B Hölmstrom - The Bell Journal of Economics, 1979 - JSTOR
Page 1. Moral hazard and observability Bengt Holmstrom Swedish School of
Economics and Business Administration The role of imperfect information in a
principal-agent relationship subject to moral hazard is considered. A ...
B Holmstrom,
P Milgrom - JL Econ. & Org., 1991 - HeinOnline
In the standard economic treatment of the principal-agent problem, compensation systems
serve the dual function of allocating risks and rewarding productive work. A tension between
these two functions arises when the agent is risk averse, for providing the agent with ...
B Holmstrom - The Bell Journal of Economics, 1982 - JSTOR
This article studies moral hazard with many agents. The focus is on two features that are
novel in a multiagent setting: free riding and competition. The free-rider problem implies a
new role for the principal: administering incentive schemes that do not balance the budget ...
B Holmstrom,
P Milgrom - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric …, 1987 - JSTOR
We consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant
absolute risk aversion. The optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of
a vector of N accounts which count the number of times that each of the N kinds of ...
B Holmström - Review of Economic Studies, 1999 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. Review of Economic Studies (1999) 66, 169–182 0034-65279900090169
$02.00 © 1999 The Review of Economic Studies Limited Managerial Incentive
Problems: A Dynamic Perspective BENGT HOLMSTRO ¨ M MIT ...
B Holmstrom, J Tirole - the Quarterly Journal of economics, 1997 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We study an incentive model of financial intermediation in which firms as well as
intermediaries are capital constrained. We analyze how the distribution of wealth across
firms, intermediaries, and uninformed investors affects investment, interest rates, and the ...
O Hart, B Holmström… - 1986 - econ.fudan.edu.cn
Page 1. Page 2. -- CHAPTER 3 The theory of contracts Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmstrom
lntroduction The past decade has witnessed a growing interest in contract theories of various
kinds. ... Page 3. 72 Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmstrom by and covering a small number of people. ...
B Holmstrom,
P Milgrom - The American Economic Review, 1994 - JSTOR
We explore the twin hypotheses (i) that high-performance incentives, worker ownership of
assets, and worker freedom from direct controls are complementary instruments for
motivating workers, and (ii) that such instruments can be expected to covary positively in ...
BR Holmstrom… - 1989 - books.google.com
Page 214. 8 The theory of the firm Bengt Holmstrom and Jean Tirole I. INTRODUCTION
The theory of the firm has long posed a problem for economists. While substantial
progress has been made on the description and analysis ...
B Holmström, J Tirole - Journal of Political Economy, 1993 - JSTOR
Page 1. Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring Bengt Holmstrom Yale University
and Helsinki School of Economics Jean Tirole Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Institut d'Economie Industrielle, and Centre d'Enseignement ...
B Holmström… - The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1998 - JSTOR
... The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited Bengt Holmstrom and John Roberts W ^ thy do firms exist? ...
In the process, the focus of * Bengt Holmstrom is Paul A. Samuelson Professor of Economics,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts. ...
B Holmstrom, J Tirole - 1996 - nber.org
This paper addresses a basic yet unresolved question: Do claims on private assets provide
sufficient liquidity for an efficient functioning of the productive sector? Or does the State have
a role in creating liquidity and regulating it either through adjustments in the stock of ...
M Harris… - The Review of Economic …, 1982 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract A dynamic, equilibrium model of long term (implicit) labour contracts under
incomplete but symmetric information is developed. Workers are assumed to be risk averse
and of unknown ability or productivity. Risk neutral firms learn, as do workers, about each ...
G Baker,
M Gibbs… - The Quarterly Journal of …, 1994 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We analyze twenty years of personnel data from one firm. The hierarchical structure
is quite simple and stable. Career movements suggest that the employee's rate of learning
and the firm's learning about ability are important. There are promotion “fast tracks.” Exit ...
B Holmstrom… - 2001 - nber.org
This paper describes and considers explanations for changes in corporate governance and
merger activity in the United States since 1980. Corporate governance in the 1980s was
dominated by intense merger activity distinguished by the prevalence of leveraged ...
B Holmström… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric …, 1983 - JSTOR
Page 1. Econometrica, Vol. 51, No. 6 (November, 1983) EFFICIENT AND DURABLE
DECISION RULES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION BY BENGT HOLMSTROM
AND ROGER B. MYERSON1 We compare six concepts ...
G Baker,
M Gibbs… - The Quarterly Journal of …, 1994 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract Salary data from a single firm are analyzed in an effort to identify the firm's wage
policy. We find that employees are partly shielded against changes in external market
conditions; that wage variation within a job level is large both cross-sectionally and for ...
B Holmstrom - Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1999 - Oxford Univ Press
Abstract This article explores the economic role of the firm in a market economy. The
analysis begins with a discussion and critique of the property rights approach to the theory of
the firm as exposited in the recent work by Hart and Moore ('Property Rights and the ...
B Holmstrom, JR i Costa - The Quarterly Journal of …, 1986 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract The paper shows how career concerns rather than effort aversion can induce a
natural incongruity in risk preferences between managers and superiors. A model, based on
learning about managerial talent, is developed to study second-best contractual remedies. ...
D Fudenberg, B Holmstrom… - Journal of economic theory, 1990 - Elsevier
Abstract Long-term contracts are valuable only if optimal contracting requires commitment to
a plan today that would not otherwise be adopted tomorrow. We show that commitments are
unnecessary, and hence short-term contracts are sufficient if (1) all public information can ...
B Holmstrom - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1989 - Elsevier
Abstract Stylized facts indicate that small firms are responsible for a disproportionate share
of innovative research. There are many possible explanations for this fact. The paper seeks
to understand this phenomenon as the outcome of an optimal assignment of tasks across ...
B Holmström,
P Milgrom - … of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) …, 1990 - JSTOR
Page 1. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) 146 (1990), 85
105 Zeitschrift ür die gesamte Staatswissenschaft Regulating Trade Among Agents*
by Bengt Holmström and Paul Milgrom /. Introduction Our ...
B Holmstrom… - 2003 - nber.org
The US corporate governance system has recently been heavily criticized, largely as a result
of failures at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and some other prominent companies. Those failures
and criticisms, in turn, have served as catalysts for legislative change (Sarbanes-Oxley Act ...
B Holmstrom, J Tirole - 1998 - nber.org
The intertemporal CAPM predicts that an asset's price is equal to the expectation of the
product of the asset's payoff and a representative consum substitution. This paper develops
an alternative approach to asset pricing based on industrial and financial corporations' ...
B Holmstrom, J Tirole - JL Econ. & Org., 1991 - HeinOnline
The transfer pricing issue is typically portrayed as a problem of finding the price or pricing
schedule that comes closest to inducing an efficient level of trade between two divisions of a
firm. The solution is easy if there is a competitive market that can provide a relevant price ...
B Holmström - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1979 - JSTOR
... Page 4. 1140 BENGT HOLMSTROM dimensional parametrized family of valuation
functions in Vi: Vi(vi, vi ) = {vi(d; yi) Ez Vi I yi Ez [0, 111, such that for all d E D (i) vi(d;
0) =vi(d), GOi vi (d; 1)=- vi(d), ... Page 6. 1142 BENGT HOLMSTROM ...
DP Baron… - Journal of Finance, 1980 - JSTOR
Page 1. THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE * VOL. XXXV, NO 5 * DECEMBER 1980 The Investment
Banking Contract For New Issues Under Asymmetric Information: Delegation And The Incentive
Problem DAVID P. BARON AND BENGT HOLMSTROM* ABSTRACT ...
B Holmstrom - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1983 - JSTOR
The paper presents a labor market equilibrium analysis of implicit contract theory. A two-
period, single-good model is used to propose consistent notions of labor market equilibrium
for long-term employment contracts both when labor is specialized and cannot move in ...
O Hart, B Holmstrom - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2010 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract The formal literature on firm boundaries has assumed that ex post conflicts are
resolved through bargaining. In reality, parties often simply exercise their decision rights. We
develop a model, based on shading, in which the use of authority has a central role. We ...
[CITATION] On incentives and control in organizations
BR Holmström - 1977 - Stanford University
B Holmström… - Journal of Economics & …, 1992 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. TO THE RAIDER GOES THE SURPLUS? A REEXAMINATION OF THE FREE-RIDER
PROBLEM BENGT HOLMSTROM AND BARRY NALEBUFF School of Organization and
Management Yale University Box ZA, Yale Sfation N m Haven, CT 06520 ...
B Holmstrom - The American Economic Review, 1981 - JSTOR
In this paper I discuss some approaches to modelling labor markets as contractually
mediated. The central thesis of such models is that due to market imperfections-absence of
contingent claims for labor and income-wage mediated auction markets will in general not ...
G Baker… - The American Economic Review, 1995 - JSTOR
That firms employ internal labor markets, in which wages and careers are partly shielded
from the vagaries of external labor markets, seems well accepted. Yet, Peter Doeringer and
Michael Piore's (1985) seminal work on internal labor markets has had a rather limited ...
B Holmström, J Tirole - Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2000 - JSTOR
... BANKING T,E,CTURE Liquidity and Risk Management BENGT HOLMSTROM JEAN TIROLE ...
The authors are grateful to the participants for helpful comments. BENGT HOLMSTROM is Paul
A. Samuelson Professor of Economics at MIT. E-mail: bengt@mit.edu. ...
B Holmstrom - Cambridge University Press, London, 1985 - books.google.com
Services are unlike goods in many regards. Some differences that appear economically
relevant are the following: Services are not storable; service quality is difficult to measure or
observe; the appropriateness of a service may be difficult to verify; service technology is ...
M Harris… - International Economic Review, 1987 - JSTOR
Most observed contracts have an explicitly specified, finite duration. 2 This is an empirical
regularity which applies not only to contracts among factors of production (eg, employment
contracts and leases), but also to many financial contracts (eg, bonds and options). ...
B Holmström - 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Page 1. Pay without Performance and the Managerial Power Hypothesis: A Comment
Bengt Holmstrom* Abstract ... 236089. Bengt Holmstrom, Managerial Incentive
Programs—A Dynamic Perspective, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 169 (1999). ...
B Holmstrom, J Tirole - The American Economic Review, 1996 - JSTOR
The possibility that monetary policy can influence real activity through a credit channel has
received wide attention recently (see eg, Ben Bemanke et al., 1994). The presence of a
credit channel presumes that financial markets are imperfect in a way that makes the ...
B Holmstrom… - The Review of Economic Studies, 1985 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We explore a managerial model of investment behaviour in which an incentive
problem arises because one input factor (managerial effort) is not publicly observed. We
show that an optimal incentive contract leads to investment levels which are below first- ...
G Baker,
M Gibbs… - European Economic Review, 1993 - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of
further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site ...
B Holmstrom - European Economic Review, 1982 - Elsevier
The paper investigates the New Soviet Incentive Scheme and managerial target-setting in a
general framework of incentive scheme design. The New Soviet Incentive Scheme is an
example of delegation of decision-making responsibility due to asymmetrically informed ...
B Holmström - Industrial and Corporate Change, 1996 - Oxford Univ Press
... Europe: A Theoretical Perspective BENGT HOLMSTROM (Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Department of Economics and Sloan School of Management, and Institute for Policy Reform, USA)
Eastern Europe suffers from a worsening capital shortage problem. ...
B Holmström, J Tirole - 2011 - books.google.com
Page 1. INSIDE AND OUTSIDE LIQUIDITY Bengt Holmström and Jean Tirole Page 2. Inside
and Outside Liquidity Page 3. Page 4. Inside and Outside Liquidity Bengt Holmström and Jean
Tirole The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England Page 5. ...
[CITATION] The Nordic model-embracing globalization and sharing risks
TM Andersen, B Holmström, S Honkapohja… - 2007 - ETLA Helsinki
O Hart, B Holmstrom - Unpublished manuscript, 2002 - cepr.org.uk
Abstract The existing literature on firms, based on incomplete contracts and property rights,
emphasizes that the ownership of assets--and thereby firm boundaries--is determined in
such a way as to encourage relationship-specific investments by the appropriate parties. It ...
[CITATION] Contracts and the market for executives: comment
B Holmstrom - Contract economics, 1992
[CITATION] The theory of contracts
B Holmstrom, O Hart - advances in economic theory, Fifth World Congress, …, 1987
[CITATION] Incentive compensation: Practical design from a theory point of view
B Holmstrom - Incentives, cooperation, and risk sharing, 1987
TV Dang, G Gorton… - Work In Progress, 2009 - finance.wharton.upenn.edu
Abstract Asymmetric information can reduce trade (possibly to zero) due to adverse
selection. Symmetric information can facilitate trade. We show that trade between agents is
maximized, and welfare highest, when neither party to a transaction has any information ...
[CITATION] Corporate Governance and Takeovers in the US: Making Sense of the 80s and 90s
B Holmstrom, S Kaplan - Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2001
[CITATION] Ability, performance and wage differentials
M Harris… - Review of Economic Studies, 1982
P Joskow, B Holmström, TO Nasser - 1997 - dspace.mit.edu
Page 1. Page 2. Page 3. Page 4. Page 5. Page 6. Page 7. Page 8. Page 9. Page 10. Page 11.
Page 12. Page 13. Page 14. Page 15. Page 16. Page 17. Page 18. Page 19. Page 20. Page
21. Page 22. Page 23. Page 24. Page 25. Page 26. Page 27. Page 28. Page 29. Page 30. Page ...
[CITATION] Observability and moral hazard
B Holmstrom - Bell Journal of Economics, 1979
[CITATION] Handbook of Industrial Organization
B Holmstrom, J Tirole, R Schmalensee… - The Theory of the Firm, 1989
[CITATION] Common agency and exclusive dealing
B Holmström, P Milgrom - Yale School of Management, Connecticut. Processed, 1988
B Holmstrom, J Tirole - The American Economic Review, 2002 - JSTOR
In an earlier paper (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998) we offered a simple model of aggregate
liquidity shortages. Because firms cannot pledge their full income stream to investors, the
collateral base of the economy may be too small to support an optimal long-term ...
[CITATION] Corporate control and the monitoring role of the stock market
B Holmström - 1990 - Yale School of Organization and …
[CITATION] J. Tirole (1991)." Transfer Pricing and Organizational Form
B Holmstrom, P Milgrom - Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
B Holmstrom… - MIT Sloan Management Review, 2003 - mendeley.com
Abstract Corporate governance problems call for safeguards, but not to the point of hobbling
risk taking and economic growth. Consider the US economy over the past 10 years. The
bursting of the stock market's bubble followed years of corporate restructuring and ...
[CITATION] The Theory ofContracts
O Hart, B Holmstrom - Advances in …, 1987 - Cam bridge: Cambridge University …
B Holmström - Organization, 2008 - mendeley.com
... By Bengt Holmstrom, MIT Professor Gorton has given us an exceptionally informative picture
of the nuclear core of the financial crisis – the fragile structure of subprime mortgage-backed
securitization and the chain of derivatives built on top of it. ...
[CITATION] Moral Hazard in Teams, the Bell Journal of Economics
B Holmstrom - Vol, 1982
[CITATION] On the duration of agreements
M Harris… - 1983 - Institute for Mathematical Studies in …
TV Dang, G Gorton… - Unpublished working paper. Yale …, 2010 - Citeseer
Page 1. 1 Preliminary; Comments Welcome Financial Crises and the Optimality of Debt
for Liquidity Provision+ Tri Vi Dang Mannheim and Yale Gary Gorton Yale and NBER
Bengt Holmström MIT and NBER This Draft: May 15, 2010 Abstract ...
[CITATION] Examples for and questions about: An Economic (?) Theory of Promises
B Holmström… - 1995 - mimeo
[CITATION] Wicksell lectures: Inside and outside liquidity
B Holmstrom, J Tirole - 2008 - Forthcoming
[CITATION] Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of
B Holmstrom, P Milgrom - 1987
[CITATION] Commentary: The panic of 2007
B Holmstrom - Maintaining Stability in a Changing Financial System, 2008
[CITATION] Theory of the firm. Handbook for Industrial Organization, Volume 1, 1989. Edited by Richard Schmalensee and Robert D. Willig
B Holmstrom, J Tirole - Elsevier Press
D Shin,
K Shin, JG Altonji… - Macroeconomic …, 2008 - Cambridge Univ Press
This paper explains how real wages are procyclical for those who stay with the same
employer. On the basis of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics data for the period from 1974–
1975 to 1990–1991, we find that the substantial wage procyclicality among job stayers is ...
[CITATION] The Economics of Corporate Governance
B Holmström - Third Louise and Göran Ehrnrooth Lectures, Swedish …, 1999
[CITATION] Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the US
H Bengt… - Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2001
BR Holmström - Journal of Accounting Research, 1980 - JSTOR
Page 1. Journal of Accounting Research Vol. 18 Supplement 1980 Printed in USA
Discussion of Economically Optimal Performance Evaluation and Control Systems
BENGT R. HOLMSTROM* Recent developments in agency ...
B Holmstrom, D Czarnitzki, K Kraft… - RH Day et al., The …, 1993 - en.scientificcommons.org
deutsch english. Publikationsansicht. 17367594. Agency costs and innovation. Holmstrom, Bengt.
Details der Publikation. Download, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V8F-45R2H3Y-
3/2/27f45bdcf9c16f07ab258b80fa490304. Archiv, RePEc (Germany). Typ, article. ...
[CITATION] Ignorance and the Optimality of Debt for Liquidity Provision
TV Dang, G Gorton… - 2011 - Working Paper, Yale University
[CITATION] Moral hazard and observability
B Holmstrom - International Library of Critical …, 1999 - EDWARD ELGAR PUBLISHING LTD
TV Dang, G Gorton… - Unpublished manustcript, 2009 - sloanweb.mit.edu
Page 1. 1 Preliminary; Comments Welcome Ignorance and the Optimality of Debt for the
Provision of Liquidity+ Tri Vi Dang Mannheim and Yale Gary Gorton Yale and NBER Bengt
Holmström MIT and NBER This Draft: December 17, 2009 Abstract ...
[CITATION] A theory of firm scope
H Oliver… - 2002
M Harris… - The American Economic Review, 1983 - JSTOR
We explore the implications of contract theory with regard to the effectiveness of aggregate
economic policy. More specifically, we consider the relationship between contractually
induced price rigidities and monetary policy. In examining this relationship, we restrict ...
[CITATION] 979.“Moral Hazard and Observability.”
B Hölmstrom - Bell Journal of Economics
[CITATION] On Decentralization, Incentives and Control
B Holmström - 1977 - Graduate School of Business, …
[CITATION] Authority, Compensation and Ownership: The Firm as an Incentive System
B Holmstrom, P Milgrom - forthcoming in the American Economic Review, 1993
[CITATION] The Theory of the Firm Revisited
B Holmstrom… - J. Econ. Persp., 1998
[CITATION] Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset
B Holmstrom, P Milgrom - Ownership, and Job Design, JL ECON. & ORG., …, 1991
[CITATION] On incentives and control in organizations Ph. D
B Holmstrom - 1977 - thesis, Stanford University
[CITATION] The State of US Corporate Governance: What's Right and What's Wrong?, 15 J
B Holmstrom, S Kaplan - Applied Corp. Fin, 2003
[CITATION] Measurement Costs and Organization Theory
B Holmstrom, P Milgrom - 1992 - Yale Working Paper Series
[CITATION] Measurement Costs and Organization Theory: The Firm as a Cluster of Attributes
B Holmström,
PR Milgrom… - 1992 - Yale School of Organization and …
[CITATION] Vision and Scope of the Firm
O Hart, B Holmstrom - unpublished typescript, Harvard and MIT, 2002
[CITATION] Corporate Governance and Structural Change Challenges to European Corporate Ownership and Control
B Erik, B Holmström, P Högfeldt, EM Milgrom… - SNS Economic Policy …, 2003
[CITATION] nThe Firm as Incentive System, oAmerican Economic Review, 84
B Holmström, P Milgrom - $991, 1994
[CITATION] Repeated Moral Hazard with Borrowing and Saving: The Exponential Case
D Fudenberg, B Holmstrom… - 1986 - draft
[CITATION] Comments on Contracts and the Market for Executives
B Holmstrom - Contract Economics, Blackwell, Cambridge, …, 1992
[CITATION] Managerial Vision and Firm Scope
O Hart, B Holmström - 2002 - mimeo
[CITATION] Repo Haircuts: No Title Yet
TV Dang, G Gorton… - 2010 - forthcoming working paper
[CITATION] nA Theory of Wage Dynamics, oReview of Economic Studies
H Milton, B Holmstrom - Vol, 1982
[CITATION] A Study of an Internal Labor Market
G Baker, M Gibbs… - 1992 - mimeo, CRDE Conference on …
[CITATION] mOn the Theory of Delegationn
B Holmstrom - Bayesian Models in Economic Theory, Studies in …, 1984
B Holmstrom… - Mimeographed. Evanston, Ill.: …, 1982 - kellogg.northwestern.edu
Abstract: We explore a managerial model of investment behavior in which an incentive
problem arises because one input factor (managerial effort) is not publicly observed. We
show that an optimal incentive contract leads to investment levels which are below first- ...
[CITATION] Multi-Task Principal-Agent Problems
B Holmstrom, P Milgrom - Yale School of Organization and Management, 1989
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