 | Professor of Economics New York University Verified email at nyu.edu Cited by 1997 |
A Lizzeri… - American Economic Review, 2001 - JSTOR
Politicians who care about the spoils of office may underprovide a public good because its
benefits cannot be targeted to voters as easily as pork-barrel spending. We compare a
winner-take-all system-where all the spoils go to the winner-to a proportional system- ...
A Lizzeri - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1999 - JSTOR
I discuss the role of intermediaries that search out the information of privately informed
parties and then choose what to reveal to uninformed parties. My focus is on the strategic
manipulation of information by these certification intermediaries. I show that in a class of ...
A Lizzeri… - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2004 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract A new rationale is presented for why an elite may want to expand the franchise
even in the absence of threats to the established order. Expanding the franchise can turn
politicians away from particularistic politics based on ad personam redistribution within the ...
I Hendel… - 1997 - nber.org
An undesirable feature of Akerlof style models of adverse selection is that ownership of"
used cars is independent of preferences and is therefore ad hoc. We present a dynamic
model" that incorporates the market for new goods. Consumers self-select into buying new ...
I Hendel… - The Rand Journal of Economics, 1999 - JSTOR
We present a model to address in a unified manner four ways in which a monopolist can
interfere with secondary markets. In the model, consumers have heterogeneous valuations
for quality so that used-good markets play an allocative role. Our results are the following:( ...
I Hendel… - 2000 - nber.org
We look at the life insurance industry to study the properties of long term contracts in a world
where consumers cannot commit to a contract. The main issue is how contracts are
designed to deal with classification risk. We present a model that captures the main ...
I Hendel… - 1998 - nber.org
Leasing contracts specify a rental rate and an option price at which the used good can be
bought at the termination of the lease. This option price cannot be controlled when the car is
sold. We show that in a world with symmetric information this additional control variable is ...
A Lizzeri… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2000 - Elsevier
We prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium for a general class of two-player bidding
games. We apply our results to the first price auction, the combination of first and second
price auctions, the war of attrition, the all pay auction, as well as combinations of the latter ...
GL Albano… - International Economic Review, 2001 - Wiley Online Library
2. Abstract We study the effect of the presence of a certification intermediary in an
environment where information asymmetries are particularly severe. The intermediary
improves the information that buyers have about quality. This in turn increases the ...
A Lizzeri… - Journal of the European Economic …, 2005 - Wiley Online Library
In most major democracies there are very few parties compared to the number of possible
policy positions held by voters. We provide an efficiency rationale for why it might be
appropriate to limit the proliferation of parties. In our model, the larger the number of ...
A Lizzeri - The Review of Economic Studies, 1999 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract This paper proposes a new view of the forces in the political process that cause
governments to accumulate debt. The analysis builds on a model of redistributive politics
that, contrary to median voter models, does not restrict the set of policies that politicians ...
A Lizzeri, MA Meyer… - 2002 - economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk
Abstract We study a dynamic moral hazard model where the agent does not fully observe his
performance. We consider the incentive effects of providing feedback to the agent: revealing
to the agent how well he is doing. We show that, if the incentive scheme is exogenously ...
I Hendel,
A Lizzeri… - The Review of …, 2005 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We discuss a class of markets for durable goods where efficiency (or approximate
efficiency) is obtained despite the presence of information asymmetries. In the model, the
number of times a good has changed hands (the vintage of the good) is an accurate ...
A Gavazza… - Review of Economic Studies, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
We provide a two period model of political competition in which voters imperfectly observe
the electoral promises made to other voters. Imperfect observability generates an incentive
for candidates to offer excessive transfers even if voters are homogeneous and taxation is ...
P Dudine, I Hendel… - The American economic …, 2006 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: We study dynamic monopoly pricing of storable goods in an environment where
demand changes over time. The literature on durables has focused on incentives to delay
purchases. Our analysis focuses on a different intertemporal demand incentive. The key ...
A Lizzeri… - Agosto: www. igs. berkeley. edu/ …, 2003 - igs.berkeley.edu
Abstract A new rationale is presented for why an elite may wish to expand the franchise
even in the absence of serious threats to the established order. Expanding the franchise can
turn politicians away from particularistic politics based on ad-personam redistribution ...
A Lizzeri… - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2008 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We propose a simple theoretical model of supervised learning that is potentially
useful to interpret a number of empirical phenomena relevant to the nature-nurture debate.
The model captures a basic trade-off between sheltering the child from the consequences ...
A Gavazza… - The American economic review, 2007 - JSTOR
Many countries have recently enacted or proposed reforms aimed at increasing the
availability of information on the quality of some public sector services. Transparency has
been a buzzword among international organizations and public sector reformers.'For ...
G Daily, I Hendel… - The American Economic Review, 2008 - JSTOR
There is a vast theoretical literature on dynamic contracts, whichhas received very little
empirical attention (exceptions are Pierre Andr? Chiappori, Bernard Salanie, and Julie
Valentin 1999 and Hendel and Lizzeri 2003). This paper describes how a recent ...
A Lizzeri, N Persico… - 2000 - evan.lunarmania.com
Abstract According to the conventional view, in politics, just as in economic markets,
competition between politicians is a force that pushes towards efficiency. We provide a
model that challenges this view. In the model, candidates can promise to provide a public ...
GL Albano… - CORE Discussion Papers, 1997 - ideas.repec.org
No abstract is available for this item. ... To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three options: 1. Check below under "Related
research" whether another version of this item is available online. 2. Check on the ...
Abstract I discuss the role of intermediaries that search out the information of privately
informed parties and then choose what to reveal to uninformed parties. The focus is on the
strategic manipulation of information by these certification intermediaries. I show that in a ...
[CITATION] Interim Evaluations in Dynamic Tournaments: The Effects of Midterm Exams
A Lizzeri, M Meyer… - University of Oxford, 1999
A Lizzeri… - Discussion Papers, 1995 - ideas.repec.org
We prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in a 2-bidder asymmetric first price
auction with affiliated values. The techniques used to prove uniqueness are different from
the ones used in analyses of private values environments. Moreover the proof of existence ...
[CITATION] The transparency of political institutions
[CITATION] mThe Incentive Effects of Interim Performance Evaluations
A Lizzeri, M Meyer… - 2002 - n CARESS working paper
A Lizzeri… - by E. Aragones, C. Bevia, LH, and N. …, 2009 - nicolapersico.com
Abstract We analyze the risk-taking behavior of political candidates who are uncertain about
the values voters assign to various policy platforms. We show that the majoritarian and
proportional electoral systems lead to different outcomes. The proportional system ...
[CITATION] Essays in Information Economics
A Lizzeri - 1995 - Northwestern University
[CITATION] kThe Drawbacks of Electoral Compe" titionl
A Lizzeri… - Journal of the European Economic Association, …, 2002
Abstract We quantitatively investigate the allocative and welfare effects of secondary
markets for cars. Gains from trade in these markets arise because of heterogeneity in the
willingness to pay for higher-quality (ie, newer) goods, but transaction costs are an ...
Abstract We investigate how the distribution of income affects the volume of trade and
allocations in durable goods markets. Activity in secondary markets arises because of some
gains from trade. In the car market, a dominant feature of such gains from trade is ...
A Gavazza… - Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
We study the policy choices of an incumbent politician when voters imperfectly observe
aggregate spending and the incumbent's ability. We show that total spending is decreasing
in the transparency of spending, but increasing in the transparency of the incumbent's ...
[CITATION] mA Drawback of Electoral Com% petitionn
A Lizzeri… - Journal of the European Economic Association, 2005
I Hendel,
A Lizzeri… - Econometric Society World Congress …, 2000 - Citeseer
Abstract We study the possibility of achieving efficiency in a dynamic adverse selection
market for durable goods. The idea is to use the number of times a car has been traded
(“vintage”) as a signal of its quality. Higher-valuation consumers experiment with younger ...
[CITATION] Strategic Certification and Provision of Quality
AG Luigi… - International Economic Review
[CITATION] iWhy Did the Elites Extend the Suffrage
A Lizzeri… - 2004 - Democ
[CITATION] The provision of public goods under alternative political regimes
A Lizzeri… - American Economic Review, 2001
Abstract This paper develops a model of nonlinear pricing of storable goods. We show that
storability imposes novel constraints on a monopolist's ability to extract surplus. We then
show that the attempt to relax these constraints can generate cyclical patterns in pricing ...
A Lizzeri… - Princeton Economic Theory Papers, 1999 - ideas.repec.org
No abstract is available for this item. ... To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three options: 1. Check below under "Related
research" whether another version of this item is available online. 2. Check on the ...
Abstract If buyers do not observe the quality of a product and production of quality is costly,
market allocations can be very inefficient. Certification intermediaries are institutions that
provide information about quality to buyers. The amount of information in the market ...
Abstract: This paper shows that politicians may not offer to provide a socially desirable
public good because the benefits of the public good cannot be targeted to voters as easily
as pork barrel spending. We present a Downsian model where candidates care only ...
Abstract According to the conventional view, in politics, just as in economic markets,
competition between politicians is a force that pushes towards efficiency. We provide a
model that challenges this view. In the model, candidates can promise to provide a public ...
AB NYU, AL NYU… - 2011 - bu.edu
Abstract Behavioral economics presents a mpaternalisticnrationale for government
interven& tion. Current literature focuses on benevolent government. This paper introduces
politicians who may indulge/exploit these behavioral biases. We present an analysis of ...
AL NYU… - 2012 - hss.caltech.edu
Abstract Behavioral economics presents a “paternalistic” rationale for government
intervention. Current literature focuses on benevolent government. This paper studies the
desirability of varying degrees of government intervention when government decisions ...
AB NYU, AL NYU… - 2010 - economics.uchicago.edu
Abstract. Behavioral economics presents a ppaternalisticqrationale for government inter&
vention. Current literature focuses on benevolent government. This paper introduces
politicians who may indulge/exploit these behavioral biases. We present an analysis of ...
GL Albano… - International Economic Review, 2001 - rasmusen.org
We study the effect of the presence of a certification intermediaiy in an environment where
information asymmetries are particularly severe. The intermediary improves the information
that buyers have about quality. This in turn increases the incentives that the seller has to ...
C Intermediaries… - 1994 - europealumni.kellogg.northwestern. …
Since Akerlofs (1970) work on (he market for lemons, a vast literature in economics has
discussed the problems that arise in markets with asymmetrically informed agents. These
problems are perceived to be important and to affect market institutions and outcomes in a ...
AB NYU, AL NYU… - 2011 - econ.umd.edu
Abstract Behavioral economics presents a “paternalistic” rationale for government
intervention. Current literature focuses on benevolent government. This paper introduces
politicians who may indulge/exploit these behavioral biases. We present an analysis of ...
I Hendel… - 2003 - escholarship.org
... Citation. Hendel, Igal; & Lizzeri, Alessandro. (2003). Commitment to Long Term Contracts: The
Case of Life Insurance. ... Commitment to Long Term Contracts: The Case of Life Insurance. Author:
Hendel, Igal, University of Wisconsin; Lizzeri, Alessandro, NYU. Publication Date: ...
A Lizzeri - Theory workshop papers, 2003 - ideas.repec.org
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I Hendel… - 2000 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Leasing contracts are extensively used in durable goods markets. These contracts
specify a rental rate and an option price at which the used good can be bought at the
termination of the lease. This option price cannot be controlled when the car is sold. We ...
Abstract A new rationale is presented for why an elite may wish to expand the franM chise
even in the absence of serious threats to the established order. Expanding the franchise can
turn politicians away from particularistic politics based on adMpersonam redistribution ...
I Hendel… - Princeton Economic Theory Papers, 1999 - ideas.repec.org
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