RO Cavalcanti, A Erosa… - Journal of Political Economy, 1999 - JSTOR
In this paper, we develop a model of money and reserve-holding banks. We allow for private
liabilities to circulate as media of exchange in a random-matching framework. Some
individuals, which we identify as banks, are endowed with a technology to issue private ...
D Corbae, T Temzelides… - Econometrica, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
We develop a model of monetary exchange where, as in the random matching literature,
agents trade bilaterally and not through centralized markets. Rather than assuming they
match exogenously and at random, however, we determine who meets whom as part of ...
T Temzelides… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2001 - Elsevier
The first setup we study is a deterministic model with spatial separation where we consider
alternative payments systems institutions and their implications for allocation and welfare. A
payments system with period-by-period settlement in outside money improves on ...
D Corbae, T Temzelides… - The American Economic Review, 2002 - JSTOR
In Corbae, Temzelides, and Wright (2001)(hereafter, CTW) we proposed a new version of
the framework that uses bilateral matching to model the exchange process, and in particular
to model the use of money as a medium of exchange. Our version does not have agents ...
T Koeppl, C Monnet… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2008 - Elsevier
We investigate the role of settlement in a dynamic model of a payment system where the
ability of participants to perform certain welfare-improving transactions is subject to random
and unobservable shocks. In the absence of settlement, the full information first-best ...
T Temzelides - Review of Economic Dynamics, 1998 - Elsevier
Within the framework of a Diamond–Dybvig model [J. Polit. Econ. 91 (1983), 401–419], but
with explicitly modelling the autarky choice during the planning period, we demonstrate that
a mixed strategy bank run equilibrium that does not rely on sunspots may coexist with the ...
T Temzelides - Business Review-Federal Reserve Bank of …, 1997 - phil.frb.org
Banks are a vital part of the economy because they provide an important channel through
which many businesses get their financing. However, as we know from the history of the
United States and other countries, banks can be subject to runs and panics. A panic that ...
S Shi… - International Economic Review, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
We analyze bureaucracy and corruption in a market with decentralized exchange and
“lemons.” Exchange is modeled as a sequence of bilateral, random matches. Agents have
private information about the quality of goods they produce and can supplement trade with ...
A Blume… - Economic Theory, 2003 - Springer
Summary. We study an evolutionary model in which heterogenous boundedly rational
agents interact locally in order to play a coordination game. Agents differ in their mobility
with mobile agents being able to relocate within a country. We find that mobile agents ...
DO Cavalcanti, A Erosa… - International Economic …, 2005 - Wiley Online Library
De O. Cavalcanti, R., Erosa, A. and Temzelides, T.(2005), LIQUIDITY, MONEY CREATION
AND DESTRUCTION, AND THE RETURNS TO BANKING. International Economic Review,
46: 675–706. doi: 10.1111/j. 1468-2354.2005. 00341. x
T Temzelides… - Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on …, 2001 - Elsevier
We construct a random matching model to study the effects of clearing arrangements for
private money on the prices at which private monies trade, the volume of exchange, and
welfare. In a model with full information, clearing arrangements eliminate discounts on ...
T Temzelides… - International Economic Review, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
We introduce lack-of-recall of past transactions as an alternative assumption to anonymity in
a model where trade is centralized. In environments where there is an intertemporal lack-of-
double-coincidence of wants problem and lack-of-commitment, lack-of-recall can give rise ...
Y Jin… - Review of Economic Dynamics, 2004 - Elsevier
We study the coexistence of monetary and credit transactions in a model where exchange is
decentralized. Agents belong to different locations which are informationally separated. The
equilibrium mix of monetary and credit transactions is characterized as a function of the ...
D Corbae, T Temzelides… - Univeristy of Pennsylvania, …, 2001 - gs.cornell.edu
Abstract We present a new framework for studying monetary economics. As in the random
matching literature, agents trade bilaterally, and not through centralized markets. However,
our approach is fundamentally different in the following sense: rather than assuming ...
H Lomeli… - Economic Theory, 2002 - Springer
Summary. Under take-it-or-leave-it offers, dynamic equilibria in the discrete time random
matching model of money are a “translation” of dynamic equilibria in the standard
overlapping generations model. This formalizes earlier conjectures about the equivalence ...
T Koeppl, C Monnet… - 2005 Meeting Papers, 2005 - repec.org
Abstract We use mechanism design to study the framework through which transactions
among financial institutions take place. We find that the existence of an equilibrium in which
banks transact with each other through a payment system requires certain caps on banks' ...
M Hoerova, C Monnet, T Temzelides… - 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract We study credible information transmission by a benevolent short% lived central
bank. We consider two possibilities: direct revelation through an announcement, ver% sus
indirect transmission through monetary policy. These two ways of transmitting information ...
T Temzelides - 2002 - Citeseer
Abstract In environments with an intertemporal lack-of-double-coincidence of wants
problem, lack of commitment and lack-of-recall of past trades are sufficient
formoneytobeessential. Throughanindividualrationalityconstraint, these ...
T Koeppl, C Monnet… - Journal of Financial Economics, 2011 - Elsevier
Clearinghouses support financial trades by keeping records of transactions and by providing
liquidity through short-term credit that participants clear periodically. We study efficient
clearing arrangements for exchanges, where traders must clear with a clearinghouse, and ...
J Duffy, A Matros… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2011 - econ.pitt.edu
Abstract We explore whether competitive outcomes arise in an experimental implementation
of a market game, introduced by Shubik (1972). Market games obtain Pareto inferior (strict)
Nash equilibria, in which some markets are closed. We find that subjects do not ...
[CITATION] Money and matching
D Corbae, T Temzelides… - 2000 - Manuscript
JA Birchenall, T Guo, W Hawkins, M Kapicka… - 2010 - econ.ucsb.edu
Abstract This paper studies a general equilibrium island model of mismatch and examines
the stationary properties of the equilibrium. Aggregate demand is uncertain and market
participants cannot instantaneously adjust to changes in demand. Changes in ...
Y Jin, T Temzelides - 1998 - 129.3.20.41
Abstract We study the emergence and coexistence of monetary and credit transactions in a
model where exchange is decentralized. Agents belong to different villages which are
informationally separated. The frequency of meetings between any two different villages ...
A Matros… - Manuscript. University of Pittsburgh, 2004 - econ.pitt.edu
Abstract We revisit the question of price formation in general equilibrium theory. We explore
whether evolutionary forces lead to Walrasian equilibrium in the context of a market game,
introduced by Shubik (1972). Market games have Pareto inferior (strict) Nash equilibria, in ...
S Shi… - Working Papers, 2003 - clevelandfed.org
Abstract We analyze bureaucracy and corruption in a market with decentralized exchange
and “lemons.” Exchange is modelled as a sequence of bilateral, random matches. Agents
have private information about the quality of goods they produce and can supplement ...
M Hoerova, C Monnet… - 2008 - bis.org
Abstract We study credible information transmission by a benevolent Central Bank. We
consider two possibilities: direct revelation through an announcement, versus indirect
information transmission through monetary policy. These two ways of transmitting ...
A Matros,
J Duffy… - Working Papers, 2006 - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of
further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site ...
T Temzelides - 1998 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Within the framework of Diamond-Dybvig (1983), the optimal (run free) outcome is
shown to be the unique forward induction equilibrium. In a version of the model that posits
Bertrand competition among banks, there are sequential equilibria that imply positive ...
T Temzelides… - 1999 - Citeseer
Abstract We study two dynamic models of payments systems. The first is a deterministic
model with spatial separation where we consider alternative payments systems institutions
and their implications for allocation and welfare. A payments system with period-by-period ...
[CITATION] Evolution and Competitive Behavior in Market Games
A Matros… - 2007
T Koeppl, C Monnet… - 2008 - econwebb.tamu.edu
Abstract Payment and settlement systems support financial transactions through credit, keep
records of transactions by adjusting credit balances and require such balances to be
periodically reset through settlement. We study the efficient design of financial trades ...
TP Temzelides - 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Page 1. ENDOGENOUS DYNAMIC MATCHING AND FASHION∗ Ted Temzelides University
of Pittsburgh Pittsburgh, PA 15260 tedt@pitt.edu April 3, 2006 Abstract We study bilateral
matching under private information about agents' characteristics. ...
T Ted, DW Stephen - ukpmc.ac.uk
We study two dynamic models of payments systems. The... rst is a deterministicmodel with
spatial separation where we consider alternative paymentssystems institutions and their
implications for allocation and welfare. A paymentssystem with period-by-period ...
B Adão… - 1997 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Within the framework of a Diamond-Dybvig model, but with agents being able to
choose autarky in the planning period, the optimal (run free) outcome is shown to be the
unique pure strategy equilibrium consistent with a forward induction property. In a version ...
A Blume,
J Duffy… - Journal of Economic Dynamics and …, 2010 - Elsevier
We investigate conditions under which self-organized criticality (SOC) arises in a version of
a dynamic entry game. In the simplest version of the game, there is a single location—a pool—
and one agent is exogenously dropped into the pool every period. Payoffs to entrants are ...
T Koeppl, C Monnet… - Working Papers, 2007 - qed.econ.queensu.ca
Abstract We use mechanism design to study efficient intertemporal payment arrangements
when the ability of agents to perform certain welfare-improving transactions is subject to
random and unobservable shocks. Efficiency is achieved via a payment system that ...
T Temzelides - Review of Economic Dynamics, 2009 - Elsevier
We study bilateral matching under private information about agents' characteristics.
Assortative matching is the only equilibrium outcome in the absence of private information.
When an information friction is present, the matching process can be improved if a payoff- ...
S Fang, AM Jaffe… - 2012 - owlnet.rice.edu
Abstract We analyze the likelihood of different coalitions emerging in energy markets in light
of two new transformational events: the Arab Awakening and the rise of shale gas in the
United States. Our analysis considers both economic and political payouts resulting from ...
T Temzelides - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2010 - Elsevier
Motivated by time-series experimental designs, we develop a model of the act of
measurement in the social sciences. Meaningful measurements are represented by
operators that obey a non-commutative algebra. Thus, the order in which information is ...
T Koeppl, C Monnet… - 2008 - uryerson.org
Abstract Payment systems support transactions through credit, keep records of transactions
by adjusting credit balances, and require such balances to be periodically reset through
settlement. We study the efficient design of payment systems when the system can monitor ...
T Temzelides… - Macroeconomics, 2001 - ideas.repec.org
In environments with no commitment and with a need for intertemporal trade, bounded recall
is shown to be a sufficient friction for a receipt system (fiat money) to lead to improved
allocations in an otherwise frictionless Walrasian model. The absence of other frictions ...
P Hartley, KB Medlock III, T Temzelides… - 2011 - econweb.tamu.edu
Abstract We study the optimal transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy in a
neoclassical growth economy with endogenous technological progress in energy
production. Technological innovations maintain a fairly constant cost of fossil fuel energy ...
T Temzelides - 1998 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: I study equilibrium selection by an evolutionary process in an environment with
multiple equilibria, one of which involves a banking panic. The analysis is built on a
repeated version of the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model. The optimal (run free) equilibrium ...
T Temzelides - … Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, 2000 - ideas.repec.org
We study a model in which heterogenous boundedly rational agents interact locally in order
to play a coordination game. Agents differ in their mobility with mobile agents being able to
relocate within a country. The model yields the following predictions:(1) mobile agents ...
T Temzelides, R Wright… - American economic review, 2002 - dialnet.unirioja.es
... Matching and Money. Autores: Ted Temzelides, Randall Wright, Dean Corbae;
Localización: American economic review, ISSN 0002-8282, Vol. 92, Nº 2, 2002 ,
págs. 67-71. Fundación Dialnet. Acceso de usuarios registrados. ...
J Yu… - International economic review, 2004 - dialnet.unirioja.es
... LACK-OF-RECALL AND CENTRALIZED MONETARY TRADE. Autores: Jialin Yu, Ted
Temzelides; Localización: International economic review , ISSN 0020-6598, Nº. 4, 2004 ,
págs. 1221-1227. Fundación Dialnet. Acceso de usuarios registrados. ...
T Temzelides, R Wright… - Econométrica, 2003 - dialnet.unirioja.es
... DIRECTED MATCHING AND MONETARY EXCHANGE. Autores: Ted Temzelides, Randall
Wright, Dean Corbae; Localización: Econométrica, ISSN 0012-9682, Vol. 71, Nº 3, 2003 ,
págs. 731-756. Fundación Dialnet. Acceso de usuarios registrados. ...
A Erosa, T Temzelides… - International economic …, 2005 - dialnet.unirioja.es
... LIQUIDITY, MONEY CREATION AND DESTRUCTION, AND THE RETURNS TO BANKING.
Autores: Andrés Erosa, Ted Temzelides, Ricardo de O. Cavalcanti; Localización: International
economic review , ISSN 0020-6598, Nº. 2, 2005 , págs. 675-706. Fundación Dialnet. ...
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