PK Goldbe… - 1997 - nber.org
A prominent model in the recent political-economy literature on trade policy is Grossman
and Helpman's (1994) Protection for Sale'model. This model yields clear predictions for the
cross-sectional structure of trade protection. The objective of our" paper is to check ...
G Maggi - American Economic Review, 1999 - JSTOR
The World Trade Organization (WTO) lacks the power to directly enforce agreements. It is
therefore important to understand what role the WTO can play to facilitate international
cooperation, and whether a multilateral institution can offer distinct advantages over a web ...
A Ichino… - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2000 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract The prevalence of shirking within a large Italian bank appears to be characterized
by significant regional differentials. In particular, absenteeism and misconduct episodes are
substantially more prevalent in the south. We consider a number of potential explanations ...
G Maggi… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1995 - Elsevier
This paper extends and unifies previous work on optimal contracts under countervailing
incentives, shedding light in particular on the relation between countervailing incentives and
pooling (" inflexible rules"). Our main result is that the nature of the optimal contract ...
G Maggi… - Journal of Political Economy, 1998 - JSTOR
An argument often heard in favor of trade agreements is that, by committing to free trade, a
government can credibly distance itself from domestic lobbies, But several existing models
of endogenous protection suggest that governments have no interest in foreclosing ...
G Maggi - The American Economic Review, 1996 - JSTOR
This paper develops a model of capacity-price competition in which the equilibrium outcome
ranges from the Bertrand to the Cournot outcome as capacity constraints become more
important. This model is employed to reexamine aspects of strategic-trade-policy theory ...
P Battigalli… - The American Economic Review, 2002 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: In this paper we model contract incompleteness" from the ground up," as arising
endogenously from the costs of describing the environment and the parties' behavior.
Optimal contracts may exhibit two forms of incompleteness: discretion, meaning that the ...
GM Grossman… - 1998 - nber.org
We develop a competitive model of trade between countries with similar aggregate factor
endowments. The trade pattern reflects differences in the distribution of talent across the
labor forces of the two countries. The country with a relatively homogenous population ...
G Maggi… - 2005 - nber.org
This paper presents a theory of trade agreements where" politics" play an central role. This
stands in contrast with the standard theory, where even politically-motivated governments
sign trade agreements only to deal with terms-of-trade externalities. We develop a model ...
G Maggi - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1996 - JSTOR
In this article I analyze strategic investment under uncertainty in a new market, where firms
face a tradeoff between commitment and flexibility. The model predicts asymmetric equilibria
under fairly general conditions, even though firms are ex ante identical and have ...
G Maggi… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1995 - JSTOR
Anecdotal evidence suggests that agents often spend resources distorting information
transmitted to principals. We present a model where costly information distortion emerges as
equilibrium behavior. The information structure we focus on is intermediate between (and ...
G Maggi… - 2003 - nber.org
Some international organizations are governed by unanimity rule, some others by a majority
system. Still others have moved from one system to the other over time. The existing voting
models, which generally assume that decisions made by voting are perfectly enforceable, ...
G Maggi… - Journal of International Economics, 2000 - Elsevier
In this paper we reconsider a key empirical prediction generated by an important class of
political-economy models of trade policy, namely that trade protection should be higher in
sectors characterized by lower import penetration (we call this the 'standard'prediction). ...
H Horn, G Maggi… - 2006 - nber.org
We propose a model of trade agreements in which contracting is costly, and as a
consequence the optimal agreement may be incomplete. In spite of its simplicity, the model
yields rich predictions on the structure of the optimal trade agreement and how this ...
G Maggi - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1999 - JSTOR
The idea that commitment is valuable plays a key role in many economic models. However,
Bagwell (1995) has shown that commitment may have no value if there is (even a slight)
noise in the observation of the leader's action, thus casting doubt on the notion that ...
GM Grossman… - 1997 - nber.org
We investigate whether a welfare-maximizing government ought to pursue a program of"
strategic trade intervention or instead commit itself to free trade when domestic firms will
have an opportunity to manipulate the government's choice of the level of" intervention. ...
G Maggi - International Economic Review, 1999 - Wiley Online Library
2. Abstract This paper examines equilibrium trade policies when firms have better
information than governments about the profitability of the industry. Contrary to the intuition
that the policymakers' lack of information should reduce their incentives to engage in ...
G Maggi… - 2008 - nber.org
Formal economic analysis of trade agreements typically treats disputes as synonymous with
concerns about enforcement. But in reality, most WTO disputes involve disagreements of
interpretation concerning the agreement, or instances where the agreement is simply ...
P Battigalli… - 2003 - nber.org
We propose a theory of international agreements on product standards. The key feature of
the model is that agreements are viewed as incomplete contracts. In particular, these do not
specify standards for products that may arise in the future. One potential remedy to ...
P Battigalli… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
We examine a model of contracting where parties interact repeatedly and can contract at
any point in time, but writing formal contracts is costly. A contract can describe the external
environment and the parties' behavior in a more or less detailed way, and the cost of ...
P Battigalli… - NYU Working Paper No. EC-04-33, 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We examine a model of contracting where parties interact repeatedly and can
contractat any point in time, but writing enforceable contracts is costly. A contract can
describe contingencies and actions at a more or less detailed level, and the cost of writing ...
P Battigalli… - European University Institute, mimeo, 2000 - didattica.unibocconi.it
Abstract In this paper we model imperfect contracting'from the ground up,'as arising
endogenously from the costs of writing contracts. We model these costs by making explicit
the language used to describe the environment and the parties' behavior. The optimal ...
G Maggi… - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2011 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract Although disputes are typically treated as synonymous with concerns about
enforcement in economic models of trade agreements, in reality most WTO disputes seem to
concern the interpretation of vague provisions, or instances where the agreement is silent. ...
G Maggi… - 2009 - nber.org
We provide a simple but novel model of trade agreements that highlights the role of
transaction costs, renegotiation and dispute settlement. The model allows us to characterize
the appropriate remedy for breach and whether the agreement should be structured as a ...
[CITATION] Strategic trade policies with uncertainty about the mode of inter-firm competition
G Maggi - 1993 - Center for Economic Policy …
P Battigalli… - 2003 - cepr.org
Abstract In this paper we examine a model of contracting where parties interact repeatedly
and can contract at any point in time, but writing enforceable contracts is costly. We argue
that the costs of writing contracts can provide a theoretical explanation for two common ...
H Horn, G Maggi… - 2006 - 128.36.236.74
The World Trade Organization (WTO) regulation of trade in goods—the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—is a highly incomplete contract. 1 It directly binds only trade
policies, leaving significant discretion over domestic policy instruments with trade impact ...
G Maggi - Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 1993 - Springer
Abstract We propose a model of the international technology gap that focuses on two
sources of self-reinforcing mechanisms in the industrial competition:(i) a positive feedback
that runs from innovations to profits to R & D expenditures, and (ii) learning effects in R & ...
[CITATION] 0The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation. 1 American Economic Review
G Maggi - March, 1999
[CITATION] Trade and Diversity
G Grossman… - American Economic Review, 2000
G Maggi… - 2005 - emlab.berkeley.edu
Abstract Virtually all the existing models of trade agreements determine only the amount of
net trade protection in a given sector, not the levels of import tariffs and export subsidies. In
this paper we argue that it is important to understand how the levels of these policy ...
G Maggi - The Review of Economic Studies, 1998 - JSTOR
In this note I point out what I think is a central flaw in Brainard and Martimort's (1996)
analysis of strategic trade policies under asymmetric information. I will concentrate on their
analysis of the unilateral-intervention game. The flaw I will point out carries over to the ...
G Maggi… - Yale University, 2010 - europealumni.kellogg.northwestern. …
Abstract In this paper we forge a link between the theory of trade agreements and the law $
and $ economics theory of optimal remedies for breach. We study the design of legal
remedies for breach in trade agreements through a simple but novel model that highlights ...
[CITATION] Clare. 1998.“The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressures.”
G Maggi… - Journal of Political Economy
[CITATION] 1999+ Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation+
P Goldberg… - American Economic Review
[CITATION] The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation',(1999)
G Maggi - Am. Econ. Rev.
H Horn, G Maggi… - Unpublished manuscript. IIES, …, 2006 - enteluigieinaudi.it
Abstract We propose a model of trade agreements in which contracting is costly, and as a
consequence the optimal agreement may be incomplete. In spite of its simplicity, the model
yields rich predictions on the structure of the optimal trade agreement and how this ...
[CITATION] A Political-Economy Theory of Trade Agreements (October 2005)
G Maggi… - NBER Working Paper
[CITATION] kTrade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts, lAmerican Economic Review
H Horn, G Maggi… - 2010 - March
[CITATION] 0SelfMenforcing Voting in International Organizations1
G Maggi… - NBER working paper, 2003
G Maggi… - 2011 - igier.unibocconi.it
Abstract We study the optimal design of trade agreements in a setting where governments
can renegotiate the agreement ex $ post subject to a key transaction cost, namely that
compensation between governments is ineffi cient. The optimum may be a nproperty $ ...
[CITATION] International Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts
H Horn, G Maggi… - Princeton University manuscript, September, 2006
[CITATION] Clare. 2007
G Maggi… - VA Political% Economy Theory of Trade Agreements. V …
[CITATION] rProtection for Sale: An Em& pirical Investigation, sAmerican Economic Review
PK Goldberg… - 1999 - LXXXIX
[CITATION] lRigidity, discretion and the costs of writing contracts, mThe American Economic Review, vol. 92 (4)
P Battigalli… - $817, 2002
[CITATION] forthcoming.“The Role of Dispute Settlement Procedures in International Trade Agreements.”
G Maggi… - Quarterly Journal of Economics
[CITATION] Rodriguez% Clare, A., forthcoming. A political% economy theory of trade agreements
G Maggi - American Economic Review
A Ichino… - 1999 - dse.unibo.it
Abstract The prevalence of shirking within a large Italian bank appears to be characterized
by significant regional differentials. In particular, absenteeism and misconduct episodes are
substantially more prevalent in the south. We consider a number of potential explanations ...
G Maggi… - Papers, 1997 - ideas.repec.org
We investigate whether a welfare-maximising government ought to pursue a program of
strategic trade intervention or instead commit itself to free trade when, in the former case,
domestic firms will have an opportunity to manipulate the government's choice of the level ...
G Maggi - 1994 - en.scientificcommons.org
Publikationsansicht. 30995913. Essays on trade policy and international institutions under
incomplete information / (1994). Maggi, Giovanni. Abstract. Thesis (Ph. D.)--Stanford University,
1994.. Submitted to the Department of Economics.. Copyright by the author. ...
[CITATION] Work environment and individual background
A Ichino… - 1999
H Horn, G Maggi… - 2007 - cepr.org
We propose a model of trade agreements in which contracting is costly, and as a
consequence the optimal agreement may be incomplete. In spite of its simplicity, the model
yields rich predictions on the structure of the optimal trade agreement and how this ...
[CITATION] Views of the Roman Basilicae
G Maggi
R Baldwin, Y Sugita, N Jinji, Y Taba… - … Carlos (University of …, 2003 - econ.hit-u.ac.jp
... Tariff Reforms". April, 2006 - March, 2007. March 22, 2007 Giovanni Maggi (Princeton
University) "Trade agreements as endogenously incomplete contracts"; February
28, 2007 COE/RES One-Day Trade Workshop; January 23 ...
G Maggi - economics.stanford.edu
Abstract We provide a simple but novel model of trade agreements that highlights the role of
transaction costs, renegotiation and dispute settlement. The model allows us to charac terize
the appropriate remedy for breach and whether the agreement should be structured as a ...
G Maggi… - 2009 - cepr.org
We provide a simple but novel model of trade agreements that highlights the role of
transaction costs, renegotiation and dispute settlement. The model allows us to characterize
the appropriate remedy for breach and whether the agreement should be structured as a ...
G Grossman… - 1998 - cepr.org
We investigate whether a welfare-maximizing government ought to pursue a programme of
strategic trade intervention or instead commit itself to free trade when, in the former case,
domestic firms will have an opportunity to manipulate the government's choice of the level ...
G Maggi… - 2005 - cepr.org
We develop a model where trade agreements-in addition to correcting terms-of-trade
externalities-help governments to commit vis-a-vis domestic industrial lobbies. We explore
how trade liberalization is affected by the characteristics of the political environment, such ...
G Grossman… - 1998 - cepr.org
We develop a competitive model of trade between countries with similar aggregate factor
endowments. The trade pattern reflects differences in the distribution of talent across the
labour forces of the two countries. The country with a relatively homogeneous population ...
[CITATION] 2 FREE TRADE VS. STRATEGIC
GMGG Maggi - Global competition and integration, 1999 - Kluwer Academic Pub
A Ichino… - 2000 - cepr.org
The prevalence of shirking within a large Italian bank appears to be characterized by
significant regional differentials. In particular, absenteeism and misconduct episodes are
substantially more prevalent in the south. We consider a number of potential explanations ...
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