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Conflict and deterrence under strategic risk

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S Chassang… - The quarterly journal of …, 2010 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We examine the determinants of cooperation and the effectiveness of deterrence
when fear is a motive for conflict. We contrast results obtained in a complete information
setting with those obtained in a setting with strategic risk, where players have different ...
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[PDF] Economic shocks and civil war

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S Chassang… - Quarterly Journal of Political …, 2009 - princeton.edu
Abstract This article revisits the relationship between income per capita and civil conflict. We
establish that the empirical literature identifies two different patterns. First, poor countries
have a higher propensity to suffer from civil war. Second, civil war occurs when countries ...
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Building routines: Learning, cooperation, and the dynamics of incomplete relational contracts

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S Chassang - The American Economic Review, 2010 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: This paper studies how agents with conflicting interests learn to cooperate when
the details of cooperation are not common knowledge. It considers a repeated game in
which one player has incomplete information about when and how her partner can ...
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Fear of miscoordination and the robustness of cooperation in dynamic global games with exit

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S Chassang - Econometrica, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
This paper develops a framework to assess how fear of miscoordination affects the
sustainability of cooperation. Building on theoretical insights from Carlsson and van Damme
(1993), it explores the effect of small amounts of private information on a class of dynamic ...
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[PDF] Mutual Fear and Civil War1

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S Chassang&… - 2007 - Citeseer
Page 1. Mutual Fear and Civil War1 Sylvain Chassang& Princeton University Gerard Padréo
i Miquel' Stanford Graduate School of Business September 17, 2007 Previous versions of this
paper were presented at the Political Science Departments of MIT, Harvard, ...
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[PDF] Strategic Risk, Civil War and Intervention

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S Chassang… - Unpublished Manuscript, London …, 2006 - personal.lse.ac.uk
Abstract This paper presents a theory of conflict in which violence occurs as a result of
strategic risk. Actors face a difficult balancing act between the fear of being attacked and the
opportunity cost of breaking peace that selects the risk dominant equilibrium. We link the ...
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Uniform selection in global games

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S Chassang - Journal of Economic Theory, 2008 - Elsevier
This paper brings together results which are required in order to extend the global games
approach to settings where the game structure is endogenous. More precisely, it shows that
the selection argument of Carlsson and van Damme [Global games and equilibrium ...
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Robustness to incomplete information in repeated games

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S Chassang… - Theoretical Economics, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
This paper extends the framework of Kajii and Morris (1997) to study the question of
robustness to incomplete information in repeated games. We show that dynamically robust
equilibria can be characterized using a one-shot robustness principle that extends the one ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - All 35 versions

Defensive weapons and defensive alliances

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S Chassang… - The American Economic Review, 2009 - JSTOR
In 2002, US President George W. Bush initi ated the deploymentof a new ballistic missile
defense system. 1 The move triggered vocifer ous international concerns, including a recent
statement of Russia and China condemning US plans as a destabilizing move. 2 Indeed, ...
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[CITATION] i $ Miguel (2008): lConflict and De $ terrence under Strategic Risk, mmimeo

S Chassang… - Princeton
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[CITATION] Rationalizability and Selection in Dynamic Games with Exit

S Chassang - 2005 - MIT Mimeo
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Calibrated Incentive Contracts

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S Chassang - … University Economic Theory Center Working Paper …, 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper studies a dynamic agency problem which includes limited liability,
moral hazard and adverse selection. The paper develops a robust approach to dynamic
contracting based on calibrating the payoffs that would have been delivered by simple ...
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[CITATION] PADRO-I-MIQUEL, G.(2009),“Economic Shocks and Civil War”

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S Chassang - Quarterly Journal of Political Science
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[PDF] A Theory of Informal Justice

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S Chassang… - 2011 - princeton.edu
Abstract This paper develops a positive theory of informal justice based on social
preferences. We consider a principal and an agent whose relationship is mediated by a third-
party arbitrator that decides on ex post transfers between the two parties. Importantly, ...
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[PDF] tSelective Trials, Information Production and Technology Diffusionu

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S Chassang, GP i Miquel… - 2009 - isites.harvard.edu
Abstract This paper explores how to run randomized experiments when outcomes depend
significantly on unobserved effort decisions taken by agents. Our first set of results show that
making selection explicit rather than implicit can generate greater information. This ...
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Savings and predation

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S Chassang… - Journal of the European Economic …, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract We contrast the relationship between predation and the savings of its potential
victim in two different simple models. In the first model, predation is an exogenous event in
which savings are expropriated with some fixed probability. In such a setting, the higher ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - All 10 versions

[PDF] Fear of miscoordination and the robustness of cooperation in dynamic global games with exit

[PDF] from iese.edu
S Chassang - 2006 - iese.edu
Abstract This paper develops a framework to assess the impact of miscoordination fear on
agents' ability to sustain dynamic cooperation. Building on theoretical insights from Carlsson
and van Damme (1993), it explores the effect of small amounts of private information on a ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 12 versions

[PDF] Robustness to Incomplete Information in Repeated and Dynamic Games

[PDF] from rutgers.edu
S Chassang… - 2008 - economics.rutgers.edu
Abstract This paper extends Kajii and Morris (1997)'s notion of robustness to incomplete
information to repeated and more generally dynamic games. We argue that in dynamic
games, the requirements of robustness should be strengthened to allow for small payoff ...
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Non-asymptotic tests of model performance

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S Chassang - Economic Theory, 2009 - Springer
Abstract This paper describes a non-asymptotic approach to the problem of selection bias in
economic forecasting. By using non-asymptotic measure concentration results, it is possible
to deal with settings in which the class of potential models is large with respect to the ...
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Robustness to incomplete information in repeated games

S Takahashi… - Theoretical Economics, 2011 - ideas.repec.org
This paper extends the framework of Kajii and Morris (1997) to study the question of
robustness to incomplete information in repeated games. We show that dynamically robust
equilibria can be characterized using a one-shot robustness principle that extends the one ...
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Essays on coordination, cooperation, and learning

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AV Banerjee, M Yildiz, SG Chassang - 2007 - dspace.mit.edu
... at the MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY June 2007 @ Sylvain Chassang, All
rights reserved. The author hereby grants to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology permission
to reproduce and distribute copies of this thesis document in whole or in part. ...
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[CITATION] Conflict and Development-Defensive Weapons and Defensive Alliances

Full text - MIT Libraries
S Chassang… - American Economic Review, 2010

[CITATION] Essays on Coordination, Cooperation, and Learning

SG Chassang - 2007 - Massachusetts Institute of …
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[PDF] Accounting for Behavior in Treatment Effects: New Applications for Blind Trials

[PDF] from caltech.edu
S Chassang, E Snowberg… - 2012 - hss.caltech.edu
New treatments can affect patient outcomes through three distinct channels:(i) direct
therapeutic effects,(ii) changes in conscious or unconscious behavior accompanying
treatment, and (iii) interaction effects between treatment and changes in behavior. We ...
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[PDF] Learning how to cooperate when contingencies are ambiguous

[PDF] from chicagobooth.edu
S Chassang - 2007 - faculty.chicagobooth.edu
Abstract This paper studies how economic agents learn to cooperate when the details of
what cooperation means are ambiguous. It considers a dynamic game in which one player's
cost for the cooperative action is private information. From the perspective of the other ...
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[PDF] Social Preferences, Informal Justice, and Incentives

[PDF] from columbia.edu
S Chassang… - 2011 - jagiellonia.econ.columbia.edu
Abstract This paper develops a positive theory of informal justice based on social
preferences. We consider a principal and an agent whose relationship is mediated by a third-
party arbitrator that decides on ex post transfers between the two parties. Importantly, ...
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[CITATION] Social Preferences as Heuristics for Play in Repeated Game

S Chassang - 2010
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[PDF] A Theory of Conflict as a Coordination Failure in Anarchic Environments

[PDF] from escholarship.org
S Chassang… - 2006 - escholarship.org
Abstract This paper presents a theory of conflict in which violence occurs as an outcome of a
difficult balancing act between the fear of being attacked and the opportunity cost of
breaking peace. We link the propensity of conflict to current and future economic ...
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