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Abstract: If voter preferences depend on a noisy state variable, under what conditions do
large elections deliver outcomes" as if" the state were common knowledge? While the
existing literature models elections using the jury metaphor where a change in information ...
P Puranam, R Gulati… - 2009 - ewi-ssl.pitt.edu
Abstract While many theories of the firm seek to explain when firms make rather than buy, in
practice firms often make and buy the same input-they engage in plural sourcing. We argue
that explaining the mix of external and internal procurement for the same input requires ...
Abstract Current mobile phones provide GSM cell information and many devices also
support GPS or WiFi-based location information. A problem with raw location data is that it
does not provide semantic information, which makes it hard to integrate location- ...
P Puranam, R Gulati… - 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: While many theories of the firm seek to explain when firms make rather than buy, in
practice firms often make and buy the same input-they engage in plural sourcing. We argue
that explaining the mix of external procurement and internal sourcing for the same input ...
Abstract I analyse informational effi ciency of two $ candidate elections where the utility of
the voters depends on the realisation of an uncertain state variable. I show that large elec $
tions aggregate information for any voting rule in the unique equilibrium if and only if ...
D Etkin, E Olander… - International Conference Advances …, 2000 - Citeseer
ABSTRACT: Information security has gained critical importance with the growth of Internet
connected computing and business systems. Denial-of-Service (DoS) is a prime concern in
information security, as evidenced by the recent attacks on popular e-commerce sites. In ...
[CITATION] received the PhD degree in computer science from the University of Minnesota in 1993 (formally, 1994). Currently, he is an associate professor in the …
S Bhattacharya - His research interests include network security and …
[CITATION] mPreference Monotonicity and Information Aggrega $ tion in Elections. nUniversity of Pittsburgh mimeo
S Bhattacharya - 2007
Abstract: We consider a persuasion game where multiple experts with potentially conflicting
self-interests attempt to persuade a decision-maker, or, a judge. The judge prefers to take an
action that is most appropriate given the true state of the world but the experts' preferences ...
Abstract: I examine the choice of political rhetoric when one candidate's willingness to
misinform the voter is checked by the other's ability to inform. In the basic model, a debate is
a competition between two candidates in which the" good" candidate wants to reveal ...
Abstract: If a government has ability and willingness to redistribute the surplus created by an
external investor, why do we still observe resistance to such investment, sometimes in the
form of destruction of productive assets? And how does such destructive action affect a ...
S Bhattacharya - computer.org
Abstract—Security issues are critical in networked information systems, eg, with financial
information, corporate proprietary information, contractual and legal information, human
resource data, medical records, etc. The theme of this paper is to address such diversity of ...
We report on an experiment comparing compulsory and voluntary voting mechanisms.
Theory predicts that these different mechanisms have different implications both for the
sincerity of the voting decisions and for the participation decisions of voters, and we find ...
S Bhattacharya, T Feddersen… - Working Papers, 2007 - econpapers.repec.org
... Please update your bookmarks. A Possibility Theorem on Information Aggregation in Elections.
Sourav Bhattacharya, Timothy Feddersen and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (). No 327, Working Papers
from University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics. Abstract: . . . ...
Abstract We study political competition between two groups, where the winner has the
decision rights to allocate resources, like political parties sharing patronage goods. What
factors determine how resources are shared? We highlight an important force that affects ...
Abstract: In this dissertation, I analyse the effectiveness of various political institutions in
aggregating private information. In the first two chapters, I consider diversity of information
among the voters about given electoral alternatives and examine the conditions under ...
S Bhattacharya, R Gulati… - Working Papers, 2008 - econpapers.repec.org
... Please update your bookmarks. How Much to Make and How Much to Buy: Explaining Plural
Sourcing Strategies. Sourav Bhattacharya, Ranjay Gulati and Phanish Puranam. No 353, Working
Papers from University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics. Abstract: . . . ...
Abstract We report on an experiment comparing compulsory and voluntary voting
mechanisms. Theory predicts that these different mechanisms have important implications
both for the sincerity of voting decisions and for the participation decisions of voters, and ...
Abstract Suppose we have two alternatives P and Q and two states A and B, and a voter type
is defined as a pair of iid random variables that denotes the utility difference between the
alternatives P and Q in each state. Each voter receives a private, noisy signal about the ...
Abstract Poor communities sometimes resist private investment and destroy economic
surplus even if the government has the willingness and ability to redistribute. We interpret
such acts of resistance as demands for redistribution: destruction contains credible ...
Abstract: We study a political competition between two groups, where the winner has the
decision rights to allocate resources, like political parties deciding on sharing of patronage
goods. What factors determine how resources are shared? We highlight an important ...
[CITATION] Raymond A. Paul, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Panelists: CV Ramamoorthy, University of California
A Ghafoor… - Proceedings, 1996 - IEEE Computer Society Press
I Khosla, S Bhattacharya… - Journal of the Operational Research …, 1996 - JSTOR
When a job is processed in a hypercube multi-processor, it is allocated a cube of processing
elements of the requisite size. There are three distinct costs involved in the hypercube
scheduling problem: the cost of detecting a free cube (allocation), the cost of migrating ...
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