R Deneckere… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1985 - JSTOR
In this article we investigate the incentive to merge when firms that produce differentiated
products engage in price competition. We demonstrate that mergers of any size are
beneficial, and are so increasingly: large mergers yield higher profits than smaller ones. ...
C Davidson… - The Rand Journal of Economics, 1986 - JSTOR
In this article we investigate the nature of equilibrium in markets in which firms choose the
scale of operation before they make pricing decisions. We analyze a duopoly model in
which firms choose their capacities before engaging in Bertrand-like price competition. We ...
LM Ausubel… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric …, 1989 - JSTOR
Page 1. Econometrica, Vol. 57, No. 3 (May, 1989), 511-531 REPUTATION IN
BARGAINING AND DURABLE GOODS MONOPOLY BY LAWRENCE M. AUSUBEL
AND RAYMOND J. DENECKERE1 This paper analyzes durable ...
RJ Deneckere… - Journal of Economics & …, 1996 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. DAMAGED GOODS RAYMOND J. DENECKERE Department of Economics
University of Wisconsin-Madison Madison, Wf 53706 R. PRESTON MCAFEE
University of Texas at Austin Austin, TX 78712 Manufacturers ...
R Deneckere… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1986 - Elsevier
Abstract What kinds of dynamic behavior can optimal trajectories in deterministic growth
models display? This paper presents examples of economies that have stable equilibrium
cycles in consumption, capital, and prices of arbitrary period, as well as of economies that ...
RJ Deneckere… - The Review of Economic …, 1992 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Page 1. Review of Economic Studies (1992) 59, 143-162 © 1992 The Review of Economic
Studies Limited 0034-6527/92/00080143S02.00 Price Leadership RAYMONDJ. DENECKERE
Northwestern University and DAN KOVENOCK Purdue University ...
R Deneckere - Economics Letters, 1983 - Elsevier
Abstract When goods are complements or very close substitutes, more tacit collusion is
supported by trigger strategies in price setting supergames than in quantity setting
supergames. For moderate or poor substitutes, the situation is reversed. This contrasts ...
R Deneckere, HP Marvel… - The American Economic Review, 1997 - JSTOR
This paper offers a new theory of destructive competition. We compare minimum resale price
maintenance (RPM) to retail market-clearing in a model with a monopolistic manufacturer
selling to competitive retailers. In both the RPM and flexible-price games, retailers must ...
C Davidson… - International Economic Review, 1990 - JSTOR
In this paper, we analyze a restricted class of equilibria in the dynamic model of Benoit and
Krishna (1987) in which firms choose their scale of operation before engaging in a repeated
game of price competition. Benoit and Krishna established that all firms carry excess ...
R Deneckere, HP Marvel… - The Quarterly Journal of …, 1996 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We show that a manufacturer facing uncertain demand and selling through a
competitive retail market may wish to support adequate retail inventories by preventing the
emergence of discount retailers. In our model, discounters offer low prices made possible ...
LM Ausubel… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1987 - JSTOR
Page 1. RAND Journal of Economics Vol. 18, No. 2, Summer 1987 One is almost
enough for monopoly Lawrence M. Ausubel* and Raymond J. Deneckere* It has
been argued that two factors-product durability and (potential ...
R Deneckere… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1995 - JSTOR
We consider a two-stage game in which firms simultaneously select prices and capacities.
Then, a random number of consumers attends the market and selects a firm to visit.
Consumers know all prices and quantities but not the realization of aggregate demand. ...
R Deneckere, D Kovenock… - The Journal of Industrial Economics, 1992 - JSTOR
This paper analyses a duopolistic price setting game in which firms have loyal consumer
segments, but cannot distinguish them from price sensitive consumers. We adapt a variant of
Varian's [1980] simultaneous price setting game to analyse price leader equilibria. The ...
C Davidson… - International Journal of Industrial …, 1984 - Elsevier
Abstract In the Industrial Organization literature, it is generally felt that mergers hurt
consumers; not only because of the increased industrial concentration they effect, but also
because collusion becomes more likely. In this paper we show that, at least in one ...
M Boldrin… - Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 1990 - Elsevier
... Raymond Deneckere's research was supported in part by National Science Foundation Grant
No. ... Boldrin, Michele and Raymond Deneckere, 1987, Simple macroeconomic models with very
complicated dynamics, Department of Economics working paper no. ...
RJ Deneckere… - Economic Theory, 1996 - Springer
Page 1. Economic Theory 8, 1-25 (1996) Econom/c Theory 9 Springer-Verlag 1996
Research articles Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly with unit cost asymmetry* Raymond
J. Deneckere I and Dan Kovenock / i Department of Economics ...
LM Ausubel… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1989 - Elsevier
R Deneckere… - The Review of Economic …, 1992 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract This paper presents a general model of the demand for differentiated products
which has as special cases two popular models used to analyse welfare and competition in
monopolistically competitive markets: the model of spatial competition and the symmetric ...
B Allen, R Deneckere, T Faith… - Economic Theory, 2000 - Springer
Summary. With few exceptions, the literature on the role of capacity as a strategic entry
deterrent has assumed Cournot competition in the post-entry game. In contrast, this paper
studies a model in which the incumbent and entrant sequentially precommit to capacity ...
LM Ausubel… - The Review of Economic …, 1992 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Page 1. Review of Economic Studies (1992) 59, 795-812 © 1992 The Review of
Economic Studies Limited 0034-6527/92/00410795502.00 Durable Goods Monopoly
with Incomplete Information LAWRENCE M. AUSUBEL and ...
R Deneckere… - Econometrica, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
A seller and a buyer bargain over the terms of trade for an object. The seller receives a
perfect signal that determines the value of the object to both players, whereas the buyer
remains uninformed. We analyze the infinite-horizon bargaining game in which the buyer ...
R Deneckere… - 2002 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper focuses on implementation issues in environments where it may be
costly for the players to send certain messages. We develop an approach allowing to
characterize the set of implementable outcomes in such environments, and then apply it to ...
LM Ausubel… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric …, 1992 - JSTOR
... 19012. Financial assistance was also provided, for Lawrence Ausubel, by the Lynde
and Harry Bradley Foundation, and for Raymond Deneckere, by the Kellogg School
of Management's Beatrice/Esmark Research Chair. The ...
... 19012. Financial assistance was also provided, for Lawrence Ausubel, by the Lynde
and Harry Bradley Foundation, and for Raymond Deneckere, by the Kellogg School
of Management's Beatrice/Esmark Research Chair. We ...
LM Ausubel… - The Review of Economic …, 1993 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Page 1. Review of Economic Studies (1993) 60, 435-461 © 1993 The Review of Economic
Studies Limited 0034-6527/93/00220435$02.00 Efficient Sequential Bargaining LAWRENCE
M. AUSUBEL and RAYMOND J. DENECKERE Northwestern University ...
RJ Deneckere… - Cycles and Chaos in Economic …, 1992 - books.google.com
... Page 320. 310 RAYMOND DENECKERE & KENNETH JUDD agents. The ... Page 322.
312 RAYMOND DENECKERE & KENNETH Jl'III) novation, F. Therefore, innovation
will continue until profits net of innovation costs are zero. Hence ...
[CITATION] Coalition formation in noncooperative oligopoly models
R Deneckere… - Econometrics Workshop Paper, 1983
RJ Deneckere… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1998 - JSTOR
Page 1. RAND Journal of Economics Vol. 29, No. 4, Winter 1998 pp. 750-771 The
diffusion of consumer durables in a vertically differentiated oligopoly Raymond J.
Deneckere* and Andre de Palma** In a vertically differentiated ...
R Deneckere, DJ Kovenock… - 1994 - 129.3.20.41
Abstract This paper characterizes the set of Nash equilibria in a price setting duopoly in
which firms have limited capacity, and in which unit costs of production up to capacity may
differ. Assuming concave revenue and efficient rationing, we show that the case of ...
[CITATION] Bargaining and forward induction
LM Ausubel… - Unpublished Paper, 1998
S Severinov… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
We characterize the optimal screening mechanism for a monopolist facing consumers with
privately known demands, some of whom have limited abilities to misrepresent their
preferences. We show that consumers with better abilities to misrepresent information ...
B Allen, R Deneckere, T Faith… - Industrial Organization, 1994 - ideas.repec.org
With few exceptions, the literature on the role of capacity as a strategic entry deterrent has
assumed Cournot competition in the post-entry game. In contrast, our model is in the spirit of
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983): the incumbent and entrant sequentially precommit to ...
R Deneckere… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2008 - Elsevier
We study implementation in environments where agents have limited ability to imitate others.
Agents are randomly and privately endowed with type-dependent sets of messages. So
sending a message becomes a partial proof regarding type. For environments where ...
R Deneckere, MY Liang… - 2001 - economics.uwo.ca
Abstract A seller and a buyer bargain over the terms of trade for an object. The seller
receives a perfect signal determining the value of the object to both players, while the buyer
remains uninformed. We analyze the infinite horizon bargaining game in which the buyer ...
Page 1. From the SelectedWorks of Peter Cramton March
2001 Bargaining with Incomplete Information ...
LM Ausubel… - Center for Mathematical …, 1988 - kellogg.northwestern.edu
Page 1. Discussion Paper No. 784 STATIONARY SEOUENTIAL EQUILIBRIA IN
BARGAINING WITH TWO-SIDED INCOMPLETE INFORMATION by Lawrence M.
Ausubel* and Raymond J. Deneckere June 1988 Department ...
R Deneckere… - University of Winsconsin, Department …, 2005 - econ.ohio-state.edu
Abstract This paper studies a dynamic model of perfectly competitive price posting under
demand uncertainty. Firms must produce output in advance. After observing aggregate sales
in prior periods, firms post prices for their unsold output. In each period the demand of a ...
[CITATION] Dynamic Competition with Random Demand and Costless Search: A Theory of Price Posting
D Raymond… - 2005 - mimeo
RJ Deneckere… - Discussion Papers, 1992 - ideas.repec.org
Downloadable! ) and Shaked and Sutton (1982). Finally, despite the fact that the equilibrium
concept is open-loop, all but the introductory price of the high quality good converge to marginal
cost in the limit as firms can change prices arbitrarily frequently.
[CITATION] Demand Uncertainty and Price Maintenance: Markdowns as Destructive Competition”(1997)
R Deneckere, HP Marvel… - Am. Econ. Rev.
R Deneckere… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
This article considers a market served by a monopolist who sells a durable good that depreciates
stochastically over time. We show that there exist three types of stationary equilibria: a Coase
Conjecture equilibrium, a monopoly equilibrium, and a reputational equilibrium. When the ...
R Deneckere… - manuscript. University of Wisconsin, Madison, 2007 - sfu.ca
Abstract We study mechanism design in environments where misrepresenting private
information is costly. Specifically, a privately informed agent has to take several signalling
actions, send several messages or undergo a number of tests in which it is costly for her to ...
R Deneckere, HP Marvek - Working papers, 1994 - ideas.repec.org
No abstract is available for this item. ... To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three options: 1. Check below under "Related
research" whether another version of this item is available online. 2. Check on the ...
M Boldrin, R Deneckere… - 1989 - econ.ucla.edu
Here we adopt the modern framework of intertemporal competitive equilibrium, but at the
same time dispense with the need for stochastic forces in order to produce and sustain
oscillations in aggregate variables over time. We obtain endogenous oscillations despite ...
R Deneckere, J Buongiorno… - Forest science, 1986 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: This paper investigated the effectiveness of the lumber futures market in hedging
unexpected price variations. The related optimum hedge ratio, ie, the fraction of the cash
position that should be hedged to minimize risk, was also studied. The measure of ...
[CITATION] An Improved Sufficiency Condition for Complex Dynamics in Optimal Growth Models
R Deneckere - 1988 - mimeo, Northwestern University
RJ Deneckere, D Kovenock… - 2000 - emeraldinsight.com
Page 1. QUOTAS AND TARIFFS WITH ENDOGENOUS CONDUCT Raymond J.
Deneckere, Dan Kovenock and Yong Yeop Sohn ABSTRACT This chapter utilizes
the results ofDeneckere & Kovenock (1988, 1989, 1992, 1996 ...
[CITATION] nBargaining with Incom& plete Information. oin RJ Aumann and S. Hart, eds., Handbook of Game Theory, Volume 3, Chapter 50
LM Ausubel, P Cramton… - 2002 - Amsterdam: Elsevier
S Severinov… - 2003 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We examine the optimal selling strategy of a monopolist facing consumers who
have privately known demands, and some of whom have limited abilities to misrepresent
their preferences. We derive the optimal mechanism in this environment and characterize ...
[CITATION] One is Almost Enough for Monopoly, 18 RAND J
LM Ausubel… - 1987 - Econ
R Deneckere, J Peck… - 1998 - econ.wisc.edu
Abstract We demonstrate a new coordination failure in a general equilibrium model where
the set of active consumers is random and consumers choose when to access the market.
Consumers face a cost of transacting early, yet we show the existence of competitive ...
[CITATION] The coase conjecture and durable goods monopoly with depreciation
R Deneckere… - 2005 - Working Paper from Department of …
[CITATION] nExcess Capacity and Collusion. oInternational Eco% nomic Review
C Davidson… - Vol, 1990
[CITATION] Influence of consumer behavior on duopoly power in two stage games., Department of Economics, Michigan State University, East Lansing
C Davidson… - 1982 - MI
[CITATION] The Market for Audit Services and Mandatory Rotation," manuscript
A Palma… - 1995
A De Palma, R Deneckere - 1995 - archive-ouverte.unige.ch
Archive institutionnelle de l'Université de Genève - Institutional
Repository of the University of Geneva.
HP Marvel, R Deneckere… - Working Papers, 1995 - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of
further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site ...
R Deneckere… - 2010 - econweb.umd.edu
Abstract In models of tax compliance, the existence of a budget or capacity constraint on tax
enforcement creates a complementarity between taxpayersiincentives to comply. All else
equal, the higher the level of non $ compliance in the population, the lower the like $ ...
[CITATION] Communication Costs and the Revelation Principle
R Deneckere… - 2000
LM Ausubel… - 1988 - execed.kellogg.northwestern.edu
Page 1. Discussion Paper N0. 784 STATIONARY SEOUENTIAL EQUILIBRIA IN BARGAINING
WITH ' TWO—SIDED INCOMPLETE INFORMATION bv Lawrence M. Ausubel' and Raymond
J. Deneckere' June 1988 x Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences. ...
R Deneckere, HPM Madison… - Review of Industrial Organization, 1994 - Springer
Society at the ASSA Meetings, Washington DC, ... Raymond Deneckere, University of
Wisconsin, Madison, Howard P. Marvel, Ohio State University, and James Peck, Ohio State University
- Resale Price Main- tenance under Demand Uncertainty ... Frank Gollop, Boston ...
HP Marvel, R Deneckere… - Working Papers, 1995 - ideas.repec.org
This paper offers a new theory of destructive competition. We compare minimum resale price
maintenance (RPM) to retail market clearing in a model with a monopolistic manufacturer
selling to competitive retailers. In both the RPM and Flexible-Pricing Games, retailers must ...
B Allen, J Andreoni,
L Ausubel, K Bagwell… - …, 2001 - Wiley Online Library
THE 2001 AUSTRALASIAN MEETING of the Econometric Society will be held in Auckland,
New Zealand from Friday 6 July to Sunday 8 July, inclusive. The program co-chairs are
Bryce Hool and Peter CB Phillips. The meeting is open to all economists and ...
R Deneckere… - 2010 - montoya.econ.ubc.ca
Abstract In models of tax compliance, the existence of a budget or capacity constraint on tax
enforcement creates a complementarity between taxpayers' incentives to comply. All else
equal, the higher the level of non-compliance in the population, the lower the likelihood ...
R Deneckere… - 2005 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract Technical Appendix Screening When Not All Agents Are Strategic Does Monopoly
Need Exclude Proof Theorem Existence wish show that there exists tuple measurable
bounded functions solving the maximization problem Note that since the monopolist will ...
B Allen, R Deneckere, T Faith, D Kovenock… - 1994 - 129.3.20.41
Abstract With few exceptions, the literature on the role of capacity as a strategic entry
deterrent has assumed Cournot competition in the post-entry game. In contrast, our model is
in the spirit of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983): the incumbent and entrant sequentially ...
BAR Deneckere… - 1995 - mpls.frb.org
ABSTRACT This paper considers the role of capacity as a strategic entry deterrent for a
game in which the incumbent and entrant sequentially precommit to capacity levels before
competing in price, possibly using mixed strategies. Depending on the magnitudes of the ...
[CITATION] INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS
JA WEINBERG, R DENECKERE, DAN KOVENOCK… - THE JOURNAL OF …, 1992
RJ Deneckere - 1983 - en.scientificcommons.org
RJ Deneckere… - Review of economic studies, 1993 - dialnet.unirioja.es
Información del artículo Efficient Sequential Bargaining.
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