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User profiles for author:"Erik Snowberg"

Erik Snowberg

Professor of Economics and Political Science, California Institute of Technology
Verified email at caltech.edu
Cited by 392

Partisan impacts on the economy: evidence from prediction markets and close elections

[PDF] from oxfordjournals.org
Full text - MIT Libraries
E Snowberg, J Wolfers… - The Quarterly Journal of …, 2007 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract Analyses of the effects of election outcomes on the economy have been hampered
by the problem that economic outcomes also influence elections. We sidestep these
problems by analyzing movements in economic indicators caused by clearly exogenous ...
Cited by 93 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 64 versions

[PDF] The promise of prediction markets

[PDF] from arlingtoneconomics.com
Full text - MIT Libraries
KJ Arrow, R Forsythe, M Gorham… - … -NEW YORK THEN …, 2008 - arlingtoneconomics.com
Information revelation through time. Data are from the Iowa Electronic Markets for markets
predicting the two-party vote shares from the 1988, 1992, 1996, and 2000 presidential
elections (19). The vertical axis plots the average absolute difference between the market ...
Cited by 71 - Related articles - View as HTML - BL Direct - All 22 versions

Explaining the Favorite-Longshot Bias: Is it Risk-Love or Misperceptions?

[PDF] from ifo-dresden.de
E Snowberg… - 2010 - nber.org
The favorite-longshot bias describes the longstanding empirical regularity that betting odds
provide biased estimates of the probability of a horse winning—longshots are overbet, while
favorites are underbet. Neoclassical explanations of this phenomenon focus on rational ...
Cited by 58 - Related articles - Library Search - All 68 versions

Television and the incumbency advantage in US elections

[PDF] from psu.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
S Ansolabehere, EC Snowberg… - Legislative Studies …, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. 469 Television and Incumbency Advantage LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY,
XXXI, 4, November 2006 469 STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE Massachusetts Institute of Technology
ERIK C. SNOWBERG Stanford University JAMES M. SNYDER, JR. ...
Cited by 32 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 9 versions

Unrepresentative Information

[PDF] from psu.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
S Ansolabehere, EC Snowberg… - Public Opinion Quarterly, 2005 - AAPOR
... Erik Snowberg would like to thank Dan Arnon and Mathieu Gagné for founding Oryxa, a company
where I could earn my livelihood while still pursuing my life. Professor Ansolabehere and Professor
Snyder thank the National Science Foundation for its financial support. ...
Cited by 25 - Related articles - All 18 versions

18 Information (in) efficiency in prediction markets

[PDF] from upenn.edu
E Snowberg, J Wolfers… - Information efficiency in …, 2005 - books.google.com
This chapter examines a new class of markets at the intersection of traditional betting and
traditional financial markets. We call these 'prediction markets'. Like both financial and
betting markets, prediction markets focus on uncertain outcomes and involve trading in ...
Cited by 20 - Related articles - All 12 versions

Statement on prediction markets

K Arrow, S Sunder, R Forsythe, R Litan… - AEI-Brookings Joint …, 2007 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Prediction markets are markets for contracts that yield payments based on the
outcome of an uncertain future event, such as a presidential election. Using these markets
as forecasting tools could substantially improve decision making in the private and public ...
Cited by 14 - Related articles - All 3 versions

Party Influence in Congress and the Economy

[PDF] from caltech.edu
E Snowberg, J Wolfers… - 2006 - nber.org
To understand the extent to which partisan majorities in Congress influence economic
policy, we compare financial market responses in recent midterm elections to Presidential
elections. We use prediction markets tracking election outcomes as a means of precisely ...
Cited by 12 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 32 versions

How Prediction Markets Can Save Event Studies

[PDF] from wustl.edu
E Snowberg, J Wolfers… - 2011 - nber.org
This review paper articulates the relationship between prediction market data and event
studies, with a special focus on applications in political economy. Event studies have been
used to address a variety of political economy questions from the economic effects of party ...
Cited by 10 - Related articles - Library Search - All 40 versions

[CITATION] Examining explanations of a market anomaly: preferences or perceptions

E Snowberg… - Handbook of sports and lottery markets, 2008
Cited by 10 - Related articles

[CITATION] Explaining the favorite-longshot bias: Is it risk-love

E Snowberg… - 2005 - or misperceptions
Cited by 9 - Related articles

[PDF] Mecro-Economic Voting: Local Information and Micro-Perceptions of the Macro-Economy

[PDF] from upenn.edu
S Ansolabehere, M Meredith… - annual meeting of the …, 2011 - bpub.wharton.upenn.edu
Abstract We develop an incomplete-information theory of economic voting, where voters'
perceptions of macro-economic performance are affected by economic conditions of people
similar to themselves. Our theory alleviates two persistent issues in the literature: it shows ...
Cited by 8 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 9 versions

Sociotropic Voting and the Media

[PDF] from nyu.edu
S Ansolabehere, M Meredith… - 2008 - books.google.com
The literature on economic voting notes that voters' subjective evaluations of the overall
state of the economy are correlated with vote choice, whereas personal economic
experiences are not (Kinder and Kiewiet 1979, 1981). Missing from this literature is a ...
Cited by 7 - Related articles - All 14 versions

[CITATION] “The Favorite-Longshot Bias: Understanding a Market Anomaly

E Snowberg… - Efficiency of Sports and Lottery Markets, edited by …, 2007
Cited by 4 - Related articles

[PDF] A Multi-Dimensional Signaling Model of Campaign Finance

[PDF] from caltech.edu
B Daley… - Discussion Papers, 2007 - hss.caltech.edu
Abstract We develop a dynamic multi-dimensional signaling model of campaign finance in
which candidates can signal their ability by enacting policy and/or by raising and spending
campaign funds, both of which are costly. Our model departs from the existing literature in ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 13 versions

[PDF] Asking About Numbers: Why and How

[PDF] from upenn.edu
S Ansolabehere, M Meredith… - annual meeting of the …, 2010 - sas.upenn.edu
Abstract Survey questions about quantities offer a number of advantages over more
common qualitative questions. However, concerns about survey respondents' abilities to
accurately report numbers have limited the use of quantitative questions. This paper ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 3 versions

The 2008 Presidential Primaries through the Lens of Prediction Markets

[PDF] from wustl.edu
N Malhotra… - 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: To explore the influence of primary results during the 2008 nomination process we
leverage a previously unused methodology-the analysis of prediction market contracts. The
unique structure of prediction markets allows us to address two unexplored questions. ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 11 versions

[CITATION] Understanding the Favorite-Longshot Bias: Risk Preferences versus Misperceptions

E Snowberg… - 2006 - citeulike.org
Erik Snowberg, Justin Wolfers. (2006). prediction money markets incentives horseracing.
Cited by 2 - Related articles - Cached

Even if it is not bribery: the case for campaign finance reform

[PDF] from psu.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
B Daley… - Journal of Law, Economics, and …, 2011 - Oxford Univ Press
Abstract We develop a dynamic multidimensional signaling model of campaign finance in
which candidates can signal their ability by enacting policy and/or by raising and spending
campaign funds, both of which are costly. Our model departs from the existing literature in ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - All 8 versions

[PDF] Accountability with Strong Parties

[PDF] from imtlucca.it
G Padró-i-Miquel… - 2009 - imtlucca.it
Abstract We examine the accountability of politicians to their parties when parties are able to
discipline incumbents by dismissing them at no cost. The fundamental tension between
parties and their politicians is that while parties want politicians who will implement the ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 19 versions

[PDF] Carrots and Sticks: Punishment and Party Power in Congress

[PDF] from caltech.edu
E Snowberg - 2008 - hss.caltech.edu
Abstract This paper proposes a dual-utility theory of parties in a legislature. In this theory a
legislator has preferences over both actions and policy outcomes. Specifically, a legislator's
utility is determined by position taking—his own votes—and by partisan utility which ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 3 versions

[PDF] tSelective Trials, Information Production and Technology Diffusionu

[PDF] from harvard.edu
S Chassang, GP i Miquel… - 2009 - isites.harvard.edu
Abstract This paper explores how to run randomized experiments when outcomes depend
significantly on unobserved effort decisions taken by agents. Our first set of results show that
making selection explicit rather than implicit can generate greater information. This ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 6 versions

[PDF] Cross-Cutting Cleavages and Government Spending

[PDF] from nyu.edu
E Snowberg - 2007 - politics.as.nyu.edu
Abstract When racial groups differ in terms of their political sensitivity—the propensity of
group members to change their vote based on changes in a candidate's redistributive
platform—the racial composition of a political jurisdiction affects redistributive policy even ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 5 versions

The lesser evil: Executive accountability with partisan supporters

[PDF] from cepr.org
Full text - MIT Libraries
GP i Miquel, E Snowberg - Journal of theoretical politics, 2012 - jtp.sagepub.com
Abstract We develop a model of electoral accountability with primaries. Prior to the general
election, the supporters of each of two parties decide which candidates to nominate. We
show that supporters suffer from a fundamental tension: while they want politicians who ...
Related articles - All 10 versions

Even if it is not Bribery: The Case for Campaign Finance Reform

Full text - MIT Libraries
E Snowberg - Journal of Law, Economics and Organization - ideas.repec.org
We develop a dynamic multidimensional signaling model of campaign finance in which
candidates can signal their ability by enacting policy and/or by raising and spending
campaign funds, both of which are costly. Our model departs from the existing literature in ...
Cached - All 3 versions

[PDF] Party Influence in Congress and the Economy

[PDF] from yale.edu
E Zitzewitz, E Snowberg… - Related Publications, 2006 - fairmodel.econ.yale.edu
Abstract To understand the extent to which partisan majorities in Congress influence
economic policy, we compare financial market responses in recent midterm elections to
Presidential elections. We use prediction markets tracking election outcomes as a means ...
Related articles - All 4 versions

DP5591 Partisan Impacts on the Economy: Evidence from Prediction Markets and Close Elections

E Snowberg, J Wolfers… - 2006 - cepr.org
Political economists interested in discerning the effects of election outcomes on the
economy have been hampered by the problem that economic outcomes also influence
elections. We sidestep these problems by analyzing movements in economic indicators ...
Cached - All 3 versions

The lesser evil: Executive accountability with partisan supporters

Full text - MIT Libraries
E Snowberg - Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2012 - econpapers.repec.org
We develop a model of electoral accountability with primaries. Prior to the general election,
the supporters of each of two parties decide which candidates to nominate. We show that
supporters suffer from a fundamental tension: while they want politicians who will faithfully ...
Cached

DP8351 How Prediction Markets Can Save Event Studies

E Snowberg, J Wolfers… - 2011 - cepr.org
This review paper articulates the relationship between prediction market data and event
studies, with a special focus on applications in political economy. Event studies have been
used to address a variety of political economy questions from the economic effects of party ...
Cached - All 3 versions

The lesser evil: Executive accountability with partisan supporters

Full text - MIT Libraries
GPÃ i Miquel… - Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2010 - ideas.repec.org
We develop a model of electoral accountability with primaries. Prior to the general election,
the supporters of each of two parties decide which candidates to nominate. We show that
supporters suffer from a fundamental tension: while they want politicians who will faithfully ...
Cached

[PDF] Theory and Proofs for “The Personality of Politicians”

[PDF] from princeton.edu
E Snowberg… - 2011 - princeton.edu
Abstract We develop a citizen-candidate model of redistribution between both rich and poor
citizens, and between legislative districts, where citizens that are more productive in the
private sector are also more effective at directing transfers to their district if elected to a ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 2 versions

[PDF] The 2008 Presidential Primaries through the Lens of Prediction Markets (Research Note)

[PDF] from psu.edu
N Malhotra… - Citeseer
Abstract To explore the influence of primary and caucus results during the 2008 nomination
process we leverage a previously unused methodology—the analysis of prediction market
contracts. The unique structure of prediction markets allows us to address two questions. ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 4 versions

[CITATION] Partisan Impacts on the Economy: Evidence from Prediction Markets and Close Elections

E Zitzewitz, E Snowberg… - Related Publications, 2006 - Regulation2point0
All 3 versions

Essays in political economics

E Snowberg - 2008 - gradworks.umi.com
Abstract: Formal models in political economy are often criticized for their reductionism.
Proponents of other methodologies express displeasure that complex figures like politicians,
voters, and other actors are rendered in stark terms by formal models. The following three ...
Cached - Library Search - All 2 versions

[PDF] Accounting for Behavior in Treatment Effects: New Applications for Blind Trials

[PDF] from caltech.edu
S Chassang, E Snowberg… - 2012 - hss.caltech.edu
New treatments can affect patient outcomes through three distinct channels:(i) direct
therapeutic effects,(ii) changes in conscious or unconscious behavior accompanying
treatment, and (iii) interaction effects between treatment and changes in behavior. We ...
Related articles - View as HTML

DP7801 Explaining the Favorite-Longshot Bias: Is it Risk-Love or Misperceptions?

E Snowberg… - 2010 - cepr.org
The favorite-longshot bias describes the longstanding empirical regularity that betting odds
provide biased estimates of the probability of a horse winning—longshots are overbet, while
favorites are underbet. Neoclassical explanations of this phenomenon focus on rational ...
Cached - All 3 versions

Statistical bias in newspaper reporting on campaign finance

[PDF] from mit.edu
S Ansolabehere, E Snowberg… - 2003 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper examines evidence of statistical bias in newspaper reporting on
campaign finance. We compile data on all dollar amounts for campaign expenditures,
contributions, and receipts reported in the five largest circulation newspapers in the United ...
Related articles - All 4 versions

[PDF] Can Parties Control Politicians?

[PDF] from caltech.edu
G Padró-i-Miquel… - 2009 - hss.caltech.edu
Abstract We examine a fundamental tension between parties and their politicians. While
parties want politicians who will implement the party's agenda in office, they also need
politicians who can win elections. Therefore parties might be forced to keep a charismatic ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 3 versions

Mecro-Economic Voting: Local Information and Micro-Perceptions of the Macro-Economy

E Snowberg, M Meredith… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We develop an incomplete-information theory of economic voting, where voters'
perceptions of macro-economic performance are affected by economic conditions of people
similar to themselves. Our theory alleviates two persistent issues in the literature: it shows ...
Related articles

[CITATION] What Do Voters Believe About the Economy?

E Snowberg, S Ansolabehere… - 2011

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