 | Professor of Economics, Brown University Verified email at brown.edu Cited by 700 |
K Eliaz… - The Review of Economic Studies, 2006 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract In standard contract-theoretic models, the underlying assumption is that agent types
differ in their preference or cost parameters, and the principal's objective is to design
contracts in order to screen this type. We study a contract-theoretic model in which the ...
K Eliaz - Review of Economic Studies, 2002 - Wiley Online Library
1 This is true for a setting with asymmetric information, whereas we are dealing with a
symmetric information setting. The example is given only to illustrate why the standard
definition of full implementation needs to be amended in a setting with faulty players.
K Eliaz… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2006 - Elsevier
A commonly held belief in economics is that an individual's preferences that are revealed by
her choices must be complete. This paper takes issue with this position by showing that one
may be able to distinguish between indifference and indecisiveness of an agent upon ...
K Eliaz… - The Review of Economic Studies, 2011 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We study a market model in which competing firms use costly marketing devices to
influence the set of alternatives which consumers perceive as relevant. Consumers in our
model are boundedly rational in the sense that they have an imperfect perception of what ...
A Caplin… - RAND Journal of Economics, 2003 - JSTOR
Economic theorists have given little attention to health-related externalities, such as those
involved in the spread of AIDS. One reason for this is the critical role played by
psychological factors, such as fear of testing, in the continued spread of the disease. We ...
K Eliaz… - Theoretical Economics, 2008 - econtheory.org
Abstract We study monopolistic design of a menu of non-linear tariffs when consumers have
biased prior beliefs regarding their future preferences. In our model, consumers are"
optimistic''if their prior belief assigns too much weight to states of nature characterized by ...
K Eliaz… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2006 - Elsevier
The well-being of agents is often directly affected by their beliefs, in the form of anticipatory
feelings such as anxiety and hopefulness. Economists have tried to model this effect by
introducing beliefs as arguments in decision makers' vNM utility function. One might ...
K Eliaz, D Ray… - The American economic review, 2006 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: The phenomenon of choice shifts in group decision-making has received attention
in the social psychology literature. Faced with a risky group decision, individuals appear to
support more extreme choices relative to those they would make on their own. This paper ...
K Eliaz - Games and Economic Behavior, 2003 - Elsevier
Nash equilibrium is often interpreted as a steady state in which each player holds the correct
expectations about the other players' behavior and acts rationally. This paper investigates
the robustness of this interpretation when there are small costs associated with ...
K Eliaz… - Econometrica, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
When two parties have different prior beliefs about some future event, they can realize gains
through speculative trade. Can these gains be realized when the parties' prior beliefs are not
common knowledge? We examine a simple example in which two parties having ...
K Eliaz, D Ray… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
A model of group decision-making is studied, in which one of two alternatives must be
chosen. While agents differ in their preferences over alternatives, everybody prefers
agreement to disagreement. Our model is distinguished by three features: private ...
K Eliaz - Social Choice and Welfare, 2004 - Springer
This paper proposes a general framework for analyzing a class of functions called social
aggregators, which map profiles of linear orders to a set of binary relations. This class of
aggregators includes aggregators that yield a preference relation (social welfare functions ...
K Eliaz… - The American economic review, 2007 - JSTOR
The classical model of decision making under uncertainty assumes that decision makers
care only about final outcomes. The decision makers' beliefs enter the model only as a
means of weighting the possible material outcomes, yet they do not generate an intrinsic ...
G De Clippel… - Theoretical Economics, 2012 - Wiley Online Library
Among the most important and robust violations of rationality are the attraction and the
compromise effects. The compromise effect refers to the tendency of individuals to choose
an intermediate option in a choice set, while the attraction effect refers to the tendency to ...
K Eliaz… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2010 - Elsevier
This paper presents experimental evidence that when individuals are about to make a given
decision under risk, they are willing to pay for information on the likelihood that this decision
is ex-post optimal, even if this information will not affect their decision. Our findings ...
K Eliaz, T Offerman… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2008 - Elsevier
This paper presents an experimental study of a mechanism that is commonly used to sell
multiple heterogeneous goods. The novel feature of this procedure is that instead of selling
each good in a separate auction, the seller executes a single auction in which buyers, ...
K Eliaz… - 2006 - vlab2.gsb.columbia.edu
Abstract This paper presents experimental evidence suggesting that decision% makers
derive an intrinsic benefit from their posterior beliefs: they prefer to make decisions with a
high posterior of being correct. We demonstrate this in the lab by showing that most sub% ...
Abstract This paper studies a decision maker who for each choice set selects a subset of (at
most) two alternatives. We axiomatize three types of procedures:(i) The top two: the decision
maker has in mind an ordering and chooses the two maximal alternatives.(ii) The two ...
[CITATION] Debraj Ray, and Ronny Razin (2006),“Choice shifts in groups: A decisiontheoretic basis.”
K Eliaz… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2009 - Elsevier
When two agents hold different priors over an unverifiable state of nature, which affects the
outcome of a game they are about to play, they have an incentive to bet on the game's
outcome. We pose the following question: what are the limits to the agents' ability to ...
K Eliaz… - The Economic Journal, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
We present a simple model of how a monopolistic search engine optimally determines the
average relevance of firms in its search pool. In our model, there is a continuum of
consumers, who use the search engine's pool, and there is a continuum of firms, whose ...
Abstract We present experiment evidence of a systematic bias towards “false diversification”
in decision-making under risk. Ie, the majority of our subjects were willing to pay to switch
from a lottery that pays a prize in only one particular state of nature to a lottery that pays a ...
K Eliaz… - CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5433, 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We propose to view action-contingent contracts as bets, motivated by different prior
beliefs between the contracting parties (rather than, say, as an instrument for overcoming
moral hazard problems). Such differences in prior beliefs may arise from inherent biases ...
K Eliaz… - Theoretical Economics, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
This is a substantial reformulation of material that originally appeared as part of a 2006
working paper titled “Consideration Sets and Competitive Marketing.” We thank Amitav
Chakravarti, Eddie Dekel, John Lynch, Ariel Rubinstein, the editor, and the referees of this ...
K Eliaz, D Ray, R Razin… - 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: The phenomenon of choice shifts in group decision-making is fairly ubiquitous in
the social psychology literature. Faced with a choice between a'safe'and'risky'decision,
group members appear to move to one extreme or the other, relative to the choices each ...
K Eliaz - RAND Journal of Economics, 2003 - econ.brown.edu
The Richard B. Salomon Faculty Research Award, Brown University, 2009-2010 NSF,
2007-2010, “Mechanism Design with Diversity of Opinion” SES - 0611938, SES-0802789
(no-cost extension) NSF, 2004-2006, “Group Polarization” SES-0421852 (joint with ...
K Eliaz… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2011 - Elsevier
Framing effects have a significant influence on the finitely repeated matching pennies game.
The combination of being labelled “a guesser,” and having the objective of matching the
opponent's action, appears to be advantageous. We find that being a player who aims to ...
[CITATION] Debraj Ray, and Ronny Razin, 2006, A Decision# Theoretic Basis for Choice Shifts in Groups
K Eliaz - American Economic Review
K Eliaz… - Review of Economic Design, 2008 - Springer
Abstract A collection of large traders holds heterogeneous prior beliefs regarding market
fundamentals. This gives them a motive to engage in speculative trade with respect to
market prices. Rather than assuming a particular institution or market for speculative trade, ...
[CITATION] mA Mechanism# Design Approach to Specula# tive Trade, nEconometrica, forthcoming
K Eliaz… - 2005
K Eliaz - Papers, 2001 - ideas.repec.org
This paper argues that when organizations are imperfect in the sense that members may
make mistakes and messages may be distorted, then the inner structure of the organization
should be explicitly modeled. This paper proposes a framework for studying games ...
K Eliaz, T Offerman… - DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES- …, 2004 - fee.uva.nl
Abstract We study a procedure for selling multiple heterogenous goods, which is commonly
used in practice but rarely studied in the literature. The novel feature of this procedure is that
instead of selling the goods themselves, the seller offers buyers the right to choose among ...
K Eliaz… - 2006 - discovery.ucl.ac.uk
When two agents hold different priors over an unverifiable state of nature, which affects the
outcome of a game they are about to play, they have an incentive to bet on the game's
outcome. We pose the following question: what are the limits to the agents' ability to ...
[CITATION] Andrew Schotter, forthcoming.“Creating Competition Out of Thin Air: An Experimental Study of Right-to-Choose Auctions,”
K Eliaz… - Games and Economic Behavior
[CITATION] Forthcoming.“Consideration Sets and Competitive Marketing.”
K Eliaz… - Review of Economic Studies
[CITATION] mEffi cient Bargaining over Bets, nWorking Paper
K Eliaz… - New York University and University College London, 2006
K Eliaz… - Levine's Working Paper Archive, 2008 - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of
further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site ...
G DeClippel… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Most of the economic literature on bargaining has focused on situations where the
set of possible outcomes is taken as given. This paper is concerned with situations where
decision-makers first need to identify the set of feasible outcomes before they bargain over ...
[CITATION] “Aids Policy and Psychology: A Theoretical Approach
A Caplin… - forthcoming, Rand Journal of Economics. URL: http:// …, 2002
K Eliaz, R Spiegler… - 2002 - primage.tau.ac.il
Abstract The well-being of agents is often directly affected by their beliefs, in the form of
anticipatory feelings such as anxiety. Economists have tried to incorporate such effects by
introducing beliefs as arguments in decision makers' VNM utility function. Intuition ...
R Spiegler… - 2010 - lib.ruppin.ac.il
Abstract We present a simple model of how a monopolistic search engine optimally
determines the average quality of firms in its search pool. In our model, there is a continuum
of consumers, who use the search engine's pool, and there is a continuum of firms, whose ...
The phenomenon of choice shifts in group decision-making is fairly ubiquitous in the social
psychology literature. Faced with a choice between a 'safe'and 'risky'decision, group
members appear to move to one extreme or the other, relative to the choices each ...
A model of group decision-making is studied, in which one of two alternatives must be
chosen. While group members differ in their valuations of the alternatives, everybody prefers
agreement to disagreement. Our model is distinguished by three features: private ...
G de Clippel… - 2009 - cepr.org
This paper proposes a model of boundedly rational choice that explains the well known
attraction and compromise effects. Choices in our model are interpreted as a cooperative
solution to a bargaining problem among an individual's conflicting dual selves. We ...
K Eliaz… - The Economic Journal, 2011 - res.org.uk
We present a simple model of how a monopolistic search engine optimally determines the
average relevance of firms in its search pool. In our model, there is a continuum of
consumers, who use the search engine's pool, and there is a continuum of firms, whose ...
K Eliaz… - … Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings, 2004 - ideas.repec.org
The phenomenon of" choice shifts" in group decision-making is fairly ubiquitous in the social
psychology literature. Faced with a choice between a``safe" and``risky" decision, group
members appear to move to one extreme or the other, relative to the choices each ...
R Spiegler… - Theoretical Economics, 2011 - ideas.repec.org
When a firm decides which products to offer or put on display, it takes into account the
products' ability to attract attention to the brand name as a whole. Thus, the value of a
product to the firm emanates from the consumer demand it directly meets, as well as the ...
When a firm decides which products to offer or put on display, it takes into account the
products' ability to attract attention to the brand name as a whole. Thus, the value of a
product to the firm emanates from the consumer demand it directly meets, as well as the ...
We study a market model in which competing firms use costly marketing devices to influence
the set of alternatives which consumers perceive as relevant. Consumers in our model are
boundedly rational in the sense that they have an imperfect perception of what is relevant ...
G de Clippel… - 2011 - cepr.org
Most of the economic literature on bargaining has focused on situations where the set of
possible outcomes is taken as given. This paper is concerned with situations where decision-
makers first need to identify the set of feasible outcomes before they bargain over which of ...
[CITATION] Social Aggregators
KE NYU - 2001
Abstract. The traditional Ellsberg-type experiment involves the choice between options that
contains no ambiguity (N), and options in which the probability of winning is ambiguous,
while the amount of the prize is not (P). The typical finding is that subjects prefer N to P, ...
G de Clippel,
K Eliaz… - 2011 - cepr.org
A key issue in arbitration, which resolves disputes among parties, involves the procedure for
selecting an arbitrator. We take an implementation-theoretic approach and provide
theoretical, empirical and experimental analyses of this problem. Our findings highlight the ...
G de Clippel… - 2012 - cepr.org
A group of rational individuals with common interest need to select one of two outcomes.
The optimal decision depends on whether certain premises or pieces of evidence are
established as being true, and each member receives a noisy signal of the truth value of ...
We propose to view action-contingent contracts as bets, motivated by different prior beliefs
between the contracting parties (rather than, say, as an instrument for overcoming moral
hazard problems). Such differences in prior beliefs may arise from inherent biases such as ...
In contrast to what we assume in our theoretical models, there is overwhleming evidence
that deci $ sion makers are prone to making mistakes. In ZFault Tolerant Implementation [[3]
I explore the question of designing institutions that are robust to the potential of having a ...
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KE NYU - 2002 - econ.tau.ac.il
Abstract Nash equilibrium is often interpreted as a steady state in which each player holds
the correct expectations about the other players' behavior and acts rationally. This paper
investigates the robustness of this interpretation when there are small costs associated ...
K Eliaz… - 2012 - kellogg.northwestern.edu
• An idea with a long pedigree: reciprocal-fairness/morale concerns prevent wages from
falling during recessions (Keynes 1936, Solow 1979, Akerlof 1982, Bewley 1999, Fehr-Falk
1999)• We incorporate this idea into a search-matching model and study implications for ...
A principal contracts with agents who have diverse abilities to forecast changes in their
future tastes. While the principal knows that the agent's tastes are changing, the agent
believes that with probability?, their future preferences will be identical to their present ...
When agents hold non-common priors over an unverifiable state of nature which affects the
outcome of their future actions, they have an incentive to bet on the outcome. We pose the
following question: what are the limits on the agents' ability to realize gains from ...
D Ray,
K Eliaz… - 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: A model of group decision-making is studied, in which one of two alternatives must
be chosen. While group members differ in their valuations of the alternatives, everybody
prefers some alternative to disagreement. Our model is distinguished by three features: ...
K Eliaz, T Offerman… - 2004 - cepr.org
We study a procedure for selling multiple heterogenous goods, which is commonly used in
practice but rarely studied in the literature. The novel feature of this procedure is that instead
of selling the goods themselves, the seller offers buyers the right to choose among the ...
K Eliaz… - 2009 - cepr.org
This paper presents experimental evidence that when individuals are about to make a given
decision under risk, they are willing to pay for information on the likelihood that this decision
is ex-post optimal, even if this information will not affect their decision. Our findings ...
G De Clippel… - 2012 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: A group of rational individuals with common interest need to select one of two
outcomes. The optimal decision depends on whether certain premises or pieces of evidence
are established as being true, and each member receives a noisy signal of the truth value ...
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