SJ Grossman… - The Journal of Political Economy, 1986 - JSTOR
Page 1. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral
Integration Sanford J. Grossman Princeton University Oliver D. Hart Massachusetts
Institute of Technology Our theory of costly contracts emphasizes ...
[CITATION] Firms, contracts, and financial structure
O Hart - 1995 - Oxford University Press, USA
O Hart… - Journal of political economy, 1990 - JSTOR
This paper provides a framework for addressing the question of when transactions should
be carried out within a firm and when through the market. Following Grossman and Hart, we
identify a firm with the assets that its owners control. We argue that the crucial difference ...
SJ Grossman… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1983 - JSTOR
Page 1. Econometrica, Vol. 51, No. 1 (January, 1983) AN ANALYSIS OF THE
PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM BY SANFORD J. GROSSMAN AND OLIVER D.
HART' Most analyses of the principal-agent problem assume that ...
SJ Grossman… - The Bell Journal of Economics, 1980 - JSTOR
Page 1. Takeover bids, the free-rider problem, and the theory of the corporation Sanford J.
Grossman* and Oliver D. Hart** It is commonly thought that a widely held corporation that is not
being run in the interest of its shareholders will be vulnerable to a takeover bid. ...
O Hart, B Holmström… - 1986 - econ.fudan.edu.cn
The past decade has witnessed a growing interest in contract theories of various kinds. This
development is partly a reaction to our rather thorough understanding of the standard theory
of perfect competition under complete markets, but more importantly to the resulting ...
O Hart… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1988 - JSTOR
When drawing up a contract, it is often impracticable for the parties to specify all the relevant
contingencies. In particular, they may be unable to describe the states of the world in
enough detail that an outsider (the courts) could later verify which state had occurred, and ...
SJ Grossman… - Journal of financial economics, 1988 - Elsevier
O Hart, A Shleifer… - 1996 - nber.org
When should a government provide a service inhouse and when should it contract out
provision? We develop a model in which the provider can invest in improving the quality of
service or reducing cost. If contracts are incomplete, the private provider has a stronger ...
SJ Grossman… - 1982 - nber.org
Page 1. This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic
Research Volume Title: The Economics of Information and Uncertainty Volume Author/Editor: John
McCall, ed. Volume Publisher: UMI Volume ISBN: 0-226-55559-3 ...
OD Hart - The Bell Journal of Economics, 1983 - JSTOR
Page 1. The market mechanism as an incentive scheme Oliver D. Hart* It is often
argued that competition in the product market reduces managerial slack. We formalize
this idea. Suppose that there is a common component to ...
O Hart… - 1995 - nber.org
Consider an entrepreneur who needs to raise funds from an investor, but cannot commit not
to withdraw his human capital from the project. The possibility of a default or quit puts an
upper bound on the total future indebtedness from the entrepreneur to the investor at any ...
O Hart… - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1998 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We analyze the role of debt in persuading an entrepreneur to pay out cash flows,
rather than to divert them. In the first part of the paper we study the optimal debt contract—
specifically, the trade-off between the size of the loan and the repayment—under the ...
O Hart… - Review of economic Studies, 1999 - Wiley Online Library
In the last few years, a new area has emerged in economic theory, which goes under the
heading of “incomplete contracting”. However, almost since its inception, the theory has
been under attack for its lack of rigorous foundations. In this paper, we evaluate some of ...
O Hart, J Tirole, DW Carlton… - Brookings papers on …, 1990 - JSTOR
FEW PEOPLE would disagree that horizontal mergers have the potential to restrict output
and raise consumer prices, but there is much less agreement about the anticompetitive
effects of vertical mergers. Some commentators have argued that a purely vertical merger ...
O Hart - The Economic Journal, 1995 - JSTOR
This article attempts to provide a theoretical framework for the corporate governance debate,
and to derive some implications which may be useful as a guide to policy. The first part of the
article reviews the conditions under which corporate governance issues are relevant. The ...
O Hart - Colum. L. Rev., 1989 - HeinOnline
An outsider to the field of economics would probably take it for granted that economists have
a highly developed theory of the firm. After all, firms are the engines of growth of modem
capitalistic economies, and so economists' must surely have fairly sophisticated views of ...
O Hart… - 1995 - nber.org
We argue that long-term debt has a role in controlling management's ability to finance future
investments. A company with high (widely-held) debt will find it hard to raise capital, since
new security holders will have low priority relative to existing creditors. Conversely for a ...
OD Hart - Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 1988 - JSTOR
Page 1. Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm OLIVER D. HART
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1. INTRODUCTION "The Nature of the Firm"
(together with Coase's later paper, "The Problem of Social Cost") has ...
OD Hart - Journal of Economic Theory, 1975 - ideas.repec.org
Downloadable (with restrictions)! No abstract is available for this item.
P Aghion, O Hart… - 1992 - nber.org
We propose a new bankruptcy procedure. Initially, a firm's debts are cancelled, and cash
and non-cash bids are solicited for the'new"(all-equity) firm. Former claimants are given
shares, or options to buy shares, in the new firm on the basis of absolute priority. Options ...
J Lakonishok, A Shleifer, RW Vishny, O Hart… - Brookings Papers on …, 1992 - JSTOR
IN 1990 TOTAL FINANCIAL assets in US capital markets amounted to $13.7 trillion, of which
$3.4 trillion was equities, and the rest were bonds, government securities, tax-exempt
securities, and mortgages. These financial assets were held by two principal types of ...
O Hart - 2001 - nber.org
This paper discusses how economists' views of firms' financial structure decisions have
evolved from treating firms' profitability as given; to acknowledging that managerial actions
affect profitability; to recognizing that firm value depends on the allocation of decision or ...
O Hart - The Economic Journal, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
The question of what should determine the boundaries between public and private firms in
an advanced capitalist economy is a highly topical one. In this paper I discuss some recent
theoretical thinking on this issue. I divide the paper into two parts. First, I make some ...
SJ Grossman… - The Journal of Finance, 1980 - JSTOR
Page 1. THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE * VOL. XXXV, NO. 2 * MAY 1980 Disclosure Laws
and Takeover Bids SJ GROSSMAN and 0. D. HART* THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE ACT not only prohibits the making of false statements ...
O Hart - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1982 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract The recent literature on “the reappraisal of Keynes” has viewed Keynesian
equilibria as arising when prices are fixed and effective demands and supplies are
equilibrated through the adjustment of quantities. One problem with this approach is that it ...
OD Hart… - The Review of Economic Studies, 1988 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Page 1. Review of Economic Studies (1988) LV, 509-540 © 1988 The Review of Economic Studies
Limited 0034-6527/88/00330509$02.00 Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics OLIVER
D. HART and JEAN TIROLE Massachusetts Institute of Technology ...
OD Hart - The Review of Economic Studies, 1983 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Page 1. Review of Economic Studies (1983) L, 3-35 © 1983The Society for Economic Analysis
Limited 0034-6527/83/00010003$00.50 Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information:
An Introduction OLIVER D. HART London School ofEconomics ...
SJ Grossman… - The American Economic Review, 1981 - JSTOR
Page 1. MODELS OF LABOR MARKET EQUILIBRIUM Implicit Contracts, Moral Hazard, and
Unemployment By SANFORD J. GROSSMAN AND OLIVER D. HART* This paper considers
a firm whose mar- ginal (revenue) product of labor is a random variable. ...
S Djankov, O Hart, C McLiesh… - 2006 - nber.org
We present insolvency practitioners from 88 countries with an identical case of a hotel about
to default on its debt, and ask them to describe in detail how debt enforcement against this
hotel will proceed in their countries. We use the data on time, cost, and the likely ...
O Hart… - Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 1996 - Oxford Univ Press
Abstract Many securities exchanges are run as members' cooperatives: they are run on
behalf of the people who use the exchange. This form of governance is unusual. Most
businesses have outside ownership: the people who own and run the firm are typically not ...
O Hart - 2000 - nber.org
In the last fifteen years or so, lawyers working in law and economics and economists with an
interest in legal matters have turned their attention to the topic of bankruptcy. A large amount
of work has resulted, both theoretical and empirical, some of which has been concerned ...
O Hart… - 1999 - nber.org
We develop a model of hierarchies based on the allocation of authority. A firm's owners have
ultimate authority over a firm's decisions, but they have limited time or capacity to exercise
this authority. Hence owners must delegate authority to subordinates. However, these ...
O Hart… - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2008 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We argue that a contract provides a reference point for a trading relationship: more
precisely, for parties' feelings of entitlement. A party's ex post performance depends on
whether he gets what he is entitled to relative to outcomes permitted by the contract. A ...
SJ Grossman… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1979 - JSTOR
Page 1. Econometrica, Vol. 47, No. 2 (March, 1979) A THEORY OF COMPETITIVE
EQUILIBRIUM IN STOCK MARKET ECONOMIES1 BY SANFORD J. GROSSMAN
AND OLIVER D. HART In an economy with incomplete markets ...
OD Hart… - The Journal of Political Economy, 1986 - JSTOR
Page 1. Price Destabilizing Speculation Oliver D. Hart Massachusetts Institute of
Technology David M. Kreps Stanford Uni versity It is sometimes asserted that rational
speculative activity must result in more stable prices because ...
SJ Grossman… - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1983 - JSTOR
Page 1. IMPLICIT CONTRACTS UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION SANFORD
J. GROSSMAN AND OLIVER D. HART A model is analyzed where the firm knows
more about its own profit opportunities than do its workers. ...
OD Hart… - The Review of Economic Studies, 1974 - JSTOR
Page 1. On the Application of Portfolio Theory to Depository Financial Intermediaries
12 OLIVER D. HART and DWIGHT M. JAFFEE Princeton University I. INTRODUCTION
It has long been recognized that the useful application ...
O Hart, B Holmstrom - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2010 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract The formal literature on firm boundaries has assumed that ex post conflicts are
resolved through bargaining. In reality, parties often simply exercise their decision rights. We
develop a model, based on shading, in which the use of authority has a central role. We ...
OD Hart - 1974 - princeton.edu
Page 1. ON THE EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM IN A SECURITIES MODEL* Oliver D. Hart
Econometric Research Program Research Memorandum No. I58 January 197^ Econometric
Research Program PRINCETON UNIVERSITY 207 Dickinson Hall Princeton, New Jersey ...
[CITATION] Imperfect competition in general equilibrium: an overview of recent work
OD Hart - 1982
OD Hart - The Review of Economic Studies, 1979 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Page 1. Monopolistic Competition in a Large Economy with Differentiated Commodities
OLIVER D. HART Churchill College, Cambridge 1. INTRODUCTION Since the
publication of Chamberlin's (1933) famous book" The Theory ...
[CITATION] The costs and benefits of ownership: a theory of vertical and lateral integration
OD Hart… - Journal of political economy, 1986
OD Hart - The Review of Economic Studies, 1985 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Page 1. Review of Economic Studies (1985) LII, 529-546 © 1985 The Society for
Economic Analysis Limited 0034-6527/85/00370539$02.00 Monopolistic Competition
in the Spirit of Chamberlin: A General Model OLIVER D. HART ...
O Hart - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1989 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract A recent literature has shown that asymmetric information about a firm's profitability
does not by itself explain strikes of substantial length if the firm and workers can bargain very
frequently without commitment. In this paper we show that substantial strikes are possible ...
O Hart - The University of Toronto Law Journal, 1993 - JSTOR
THE ADEQUACY OF STAKEHOLDER CONTRACTUAL PROTECTION 301 example, his
effort, are observed only by him and cannot be included in the contract. However, the
contract will be'comprehensive'in the sense that there will never be a need to revise it later ...
O Hart - 2001 - nber.org
This paper discusses some of the attempts economists have made in the last ten years or so
to integrate norms into the theory of the firm. The paper argues that (a) although norms are
undoubtedly very important both inside and between firms, incorporating them into the ...
SJ Grossman… - The Journal of Finance, 1981 - JSTOR
Page 1. THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE * VOL. XXXVI, NO. 2 * MAY 1981 The
Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmetric Information SANFORD
J. GROSSMAN* and OLIVER D. HART** 1. Introduction IT is ...
O Hart… - 1998 - nber.org
We are concerned with the design of a constitution for a firm--an ex ante contract which
assigns residual rights of control (and possibly residual income rights) without reference to
the issue to be decided. We focus attention on two polar constitutions: nonprofit ...
O Hart - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics ( …, 1990 - JSTOR
In the last few years, a literature has developed on the theory of incomplete contracts, and
on applications of this theory to the understanding of organizations, such as firms. 1 In this
paper, I will argue that, while transaction costs of various sorts are a crucial ingredient of ...
OD Hart - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1979 - JSTOR
Page 1. ECONOMETRICA VOLUME 47 SEPTEMBER, 1979 NUMBER. 5 ON
SHAREHOLDER UNANIMITY IN LARGE STOCK MARKET ECONOMIES BY OLIVER
D. HART' In an economy with complete markets, the owners ...
O Hart - NBER Working Paper No. R1806, 1993 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: In the thirty or so years since the Modigliani-Miller theorem, scholars have worked
to relax the theorem's assumptions in order to obtain a better understanding of the capital
structure of firms. This work has produced some important insights but has not yet ...
O Hart, R La Porta Drago, F Lopez-de-Silanes… - European Economic …, 1997 - Elsevier
We propose a new bankruptcy procedure, that makes use of multiple auctions. The
procedure is designed to work even when capital markets do not function well (for example
in developing economies, or in economies in transition)—although it can be used in all ...
O Hart, L Zingales… - 2009 - nber.org
Abstract We design a new, implementable capital requirement for large financial institutions
(LFIs) that are―too big to fail‖. Our mechanism mimics the operation of margin accounts.
To ensure that LFIs do not default on either their deposits or their derivative contracts, we ...
O Hart… - 1990 - nber.org
ABSTRACT We develop a theory of optimal capital structure based on the idea that debt and
equity differ in their priority status relative to future corporate cash payments. A company with
high (dispersed) debt will find it hard to raise new capital since new security-holders will ...
OD Hart - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1977 - JSTOR
Page 1. ON THE PROFITABILITY OF SPECULATION* OLIVER D. HART I. Introduction,
579-II. The model, 581.-Ill. The linear case, 586.-IV. Proofs, 593-V. Conclusion, 596.
I. INTRODUCTION There are certain subjects in economics ...
P Aghion, O Hart… - Wash. ULQ, 1994 - HeinOnline
There is a widespread dissatisfaction with bankruptcy procedures throughout the world.
Bankruptcy reform is being actively considered in the United Kingdom and France and is in
the air in the United States. East European countries that must select a bankruptcy law for ...
OD Hart - The Economic Journal, 1985 - JSTOR
Page 1. THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL DECEMBER 1985 The Economic Journal, 95
(December I985), 889-908 Printed in Great Britain MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION IN
THE SPIRIT OF CHAMBERLIN: SPECIAL RESULTS Oliver D. Hart* ...
O Hart - American Law & Economics Association Annual …, 2005 - law.bepress.com
Abstract We view a contract as a list of outcomes. Ex ante, the parties commit not to consider
outcomes not on the list, ie, these are “ruled out”. Ex post, they freely bargain over outcomes
on the list, ie, the contract specifies no mechanism to structure their choice; in this sense ...
E Fehr, OD Hart… - 2008 - nber.org
Page 1. NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES CONTRACTS AS REFERENCE POINTS -
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE Ernst Fehr Oliver D. Hart Christian Zehnder Working
Paper 14501 http://www.nber.org/papers/w14501 NATIONAL ...
L Bebchuk… - 2001 - nber.org
This paper evaluates the primary mechanisms for changing management or obtaining
control in publicly traded corporations with dispersed ownership. Specifically, we analyze
and compare three mechanisms:(1) proxy fights (voting only);(2) takeover bids (buying ...
OD Hart - Journal of Economic Theory, 1980 - Elsevier
SJ Grossman, OD Hart… - 1982 - nber.org
... UNEMPLOYMENT WITH OBSERVABLE AGGREGATE SHOCKS Sanford J. Grossman Oliver
Hart Eric Maskin Working Paper No. 975 ... (312) 962—8178 Oliver Hart London School of Economics
Eric Maskin Churchill College and Massachusetts Institute of Technology Page 3. ...
O Hart - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2009 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We study two parties who desire a smooth trading relationship under conditions of
value and cost uncertainty. A contract fixing price works well in normal times because there
is nothing to argue about. However, when value or cost is unusually high or low, one party ...
H Oliver - 1995 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract This work uses recent developments in the theory of incomplete contracts to
analyze a range of topics in organization theory and corporate finance. Beginning with a
general model of the firm, Hart analyzes in greater depth the financial structure of firms, ...
O Hart, B Holmstrom - Unpublished manuscript, 2002 - cepr.org.uk
Abstract The existing literature on firms, based on incomplete contracts and property rights,
emphasizes that the ownership of assets--and thereby firm boundaries--is determined in
such a way as to encourage relationship-specific investments by the appropriate parties. It ...
OD Hart… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1975 - ideas.repec.org
Downloadable (with restrictions)! No abstract is available for this item.
O Hart - Economica, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
I argue that it has been hard to make progress on Coase's theory of the firm agenda
because of the difficulty of formalizing haggling costs. I propose an approach that tries to
move things forward using the idea of aggrievement costs, and apply it to the question of ...
O Hart… - The American economic review, 2007 - JSTOR
Since Ronald H. Coase's famous 1937 article, economists have grappled with the question
of what characterizes a firm and what determines its boundaries.'Transaction cost
economics (see, eg, Oliver Williamson 1975, 1985; Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford, ...
OD Hart - Canadian Journal of Economics, 1988 - JSTOR
Page 1. Capital structure as a control mechanism in corporations OLIVER D. HART
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Abstract. This paper gives a brief discussion
of some recent work on the theory of the firm. Particular emphasis ...
OD Hart - The Review of Economic Studies, 1975 - JSTOR
Page 1. Some Negative Results on the Existence of Comparative Statics Results in Portfolio
Theory'2 OLIVER D. HART University of Essex 1. INTRODUCTION Consider an investor who
has a certain amount of wealth to invest in a riskless security and several risky securities. ...
[CITATION] The theory of contracts
B Holmstrom, O Hart - advances in economic theory, Fifth World Congress, …, 1987
L Bebchuk… - Financial Times, 2002 - webkuliah.unimedia.ac.id
The report by the high-level group of company law experts contains much that is sensible
about takeover policy. However, there is one element of the report-the breakthrough rule–
whose import goes well beyond the regulation of takeovers. Much of what the report seeks ...
[CITATION] Vertical integration and the distribution of property rights
SJ Grossman… - Economic Policy and Practice. London: Macmillan, 1987
[CITATION] Cooperatives versus outside ownership
O Hart… - 1998 - Harvard Institute of Economic …
M Holmen, P Högfeldt, LA Bebchuk, J Franks… - 2000 - Citeseer
Abstract We analyze how legal rules affect a firm's decisions to go public, design of
securities and initial ownership structure. By extensively using dual-class shares, Swedish
IPOs are primarily privately controlled firms that owners take public to maintain control, to ...
O Hart - Journal of Accounting Research, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
Many of the papers in this special issue are concerned with regulation and some with the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). In this commentary, I will begin by summarizing the arguments for
regulation that have been made in the literature. 1 I will then consider whether these ...
E Fehr,
C Zehnder… - Journal of the European …, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract In this paper we study the role of incomplete ex ante contracts for ex post trade.
Previous experimental evidence indicates that a contract provides a reference point for
entitlements when the terms are negotiated in a competitive market. We show that this ...
P Aghion, O Hart… - 1995 - opengrey.eu
Insolvency reform in the UK: a revised proposal. P Aghion, O Hart, J Moore TOLLEYS
INSOLVENCY LAW AND PRACTICE 11, 67-67, TOLLEY PUBLISHING CO. LTD, 1995.
O Hart - Rationality and Society, 1996 - rss.sagepub.com
Abstract A recent economic literature analyzes institutions, such as firms, in terms of
incomplete contracts and property rights. The paper begins by briefly summarizing this
literature. The paper goes on to argue that the incomplete-contracting approach can ...
[CITATION] oThe Costs and Benefits of Own% ership: A Theory of Vertical Integration, pJournal of Political Economy, vol
S Grossman… - 1986 - N
[CITATION] Theories of optimal capital structure: A principal-agent perspective
O Hart - Brookings Conference on Takeovers, LBOs, and …, 1991
[CITATION] Firms, contracts, and financial structure
O Hart - 1995 - Oxford: Oxford University Press
[CITATION] Incomplete contracts and renegotiation
H Oliver… - Econometrica, 1988
[CITATION] Cooperatives vs
O Hart… - Outside Ownership, 1998
OD Hart - STICERD-Theoretical Economics Paper Series, 1982 - econpapers.repec.org
By Oliver D. Hart; Reasonable Conjectures.
[CITATION] Clarendon Lectures in Economics
OFC Hart… - Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structures, 1995
[CITATION] Debt, Default and Renegotiation
O Hart… - Harvard University Unpublished Manuscript, 1996
OD Hart - Journal of Economic Theory, 1977 - econpapers.repec.org
By Oliver D. Hart; Take-over bids and stock market equilibrium.
[CITATION] The costs and benefits of ownership: a theory of vertical integration
SJ Grossman… - 1984 - London School of Economics and …
O Hart - American Law & Economics Association Annual …, 2008 - law.bepress.com
Abstract We study two parties who desire a smooth trading relationship under conditions of
value and cost uncertainty. A contract fixing price works well in normal times since there is
nothing to argue about. However, when value or cost is exceptional, one party will deviate ...
AA Alchian, S Woodward, H Demsetz… - …, 1972 - competence.myweb.hinet.net
Page 1. Alchian, Armen A.; Woodward, Susan “The Firm Is Dead; Long Live The Firm
a Re- view of Oliver E. Williamson's The Economic Institutions of Capitalism”, Journal
of Economic Literature, March, 1988, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp 65-79. ...
[CITATION] VThe Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A theory of Lateral and Vertical Integration
SJ Grossman… - V Journal of Political Economy, 1986
J Hardman Moore… - CEPR Discussion Papers, 1985 - ideas.repec.org
When drawing up a contract, it is often impracticable to specify all the possible relevant
contingencies, and so contracts are typically incomplete. This paper considers the extent to
which these gaps might be filled by building into the contract a mechanism for revising the ...
R Guesnerie… - International Economic Review, 1985 - JSTOR
In the last few years, much work has been done on the relationship between Cournot-Nash
equilibria and perfectly competitive equilibria in large economies. Among other things, it has
been shown that in a large economy, every Cournot-Nash equilibrium is approximately ...
[CITATION] Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure
O Hart, J Tirole - Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (Special Issue), 1990
[CITATION] Firms, contracts, and financial structure. Clarendon
OD Hart - 1995 - Oxford
O Hart… - Wall Street Journal, 2008 - relooney.info
By OLIVER HART and LUIGI ZINGALES This year will be remembered not just for one of the
worst financial crises in American history, but also as the moment when economists
abandoned their principles. There used to be a consensus that selective intervention in ...
[CITATION] Firms, Contracts and Market Structure
O Hart - 1995 - Oxford: Oxford University Press
[CITATION] lProperty Rights and the Nature of the Firm, mJournal of Political Economy
O Hart… - Vol, 1990
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