 | Assistant Professor of Economics, Texas A&M University Verified email at econmail.tamu.edu Cited by 52 |
Y Zhang - Journal of Economic Theory, 2009 - Elsevier
In this paper, we develop continuous-time methods for solving dynamic principal–agent
problems in which the agent's privately observed productivity shocks are persistent over
time. We characterize the optimal contract as the solution to a system of ordinary ...
Y Zhang - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2007 - Elsevier
This paper studies the stability of a stochastic optimal growth economy introduced by Brock
and Mirman [Brock, WA, Mirman, L., 1972. Optimal economic growth and uncertainty: the
discounted case. Journal of Economic Theory 4, 479–513] by utilizing stochastic ...
Z Yiliang… - Economist, 2006 - en.cnki.com.cn
Based on the understanding of two concepts,“self-innovation” and “national innovation
capability”, the author explores the connotation of “national self-innovation capability”;
develops the evaluation index system of national self-innovation capability; classifies the ...
[CITATION] A nine-measure package broadened the government's economic stimulus plan to embrace REITs, PEs and other vehicles
Q Li, X Wen… - Caijing Magazine, http://english. caijing. com. cn/2008- …, 2008
B Ravikumar… - 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We study the optimal auditing of a taxpayer's income in a dynamic principal-agent
model of hidden income. Taxpayers in our model initially have low income and
stochastically transit to high income that is an absorbing state. A low-income taxpayer who ...
Abstract: In this paper I provide an analytic solution to a large class of contracting models
with one-sided limited commitment. To compute the optimal contract, I also design an
algorithm that is more efficient than value-function iteration. Keywords: Limited ...
L Gong,
Y Zhang… - CEMA Working Papers, 2008 - ideas.repec.org
This paper presents a group of models showing the strikingly different implications of foreign
aid to the private sector and public sector. In the first model, with decentralized decision-
making and without optimal choices of fiscal policies on behalf of the government, foreign ...
M Mitchell… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2010 - Elsevier
This paper studies the design of unemployment insurance when neither the searching effort
nor the savings of an unemployed agent can be monitored. If the principal could monitor the
savings, the optimal policy would leave the agent savings-constrained. With a constant ...
B Grochulski… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2011 - Elsevier
We study a continuous-time version of the optimal risk-sharing problem with one-sided
commitment. In the optimal contract, the agentʼs consumption is a time-invariant, strictly
increasing function of a single state variable: the maximal level of the agentʼs income ...
[CITATION] Fraud and Optimal Monitoring
B Ravikumar… - 2008
Y Zhang… - Theoretical Economics, 2011 - ideas.repec.org
We study the optimal auditing of a taxpayer’ s income in a dynamic principal-agent
model of hidden income. Taxpayers in our model initially have low income and
stochastically transit to high income that is an absorbing state. A low-income taxpayer who ...
B Grochulski… - 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We study a continuous-time version of the optimal risk-sharing problem with one-
sided commitment. In the optimal contract, the agent's consumption is non-decreasing and
depends only on the maximal level of the agent's income realized to date. In the complete- ...
Z Yuzhe, W Jun… - en.cnki.com.cn
The article pictures the development status of the USbiomass industry,and expounds the
promoting policy made by the USgovernment to facilitate the biomass utilization in the 21 century.
B Ravikumar… - Working Paper Series, 2011 - research.stlouisfed.org
We study the optimal auditing of a taxpayer's income in a dynamic principal-agent model of
hidden income. Taxpayers in our model initially have low income and stochastically transit to
high income that is an absorbing state. A low-income taxpayer who transits to high income ...
We study how best to reward innovators whose work builds on earlier innovations.
Incentives to innovate are obtained by offering innovators the opportunity to profit from their
innovations. Since innovations compete, awarding rights to one innovator reduces the ...
[CITATION] Stability in models with aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks
B Grochulski… - 2011 - webs.uvigo.es
Abstract We study an optimal compensation problem with private information and limited
com# mitment. A risk# neutral principal hires a risk# averse agent whose productivity follows
a Brownian motion. The agent can exert effort to increase the drift of his productivity. ...
Y Zhang - 2006 - books.google.com
The third essay develops continuous-time methods for solving dynamic principal-agent
problems in which the agent's privately observed productivity shocks are persistent over
time. I characterize the optimal contract as the solution to a system of ordinary differential ...
[CITATION] Are the MFN and National Treatment Principles Under GATS in Favour of Developing Countries?: Case Study on China
Y Zhang - 2005 - University of Essex
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