 | Mellon Professor of Economics, University of Pittsburgh Verified email at pitt.edu Cited by 2686 |
Competitive high ranking positions are largely occupied by men, and women remain scarce
in engineering and sciences. Explanations for these occupational differences focus on
discrimination and preferences for work hours and field of study. We examine if absent ...
J Andreoni… - The Quarterly Journal of …, 2001 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We study gender differences in altruism by examining a modified dictator game with
varying incomes and prices. Our results indicate that the question “which is the fair sex?” has
a complicated answer—when altruism is expensive, women are kinder, but when it is ...
Abstract: We examine demands for rewards and punishments in a simple proposer-
responder game. The proposer first makes an offer to split a fixed-sized pie. According to the
2 x 2 design, the responder is or is not given a costly option of increasing or decreasing ...
This paper examines a puzzling inconsistency between the theoretical prediction of private
provisions to public goods and actual fundraising behavior. While fundraisers often choose
to announce past contributions, economic theory predicts that contributions will be largest ...
WT Harbaugh, K Krause… - Experimental Economics, 2002 - Springer
In this paper we examine how risk attitudes change with age. We present participants from
age 5 to 64 with choices between simple gambles and the expected value of the gambles.
The gambles are over both gains and losses, and vary in the probability of the non-zero ...
L Vesterlund - The nonprofit sector: A research handbook, 2006 - pitt.edu
The vast majority of Americans make charitable contributions. In 2000 90 percent of US
households donated on average $1,623 to nonprofit organizations. 1 Why do so many
people choose to give their hard-earned income away? What motivates them to behave in ...
J Potters, M Sefton… - Journal of Public Economics, 2005 - Elsevier
We examine contributions to a public good when some donors do not know the true value of
the good. If donors in such an environment determine the sequence of moves, two
contribution orders may arise as equilibria. Either the uninformed and informed donors ...
J Andreoni, PM Brown… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2002 - Elsevier
We explore three two-person public goods games with similar equilibrium predictions, but
with different rules of the game, different payoff possibilities, and, as we show, different
choices by subjects. Comparisons among games allow inferences of what may or may not ...
J Potters, M Sefton… - Economic Theory, 2007 - Springer
Abstract We report experimental results on the effect of leadership in a voluntary contribution
game. Consistent with recent theories we find that leading-by-example increases
contributions and earnings in an environment where a leader has private information ...
WT Harbaugh, K Krause… - Economics Letters, 2001 - Elsevier
We find that large increases in age do not reduce the endowment effect, supporting the
hypothesis that people have reference-dependent preferences which are not changed by
repeated experience getting and giving up goods.
WT Harbaugh, K Krause… - Trust and reciprocity: …, 2003 - economics.uoregon.edu
Many relations are not covered by complete contracts. Although the involved parties may
prefer a legally binding agreement, it is often too costly to construct a contract which fully
accounts for the possible contingencies of the relationship. Absent of such contracts, ...
Recent research documents that while men are eager to compete, women often shy away
from competitive environments. A consequence is that few women enter and win
competitions. Using experimental methods we examine how affirmative action affects ...
L Muller, M Sefton, R Steinberg… - Journal of Economic …, 2008 - Elsevier
Voluntary contribution experiments systematically find that contributions decline over time.
We use a two-stage voluntary contribution game to investigate whether this decrease is
caused by learning or strategic behavior. Using a strategy method we find a robust pattern ...
M Niederle… - The Journal of Economic …, 2010 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: The mean and standard deviation in performance on math test scores are only
slightly larger for males than for females. Despite minor differences in mean performance,
many more boys than girls perform at the right tail of the distribution. This gender gap has ...
Abstract Competitive high ranking positions are largely occupied by men, and women
remain scarce in engineering and sciences. Explanations for these occupational differences
focus on discrimination and preferences for work hours and field of study. We explore an ...
J Andreoni, WT Harbaugh… - The New Palgrave …, 2007 - altruists.org
Unlike experiments on markets or mechanisms, experiments on altruism are about an
individual motive or intention. This raises serious obstacles for research. How do we define
an altruistic act, and how do we know altruism when we see it?
W Harbaugh, K Krause… - 2003 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: The most distinctive prediction of prospect theory is the fourfold pattern (FFP) of risk
attitudes. People are said to be (1) risk-seeking over low-probability gains,(2) risk-averse
over low-probability losses,(3) risk-averse over high-probability gains, and (4) risk-seeking ...
Abstract Why do fundraisers announce initial contributions to their charity? Potential
explanations are that these announcements cause future donors to increase their
contributions, either because they want to reciprocate the generosity of earlier donors, or ...
C Kumru… - New York Times, 2002 - socionet.org
Abstract Fundraisers often start their campaigns by soliciting the wealthier, more recognized
and respected individuals in a community. We examine whether an explanation for such a
solicitation ordering may be that people prefer to associate with those of higher social ...
L Vesterlund - Wisconsin Ph. D. dissertation, 1997 - Citeseer
Abstract Previous research has shown that more risk averse workers are at a disadvantage
when bargaining over wages. However, it has yet to be determined whether this differential
treatment can be sustained in markets where equally productive workers differ in their ...
J Duffy, J Ochs… - Journal of Public Economics, 2007 - Elsevier
Charitable contributions are frequently made over time. Donors are free to contribute
whenever they wish and as often as they want, and are frequently updated on the level of
contributions by others. A dynamic structure enables donors to condition their contribution ...
S Bose, G Orosel,
M Ottaviani… - The RAND Journal of …, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
We study dynamic pricing by a monopolist selling to buyers who learn from each other's
purchases. The price posted in each period serves to extract rent from the current buyer, as
well as to control the amount of information transmitted to future buyers. As information ...
S Bose, G Orosel,
M Ottaviani… - Economic Theory, 2008 - Springer
Abstract How should a monopolist price when selling to buyers who learn from each other's
decisions? Focusing on the case in which the common value of the good is binary and each
buyer receives a binary private signal about that value, we completely answer this ...
S Bose, G Orosel… - 2002 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We consider a monopolist who sells identical objects of common but unknown
value in a herding-prone environment. Buyers make their purchasing decisions sequentially,
and rely on a private signal as well as previous buyers' actions to infer the common value ...
WT Harbaugh, K Krause… - Journal of economic psychology, 2007 - Elsevier
This paper studies how children learn to bargain. We performed simple anonymous
bargaining experiments with real payoffs with 256 children from age 8 to 18. Average offers
by even the youngest children were close to the amount that maximized their expected ...
WT Harbaugh, K Krause… - The Economic Journal, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
We examine the robustness of the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes under two elicitation
procedures. We find that individuals are, on average, risk-seeking over low-probability gains
and high-probability losses and risk-averse over high-probability gains and low- ...
J Potters, M Sefton… - Journal of Public Economics, 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We examine contributions to a public good when some donors do not know the
true value of the good. If donors in such an environment determine the sequence of moves,
two contribution orders may arise as equilibria. Either the uninformed and informed ...
M Niederle… - Negotiation Journal, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
Negotiating in a highly competitive environment may prove particularly challenging for
women. We describe three experimental studies that investigated and documented differences
in the competitive behaviors of men and women. The first study examined gender ...
[CITATION] How costly is diversity? affirmative action in competitive environments
M Niederle, C Segal… - NBER Working Paper, 2008
CS Kumru… - Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
2. We thank Jennifer Scanlon for providing practical fundraising insights and participants at
seminars at Cornell, Harvard, NYU, OSU, SUNY Albany and Texas A&M for very helpful
comments. We are grateful to the NSF for generous financial support.
[CITATION] What produces fairness? Some experimental evidence
J Andreoni, P Brown… - Games & Economic Behavior, 2002
[CITATION] Fairness, Selfishness and Selfish Fairness: Experiments on Games with Unequal Equilibrium Payoffs
[CITATION] An Experimental Test of the Impure Altruism Model of Giving
L Vesterlund, M Wilhelm… - 2009 - mimeo
Abstract Charities often let the sum of contributions determine the quantity of services to
provide. Some organizations, however, have the option of setting a minimum threshold
necessary for provision of the public good, allowing donors to pledge donations ...
[CITATION] sWhy do People Give? tin Richard Steinberg and Walter W. Powell eds., The Nonprofit Sector
L Vesterlund - 2006 - Yale Press
[CITATION] The Informational Value of Sequential Fund-raising, Department of Economics, Iowa State University
L Vesterlund - 2000 - Working Paper, June
A Bracha, O Heffetz… - 2009 - mason.gmu.edu
Abstract Social status can affect charitable giving both exogenously and endogenously.
Exogenously, individuals may change their giving behavior as a result of being endowed
with status. Endogenously, status-seeking individuals may give to charity to gain status. ...
... Muriel Niederle Stanford University and NBER Lise Vesterlund University of Pittsburgh June
14, 2009 ... Niederle, Muriel, Carmit Segal, and Lise Vesterlund, “How Costly is Diversity? Affirmative
Action in Light of Gender Differences in Competitiveness” May 2009. ...
A Bracha, M Menietti… - Journal of Public Economics, 2011 - Elsevier
The public phase of a capital campaign is typically launched with the announcement of a
large seed donation. Andreoni (1998) argues that such a fundraising strategy may be
particularly effective when funds are being raised for projects that have fixed production ...
[CITATION] 0Which is the Fair Sex? 1
J Andreoni… - Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2001
[CITATION] Provision point mechanisms and over provision of public goods
M Menietti, M Morelli… - 2009 - Working Paper, Department of …
[CITATION] forthcoming.“Which is the fair Sex? Gender Differences in Altruism”
J Andreoni… - Quarterly Journal of Economics
[CITATION] The Endowment Effect in Kids
W Harbaugh, K Krause… - Unpublished working Paper, 1998
[CITATION] The Carrot or the Stick: Rewards
J Andreoni, W Harbaugh… - Punishments, and Cooperation, 2003
[CITATION] Why Do People Give? Walter W. Powell and Richard S. Steinberg
L Vesterlund - The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook, 2006
[CITATION] Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental research
J Andreoni… - preparation for the second edition of the Handbook of …
[CITATION] vDo Women Shy away from Competition
M Niederle… - Do Men, 2007
[CITATION] forthcoming. Why do People Give
L Vesterlund - The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook
Abstract Economic theory on charitable giving distinguishes between the pure and impure
altruism model. The pure altruism model argues that the sole motive for giving is a concern
for securing the charity‟ s output, whereas the impure altruism model allows for the ...
[CITATION] The Effects of Status on Voluntary Contribution
L Vesterlund… - Working Papers, 2005 - University of Pittsburgh, Department …
WT Harbaugh, K Krause… - 2002 - econ2.econ.iastate.edu
Abstract: Experimental and real world evidence show that many aspects of risk-taking
behavior can be explained by assuming that people weight outcomes by a subjective rather
than objective probability. In this paper we explore how these probability weights change ...
The objective of this chapter is to describe and discuss recent experimental research on
voluntary provision of public goods. The chapter builds on Ledyard's highly influential
chapter in the first volume of the handbook (Handbook of Experimental Economics, ed. by ...
WT Harbaugh, K Krause,
L Vesterlund… - The Economic …, 2009 - res.org.uk
We examine the robustness of the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes under two elicitation
procedures. We find that individuals are, on average, risk-seeking over low-probability gains
and high-probability losses and risk-averse over high-probability gains and low- ...
J Ochs,
J Duffy… - Working Papers, 2006 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks.
Giving Little by Little. Jack Ochs, John Duffy () and Lise Vesterlund (). No 232, Working
Papers from University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics. ...
This paper studies dynamic pricing by a monopolist selling to buyers who learn from each
other's purchases. The price posted in each period serves to extract rent from the current
buyer, as well as to control the amount of information transmitted to future buyers. As ...
We examine gender differences in bargaining outcomes in a highly competitive and
commonly used market: the taxi market in Lima, Peru. Examining the entire path of
negotiation we find that men face higher initial prices and rejection rates. These ...
[CITATION] 2004 North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society (2003, Vol. 29, No. 21.)
D Duffie, F Economics, JV Henderson, U Economics…
JB Kessler, S Dellavigna, A Falk,
D Fudenberg… - 2011 - bpub.wharton.upenn.edu
Abstract Can non'binding signals of support for a public good increase contribution? In a
field experiment involving over 24,000 employees in 198 workplace fundraising cam'paigns,
providing pins that allow employees to signal support for a charity before the donation ...
M Castillo, R Petrie, M Torero… - Working Papers, 2011 - repec.ices-gmu.org
Abstract: We examine gender differences in bargaining outcomes in a highly competitive
and commonly used market: the taxi market in Lima, Peru. Examining the entire path of
negotiation we find that men face higher initial prices and rejection rates. These ...
P Chander, JP Conley… - Journal of Public …, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
The objective of the conference on “Leadership, Altruism, and Social Organization” was to
bring researchers together who were interested in exploring the functioning of the nonprofit
sector. The conference and this special issue focus on three themes. First, what causes ...
L Vesterlund, B Harbaugh… - Working Papers, 2005 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract PROSPECT THEORY CHOICE AND PRICING TASKS William Harbaugh University
Oregon and R Kate Krause University New Mexico Lise Vesterlund University Pittsburgh
JEL classification Keywords Probability weighting expected utility prospect theory ...
L Vesterlund… - Econometric Society 2004 North …, 2004 - ideas.repec.org
Despite sustained efforts of equal opportunities for men and women, large gender
differences prevail in competitive high ranking positions. Possible explanations include
discrimination, differences in human capital and preferences, which overall may make ...
J Andreoni, PM Brown… - Working papers, 1997 - ideas.repec.org
In games with unequal equilibrium payoffs, concepts of fairness and selfishness often clash.
We strucrure the approach to fairness versus selfishness as a struggle between two forces that
act aon an individual's behavior. ... To our knowledge, this item is not available for ...
L Vesterlund, L Muller, M Sefton… - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract Strategic Behavior and Learning Repeated Voluntary Contribution Experiments
Laurent Mullera Martin Seftonb Richard Steinbergc and Lise Vesterlundd INRA GAEL
University Grenoble Grenoble Cedex France University Nottingham School Economics ...
W Harbaugh, C Krause… - Staff General Research …, 2001 - ideas.repec.org
We find that large increases in age do not reduce the endowment effect, supporting the
hypothesis that people have reference-dependent preferences which are not changed by
repeated experience getting and giving up goods.
Publikationsansicht. 33728589. Three essays : The effects of risk aversion on job matching;
Sequential versus simultaneous fundraising; The WTA-WRP gap / (1998). Vesterlund, Lise.
Abstract. Thesis(Ph.D.)--University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1997. ...
SG Liday,
L Vesterlund, W Harbaugh… - 2002 - scholarsbank.uoregon.edu
In this paper we study trust/reciprocity behavior in children ages eight to eighteen using an
augmented version of Berg et al. â s (1995) trust game. This study is intended to inspect and
reveal when certain aspects of trust behavior are formed in individuals. In addition, we ...
[CITATION] Gender differences in bargaining outcomes: A field experiment on differential treatment
M Castillo, R Petrie, M Torero…
Shelling (1960) among others have argued that contributions to public goods may be larger
if people spread their contributions and give one small contribution at a time. Examining a
threshold public good environment, Marx and Matthews (2000) show that multiple rounds ...
[CITATION] After You: Endougenous Sequencing in Voluntary Contribution Games
Abstract Monopoly pricing the binary herding model Subir Bose Gerhard Orosel Marco
Ottaviani Lise Vesterlund March Abstract How should monopolist price when selling buyers
who learn from each other decisions This paper provides complete answer this question ...
M Ottaviani, S Bose, G Orosel… - RAND Journal of …, 2006 - works.bepress.com
... Dynamic Monopoly Pricing and Herding. Marco Ottaviani, Northwestern University Subir
Bose Gerhard Orosel, Vienna Lise Vesterlund, Pittsburgh. Abstract. ... Suggested Citation.
Marco Ottaviani, Subir Bose, Gerhard Orosel, and Lise Vesterlund. ...
Create email alert
About Google Scholar - All About Google - My Citations
©2012 Google