M Stegeman - The American Economic Review, 1991 - JSTOR
In this paper, small firms sell a homogeneous good to small consumers under conditions of
free entry, but consumers receive price information only through firms' advertising. In
equilibrium, every firm on the continuous price distribution buys less advertising than is ...
M Stegeman - Journal of Economic Theory, 1996 - upi-yptk.ac.id
The theory of mechanism design usually assumes that each agent sends a free message to
a central coordinator, but it may be more realistic to assume that communication is costly.
This paper assumes that silence, represented as the``null''message, is free, and other ...
P Rhode… - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2001 - Elsevier
Consider a symmetric, differentiated duopoly. If firms' strategy choices, in the repeated
game, follow a stochastic Darwinian process, then they cluster around a strategy profile that
is typically not a one-shot Nash equilibrium. This profile is invariant under a broad class of ...
M Komai, M Stegeman… - The American economic review, 2007 - JSTOR
Researchers in management and political science believe that leadership is important, but
economists rarely study it. 1 When they do, economists tend to focus on how the leader
leads. In particular, Hermalin (1998) and subsequent researchers ask how a leader with ...
M Dufwenberg… - Econometrica, 2002 - Wiley Online Library
Iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies is an order dependent procedure. It can
also generate spurious Nash equilibria, fail to converge in countable steps, or converge to
empty strategy sets. If best replies are well–defined, then spurious Nash equilibria cannot ...
P Rhode… - Econometrica, 1996 - JSTOR
Let?(z) lj1 (z)-H2 (z), the relative payoff to s, in state z. To the deterministic process, zt+ 1= b
(zt), KMR add a stochastic component, representing random mutation. They assume that, in
each period, each player switches strategies with probability e, independent of all other ...
IL Gale, DB Hausch… - International Economic …, 2000 - Wiley Online Library
2. Abstract Two symmetric sellers are approached sequentially by fragmented buyers. Each
buyer conducts a second-price auction and purchases from the seller who offers the lower
price. Winning an auction affects bidding for future contracts because the sellers have ...
IL Gale… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2001 - Elsevier
Two completely informed but possibly asymmetric bidders buy or sell identical “claims” in
sequential auctions. They subsequently receive monetary prizes that depend upon the final
allocation of claims. Iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies leaves a unique ...
M Komai… - Virginia Polytechnic Institute Economics …, 2004 - stcloudstate.edu
Abstract An organization makes collective decisions through neither markets nor contracts.
Instead, rational agents voluntarily choose to follow a leader. In many cases incentive and
coordination problems are solved: the unique nondegenerate equilibrium achieves the ...
M Komai… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
1. All the theorems in this article, except Theorems 5 and 6, have appeared previously in
Komai and Stegeman (2004b). The suggestions of two anonymous referees, including the
extension to the three-stage model, greatly improved the article. The online version of the ...
M Stegeman… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2004 - Elsevier
We establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the stability of stochastic Darwinian
dynamics in quadratic games. Each player's strategy adjusts through mutation and selection
shocks, and stability is independent of the rates at which these shocks arrive. Given ...
[CITATION] Limit Equilibria of a Bilateral Search Market
M Stegeman - Unpublished Paper, 1989
IL Gale, M Stegeman… - 1994 - 199.169.201.130
Abstract In a recent paper, Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1993) derive a general formula for
the seller's expected revenue in an all-pay auction, where the buyers' valuations are
common knowledge. They use this formula to show that excluding the buyer with the ...
[CITATION] Information and Leadership
M Komai, M Stegeman… - American Economic Review, 1997
[CITATION] A Theory of Leadership Based on Endogenous Assignment of Information
M Komai… - 2004 - NBER Decentralization Conference [ …
M Dufwenberg, M Stegeman… - 1999 - Citeseer
Abstract: Iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies is an order dependent
procedure. It need not converge in countable steps and may generate spurious Nash
equilibria. If strategy spaces are compact and payoff functions continuous, then order does ...
[CITATION] A Model of Internet Advertising
M Stegeman - 2004 - Mimeo, Virginia Polytechnic Institute
M Stegeman - 1721 - en.scientificcommons.org
Publikationsansicht. 738169. Essays in search and speculation (1986). Stegeman, Mark. Abstract.
Thesis (Ph. ... of Economics, 1987.. MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND DEWEY..
Includes bibliographies.. by Mark Stegeman.. Ph.D. Details der Publikation. ...
M Komai, M Stegeman… - Department of Economics, …, 2007 - stcloudstate.edu
Abstract An organization makes collective decisions through neither markets nor contracts.
Instead, rational agents voluntarily choose to follow a leader. The leader has no special
talents but is distinguished by getting exclusive access to information. If a credibility ...
M Stegeman… - 1988 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract In this paper, small firms sell a homogeneous good to small consumers under
conditions of free entry, but consumers receive price information only through firms'
advertising. In equilibrium, every firm on the continuous price distribution buys less ...
PA Diamond, ES Maskin, M Stegeman - 1986 - dspace.mit.edu
ABSTRACT Essay 1: The model is a two—period, pure exchange, competitive market
economy. Different markets open in the two periods, and agents have asymmetric
information in each period. Four propositions establish conditions implying that the period ...
M Stegeman - 2000 - emeraldinsight.com
Abstract: A consumer in the real world typically must visit (eg by phone) a monopolist to
observe its price, even though the consumer may have correct expectations about that price.
This causes monopoly prices to be higher and stickier than is predicted by the textbook ...
M Stegeman - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1993 - JSTOR
Consider a sequence economy in which small agents trade event-contingent claims to a
single physical good. The agents have uncommon priors, state-contingent utility functions,
and asymmetric information in every period. The claims traded vary from period to period. ...
[CITATION] Excess Advertising in a Bilateral Search Market
M Stegeman… - 1989 - University of North Carolina Press
[CITATION] Monopoly Pricing with Visiting Costs
M Stegeman… - 1989 - University of North Carolina Press
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