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[BOOK] Development economics

[PDF] from ucr.edu
D Ray - 1998 - books.google.com
The study of development in low-income countries is attracting more attention around the
world than ever before. Yet until now there has been no comprehensive text that
incorporates the huge strides made in the subject over the past decade. Development ...
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On the measurement of polarization

[PDF] from brown.edu
JM Esteban… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1994 - JSTOR
Suppose that a population of individuals may be grouped according to some vector of
characteristics into" clusters," such that each cluster is very" similar" in terms of the attributes
of its members, but different clusters have members with very" dissimilar" attributes. In that ...
Cited by 917 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - BL Direct - All 16 versions

A theory of endogenous coalition structures

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D Ray… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1999 - Elsevier
Consider an environment with widespread externalities, and suppose that binding
agreements can be written. We study coalition formation in such a setting. Our analysis
proceeds by defining on a partition function an extensive-form bargaining game. We ...
Cited by 376 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 25 versions

Inequality as a determinant of malnutrition and unemployment: Theory

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P Dasgupta… - The Economic Journal, 1986 - JSTOR
'But it was only in the last generation that a careful study was begun to be made of the effects
that high wages have in increasing the efficiency not only of those who receive them, but
also of their children and grandchildren... the application of the comparative method of ...
Cited by 378 - Related articles - All 6 versions

Conflict and distribution

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J Esteban… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1999 - Elsevier
We develop a behavioral model that links the level and pattern of social conflict to the
societywide distribution of individual characteristics. The model can be applied to groups
that differ in characteristics such as wealth, ethnicity, religion, and political ideology. We ...
Cited by 345 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 19 versions

Equilibrium binding agreements

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D Ray… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1997 - Elsevier
We study equilibrium binding agreements, the coalition structures that form under such
agreements, and the efficiency of the outcomes that result. We analyze such agreements in
a context where the payoff to each player depends on the actions of all other players. Thus ...
Cited by 343 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 18 versions

Cooperation in community interaction without information flows

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P Ghosh… - The Review of Economic Studies, 1996 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We study cooperative behaviour in communities where the flow of information
regarding past conduct is limited or missing. Players are initially randomly matched with no
knowledge of each other's past actions; they endogenously decide whether or not to ...
Cited by 278 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 10 versions

Polarization: concepts, measurement, estimation

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JY Duclos, J Esteban… - Econometrica, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
We develop the measurement theory of polarization for the case in which income
distributions can be described using density functions. The main theorem uniquely
characterizes a class of polarization measures that fits into what we call the “identity- ...
Cited by 278 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 18 versions

A noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining

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K Chatterjee, B Dutta, D Ray… - The Review of …, 1993 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We explore a sequential offers model of n-person coalitional bargaining with
transferable utility and with time discounting. Our focus is on the efficiency properties of
stationary equilibria of strictly superadditive games, when the discount factor δ is ...
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Persistent inequality

[PDF] from isid.ac.in
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D Mookherjee… - Review of Economic Studies, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
When human capital accumulation generates pecuniary externalities across professions,
and capital markets are imperfect, persistent inequality in utility and consumption is
inevitable in any steady state. This is true irrespective of the degree of divisibility in ...
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An Extension of a Measure of Polarization, with an application to the income distribution of five OECD countries

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J Esteban, C Gradín… - Journal of Economic Inequality, 2007 - Springer
Abstract We introduce an extension of the Esteban and Ray [Econometrica, 62: 819–851
1994] measure of polarization that can be applied to density functions. As a by-product we
also derive the Wolfson [Am. Econ. Rev., 84: 353–358 1994] measure as a special case. ...
Cited by 216 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 15 versions

Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games

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B Douglas Bernheim… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1989 - Elsevier
Abstract We formalize the notion of collective dynamic consistency for noncooperative
repeated games. Intuitively, we require that an equilibrium not prescribe any course of action
in any subgame that players would jointly wish to renegotiate, given the restriction that any ...
Cited by 203 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 9 versions

A concept of egalitarianism under participation constraints

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B Dutta… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1989 - JSTOR
We define a new solution concept for transferable utility cooperative games in characteristic
function form, in a framework where individuals believe in equality as a desirable social
goal, although private preferences dictate selfish behavior. This latter aspect implies that ...
Cited by 196 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 11 versions

Group Formation in Risk‐Sharing Arrangements

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G Genicot… - Review of Economic Studies, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
We study informal insurance within communities, explicitly recognizing the possibility that
subgroups of individuals may destabilize insurance arrangements among the larger group.
We therefore consider self-enforcing risk-sharing agreements that are robust not only to ...
Cited by 159 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 21 versions

Collective action and the group size paradox

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J Esteban… - American political science review, 2001 - Cambridge Univ Press
JOAN ESTEBAN Instituto de Análisis Económico (CSIC) DEBRAJ RAY New York University
According to the Olson paradox, larger groups may be less successful than smaller groups
in furthering their interests. We address the issue in a model with three distinctive features: ...
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[PDF] Coalitional power and public goods

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D Ray… - Journal of Political Economy, 2001 - are.berkeley.edu
We study the provision of public goods when all agents have complete information and can
write binding agreements. This framework is in deliberate contrast to a traditional view of the
free-rider problem based on hidden information or voluntary provision. We focus on ...
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Inequality as a determinant of malnutrition and unemployment: policy

[PDF] from isical.ac.in
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P Dasgupta… - The Economic Journal, 1987 - JSTOR
In the predecessor to this article (Dasgupta and Ray, I986; hereafter DR), we developed a
theory which provides a link between persistent involuntary unemployment and the
incidence of undernourishment, relates them in turn to the production and distribution of ...
Cited by 146 - Related articles - All 6 versions

Coalition formation as a dynamic process

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H Konishi… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2003 - Elsevier
We study coalition formation as an ongoing, dynamic process, with payoffs generated as
coalitions form, disintegrate, or regroup. A process of coalition formation (PCF) is an
equilibrium if a coalitional move to some other state can be “justified” by the expectation of ...
Cited by 139 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 26 versions

Evolving aspirations and cooperation

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R Karandikar, D Mookherjee, D Ray… - Journal of Economic …, 1998 - Elsevier
A 2× 2 game is played repeatedly by two satisficing players. The game considered includes
the Prisoner's Dilemma, as well as games of coordination and common interest. Each player
has anaspirationat each date, and takes an action. The action is switched at the ...
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[PDF] Inequality, control rights, and rent seeking: sugar cooperatives in Maharashtra

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A Banerjee, D Mookherjee, K Munshi… - Journal of Political …, 2001 - sws.bu.edu
This paper could not have been completed without the support and encouragement that we
received from Shivajirao Patil and Jamsheed Kanga. The staff of the Maharashtra State
Federation of Co-operative Sugar Factories, the Directorate of Economics and Statistics, ...
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[BOOK] A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation

[PDF] from nyu.edu
D Ray - 2007 - books.google.com
The formation of coalitions to achieve both collaborative and competitive goals is a
phenomenon we see all around us. The list is long and varied: production cartels, political
lobbies, customs unions, environmental coalitions, and ethnic alliances are just a few ...
Cited by 118 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 9 versions

Contractual structure and wealth accumulation

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D Mookherjee… - The American Economic Review, 2002 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: Can historical wealth distributions affect long-run output and inequality despite"
rational" saving, convex technology and no externalities? We consider a model of
equilibrium short-period financial contracts, where poor agents face credit constraints ...
Cited by 111 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 30 versions

On the salience of ethnic conflict

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J Esteban… - The American Economic Review, 2008 - JSTOR
A classical literature views economic class divisions as the main cause of social conflict. 1
Yet many, if not most, of the conflicts we observe today are ethnic in nature. As Rogers
Brubaker and David D. Laitin (1998) observe,"[An] aspect of the post-Cold War world to ...
Cited by 99 - Related articles - All 24 versions

[CITATION] Credit rationing in developing countries: An overview of the theory

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P Ghosh, D Mookherjee… - Readings in the theory of economic development, 2000
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Informal insurance in social networks

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F Bloch, G Genicot… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2008 - Elsevier
This paper studies bilateral insurance schemes across networks of individuals. While
transfers are based on social norms, individuals must have the incentive to comply. We
investigate the structure of self-enforcing insurance networks. Network links play two ...
Cited by 98 - Related articles - All 41 versions

Farsighted network formation

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B Dutta, S Ghosal… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2005 - Elsevier
This paper studies a model of dynamic network formation when individuals are farsighted:
players evaluate the desirability of a “current” move in terms of its consequences on the
entire discounted stream of payoffs. We define a concept of equilibrium which takes into ...
Cited by 91 - Related articles - All 22 versions

Polarization, fractionalization and conflict

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J Esteban… - Journal of Peace Research, 2008 - jpr.sagepub.com
Abstract This article provides a theoretical framework that distinguishes between the
occurrence of conflict and its severity, and clarifies the role of polarization and
fractionalization in each of these cases. The analysis helps in ordering the various ...
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Vertical links between formal and informal financial institutions

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M Sagrario Floro… - Review of Development Economics, 1997 - Wiley Online Library
The paper investigates vertical linkages between formal and informal financial institutions.
Specifically, it studies a policy that expands formal credit to informal lenders, in the hope that
this will improve loan terms for borrowers who are shut out of the formal sector. Special ...
Cited by 71 - Related articles - All 16 versions

History and coordination failure

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A Adsera… - Journal of Economic Growth, 1998 - Springer
An extensive literature discusses the existence of a virtuous circle of expectations that might
lead communities to Pareto-superior states among multiple potential equilibria. It is
generally accepted that such multiplicity stems fundamentally from the presence of ...
Cited by 70 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 24 versions

Aspirations, poverty, and economic change

D Ray - Understanding poverty, 2006 - books.google.com
My aim in this short essay is to discuss a particular aspect of poverty, which is its close and
brutal association with a failure of aspirations. Lest the point I am about to develop be
misunderstood, let me state immediately that this is not an assertion about individuals who ...
Cited by 72 - Related articles - All 3 versions

Inequality, lobbying, and resource allocation

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J Esteban… - The American economic review, 2006 - JSTOR
This paper describes how wealth inequality may distort public resource allocation. A
government seeks to allocate limited resources to productive sectors, but sectoral
productivity is privately known by agents with vested interests in those sectors. They lobby ...
Cited by 66 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - BL Direct - All 32 versions

What's new in development economics?

[PDF] from bris.ac.uk
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D Ray - The American Economist, 2000 - JSTOR
This essay is meant to describe the current fron tiers of development economics, as I see
them. I mightas well throw my hands up at the beginning and say there are too many
frontiers. In recent years, the subject has made excellent use of eco nomic theory, ...
Cited by 67 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 22 versions

Economic growth with intergenerational altruism

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BD Bernheim… - The Review of Economic Studies, 1987 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We consider the properties of equilibrium behaviour in an aggregative growth
model with intergenerational altruism. Various positive properties such as the cyclicity of
equilibrium programs, and the convergence of equilibrium stocks to a steady state, are ...
Cited by 61 - Related articles - All 6 versions

A consistent bargaining set

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B Dutta, D Ray, K Sengupta… - Journal of economic theory, 1989 - Elsevier
Abstract Both the core and the bargaining set fail to satisfy a natural requirement of
consistency. In excluding imputations to which there exist objections, the core does not
assess the “credibility” of such objections. The bargaining set goes a step further. Only ...
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Dynamic equilibria with unemployment due to undernourishment

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D Ray… - Economic Theory, 1993 - Springer
Summary We provide characterization and stability results for the stationary equilibria of a
competitive infinite-horizon model that incorporates the nutritional requirements of physical
labor. We find that for many aggregate land stocks, there is a large continuum of stationary ...
Cited by 53 - Related articles - All 9 versions

The Time Structure of Self‐Enforcing Agreements

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D Ray - Econometrica, 2002 - Wiley Online Library
2. Abstract A principal and an agent enter into a sequence of agreements. The principal
faces an interim participation constraint at each date, but can commit to the current
agreement; in contrast, the agent has the opportunity to renege on the current agreement. ...
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[CITATION] Interlinkages and the Pattern of Competition

D Ray… - 1991 - agris.fao.org
Go to AGRIS search. Interlinkages and the pattern of competition. ...
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5.. Contracts With Eviction in Infinitely Repeated Principal-Agent Relationships

B Dutta, D Ray… - The economic theory of agrarian …, 1991 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: In this chapter, the authors use a model of an infinitely repeated principal-agent
relationship where they explore the conditions under which labour contracts with threats of
sacking or contract termination will be equilibrium outcomes.
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Nonpaternalistic intergenerational altruism

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D Ray - Journal of Economic Theory, 1987 - Elsevier
Abstract The paper develops a concept of equilibrium behaviour and establishes its
existence in a model of nonpaternalistic intergenerational altruism. Each generation derives
utility from its own consumption and the utilities of its successors. Equilibrium capital ...
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Why Does Asset Inequality Affect Unemployment? A study of the demand composition problem

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JM Baland… - Journal of Development Economics, 1991 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper is devoted to a general equilibrium analysis of the relationship between
the inequality in asset holdings and the aggregate levels of output and employment in a
developing economy. Since luxuries and basic goods compete for the use of the same ...
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Is Equality Stable?

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D Mookherjee… - The American Economic Review, 2002 - JSTOR
Economic inequality is of interest not only at some intrinsic level, but also for its close
connections to diverse variables, ranging from economic indicators such as growth rates to
sociopolitical outcomes such as collective action and conflict. It is only natural, then, to ...
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[PDF] Aspirations, poverty and economic change

[PDF] from nyu.edu
D Ray - very preliminary draft, 2003 - econ.nyu.edu
My aim in this short paper is to discuss a particular aspect of poverty, which is its close and
brutal association with a failure of aspirations. Lest the point I am about to develop be
misunderstood, let me state immediately that this is not an assertion about individuals who ...
Cited by 38 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 12 versions

A model of ethnic conflict

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J Esteban… - Journal of the European Economic …, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
2. Acknowledgments: We thank Tzachi Gilboa and Rohini Pande for useful comments.
Esteban is grateful for support from the Generalitat de Catalunya and the CICYT (SEC-2003-
1961) and from Axa Research Fund. This research is part of the Polarization and Conflict ...
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Labor tying

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A Mukherjee… - Journal of Development Economics, 1995 - Elsevier
We study labor-tying in a competitive agricultural economy. The co-existence of seasonal
fluctuations in income and imperfect credit markets suggests that tied contracts should
dominate casual labor markets. However, empirical observation from India suggests that ...
Cited by 35 - Related articles - Library Search - All 9 versions

[BOOK] Information and enforcement in informal credit markets

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P Ghosh… - 1999 - cenet.org.cn
Abstract We study the problem of loan enforcement in an informal credit market with limited
information flow. Specifically, credit histories of borrowers are not available, raising the
possibility of endemic default. We show that if there is some minimum proportion of “ ...
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Strategy for economic reform in West Bengal

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A Banerjee, P Bardhan, K Basu… - Economic and Political …, 2002 - JSTOR
During the last two decades West Bengal has led the rest of the country with regard to
agricultural performance and implementation of panchayat institutions. But these
developments have begun to level out. At the same time the state has fallen behind in ...
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On the competitive pressure created by the diffusion of innovations

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D Mookherjee… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1991 - Elsevier
Abstract We consider the decision of a dominant firm to adopt a sequence of potential cost-
reducing innovations, where the latest technology adopted diffuses to a competitive fringe at
an exogenous rate. With price competition on the product market, the leader optimally ...
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[PDF] Egalitarianism and incentives

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D Ray… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1996 - nyu.edu
A group of agents is collectively engaged in a joint productive activity. Each agent supplies
an observable input, and output is then collectively shared among the members. A Bergson
Samuelson welfare function defined on individual utilities describes the social values of ...
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Dynamic optimization on a non-convex feasible set: some general results for non-smooth technologies

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T Mitra… - Journal of Economics, 1984 - Springer
In the theory of optimal intertemporal allocation, the assumption of a convex feasible set has
played a dominant role. In recent years, several contributions have focused on the
implications for this theory, when the feasible set does not have the convexity property.( ...
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Contracts and externalities: How things fall apart

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G Genicot… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2006 - Elsevier
A single principal interacts with several agents, offering them contracts. The crucial
assumption of this paper is that the outside-option payoffs of the agents depend positively on
how many uncontracted or “free” agents there are. We study how such a principal, ...
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Markov perfect equilibria in altruistic growth economies with production uncertainty

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BD Bernheim… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1989 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper concerns the existence of Markov perfect equilibria in altruistic growth
economies. Previous work on deterministic models has established existence only under
extremely restrictive conditions. We show that the introduction of production uncertainly ...
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Social decision rules are not immune to conflict

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J Esteban… - Economics of Governance, 2001 - Springer
Abstract. Why is rent-seeking so endemic in societies? Might it not be possible to design a
Pareto-improving social decision rule that sidesteps the inefficient waste of resources
resulting from conflict? We study this question for a multi-player contest. We assume that a ...
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Constrained egalitarian allocations

B Dutta… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1991 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper proposes a constrained egalitarian solution concept for TU games which
combines commitment for egalitarianism and promotion of individual interests in a consistent
manner. The paper shows that the set of constrained egalitarian allocations is nonempty ...
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[PDF] Occupational diversity and endogenous inequality

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D Mookherjee… - … Department of Economics-The institute for …, 2006 - econ.brown.edu
ABSTRACT A traditional view of markets with intergenerational bequests within dynasties is
that they equalize wealth across households. A more recent literature suggests that markets
are inherently disequalizing. A third viewpoint argues that initial history is crucial in ...
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Missing women: Age and disease

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S Anderson… - Review of Economic Studies, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
Relative to developed countries and some parts of the developing world, most notably sub-
Saharan Africa, there are far fewer women than men in India and China. It has been argued
that as many as a 100 million women could be missing. The possibility of gender bias at ...
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Linking conflict to inequality and polarization

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J Esteban… - The American Economic Review, 2011 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: In this paper we study a behavioral model of conflict that provides a basis for
choosing certain indices of dispersion as indicators for conflict. We show that a suitable
monotone transform of the equilibrium level of conflict can be proxied by a linear function ...
Cited by 25 - Related articles - All 29 versions

[PDF] Self-control, saving, and the low asset trap

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D Bernheim, D Ray… - 1999 - stanford.edu
Abstract We examine a class of intertemporal consumption allocation models in which time
inconsistent preferences create self-control problems. Behavior corresponds to an
equilibrium of a game played by successive incarnations of the single decision-maker, ...
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Inequality and Inefficiency in Joint Projects*

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D Ray, JM Baland… - The Economic Journal, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
We thank an Editor and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. Ray acknowledges
support from the National Science Foundation under grant number 0241070. This work was
also supported by the PAI programme of the Belgium Federal Government, as well as by ...
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Collusive market structure under learning-by-doing and increasing returns

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D Mookherjee… - The Review of Economic Studies, 1991 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract Learning-by-doing and increasing returns are often perceived to have similar
implications for market structure and conduct. We analyse this in the context of an infinite-
horizon price-setting game. Learning is shown to not reduce the viability of market-sharing ...
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Coalition formation with binding agreements

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K Hyndman… - The Review of Economic Studies, 2007 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We study coalition formation in “real time”, a situation in which coalition formation is
intertwined with the ongoing receipt of pay-offs. Agreements are assumed to be permanently
binding: They can only be altered with the full consent of existing signatories. For ...
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[PDF] Reinforcement learning in repeated interaction games

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J Bendor, D Mookherjee… - Advances in Theoretical Economics, 2001 - sws1.bu.edu
Abstract We study long run implications of reinforcement learning when two players
repeatedly interact with one another over multiple rounds to play a finite action game. Within
each round, the players play the game many successive times with a fixed set of ...
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Choice shifts in groups: A decision-theoretic basis

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K Eliaz, D Ray… - The American economic review, 2006 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: The phenomenon of choice shifts in group decision-making has received attention
in the social psychology literature. Faced with a risky group decision, individuals appear to
support more extreme choices relative to those they would make on their own. This paper ...
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[CITATION] Aspirations, adaptive learning and cooperation in repeated games

J Bendor, D Mookherjee… - 1994 - econpapers.repec.org
Related works: Working Paper: Aspirations, Adaptive Learning and Cooperation in Reapeted
Games (1994) This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the
same title. ... This site is part of RePEc and all the data displayed here is part of the ...
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On the dynamics of inequality

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D Ray - Economic Theory, 2006 - Springer
Abstract The dynamics of inequality are studied in a model of human capital accumulation
with credit constraints. This model admits a multiplicity of steady state skill ratios that exhibit
varying degrees of inequality across households. The main result studies equilibrium ...
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[PDF] Internally renegotiation-proof equilibrium sets: Limit behavior with low discounting

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D Ray - Games and Economic Behavior, 1994 - nyu.edu
Recent literature in the theory of games addresses the criticism that efficient outcomes in a
dynamic game are often supported by punishment paths that do not have the same
efficiency property. The outcome of this research is the notion of renegotiation-proof ...
Cited by 21 - Related articles - All 7 versions

[CITATION] Inequality, control rights and efficiency: a study of sugar cooperatives in Western Maharashtra

Full text - MIT Libraries
A Banerjee, D Mookherjee, K Munshi… - Journal of Political Economy, 2001
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Reciprocity in groups and the limits to social capital

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F Bloch, G Genicot… - The American Economic Review, 2007 - JSTOR
Robert D. Putnam defines social capital as" features of social organization, such as
networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation"(Putnam 1995,
67). Such networks are typically associated with norms that promote coordination, ...
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[CITATION] Altruistic Growth Economies: I. Existence of Bequest Equilibria

BD Bernheim… - IMSSS DP, 1983
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[CITATION] On the measurement of polarisation

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J Estaban… - Econometrica, 1994
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Endogenous group formation in risk-sharing arrangements

G Genicot… - 2002 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We study informal insurance within communities, explicitly recognizing the
possibility that subgroups of individuals may destabilize insurance arrangements among the
larger group. We therefore consider self-enforcing risk-sharing agreements that are robust ...
Cited by 17 - Related articles - All 2 versions

Group decision-making in the shadow of disagreement

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K Eliaz, D Ray… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
A model of group decision-making is studied, in which one of two alternatives must be
chosen. While agents differ in their preferences over alternatives, everybody prefers
agreement to disagreement. Our model is distinguished by three features: private ...
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Bargaining power and enforcement in credit markets

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G Genicot… - Journal of Development Economics, 2006 - Elsevier
In a credit market with enforcement constraints, we study the effects of a change in the
outside options of a potential defaulter on the terms of the credit contract, as well as on
borrower payoffs. The results crucially depend on the allocation of “bargaining power” ...
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[CITATION] Income distribution and macroeconomic behavior

D Ray - Unpublished Notes, 1990
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[PDF] Inequality, Control Rights and Rent Seeking

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A Banerjee, D Mookherjee, K Munshi… - Journal of Political, 1997 - bu.edu
Abstract This paper presents a theory of rent-seeking within farmer cooperatives in which
inequality of asset ownership affects relative control rights of different groups of members.
The two key assumptions are constraints on lumpsum transfers from poorer members and ...
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Wealth constraints, lobbying and the efficiency of public allocation

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J Esteban… - European Economic Review, 2000 - Elsevier
In Esteban and Ray (1999, Inequality public allocation and development, Mimeo.) we
formalize a model in which individuals lobby before the government in order to benefit from
some productivity-enhancing government action (infrastructures, direct subsidies, ...
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Aspirations, Segregation, and Occupational Choice

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D Mookherjee, D Ray… - Journal of the European …, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract This paper examines the steady states of an overlapping generations economy with
a given distribution of household locations over a one-dimensional interval. Parents decide
whether or not to educate their children. Educational decisions are affected by location: ...
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Beyond Nandigram: Industrialisation in West Bengal

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AV Banerjee, P Bardhan, K Basu… - Economic and Political …, 2007 - JSTOR
If we are to learn the right lessons from the tragedy of Nandigram, then we must ensure that
the government is involved in the land acquisition process and that we correctly deal with
three sets of issues: the size and form of compensation, the eligibility for compensation ...
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[CITATION] Binding agreements and coalitional bargaining

D Ray… - J Econ Theory, 1995
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[CITATION] Adapting to undernourishment: the clinical evidence and its implications

P Dasgupta… - WIDER Working Papers, 1987 - agris.fao.org
Go to AGRIS search. WIDER Working Papers (1987). Adapting to
undernourishment: the clinical evidence and its implications. ...
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[PDF] Satisficing and Selection in Electoral Competition

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J Bendor, D Mookherjee… - Quarterly Journal of Political …, 2006 - sws1.bu.edu
ABSTRACT We model political parties as adaptive decision-makers who compete in a
sequence of elections. The key assumptions are that winners satisfice (the winning party in
period t keeps its platform in t+ 1) while losers search. Under fairly mild assumptions about ...
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[CITATION] Polarization: Concepts

JY Duelos, J Esteban… - Measurement, Estimation, Econometrica, 2004
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[PDF] Social Networks and Informal Insurance

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F Bloch, G Genicot… - 2004 - neumann.hec.ca
Abstract VERY PRELIMINARY DRAFT. This paper studies networks of informal insurance,
and builds a model of risksharing which captures two basic characteristics. First, informal
insurance is fundamentally bilateral, and rarely consists of an explicit arrangement across ...
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Wages and involuntary unemployment in the slack season of a village economy

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A Mukherjee… - journal of Development Economics, 1991 - Elsevier
Abstract We model slack season wages in a village economy, in the presence of involuntary
unemployment. Our model draws its inspiration from sociological notions of'everyday
peasant resistance'. In particular, labourers can react to employers who pay low slack ...
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[PDF] Aspirations, inequality, investment and mobility

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G Genicot… - Georgetown University and New York University, …, 2009 - nyu.edu
What individuals want for themselves, or what parents want for their children, is conditioned
by society in fundamental ways. One such pathway is via the creation of individual
aspirations (for their own future, or for their children's future). To some extent, such ...
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[CITATION] Inequality, malnutrition and unemployment: a critique of the market mechanism

P Dasgupta… - 1984 - Stanford IMSS Technical Report, …
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[CITATION] Information and repeated interaction: application to informal credit markets

P Ghosh… - Texas A&M and Boston University, draft, 1997
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[PDF] Implications of an economic theory of conflict

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A Mitra… - 2010 - nyu.edu
ABSTRACT We study inter-group conflict driven by economic changes within groups. We
show that if group incomes are “low”, increasing group incomes raises violence against that
group, and lowers violence generated by it. These correlations are tests for group ...
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Uneven growth: A framework for research in development economics

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D Ray - The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2010 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: The textbook paradigm of economywide development rests on the premise of
“balanced growth”: that is, on the presumption that all sectors will grow in unison over time
as a country gets richer. Of course, we would all agree that balanced growth is an ...
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[CITATION] The economics of rural organization: Theory, practice, and policy

Full text - MIT Libraries
K Hoff, A Braverman, JE Stiglitz… - Journal of Economic …, 1994 - orton.catie.ac.cr
SIDALC - Servicio de Informacion y Documentacion Agropecuaria de las Americas.
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[PDF] On some implications of backward discounting

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D Ray… - Unpublished manuscript, 2001 - econ.nyu.edu
Abstract. We study a model in which lifetime individual felicities are derived from both
present and past consumption streams. Each of these streams is discounted, the former
forward in the usual way, the latter backward. This discounting method is timeinconsistent, ...
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Introduction to development theory

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D Ray - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
Journal of Economic Theory 137 (2007) 1 10 www.elsevier.com/locate/jet Introduction to development
theory Debraj Ray Department of Economics, New York University, New York, NY 10012, USA
Available online 22 August 2007 Abstract This article introduces the symposium on ...
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Informal insurance, enforcement constraints, and group formation

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G Genicot… - Group Formation in Economics; Networks, …, 2005 - books.google.com
14 Informal Insurance, Enforcement Constraints, and Group Formation Garance Genicot and
Debraj Ray 14.1. Introduction This chapter, largely based on Genicot and Ray (2003), discusses
group formation in the context of informal insurance arrangements with enforcement ...
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Inequality and markets: some implications of occupational diversity

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D Mookherjee… - American Economic Journal: …, 2010 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: This paper studies income distribution in an economy with borrowing constraints.
Parents leave both financial and educational bequests; these determine the occupational
choices of children. Occupational returns are determined by market conditions. If the span ...
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Efficient and optimal programs when investment is irreversible:: A duality theory

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T Mitra… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1983 - Elsevier
Abstract An attempt is made in this paper to formulate a satisfactory duality theory of efficient
and optimal programs in intertemporal models with irreversible inveatment. The introduction
of the constraint that depreciated capital stock cannot be used for present consumption ...
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On the existence of Markov-consistent plans under production uncertainty

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BD Bernheim… - The Review of Economic Studies, 1986 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract Strotz (1956) and Pollak (1968) were among the first to study the behaviour of an
economic agent whose preferences change over time. They suggested that such an agent
would choose a “consistent plan” which they described as “the best plan that he would ...
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[PDF] Remarks on the initiation of costly conflict

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D Ray - Workshop on Conflict and, 2009 - client7.ion.fas.nyu.edu
This paper studies costly conflict in a world of complete information, in which society can
commit to divisible transfers among all potentially warring groups. The difficulty in preventing
conflict arises from the possibility that there may be several conflictual divisions of society, ...
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Monetary equilibrium in an overlapping generations model with productive capital

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A Bose… - Economic Theory, 1993 - Springer
Summary We study perfect foresight competitive equilibrium in an overlapping generations
model with productive capital and a fixed nominal stock of money. We obtain almost-
complete characterizations of (a) the existence of a monetary equilibrium from an arbitrary ...
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[CITATION] Altruistic growth economies I: Existence of bequest equilibria. IMSSS DP 419

D Bernheim… - 1983 - Stanford University
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A Dynamic Incentive‐Based Argument for Conditional Transfers*

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D Mookherjee… - Economic Record, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
This paper is based in part on a lecture given by Mookherjee to the Australian Conference
for Economists at Hobart, Tasmania in September 2007, and by Mookherjee and Ray at the
Latin American Meetings of the Econometric Society at Bogota in October 2007. Authors ...
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[CITATION] Dynamic Price Games with Learning-by-doing

D Mookherjee… - 1986 - Graduate School of Business, …
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