CZ Qin - Journal of Economic Theory, 1996 - upi-yptk.ac.id
This paper presents an approach for studying how cooperation among players in a
coalitional game might arise endogenously. The approach begins with Myerson's [10]
general representation of a cooperation structure as a set of undirected bilateral links ...
G Charness, GR Frechette… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2007 - Elsevier
We test a two-stage compensation mechanism for promoting cooperation in Prisoner's
Dilemma games. Players first simultaneously choose binding non-negative amounts to pay
their counterparts for cooperating, and then play the induced game knowing these ...
CZ Qin - Journal of Economic Theory, 1993 - Elsevier
Abstract The inner core, motivated by the study of competitive outcomes in the cores of
market games, is shown to be contained in the strictly inhibitive set, and coincides with the
strictly inhibitive set for a large class of games. Journal of Economic Literature ...
CZ Qin… - Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 1997 - Springer
Maynard Smith (1972) proposed a static notion of equilibrium for evolutionary games.
Roughly, an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is a strategy x that resists invasion in the
sense that any ''mutant''strategy that arises at a low rate in a population playing x tends to ...
R Garratt… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1996 - Elsevier
Lotteries are introduced in the exchange model of Shapley and Scarf (J. Math. Econ. 1
(1974), 23-37). In competition, traders buy and sell probabilities on houses. When
considering the core, feasible allocations of the economy and blocking allocations of ...
CZ Qin… - Economic Theory, 1997 - Springer
Summary. Bertrand criticized Cournot's analysis of the competitive process, arguing that
firms should be seen as playing a strategy of setting price below competitors' prices
(henceforth, the Bertrand strategy) instead of a strategy of accepting the price needed to ...
Q Cheng-Zhong - Games and Economic Behavior, 1994 - Elsevier
Abstract Sufficient conditions for a general n-person game to have a nonempty inner core
are established. They relate to the balancedness condition and characterize a class of NTU
games that is larger than the class of compactly generated and balanced with slack ...
R Garratt, T Keister, CZ Qin… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2002 - Elsevier
We analyze sunspot-equilibrium prices in nonconvex economies with perfect markets and a
continuous sunspot variable. Our primary result is that every sunspot equilibrium allocation
can be supported by prices that, when adjusted for probabilities, are constant across ...
CZ Qin - International Journal of Game Theory, 1993 - Springer
It is shown that for every NTUmarket game, there is amarket thatrepresents the game
whosecompetitive payoff vectors completely fill up theinner core of the game. It is also
shown that for every NTU market game and for any point in its inner core, there is a market ...
R Garratt… - Economics Bulletin, 2003 - econ.ucsb.edu
Abstract This paper looks at cooperation structures that result from a strategic game where
players make simultaneous proposals for cooperation. We identify cooperation structures
that maximize the potential of the game, and show how the outcome of potential maxr ...
R Garratt… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1997 - Elsevier
Given a game, the set of joint lotteries over partitions of the agents of any subgame induces
a subset of the vectors of balancing weights for the subgame. Games whose subgames are
all balanced with respect to these vectors of balancing weights are called totally L- ...
CZ Qin, LS Shapley… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2006 - Elsevier
The Walras core of an economy is the set of allocations that are attainable for the consumers
when their trades are constrained to be based on some agreed price system, such that no
alternative price system exists for any sub-coalition that allows all members to trade to ...
B Hehenkamp, CZ Qin… - Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 1999 - Springer
Abstract. We study economic natural selection in classical oligopoly settings. When
underlying pure strategies consist of a finite number of prices, convex monotonic dynamics
always converge under a weak condition to the smallest price in the support of the initial ...
R Garratt, CZ Qin, J Parco… - … Review, Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. …, 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: A model of coalition government formation is presented in which inefficient, non-
minimal winning coalitions may form in Nash equilibrium. Predictions for five games are
presented and tested experimentally. The experimental data support potential ...
R Garratt, CZ Qin… - Games and Economic …, 2000 - econ.ucsb.edu
Abstract We consider markets in which agents supply their time or the services of a capital
good, and the duration of the market is limited. We show that a coalitional game can be
generated by such a market if and only if the charac0 teristic function of the game is ...
CZ Qin… - 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We show by an iterated process of price normalization that there generically exists
a price-normalizing bundle that determines a credit money, such that the enlargement of the
general-equilibrium structure to allow for default subject to an appropriate credit limit and ...
SK Kim, CZ Qin… - 2004 - escholarship.org
Abstract In many principal-agent relations, objective measures of the agents' performance
are not available. In those cases, the principals have to rely on subjective performance
measures for designing incentive schemes. Incentive schemes based on subjective ...
R Garratt… - Economics Bulletin, 2007 - ideas.repec.org
We specify an adjustment process that converges to the set of potential-maximizing strategy
profiles for 3-player cooperation-formation games or n-player cooperation-formation games
based on a superadditive characteristic function. Our analysis provides a justification for ...
CZ Qin - Economic Theory, 1994 - Springer
The notion of the inner core I of a finite NTU game was first described by Shapley and Shubik
[18] and subsequently formalized by Shapley [ 17]. Forfinite economies, competitive allocations
(CE), the core, and the inner core need not coincide. For large economies, however, a ...
JA Birchenall, T Guo, W Hawkins, M Kapicka… - 2010 - econ.ucsb.edu
Abstract This paper studies a general equilibrium island model of mismatch and examines
the stationary properties of the equilibrium. Aggregate demand is uncertain and market
participants cannot instantaneously adjust to changes in demand. Changes in ...
CZ Qin - 2005 - escholarship.org
Abstract This paper considers self-stipulated penalties for defection and rewards for
cooperation as inducements to cooperate in the prisoner's dilemma. The paper explicitly
characterizes penalties and rewards that are necessary and sufficient to induce the ...
CZ Qin… - Journal of Economics, 2009 - Springer
Abstract The enlargement of the general-equilibrium structure to allow for default subject to
penalties results in a construction of a simple mechanism for selecting a unique competitive
equilibrium. We consider economies for which a common credit money can be applied to ...
CZ Qin… - 1996 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract A hostage with respect to an action of a player is defined here to be an amount
ofpayoff that will be placed in the opponent's possession if the player takes the action.
Whereas the only Nash equilibrium for a prisoner's dilemma game is mutual defection, it is ...
CZ Qin… - Economic Theory, 2009 - Springer
Abstract We introduce endogenous fees for participating in second-price auction which we
use for a two-stage mechanism to solve King Solomon's dilemma. They are positive for all
agents. They are nonetheless shown to maintain the agents' incentives for truthful bidding ...
R Garratt… - 2001 - feem-web.it
Abstract This paper looks at cooperation structures that result from a strategic game where
players make simultaneous proposals for cooperation. We characterize the solutions to the
game, and provide a justification in terms of a simple learning/adjustment process for ...
R Garratt… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1994 - Elsevier
Abstract We provide a condition for testing non-concavifiability of preference relations that
utilizes the marginal rate of substitution. The result is derived from Kannai's Proposition 2.1
(ii) in Journal of Mathematical Economics 4, 1977, pp. 1-56.
[CITATION] Signaling Product Quality by Price
S Parendo… - 2010
[CITATION] D40, D44, D60, P21, P23, P50
CFH Dumas, P Isard, MS Khan… - … Fund staff papers, 1993 - International Monetary Fund
[CITATION] On the Informational Êole of Prices with
Ê Expectations… - 2006
CZ Qin - atlas-conferences.com
This paper studies a commitment device that is based on the holding of economic hostages
to induce cooperation. Like hostages in ancient times, economic hostages raise the cost of
opportunism and, hence, they perform the ex ante function of deterrence. However, unlike ...
CZ Qin… - 2006 - escholarship.org
Abstract: Traders' expected utilities in fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium (REE)
are shown to decrease as the number of informed traders is increased for an asset market
model with diverse information as in Grossman (1976). It follows that no trader has any ...
W Kilenthong… - 2010 - mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
We apply an intermediation game of Townsend (1983) to analyze trade in an exchange
economy through endogenous intermediaries. In this game, each trader has the opportunity
to become an intermediary by oering to buy or sell unlimited quantities of the commodities ...
[CITATION] On the Cartelization of Cross-Holdings in Oligopoly
CZ Qin, S Zhang… - 2010
[CITATION] The Value of Multilateral Trade Liberalization and the Need for Third-Party Punishment
KP Chen, CZ Qin… - 2001
[CITATION] On Separating Equilibria with Positive
T Bandyopadhyay… - 2006
CZ Qin - Annals of Economics and Finance, 2008 - aeconf.net
This paper considers an approach for inducing cooperation in prisoner's dilemma. The
approach is based on players individually committing to pay self-stipulated penalties for
defection. We provide a complete characterization of self-stipulated penalties that are ...
CZ Qin, S Shi… - 2008 - gsm.pku.edu.cn
Abstract We completely characterize a class of bargaining problems on which three of Nash
axioms uniquely characterize the Nash bargaining solution up to specifications of
bargaining powers. We show that this class includes noconvex bargaining problems ...
[CITATION] Relative Profits and Competitive Equilibrium
CZ Qin… - 2001
CZ Qin, S Zhang… - 2010 - econ.ucsb.edu
Abstract This paper considers a model of endogenous bilateral cross-holdings in Oligopoly
with linear demand and cost functions. A notion of pairwise stability is applied to analyze
firms' incentives for cross-holdings. Under Cournot competition on output market and a ...
CZ Qin - 2006 - escholarship.org
Abstract: This paper offers an explanation for the rationality of why successful businesses
sometimes maintain excess demand. The explanation is motivated from the signaling role of
excess demand for firms. Considering a monopolistic market for a good whose quality is ...
CZ Qin… - 2009 - escholarship.org
Abstract: This paper considers a model of endogenous bilateral cross-holdings. A notion of
pairwise stability is applied to analyze firms' incentives for cross-holdings. Under certain
conditions and Cournot competition on the output market, it is shown that monopoly is the ...
KP Chen, CZ Qin… - 2002 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Trade policies such as tariffs are often featured by the prisoners' dilemma. One
country's trade liberalization is vulnerable to the opportunism of another country. This
problem is more serious in cases where a country behaving opportunistically can only be ...
CZ Qin - 1997 - 128.111.225.6
Abstract A hostage from a player is offered with respect to a particular action. It is defined
here to be a quantity of an asset of the player, held in escrow by a third party, that will be
given to the opponent if the player takes the action. For a prisoner, s dilemma game, it is ...
CZ Qin - 2006 - escholarship.org
Abstract: In this paper we propose a mechanism to resolve King Solomon's dilemma about
allocating an indivisible good at no cost to the participating agents. A distinctive feature of
our mechanism is the design of a two-part contest that makes the agents guess each ...
CZ Qin, LS Shapley… - 2009 - dido.econ.yale.edu
Abstract: A link between a no-side-payment (NSP) market game and a sidepayment (SP)
market game can be established by introducing a sufficient amount of an ideal utility-money
of constant marginal utility to all agents. At some point when there is “enough money” in ...
CZ Qin - 2008 - economics.smu.edu.sg
Abstract: This paper considers the performance of a compensation mechanism that has
received increasing attention in recent experimental literature. Our purpose is two-fold:(i) to
characterize endogenous payments that can induce (mutual) cooperation in prisoner's ...
[CITATION] Externalities in Insurance Markets with Asymmetric Information
JW Liu, MJ Browne, DH Gresik, S Papai, P Picard…
CZ Qin, C Stuart… - 1993 - en.scientificcommons.org
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