M Rabin - The American Economic Review, 1993 - JSTOR
People like to help those who are helping them, and to hurt those who are hurting them.
Outcomes reflecting such motivations are called fairness equilibria. Outcomes are mutual-
max when each person maximizes the other's material payoffs, and mutual-min when ...
M Rabin - Journal of economic literature, 1998 - JSTOR
BECAUSE PSYCHOLOGY systemati-cally explores human judgment, behavior, and well-
being, it can teach us important facts about how humans differ from the way tlhey are
traditionally described by economists. In this essay I discuss a selection of psychological ...
G Charness… - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2002 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract Departures from self-interest in economic experiments have recently inspired
models of “social preferences.” We design a range of simple experimental games that test
these theories more directly than existing experiments. Our experiments show that ...
T O'donoghue… - American Economic Review, 1999 - JSTOR
We examine self-control problems--modeled as time-inconsistent, present-biased
preferences--in a model where a person must do an activity exactly once. We emphasize
two distinctions: Do activities involve immediate costs or immediate rewards, and are ...
M Rabin - Econometrica, 2000 - Wiley Online Library
USING EXPECTED-UTILITY THEORY, economists model risk aversion as arising solely
because the utility function over wealth is concave. This diminishing-marginal-utility-ofwealth
theory of risk aversion is psychologically intuitive, and surely helps explain some of our ...
J Farrell… - The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1996 - JSTOR
* Joseph Farrell is Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, California. He
is also serving as ChiefEconomist at the Federal Communications Commission,
Washington, DC, where he is trying to make talk as cheap as possible; however, his ...
B Kőszegi… - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2006 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We develop a model of reference-dependent preferences and loss aversion where
“gain-loss utility” is derived from standard “consumption utility” and the reference point is
determined endogenously by the economic environment. We assume that a person's ...
C Camerer, S Issacharoff,
G Loewenstein… - … of Pennsylvania Law …, 2003 - JSTOR
Regulation by the state can take a variety of forms. Some regulations are aimed entirely at
redistribution, such as when we tax the rich and give to the poor. Other regulations seek to
counteract externalities by restricting behavior in a way that imposes harm on an ...
M Rabin… - The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2001 - JSTOR
Matthew Rabin and Richard H. Thaler conomics can be distinguished from other social
sciences by the belief that most (all?) behavior can be explained by assuming that rational
agents with stable, well-defined preferences interact in markets that (eventually) clear. An ...
G Loewenstein, T O'Donoghue… - The Quarterly Journal …, 2003 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract People exaggerate the degree to which their future tastes will resemble their current
tastes. We present evidence from a variety of domains which demonstrates the prevalence
of such projection bias, develop a formal model of it, and use this model to demonstrate its ...
M Rabin - European economic review, 2002 - Elsevier
This essay provides a perspective on the recent trend towards integrating psychology into
economics. Some specific topics are discussed briefly, and arguments are provided for why
greater psychological realism will improve mainstream economics.
T O'Donoghue… - Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2001 - JSTOR
Recent models of procrastination due to self-control problems assume that a procrastinator
considers just one option and is unaware of her self-control problems. We develop a model
where a person chooses from a menu of options and is partially aware of her self-control ...
M Rabin… - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1999 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract Psychological research indicates that people have a cognitive bias that leads them
to misinterpret new information as supporting previously held hypotheses. We show in a
simple model that such confirmatory bias induces overconfidence: given any probabilistic ...
When making many choices, a person can broadly bracket them by assessing the
consequences of all of them taken together, or narrowly bracket them by making each
choice in isolation. We integrate research conducted in a wide range of decision contexts ...
M Rabin - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2002 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract People exaggerate the degree to which small samples resemble the population
from which they are drawn. To model this belief in the “Law of Small Numbers,” I assume that
a person exaggerates the likelihood that a short sequence of iid signals resembles the ...
D Bowman, D Minehart… - Journal of Economic …, 1999 - hassler-j.iies.su.se
Abstract We propose a model of consumption and saving based on Kahneman and
Tversky's Prospect Theory that implies a fundamental asymmetry in consumption behavior
inconsistent with other models of consumption. When there is sufficient income uncertainty ...
T O'Donoghue… - The Quarterly Journal of …, 1999 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We examine how principals should design incentives to induce time-inconsistent
procrastinating agents to complete tasks efficiently. Delay is costly to the principal, but the
agent faces stochastic costs of completing the task, and efficiency requires waiting when ...
E Eyster… - Econometrica, 2005 - Wiley Online Library
There is evidence that people do not fully take into account how other people's actions
depend on these other people's information. This paper defines and applies a new
equilibrium concept in games with private information, cursed equilibrium, which assumes ...
T O'Donoghue… - Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 2000 - tinbergen.nl
ABSTRACT People have self-control problems: We pursue immediate gratification in a way
that we ourselves do not appreciate in the long run. Only recently have economists
considered the behavioral and welfare implications of such time-inconsistent preferences. ...
G Charness… - 2000 - escholarship.org
Abstract: Departures from pure self interest in economic experiments have recently inspired
models of" social preferences". We conduct experiments on simple two-person and three-
person games with binary choices that test these theories more directly than the array of ...
B Koszegi… - The American Economic Review, 2007 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: We use Koőszegi and Rabin's (2006) model of reference-dependent utility, and an
extension of it that applies to decisions with delayed consequences, to study preferences
over monetary risk. Because our theory equates the reference point with recent ...
T O'Donoghue… - The American economic review, 2003 - JSTOR
The classical economic approach to policy analysis assumes that people always respond
optimally to the costs and benefits of their available choices. A great deal of evidence
suggests, however, that in some contexts people make errors that lead them not to behave ...
M Rabin - Journal of Economic Theory, 1990 - Elsevier
Abstract Conventional game-theoretic solution concepts never guarantee meaningful
communication in cheap-talk games. I define a solution concept which does guarantee
communication in some games. I assume full rationality without imposing equilibrium ...
M Rabin - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1994 - Elsevier
Abstract When people behave immorally according to their own standards, they feel bad.
Rational people may therefore engage in less of an immoral activity than would be in their
material self-interest. Despite this fact, I show that increasing people's distaste for being ...
TED O'DONOGHUE… - Behavioral dimensions of …, 1999 - books.google.com
For many years economists have hypothesized that people may save too little because they
lack self-control.'Such studies have examined how people who seek immediate gratification
may sacrifice too much future consumption for the sake of current consumption and end ...
T O'Donoghue… - Journal of Public Economics, 2006 - Elsevier
We investigate “sin taxes” on unhealthy items, such as fatty foods, that people may (by their
own reckoning) consume too much of. We employ a standard optimal-taxation framework,
but replace the standard assumption that all consumers have 100% self control with an ...
T O'Donoghue… - Addiction: Entries and exits, 1999 - iew.uzh.ch
Abstract We explore the implications of self-control problems–formalized as a time-
inconsistent taste for immediate gratification–for the consumption of harmful addictive
products. We also examine the implications of whether a person is sophisticated–aware of ...
M Rabin - 1995 - escholarship.org
Abstract Economists have formally modeled moral dispositions by directly incorporating into
utility analysis concern for the well-being of others. But sometimes moral dispositions are not
preferences, as connoted by utility analysis, but rather are ingrained as (internal) ...
M Rabin - 2000 - escholarship.org
Economists pervasively explain widespread risk aversion by the realistic assumption that
people generally have diminishing marginal utility of wealth. Indeed, diminishing marginal
utility of wealth probably explains much of our aversion to large-scale financial risk: We ...
B Koszegi… - The American Economic Review, 2009 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: We develop a rational dynamic model in which people are loss averse over
changes in beliefs about present and future consumption. Because changes in wealth are
news about future consumption, preferences over money are reference-dependent. If ...
T O'Donoghue… - 2001 - nber.org
The goal of this volume is to provide an economic analysis of risky behavior among youths,
loosely defined to be behavior by people under age nineteen that might have important
future ramifications. Examples of such behaviors include smoking, drinking, having ...
T O'Donoghue… - 2002 - escholarship.org
Abstract: We investigate the role that self-control problems—modeled as time-inconsistent,
presentbiased preferences—and a person's awareness of those problems might play in
leading people to develop and maintain harmful addictions. Present-biased preferences ...
T O'Donoghue, M Rabin - Time and Decision: Economic and …, 2003 - books.google.com
JL eople have self-control problems: from a prior perspective, they want to behave relatively
patiently, but as the moment of action approaches, they want to behave relatively
impatiently. 1 While the existence of self-control problems is well established and much ...
G Charness… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2005 - Elsevier
Participants in experimental games typically can only choose actions, without making
comments about other participants' future actions. In sequential two-person games, we allow
first movers to express a preference between responder choices. We find that responder ...
M Rabin… - The American economic review, 2009 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: We show that any decision maker who" narrowly brackets"(evaluates decisions
separately) and does not have constant-absolute-risk-averse preferences will make a first-
order stochastically dominated combined choice in some simple pair of independent ...
[CITATION] Revealed mistakes and revealed preferences
B Koszegi… - The foundations of positive and normative economics: …, 2008
B Kőszegi… - Journal of Public Economics, 2008 - Elsevier
This article explores some conceptual issues in the study of well-being using the traditional
economic approach of inferring preferences solely from choice behavior. We argue that
choice behavior alone can never reveal which situations make people better off, even with ...
TO Donoghue… - Econometric Society Monographs, 2006 - books.google.com
Abstract We investigate the design of incentives for people subject to self-control problems
in the form of a time-inconsistent taste for immediate gratification. Because such present-
biased people may not behave in their own long-run best interests, there is scope for firms ...
T O'Donoghue… - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2008 - Elsevier
We investigate naive procrastination on projects with multiple stages. In addition to classic
procrastination in starting projects, naive people might undertake costly effort to begin
projects but then never finish. Procrastination is more likely when the costs of completing ...
J Le Grand… - 1986 - eprints.lse.ac.uk
M Rabin… - Review of Economic Studies, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
We develop a model of the gambler's fallacy—the mistaken belief that random sequences
should exhibit systematic reversals. We show that an individual who holds this belief and
observes a sequence of signals can exaggerate the magnitude of changes in an ...
[CITATION] Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics
R Matthew - American Economic Review, 1993
[CITATION] Incorporating fairness into economics and game theory
M Rabin - American Economic Review, 1993
M Rabin - Problems of coordination in economic activity, 1994 - Springer
The standard approach to making predictions in noncooperative game theory is to invoke
internal consistency: Behavior is only ruled out when we can argue that if players came to
believe in the behavior, then at least one player would wish to deviate. Such internal- ...
B Kőszegi… - The American economic review, 2007 - JSTOR
Economics has always been concerned not only with describing or predicting economic
behavior but also with understanding economic well-being. The traditional, official way
economists (claimed to) have assessed well-being is from" revealed preference"''- ...
[CITATION] Economics and psychology
M Rabin - Journal of Economic Literature, 1998
M Rabin… - 1993 - escholarship.org
Abstract Many standard solution concepts rule out those Nash equilibria that are susceptible
to deviations. We propose a framework for considering not only which equilibria are not
susceptible to deviations. but also which equiiibria are likely to persist in the long run ...
M Rabin… - Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2002 - econpapers.repec.org
Downloads: (external link) http://www.e-jep.org/archive/1602/16020229.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members. ... Related works: This item may be available
elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
M Rabin - Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1993 - Oxford Univ Press
It has long been recognized that there are difficulties with economic agents selling
potentially useful private information to others. Arrow (1962) and others have emphasized
this problem in the context of marketing innovations. A person who believes that she has ...
T O'Donoghue… - University of California, Berkeley, 2003 - sticerd.lse.ac.uk
Abstract Economists currently analyze optimal commodity taxation based on the assumption
that people's choices fully reflect their own best interests. In this paper, we extend optimal-
tax theory by studying the welfare effects of “sin taxes” on unhealthy items, such as fatty ...
[CITATION] Optimal taxes for sin goods
TO Donoghue, M Rabin - Swedish …, 2005 - ECONOMIC COUNCIL OF SWEDEN
G Charness… - Unpublished Manuscript, 2000 - Citeseer
Abstract: Departures from pure self-interest in economic experiments have recently inspired
models of “social preferences”. We conduct experiments on simple games that test these
theories more directly than the array of games conventionally considered. Our ...
M Rabin - New frontiers in economics, 2004 - books.google.com
The formal neoclassical paradigm that has dominated economics for decades draws out the
implications of a narrow conception of human nature-that we are entirely rational. time-
consistent pursuers of our material self-interest. Although there have always been ...
E Eyster, M Rabin… - 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: In social-learning environments, we investigate implications of the assumption that
people naively believe that each previous person's action reflects solely that person's private
information, leading them to systematically imitate all predecessors even in the many ...
M Rabin - 1997 - escholarship.org
In Rabin (1993), I develop a game—theoretic model of some social components of
preferences which have conventionally been ignored by economists. The solution concept
fairness equilibrium assumes that people may prefer to sacrifice their material we11— ...
D Bowman, D Minehart… - 1993 - escholarship.org
Abstract Psychological evidence indicates that a person's well-being depends not only on
his current consumption of goods, but on a reference level determined by his past
consumption. According to Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) prospect theory, people care ...
M Rabin - The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
In an essay on his web page, Paul Krugman recommends as his first rule of research to
young economists that they “Listen to the Gentiles.… Pay attention to what intelligent people
are saying, even if they do not have your customs or speak your analytical language.” His ...
M Rabin - Social Research: An International Quarterly, 2006 - Social Research
In recent years, experimental economists have complemented earlier research by
psychologists on equity theory, altruism, and related theories, by studying the anonymous
allocation of dollar prizes by experimental subjects. This research has helped us ...
[CITATION] Advances in behavioral economics
G Loewenstein, M Rabin… - Russell Sage Foundation, New York, NY, 2004
M Rabin - 1997 - escholarship.org
Abstract: Experiments with the ultimatum game—where one party can make a take-it-or-
leave-it offer to a second party on how to split a pie—illustrate that conventional game theory
has been wrong in its predictions regarding the simplest of bargaining settings: Even ...
M Rabin - University of California, Berkeley, Department of …, 1997 - Citeseer
Abstract Within the expected-utility framework, the only explanation for risk aversion is that
the utility function for wealth is concave: A person has lower marginal utility for additional
wealth when she is wealthy than when she is poor. This paper provides a theorem ...
[CITATION] Psychology and Economics, 36 J
M Rabin - ECON. LITERATURE, 1998
[CITATION] Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky
M Rabin - American Economists of the Late Twentieth Century …, 1996
[CITATION] Endogenous preferences in games
M Rabin - American Economic Review, 1993
[CITATION] Doing it now or later
M Rabin… - American Economic Review, 1999
E Eyster… - … London School of Economics: London, UK, 2008 - emlab.berkeley.edu
Abstract In a social-learning environment, we investigate implications of the assumption that
players naively believe that a previous player's actions reflect solely that player's private
information. This error leads players to inadvertently over-weight early players' private ...
[CITATION] Studying Optimal Paternalism
T O'Donoghue… - Illustrated by a Model of Sin Taxes, 2003
[CITATION] Expressed Preferences and Reciprocity in Experimental Games
G Charness… - 2001 - mimeo
E Eyster… - American economic journal: …, 2010 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: In social-learning environments, we investigate implications of the assumption that
people naïvely believe that each previous person's action reflects solely that person's private
information. Naïve herders inadvertently over-weight early movers' private signals by ...
[CITATION] Modelling Reference-Dependent Preferences
B Koszegi… - 2003 - Berkeley mimeo
[CITATION] Some simple tests of social preferences and a new model
G Charness… - 2000 - Discussion Paper, University of …
M Rabin - Game Theory and Information, 2001 - ideas.repec.org
Arrow (1971) shows that an expected-utility maximizer with a differentiable utility function will
always want to take a sufficiently small stake in any positive-expected-value bet. That is,
expected-utility maximizers are arbitrarily close to risk neutral when stakes are arbitrarily ...
OD Ted… - J. PUB. ECON., 2006 - econ.berkeley.edu
We investigate the welfare effects of—sin taxes “on unhealthy items, such as fatty foods, that
people may (by their own reckoning) consume too much of. The standard economic
approach to taxation a priori assumes that there is no such—over-consumption “, and ...
[CITATION] Risk-aversion for small stakes: A calibration theorem
M Rabin - Econometrica, 2000
[CITATION] Revealed preferences and revealed mistakes
B Kőszegi… - 2008 - The Foundations of Positive and …
[CITATION] Advances in Behavioral Economics. New York/Princeton, NJ: Russell Sage Foundation
CF Camerer, G Loewenstein… - 2003 - Princeton University Press
OD Ted… - 2000 - econpapers.repec.org
Recent models of procrastination due to self-control problems assume that a procrastinator
considers just one option and is unaware of her self-control problems. We develop a model
where a person chooses from a menu of options and is partially aware of her self-control ...
[CITATION] Social Preferences: Some Simple Tests and a New Model
M Rabin… - 1999 - mimeo
[CITATION] Forthcoming.“Risk Aversion and Expected-Utility Theory: A Calibration Theorem,”
M Rabin - Econometrica
[CITATION] Forthcoming.“Narrow Bracketing and Dominated Choices.”
M Rabin… - American Economic Review
[CITATION] Thaler 2002,“Response (Anomalies: Risk Aversion)”
M Rabin - Journal of Economic Perspectives
[CITATION] Bargaining Structure, Fairness
M Rabin - 1997 - and efficiency. Working paper, …
[CITATION] 998.“Psychology and Economics.”
M Rabin - Journal of Economic Literature
[CITATION] VThe Gamblerps and Hot&Hand Fallacies: Theory and Applications
M Rabin… - V Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming, 2009
[CITATION] forthcoming. A model of reference-dependent preferences
B Koszegi… - Quarterly Journal of Economics
[CITATION] Cheap Talk 1996
J Farrell… - The J ournd rf E œnonic Perspectives
[CITATION] Incentives and procrastinations
T O'Donkghue… - Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1999
[CITATION] Some Simple Tests of Preferences and a New Model."
G Charness… - 2000
[CITATION] Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics”(1993)
M Rabin - Am. Econ. Rev.
[CITATION] QDoing It Now or Later, R American Economic Review, March 1999, 89 (1), 1o3S124. and, QIncentives for Procrastinators
T OPDonoghue… - R Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1999
[CITATION] Cheap Talk, 10
[CITATION] Procrastination in preparing for retirement
M Rabin… - … of Retirement Economics, Brookings Institution Press & …, 1999
[CITATION] 0Addiction and SelfMControl, 1 in Addiction: Entries and Exits, J
T OGDonoghue… - New York:, NY: Russel Sage Foundation, 1999
[CITATION] First Impressions Matter: A Model of Confirmatory Bias, 114Q
M Rabin… - J. ECON, 1999
[CITATION] nUnderstanding social preferences with simple testsoDepartment of Economics Working paper No
G Charness… - E02&317, University of California& Berkeley, 2001
[CITATION] Reference-Dependent Consumption Paths
B Koszegi… - American Economic Review, 2006
[CITATION] Arrow, Kenneth J. et al., eds. The rational foundations of economic behaviour: Proceedings of the IEA Conference held in Turin, Italy
M Rabin - Journal of Economic Literature, 1997 - AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOC
[CITATION] VStudying Optimal Paternalism
OD Ted… - 2003 - Illustrated
[CITATION] Diminishing Marginal Utility of Wealth Cannot Explain Risk Aversion (in Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky eds.)
M Rabin - Choices, Values, and Frames, Russell Sage …, 2000
[CITATION] Risk Aversion and Diminishing Marginal Utility: A Calibration Theorem
M Rabin - 1997 - Mimeo, U. of California at Berkeley, …
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