S Board - The Journal of Finance, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
This paper investigates auctions where bidders have limited liability. First, we analyze
bidding behavior under different auction formats, showing that the second-price auction
induces higher prices, higher bankruptcy rates, and lower utilities than the first-price ...
S Board - Economic Theory, 2009 - Springer
Abstract When there are two bidders, releasing independent information in an English
auction with private values makes the seller worse off. However, this is no longer true with
more bidders: when there is enough competition, revelation benefits the auctioneer. In ...
S Board - Review of Economic Studies, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
This paper solves for the profit-maximizing strategy of a durable-goods monopolist when
incoming demand varies over time. We first characterize the consumers' optimal purchasing
decision by a cut-off rule. We then show that, under a monotonicity condition, the profit- ...
S Board - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
Contracts often take the form of options: oil fields can be abandoned, planning permission
may go unused, and acquired firms can be liquidated. We consider a seller who auctions a
dynamic option among N agents. After the auction, the economy evolves and the winning ...
S Board… - Unpublished working paper, 2010 - Citeseer
Abstract We consider a seller who wishes to sell K goods by time T. Potential buyers enter
IID over time and are patient. At any point in time, profit is maximized by awarding the good
to the agent with the highest valuation exceeding a cutoff. These cutoffs are characterized ...
S Board… - 2010 - econ.ucla.edu
Abstract We consider a seller who wishes to sell K goods by time T. Potential buyers enter
IID over time and are forward-looking, so can strategically time their purchases. At any point
in time, profit is maximized by awarding the good to the agent with the highest valuation ...
S Board… - 2003 - econ.ucla.edu
Abstract We analyze a bargaining game where two agents compete for the right to propose
a split of the pie to the other. This captures the notion that agenda control is a valuable asset
that both bargaining parties covet. In the game, time is finite and agents are endowed with ...
S Board… - Report, UCLA.[821], 2010 - econ.msu.edu
Abstract We propose a new model of firm reputation where product quality is persistent and
depends stochastically on the firm's past investments. Reputation is then modeled directly as
the market belief about quality. We analyze how investment incentives depend on the ...
S Board - American Economic Review, 2011 - econ.ucla.edu
Abstract This paper characterises the optimal contract for a principal who repeatedly
chooses among a set of potential trading partners (agents) under the threat of holdup. As the
economy evolves, the principal would like to trade with different agents; however, the ...
[CITATION] Commitment in Auctions
SA Board - 1999 - University of Oxford
S Board - Theoretical Economics, 2009 - econtheory.org
Abstract In a range of settings, private firms manage peer effects by sorting agents into
different groups, be they schools, communities, or product categories. This paper considers
such a firm, which controls group entry by setting a series of anonymous prices. We show ...
[CITATION] Optimal dynamic auctions for durable goods: Posted prices and fire-sales
S Board - 2007 - www-rcf.usc.edu
Abstract This paper characterises the optimal self–enforcing contracts in a large anonymous
labour market. We show that the introduction of on–the–job search leads otherwise identical
firms to offer different contracts. High–wage firms rarely lose workers and demand a high ...
S Board… - 2011 - econ.ucla.edu
Abstract This paper characterizes the distribution of jobs in a relational contracting model
where both employed and unemployed workers compete for jobs. In equilibrium, identical
firms offer a continuous distribution of contracts, with some firms offering high-wage, high- ...
S Board… - 2009 - econ.as.nyu.edu
Abstract We study a dynamic moral hazard model, where a firm can invest into the quality of
its product which, in turn, is imperfectly observed by consumers. We analyse how investment
incentives depend on the firm's reputation and the information structure of consumer ...
C Avery, A Beggs, S Bikhchandani, S Board… - Economic …, 2004 - mendeley.com
Abstract This chapter provides an elementary, non-technical survey of auction theory, by
introducing and describing some of the critical papers in the subject.(The most important of
these are reproduced in a companion book, Klemperer, Paul (ed.)(2000a) The Economic ...
S Board - econ.ucla.edu
For those enrolled, there will be three problem sets (15% each) and a final (55%). The
problem sets will be due on 13th October (week 5), 10th November (week 9) and 8th
December (week 13). Later in the term, there will also be opportunities for students to ...
S Board… - 1999 - hicks.nuff.ox.ac.uk
Although it was pathbreaking work, Armando Ortega Reichert's (1968) PhD thesis “Models
for Competitive Bidding under Uncertainty” was never published. For reasons of space we
publish just Chapter VIII,“A Sequential Game with Information Flow”, which was a seminal ...
S Pouget, S Board,
SR Das, D Duffie, N Kapadia… - 2007 - Wiley Online Library
A Theory of Friendly Boards . . . . . . . . . . Renée B. Adams and Daniel Ferreira 217 Adaptive Traders
and the Design of Fi- nancial Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sebastien Pouget 2835 Bidding
into the Red: A Model of Post- Auction Bankruptcy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Simon Board 1 ...
S Board… - econ.ucla.edu
Abstract We study the lifecycle of a firm who sells a product of uncertain quality,
characterizing the optimal investment and exit decisions and the resulting firm dynamics. We
investigate two model variations. If the firm shares the market's uncertainty, it learns about ...
S Board… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: A buyer wishes to purchase a good from a seller who chooses a sequence of
prices over time. In each period, the buyer can also exercise an outside option such as
moving onto another seller. We show there is a unique equilibrium in which the seller ...
S Board - 2004 - econ.ucla.edu
This course concerns models of auctions, bargaining and pricing. Other than the first year
courses, the primary requirement is an interest in microeconomic theory. You may also find it
useful to know some contract theory. I recommend Salanie (1997), Laffont and Martimort ( ...
S Board - 2005 Meeting Papers, 2005 - repec.org
Abstract This paper solves for the profit maximising strategy of a durable–goods monopolist
when incoming demand varies over time. Each period an additional demand curve enters
the market; these consumers can then choose whether and when to purchase. The ...
S Pouget, S Board,
SR Das, D Duffie, N Kapadia… - 2008 - Wiley Online Library
A Theory of Friendly Boards . . . . . . . . . . Renée B. Adams and Daniel Ferreira 217 Adaptive Traders
and the Design of Fi- nancial Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sebastien Pouget 2835 Bidding
into the Red: A Model of Post- Auction Bankruptcy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Simon Board 2695 ...
S Board - 2004 - en.scientificcommons.org
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