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User profiles for author:"Peter Cramton"

Peter Cramton

Professor of Economics, University of Maryland
Verified email at umd.edu
Cited by 6941

Introduction to combinatorial auctions

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P Cramton, Y Shoham… - 2006 - works.bepress.com
Abstract Combinatorial auctions are those auctions in which bidders can place bids on
combinations of items, called “packages,” rather than just individual items. The study of
combinatorial auctions is inherently interdisciplinary. Combinatorial auctions are in the ...
Cited by 706 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 42 versions

Demand reduction and inefficiency in multi-unit auctions

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LM Ausubel… - 2002 - drum.lib.umd.edu
Auctions typically involve the sale of many related goods. Treasury, spectrum and electricity
auctions are examples. In auctions where bidders pay the market-clearing price for items
won, large bidders have an incentive to reduce demand in order to pay less for their ...
Cited by 611 - Related articles - All 31 versions

Dissolving a partnership efficiently

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P Cramton, R Gibbons… - Econometrica, 1987 - works.bepress.com
Abstract Several partners jointly own an asset that may be traded among them. Each partner
has a valuation for the asset; the valuations are known privately and drawn independently
from a common probability distribution. We characterize the set of all incentive-compatible ...
Cited by 344 - Related articles - All 17 versions

Tradeable carbon permit auctions: How and why to auction not grandfather

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P Cramton… - Energy policy, 2002 - Elsevier
An auction of carbon permits is the best way to achieve domestic carbon caps designed to
limit global climate change. To minimize administrative costs, permits would be required at
the level of oil refineries, natural gas pipe lines, natural gas liquid sellers, and coal ...
Cited by 309 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 40 versions

The FCC spectrum auctions: An early assessment

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P Cramton - Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1997 - Wiley Online Library
This paper analyzes six spectrum auctions conducted by the Federal Communications
Commission from July 1994 to May 1996. These auctions were simultaneous multiple-round
auctions in which collections of licenses were auctioned simultaneously. This auction form ...
Cited by 284 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 20 versions

Money out of thin air: The nationwide narrowband PCS auction

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PC Cramton - Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1995 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. MONEY OUT OF THIN AIR: THE NATIONWIDE NARROWBAND PCS
AUCTION PETER C. CRAMTON University of Maryland 20742 The Federal
Communications Commission held its first aucfion of radio spec- trum ...
Cited by 237 - Related articles - All 26 versions

Bargaining with incomplete information: an infinite-horizon model with two-sided uncertainty

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PC Cramton - The Review of Economic Studies, 1984 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Page 1. Review of Economic Studies (1984) LI, 579-593 © 1984 The Society for Economic
Analysis Limited 0034-6527/84/00390579$02.00 Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An
Infinite-Horizon Model with Two-Sided Uncertainty PETER C. CRAMTON Stanford University ...
Cited by 223 - Related articles - Library Search - All 15 versions

Collusive bidding: Lessons from the FCC spectrum auctions

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P Cramton… - Journal of regulatory economics, 2000 - Springer
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions use a simultaneous
ascending auction design. Bidders bid on numerous communication licenses
simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no bidder is willing to bid ...
Cited by 221 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 28 versions

Strategic delay in bargaining with two-sided uncertainty

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P Cramton - Review of Economic Studies, 1992 - works.bepress.com
Abstract The role of strategic delay is analyzed in an infinite-horizon alternating-offer model
of bargaining. A buyer and seller are engaged in the trade of a single object. Both
bargainers have private information about their own preferences and are impatient in that ...
Cited by 206 - Related articles - All 19 versions

Ascending auctions

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P Cramton - European Economic Review, 1998 - Elsevier
A key question of auction design is whether to use an ascending-bid or a sealed-bid format.
The critical distinction between formats is that an ascending auction provides the bidders
with information through the process of bidding. This information is a two-edged sword. It ...
Cited by 200 - Related articles - All 25 versions

Strikes and holdouts in wage bargaining: theory and data

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P Cramton… - American Economic Review,, 1992 - works.bepress.com
Abstract We develop a private-information model of union contract negotiations in which
disputes signal a firm's willingness to pay. Previous models have assumed that all labor
disputes take the form of a strike. Yet a prominent feature of US collective bargaining is the ...
Cited by 159 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 37 versions

Synergies in wireless telephony: Evidence from the broadband PCS auctions

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P Cramton, LM Ausubel, RP McAfee… - Journal of Economics …, 1997 - works.bepress.com
Abstract We examine bid data from the first two broadband PCS spectrum auctions for
evidence of value synergies. First, we estimate a benchmark regression for the determinants
of final auction prices. Then, we include variables reflecting the extent to which bidders ...
Cited by 158 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 28 versions

Bargaining with incomplete information

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LM Ausubel, P Cramton… - Handbook of game theory with …, 2002 - Elsevier
Abstract A central question in economics is understanding the difficulties that parties have in
reaching mutually beneficial agreements. Informational differences provide an appealing
explanation for bargaining inefficiencies. This chapter provides an overview of the ...
Cited by 154 - Related articles - All 14 versions

Cartel enforcement with uncertainty about costs

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P Cramton… - International Economic Review, 1990 - works.bepress.com
Abstract What cartel agreements are possible when firms have private information about
production costs? For private cost uncertainty we characterize the set of cartel agreements
that can be supported, recognizing incentive and participation constraints. If defection ...
Cited by 120 - Related articles - All 17 versions

Deficit reduction through diversity: How affirmative action at the FCC increased auction competition

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P Cramton… - Stanford Law Review, 1996 - works.bepress.com
Abstract In recent auctions for paging licenses, the Federal Communications Commission
has granted businesses owned by minorities and women substantial bidding credits. In this
article, Professors Ayres and Cramton analyze a particular auction and argue that the ...
Cited by 118 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 22 versions

Auctioning many divisible goods

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LM Ausubel… - Journal of the European Economic …, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract We study the theory and practical implementation of auctioning many divisible
goods. With multiple related goods, price discovery is important not only to reduce the
winner's curse, but more importantly, to simplify the bidder's decision problem and to ...
Cited by 104 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 34 versions

[BOOK] The optimality of being efficient

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LM Ausubel, PC Cramton… - 1998 - works.bepress.com
Page 1. 1 The Optimality of Being Efficient Lawrence Ausubel and Peter Cramton
Department of Economics University of Maryland 2 Common Reaction Why worry
about efficiency, when there is resale? Our Conclusion Why ...
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A capacity market that makes sense

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P Cramton… - The Electricity Journal, 2005 - Elsevier
The capacity market that the authors have proposed for New England avoids problems
found in early capacity markets by only rewarding capacity that contributes to reliability as
demonstrated by its performance during hours in which there is a shortage of operating ...
Cited by 102 - Related articles - All 34 versions

Using auction theory to inform takeover regulation

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P Cramton… - Journal of Law, Economics, and …, 1991 - works.bepress.com
Abstract This paper focuses on certain mechanisms that govern the sale of corporate assets.
Under Delaware law, when a potential acquirer makes a serious bid for a target, the target's
Board of Directors is required to act as would" auctioneers charged with getting the best ...
Cited by 96 - Related articles - All 23 versions

Collusive bidding in the fcc spectrum auctions

[PDF] from umd.edu
P Cramton… - 2002 - drum.lib.umd.edu
This paper describes the bid signaling that occurred in many of the FCC spectrum auctions.
Bidders in these auctions bid on numerous spectrum licenses simultaneously, with bidding
remaining open on all licenses until no bidder is willing to raise the bid on any license. ...
Cited by 93 - Related articles - All 27 versions

The efficiency of the FCC spectrum auctions

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P Cramton - Journal of Law and Economics, 1998 - works.bepress.com
Abstract From July 1994 to July 1996, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
conducted nine spectrum auctions, raising about $20 billion for the US Treasury. The
auctions assigned thousands of licenses to hundreds of firms. Were the auctions efficient? ...
Cited by 88 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 23 versions

Relational investing and agency theory

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P Cramton… - Cardozo Law Review, 1994 - works.bepress.com
Abstract This Article analyzes how, and when, corporate governance could be improved by
utilizing" relational investing." The term relational investing is just coming into vogue and
there does not yet seem to be a consensus on what it means. Although the term has been ...
Cited by 84 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 15 versions

Electricity market design: The good, the bad, and the ugly

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P Cramton - System Sciences, 2003. Proceedings of the 36th …, 2003 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Abstract This paper examines principles of market design as applied to electricity markets.
The author illustrates the principles with examples of both good and bad designs. The
author discusses one of the main design challenges-dealing with market power. The ...
Cited by 75 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 24 versions

Shrewd bargaining on the moral frontier: Toward a theory of morality in practice

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JG Dees… - Business Ethics Quarterly, 1991 - JSTOR
Page 1. SHREWD BARGAINING ON THE MORAL FRONTIER: TOWARD A THEORY
OF MORALITY IN PRACTICE* J. Gregory Dees and Peter C. Cramton A6stract: From
a traditional moral point of view, business practitio- ners ...
Cited by 70 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 14 versions

Uniform pricing or pay-as-bid pricing: a dilemma for California and beyond

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AE Kahn, PC Cramton, RH Porter… - The Electricity Journal, 2001 - Elsevier
Cited by 69 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 15 versions

Simultaneous ascending auctions

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P Cramton, Y Shoham… - 2006 - works.bepress.com
Abstract The simultaneous ascending auction has proved to be a successful method of
auctioning many related items. Simultaneous sale and ascending bids enable price
discovery, which helps bidders build desirable packages of items. Although package bids ...
Cited by 69 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 15 versions

[PDF] Pricing in the California Power Exchange Electricity Market: should California switch from uniform pricing to pay-as-bid pricing?

[PDF] from berkeley.edu
AE Kahn, P Cramton, RH Porter… - Blue Ribbon Panel …, 2001 - ucei.berkeley.edu
In mid-November, this Panel was constituted to investigate “whether the current rules for
determining the market price in the California Power Exchange Day-Ahead market results in
a fair and efficient price for electricity in California.” To this end, we held hearings in New ...
Cited by 63 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 20 versions

Ratifiable mechanisms: learning from disagreement

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P Cramton… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1995 - works.bepress.com
Abstract In a mechanism design problem, participation constraints require that all types
prefer the proposed mechanism to some status quo. If equilibrium play in the status quo
mechanism depends on the players' beliefs, then the inference drawn if someone objects ...
Cited by 60 - Related articles - All 14 versions

Auctioning securities

[PDF] from umd.edu
LM Ausubel… - 1998 - drum.lib.umd.edu
Treasury debt and other divisible securities are traditionally sold in either a pay-your-bid
(discriminatory) auction or a uniform-price auction. We compare these auction formats with a
Vickrey auction and also with two ascending-bid auctions. The Vickrey auction and the ...
Cited by 59 - Related articles - All 21 versions

The determinants of US labor disputes

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P Cramton… - Journal of Labor Economics, 1994 - works.bepress.com
Abstract We present a bargaining model of union contract negotiations, in which the union
decides between two threats: the union can strike or continue to work under the expired
contract. The model makes predictions about the level of dispute activity and the form the ...
Cited by 58 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 22 versions

The use of replacement workers in union contract negotiations: The US experience, 1980-1989

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P Cramton… - Journal of Labor Economics, 1998 - works.bepress.com
Abstract It is argued in many circles that a structural change occurred in US collective
bargaining in the 1980s. Strike incidence declined, dispute incidence increased, and the
composition of disputes shifted away from strikes and toward holdouts. We investigate the ...
Cited by 54 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - BL Direct - All 35 versions

Efficient relocation of spectrum incumbents

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P Cramton, E Kwerel… - Journal of Law and …, 1998 - works.bepress.com
Abstract Changes in technologies and in consumer demands have made prior radio
spectrum allocations far from efficient. To address this problem the FCC has recently
reallocated spectrum for more flexible use in bands that are partially occupied by ...
Cited by 51 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 24 versions

The effect of collective bargaining legislation on strikes and wages

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P Cramton, M Gunderson… - Review of Economics and …, 1999 - works.bepress.com
Abstract Using Canadian data on large, private-sector contract negotiations from January
1967 to March 1993, we find that wages and strikes are substantially influenced by labor
policy. The data indicate that conciliation policies have largely been ineffective in reducing ...
Cited by 51 - Related articles - All 33 versions

Vickrey auctions with reserve pricing

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LM Ausubel… - Economic Theory, 2004 - Springer
Summary. We generalize the Vickrey auction to allow for reserve pricing in a multi-unit
auction with interdependent values. In the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing, the seller
determines the quantity to be made available as a function of the bidders' reports of ...
Cited by 48 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 27 versions

Wage bargaining with time-varying threats

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P Cramton… - Journal of Labor Economics, 1994 - works.bepress.com
Abstract We study wage bargaining in which the union is uncertain about the firm's
willingness to pay and threat payoffs vary over time. Strike payoffs change over time as
replacement workers are hired, as strikers find temporary jobs, and as inventories or strike ...
Cited by 46 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 21 versions

Sequential bargaining mechanisms

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P Cramton - 1985 - works.bepress.com
Abstract The introductory discussion presented in this chapter considers the simplest type of
sequential bargaining games in which the players' time preferences are described by known
and fixed discount rates. I begin by characterizing the class of perfect bargaining ...
Cited by 44 - Related articles - Library Search - All 15 versions

Promoting honesty in negotiation: an exercise in practical ethics

[PDF] from umd.edu
P Cramton… - Business ethics quarterly, 1993 - works.bepress.com
Abstract In a competitive and morally imperfect world, business people are often faced with
serious ethical challenges. Harboring suspicions about the ethics of others, many feel
justified in engaging in less-than-ideal conduct to protect their own interests. The most ...
Cited by 45 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 20 versions

Competitive bidding behavior in uniform-price auction markets

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P Cramton - 2003 - works.bepress.com
(1) I have been asked by Duke Energy to present the economic theory of competitive bidding
in uniform-price auction markets, such as the markets administered by the California
Independent System Operator (“CAISO”) and the California Power Exchange (“CalPX”). I ...
Cited by 38 - Related articles - All 27 versions

[CITATION] Tradable carbon allowance auctions: how and why to auction

P Cramton… - Center for Clean Air Policy, 1998
Cited by 35 - Related articles

How best to auction oil rights

[PDF] from umd.edu
P Cramton - 2007 - works.bepress.com
Abstract I study the design of oil rights auctions. A good auction design promotes both an
efficient assignment of rights and competitive revenues for the seller. The structure of bidder
preferences and the degree of competition are key factors in determining the best design. ...
Cited by 33 - Related articles - All 10 versions

Unions, bargaining and strikes

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P Cramton… - 2002 - works.bepress.com
Abstract Labor disputes are an intriguing feature of the landscape of industrialized
economies. Economists have had a long-standing interest in formulating a framework for
understanding and analyzing labor disputes. The development of noncooperative ...
Cited by 35 - Related articles - All 33 versions

Colombia firm energy market

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P Cramton… - 2007 - works.bepress.com
Abstract A firm energy market for Colombia is presented. Firm energy—the ability to provide
energy in a dry period—is the product needed for reliability in Colombia's hydro-dominated
electricity market. The firm energy market coordinates investment in new resources to ...
Cited by 30 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 36 versions

Dynamic bargaining with transaction costs

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P Cramton - Management Science, 1991 - works.bepress.com
Abstract A buyer and seller alternate making offers until an offer is accepted or someone
terminates negotiations. The seller's valuation is common knowledge, but the buyer's
valuation is known only by the buyer. Impatience to reach an agreement comes from two ...
Cited by 29 - Related articles - All 20 versions

The distributional effects of carbon regulation

[PDF] from marketdesign.com
P Cramton… - 1999 - works.bepress.com
Abstract We examine the distributional effects of carbon regulation. An auction of carbon
permits is the best way to achieve carbon caps set by international negotiation to limit global
climate change. An auction is preferred to grandfathering (giving polluters permits in ...
Cited by 27 - Related articles - All 27 versions

Forward reliability markets: Less risk, less market power, more efficiency

[PDF] from stoft.com
P Cramton… - Utilities Policy, 2008 - Elsevier
A forward reliability market is presented. The market coordinates new entry through the
forward procurement of reliability options—physical capacity bundled with a financial option
to supply energy above a strike price. The market assures adequate generating resources ...
Cited by 28 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 15 versions

[CITATION] jDemand Reductions and Ineffi ciency in Multi# Unit Auctions. kMimeo

L Ausubel… - University of Maryland, 1998
Cited by 25 - Related articles

Why we need to stick with uniform-price auctions in electricity markets

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P Cramton… - The Electricity Journal, 2007 - Elsevier
Arguments that the uniform-price auction yields electricity prices that are systematically too
high are incorrect. Tampering with the spot price would cause inefficiency and raise long-
term costs. The proper way to dampen the impact of spot price fluctuations is with long- ...
Cited by 23 - Related articles - All 26 versions

[PDF] Vickrey auctions with reserve pricing

[PDF] from market-design.com
LM Ausubel… - Dept. of Economics, University of …, 1999 - market-design.com
Abstract We generalize the Vickrey auction to allow for reserve pricing in a multiple item
auction with interdependent values. By withholding quantity in some circumstances, the
seller can improve revenues or mitigate collusion. In the Vickrey auction with reserve ...
Cited by 23 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 10 versions

The role of the ISO in US electricity markets: A review of restructuring in California and PJM

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L Cameron… - The Electricity Journal, 1999 - Elsevier
Despite their design differences, both the California and the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-
Maryland markets provide explicit roles for competition in the scheduling functions while
allowing the ISO to manage the spot market. Experience has shown that both can work.
Cited by 23 - Related articles - All 25 versions

Lessons learned from the UK 3G spectrum auction

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P Cramton - 2001 - works.bepress.com
Objective The Government's overall aim for the auction was" to secure, for the long term
benefit of United Kingdom customers and the national economy, the timely and
economically advantageous development and sustained provision of thirdgeneration ...
Cited by 21 - Related articles - All 10 versions

Deception and mutual trust: a reply to Strudler

[PDF] from umd.edu
JG Dees… - Business Ethics Quarterly, 1995 - JSTOR
Page 1. DECEPTION AND MUTUAL TRUST: A REPLY TO STRUDLER1 J. Gregory Dees and
Peter C. Cramton Abstract: Alan Strudler has written a stimulating and provocative article about
deception in negotiation. He presents his views, in part, in con? ...
Cited by 19 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - BL Direct - All 12 versions

The quadratic core-selecting payment rule for combinatorial auctions

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P Cramton… - 2008 - works.bepress.com
Abstract We report on the use of a quadratic programming technique in recent and
upcoming spectrum auctions in Europe, and proposed for use in the FAA's landing-slot
auctions in the United States. Specifically, we compute a unique point “in the core” that ...
Cited by 20 - Related articles - All 10 versions

Market-based alternatives for managing congestion at new york's laguardia airport

[PDF] from umd.edu
P Cramton, MO Ball, LM Ausubel, F Berardino… - 2007 - works.bepress.com
Abstract We summarize the results of a project that was motivated by the expiration of the
“High Density Rule,” which defined the slot controls employed at New York's LaGuardia
Airport for more than 30 years. The scope of the project included the analysis of several ...
Cited by 18 - Related articles - All 19 versions

Auctions and takeovers

P Cramton - 1998 - works.bepress.com
Abstract Under Delaware law (the predominant corporate law in the US), when a potential
acquirer makes a serious bid for a target, the target's board of directors is required to act as
would" auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stock-holders at a sale of the ...
Cited by 18 - Related articles

Auction design for standard offer service

[PDF] from marketdesign.com
P Cramton, A Parece… - 1997 - works.bepress.com
Abstract During the transition to a competitive electricity market, when a consumer does not
select an electricity provider, who provides service to the customer and at what price? An
auction for this" standard offer service" is a market-based way to assign the service ...
Cited by 15 - Related articles - All 15 versions

Economists' statement on network neutrality policy

[PDF] from nextgenweb.org
WJ Baumol, M Cave, P Cramton… - AEI-Brookings Joint …, 2007 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Network neutrality is a policy proposal that would regulate how network providers
manage and price the use of their networks. Congress has introduced several bills on
network neutrality. Proposed legislation generally would mandate that Internet service ...
Cited by 14 - Related articles - All 10 versions

Virtual power plant auctions

[PDF] from umd.edu
LM Ausubel… - Utilities Policy, 2010 - Elsevier
Since their advent in 2001, virtual power plant (VPP) auctions have been implemented
widely. In this paper, we describe the simultaneous ascending-clock auction format that has
been used for virtually all VPP auctions to date, elaborating on other design choices that ...
Cited by 14 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 13 versions

The effect of collective bargaining legislation on strikes and wages

P Cramton, M Gunderson… - Papers of Peter Cramton, 1998 - econpapers.repec.org
Using Canadian data on large, private-sector contract negotiations from January 1967 to
March 1993, we find that strikes and wages are substantially influenced by labor policy. The
data indicate that conciliation policies have largely been ineffective in reducing strike ...
Cited by 13 - Related articles - Cached - All 4 versions

[PDF] Dynamic auctions in procurement

[PDF] from psu.edu
LM Ausubel… - Handbook of Procurement, 2006 - Citeseer
Abstract We study the theory and practical implementation of dynamic procurement auctions.
We consider the procurement of many related items. With many related items, price
discovery is important not only to reduce the winner's curse, but more importantly, to ...
Cited by 14 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 12 versions

[CITATION] An agency perspective on relational investing

I Ayres, P Cramton… - 1993 - John M. Olin Program in Law and …
Cited by 13 - Related articles

A Review of ISO New England's Proposed Market Rules

[PDF] from marketdesign.com
P Cramton… - 1998 - works.bepress.com
Abstract This report reviews the proposed rules for restructured wholesale electricity markets
in New England. We review the market rules, both individually and collectively, and identify
potential problems that might limit the efficiency of these markets. We examine alternatives ...
Cited by 12 - Related articles - All 21 versions

New England's forward capacity auction

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P Cramton - 2006 - works.bepress.com
Abstract This note provides a brief description of New England's Forward Capacity Auction
(FCA) for the procurement of electricity capacity. The description is based on the 6 March
2006 Settlement Agreement. The description here presents a simpler description of the ...
Cited by 11 - Related articles - All 5 versions

ESOP fables: The impact of employee stock ownership plans on labor disputes

[PDF] from umd.edu
P Cramton, H Mehran… - 2008 - works.bepress.com
Abstract By the early 1990s employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) had become as
prevalent in unionized firms as in nonunionized firms. However, little research has been
devoted to examining the implications of ESOPs for collective bargaining, or cross ...
Cited by 12 - Related articles - All 35 versions

Simultaneous ascending auctions with package bidding

P Cramton, J McMillan, P Milgrom, B Miller… - 1998 - works.bepress.com
Abstract An effective package bidding mechanism addresses three problems: the exposure
problem (the risks a bidder faces in trying to construct an efficiently large combination of
licenses), the free-rider problem (the difficulties small bidders have in beating those who ...
Cited by 11 - Related articles - All 5 versions

Simulation of the Colombian Firm Energy Market

[PDF] from umd.edu
P Cramton… - 2006 - works.bepress.com
Abstract We present a simulation analysis of the proposed Colombian firm energy market.
The main purpose of the simulation is to assess the risk to suppliers of participation in the
market. We also are able to consider variations in the market design, and assess the ...
Cited by 10 - Related articles - All 17 versions

Eliminating the Flaws in New England's Reserve Markets

[PDF] from umd.edu
P Cramton… - 2000 - works.bepress.com
New England's wholesale electricity market has been in operation, since May 1, 1999. When
the market began it was understood that the rules were not perfect (Cramton and Wilson
1998). However, it was decided that it was better to start the market with imperfect rules, ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - All 15 versions

A review of Markets for clean air: The US Acid Rain Program

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P Cramton - Journal of Economic Literature, 2000 - works.bepress.com
Prices,“If it is feasible to establish a market to implement a policy, no policymaker can afford
to do without one.” This book provides important evidence in support of Dales' statement by
thoroughly examining the first several years of the US acid rain program. This innovative ...
Cited by 8 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 13 versions

How best to auction natural resources

[PDF] from umd.edu
P Cramton - 2009 - works.bepress.com
Abstract I study the design of auctions of natural resources, such as oil or mineral rights. A
good auction design promotes both an efficient assignment of rights and competitive
revenues for the seller. The structure of bidder preferences and the degree of competition ...
Cited by 8 - Related articles - All 10 versions

Impacts of Strike Replacement Banks in Canada

[PDF] from frb.org
P Cramton, M Gunderson… - Labor Law Journal, 1999 - works.bepress.com
Abstract In the labor relations area no issue generates as much controversy and division
between labor and management as does the legislative ban on replacement workers. In the
United States, the issue of a ban on permanent replacement workers has come before ...
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[PDF] Designed to fail: the medicare auction for durable medical equipment

[PDF] from umd.edu
P Cramton… - University of Maryland, 2011 - cramton.umd.edu
Abstract We examine the theoretical properties of the auction format for Medicare Durable
Medical Equipment. The format was used in a pilot auction in November 2009 covering nine
cities and is planned for use in 100 cities in 2012. Two unusual features of the Medicare ...
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Price is a better climate commitment

[PDF] from umd.edu
P Cramton… - 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Developing countries reject meaningful emission targets (recent intensity caps are
no exception). This prevents the Kyoto Protocol from establishing a global price for
greenhouse gas emissions and leaves almost all new emissions unpriced.
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The effect of collective bargaining legislation on strikes and wages

PC Cramton, M Gunderson… - 1995 - nber.org
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Lessons from the United States spectrum auctions

P Cramton - 2000 - works.bepress.com
Mr. Chairman and members of the Senate Budget Committee, I am honored to appear
before you today. My remarks are about the spectrum auctions in the United States. I will
discuss spectrum auction successes, failures, and what I think are key issues in upcoming ...
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Colombia's Forward Energy Market

[PDF] from idei.fr
P Cramton - 2007 - works.bepress.com
Abstract This paper presents a market design for Colombia's forward energy market, which
is scheduled to began in 2008. The forward energy market is an organized market to
procure energy for electricity customers on a forward basis. It includes both the regulated ...
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Bargaining with incomplete information

P Cramton, LM Ausubel… - 2001 - works.bepress.com
Abstract A central question in economics is understanding the difficulties that parties have in
reaching mutually beneficial agreements. Informational differences provide an appealing
explanation for bargaining inefficiencies. This chapter provides an overview of the ...
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Using forward markets to improve electricity market design

[PDF] from umd.edu
LM Ausubel… - Utilities Policy, 2010 - Elsevier
Forward markets, both medium term and long term, complement the spot market for
wholesale electricity. The forward markets reduce risk, mitigate market power, and
coordinate new investment. In the medium term, a forward energy market lets suppliers ...
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No Substitute for the" P" Word in Financial Rescue

LM Ausubel… - The Economists' Voice, 2009 - works.bepress.com
Abstract Fears of pricing troubled assets have needlessly stalled the rescue effort, according
to Lawrence Ausubel and Peter Cramton, two market-design economists whose work on
TARP has received the attention of the Treasury and policy makers.
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Demand reduction and inefficiency in multi-unit auctions

P Cramton… - 2002 - works.bepress.com
Abstract Auctions typically involve the sale of many related goods. Treasury, spectrum and
electricity auctions are examples. In auctions where bidders pay the market-clearing price
for items won, large bidders have an incentive to reduce demand in order to pay less for ...
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Comments on the RGGI Market Design

P Cramton - 2007 - works.bepress.com
1 Summary The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a cap and trade program to
limit the total CO2 emissions from electricity sources in the ten member states on the East
Coast from Maryland to Maine, excluding Pennsylvania. Each RGGI state has an ...
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Reducing healthcare costs requires good market design

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P Cramton… - The Economists' Voice, 2010 - works.bepress.com
As the Government comes to grips with rising deficits, there is a bigger economic tsunami
lurking in the background—many tens of trillions in unfunded Medicare costs. 1 Innovations
are desperately needed to contain healthcare costs and avoid fiscal disaster. One thing in ...
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The effect of incumbent bidding in set-aside auctions: An analysis of prices in the closed and open segments of FCC Auction 35

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Full text - MIT Libraries
P Cramton, AT Ingraham… - Telecommunications Policy, 2008 - Elsevier
This paper examines the impact of an incumbent carrier's participation in two simultaneously
conducted auctions: one set-aside for non-incumbents and one open to all carriers. This
paper estimates the extent to which prices in the closed auction were inflated by the ...
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Common-value auctions with liquidity needs: An experimental test of a troubled assets reverse auction

[PDF] from umd.edu
LM Ausubel, P Cramton, E Filiz-Ozbay… - Papers of Peter …, 2009 - works.bepress.com
Abstract We experimentally test alternative auction designs suitable for pricing and removing
troubled assets from banks' balance sheets as part of the financial rescue. Many individual
securities or pools of securities are auctioned simultaneously. Securities that are widely ...
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Review of the proposed reserve markets in New England

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P Cramton, H Chao… - 2005 - works.bepress.com
1 Summary ISO New England proposes reserve markets designed to improve the existing
forward reserve market and improve pricing during real-time reserve shortages. We support
all of the main elements of the proposal. For example, we agree that little is gained by ...
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[CITATION] Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model with Two-Sided Uncertainty, 51 REV. ECON

PC Cramton - Stud, 1984
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[CITATION] Cartel enforcement with uncertainty about costs

PC Cramton… - Working Papers, 1986 - ideas.repec.org
... Additional information is available for the following registered author(s): Peter Cramton. Abstract. ...
"Collusion with Internal Contracting," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 693,
Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]; Peter Cramton & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1995. ...
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Review of the Reserves and Operable Capability Markets: New England's Experience in the First Four Months

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P Cramton - 1999 - works.bepress.com
Abstract I review the performance of the operating reserves and the operable capability
markets in New England. The review covers the first four months of operation from May 1 to
August 31, 1999. The review is based on my knowledge of the market rules and their ...
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[BOOK] Wind energy in Colombia: a framework for market entry

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W Vergara, A Deeb, N Toba, P Cramton… - 2010 - books.google.com
Wind Energy in Colombia is part of the World Bank Study series. These papers are
published to communicate the results of the Bank's ongoing research and to stimulate public
discussion. The purpose of this study is to provide decision makers---anlysts, planners, ...
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Auctioning greenhouse gas emissions permits in Australia*

[PDF] from umd.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
R Betz, S Seifert, P Cramton… - Australian Journal of …, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
The allocation of permits is an important design aspect of an emissions trading scheme.
Traditionally, governments have favoured the free allocation of greenhouse gas permits
based on individual historical emissions ('grandfathering') or industry benchmark data. ...
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[CITATION] The Convergence of Market Designs for Adequate Generating Capacity with Special Attention to the CAISO's Resource Adequacy Problem, a white paper …

P Cramton… - 2006 - … Working Paper 06-007, Center for …
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[CITATION] jThe Optimality of Being Effi cient. kMimeo

L Ausubel… - University of Maryland, 1999
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Auctioning the Digital Dividend

[PDF] from umd.edu
P Cramton - 2009 - works.bepress.com
Abstract I begin by describing some of the problems of the simultaneous ascending auction.
Then I present the package clock auction, which retains the benefits, while addressing the
weaknesses, of the simultaneous ascending auction. I emphasize two essential elements ...
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[PDF] Auction design for medicare durable medical equipment

[PDF] from umd.edu
P Cramton - 2011 - cramton.umd.edu
• Since capacities of existing providers are set to equal approximately 100 blocks (100% of
demand), excess supply comes from the desire of new entrants to supply at the current
auction price• The price keeps declining until new entrants are unwilling to supply or a ...
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[CITATION] Economists' Statement on Network Neutrality Policy (March), AEI-Brookings Joint Center Working Paper No

WJ Baumol, ME Cave, PC Cramton, RW Hahn… - RP07-08, 2007
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[BOOK] Ratifiable mechanisms: learning from disagreement

PC Cramton, TR Palfrey… - 1990 - en.scientificcommons.org
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The 700 MHz spectrum auction: An opportunity to protect competition in a consolidating industry

[PDF] from umd.edu
P Cramton, A Skrzypacz… - 2007 - works.bepress.com
Abstract This paper is provided in connection with the 2007 Telecommunications
Symposium–Voice, Video and Broadband: The Changing Competitive Landscape and Its
Impact on Consumers, sponsored by the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice ...
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Global Carbon Pricing: A Better Climate Commitment

P Cramton… - Papers of Peter Cramton, 2009 - ideas.repec.org
Developing countries reject meaningful emission targets (recent intensity caps are no
exception), while many industrialized countries insist that developing countries accept them.
This impasse has prevented the Kyoto Protocol from establishing a global price for ...
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Pricing in the California Power Exchange Electricity Market: Should California Switch from Uniform Pricing to Pay-as-Bid Pricing?

P Cramton, AE Kahn, RH Porter… - 2001 - works.bepress.com
In mid-November, this Panel was constituted to investigate “whether the current rules for
determining the market price in the California Power Exchange Day-Ahead market results in
a fair and efficient price for electricity in California.” To this end, we held hearings in New ...
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A Tax-Cut Auction for the Environment: How and why to auction CO2 emissions permits

P Cramton… - Resources for the Future Discussion Paper, 1998 - motu.org.nz
Abstract An auction of carbon permits is the best way to achieve carbon caps set by
international negotiation to limit global climate change. To minimize administrative costs,
permits would be required at the level of oil refineries, natural gas pipe lines, liquid sellers, ...
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[PDF] Medicare auction failure: early evidence from the round 1 rebid

[PDF] from umd.edu
P Cramton - 2011 - cramton.umd.edu
... The vast majority of existing suppliers by volume will be excluded from supplying Medicare
beneficiaries for the major product categories. Source: Compiled by Peter Cramton, 17
Nov 2010. ... Source: Compiled by Peter Cramton, 17 Nov 2010. ...
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Global Energy G Elobal NERGY POLICY CENTER

[PDF] from psu.edu
P Cramton… - 2010 - works.bepress.com
Abstract Greenhouse gas abatement is a public good, so climate policy is a public-goods
game and suffers from the free-rider incentives that make the outcome of such games
notoriously uncooperative. Adopting an international agreement can change the nature of ...
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