R Benabou… - Economics Letters, 2002 - Elsevier
We show that Gul and Pesendorfer's [Econometrica 69 (2001) 1403] representation result for
preferences with temptation and self-control can be reexpressed in terms of a costly
intrapersonal conflict between a Planner and Doer, as in Thaler and Shefrin [J. Political ...
M Pycia… - Boston College Working Papers in Economics, 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We study the allocation and exchange of indivisible objects without monetary
transfers. In market design literature, some problems that fall in this category are the house
allocation problem with and without existing tenants, and the kidney exchange problem. ...
M Pycia - manuscript, http://pycia. bol. ucla. edu/pycia-matching- …, 2007 - alum.mit.edu
Abstract This paper studies many-to-one matching problems such as between students and
colleges, and workers and firms in the general case, in which both peer effects and
complementarities are allowed. In a matching, an agent on one side, say a firm, employs a ...
M Pycia - Econometrica, 2012 - Wiley Online Library
We study matching and coalition formation environments allowing complementarities and
peer effects. Agents have preferences over coalitions, and these preferences vary with an
underlying, and commonly known, state of nature. Assuming that there is substantial ...
M Pycia - MIT Industrial Performance Center Working Paper, 2005 - kms1.isn.ethz.ch
Abstract This paper studies many-to-one matching such as matching between students and
colleges, interns and hospitals, and workers and firms. A major question that arises in such
settings is the stability of matchings. A matching is stable if no agent or pair of agents can ...
Q Liu… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We show that in large markets all sensible, symmetric, and asymptotically strategy-
proof ordinal allocation mechanisms coincide asymptotically, and that ordinal efficiency is
obtained in the limit. The equivalence builds on a surprising finite-market result: the ...
M Pycia… - UCLA and Boston College, unpublished mimeo, 2009 - nber.org
Abstract We study the allocation and exchange of discrete resources without monetary
transfers. In market design literature, some problems that fall in this category are the house
allocation problem with and without existing tenants, and the kidney exchange problem. ...
[CITATION] Discriminatory or uniform? Design of divisible good auctions
M Rostek, M Weretka… - 2010 - … . Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k- …
M Rostek, M Weretka… - 2010 - ssc.wisc.edu
Abstract Uniform price and discriminatory price auctions are the two most common formats
for selling divisible goods. This paper establishes the revenue rankings for these formats
and the Vickrey auction in markets with strategic buyers. Our analysis underscores the key ...
M Pycia… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: In this note we study the allocation and exchange of discrete resources in environ-
ments in which monetary transfers are not allowed. We allow each discrete resource to be
represented by several copies, extend onto this environment the trading cycles ...
[CITATION] jGenericity of Stochastic Mechanisms in Multidimensional Screening, kPart 2 of DEEQA Research Project
M Pycia - Toulouse University, 2000
[CITATION] Assignment with Multiple-Unit Demands and Responsive Preferences
M Pycia - 2011
M Pycia - 2008 - pycia.bol.ucla.edu
Pycia (2005) studies many-to-one matching without transfers in which agents' payoffs
depend on coalition-level shocks. He establishes a sufficient and necessary condition for
existence of stable matchings irrespective of the realization of shocks. The present note ...
M Pycia - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This note shows how envy-freeness ties together consumptions of different agents,
and derives two of the many results in Liu and Pycia (2011a) as corollaries: ordinal
efficiency and envy-freeness characterize Probabilistic Serial, and the characterization ...
Q Liu… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
∗We would like to thank Andrew Atkeson and William Zame. Keywords: multi-unit demands,
re- sponsive preferences, asymptotic ordinal efficiency, asymptotic strategy-proofness,
symmetry, envy- freeness, ordinal efficiency, Random Priority, Probabilistic Serial, large ...
M Pycia - econ.ucsb.edu
Faculty Directory. Marek Pycia Visiting Researcher Ph.D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
(microeconomic theory). department address. 2127 North Hall University of California Santa
Barbara, CA 93106 Mail Stop 9210. Marek Pycia's homepage. Marek Pycia. ...
M Pycia - 2006 - pycia.bol.ucla.edu
Abstract This paper studies the multidimensional screening problem of a profit% maximizing
monop% olist who designs and sells goods with multiple indivisible attributes. The buyeris
utility is linear in the probabilities of obtaining the attributes. The values of the attributes ...
M Pycia - 2006 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract This thesis consists of three essays on economic design and coalition formation.
The first chapter studies the stability of many-to-one matching, such as matching between
students and colleges or interns and hospitals. Complementarities and peer effects are ...
B Holmstrom, G Ellison, M Pycia - 2006 - dspace.mit.edu
This thesis consists of three essays on economic design and coalition formation. The first
chapter studies the stability of many-to-one matching, such as matching between students
and colleges or interns and hospitals. Complementarities and peer effects are inherent in ...
S Board… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: A buyer wishes to purchase a good from a seller who chooses a sequence of
prices over time. In each period, the buyer can also exercise an outside option such as
moving onto another seller. We show there is a unique equilibrium in which the seller ...
M Pycia - 2006 - gtcenter.org
Abstract This paper studies the multidimensional screening problem of a profit% maximizing
monop% olist who designs and sells goods with multiple indivisible attributes. The buyeris
utility is linear in the probabilities of obtaining the attributes. The values of the attributes ...
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