P Keefer… - Journal of Law, Economics, and …, 2008 - Oxford Univ Press
Abstract Despite having adopted the political institutions of established democracies,
democratizing countries display a systematically different pattern of fiscal outcomes. This
article attributes these differences to the low credibility of electoral promises in new ...
P Keefer… - 2005 - books.google.com
" Keefer and Vlaicu demonstrate that sharply different policy choices across democracies
can be explained as a consequence of differences in the ability of political competitors to
make credible pre-electoral commitments to voters. Politicians can overcome their ...
R Vlaicu - 2008 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper introduces institutions in the standard political agency model with
adverse selection and moral hazard (eg Besley 2006). It shows that when an executive has
more policy expertise than the community that hired him, the particular institution used to ...
D Diermeier… - American Political Science Review …, 2008 - Cambridge Univ Press
We present a theory of parties-in-legislatures that can generate partisan policy outcomes
despite the absence of any party-imposed voting discipline. Legislators choose all
procedures and policies through majority-rule bargaining and cannot commit to vote ...
D Diermeier… - The Review of Economic Studies, 2011 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract The higher legislative success of parliamentary governments relative to presidential
governments has been used to argue that legislative success is driven by parliamentary
governments' superior agenda power or their control of legislative majorities. We show ...
[CITATION] Credibility, clientelism and democracy
P Keefer… - Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 2008
[CITATION] Forthcoming.“Democracy, Credibility, and Clientelism.”
P Keefer… - Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
[CITATION] Democracy, Credibility and Clientelism.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3472
P Keefer… - 2005
D Diermeier… - University of Maryland. Working paper, 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: A puzzling feature of legislative organization is the continuous support by a
majority of seemingly non-majoritarian procedures, such as non-median committees and
limits on amendments. This paper studies a legislature's choice of procedures. We focus ...
[CITATION] qExecutive Performance under Direct and Hierarchical Accountability Structures: Theory and Evidence. rWorking paper
R Vlaicu - 2008
R Vlaicu… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: How are the incentives of an indirectly-elected policymaker different from those of a
directly-elected policymaker? Using a principal-monitor-agent model with adverse selection
and moral hazard we show that hierarchical accountability weakens the policymaker's ...
R Vlaicu - 2008 - economia.uniandes.edu.co
Abstract This paper introduces institutions in the standard political agency model with ad#
verse selection and moral hazard. I analyze two basic accountability mechanisms for the
executive branch of government: direct popular election vs. appointment by a popularly ...
R Vlaicu - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper revisits theoretically and empirically the claim that fragmentation of
decisionmaking power in fiscal affairs creates a bias towards increased government
spending and poor budget discipline. I propose a new channel for this effect, which ...
R Vlaicu - Review of Economic Studies, 2011 - ecprnet.eu
Abstract The higher legislative success of parliamentary governments relative to presidential
govern% ments has been used to argue that legislative success is driven by parliamentary
governmentsm superior agenda power or their control of legislative majorities. We show ...
R Vlaicu - 2006 - gradworks.umi.com
Abstract: This dissertation contains three independent chapter-essays that study effects of
alternative executive and legislative institutions for public policy and political accountability.
Chapter one addresses the conceptual problems involved in measuring an executive's ...
R Vlaicu… - APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper, 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: A puzzling feature of legislative organization is the continuous support by a
majority of seemingly non-majoritarian procedures, such as non-median committees and
limits on amendments. This paper studies a legislature's choice of procedures. We focus ...
R Vlaicu… - Public Choice, 2011 - Springer
Abstract This paper examines the effects of the most recent US housing bubble on the fiscal
policy of California cities. We use an instrumental variables approach that helps isolate the
fiscal consequences of house price appreciation by taking advantage of the influence of ...
R Vlaicu - 2008 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between pressure groups and British
executive-legislative institutions during a period of increased government interventionism
following the Second World War. In spite of a phase of tripartite institutions and practices, ...
[CITATION] Course: Corporate Finance Professor Dušan Mramor
BE Bálint, M Marcu, RC Vlaicu…
R Vlaicu - 2009 - europealumni.kellogg.northwestern. …
Abstract A puzzling feature of legislative organization is the continuous support by a majority
of seemingly non $ majoritarian procedures, such as non $ median committees and limits on
amend $ ments. This paper studies a legislatureks choice of procedures. We focus on how ...
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