S Govindan… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2003 - Elsevier
A new algorithm is presented for computing Nash equilibria of finite games. Using Kohlberg
and Mertens' structure theorem we show that a homotopy method can be represented as a
dynamical system and implemented by Smale's global Newton method. The algorithm is ...
S Govindan… - Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2004 - Elsevier
This article develops a new algorithm for computing Nash equilibria of N-player games. The
algorithm approximates a game by a sequence of polymatrix games in which the players
interact bilaterally. We provide sufficient conditions for local convergence to an equilibrium ...
S Govindan… - Econometrica, 2001 - Wiley Online Library
Ž. Ž. Ž. HARSANYI 1973, ROSENMULLER 1971, AND WILSON 1971 showed that for each
assignment of generic payoffs to the normal form of a game, the number of Nash equilibria is
finite and odd. Nowadays, this result is seen as an immediate corollary of Ž.
S Govindan… - Econometrica, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
A player's pure strategy is called relevant for an outcome of a game in extensive form with
perfect recall if there exists a weakly sequential equilibrium with that outcome for which the
strategy is an optimal reply at every information set it does not exclude. The outcome ...
S Govindan… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1997 - faculty-gsb.stanford.edu
Abstract: Associated with each component of the Nash equilibria of a game are its index and
degree. Its index is the local degree of the displacement map whose roots are the Nash
equilibria of the game. Its degree is the local degree of the projection map from the Nash ...
S Govindan, PJ Reny… - Games and …, 2004 - ess-routing.googlecode.com
*We wish to thank Stephen Morris, Mark Satterthwaite, Jeroen Swinkels, and Bob Wilson for
helpful comments. Govindan acknowleges research support from the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada; Reny from the National Science Foundation (SES- ...
S Govindan… - Econometrica, 2001 - Wiley Online Library
2. Abstract Consider nonempty finite pure strategy sets S 1,…, S n, let S= S 1×⋅⋅⋅× S n, let
Ω be a finite space of “outcomes,” let Δ (Ω) be the set of probability distributions on Ω, and let
θ: S→ Δ (Ω) be a function. We study the conjecture that for any utility in a generic set of n- ...
S Govindan… - Economic Theory, 1997 - Springer
Summary. Given a map whose roots are the Nash equilibria of a game, each component of
the equilibrium set has an associated index, defined as the local degree of the map. This
note shows that for a two-player game, every map with the same roots induces the same ...
S Govindan… - International Journal of Game Theory, 2003 - Springer
Abstract. We extend the results of Blume, Brandenberger, and Dekel (1991b) to obtain a
finite characterization of perfect equilibria in terms of lexicographic probability systems
(LPSs). The LPSs we consider are defined over individual strategy sets and thus capture ...
S Govindan… - The new Palgrave dictionary of economics, 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper describes ways that the definition of an equilibrium among players'
strategies in a game can be sharpened by invoking additional criteria derived from decision
theory. Refinements of John Nash's 1950 definition aim primarily to distinguish equilibria ...
S Govindan - Journal of Economic Theory, 1995 - Elsevier
For the Kreps and Wilson version of Selten′ s Chain Store Game, every equilibrium of
every stable set induces the same outcome. This unique outcome is that induced by the
Kreps and Wilson solution. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72.
S Govindan… - University of Iowa and Stanford …, 2004 - faculty-gsb.stanford.edu
Addresses: (1) Professor Srihari Govindan, Department of Economics, University of Iowa, Iowa
City IA 52242, USA. Email: srihari-govindan@uiowa.edu. (2) Professor Robert Wilson, Stanford
Business School, Stanford, CA 94305-5015, USA. Email: rwilson@stanford.edu.
LA Busch… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2004 - Elsevier
We construct a pure exchange economy with spot and real security markets for which there
does not exist a competitive equilibrium. Moreover, we show that the problem of
nonexistence is robust to small perturbations of the endowments of the consumers. The ...
S Govindan… - Journal of economic theory, 1998 - Elsevier
Gul and Pearce argue that forward induction has much less power as an equilibrium
refinement than is generally supposed. The present comment raises the issue: What does
admissibility imply for Gul and Pearce's analysis? In a key example, the precise ...
S Govindan… - Economic Theory, 2010 - Springer
Abstract An N-player game can be decomposed by adding a coordinator who interacts
bilaterally with each player. The coordinator proposes profiles of strategies to the players,
and his payoff is maximized when players' optimal replies agree with his proposal. When ...
S Govindan… - Mathematics of Operations Research, 2008 - works.bepress.com
Metastability is a refinement of the Nash equilibria of a game derived from two conditions:
embedding combines behavioral axioms called invariance and small-worlds, and continuity
requires games with nearby best replies to have nearby equilibria. These conditions imply ...
S Govindan… - University of Western Ontario, 1998 - faculty-gsb.stanford.edu
Abstract. We show that the index of a Nash equilibrium is intrinsically game-theoretic. In
particular, the index function dened on components of the Nash equilibria of nite games is
shown to be independent of the xed-point map used to characterize equilibria.
[CITATION] Generic finiteness of outcome distributions for two person game forms with zero sum and common interest utilities
S Govindan… - 1998 - Mimeo, University of Western …
S Govindan… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2009 - Elsevier
The Global Newton Method for games in normal form and in extensive form is shown to have
a natural extension to computing Markov-perfect equilibria of stochastic games. ... [1] V. Aguirregabiria
and P. Mira, Sequential estimation of dynamic discrete games. Econometrica, 75 (2007), ...
S Govindan - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1995 - JSTOR
THE PURPOSE OF THIS NOTE is to show that every stable set, as defined in Mertens
(1989), contains a fully stable set in the sense of Hillas (1990). Such a result could be
viewed as a strengthening of the backward induction property of stable equilibria, since ...
S Govindan, RB Wilson… - 2010 - works.bepress.com
ABSTRACT A first-price sealed-bid auction of an item for which bidders are risk-neutral and
have privately known values is shown to have an equilibrium in mixed behavioral strategies
if the joint distribution of bidders' values has a continuous density on a cubical support. ...
S Govindan, RB Wilson… - 2010 - works.bepress.com
ABSTRACT For two symmetric bidders, weak monotonicity conditions are shown to imply
existence of an equilibrium in mixed behavioral strategies for a sealed-bid first-price auction
of an item for which each bidder's value depends on every bidder's observed signal. Such ...
[CITATION] A game form with infinitely many equilibria on an open set of payoffs
S Govindan… - Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, 1995
S Govindan - Mathematics of operations research, 1996 - JSTOR
Stable sets project onto stable sets of subgames in the following sense: stable sets consist of
normal form perfect equilibria; for any given ε, we could therefore look at the set of strategy
profiles in a subgame that are induced by the set of ε-perfect equilibria in a neighborhood ...
S Govindan… - 2009 - works.bepress.com
Abstract We impose three conditions on refinements of the Nash equilibria of finite games
with perfect recall that select closed connected subsets, called solutions. A. Each equilibrium
in a solution uses undominated strategies; B. Each solution contains a quasi-perfect ...
S Govindan… - 2010 - works.bepress.com
Abstract A first-price sealed-bid auction of an item for which bidders are risk-neutral and
have privately known values is shown to have an equilibrium in mixed behavioral strategies
if the joint distribution of bidders' values has a continuous density on a cubical support. ...
S Govindan… - … School of Business Research Paper No. …, 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Mertens'(1989) definition of stability for a game in strategic form is applied to a
game in extensive form with perfect recall. If payoffs are generic then the outcomes of stable
sets of equilibria defined via homological essentiality by Mertens coincide with those ...
S Govindan, RB Wilson… - 2010 - works.bepress.com
ABSTRACT For an all-pay sealed-bid auction of an item for which each bidder's realized
value can depend on every bidder's privately observed signal, existence of equilibria in
behavioral strategies is established using only the assumption that bidders' value ...
S Govindan… - 2008 - economics.uchicago.edu
ABSTRACT Three axioms from decision theory select sets of Nash equilibria of signaling
games in extensive form with generic payoffs. The axioms require undominated strategies
(admissibility), inclusion of a sequential equilibrium (backward induction), and ...
RB Wilson… - 2005 - works.bepress.com
... Search All Sites. RSS Feed. Print this page. Bookmark. Unpublished Papers «Previous.
Refinements of Nash Equilibria. Robert B. Wilson, Stanford University Srihari Govindan, University
of Iowa. Abstract. ... Suggested Citation. Robert B. Wilson and Srihari Govindan. 2005. ...
S GOVINDAN - 2003 - econ.rochester.edu
Page 1. 1 October, 2011 SRIHARI GOVINDAN Department of Economics
223 Harkness Hall University of Rochester Rochester, NY 14627 Ph.
585.275.7214 E-mail: s.govindan@rochester.edu ...
R Wilson… - 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: A first-price sealed-bid auction of an item for which bidders are risk-neutral and
have privately known values is shown to have an equilibrium in mixed behavioral strategies
if the joint distribution of bidders' values has a continuous density on a cubical support. ...
S Govindan… - … School of Business Research Paper No. …, 2008 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: A player's pure strategy is called relevant for an outcome of a game in extensive
form with perfect recall if there exists a weakly sequential equilibrium with that outcome for
which the strategy is an optimal reply at every information set it does not exclude. The ...
S Govindan… - 2008 - works.bepress.com
Abstract Three axioms from decision theory are applied to refinements of the Nash equilibria
of a game in extensive form with perfect recall. One axiom requires that a refinement does
not depend on embeddings within larger games that preserve the reduced normal form of ...
S Chatterji… - Economic Theory, 2006 - Springer
Summary. We show that a perfect correlated equilibrium distribution of an N- person game, as
defined by Dhillon and Mertens (1996) can be achieved using a finite number of copies of the
strategy space as the message space. ... Keywords and Phrases: Correlated equilibrium, ...
[CITATION] STABLE EQUILIBRIA OF SIGNALING GAMES
S GOVINDAN… - 2001
R Wilson… - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: For two symmetric bidders, weak monotonicity conditions are shown to imply
existence of an equilibrium in mixed behavioral strategies for a sealed-bid first-price auction
of an item for which each bidder's value depends on every bidder's observed signal. Such ...
S GOVINDAN… - 2009 - tippie.uiowa.edu
Abstract. We apply three axioms adapted from decision theory to refinements of the Nash
equilibria of games with perfect recall that select connected closed subsets called solutions.
Undominated Strategies: No player uses a weakly dominated strategy in an equilibrium in ...
[CITATION] EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN OUTSIDE-OPTION GAMES
S GOVINDAN… - 2002
S Govindan… - Stanford GSB Working Paper No. 1896, 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Two assumptions are used to justify selection of equilibria in stable sets. One
assumption requires that a selected set is invariant to addition of redundant strategies. The
other is a strong version of backward induction. Backward induction is interpreted as the ...
[CITATION] Water Scarcity and Optimal Pricing of Water
HJ Paarsch, S Govindan… - 2010 - University of Iowa
S Govindan… - … School of Business Research Paper No. …, 2008 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Three axioms from decision theory select sets of Nash equilibria of signaling
games in extensive form with generic payoffs. The axioms require undominated strategies
(admissibility), inclusion of a sequential equilibrium (backward induction), and ...
RB Wilson… - 2008 - works.bepress.com
Abstract Three axioms from decision theory select sets of Nash equilibria of signaling games
in extensive form with generic payoffs. The axioms require undominated strategies
(admissibility), inclusion of a sequential equilibrium (backward induction), and ...
S Govindan, RB Wilson… - 2008 - gsbapps.stanford.edu
ABSTRACT Three axioms from decision theory select sets of Nash equilibria of signaling
games in extensive form with generic payoffs. The axioms require undominated strategies
(admissibility), inclusion of a sequential equilibrium (backward induction), and ...
S Govindan… - 2009 - works.bepress.com
Abstract Three axioms from decision theory are applied to refinements that select connected
subsets of the Nash equilibria of games with perfect recall. The first axiom requires all
equilibria in a selected subset to be admissible, ie\ each player's strategy is an admissible ...
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