JB Van Huyck, RC Battalio… - The American Economic Review, 1990 - JSTOR
Page 1. Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure
By JOHN B. VAN HUYCK, RAYMOND C. BATTALIO, AND RICHARD 0. BEIL*
Deductive equilibrium methods-such as Rational Expectations ...
H Grossman… - 1989 - nber.org
... Herschel Grossman John Van Huyck Department of Economics Department of Economics Brown
University Texas A&M University Providence, RI 02912 College Station, TX 77843 Page 3. History
suggests the following stylized facts about defaults on Sovereign debt: ...
JB Van Huyck, RC Battalio… - The Quarterly Journal of …, 1991 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Page 1. STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY, EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION, AND
COORDINATION FAILURE IN AVERAGE OPINION GAMES* JOHN B. VAN HUYCK
RAYMOND C. BATTALIO RICHARD 0. BEIL Deductive equilibrium ...
R Battalio, L Samuelson… - Econometrica, 2001 - Wiley Online Library
THE SPECIFICATION OF THE FEASIBLE strategies and preferences that define a strategic-
form game, together with the assumption that players are substantively rational, provides a
powerful framework for analyzing strategic behavior. This framework in turn can be ...
JB Van Huyck, JP Cook… - Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 1997 - Elsevier
JB Van Huyck, AB Gillette… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1992 - Elsevier
JB Van Huyck, RC Battalio… - The Economic Journal, 1997 - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. Wiley Online Library will be disrupted 4
Feb from 10-12 GMT for monthly maintenance. ...
JB Van Huyck, JP Cook… - Journal of Political Economy, 1994 - JSTOR
Page 1. Selection Dynamics, Asymptotic Stability, and Adaptive Behavior John B.
Van Huyck Texas A&M University Joseph P. Cook Technical University-Varna
Raymond C. Battalio Texas A&M University Selection dynamics ...
JB Van Huyck, RC Battalio… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1995 - Elsevier
Page 1. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 10, 143-170 (1995) Commitment versus
Discretion in the Peasant-Dictator Game John B. Van Huyck, Raymond С Battalio,
and Mary F. Walters Texas A&M University, College Station ...
FW Rankin, JB Van Huyck… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2000 - Elsevier
DJ Meyer, JB Van Huyck, RC Battalio… - Journal of Political …, 1992 - JSTOR
Page 1. History's Role in Coordinating Decentralized Allocation Decisions Donald J.
Meyer Western Michigan University John B. Van Huyck, Raymond C. Battalio, and
Thomas R. Saving Texas A&M University What causes individual ...
J Van Huyck, R Battalio, S Mathur… - International Journal of …, 1995 - Springer
We use a dynamical systems approach to model the origin of bargaining conventions and
report the results of a symmetric bargaining game experiment. Our experiment also provides
evidence on the psychological salience of symmetry and efficiency. The observed ...
JB Van Huyck, RC Battalio… - Economic Theory, 2007 - Springer
Page 1. Economic Theory (2007) 33: 53–65 DOI 10.1007/s00199-007-0209-8
SYMPOSIUM John B. Van Huyck · Raymond C. Battalio · Frederick W. Rankin
Selection dynamics and adaptive behavior without much information ...
HI Grossman… - Journal of Monetary Economics, 1986 - Elsevier
This paper derives a reputational equilibrium for inflation in a model in which the sovereign
obtains valuable seigniorage by issuing fiat money in exchange for.
DJ Cooper… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2003 - Elsevier
JB Van Huyck, RC Battalio… - Experimental Economics, 2007 - Springer
Page 1. Exp Econ (2007) 10: 205–220 DOI 10.1007/s10683-007-9175-z Evidence on learning
in coordination games John B. Van Huyck · Raymond C. Battalio · Frederick W. Rankin Published
online: 25 August 2007 © Economic Science Association 2007 ...
JB Van Huyck, JM Wildenthal… - Games and Economic …, 2002 - Elsevier
J Van Huyck, RC Battalio… - … manuscript, Texas A&M …, 2001 - economicscience.us
Abstract: In this paper we use the experimental method to determine whether reputation is a
substitute for commitment in the Peasant-Dictator game. Reputation is an imperfect
substitute for commitment in the experiment. It is less efficient on average. Its effectiveness ...
HI Grossman… - 1985 - en.scientificcommons.org
TF Cosimano… - Journal of Monetary Economics, 1989 - Elsevier
Interest rate stabilization results in an instrument shortage that complicates monetary control
by introducing strategic considerations into the Trading Desk's.
C Nicholas McKinney… - Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 2007 - Elsevier
B Seely, J Van Huyck… - Journal of Public Economics, 2005 - Elsevier
This paper reports an experiment investigating how assignments improve economic
efficiency in a modified version of the standard voluntary-contributions mechanism. The
experiment uses a non-binding message that makes common information assignments in ...
[CITATION] Saving (1992)“History's Role in Coordinating Decentralized Allocation Decisions: Laboratory Evidence on Repeated Binary Allocation Games,”
DJ Meyer, JB Van Huyck, RC Battalio… - Journal of Political Economy
J Van Huyck, R Battalio… - Texas A&M University Economics …, 1996 - Citeseer
Abstract: This paper reports an experiment designed to detect the influence of strategic
uncertainty on behavior in order statistic coordination games, which arise when a player's
best response is an order statistic of the cohort's action combination. Unlike previous ...
H Grossman… - 1994 - nber.org
... issue nominal debts? Herschel Grossman Department of Economics Brown University
Providence, RI 02912 John Van Huyck Department of Economics Texas A&M
University College Station, TX 77843 Page 3. Over the course ...
R Battalio, L Samuelson… - Laser-script, 1997 - pubmail.dklevine.com
Abstract: This paper reports an experiment comparing three stag hunt games that have the
same best-response correspondence. The games have the same expected payoff from the
mixed equilibrium, but differ in the pecuniary incentive a player has to play a best ...
J Van Huyck… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2002 - Elsevier
Most learning experiments involve repeated play of exactly the same situation and, hence,
can not discriminate between learning to use a deductive principle and other forms of
routine learning. In this paper, subjects confront a sequence of similar, but not identical, ...
J Van Huyck - Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, 2008 - Elsevier
A stranger in a foreign land often finds those around him incomprehensible. He may not
understand what they say. They laugh or frown at what he does. Above all it is difficult for a
stranger to give or receive help from the people he meets. Conventions make those ...
CN McKinney… - Experimental economics, 2006 - Springer
Page 1. Exp Econ (2006) 9:297–303 DOI 10.1007/s10683-006-9129-x Does seeing
more deeply into a game increase one's chances of winning? C. Nicholas McKinney
Jr. · John B. Van Huyck Received: 24 January 2005 / Revised ...
[CITATION] Optimization incentives and coordination failure in laboratory stag hunt games
JB Van Huyck, RC Battalio… - Econometrica, 2001
[CITATION] Credible Assignments in Non-cooperative Games
JB Van Huyck, AB Gillette… - Texas A&M University working paper, 1988
HI Grossman… - Journal of Economics and Business, 1993 - Elsevier
This paper analyzes a reputational equilibrium in a model in which nominal sovereign debt
serves to shift risk associated with the unpredictability of tax reven.
J Van Huyck… - Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, 2008 - Elsevier
A central question in economics is how do markets coordinate the behavior of anonymous
decision makers in a many person decentralized economy. Economic theory has
traditionally addressed the question using the equilibrium method, which abstracts away ...
[CITATION] VIs Reputation a Substitute for Commitment in the Peasant'Dictator Game
JB Van Huyck, RC Battalio… - V manu'script, 2001
[CITATION] Contributions and Crowd-Out of Public Goods: Competing Models and Experimental Evidence
T Gronberg, A Luccasen… - Unpublished manuscript, 2003
[CITATION] Frederick w. Rankin. 1997." On the Origin of Convention: Evidence from Coordination Games."
JB van Huyck… - The Economic Journal
[CITATION] Sovereign debt as a contingent claim: Excusable default, repudiation, and reputation, Brown University, Providence
H Grossman… - 1985 - RI
JB Van Huyck - Journal of Monetary Economics, 1987 - econpapers.repec.org
By John B. Van Huyck; A retrospective on the classical gold standard, 1821-1931: A review essay.
J Van Huyck, F Rankin… - Experimental economics, 1999 - Springer
This paper reports an experiment to determine whether subjects will learn to stop using a
strictly dominated strategy that can be an above average reply. It is difficult to find an
experimental design that eliminates the play of the strictly dominated strategy completely. ...
TJ Gronberg, RA Luccasen,
TL Turocy… - 2010 - econweb.tamu.edu
Page 1. The Crowding-Out of Public Goods: Competing Models and Experimental Evidence
Timothy J. Gronberg Texas A&M University R. Andrew Luccasen* Mississippi University for
Women Theodore L. Turocy University of East Anglia John B. Van Huyck ...
[CITATION] Seigniorage, sovereign debt, and reputation
JB Van Huyck - 1986 - Brown University
CN McKinney Jr… - 2004 - economicscience.us
Abstract: This paper investigates whether the variation in estimated rationality bounds is
correlated with the probability of winning when playing against another person in games that
exceed both players estimated rationality bound. Does seeing deeper into a game matter ...
CN McKinney Jr… - 2004 - irving.vassar.edu
Abstract: When learning to play a game well, does it help to play against an opponent who
makes the same sort of mistakes one tends to make or is it better to play against a
procedurally rational algorithm, which never makes mistakes? A procedurally rational ...
CY Horioka, DJ Cooper, S Garvin, JH Kagel… - The Economic …, 1997 - res.org.uk
JB Van Huyck, RC Battalio… - The Economic Journal, 1997 - res.org.uk
[CITATION] 2002 NORTH AMERICAN WINTER MEETING OF THE ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY
L Ausubel, S Berry, U Yale, A Case, PA Chiappori… - Econometrica, 1933 - G. Banta
J Van Huyck, F Rankin… - 1998 - Citeseer
Abstract: This paper reports an experiment to determine whether subjects will learn to stop
using a strictly dominated strategy that can be an above average reply. It is difficult to find an
experimental design that eliminates the play of the strictly dominated strategy completely. ...
TJ Gronberg, RA Luccasen, TL Turocy… - Journal of Public …, 2012 - Elsevier
We report the results of a laboratory experiment on crowd-out in a voluntary contribution
mechanism public goods game. In our setting, a standard argument state.
JH Kagel… - Experimental Economics, 2007 - Springer
... The first paper is one of a series of papers on coordination games that Ray and John Van Huyck
collaborated on, in this case with their student Bill Rankin. This paper is illustrative of the interplay
between experiments and theory designed to or- ganize experimental results. ...
FW Rankin… - 1996 - economicscience.us
... 1996-1998 by the authors. All rights reserved. Page 2. 2 Running Head: Emergent
Conventions. Corresponding Author: John Van Huyck, Department of Economics, Texas
A&M University, College Station, TX 77843-4228. john.vanhuyck@tamu.edu ...
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