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Collusion via signalling in simultaneous ascending bid auctions with heterogeneous objects, with and without complementarities

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S Brusco… - Review of Economic Studies, 2002 - Wiley Online Library
Collusive equilibria exist in simultaneous ascending bid auctions with multiple objects, even
with large complementarities in the buyers' utility functions. The bidders collude by dividing
the objects among themselves, while keeping the prices low. In the most collusive ...
Cited by 120 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 17 versions

Reallocation of corporate resources and managerial incentives in internal capital markets

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S Brusco… - European Economic Review, 2005 - Elsevier
Diversified firms often trade at a discount with respect to their focused counterparts. The
literature has tried to explain the apparent misallocation of resources with lobbying activities
or power struggles. We show that diversification can destroy value even when resources ...
Cited by 104 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 18 versions

Optimal secession rules

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M Bordignon… - European Economic Review, 2001 - Elsevier
Should the constitution of a federation allow for peaceful secession? Constitutionally defined
secession rules are optimal expost if the federation breaks down. However, they may be
suboptimal exante if the member countries receive a benefit from the perceived long-term ...
Cited by 90 - Related articles - Library Search - All 18 versions

On enhanced cooperation

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M Bordignon… - Journal of Public Economics, 2006 - Elsevier
We analyze the issues relative to the formation of sub-unions in a federation, called
enhanced cooperation agreements in the European Union. When centralization is not
politically feasible, an agreement among a subset of countries may allow such countries to ...
Cited by 78 - Related articles - Library Search - All 52 versions

Liquidity coinsurance, moral hazard, and financial contagion

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S Brusco… - The Journal of Finance, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
We study the propagation of financial crises among regions in which banks are protected by
limited liability and may take excessive risk. The regions are affected by negatively
correlated liquidity shocks, so liquidity coinsurance is Pareto improving. The moral hazard ...
Cited by 54 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 52 versions

Implementing action profiles when agents collude

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S Brusco - Journal of Economic Theory, 1997 - Elsevier
In this paper we consider the principal–multiple agents problem when collusion among
agents is possible. Collusion is captured by the use of equilibrium notions allowing for
coalitional deviations. We first analyze the constraints that collusion puts on feasible wage ...
Cited by 27 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 10 versions

EFFICIENT MECHANISMS FOR MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS*

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S Brusco, G Lopomo, DT Robinson… - International …, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
We characterize incentive-efficient merger outcomes when payments can be made both in
cash and stock. Each firm has private information about both its stand-alone value and a
component of the (possibly negative) potential synergies. We study two cases: when ...
Cited by 21 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 17 versions

Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints

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S Brusco… - Economic Theory, 2009 - Springer
Abstract We study simultaneous ascending auctions of two identical objects when bidders
are financially constrained and their valuations exhibit complementarities. We assume the
budget constraints are known but the values for individual objects are private information, ...
Cited by 20 - Related articles - All 15 versions

Collusion via signalling in open ascending auctions with multiple objects and complementarities

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S Brusco… - NYU Working Paper No. EC-99-05, 1999 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Collusive equilibria exist in open ascending auctions with multiple objects, if the
number of the bidders is sufficiently small relative to the number of objects, even with large
complementarities in the buyers' utility function. The bidders collude by dividing the ...
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Perfect bayesian implementation

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S Brusco - Economic Theory, 1995 - Springer
Summary We study Social Choice Sets (SCS) implementable as perfect Bayesian equilibria
of some incomplete information extensive form game. We provide a necessary condition
which we callcondition ß. The condition is analogous tocondition C that Moore and ...
Cited by 18 - Related articles - All 8 versions

Unique implementation of the full surplus extraction outcome in auctions with correlated types

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S Brusco - Journal of Economic Theory, 1998 - Elsevier
In auctions with correlated types it is possible to design mechanisms such that full surplus
extraction can be obtained as the outcome of an equilibrium in which agents use (weakly)
dominant strategies. However, it is not assured that the outcome is unique. We present an ...
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The optimal design of a market

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S Brusco… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1999 - Elsevier
We study the optimal design of the rules of trade in a two-period market given that agents
arrive at different times and may only trade with agents present contemporaneously. First
period agents face a fixed cost of trading across periods. Given the non-convexities ...
Cited by 16 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 18 versions

[PDF] Simultaneous ascending bid auctions with privately known budget constraints

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S Brusco… - Journal of Industrial Economics, 2008 - faculty.fuqua.duke.edu
Abstract In simultaneous ascending bid auctions, the mere possibility, even if arbitrarily
small, of binding budget constraints can reduce competition substantially because bidders
can 'pretend'to be constrained, even if they are not. Thus measures restricting the ...
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Price discovery in the pre-opening period. theory and evidence from the madrid stock exchange

[PDF] from uc3m.es
S Brusco, C Manzano… - Nº.: Workings Paper. …, 2003 - e-archivo.uc3m.es
Some stock exchanges, such as the Spanish Stock Exchange and Euronext (Paris), allow
traders to place orders in a'pre-opening'period. Orders placed in this period are used to
determine the opening price, and can be cancelled at any moment and at no cost by the ...
Cited by 12 - Related articles - All 16 versions

Collusion, renegotiation and implementation

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S Baliga… - Social Choice and Welfare, 2000 - Springer
Abstract. We study the implementation problem for exchange economies when agents can
renegotiate the outcome assigned by the planner and can collude. We focus on the use of
sequential mechanisms and present a simple sufficient condition for implementation with ...
Cited by 10 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 11 versions

THE ECONOMIC VALUE ADDED(EVA): AN ANALYSIS OF MARKET REACTION

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BD Tortella… - Advances in Accounting, 2003 - books.google.com
ABSTRACT The Economic Value Added (EVA® 1) is a widely adopted technique for the
measurement of value creation. Using different event study methodologies we test the
market reaction to the introduction of EVA. Additionally, we analyze the long-run evolution ...
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BUDGET CONSTRAINTS AND DEMAND REDUCTION IN SIMULTANEOUS ASCENDING‐BID AUCTIONS*

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S Brusco… - The Journal of Industrial Economics, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
BRUSCO, S. and LOPOMO, G.(2008), BUDGET CONSTRAINTS AND DEMAND
REDUCTION IN SIMULTANEOUS ASCENDING-BID AUCTIONS. The Journal of Industrial
Economics, 56: 113–142. doi: 10.1111/j. 1467-6451.2008. 00335. x
Cited by 9 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 10 versions

Understanding reverse mergers: a first approach

[PDF] from uc3m.es
A Arellano Ostoa… - Nº.: Workings Paper. Bussiness …, 2002 - e-archivo.uc3m.es
A reverse merger (RM) is a technique in which a private company is acquired by a shell or
defunct public company via stock swap. As a result, the private company becomes public.
The main difference between an IPO and a RM is that an IPO allows going public and also ...
Cited by 10 - Related articles - All 18 versions

The economics of contingent re-auctions

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S Brusco, G Lopomo… - American Economic Journal: …, 2011 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: We consider an auction environment where an object can be sold with usage
restrictions that generate benefits to the seller but decrease buyers' valuations. In this
environment, sellers such as the FCC have used “contingent re-auctions,” offering the ...
Cited by 8 - Related articles - All 12 versions

Implementing action profiles with sequential mechanisms

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S Brusco - Review of Economic Design, 1998 - Springer
Abstract. In this paper we consider the problem of a principal with many agents who desires
to implement a given action profile. Agents observe the actions taken by their colleagues,
and this information can be exploited by the principal. Sufficient conditions for ...
Cited by 6 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 6 versions

The [] Google effect'in the FCC's 700 MHz auction

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S Brusco, G Lopomo… - Information Economics and Policy, 2009 - Elsevier
We describe and interpret bidding behavior in FCC Auction 73 for the C-block licenses.
These licenses were initially offered subject to an open platform restriction, which was highly
valued by firms such as Google. Google entered bids until its bids reached the C-block ...
Cited by 6 - Related articles - All 7 versions

Split-award procurement auctions with uncertain scale economies: Theory and data

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JJ Anton, S Brusco… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2010 - Elsevier
In a number of observed procurements, the buyer has employed an auction format that
allows for a split-award outcome. We focus on settings where the range of uncertainty
regarding scale economies is large and, depending on cost realizations, the efficient ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - All 12 versions

Implementation with extensive form games: One round of signaling is not enough

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S Brusco - Journal of economic theory, 1999 - Elsevier
In situations of complete information, when a social choice function can be implemented
using an extensive form game it is always the case that there is an equilibrium which does
not go beyond the first stage (that is, an equilibrium with “one round of signaling”). We ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 12 versions

[PDF] Financing Constraints and Firm Dynamics with Durable Capital

[PDF] from sunysb.edu
S Brusco… - Department of Economics Working Papers, 2007 - ms.cc.sunysb.edu
Abstract We consider a dynamic financing problem of a firm subject to moral hazard
problems. With respect to the existing literature (eg as Clementi and Hopenhayn [2] and
Quadrini [12]), we enrich the model by introducing durable capital and a stochastic ...
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[BOOK] Merger mechanisms

[PDF] from feem.it
S Brusco, G Lopomo, SV Viswanathan… - 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: A firm can merge with one of n potential partners. The owner of each firm has
private information about both his firm's stand-alone value and a component of the synergies
that would be realized by the merger involving his firm. We characterize incentive-efficient ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 20 versions

Unique implementation of action profiles: necessary and sufficient conditions

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S Brusco - International Economic Review, 2002 - JSTOR
I study the general problem of a principal who desires to implement a given vector of actions
and pay the agents according to a given compensation scheme. Previous work has provided
mechanisms for implementation in various special cases. In this article, I fully characterize ...
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[PDF] An analysis of cancellations in the spanish stock exchange

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S Brusco… - 2006 - webmeets.com
Abstract The Spanish Stock Exchange is a trasparent market where traders have access to
the limit order book and have the option to cancel limit orders not yet fulfilled. The option
may be used if market conditions move adversely but also as a way to discover more ...
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[CITATION] jSimultaneous Ascending Auctions with Budget Constraintsk

S Brusco… - 2002 - Working Paper, Stern School of Busi …
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Heterogeneous distribution of information and convergence to rational expectations equilibrium in a partial equilibrium model

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S Brusco - Economics Letters, 1988 - Elsevier
Abstract In models of convergence to rational expectations equilibrium it is usually assumed
that information is (initially) concentrated upon a group of agents. We argue that this
assumption is relevant for convergence results, and we show that when it is removed ...
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[CITATION] kOn Enhanced Cooperation

M Bordignon… - l Journal of Public Economics, 2006
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Bankruptcy, takeovers, and wage contracts

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S Brusco - Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1996 - Wiley Online Library
1. This paper is a revised version of a chapter of my dissertation at Stanford University,
Graduate School of Business. I would like to thank, without implicating, Faruk Gül, Bob
Wilson, and especially John Roberts for their constant advice and encouragement. ...
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Aggregate uncertainty in the citizen candidate model yields extremist parties

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S Brusco… - Social Choice and Welfare, 2011 - Springer
Abstract We extend the citizen candidate model of electoral competition with sincere voting
to allow for k≥ 2 states of aggregate uncertainty. We discuss and characterize the
equilibrium set in this framework. We provide conditions for the existence of two-party ...
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Simultaneous ascending bid auctions with budget constraints

[TXT] from nyu.edu
S Brusco… - NYU Working Paper No. EC-02-14, 2002 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We identify and analyze three distinct effects arising from potentially binding
budget constraints in multi-unit ascending auctions. First, binding budgets clearly reduce the
level of competition among bidders. Second, budget constraints may at the same time ...
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[PDF] Perfect Bayesian implementation in economic environments

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S Brusco - Journal of Economic Theory, 2006 - ms.cc.sunysb.edu
Abstract We study social choice functions implementable as perfect Bayesian equilibria
(PBE) of incomplete information extensive form games. We restrict attention to two-stage
mechanisms in which agents observe a common public signal after the first stage, and ...
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Deregulation with consensus

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S Brusco… - Economic Theory, 2007 - Springer
Abstract We analyze the problem of eliminating an inefficient regulation, such as protection,
in a dynamic model in which there is incomplete information and unanimous approval from
all parties involved is necessary. Existing firms have heterogeneous cost, and efficiency ...
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[PDF] Coordination in Split-Award Auctions with Uncertain Scale Economies: Theory and Data

[PDF] from duke.edu
JJ Anton, S Brusco… - Department of Economics …, 2007 - faculty.fuqua.duke.edu
Abstract In a number of observed procurements, the buyer has employed an auction format
that allows for a split-award outcome. We focus on settings where the range of uncertainty
regarding scale economies is large and, depending on cost realizations, the efficient ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 5 versions

[CITATION] Jaideep Roy VAggregate Uncertainty in the Citizen Candidate Model Yields Extremist Parties

S Brusco - V Social Choice and Welfare, forthcoming
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The Hotelling-Downs model with runoff voting

[PDF] from nyu.edu
S Brusco, M Dziubinski… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2011 - Elsevier
We consider the Hotelling–Downs model with n⩾ 3 office-seeking candidates and runoff
voting. We show that Nash equilibria in pure strategies always exist and that there are
typically multiple equilibria, both convergent (all candidates are located at the median) ...
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[PDF] Managerial Compensation and Capital Allocation in Conglomerate Firms

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S Brusco… - 2002 - acrobatplanet.com
Abstract We study the problem of capital allocation in internal capital markets, without
restricting the set of possible compensation schemes and capital allocation rules. Divisions
have technologies with strictly decreasing returns to scale and unobservable quality. ...
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[PDF] Local Governments Tax Autonomy, Lobbying, and Welfare

[PDF] from eea-esem.com
S Brusco, L Colombo… - DISCE-Quaderni dell'Istituto di …, 2010 - eea-esem.com
Abstract What degree of tax autonomy should be granted to a regional government on a
local tax base? Although the regional policy maker aims at maximizing social welfare, her
tax policy may be distorted by the lobbying activity of local taxpayers. In this political ...
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DP2103 Short-Termism as Optimal Investment Policy

S Brusco - 1999 - cepr.org
Models of managerial short-termism rely on a number of assumption, such as limited
availability of capital, fixed compensation schemes and an additive impact of managerial
ability on revenue. We discuss the role of these assumption in generating short-termism. ...
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[PDF] OPTIMAL SECESSION RULES

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MBS Brusco - 1999 - unipv.it
Abstract Should the constitution of a federation allow for peaceful secession?
Constitutionally defined secession rules are optimal ex post if the federation breaks down.
However, they may be suboptimal ex ante if the member countries receive a benefit from ...
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Short-termism as optimal investment policy

S Brusco - CEPR Discussion Papers, 1999 - ideas.repec.org
Models of managerial short-termism rely on a number of assumption, such as limited
availability of capital, fixed compensation schemes and an additive impact of managerial
ability on revenue. We discuss the role of these assumption in generating short-termism. ...
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Cost minimization and regulation in general equilibrium: an example

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S Brusco - Economics Letters, 1999 - Elsevier
We present a general equilibrium example in which cost minimizing behavior prevents the
economy from reaching the Pareto optimal allocation. In the example a firm with non-convex
technology can use two different inputs to produce a single output. Pareto optimality ...
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[CITATION] A Note on Cost Minimization in General Equilibrium Models

S Brusco - UFAE and IAE Working Papers, 1995 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks. A Note
on Cost Minimization in General Equilibrium Models. Sandro Brusco. ...
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[PDF] Area Conference on Industrial Organisation

[PDF] from ifo.de
S Brusco… - ifo.de
The analysis of the allocation of funds among different divisions of a conglomerate firm is a
relatively young topic. Stein (2001) provides a recent survey. The general theme coming
from the empirical literature is that diversified firms trade on average at a discount relative ...
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[PDF] Timing of Investment and Dynamic Pricing in Privatized Sectors

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S Brusco, O Tarola… - 2012 - unitn.it
Abstract In equipment intensive sectors such as water utilities, power gen eration, gas
billions of dollars are spent in capital equipment. We discuss and characterize the optimal
policy of a profit maximizing firm and compare it with the optimal policy of a welfare ...
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Short-termism as optimal experimentation policy

[PDF] from uc3m.es
S Brusco - 1999 - e-archivo.uc3m.es
Models of managerial short-termism rely on a number of assumption, such as limited
availability of capital, fixed compensation schemes and an additive impact of managerial
ability on revenue. We discuss the role of these assumption in generating short-termism. ...
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[CITATION] TheGoogle Effect'in the FCC's 700 MHz Auction

S Brusco, GP Lopomo… - Department of Economics …, 2008 - econpapers.repec.org
Related works: Journal Article: The [`]Google effect' in the FCC's 700Â MHz auction (2009) This
item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title. ... This
site is part of RePEc and all the data displayed here is part of the RePEc data set.
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[CITATION] On Enhanced Cooperation

S Brusco - New York University Stern School of Business Memeo, 2003

THE ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY ANNUAL REPORTS ECONOMETRICA REFEREES JULY 1999JUNE 2000

[PDF] from econometricsociety.org
K Abadir, J Abbring, J Abrevaya… - …, 2001 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. Ž . Econometrica, Vol. 69, No. 1 January, 2001 THE ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY ANNUAL
REPORTS ECONOMETRICA REFEREES JULY 1999JUNE 2000 A Abadir, K. Abbring, J.
Abrevaya, J. Acemoglu, D. Adda, J. Ahlin, C. Ai, C. Ait-Sahalia, Y. Al-Najjar I. Nabil ...
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[PDF] Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Multiple Objects and Known Budget Constraints

[PDF] from eea-esem.com
S Brusco… - 2004 - eea-esem.com
We study multi-unit simultaneous ascending-bid auctions in which agents have use for more
than one object and face budget constraints, that is they have only a limited amount of
money available for bidding There are two objects, and two bidders. Each bidder i= 1, 2 ...
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[CITATION] The Information Content of Specialist Pricing: A Dynamic Model

S Brusco… - 1989 - Università Commerciale" L. Bocconi" …
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[BOOK] The Optimal Design of a Market

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
MO Jackson, S Brusco… - 1997 - kellogg.northwestern.edu
Abstract We study the optimal design of the rules of trade in a two-period market given that
agents arrive at different times and may only trade with agents present contemporaneously.
First period agents face a fixed cost of trading across periods, and their decisions of ...
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[PDF] Firm Dynamics with Durable Capital and Financing Constraints

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S Brusco… - 2007 - webmeets.com
Abstract We consider the financing problem of a firm subject to moral hazard problems
considered by Clementi and Hopenhayn [3]. We enrich the original model introducing
durable capital, which allows us to make predictions based on the size of the firm, and we ...
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[PDF] Internal Financing, Managerial Compensation and Multiple Tasks

[PDF] from unipd.it
S Brusco… - 2009 - tiche.decon.unipd.it
Abstract We study the choice between internal and external financing without restricting the
set of possible compensation schemes and capital allocation rules. We assume that
managers can dedicate effort either to increase the short-term profitability of the firm, thus ...
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Merger Mechanisms

SBGLS Viswanathan - Department of Economics Working Papers, 2004 - ideas.repec.org
A firm can merge with one of n potential partners. The owner of each firm has private
information about both his firm's stand-alone value and a component of the synergies that
would be realized by the merger involving his firm. We characterize incentive-efficient ...
Cached - All 5 versions

DP2532 Reallocation of Corporate Resources and Managerial Incentives in Internal Capital Markets

S Brusco… - 2000 - cepr.org
One distinguishing feature of internal capital markets is their ability to reallocate funds in
favour of the most profitable divisions (winner-picking). Yet, diversified firms often trade at a
discount with respect to their focused counterparts. The literature has tried to explain the ...
Cached - All 4 versions

[PDF] Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Unknown Budget Constraints

[PDF] from uni-bocconi.it
S Brusco… - igier.uni-bocconi.it
Abstract The mere possibility, even if arbitrarily small, of binding budget constraints can
reduce competition substantially because bidders can 'pretend'to be constrained, even if
they are not. In these cases, measures restricting the participation of low-budget bidders, ...
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[CITATION] Efectos de la introducción de medidas financieras en los sistemas de compensación del equipo directivo: Los Stock Option Plans y el Economic Value …

BD Tortella, S Brusco, LR Gómez-Mejía… - 2004 - Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, …
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Perfect bayseian implementation: one round of signaling is not enough

[PDF] from uc3m.es
S Brusco - 1997 - e-archivo.uc3m.es
We show that there exists a social choice function that cannot be implemented in perfect
Bayesian equilibrium if the mechanism has an equilibrium with one round of signaling. The
social choice function can however be implemented in perfect Bayesian equilibrium, ...
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[CITATION] Multiple Equilibrria and Policy Effectiveness

S Brusco… - 1990 - Università Commerciale" L. Bocconi" …
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[CITATION] Estructura de capital, factores institucionales, crecimiento e inversión: Evidencia empírica internacional

NU González, S Brusco… - 2002 - Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, …
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[CITATION] Organizational dynamics

S Brusco… - 1996 - opengrey.eu
Organizational Dynamics. Sandro Brusco, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament
d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica, Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica Departament d'Economia
i d'Història Econòmica. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 1996.
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[CITATION] Ensayos sobre contagio financiero y macroeconomía: Tesis doctoral, doctorado en Economía

F Castiglionesi, S Brusco… - 2004 - Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
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La preapertura en la Bolsa de Madrid: discusión teórica y evidencia empírica

Full text - MIT Libraries
M Tapia Torres… - … europea de dirección y economía de …, 2002 - dialnet.unirioja.es
Resumen: En este trabajo, en primer lugar, mostramos la evidencia teórica y empírica sobre
el periodo de preapertura de los mercados bursátiles. Además contrastamos los resultados
obtenidos anteriormente y el efecto tamaño para los distintos activos en el proceso de ...
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[CITATION] A Note on Cost Minimization in General Equilibrium

S Brusco… - 1995 - Departament d'Economia i d'Història …
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