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The Nash bargaining solution in economic modelling

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K Binmore, A Rubinstein… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1986 - JSTOR
This article establishes the relationship between the static axiomatic theory of bargaining
and the sequential strategic approach to bargaining. We consider two strategic models of
alternating offers. The models differ in the source of the incentive of the bargaining parties ...
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[BOOK] A strategic model of social and economic networks

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MO Jackson… - 1996 - business.uiuc.edu
We study the stability and efficiency of social and economic networks, when selfinterested
individuals can form or sever links. First, for two stylized models, we characterize the stable
and efficient networks. There does not always exist a stable network that is efficient. Next, ...
Cited by 1398 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - BL Direct - All 41 versions

Equilibrium in a market with sequential bargaining

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A Rubinstein, A Wolinsky - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric …, 1985 - JSTOR
This paper considers a market where pairs of agents who are interested in carrying out a
transaction are brought together by a stochastic process and, upon meeting, initiate a
bargaining process over the terms of the transaction. The basic bargaining problem is ...
Cited by 413 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 13 versions

Middlemen

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A Rubinstein, A Wolinsky - The Quarterly Journal of …, 1987 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We study a model of a market with three types of agents: sellers, buyers, and
middlemen. Buyers and sellers can trade directly or indirectly through the middlemen. The
analysis focuses on steady state situations in which the numbers of agents of the different ...
Cited by 380 - Related articles - Library Search - All 7 versions

Prices as signals of product quality

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A Wolinsky - The Review of Economic Studies, 1983 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract This paper is concerned with the provision of quality in markets in which consumers
have only imperfect information. The analysis focuses on a market for a product that can be
produced at different quality levels. All consumers prefer higher to lower quality, but they ...
Cited by 356 - Related articles - Library Search - All 7 versions

Bilateral monopolies and incentives for merger

H Horn… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1988 - JSTOR
We analyze a duopoly in which firms acquire inputs through bilateral monopoly relations
with suppliers. We combine a bargaining model with a duopoly model to examine how input
prices and profits are affected by the structures of the upstream and downstream ...
Cited by 292 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 13 versions

Worker substitutability and patterns of unionisation

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H Horn… - The Economic Journal, 1988 - JSTOR
Studies of wage bargaining under trade unionism record a variety of patterns. In some firms
the bargaining is at the plant level, in other firms at a firm-wide level; in some cases unions
are organised according to workers skills, and in other cases according to their work-place ...
Cited by 239 - Related articles - Library Search - All 5 versions

Competition in a market for informed experts' services

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A Wolinsky - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1993 - JSTOR
This article investigates how information asymmetries affect the organization of markets in
which sellers are also experts who determine customers' needs. It examines how customers'
search for multiple opinions and reputation considerations each play a role in disciplining ...
Cited by 227 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - BL Direct - All 17 versions

Decentralized trading, strategic behaviour and the Walrasian outcome

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A Rubinstein, A Wolinsky - The Review of Economic …, 1990 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract For a market with a finite number of agents, pairwise matching and bargaining, it is
shown that, even when the market is frictionless, the equilibrium is not necessarily
competitive. It depends on the amount of information agents use. If their behaviour is ...
Cited by 175 - Related articles - Library Search - All 10 versions

True monopolistic competition as a result of imperfect information

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A Wolinsky - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1986 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract The paper restates Hart's [1985a, 1985b] definition of large group monopolistic
competition, distinguishes it from oligopolistic competition, and raises the question of
whether there are reasonable circumstances that give rise to true monopolistic ...
Cited by 128 - Related articles - Library Search - All 6 versions

Information revelation in a market with pairwise meetings

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A Wolinsky - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1990 - JSTOR
This paper presents a simple pairwise meetings model of trade. The new feature is that
agents have asymmetric information about the true state of the world. The focus is on the
transmission of the information through the process of trade. The qualitative question: to ...
Cited by 121 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 17 versions

Retail trade concentration due to consumers' imperfect information

A Wolinsky - The Bell Journal of Economics, 1983 - JSTOR
The main idea of this article is that geographical concentration of stores selling similar
products can be explained by consumers' imperfect information and their resulting need to
search the market. A cluster of stores sustained by these forces is not necessarily located ...
Cited by 118 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 10 versions

Matching, search, and bargaining

A Wolinsky - Journal of Economic Theory, 1987 - Elsevier
Abstract First, the paper incorporates search for alternative opportunities into a model of
strategic bargaining. Second, this search and bargaining model is embedded in a market
matching model. The solutions are presented in a manner that clarifies the role of the ...
Cited by 117 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 8 versions

Competition in markets for credence goods

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A Wolinsky - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics ( …, 1995 - JSTOR
This paper investigates the functioning of markets for credence goods. These are markets in
which the information asymmetries are of the form that sellers are also experts who
determine customers' needs. It examines the role of customers' search for multiple ...
Cited by 97 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - BL Direct - All 15 versions

Renegotiation-proof implementation and time preferences

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A Rubinstein, A Wolinsky - The American Economic Review, 1992 - JSTOR
This paper explores how the requirement that the implementation of contracts be
renegotiation-proof affects the set of contracts that can be implemented in a seller--buyer
scenario in which the information regarding the agents' valuations is nonverifiable. This ...
Cited by 81 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 15 versions

Eliciting information from multiple experts

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A Wolinsky - Games and Economic Behavior, 2002 - Elsevier
A decision maker DM has to elicit information from informed experts regarding the
desirability of a certain action. The experts share similar preferences, which differ
significantly from those of DM, and they possess different pieces of information. The ...
Cited by 82 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 11 versions

Second opinions and price competition: Inefficiency in the market for expert advice

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W Pesendorfer… - Review of Economic Studies, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
We consider a market in which an expert must exert costly but unobservable effort to identify
the service that meets the consumer's need. In our model, experts offer competing contracts
and the consumer may gather multiple opinions. We explore the incentives that a ...
Cited by 79 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 36 versions

Dynamic markets with competitive bidding

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A Wolinsky - The Review of Economic Studies, 1988 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract The model features a dynamic market in steady state in which prices are
determined in first-price auctions. It combines competition over time familiar from the
pairwise meeting models with instantaneous bidding competition. It inquires how different ...
Cited by 73 - Related articles - All 5 versions

Product differentiation with imperfect information

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A Wolinsky - The Review of Economic Studies, 1984 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract The paper employs a model of monopolistic competition and product differentiation
with consumers who are not well informed about the specification of the offered brands.
Welfare analysis of the degree of product differentiation in such a market concludes that ...
Cited by 66 - Related articles - Library Search - All 7 versions

On the Logic of

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A Rubinstein, A Wolinsky - Journal of Economic Theory, 1990 - Elsevier
Abstract The analysis of the “agreeing to disagree” type results is unified by considering
functions which assign to each set of states of nature the value “True” or “False”. We identify
properties of such functions, being preserved under union, under disjoint union and under ...
Cited by 58 - Related articles - Library Search - All 8 versions

[PDF] Rationalizable conjectural equilibrium: between Nash and rationalizability

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A Rubinstein, A Wolinsky - Games and Economic Behavior, 1994 - dklevine.com
Static equilibria can be viewed as steady states of recurring play of a game. Such steady
states in which players do not perfectly observe the actions of others need not be Nash
equilibria. This paper suggests a static solution concept, rationalizable conjectural ...
Cited by 57 - Related articles - Library Search - All 13 versions

Regulation of duopoly: managed competition vs regulated monopolies

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A Wolinsky - Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1997 - Wiley Online Library
This paper discusses the regulation of oligopolistic differentiated-product industries. The
regulator can control prices and impose quantity restrictions, but cannot control the quality
choices of the firms. We inquire about the optimal choice of regulatory regime—whether ...
Cited by 56 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 14 versions

Vote buying: General elections

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E Dekel, MO Jackson… - Journal of Political Economy, 2008 - JSTOR
We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and
free of stigma. Two parties compete in a binary election and may purchase votes in a
sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign promises ( ...
Cited by 60 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 25 versions

A Theory of the Firm with Non‐binding Employment Contracts

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A Wolinsky - Econometrica, 2000 - Wiley Online Library
This paper examines an employment relation in which individual workers enjoy some
bargaining power vis-a-vis the firm although they are not unionized. The main elements of
the situations studied here are that the employment contracts are non-binding across ...
Cited by 50 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 14 versions

Learning about variable demand in the long run

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A Rustichini, A Wolinsky - Journal of economic Dynamics and Control, 1995 - Elsevier
This paper studies the problem of a monopoly who is uncertain about the demand it faces
and learns about it over time through its pricing experience. The demand curve facing the
monopoly is not constant—it changes over time in a Markovian fashion. We characterize ...
Cited by 42 - Related articles - Library Search - All 15 versions

Brand names and price discrimination

A Wolinsky - The Journal of Industrial Economics, 1987 - JSTOR
This paper explains the fact that firms market both labeled and unlabeled products as a
practice of price discrimination that emerges as a noncooperative equilibrium outcome. We
consider a market for a differentiated product where the possibility to price discriminate by ...
Cited by 40 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 5 versions

Game theory and industrial organization

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K Bagwell, A Wolinsky - Handbook of Game Theory with Economic …, 2002 - Elsevier
Abstract In this article, we consider how important developments in game theory have
contributed to the theory of industrial organization. Our goal is not to survey the theory of
industrial organization; rather, we consider the contribution of game theory through a ...
Cited by 31 - Related articles - Library Search - All 41 versions

[BOOK] Rationalizable outcomes of large independent private-value first-price discrete auctions

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E Dekel, A Wolinsky… - 2000 - execed.kellogg.northwestern.edu
Abstract We consider discrete versions of first-price auctions. We present a condition on
beliefs about players' values such that, with any fixed finite set of possible bids and
sufficiently many players, only bidding the bid closest from below to one's true value ...
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Remarks on infinitely repeated extensive-form games

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A Rubinstein, A Wolinsky - Games and Economic Behavior, 1995 - Elsevier
Let Γ be a game in extensive form and G be its reduced normal form game. Let Γ∞(δ) and
G∞(δ) be the infinitely repeated game versions of Γ and G respectively, with common
discount factor δ. This note points out that the set of SPE payoff vectors of Γ∞(δ) might be ...
Cited by 26 - Related articles - All 8 versions

[PDF] Vote buying: legislatures and lobbying

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E Dekel, MO Jackson… - … Journal of Political …, 2009 - faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu
ABSTRACT We examine the consequences of lobbying and vote buying, assuming this
practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two lobbyists compete for the votes of legislators
by offering up-front payments to the legislators in exchange for their votes. We analyze ...
Cited by 25 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 8 versions

Information transmission when the sender's preferences are uncertain

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A Wolinsky - Games and Economic Behavior, 2003 - Elsevier
In deciding on the magnitude of a certain action (say, investment), a decision maker relies
on the report of an informed and interested expert who can suppress favorable information.
The main departure from the related literature is that the decision maker is uncertain as to ...
Cited by 24 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 8 versions

The nature of competition and the scope of firms

A Wolinsky - The journal of industrial economics, 1986 - JSTOR
This paper examines how the scope of firms in an industry is affected by the nature of the
competition in that industry. The main observation is that imperfectly competitive conduct
introduces additional incentives (as compared to competition among price takers) to form ...
Cited by 21 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 7 versions

[PDF] Vote buying

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E Dekel, MO Jackson… - Tel Aviv University, California …, 2004 - econ.tau.ac.il
Abstract We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed
and free of stigma. Two parties competing in a binary election may purchase votes in a
sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign promises ( ...
Cited by 17 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 46 versions

Procurement via sequential search

A Wolinsky - Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 113, pp. 785-819, …, 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Numerous design and repair services are nonstandard and have to be tailored to
the needs of the individual buyers. Prospective sellers have to make preliminary efforts in
order to come up with a plan, and buyers often consult a number of sellers before making ...
Cited by 16 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 8 versions

[BOOK] New directions in economic theory-Bounded rationality

[PDF] from tau.ac.il
A Rubinstein, KG Binmore, MJ Osborne, U Broll… - 1990 - arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il
Resumen Este trabajo presenta varios modelos que destacan el contraste entre las teorías
de la decisión y de los juegos, por una parte, y la intuición y los datos empíricos y
experimentales, por otra. Estos ejemplos estimulan la adopción del punto de vista de la ...
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[PDF] Vote buying II: legislatures and lobbying

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E Dekel, MO Jackson… - Discussion Papers, 2006 - financialtrustindex.org
Abstract We examine the consequences of lobbying and vote buying, assuming this prac#
tice were allowed and free of stigma. Two jlobbyistskcompete for the votes of legislators by
offering up# front payments to the legislators in exchange for their votes. We analyze how ...
Cited by 7 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 17 versions

[CITATION] tA Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, uJournal of Economic Theory

MO Jackson… - Vol, 1996
Cited by 7 - Related articles

[CITATION] Regulation of Duopoly under Asymmetric Information

A Wolinsky - manuscript, Northwestern University, 1993
Cited by 6 - Related articles

[CITATION] Wages, Employment, and the Structure of Bargaining

H Horn… - 1985 - swepub.kb.se
SwePub titelinformation: Wages, Employment, and the Structure of Bargaining [Elektronisk resurs].
Cited by 4 - Related articles - Cached - All 2 versions

[PDF] Search with Adverse Selection

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S Lauermann… - Presentation at the Midwest …, 2008 - sites.google.com
Abstract This paper analyzes a search model with asymmetric information of the common
values variety. The basic features of this environment resemble those of a common values
(procurement) auction, except that the searcher in our model, who is the counterpart of the ...
Cited by 7 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 19 versions

[PDF] Jump bidding and budget constraints in all-pay auctions and wars of attrition

[PDF] from psu.edu
E Dekel, MO Jackson… - 2006 - Citeseer
Abstract We study all% pay auctions (or wars of attrition), where the highest bidder wins an
object, but all bidders pay their bids. We consider such auctions when two bidders alternate
in raising their bids and where all aspects of the auction are common knowledge including ...
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[CITATION] All-Pay Auctions

E Dekel, MO Jackson… - Manuscript, Northwestern Univ, 2006
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[CITATION] Game Theory and Industrial Organization Theory

K Bagwell, A Wolinsky - 1997 - Mimeo, Columbia University
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[BOOK] Dynamic Markets with Competitive Bidding

A Wolinsky - 1987 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract The model features a dynamic market in steady state in which prices ar e
determined in first-price auctions. It combines competition over ti me, familiar from the
pairwise meeting models, with instantaneous bid ding competition. It inquires how ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - Cached - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search

[CITATION] The Nash bargaining solution in economic bargaining

K Binmore, A Rubinstein… - RAND Journal of Economics, 1986
Cited by 2 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries

Durable-good monopoly with inventories

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A Wolinsky - Economics Letters, 1991 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper points out that familiar strategic considerations may induce a durable
good monopolist to hold inventories. The motive for inventory holding by the monopoly is the
standard one of production smoothing, but it arises here due to strategic considerations ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - All 5 versions

[CITATION] Competition in a Market for Informed Experts' Services, 24 Rand J

A Wolinsky - 1993 - Econ
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[CITATION] Competition in Markets for Credence Goods, 151 J

A Wolinsky - INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON, 1995
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[CITATION] Retail Trade Concentration Due to Consumers' Imperfect Information

A Wolinsky - 1981 - Bell Telephone Laboratories, …
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[BOOK] A market based approach to property tax

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A Wolinsky… - 2000 - kellogg.northwestern.edu
Abstract This paper discusses the possibility of basing the the administration of property
taxes on market forces or even privatizing it. The basic idea is that owners will be free to
determine the assessed valuations of their own properties, but these assessments will ...
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Small deviations from maximizing behavior in a simple dynamic model

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A Wolinsky - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1994 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract The motivating intuition is that the presence of nonmaximizing agents induces
maximizing agents to take advantage of them, and that this might magnify the effect of small
deviations from maximizing behavior. This intuition is explored using a simple dynamic ...
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[CITATION] Decentralized Trading with Asymmetric Information

A Wolinsky - 1987 - University of Pennsylvania, Center …
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[CITATION] Remarks on the Logic of Agreeing to Disagree Type Results (Now published in Journal of Economic Theory, 51 (1990), pp. 184-193.)

A Rubinstein, A Wolinsky - STICERD-Theoretical Economics …, 1989 - ideas.repec.org
Remarks on the Logic of Agreeing to Disagree Type Results (Now published in Journal of Economic
Theory, 51 (1990), pp.184-193.) ... No abstract is available for this item. ... To our
knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there ...
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[CITATION] Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behavior and the Walrasian Outcome (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, 57 (1990), pp. 63-78.)

A Rubinstein, A Wolinsky - … -Theoretical Economics Paper …, 1987 - econpapers.repec.org
By Ariel Rubinstein and Asher Wolinsky; Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behavior and the
Walrasian Outcome (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, 57 (19. ...
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[BOOK] A Remark on Infinitely Repeated Extensive Games

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
A Rubinstein, A Wolinsky… - 1992 - kellogg.northwestern.edu
Abstract Let Г be a game in extensive form and G be its reduced normal form game. Let Г*(5)
and G*(5) be the infinitely repeated game versions of Г and G respectively, with common
discount factor 6. This note points out that the set of SPE payoff vectors of Г (5) might be ...
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[CITATION] Report of the Editor American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

K Bagwell, D Bergemann, D Duffie, L Einav, F Gul…
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A note on the interaction between buyers and sellers

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A Wolinsky - Economics Letters, 1983 - Elsevier
Abstract This note demonstrates that common results are sensitive to the form of the buyer-
seller interaction, whose important role is ignored by most market models. This is presented
by an example of a market in which a buyer does not consider a seller's price quotation as ...
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[CITATION] Product differentiation and retail trade concentration with imperfect information

A Wolinsky - 1980 - Stanford University
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Worker substitutability and patterns of unionisation

H Horn… - INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF …, 2002 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract A strategic three party bargaining model is developed in which one distinguished
party, the firm, has to reac h agreements with the other two, each of which is a group of
workers. In the prebargaining stage, the two worker groups decide whether to organize ...
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Jump bidding and budget constraints in all-pay auctions and wars of attrition PDF Logo

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E Dekel, MO Jackson… - econstor.eu
Zusammenfassung: We study all-pay auctions (or wars of attrition), where the highest bidder
wins an object, but all bidders pay their bids. We consider such auctions when two bidders
alternate in raising their bids and where all aspects of the auction are common knowledge ...
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[CITATION] Characterizing Efficiency in Stochastic Overlapping Generations Models

A Rubinstein, I Zilcha, A Wolinsky, A Bar-Ilan… - 1990 - Tel Aviv University
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[PDF] done in the FTC on these subjects.

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
A Wolinsky - execed.kellogg.northwestern.edu
ABSTRACT Many important services share the feature that the seller is also the expert who
determines how much of the service is needed. Even when the outcomes of such service are
observable, it might be difficult for the customer to determine what the expert actually did ...
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[CITATION] The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling (Now published in Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 17 (1986), pp. 176-188.)

K Binmore, A Rubinstein… - … Economics Paper Series, 1985 - econpapers.repec.org
By Ken Binmore, Ariel Rubinstein and Asher Wolinsky; The Nash Bargaining Solution
in Economic Modelling (Now published in Rand Journal of Economics, vol.17 (1986),
pp.176-18. ... Ken Binmore, Ariel Rubinstein () and Asher Wolinsky. ...
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[BOOK] Regulation of Duopoly Under Asymmetric Information: Prices Vs Quantitites

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
A Wolinsky… - 1993 - kellogg.northwestern.edu
ABSTRACT This paper discusses the regulation of oligopolistic differentiated product
industries under conditions of incomplete information. The regulator can control the prices,
and impose quantity restrictions, but cannot control effectively the quality choices of the ...
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Buying Shares and/or Votes for Corporate Control

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A Wolinsky - Review of Economic Studies, 2011 - ideas.repec.org
We explore how allowing votes to be traded separately of shares may affect the efficiency of
corporate control contests. Our basic set-up and the nature of the questions continue the
work of Grossman and Hart (1980), Harris and Raviv (1988), and Blair, Golbe and Gerard ...
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[CITATION] Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger

A Wolinsky… - 1988 - University of Stockholm
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Buying shares and/or votes for corporate control

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E Dekel… - The Review of Economic Studies, 2012 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We explore how allowing votes to be traded separately of shares may affect the
efficiency of corporate control contests. Our basic set-up and the nature of the questions
continue the work of Grossman and Hart (1980), Harris and Raviv (1988), and Blair, Golbe ...
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[PDF] INSTITUTE FGR INTEQNATEONAL ECONONHC STUDQEQ

[PDF] from diva-portal.org
H Horn… - Institute for International Economic Studies, 1985 - su.diva-portal.org
2 we are aware of only two papers that formally address related issues. Rosen (1970) claims
that under plausible parameter values a wage setting union that maximizes the difference
between the wage bill with and without unionization, will increase wage differentials ...

[PDF] Costly Information and Common Agency in Venture Capital Funding

[PDF] from psu.edu
A Levy… - 2000 - Citeseer
Abstract This paper provides a rationale for why entrepreneurs seek… nancing from active
investors, such as venture capitalists, who fund potential competitors. In the model, two
potentially competing entrepreneurs must choose whether to go to common or ...
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[CITATION] INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS

SS REYNOLDS, A WOLINSKY, SI PRAIS… - The Journal of industrial …, 1985
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[CITATION] Equilibrium in a Market With Sequential Bargaining (Now published in Econometrica 53 (1985), pp. 1133-1150.)

A Rubinstein, A Wolinsky - … -Theoretical Economics Paper …, 1984 - econpapers.repec.org
By Ariel Rubinstein and Asher Wolinsky; Equilibrium in a Market With Sequential
Bargaining (Now published in Econometrica 53 (1985), pp. 1133-1150.). ...
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[CITATION] DAVID MG NEWBERY.

JE STIGLITZ, JM OSTROY, RA JONES… - International …, 1995 - Edward Elgar Pub
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[CITATION] Rationalizable Outcomes of Large Independent Private-value First-price Auctions

E Dekel, A Wolinsky… - 2000 - Center for Mathematical Studies in …
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[PDF] The Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics & Manasement Sciences

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
A Wolinsky - 1997 - kellogg.northwestern.edu
Abstract The purpose of this paper is to develop the theory of the firm to get better
understanding of situations in which individual employees enjoy some bargaining power in
their relations with the firm, and in which the terms of employment are determined and ...
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[CITATION] Vote buying

MO Jackson, E Dekel… - Working Papers, 2005 - econpapers.repec.org
Related works: Working Paper: Vote Buying (2004) Working Paper: Vote Buying (2005) This
item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title. ... This
site is part of RePEc and all the data displayed here is part of the RePEc data set.
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[CITATION] The nash bargaining solution in economic modelling

A Rubinstein, A Wolinsky… - The economics of labor …, 2002 - dialnet.unirioja.es
Información del artículo The nash bargaining solution in economic modelling.
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