with complete but unverifiable
information and where trade consists of a sequence of verifiable productive actions,
between which renegotiation can occur. The main result identifies an equivalent, ...
J Watson - Games and Economic Behavior, 1994 - Elsevier
Abstract Take the infinitely repeated prisoners′ dilemma that is perturbed with strategies of
uniformly bounded recall only, including the" tit-for-tat" strategy (with a probability that is
bounded away from zero in the perturbation). As the discount factor approaches one, the ...
RW Belk… - Advances in Consumer Research, 1998 - acrwebsite.org
The mission of the Association for Consumer Research is to advance consumer
research and facilitate the exchange of scholarly information among members
of academia, industry, and government worldwide.
JE Rauch… - The Missing Links: Formation and Decay of …, 2007 - econ.ucsd.edu
The Department of Economics was founded in 1964, the same year that UC San Diego
admitted its first undergraduates. The Department admitted its first Ph. D. students in 1965
and graduated its first bachelor degree students in 1968.
WJ Haan, G Ramey… - 1999 - nber.org
This paper develops a theoretical framework for analyzing contracting imperfections in long-
term employment relationships. We focus chiefly on limited enforceability and limited worker
liquidity. Inefficient severance of employment relationships, payment of efficiency wages, ...
J Watson… - 2009 - escholarship.org
Abstract: This paper examines a contractual settingwith unverifiable investment and a
durable trading opportunity, in which trade can take place in any one of an infinite number of
periods. The contractual setting features cross-investment, meaning that the seller's ...
M Klimenko, J Watson… - 2001 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper presents a theory of dynamic trade agreements in which external
institutions, such as the WTO, play a central role in supporting credible enforcement. In our
model, countries engage in ongoing negotiations, and as a consequence cooperative ...
J Watson - 1999 - escholarship.org
Abstract: I study a model of a long-term partnership with two-sided incomplete information.
The partners jointly determine the stakes of their relationahip and individually decide
whether to cooperate with or betray each other over time. I characterize the extremal-- ...
[CITATION] Dominance and equilibrium in alternating-offer bargaining
J Watson… - 1994 - University of California, San Diego, …
[CITATION] An Introduction to Game Theory
J Watson - New York, 2002
[CITATION] Contract and Game Theory: Basic Concepts for Settings of Complete Information
J Watson - manuscript, June, 2001
J Watson - Economics Letters, 1991 - Elsevier
Abstract In many games, players may be able to cooperate for their collective benefit without
jeopardizing individual rationality However, attaining such superior cooperation requires
that players conform to a specific axiom of behavior. In this paper, I demonstrate that pre- ...
[CITATION] Reputation and Outcome Selection in Perturbed Supergames: An Intuitive, Behavioral Approach
J Watson - Graduate School of Business, Stanford, 1992
G Ramey… - 2000 - escholarship.org
Abstract: We propose a theory of contracting in long-term relationships, emphasizing the role
of social institutions in conditioning players' joint selection of equilibria. Players adopt a
social conditioning system in order to place boundaries on their recurrent negotiation and ...
[CITATION] Strategy-An introduction to Game Theory
W Joel - 2002 - New York: WW Norton
[CITATION] Job destruction and propagation of shocks, University of California
WJ Den Haan, G Ramey… - 1997 - San Diego, Discussion Paper 97-23
[CITATION] The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting'(2004)
A Schwartz… - Journal of Law, Economics and Organization
Abstract This paper develops the concept of contractual equilibrium for repeated games with
transferable utility, whereby the players negotiate cooperatively over their continuation
strategies at the start of each period. Players may disagree in the negotiation phase, and ...
[CITATION] The film preference scale: The effect of preference and cultural capital on film going behavior
JC Watson - Advances in Consumer Research, 2006 - Association for Consumer Research; …
JE Rauch, J Watson… - 1996 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract Motivated by a characteristic way in which firms in developed countries make their
decisions regarding cooperation with potential partners from less developed countries, we
design a simple model of a DC firm's search for an LDC partner/supplier and the ...
K Buzard, J Watson - 2010 - escholarship.org
Abstract: This paper examines a class of contractual relationships with specific investment, a
non-durable trading opportunity, and renegotiation. Trade actions are modeled as individual
and trade-actionbased option contracts (“non-forcing contracts”) are explored. The paper ...
JE Rauch… - 2003 - escholarship.org
1Rauch and Watson (2002, Table 1) find that, when international trade intermediaries
handling differentiated products started their firms, clients outside of the United States with
whom they had experience from previous employment accounted for over half of their ...
K Buzard, J Watson - 2010 - econ.ucla.edu
Abstract This paper examines a class of contractual relationships with specific investment, a
non-durable trading opportunity, and renegotiation. Furthering Watson's (2007) line of
analysis, trade actions are modeled as individual and trade-action-based option contracts ...
A Schwartz… - University of California, San Diego, …, 2001 - lawweb.usc.edu
Contract theory models commonly assume that it is costless to write a contract, costless to
play a contractual mechanism and costless to renegotiate. In life, all of these “contracting
costs” are positive. The nature of contracting costs has an important impact on contractual ...
H Gjertsen, T Groves,
DA Miller, E Niesten… - 2010 - dss.ucsd.edu
Abstract We model conservation agreements using contractual equilibrium, a concept
introduced by Miller and Watson (2010) to model dynamic relationships with renegotiation.
The setting takes the form of a repeated principal-agent problem, where the principal must ...
J Watson… - 1994 - en.scientificcommons.org
Publikationsansicht. 33494619. Strategy Perturbations in Repeated Games as Rules of Thumb.
Joel Watson. Details der Publikation. Archiv, RePEc (Germany). Typ, preprint. ...
A Schwartz… - 2010 - econ.ucsd.edu
Abstract A problem in economic contract theory is to know when parties can create efficient
investment incentives with contracts. A problem in legal contract theory is to develop rules to
guide courts in interpreting contracts. These problems are related because the law's ...
WE Burhenne, F Guilmin, JW Kennedy… - 1972 - getcited.org
An academic directory and search engine.
J Watson, B Jorgensen… - CROSSING BORDERS …, 2011 - marketingeducators.org
ABSTRACT This special session examines the pedagogy of a project-based MBA program
design as compared to that of a traditional MBA program, looking specifically at the ability of
each to foster the multidisciplinary skills needed to be successful in today's business world ...
[CITATION] Reputation and Cooperation in Repeated Games: Three Essays
J Watson - 1992 - Stanford University
[CITATION] Reputation and Outcome Selection in Supergames
J Watson - University of California at San Diego, …, 1994 - Department of Economics, UC San …
J Watson - york.ac.uk
Abstract This paper examines a model in which individuals contract with one another along
the branches of a fixed network and then select verifiable productive actions with externally
enforced transfers. Special cases of the model include most settings of contracting with ...
J Watson, J Rauch - 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: One informal barrier to international trade is lack ofinformation about international
trading opportunities. This informationcan be supplied by export trading companies who
have knowledge about buyers andsellers. Employees working in production or sales ...
J Watson, K Buzard - Theoretical Economics, 2011 - ideas.repec.org
This paper examines a class of contractual relationships with specific investment, a non-
durable trading opportunity, and renegotiation. Trade actions are modeled as individual and
trade-action-based option contracts (" non-forcing contracts") are explored. The paper ...
Many economic relationships (such as partnership, employment, and buyer-supplier
relationships) are ongoing and governed in whole or in part by self-enforced incentives. e
relational contracts literature studies these relationships using the framework of in nitely ...
D MORTENSEN, É NAGYPáL… - … journal of economics, 2007 - cadmus.eui.eu
Full-text contained in Cadmus is protected by copyright law and may be downloaded for
personal research purposes only. Any additional reproduction for other purposes, whether in
hard copy or electronically, requires the consent of the copyright holder (s).
J Watson, K Buzard - 2009 - escholarship.org
Abstract: This paper examines a class of contractual relationships with specific investment, a
non-durable trading opportunity, and renegotiation. FurtheringWatson's (2007) line of
analysis, trade actions are modeled as individual and trade-action-based option contracts ...
JE Rauch… - 2010 - nber.org
Client relationships create value, which employees may try to wrest from their employers by
setting up their own firms. If when an employer and worker establish a relationship they
cannot contract on the output and profits of the worker's prospective new firm, the ...
K Buzard, J Watson - 2009 - 128.36.236.74
Abstract This paper examines a class of contractual relationships with specific investment, a
non-durable trading opportunity, and renegotiation. Furthering Watson's (2007) line of
analysis, trade actions are modeled as individual and trade-action-based option contracts ...
J Watson - Imagining marketing: art, aesthetics, and the avant- …, 2000 - books.google.com
The edge of sanity is a familiar place. It's the place where he felt totally out of control of his
life, mind and body in constant engagement. It's the conscience and unconscious levels of
the mind living lives out of touch. This is the place where structure and form fall in on each ...
[CITATION] Isaac Taylor Tichenor and the administration of the Alabama Agricultural and Mechanical College, 1872-1882.
JC Watson - 1968 - Auburn University.
[CITATION] To order any of these papers, see instructions at the end of the list. To subscribe to all NBER Working Papers or the papers in a single area, see …
C Clubs, DH Papell, JG Williamson, G Dumais… - NBER working paper …, 1997
A Schwartz… - global.law.duke.edu
Despite the contract-theory literature's broad progress over the years, it has yet to fully
address some fundamental issues regarding contract enforcement. Among these are (a) the
meaning and need for the interpretation of contracts by external enforcers,(b) why multiple ...
J Watson… - 2002 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper analyzes the role of third party intermediaries in contract enforcement.
In our model, intermediaries record information about past actions and resolve disputes
when requested to do so by the contracting agents. When the verifiability of information is ...
J Watson, M Klimenko… - 2001 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper presents a theory of dynamic trade agreements in which external
institutions, such as the WTO, play a central role in supporting credible enforcement. In our
model, countries engage in ongoing negotiations, and as a consequence cooperative ...
[CITATION] The Hold-up Problem in Settings with a Durable Trading Opportunity
J Watson, C Wignall… - 2007 - School of Economics & Finance, The …
B Jorgensen, NP Schmitt… - CROSSING BORDERS …, 2011 - marketingeducators.org
ABSTRACT Through our contact with potential employers of business students, we've
learned two things. First, employers of marketing and other business students place a high
value on students who can write well. Second, employers are not entirely satisfied with ...
[CITATION] Job Destruction and Propagation of Shocks
J WOUTER, GR HAAN…
MJ Watson - 2008 - gradworks.umi.com
Abstract: One of the enduring problems in the Western political tradition has been
reconciling the transcendent claims of religion with the political needs of the state. From
Antigone's defiant stand to the wars of religion to contemporary concerns about the ...
J Boone, J Watson - The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
We consider a continuous-time labor matching model with endogenous separation. Firms
initially lack information about the quality of workers with whom they are matched. They
acquire information both from pre-employment testing and, in the case in which a labor ...
A Schwartz… - 128.125.42.47
Abstract A problem in economic contract theory is to know when parties can create efficient
investment incentives with contracts. A problem in legal contract theory is to develop rules to
guide courts in interpreting contracts. These problems are related because the law's ...
BK Jorgensen, N Panos-Schmitt… - The Pinnacle of …, 2010 - marketingeducators.org
ABSTRACT This special session presents and discusses a unique project-based degree
completion program in business, the Bachelor of Business Administration (BBA) for working
professionals who have previously acquired associates degrees. The students for whom ...
J Watson - 2003 - escholarship.org
1Rauch and Watson (2002, Table 1) find that, when international trade intermediaries
handling differentiated products started their firms, clients outside of the United States with
whom they had experience from previous employment accounted for over half of their ...
M Klimenko, G Ramey… - 2000 - Citeseer
Abstract This paper considers the negotiation and enforcement of trade agreements in an
environment where countries negotiate repeatedly through time. The idea that countries
choose trade policies repeatedly through time has been widely applied in the literature on ...
J Watson… - 2002 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We study contracting and costly renegotiation in settings of complete but
unverifiable information, using the mechanism-design approach. We show how
renegotiation activity is best modelled in the fundamentals of the mechanism-design ...
[CITATION] Network Effects, Congestion Externalities, and Air Traffic Delays: Or Why All Delays Are Not Evil Are There Differential Effects of Price and Policy on ( …
A Hamdarri, G Grossman, ELG Lai, WB Gray… - NBER working paper …, 2002
J Watson - atlas-conferences.com
We argue for more structured game theoretic analysis of contract and institutions. We
develop a modeling framework which highlights the notion of contract, enforcement
methods, and institutional constraints. We employ the framework to explore how the ...
[CITATION] Young and Other Southern Families
J Watson - 1978
A Schwartz… - 2012 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Contract interpretation is an important subject for lawyers but there are few rigorous
economic analyses. We use a formal model to derive the interpretive rule that an “ideal”
legal enforcer would adopt. Commercial parties make contracts to maximize gains from ...
[CITATION] BILATERAL TRADE AND OPPORTUNISM IN A MATCHING MARKET
J WATSON
S Bandyopadhyay, F Iskhakov, T Johnson, S Lee… - 2012 - bu.edu
Abstract This chapter describes the operation of the job market for PhD economists and the
effort to improve the market's operation via the creation of the non-profit organization
EconJobMarket. org (EJM), a web-based service designed to serve as an “information ...
[CITATION] Multiple-issue Bargaining and Axiomatic Solutions
CP Obiols, J Watson… - 1994 - Departament d'Economia i Historia …
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