My Citations
Scholar Home
  Advanced Scholar Search



Scholar      Create email alertResults 1 - 37 of 37. (0.14 sec) 

Auditing without commitment

[PDF] from washington.edu
F Khalil - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1997 - JSTOR
I study the optimal contract when a principal cannot commit to an audit policy. The contract
must provide incentives for the agent to comply as well as for the principal to audit. The key
tradeoff is efficiency versus noncompliance instead of the familiar rent versus efficiency. ...
Cited by 183 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - BL Direct - All 11 versions

Gathering information before signing a contract

[PDF] from univ-tlse1.fr
J Crémer… - The American Economic Review, 1992 - JSTOR
After being offered a contract, an agent has the possibility to observe the state of nature. This
enables him to refuse the contract in unfavorable states but burdens him with an observation
cost. We show that the principal offers a contract in which the agent has no incentive to ...
Cited by 161 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 16 versions

Contracts and productive information gathering

[PDF] from washington.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
J Crémer, F Khalil… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1998 - Elsevier
We modify a standard Baron–Myerson model by assuming that, instead of knowing the state
of nature, the agent has to incur a cost γ to learn it. Under these conditions, the principal will
offer contracts that, depending on the value of γ, try to induce the agent to gather or not to ...
Cited by 143 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 12 versions

Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered

[PDF] from upi-yptk.ac.id
Full text - MIT Libraries
J Cremer, F Khalil… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1998 - Elsevier
In a Baron–Myerson setup, we study a situation where an agent is initially uninformed, but
can, at a cost, acquire information about the state of nature before the principal offers him a
contract. For intermediate values of the cost of acquiring information, the agent's ...
Cited by 129 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 18 versions

Collusive auditors

Full text - MIT Libraries
F Khalil… - The American Economic Review, 1995 - JSTOR
In the last 15 years, principal-agent theory has been applied to a diverse set of topics such
as industrial organization, macroeconomics, regulation, finance, accounting, corporate
governance, and so forth. This theory has become the mainstay for modeling ...
Cited by 63 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 8 versions

Input versus output monitoring: who is the residual claimant?

[PDF] from upi-yptk.ac.id
Full text - MIT Libraries
F Khalil… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1995 - Elsevier
We observe that residual claimancy can be a source of rent in a principal-agent relationship.
We show that the choice between input or output monitoring will be chiefly determined by
the identity of the residual claimant of the principal-agent relationship. The principal will ...
Cited by 50 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 9 versions

Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting

[PDF] from univ-tlse1.fr
Full text - MIT Libraries
F Khalil, D Martimort… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
Multiple principals want to obtain income from a privately informed agent and design their
contracts non-cooperatively. The degree of coordination between principals shapes the
contracts and affects the amount of monitoring. Equity-like contracts and excessive ...
Cited by 48 - Related articles - Library Search - All 43 versions

Loan size as a commitment device

F Khalil… - International Economic Review, 1998 - JSTOR
We model risky lending with costly state verification, but without commitment to an audit
strategy. The borrower under-reports with a positive probability in the successful state, and
the lender audits with a positive probability after a report of failure. Under lack of ...
Cited by 44 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - BL Direct - All 10 versions

INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTIBLE AUDITORS IN THE ABSENCE OF COMMITMENT*

Full text - MIT Libraries
F Khalil… - The Journal of Industrial Economics, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
In the absence of commitment to auditing, we study the optimal auditing contract when collusion
between an agent and an auditor is possible. We show that the auditor can be totally useless
if the auditor's independence can be compromised with relative ease. Even very stiff ...
Cited by 41 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 13 versions

Gathering information before the contract is offered: the case with two states of nature

Full text - MIT Libraries
J Crémer… - European Economic Review, 1994 - Elsevier
Focusing on a Baron-Myerson model with two states of nature, in the first part of the paper,
we study the contract that a principal would offer to an agent when he does not know
whether the agent is informed or not about the state of nature. In the second, we ...
Cited by 33 - Related articles - All 6 versions

Optimal task design: To integrate or separate planning and implementation?

[PDF] from psu.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
F Khalil, D Kim… - Journal of Economics & Management …, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
Integrating planning and implementation, by having one agent perform both tasks, may be
effective in encouraging planning activity whose outcome is not observable. Emphasizing its
information-generating role, we find that planning activity is best encouraged by partially ...
Cited by 26 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 19 versions

Catching the agent on the wrong foot: ex post choice of monitoring

[PDF] from washington.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
F Khalil… - Journal of Public Economics, 2001 - Elsevier
In a principal-agent model with multiple performance measures, we show that the principal
benefits by choosing ex post which variables will be monitored. If it is too costly for one type
of agent to mimic all performance measures expected from another type, the principal can ...
Cited by 22 - Related articles - All 12 versions

Bribery vs. extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils

[PDF] from harvard.edu
F Khalil, J Lawarrée… - Presented at CESifo Area …, 2007 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Rewards to prevent supervisors from accepting bribes create incentives for
extortion. This raises the question whether a supervisor who can engage in bribery and
extortion can still be useful in providing incentives. By highlighting the role of team work in ...
Cited by 21 - Related articles - All 60 versions

Third party purchasing of health services: Patient choice and agency

[PDF] from washington.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
M Chalkley… - Journal of health economics, 2005 - Elsevier
Health care provision is almost universally characterised by third party purchasing in which
the provider of health services is reimbursed by an agency (public or private insurer), rather
than the patient. We show how a purchaser can manage the incentives that patient choice ...
Cited by 16 - Related articles - All 14 versions

[CITATION] On commitment and collusion in auditing

F Khalil… - Working Papers, 2000 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks. On
Commitment and Collusion in Auditing. Fahad Khalil and Jacques Lawarree. ...
Cited by 13 - Related articles - Cached - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 6 versions

[CITATION] E.,” Imperfect Information In The Product Market,” Handbook Of Industrial Organization

J Stiglitz, R Schmalensee, R Willig, FJ Ledesma… - 1989 - en.scientificcommons.org
deutsch english. Publikationsansicht. 1010641. Imperfect information in the product market.
Handbook of Industrial Organization. Stiglitz, Joseph E.,; R. Schmalensee,; R. Willig.
Details der Publikation. Download, http://www.sciencedirect ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - Cached

[CITATION] ee, 1995, Collusive Auditors

Full text - MIT Libraries
F Khalil… - American Economic Review
Cited by 5 - Related articles

Auditing without Commitment

F Khalil - Discussion Papers in Economics at the …, 1992 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract I study the optimal contract when a principal cannot commit to an audit. The contract
must provide incentives for the agent to comply as well as for the principal to audit. The key
tradeoff is efficiency versus noncompliance instead of the familiar rent versus efficiency. ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - Cached - All 6 versions

Third party purchasing and incentives: the" Outcome Movement” and contracts for health services

[PDF] from dundee.ac.uk
M Chalkley… - 2001 - discovery.dundee.ac.uk
The Outcomes Movement, also referred to as the “third revolution in medical care” has
focused attention and resources on assessing the effectiveness of medical treatments.
Outcomes research aims at determining the nature of effective treatment regimes for ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - All 3 versions

Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils

Full text - MIT Libraries
F Khalil, J Lawarrée… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
Both bribery and extortion weaken the power of incentives, but there is a trade-off in fighting
the two because rewards to prevent supervisors from accepting bribes create incentives for
extortion. Which is the worse evil? A fear of inducing extortion may make it optimal to ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - All 7 versions

[CITATION] Commitment in Auditing

F Khalil - 1990 - mimeo, Department of Economics, …
Cited by 4 - Related articles

[PDF] Screening, monitoring and consumer credit

[PDF] from unipd.it
F Khalil… - 2001 - tiche.decon.unipd.it
Abstract We construct a model in which ex ante screening of loan applicants and ex-post
auditing are ways in which banks reduce the risk that loans are not reimbursed. When the
loan size is small with respect to the audit cost as in consumer credit, lenders may have ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 5 versions

[CITATION] Jean $ Charles Rochet (1998a): mContracts and Productive Information Gathering, nGames and Economic Behavior, 25

J Cremer… - $193
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[CITATION] mGathering Information before Signing a Con $ tract, nAmerican Economic Review, 82

J Cremer… - $578, 1992
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[CITATION] Jean $ Charles Rochet (1998b), mStrategic Information Gathering before a Contract is Offered, nJournal of Economic Theory, 81

J Cremer… - $200
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[CITATION] Input versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant?

Full text - MIT Libraries
K Fahad… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1995 - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of
further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - Cached - All 3 versions

[PDF] Applied Microeconomics

[PDF] from cesifo-group.de
F Khalil, J Lawarree… - cesifo-group.de
Abstract When the information used by a principal to monitor an agent is private, ie, non-
verifiable by a third party, the principal has a credibility issue. The principal must convince
the agent that she will not distort the private information. This requirement may lead to an ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 3 versions

[PDF] Contracts in Bureaucracies

[PDF] from psu.edu
F Khalil, D Kim… - Working Papers, 2008 - Citeseer
“In the days leading up to September 30, the federal government is Cinderella, courted by
legions of individuals and organizations eager to get grants and contracts from the
unexpended funds still at the disposal of each agency. At midnight on September 30, the ...
Related articles - View as HTML - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 6 versions

[PDF] Allowing the lesser of two evils: bribery or extortion?

[PDF] from kobe-u.ac.jp
F Khalil, J Lawarrée… - 2006 - rieb.kobe-u.ac.jp
Abstract Rewards to prevent enforcement agents from accepting bribes create incentives for
extortion. We present a model where a supervisor who can engage in bribery and extortion
can still be useful in providing incentive. We show that bribery may be allowed, but ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 3 versions

[CITATION] Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment," in the" Journal of Industrial Economics"(2006)

F Khalil… - Working Papers - University of Washington, …
Get it from MIT Libraries - All 3 versions

[CITATION] Essays on information gathering in principal-agent contracts

FA Khalil - 1991 - scholar.lib.vt.edu
Title page for ETD etd-02012006-141718. Type of Document, Dissertation. Author, Khalil, Fahad
Ahmed. URN, etd-02012006-141718. Title, Essays on information gathering in principal-agent
contracts. Degree, Ph. D. Department, Economics. Advisory Committee, Advisor Name ...
Cached - All 3 versions

[PDF] Bribery vs. Extortion: Allowing the Lesser of Two Evils Fahad Khalil, Jacques Lawarrée and Sungho Yun

[PDF] from cesifo-group.de
F Khalil - cesifo-group.de
Abstract Rewards to prevent enforcement agents from accepting bribes create incentives for
extortion. We present a model where a supervisor who can engage in bribery and extortion
can still be useful in providing incentives. We show that bribery may be allowed, but ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 5 versions

[CITATION] Essays in the Economics of Information, Incentives, and the Law

A Finkle, F Khalil… - 2004 - en.scientificcommons.org
Cached - Library Search - All 3 versions

[PDF] Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats

[PDF] from ergonline.org.bd
F Khalil, D Kim… - 2011 - ergonline.org.bd
Abstract We examine the power of incentive schemes in bureaucracies by studying contracts
offered by a bureaucrat to her agent. The bureaucrat operates under a fixed budget and can
engage in policy drift, which we define as inversely related to her intrinsic motivation. We ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 2 versions

Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information

F Khalil, J Lawarree… - Working Papers, 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: When the information used by a principal to monitor an agent is private, ie, non-
verifiable by a third party, the principal has a credibility issue. The principal must convince
the agent that she will not distort the private information. This requirement may lead to an ...
Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 4 versions

[PDF] Private Monitoring and Collusion

[PDF] from ecares.org
F Khalil, J Lawarree… - ecares.org
Abstract When the information used by a principal to monitor an agent is private, ie, non-
verifiable by a third party, the principal has a credibility issue. The principal must convince
the agent that she will not distort the private information. This requirement may lead to an ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 4 versions

[CITATION] An introduction to game theory

F Khalil
Related articles

 Create email alert



 

About Google Scholar - All About Google - My Citations

©2012 Google