CA Ma - Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1994 - Wiley Online Library
This paper compares the cost and quality incentive effects of cost reimbursement and
prospective payment systems in the health industry. When a provider cannot refuse patients
who require high treatment costs or discriminate patients by qualities, optimally designed ...
CTA Ma… - The American Economic Review, 1997 - JSTOR
We derive optimal insurance for patients and payment method for physicians when neither
the input decided by the patient (quantity of treatment) nor the input decided by the physician
(effort) are contractible. The equilibrium in this third-best regime may sometimes be ...
CA Ma… - Health Affairs, 1998 - Health Affairs
A carve-out of mental health and substance abuse services initiated in 1993 by the Group
Insurance Commission (GIC) of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts resulted in changes in
the costs of those services. Those changes were related to incentives in the contract ...
JF Brodley… - Stanford Law Review, 1993 - JSTOR
Two conflicting interpretations of exclusionary conduct battle for ascendancy in modem
antitrust law and industrial organization theory. The first takes a strategic view and maintains
that, given sufficient incentives and inducing circumstances, firms with market power will ...
CTA Ma - The Review of Economic Studies, 1994 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We analyse renegotiation in a hidden action principal-agent model. Contract
renegotiation offers are made by the agent. A refinement is imposed on the principal's
beliefs: if precisely one action is optimal with respect to both the principal's and the agent's ...
CA Ma… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1993 - JSTOR
Anecdotal and experimental evidence suggests that bargaining sessions subject to
deadlines often begin with cheap talk and rejected proposals. Agreements, if they are
reached at all, tend to be concluded near the deadline. We attempt to capture and explain ...
J Glazer… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1989 - Elsevier
Abstract A planner is interested in allocating an indivisible good (a “prize”) to one of many
agents in the economy. His objective is to give the prize to the agent who values it most,
without any payments being made by the recipient. The planner, however, does not know ...
CA Ma… - Journal of Economics, 1993 - Springer
In this paper, we study the supply of quality in imperfectly competitive markets, and explore
the role of regulation in markets where firms may use both quality and price to compete for
customers. In a model where firms first choose qualities and then prices, we find that ...
CT Albert Ma… - Journal of Economics & …, 2002 - Wiley Online Library
If an illness is not contractible, then even partially insured consumers demand treatment for it
when the benefit is less than the cost, a condition known as moral hazard. Traditional health
insurance, which controls moral hazard with copayments (demand management), can ...
CA Ma - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1991 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract This paper studies a multiperiod moral hazard problem under two assumptions:(i)
contracts are subject to renegotiations;(ii) the agent's action has long-term effects. The action
is also interpreted as a choice of characteristic or “type.” Renegotiation-proof contracts that ...
I Alger… - Journal of economic behavior & organization, 2003 - Elsevier
We consider a model of insurance and collusion. Efficient risk sharing requires the
consumer to get a monetary compensation in case of a loss. But this in turn implies
consumer–provider collusion incentives to submit false claims to the insurer. We assume, ...
G Biglaiser… - The Rand Journal of Economics, 1995 - JSTOR
In this article, we study the optimal regulation of a dominant firm when an unregulated firm
actively competes. Generally, the existence of an active rival imposes new and binding
constraints on regulatory problems. We characterize optimal policies both when demands ...
C Albert Ma… - European Economic Review, 1993 - Elsevier
This paper presents a signaling explanation for unemployment. Employment at an unskilled
job may be regarded as a bad signal. Therefore good workers who are more likely to qualify
for employment at a skilled job in the future may be better off being unemployed than ...
G Biglaiser… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
We study job incentives in moonlighting, when public-service physicians may refer patients
to their private practices. Some doctors in the public system are dedicated, and behave
sincerely, but others—the moonlighters—are utility maximizers. Allowing moonlighting ...
G Biglaiser… - RAND Journal of economics, 2003 - JSTOR
Firms compete with prices and qualities in markets where consumers have heterogeneous
preferences and cost characteristics. Consumers demand two goods, which can be supplied
jointly or separately by firms. We consider two strategy regimes for firms: uniform price- ...
CT Albert Ma… - Journal of Economics & …, 2002 - Wiley Online Library
This paper introduces a theory of network incentives in managed health care. Participation
in the plan's network confers an economic benefit on providers; in exchange, the plan
expects compliance with its protocols. The network sets a target for the number of ...
G Biglaiser… - Journal of Regulatory Economics, 1999 - Springer
We study the investment incentives of a regulated, incumbent firm in a deregulation process.
The regulator cannot commit to a long-term regulatory policy, and investment decisions are
taken before optimal regulatory policies are imposed. We characterize the regulated ...
M Lu, C Albert Ma… - Health economics, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract This paper examines selection and matching incentives of performance-based
contracting (PBC) in a model of patient heterogeneity, provider horizontal differentiation and
asymmetric information. Treatment effectiveness is affected by the match between a ...
CA Ma - Journal of Public Economics, 2004 - Elsevier
This paper considers a public provider's strategic use of rationing in a market served by both
public and private providers. Such a 'mixed'market structure is common in many industries
such as health care, telecommunication, postal service, and public utilities. The ...
P Choné… - forthcoming in Annales d'Économie et de Statistique, 2010 - Citeseer
Abstract We model asymmetric information arising from physician agency, and its effect on
the design of payment and health care quantity. The physician-patient coalition aims to
maximize a combination of physician profit and patient benefit. The degree of substitution ...
CA Ma - Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1998 - Wiley Online Library
I reconsider the implementation of efficient cost and quality efforts when health-care
providers may refuse services to consumers, and introduce a mechanism that is a
combination of prospective payment and cost reimbursement. Conditions are derived for ...
CA Ma - … Jahnsson Foundation 50th Anniversary Symposium on …, 2004 - Citeseer
Abstract I hypothesize that physicians have diverse preferences. Some are dedicated and
provide services at high quality despite the lack of incentive or monitoring; some others
value patients' benefits. I then set up two models to consider the interaction between the ...
M Gaynor… - Unpublished, Carnegie Mellon University, 1996 - heinz.cmu.edu
One of the least settled areas in modern industrial organization is the economics of vertical
restraints. 1 There are those, exemplified by the" Chicago School," who contend that there is
no possibility of anticompetitive impacts from vertical restraints (Bork, 1978; Posner, 1976; ...
P Choné, CA Ma… - 2004 - bu.edu
Abstract We model asymmetric information arising from physician agency, and its effect on
the design of payment and healthcare quantity. The physician-patient coalition aims to
maximize a combination of physician profit and patient benefit. The degree of substitution ...
CA Ma… - 1998 - bu.edu
Abstract This paper compares the cost and quality incentive effects of cost reimbursement
and prospective payment systems in the health industry when providers are altruistic.
Providers' behavioral rule is governed by a desire to maximize a weighted sum of profit ...
M Lu… - Journal of Mental Health Policy and Economics, 2002 - bu.edu
Abstract Background: In the health care market managed care has become the latest
innovation for the delivery of services. For efficient implementation, the managed care
organization relies on accurate information. So clinicians are often asked to report on ...
HM Lien, CT Albert Ma… - Journal of health economics, 2004 - Elsevier
This paper considers three types of provider–client interactions that influence quantity of
health care use: rationing, effort, and persuasion. By rationing, we refer to a quantity limit set
by a provider; effort, the productive inputs supplied by a provider to increase a client's ...
E Fleming, H Lien, CTA Ma… - Journal of Mental Health …, 2003 - nccu.edu.tw
Abstract Background: Rates of inpatient care for mental health and substance abuse
treatment have been reported to fall after the introduction of managed care, but the actual
decline may be overstated. Almost all managed care impact studies are based on pre-post ...
C Albert Ma… - Journal of Economics & …, 1993 - Wiley Online Library
The piper analyzes a regulatory game between a phlic and a priilate payer to finance hospital
joint costs (mainly capital and technology expeerises). The p&lic payer (inspired by the federal
Medicare program) inmy both directly reimburse for joint costs ("pass-through" payments) ...
CA Ma - Economics Letters, 1988 - Elsevier
Abstract The implementation problem in a dynamic incentive contract with job transfers is
studied. We find that in the job transfers contract, there are multiple equilibria, in some of
which the agents can lie. We construct a mechanism to uniquely implement the principal's ...
G Godager, T Iversen… - … journal of health care finance and …, 2009 - Springer
Abstract We model physicians as health care professionals who care about their services
and monetary rewards. These preferences are heterogeneous. Different physicians trade off
the monetary and service motives differently, and therefore respond differently to incentive ...
HM Lien, M Lu, CT Albert Ma… - Journal of health economics, 2010 - Elsevier
Improving patient compliance with physicians' treatment or prescription recommendations is
an important goal in medical practice. We examine the relationship between treatment
progress and patient compliance. We hypothesize that patients balance expected benefits ...
[CITATION] Public Rationing and Private Sector Selection
S Grassi… - 2008 - Boston University working paper
RP Ellis… - Health Economics, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
Because less healthy employees value health insurance more than the healthy ones, when
health insurance is newly offered job turnover rates for healthier employees decline less
than turnover rates for the less healthy. We call this adverse job turnover, and it implies ...
S Grassi… - Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2012 - Wiley Online Library
We study the interaction between nonprice public rationing and prices in the private market.
Under a limited budget, the public supplier uses a rationing policy. A private firm may supply
the good to those consumers who are rationed by the public system. Consumers have ...
CA Ma… - Working Papers, 1991 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your
bookmarks. Regulation, Quality Competition, and Price in the Hospital
Industry. Ching-to Albert Ma () and James F. Burgess. ...
S Grassi… - Boston University-Department of Economics-Working …, 2008 - Citeseer
Abstract We study how rationing in the public sector influences prices in the private sector. A
private firm uses consumers' cost information for cream-skimming. Only rationed consumers
consider purchasing from the private firm. Rich consumers are more willing to pay for an ...
[CITATION] kOptimal health insurance and provider paymentl
MC Albert… - American Economic Review, 1997
CA Ma, TG McGuire… - The economics of health care in …, 2002 - books.google.com
Block grants to fund state mental health and substance abuse services started with
President Reagan's omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981. In 1982, the Alcohol, Drug
Abuse and Mental Health (ADAMH) block grants replaced ten mental health and ...
G Biglaiser… - Working Papers, 1993 - econpapers.repec.org
Related works: Working Paper: Regulating a Dominant Firm: Quality, Private Information, and
Industry Structure (1993) This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items
with the same title. ... This site is part of RePEc and all the data displayed here is part of ...
T Iversen, CA Ma… - 2010 - sws1.bu.edu
Tor Iversen Department of Health Management and Health Economics Institute of Health and
Society University of Oslo PO Box 1089 Blindern NO-0317 Oslo, Norway
tor.iversen@medisin.uio.no ... Ching-to Albert Ma Department of Economics Boston ...
RP Ellis… - Boston University-Department of Economics- …, 2007 - ideas.repec.org
In our theoretical model some firms do not offer health insurance to their employees
because of large between-firm heterogeneity in expected employee health care costs.
Because job turnover rates for healthier employees reduce by less than those for sicker ...
S Grassi… - 2008 - Citeseer
Abstract A government or public organization would like to subsidize an indivisible good.
Consumers' valuations of the good vary according to their wealth and benefits from the
good. Education, medical care, and housing are common examples. A subsidy scheme ...
CA Ma - 2010 - Citeseer
Abstract We model asymmetric information arising from physician agency, and its effect on
the design of payment and health care quantity. The physician aims to maximize a
combination of physician profit and patient benefit. The degree of substitution between ...
M Lu, CA Ma… - Working Papers, 2000 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract This paper examines selection and matching incentives of Performance-Based
Contracting (PBC) in a model of patient heterogeneity, provider horizontal differentiation and
asymmetric information. Treatment effectiveness is affected by the match between a ...
S Grassi… - Journal of Health Economics, 2011 - Elsevier
ABSTRACT: We study optimal public health care rationing and private sector price
responses. Consumers differ in their wealth and illness severity (defined as treatment cost).
Due to a limited budget, some consumers must be rationed. Rationed consumers may ...
CA Ma - The BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2008 - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of
further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site ...
S GRASSI… - Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2012 - ingentaconnect.com
We study the interaction between nonprice public rationing and prices in the private market.
Under a limited budget, the public supplier uses a rationing policy. A private firm may supply
the good to those consumers who are rationed by the public system. Consumers have ...
I Alger, CA Ma, R Renault… - 2009 - u-cergy.fr
Abstract A principal requires a manager for production. He can use an internal manager, or
contracts with an external manger. In each case, the manager obtains experience benefits
from production. When the principal uses an internal manager, both parties share cost ...
E Fleming, C Albert Ma… - … and Policy in Mental Health and …, 2000 - Springer
The authors present a study on expenditures by state mental health, substance abuse, and
developmental disability agencies in the United States for the period between 1981 and
1993. The relationship between agency spending and organizational structure of state ...
T Iversen… - International journal of health care finance and …, 2011 - Springer
Abstract We study how market conditions influence referrals of patients by general
practitioners (GPs). We set up a model of GP referral for the Norwegian health care system,
where a GP receives capitation payment based on the number of patients in his practice, ...
CA Ma… - Working Papers, 1996 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your
bookmarks. Capacity Constraint and Monopoly Regulation under Asymmetric
Information. Ching-to Albert Ma () and Clemencia Torres (). ...
[CITATION] Noncontractible Inputs and Health Insurance-payment Policies
CA Ma, TG McGuire… - 1994 - Industry Studies Program, …
[CITATION] Incomplete, draft; not for circulation, citation, or quotation.
G Godager, T Iversen… - 2006
CTA Ma - Financing Health Care, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract This chapter presents a model of consumer-directed health care, high-deductible
insurance plans. Insurance companies in a competitive market offer such plans; higher
deductibles result in lower premiums. Such changes affect consumers' decisions on ...
E Fleming, H Lien, CTA Ma… - 2002 - bu.edu
Abstract Background: Rates of inpatient care for mental health and substance abuse
treatment have been reported to fall after the introduction of managed care, but the actual
decline may be overstated. Almost all managed care impact studies are based on pre-post ...
CTA Ma… - Health Affairs, 1998 - Health Affairs
To the Editor: By emphasizing only cost, Michael Jellinek's letter both distorts the focus of our
paper and places a negative valence on our findings. This is an unfortunate politicization of
some complex issues. Specifically, we address benefit enhancement, access, utilization, ...
[CITATION] The Industrial Organization of Health Care III
AM Ching-To - 1999 - MIT Press
T Liu… - 2011 - hec.unil.ch
Abstract We study delegating a consumer's treatment plan decisions to an altruistic
physician. The physician's degree of altruism is his private information. The consumer's
illness severity will be learned by the physician, and also become his private information. ...
I Alger, CA Ma… - 2007 - webmeets.com
Abstract A firm chooses between in-house production and outsourcing for a task supervised
by a manager. The manager may gather certifiable information about production costs and
acquires on-the-job experience that will yield additional surplus in her future career. ...
I Alger, CA Ma… - 2008 - economics.ca
Abstract What determines firm boundaries? We propose a hitherto unexplored trade-off
between making and buying for a firm. In our model a firm needs a manager to oversee
production: the firm chooses between hiring a manager as an employee, and contracting ...
[CITATION] Using Insight from Game Theory: Penalty Contracts and Monopolizing Strategies
JF Brodley… - Antitrust, 1994
CTOA MA - 1994 - sws1.bu.edu
We analyse renegotiation in a hidden action principal-agent model. Contract renegotiation
offers are made by the agent. A refinement is imposed on the principal's beliefs: if precisely
one action is optimal with respect to both the principal's and the agent's contracts, the ...
CA Ma… - 2011 - hans-moeller-seminar.vwl.uni- …
Abstract A monopolist produces a good with two qualities. All consumers have the same
valuation of the first quality, but their valuations of the second vary, and are their private
information. Qualities cannot be directly observed by consumers. A public agency can ...
CA Ma… - 2012 - unisa.it
Abstract A health care provider chooses medical service quality and cost-reduction effort.
Both choices are noncontractible. An insurer observes both quality and cost effort, and may
credibly disclose them to consumers. In prospective payment, the insurer fully discloses ...
CA Ma - Working Papers, 1998 - econpapers.repec.org
This paper compares the cost and quality incentive effects of cost reimbursement and
prospective payment systems in the health industru when providers are altuistic. Provider's
behavioral rule is governed by a desire to maximize a weighted sum of profit and ...
CA Ma… - 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We study delegating a consumer's treatment plan decisions to an altruistic
physician. The physician's degree of altruism is his private information. The consumer's
illness severity will be learned by the physician, and also become his private information. ...
CA Ma… - Working Papers, 1994 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your
bookmarks. Noncontractible Inputs and Health Insurance-Payment Systems.
Ching-to Albert Ma () and Thomas G. McGuire (). ...
[CITATION] Moral ÀaÞard, Insurance, and Some Collusion
I Alger…
[CITATION] The Industrial Organization of Health Care III: Introduction
CA Ma…
CA Ma - Boston University-Department of Economics-Working …, 2007 - brage.bibsys.no
You must be very excited, ready to start your Ph. D. program here in Bergen. To many of you
this will be an important milestone. It should be. Undertaking a Ph. D. study is not a trivial
matter, and I hope that you do take this seriously.
[CITATION] The Industrial Organization of Health Care V
TC Buchmueller… - 2005 - MIT Press
S Grassi… - Journal of Economics, 2010 - Springer
Abstract A government would like to subsidize an indivisible good. Consumers' valuations of
the good vary according to their wealth and benefits from the good. A subsidy scheme may
be based on consumers' wealth or benefit information. We translate a wealth-based policy ...
[CITATION] The industrial organization of health care: special issue
TG MacGuire, MH Riordan… - Journal of economics, 1994
[CITATION] The Industrial Organization of Health Care II
CA Ma… - 1997 - MIT Press
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