IK Cho… - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1987 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract Games in which one party conveys private information to a second through
messages typically admit large numbers of sequential equilibria, as the second party may
entertain a wealth of beliefs in response to out-of-equilibrium messages. By restricting ...
IK Cho… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1990 - Elsevier
Abstract A class of signaling games is studied in which a unique Universally Divine
equilibrium outcome exists. We identify a monotonicity property under which a variation of
Universal Divinity is generically equivalent to strategic stability. Further assumptions ...
IK Cho, N Williams… - Review of Economic Studies, 2002 - Wiley Online Library
An ordinary differential equation (ODE) gives the mean dynamics that govern the
convergence to self-confirming equilibria of self-referential systems under discounted least
squares learning. Another ODE governs escape dynamics that recurrently propel away ...
IK Cho - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1987 - JSTOR
We propose a refinement of sequential equilibrium for extensive form games by generalizing
a restriction proposed for signaling games in Cho and Kreps (1987).^ 2 The restriction is that
beliefs must not assign positive weight to the possibilities that can be excluded through ...
IK Cho - The Review of Economic Studies, 1990 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract This paper investigates the relationship between uncertainty and delay of
agreement in the one-sided offer bargaining model with two-sided uncertainty where the
seller makes offers. We construct a weak stationary equilibrium in which different types of ...
J Bullard… - Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2005 - Elsevier
We study a simple, microfounded macroeconomic system in which the monetary authority
employs a Taylor-type policy rule. We analyze situations in which the self-confirming
equilibrium is unique and learnable, and explore the prospects for the use of 'large ...
IK Cho - Journal of Economic Theory, 1995 - Elsevier
We examine the implications of bounded rationality in repeated games by modeling the
repeated game strategies as perceptrons (F. Rosenblatt," Principles of Neurodynamics,"
Spartan Books, and M. Minsky and SA Papert," Perceptions: An Introduction to ...
IK Cho… - Macroeconomic Dynamics, 2008 - Cambridge Univ Press
Abstract This paper introduces adaptive learning into the third-generation currency crisis
model of Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2001, Currency crises and monetary policy in an
economy with credit constraints, European Economic Review 45, 1121–1150). Adaptive ...
IK Cho - The Review of Economic Studies, 1994 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract Without assuming rational expectations, we examine the implications of a
stationarity assumption in a standard bargaining model with one-sided incomplete
information, where the seller makes an offer in each period. Instead of computing a weakly ...
IK Cho… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2005 - Elsevier
We study infinitely repeated symmetric 2× 2 games played by bounded rational agents who
follow a simple rule of thumb: each agent continues to play the same action if the current
payoff exceeds the average of the past payoffs, and switches to the other action with a ...
IK Cho, K Jewell… - Economic Theory, 2002 - Springer
Summary. We analyze a model of coalitional bidding in which coalitions form endogenously
and compete with each other. Since the nature of this competition influences the way in
which agents organize themselves into coalitions, our main aim is to characterize the ...
IK Cho… - Handbook of computational economics, 1996 - Elsevier
... Chapter 9 Neural networks for encoding and adapting in dynamic economies. In-Koo Cho and
Thomas J. Sargent *. Brown University. Stanford University and University of Chicago. Available
online 3 February 2005. Excerpt. Note: This is a one-page preview only. ...
IK Cho - Economic Theory, 1994 - Springer
Summary The perfect folk theorem (Fudenberg and Maskin [1986]) need not rely on
excessively complex strategies. We recover the perfect folk theorem for two person repeated
games with discounting through neural networks (Hopfield [1982]) that have finitely many ...
IK Cho… - Theoretical Economics, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
This paper examines a dynamic general equilibrium model with supply friction. With or
without friction, the competitive equilibrium is efficient. Without friction, the market price is
completely determined by the marginal production cost. If friction is present, no matter how ...
IK Cho - Rand Journal of Economics, 2003 - JSTOR
In a competitive market over a network with finite capacity, we can focus without loss of
generality on simple allocations, where the net transaction over a link is equal to the gross
transaction over the same link. If a simple allocation can be sustained by an equilibrium, ...
INKOO CHO… - Japanese Economic Review, 2005 - Wiley Online Library
We gratefully acknowledge various comments of an anonymous referee. Financial support
from the National Science Foundation (SES-0004315), the Ministry of Science and
Education, the Japan Economic Research Foundation (Nihon Keizai Kenkyu Shorei ...
IK Cho… - Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 1995 - Elsevier
We examine the classic policy problem of Ramsey (1927) modeled as an infinitely repeated
game (Stokey, 1991) between the government and the private sector where the private
sector consists of a continuum of identical households. We assume that the private sector ...
IK Cho… - Economic Theory, 1999 - Springer
Summary. This paper examines implications of complexity cost in implementing repeated
game strategies through networks with finitely many classifiers. A network consists of
individual classifiers that summarize the history of repeated play according to a weighted ...
IK Cho… - University of Illinois, 2006 - sfu.ca
Abstract. This paper studies adaptive learning with multiple models. An agent operating in a
self-referential environment is aware of potential model misspecification, and tries to detect
it, in real-time, using an econometric specification test. If the current model passes the test, ...
IK Cho - Games and Economic Behavior, 1996 - Elsevier
This paper studies two-person repeated games with imperfect monitoring without
discounting through perceptrons, which are feedforward artificial neural networks. Under a
fairly standard informational condition, we establish the folk theorem through perceptrons ...
IK Cho - Review of Economic Studies, 2005 - Wiley Online Library
This paper proves that the monotonicity of bidding strategies together with the rationality of
bidders implies that the winning bid in a first price auction converges to the competitive
equilibrium price as the number of bidders increases (Wilson, 1977). Instead of analysing ...
[CITATION] Characterization of stationary equilibria in bargaining models with incomplete information
IK Cho - 1989 - HGB Alexander Foundation
IK Cho… - conference to celebrate the Bank of Portugal's 50th …, 1997 - Citeseer
The birthday of a Central Bank provides a suitable occasion to describe our recent attempts
to analyze the acquisition of macroeconomic credibility. Central banks care about how
credibility can be sustained and how it can be earned. Recent work on credibility has ...
IK Cho - International Journal of Game Theory, 1993 - Springer
This paper extends selection rules now used in the signaling literature (such as the Intuitive
Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987)) to a class of repeated signaling games, where each
player can exchange the messages conditioned on his private information. STABAC ( ...
IK Cho… - The Energy Journal, 2007 - ideas.repec.org
This paper investigates the market power and the welfare performance of the deregulated
wholesale electricity market of California between 1998 and 2000 by incorporating the
structure of the transmission network. While Wolfram (1999), Borenstein, Bushnell, and ...
[CITATION] Equilibrium analysis of entry deterrence: A re-examination
IK Cho - 1987 - HGB Alexander Foundation
IK Cho - Working Papers, 1988 - econpapers.repec.org
By Cho, IK.; UNCERTAINTY AND DELAY IN BARGAINING.
IK Cho… - … University of Illinois, Urbana–Champaign.[230 …, 2009 - netfiles.uiuc.edu
Abstract. This paper examines a dynamic version of the newsboy problem in which a
decision maker must maintain service capacity from several sources to attempt to meet
uncertain demand for a perishable good, subject to the cost of providing sufficient capacity ...
IK Cho… - University of Illinois, 2005 - sfu.ca
Abstract. Currency crises are often followed by recessions. This is inconsistent with the
predictions of second-generation currency crisis models. In these models, devaluations
restore competitiveness and stimulate the economy. Recent work on third-generation ...
IK Cho… - The new Palgrave dictionary of economics, 2008 - files.nyu.edu
A self-confirming equilibrium is the answer to the following question: what are the possible
limiting outcomes of purposeful interactions among a collection of adaptive agents, each of
whom averages past data to approximate moments of the conditional probability ...
[CITATION] Learning and the Ramsey policy
IK Cho, A Matsui… - 1992 - University of Pennsylvania, Center …
[CITATION] Induction and bounded rationality in repeated games
IK Cho, A Matsui… - 1992 - University of Pennsylvania, Center …
[CITATION] On the Complexity of Repeated Principal Agent Games
C In-Koo - Economic Theory (1996a), 1996
IK Cho - 정기학술대회, 2004 - papersearch.net
ABSTRACT. This paper empirically investigates the welfare performance of the deregulated
wholesale electric market of California between 1998 and 2000 by incorporating the network
structure in evaluating the market power. By applying Cho (2001), we build the ...
IK Cho - University of Illinois, 2007 - economics.utoronto.ca
Abstract. We examine whether the Coase conjecture (Coase (1972), Stokey (1981), Bulow
(1982), Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986)) is robust against a slight ability of
commitment of the monopolist not to sell the durable goods to consumers. We quantify the ...
IK Cho… - … and University of Tokyo and University …, 1999 - en.scientificcommons.org
IK Cho - Economic Theory, 1996 - Springer
Summary We examine an infinitely repeated principal agent game without discounting
(Radner [1985]), in which the agent may engage in multiple projects. We focus on “linear”
strategies that summarize each history into a linear function of public outcomes, and select ...
[CITATION] Learning and model validation
C In-Koo… - 2005 - mimeo
IK Cho - Journal of Economic Theory, 2005 - upi-yptk.ac.id
The equilibrium models are built around strong assumptions on the computational and
forecasting capability of the decision makers. The seminal work by Simon [17] is followed by
a large literature on bounded rationality in which a rational player is replaced by a ...
IK Cho - Theory workshop papers, 2004 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks.
Monotonicity and Rationalizability in Large Uniform Price and Double Auctions. In-Koo Cho. ...
[CITATION] A Refinement of the Sequential Equilibrium Concept
IK Cho - Mimeographed Stanford, Calif Stanford Univ, Grad …, 1985
[CITATION] Self-confirming equilibrium
TJ Sargent… - The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, ed. by S. …, 2008
[CITATION] Escaping Nash Equilibrium
IK Cho, N Williams… - Review of Economic Studies, 2002
IK Cho… - 1998 - ideas.repec.org
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IK Cho - 1986 - en.scientificcommons.org
Publikationsansicht. 33740378. Refinement of sequential equilibrium : theory and application /
(1986). Cho, In-Koo. Abstract. Thesis (Ph.D.)--Princeton University, 1986.. Bibliography: leaves
45-46. Details der Publikation. Download, http://worldcat.org/oclc/78139156. ...
IK Cho - Working Paper, 2003 - ideas.repec.org
The result of Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2001) is powerful because it relies only
on three rather natural conditions: the Fisher equation, the convex Taylor rule, and the lower
bound of the nominal interest rate. Their result is striking because the paper reveals the ...
A Mas-Colell, MD Whinston, JR Green, IK Cho… - 2004 - econ.wisc.edu
The majority of our readings will come from the textbooks of Mas-Colell, Whinston, and
Green and of Fudenberg and Tirole. We will also look at two short sections from Myerson's
book and one chapter from van Damme's book. The article by Cho and Kreps will be ...
IK Cho - Journal of Economic Theory, 2001 - Elsevier
We examine the stability of rational expectations equilibria in the class of models in which
the decision of the individual agent is discontinuous with respect to the state variables.
Instead of rational expectations, each agent learns the unknown parameters through a ...
IK Cho… - 2012 - ideas.repec.org
This paper studies adaptive learning with multiple models. An agent operating in a self-
referential environment is aware of potential model misspecification, and tries to detect it, in
real-time, using an econometric specification test. If the current model passes the test, it is ...
CHO IN-KOo - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1987 - artsci.wustl.edu
Games in which one party conveys private information to a second through messages
typically admit large numbers of sequential equilibria, as the second party may entertain a
wealth of beliefs in response to out-of-equilibrium messages. By restricting those out-of- ...
IK Cho… - 2005 - economics.utoronto.ca
Abstract We examine the information aggregation property [24, 19] in a broad class of large
auctions in which all goods are traded at a single “market clearing” price, while each player
behaves as a noise trader [13] with a small positive probability. Following the spirit of [3], ...
[CITATION] Sophisticated Learning and the Coase Conjecture
IK Cho… - 1990 - HGB Alexander Research …
IK Cho… - Wiley Online Library
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C In-Koo - Games and Economic Behavior, 1993 - econpapers.repec.org
By Cho In-Koo; Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, 2nd, Revised and
Enlarged Edition, By Eric van Damme, Springer-Verlag,.
RJ Barro, JR Behrman, J Bhagwati… - International …, 2010 - Taylor & Francis
Help: about the FAC B Database The Food Additives and Contaminants - Surveillance Database
is a searchable database containing all the surveillance data published in Food Additives and
Contaminants Part B (FAC B) since its launch in June 2008. Search results may be ...
IK Cho… - 2005 - economics.utoronto.ca
Unless one is extremely humble or extremely lucky, one must have experienced aspiring
something in vain. When we encounter an outcome that does not meet our aspiration, we
often do one of two things: trying other methods to clear the aspiration level; and lowering ...
IK Cho - cpfd.cnki.com.cn
[摘要]: 正As an economy has experienced a rapid growth, achieving a proper balance
between the urban and the rural sectors emerges as a new challenge to the economic policy
makers. To achieve a proper balance, a policy maker should provide the same kind of ...
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