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Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade: The Maghribi traders' coalition

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A Greif - The American economic review, 1993 - JSTOR
This paper presents an economic institution which enabled 11th-century traders to benefit
from employing overseas agents despite the commitment problem inherent in these
relations. Agency relations were governed by a coalition--an economic institution in which ...
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Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: A historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies

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A Greif - Journal of political economy, 1994 - JSTOR
Lacking an appropriate theoretical framework, economists and economic historians have
paid little attention to the relations between culture and institutional structure. This limits the
ability to address a question that seems to be at the heart of developmental failures: Why ...
Cited by 1534 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - BL Direct - All 24 versions

[BOOK] Institutions and the path to the modern economy: Lessons from medieval trade

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A Greif - 2006 - books.google.com
It is widely believed that current disparities in economic, political, and social outcomes reflect
distinct institutions. Institutions are invoked to explain why some countries are rich and
others poor, some democratic and others dictatorial. But arguments of this sort gloss over ...
Cited by 1088 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - BL Direct - All 14 versions

Reputation and coalitions in medieval trade: evidence on the Maghribi traders

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A Greif - Journal of economic history, 1989 - Cambridge Univ Press
This article examines the economic institution utilized during the eleventh century to facilitate
complex trade characterized by asymmetric information and limited legal contract
enforceability. The geniza documents are employed to present the" coalition," an ...
Cited by 881 - Related articles - All 25 versions

Coordination, commitment, and enforcement: The case of the merchant guild

A Greif, P Milgrom… - Journal of political economy, 1994 - JSTOR
We interpret historical evidence in light of a repeated-game model to conclude that merchant
guilds emerged during the late medieval period to allow rulers of trade centers to commit to
the security of alien merchants. The merchant guild developed the theoretically required ...
Cited by 865 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - BL Direct - All 7 versions

A theory of endogenous institutional change

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A Greif… - American Political Science Review, 2004 - Cambridge Univ Press
Abstract This paper asks (a) why and how institutions change,(b) how an institution persists
in a changing environment, and (c) how processes that it unleashes lead to its own demise.
The paper shows that the game-theoretic notion of self-enforcing equilibrium and the ...
Cited by 362 - Related articles - All 12 versions

Historical and comparative institutional analysis

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A Greif - The American Economic Review, 1998 - JSTOR
Among the most fundamental questions of institutional economics are: Why do societies
evolve along distinct institutional trajectories? Why do societies often fail to adopt the
institutional structure of more successful ones? How may we examine the interrelations ...
Cited by 223 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 12 versions

Commitment, coercion, and markets: The nature and dynamics of institutions supporting exchange

[PDF] from usc.edu
A Greif - Handbook of new institutional economics, 2005 - Springer
Markets rest upon institutions. The development of market-based exchange relies on the
support of two institutional pillars that are, in turn, shaped by the development of markets.
Research in the field of new institutional economics has largely focused upon one such ...
Cited by 174 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 33 versions

Organizing violence

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R Bates, A Greif… - Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2002 - jcr.sagepub.com
Abstract In stateless societies, coercion is privately provided; violence is employed to
engage in, and to defend against, predation. At best, violence results in mere redistribution;
being destructive, it more often results in a loss of social welfare. When organized, ...
Cited by 157 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 12 versions

The fundamental problem of exchange: A research agenda in Historical Institutional Analysis

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A Greif - European Review of Economic History, 2000 - Cambridge Univ Press
Abstract For individuals to enter mutually beneficial exchange relationships they have to
recognise them as such and they have to be able to commit to fulfil their contractual
obligations. The ways in which a society's institutions mitigate this fundamental problem of ...
Cited by 154 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 12 versions

Self-enforcing political system and economic growth: Late medieval Genoa

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A Greif - 97-037, 1997 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper presents a micro-level historical and theoretical analysis of Genoa's
economic and political history during the twelfth and thirteenth century by examining the
factors influencing the extent to which its political system was self-enforcing and their ...
Cited by 153 - Related articles - All 11 versions

Institutions and international trade: lessons from the commercial revolution

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A Greif - The American Economic Review, 1992 - JSTOR
International trade theory distances itself from an examination of the institutions that govern
trade. To it, trade is determined by endowments, technology, preferences, and the nature of
the competition in international markets. Historical institutional analysis indicates, however ...
Cited by 140 - Related articles - All 12 versions

Contracting, enforcement and efficiency: Economics beyond the law

A Greif - in Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference …, 1997 - Citeseer
Abstract author. They do not necessarily represent Neoclassical economics maintains that a
legal system is required to foster anonymous exchange and hence efficiency. In contrast,
social scientists from other disciplines emphasize the importance of informal contract ...
Cited by 124 - Related articles - Cached - All 2 versions

On the political foundations of the late medieval commercial revolution: Genoa during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries

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A Greif - The Journal of Economic History, 1994 - Cambridge Univ Press
Abstract Although the late medieval Commercial Revolution is considered to be a watershed
in the economic history of Europe, the analysis of the interrelationship between political and
economic systems in bringing about this period of economic growth has been neglected. ...
Cited by 111 - Related articles - All 10 versions

Micro theory and recent developments in the study of economic institutions through economic history

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A Greif - 1997 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper discusses the three approaches within economic history that utilizes
micro-economic theory to examine institutions, their nature, change, and efficiency: the Neo-
classical Economics approach, the New Institutional Economic History approach, and ...
Cited by 107 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 16 versions

Institutions and impersonal exchange: from communal to individual responsibility

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A Greif - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics ( …, 2002 - JSTOR
This paper utilizes historical evidence and game theory to examine institutions that fostered
intercommunity impersonal exchange during the late medieval period. It presents the
community responsibility system that functioned throughout Europe and supported ...
Cited by 99 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - BL Direct - All 15 versions

[BOOK] Contract enforcement institutions: historical perspective and current status in Russia

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A Greif, E Kandel, Stanford University. School of Law… - 1993 - pdf.usaid.gov
Recently a Russian plant manager signed a multi-million-dollar contract with a Western
company to supply equipment for his plant. Several days later the company officials found
out to their astonishment that an identical contract had been signed with their competitor. ...
Cited by 92 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 3 versions

The analytical narrative project

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RH Bates, A Greif, M Levi, JL Rosenthal… - The American Political …, 2000 - JSTOR
In Analytic Narratives, we attempt to address several issues. First, many of us are engaged
in in-depth case studies, but we also seek to contribute to, and to make use of, theory. How
might we best proceed? Second, the historian, the anthropologist, and the area specialist ...
Cited by 89 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 10 versions

[BOOK] Institutions: Theory and history

A Greif - 2003 - stanford.edu
Page 1. Institutions: Theory and History Comparative and Historical Institutional Analysis Avner
Greif Stanford University March 05 version. Forthcoming Cambridge University Press. Page 2.
Contents Preface Part I Preliminaries 1 Introduction 2 Institutions and Transactions ...
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On the interrelations and economic implications of economic, social, political and normative factors: reflections from two late medieval societies

A Greif - in The Frontiers of the New Institutional Economics, 1997 - Citeseer
Abstract This paper utilizes transaction cost economics, game theory, and insights from
sociology and psychology to conduct a comparative historical study of the institutional
structure of two late Medieval societies, one from the Muslim world and one from the Latin ...
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Impersonal exchange without impartial law: the community responsibility system

A Greif - Chi. J. Int'l L., 2004 - HeinOnline
ABSTRACT Impartial legal enforcement provided by the state is considered necessary for
impersonal exchange,'implying that the scope of enforcement determines the extent of the
market and hence the division of labor and related efficiency gains. Yet, the development ...
Cited by 54 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 4 versions

Cliometrics after 40 years

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A Greif - The American Economic Review, 1997 - JSTOR
Cliometrics emerged 40 years ago to combine economic theory and quantitative analysis for
the advancement of history and economics. As an intellectual movement, it aspired to
enhance the study of past economies by subjecting them to the rigor of economic theory ...
Cited by 40 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 9 versions

Family structure, institutions, and growth: the origins and implications of western corporations

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A Greif - The American economic review, 2006 - JSTOR
There is a vast amount of literature that considers the importance of the family as an
institution. Little attention, however, has been given to the impact of the family structure and
its dynamics on institutions. This limits our ability to understand distinct institutional ...
Cited by 39 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 27 versions

Economic history and game theory

[PDF] from cenet.org.cn
A Greif - Handbook of game theory with economic applications, 2002 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper surveys the small, yet growing, literature that uses game theory for
economic history analysis. It elaborates on the promise and challenge of applying game
theory to economic history and presents the approaches taken in conducting such an ...
Cited by 37 - Related articles - All 19 versions

The study of organizations and evolving organizational forms through history: Reflections from the late medieval family firm

Full text - MIT Libraries
A Greif - Industrial and corporate change, 1996 - Oxford Univ Press
Abstract Despite the diversity of economic environments and organizations utilized
throughout history, historical studies of organizations and organizational innovations, by and
large, have concentrated on the very recent past. Arguably, this reflects the perception that ...
Cited by 31 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 9 versions

[CITATION] Historical institutional analysis

A Greif - 2002 - Cambridge University Press, …
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Political organizations, social structure, and institutional success: reflections from Genoa and Venice during the commercial revolution

A Greif - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics ( …, 1995 - JSTOR
It has been argued that"[w] estern wealth began with the growth of European trade and
commerce which started in the twelfth century in Italy..."(Rosenberg and Birdzell [1986, 35]).
Many factors made this beginning possible, not the least of which was the decline of the ...
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Impersonal Exchange and the Origin of Markets: From the Community Re& sponsibility System to Individual Legal Responsibility in Pre&modern Europe

A Greif - Communities and markets in economic development, 2001 - books.google.com
Communities and markets are considered by economists as alternative modes of governing
transactions. In contrast, this paper calls attention to the importance of considering them as
complements. In economic development and economic history, the view that communities ...
Cited by 25 - Related articles - All 2 versions

[BOOK] Contract Enforcement and Institutions among the Maghribi Traders: Refuting Edwards and Ogilvie

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A Greif, Universität München… - 2008 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Edwards and Ogilvie (2008) dispute the empirical basis for the view (Greif, eg,
1989, 1994, 2006) that multilateral reputation mechanism mitigated agency problems
among the eleventh century Maghribi traders. They assert that the relations among ...
Cited by 24 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 31 versions

[CITATION] The Merchant Gild as a Nexus of Contracts

A Greif, PR Milgrom, BR Weingast… - 1990 - John M. Olin Program in Law and …
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[CITATION] Genoa and the Maghribi traders: Historical and comparative institutional analysis

A Greif - Book manuscript, 1998
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[BOOK] Cultural and institutional bifurcation: China and Europe compared

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A Greif, G Tabellini… - 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: How to sustain cooperation is a key challenge for any society. Different social
organizations have evolved in the course of history to cope with this challenge by relying on
different combinations of external (formal and informal) enforcement institutions and ...
Cited by 21 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 18 versions

On the social foundations and historical development of institutions that facilitate impersonal exchange: From the community responsibility system to individual legal …

[PDF] from hse.ru
A Greif - 1998 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Existing works on the economic implications of social structures examined the
effect of intra-community information and contract enforcement institutions on personal
exchange among that community's members. In contrast, this paper examines the extent ...
Cited by 21 - Related articles - All 16 versions

The organization of long-distance trade: Reputation and coalitions in the Geniza documents and Genoa during the eleventh and twelfth centuries

A Greif - Journal of Economic History, 1991 - JSTOR
The subject of my dissertation is medieval trade organization. The basic question addressed
concerns the emergence, operation, and evolution of nonmarket economic institutions that
enabled merchants to increase trade efficiency by operating through overseas agents.' ...
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Institutions and impersonal exchange: The European experience

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A Greif - Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. …, 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper presents an institution-the Community Responsibility System (CRS)-
which has been a missing link in our understanding of market development. The CRS
fostered market expansion throughout pre-modern Europe by providing the contract ...
Cited by 17 - Related articles - All 12 versions

[CITATION] Cultural Beliefs as a Common Resource in an Integrating World

A Greif - Dasgupta, P., Mäler, K.-G. & Vercelli, A, 1997
Cited by 16 - Related articles

[CITATION] Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: a Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualistic Societies

Full text - MIT Libraries
G Avner - The Journal of Political Economy, 1994
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History lessons: the birth of impersonal exchange: the community responsibility system and impartial justice

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A Greif - The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2006 - JSTOR
This occasional feature will discuss episodes and events drawn from economic history that
have lessons for current topics in policy and research. Responses to this column and
suggestions for future ones should be sent to Kenneth Sokoloff, c/o Journal of Economic ...
Cited by 19 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 18 versions

The Administrative Foundations of Self-Enforcing Constitutions

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YG de Lara, A Greif… - The American Economic Review, 2008 - JSTOR
Evidence indicates that prosperity increases with the rule of law that limits abuse by public
officials. Less is known, however, about how to foster such rule of law in developing
countries. Constitutional theory views the problem as one of coordinating the citizenry." ...
Cited by 15 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 15 versions

[CITATION] Institutions: Theory and History. Comparative and Historical Institutional Analysis

A Greif - 2005 - Cambridge University Press: …
Cited by 15 - Related articles

[CITATION] Informal contract enforcement: lessons from medieval trade

A Greif - 1997 - John M. Olin Program in Law and …
Cited by 14 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries

Emergence of endogenous legal institutions: Property rights and community governance in the Italian alps

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M Casari, D Abreu, D Pearce… - Journal of …, 2007 - Cambridge Univ Press
This article examines changes in institutions that protected property rights in the Alps
between the thirteenth and the nineteenth century and, in particular, alternative
management systems adopted for the common pastures and forests in about 200 ...
Cited by 15 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 24 versions

The Impact of Administrative Power on Political and Economic Development

[PDF] from tuwien.ac.at
A Greif - 2007 - books.google.com
This chapter presents a conjecture regarding the origin of constitutionalism, why it was
historically insufficient to protect property rights, and why it was nevertheless positively
correlated with prosperity. Theories of constitutionalism focus on constitutional rules and ...
Cited by 14 - Related articles - All 7 versions

[CITATION] The Influence of Past Institution on its Rate of Change: Institutional Perpetuation and Endogenous Institutional Change

A Greif - Conference of the International Society for New …, 2001
Cited by 13 - Related articles

[CITATION] contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade: the Maghribi traders' coalition

Full text - MIT Libraries
G Avner - The American Economic Review, 1993
Cited by 13 - Related articles

[CITATION] Trading institutions and the commercial revolution in medieval Europe

A Greif - Economics in a changing world, 1994
Cited by 12 - Related articles

[CITATION] The Islamic equilibrium: legitimacy and political, social, and economic outcomes

A Greif - 2001 - working paper, Stanford University
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[CITATION] Institutions and the path to economic modernity: Lessons from medieval trade

A Greif - 2006 - Cambridge: Cambridge University …
Cited by 10 - Related articles

[CITATION] Markets and Legal Systems: The Development of Markets in Late Medieval Europe and the Transition from Community Responsibility to an Individual …

A Greif… - 1995 - … and the Informal Sector, University of …
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Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: a historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies

A Greif - INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF CRITICAL …, 1997 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract This paper integrates game-theoretical and sociological concepts to conduct a
comparative historical analysis of the relations between culture and institutions. It indicates
the importance of culture, and in particular cultural beliefs, in determining institutions, in ...
Cited by 8 - Related articles - Cached - BL Direct - All 2 versions

A theory of moral persistence: Crypto-morality and political legitimacy

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A Greif… - Journal of Comparative Economics, 2010 - Elsevier
Why, how, and under what conditions do moral beliefs persist despite institutional pressure
for change? Why do the powerful often fail to promote the morality of their authority? This
paper addresses these questions by presenting the role of crypto-morality in moral ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - All 12 versions

[PS] A transactions-cost theory of agglomeration economies

[PS] from stanford.edu
A Greif… - Unpublished working paper, …, 1995 - www-siepr.stanford.edu
Abstract: In contrast to recent work in Regional Economics which emphasizes the role of an
industry's scale in generating agglomeration economies, this paper emphasizes the
importance of an industry's composition, that is, the number of firms generating ...
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[CITATION] Toward political economy of implementation: the impact of administrative power on institutional and economic developments

A Greif - Institutions and growth. Harvard University Press, …, 2008
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Coercion and Exchange: How did Markets Evolve?

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A Greif - Available at ssrn. com/abstract, 2008 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: What causes distinct trajectories of market development? Why did the modern
market economy, characterized by impersonal exchange, first emerge in the West? This
paper presents a theory of market development and evaluates it based on the histories of ...
Cited by 7 - Related articles - All 21 versions

[CITATION] Analytic narratives

H Bates Robert, A Greif, M Levi… - 1998 - Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton …
Cited by 7 - Related articles

Institutions and trade during the late medieval commercial revolution: a game theoretical approach

A Greif - 2005 - lavoisier.fr
Plus d'un million de titres à notre catalogue ! ... Date de parution : 01-2006 Langue : ANGLAIS
Paperback Disponible chez l'éditeur (délai d'approvisionnement : 10 jours). ... Part I.
Preliminaries: 1. Introduction, 2. Institutions and transactions, Part II. Institutions as ...
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[CITATION] The institutional foundations of Genoa's economic growth: self-enforcing political relations, organizational innovations, and economic growth during the …

A Greif - Manuscript. Stanford University, 1995
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[PDF] Organizing violence: Wealth, power, and limited government

[PDF] from psu.edu
A Greif, R Bates… - World Bank-Princeton Workshop on the …, 2000 - Citeseer
Addressing the relationship between political order and development, Samuel Huntington
(1968, p. 1) once stated,“the most important… distinction among countries concerns not their
forms of government but their degree of government.” Events in Angola, Afghanistan, ...
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[CITATION] How do Self-enforcing Institutions Endogenously Change

A Greif… - Unpublished manuscript, Stanford University, 2003
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[CITATION] On the Historical Development and Social Foundations of Institutions that Facilitate Impersonal Exchange

A Greif - 1997 - Working paper, Stanford University
Cited by 5 - Related articles

[CITATION] Institutional structure and economic development: economic history and the new institutionalism

A Greif - Forthcoming in Frontiers of Institutional Analysis. …, 1995
Cited by 5 - Related articles

Analytic narratives

A Greif, M Levi, JL Rosenthal… - Princeton: Princeton, 1998 - 202.120.227.5
Abstract Students of comparative politics have long faced a vexing dilemma: how can social
scientists draw broad, applicable principles of political order from specific historical
examples? In Analytic Narratives, five senior scholars offer a new and ambitious ...
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[CITATION] Institutional Infrastructure and Economic Development: Reflection from the Commercial Revolution'

A Greif - 1992 - Stanford University (California), …
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[CITATION] Self-enforcing Institutions: Comparative and Historical Institutional Analysis

A Greif - 2004 - Citeseer
... Download Links. [www.esnie.org]. Save to List; Add to Collection; Correct Errors; Monitor Changes.
by Avner Greif. ... MISC{Greif04self-enforcinginstitutions:, author = {Avner Greif}, title = {Self-enforcing
Institutions: Comparative and Historical Institutional Analysis }, year = {2004} }. ...
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[CITATION] Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence from the Geniza Documents

A Greif - Berkeley Seminar on Institutional Economics (Oct. …, 1989
Cited by 5 - Related articles

[CITATION] Cultural Beliefs as a Common Resource in an Integrating World: An Example from the Theory and History of Collectivist and Individualist Societies,"

A Greif - The Economics of, 1991
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[CITATION] Institutions, Markets, and Games

A Greif - Foreword, in: TESOC, 2005
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[CITATION] Forthcoming. Institutions: Theory and History

A Greif - Book Manuscript. Contracted with Cambridge …
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The political economy of kinship societies

RH BATES, A GREIF… - Politics from anarchy to …, 2004 - books.google.com
THIS CHAPTER seeks to deepen our understanding of the process of development by
exploring the political economy of kinship societies. Looking first at the economics, it
emphasizes the manner in which families link labor and land in the process of production ...
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[CITATION] Jean-Laurent. 1998

RH Bates, A Greif… - Analytic Narratives
Cited by 4 - Related articles

[CITATION] sOrganizing Violence: Wealth

A Greif, R Bates… - Power, and Limited Government, spresented at the …, 2000
Cited by 4 - Related articles

[CITATION] Reputation and Economic Institutions in Medieval Trade: Evidences from the Geniza Documents

A Greif - Journal of Economic History, 1989
Cited by 4 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries

[CITATION] Forthcoming. Historical Institutional Analysis

A Greif - Cambridge: Cambridge University …
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Théorie des jeux et analyse historique des institutions: Les institutions économiques du Moyen Age

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A Greif - Annales, 1998 - JSTOR
Recent development of game theory has enabled expanding the analysis of historical
institutions to examine self-enforcing, non-market institutions. This paper provides a brief
methodological discussion of Historical Institutional Analysis that utilizes game theory for ...
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[CITATION] Institutions and endogenous institutional change: historical institutional analysis

A GREIF - Seminário Brasileiro da Nova Economia Institucional, 2001 - Brasil Campinas
Cited by 11 - Related articles

[CITATION] Historical Institutionalist Analysis

A Greif - Unpublished manuscript, Stanford, CA, 2001
Cited by 3 - Related articles

[CITATION] Historical institutional analysis: game theory and non-market self-enforcing institutions during the late medieval period

A Greif - Forthcoming in the Annales, 1997
Cited by 3 - Related articles

[CITATION] De Lara and Saumitra Jha, 2008,“The Administrative Foundations of Self-Enforcing Constitutions”

Full text - MIT Libraries
A Greif… - American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings
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[CITATION] The Emergence of Institutions to Protect Property Rights

A Greif - Handbook on New Institutional Economics, 2005
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[CITATION] A Theory of Moral Authority: Moral Choices under Moral Networks Externalities

A Greif - 2010 - Stanford University
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World economic primacy: 1500 to 1990

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CP Kindleberger… - Journal of Economic Literature, 1997 - questia.com
Within this project there have been eight major conferences on coun- tries, regions, or specific
issues. After two conferences in Luxembourg and at Harvard University of a more general
character, there have been meet- ings on specific topics: "The Vitality of Central and ...
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[PDF] How Do Self-enforcing Institutions Endogenously Change? Institutional Reinforcement and Quasi-Parameters

[PDF] from umich.edu
A Greif… - 2001 - icos.groups.si.umich.edu
Abstract Why and how does an institution influence its rate of change? How does an
institution influence its ability to persist in a changing environment and how does it lead to its
own demise? These questions frustrate the study of self-enforcing institutions in which ...
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[BOOK] Risk, Institutions and Growth: Why England and Not China?

[PDF] from colorado.edu
A Greif, M Iyigun… - 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We analyze the role of risk-sharing institutions in transitions to modern economies
Transitions requires individual-level risk-taking in pursuing productivity-enhancing activities
including using and developing new knowledge. Individual-level, idiosyncratic risk implies ...
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[CITATION] nd Institutions: Theory and History

A Greif - Cambridge: Cambridge University …
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[CITATION] Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders, 49J

A Greif - ECON. HIST, 1989
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Institutions: Rules or Equilibria?

[PDF] from springer.com
A Greif… - Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy and …, 2011 - Springer
Recent scholarship has demonstrated the power of the rational choice framework for
advancing our understanding of institutions and institutional change. Stimulated by these
developments, the conceptual frameworks employed by scholars studying institutions ...
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[CITATION] Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal. and Barry R. Weingast. 1998. Analytic Narratives

RH Bates… - Princeton, NJ: Princeton University …
Cited by 3 - Related articles

[CITATION] Contracting

A Greif - Enforcement and Efficiency: Economics Beyond the …, 1996
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[CITATION] Sicilian Jews During the Muslim Period (827-1061)

A Greif - Hebrew and Arabic], Master's thesis, Tel Aviv University, 1985
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[CITATION] Institutions and history

A Greif - 2006 - Cambridge University Press …
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[CITATION] The Merchant Guild as a Nexus of Contracts

PR Milgrom, A Greif… - 1991 - Hoover Working Paper
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[CITATION] Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade, 2006

A Greif - New York: Cambridge University …
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[CITATION] Barry Weingast,(1991)," The Merchant Guild as a Nexus of Contracts

A Greif… - Stanford, mimeo
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[CITATION] The Game-Theoretic Revolution in Comparative and Historical Institutional Analysis; manuscript, Department of Economics, Stanford University

A Greif - 2002
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[CITATION] Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the

A Greif - 1989
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[CITATION] Endogenous Institutions and Game-Theoretic Analysis

A Greif - Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy, 2006
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[CITATION] Historical Institutional Analysis: Interdisciplinary Approach for the Study of Self-enforcing and Self-reinforcing Economic Institutions and their Dynamics

A Greif - Cambridge: Cambridge University …
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[CITATION] The Institutional Foundations of Markets and States: Genoa and the Maghribi Traders during the Late Medieval Period

A Greif - Forthcoming
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[CITATION] Handbook of New Institutional Economics, 727w786

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[CITATION] The Influence of Past Institution on Its Rate of Change: Institutional Perpetuation and Endogenous Institutional Change, chapter 7 in Historical Institutional …

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