J Horner - The American Economic Review, 2002 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: This paper shows how competition generates reputation-building behavior in
repeated interactions when the product quality observed by consumers is a noisy signal of
firms' effort level. There are two types of firms and" good" firms try to distinguish ...
JC Ely, J Hörner… - Econometrica, 2005 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. Econometrica, Vol. 73, No. 2 (March, 2005), 377–415 BELIEF-FREE
EQUILIBRIA IN REPEATED GAMES BY JEFFREY C. ELY, JOHANNES HÖRNER,
AND WOJCIECH OLSZEWSKI1 We introduce a class of strategies ...
J Hörner… - Econometrica, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. Econometrica, Vol. 74, No. 6 (November, 2006), 1499–1544 THE FOLK
THEOREM FOR GAMES WITH PRIVATE ALMOST-PERFECT MONITORING BY
JOHANNES HÖRNER AND WOJCIECH OLSZEWSKI1 We prove ...
M Goltsman, J Hörner, G Pavlov… - Journal of Economic …, 2009 - Elsevier
... Fax: +1 519 661 3666. E-mail addresses: mgoltsma@uwo.ca (M. Goltsman), johannes.horner@
yale.edu (J. H rner), gpavlov@uwo.ca (G. Pavlov), squint@essex.ac.uk (F. Squintani).
0022-0531/$ see front matter 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. ...
J Hörner - Review of Economic Studies, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. ...
S Callander… - Journal of Economic theory, 2009 - Elsevier
... All rights reserved. JEL classification: D80 Keywords: Social learning; Minorities; Herding *
Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: scal@kellogg.northwestern.edu (S. Callander),
johannes.horner@yale.edu (J. H rner). 0022-0531/$ see front matter 2009 Elsevier Inc. ...
J Hörner… - Review of Economic Studies, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. ...
A Bonatti… - The American Economic Review, 2011 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: This paper examines moral hazard in teams over time. Agents are collectively
engaged in a project whose duration and outcome are uncertain, and their individual efforts
are unobserved. Free-riding leads not only to a reduction in effort, but also to ...
J Hörner… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. ...
J Hörner… - Journal of Political Economy, 2004 - JSTOR
J Horner… - 2012 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes
experiments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The
agent's actions are hidden, and the principal cannot commit to future actions. The ...
J Hörner… - Econometrica, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. Econometrica, Vol. 77, No. 2 (March, 2009), 453–487 BELIEF-FREE
EQUILIBRIA IN GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION BY JOHANNES
HÖRNER1 AND STEFANO LOVO We define belief-free equilibria in ...
J Hörner, T Sugaya, S Takahashi… - Econometrica, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. Econometrica, Vol. 79, No. 4 (July, 2011), 1277–1318 RECURSIVE METHODS
IN DISCOUNTED STOCHASTIC GAMES: AN ALGORITHM FOR δ → 1 AND A FOLK
THEOREM BY JOHANNES HÖRNER, TAKUO SUGAYA ...
J Hörner… - Econometrica, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. Econometrica, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January, 2009), 29–69 PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE OFFERS
IN THE MARKET FOR LEMONS BY JOHANNES HÖRNER1 AND NICOLAS VIEILLE We
study the role of observability in bargaining with correlated values. ...
J Hörner… - Review of Economic Studies, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. ...
J Hörner… - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2009 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Page 1. HOW ROBUST IS THE FOLK THEOREM? ∗ JOHANNES H¨ORNER AND
WOJCIECH OLSZEWSKI The folk theorem of repeated games has established that
cooperative behavior can be sustained as an equilibrium in repeated settings. ...
J Hörner… - forthcoming in the Quarterly …, 2008 - faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu
Page 1. How Robust is the Folk Theorem? ∗ Johannes Hörner and Wojciech Olszewski†
December 10, 2008 Abstract The folk theorem of repeated games has established that
cooperative behavior can be sustained as an equilibrium in repeated settings. ...
J Hörner, LR Ngai… - International Economic Review, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. ...
J Hörner… - The Journal of Political Economy, 2011 - JSTOR
J Horner… - The Review of Economic Studies, 2008 - eea-esem.com
Abstract We study an infinitely repeated two-player game with incomplete information, where
the stage game is a first-price auction with pure common values. Before playing, the bidders
receive affiliated private signals about the value, which itself does not change over time. ...
J Hörner, S Lovo… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2011 - Elsevier
... Yale University, 30 Hillhouse Ave., New Haven, CT 06520, USA. johannes.horner@yale.
edu.JH rner gratefully acknowledges financial support from NSF Grant SES 092098. HEC ,
Paris and GREGHEC, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas, France. lovo@hec.fr. ...
JC Ely, J Hörner… - Econometrica, forthcoming, 2004 - Citeseer
Page 1. Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games∗ Jeffrey C. Ely† Johannes Hörner‡ Wojciech
Olszewski§ March 28, 2004 Abstract We introduce a class of strategies which generalizes
examples constructed in two-player games under imperfect private monitoring. ...
J Horner, D Rosenberg, E Solan… - 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We apply the average cost optimality equation to zero-sum Markov games, by
considering a simple game with one-sided incomplete information that generalizes an
example of Aumann and Maschler (1995). We determine the value and identify the ...
H Herrera… - 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper examines social learning when only one of the two types of decisions is
observable. Because agents arrive randomly over time, and only those who invest are
observed, later agents face a more complicated inference problem than in the standard ...
J Hörner, S Lovo… - 2008 - sef.hku.hk
... and low discounting. This class of equilibria has been introduced by Hörner and Lovo
∗Yale University. johannes.horner@yale.edu. †HEC School of Management, Paris
and GREGHEC, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas, France. lovo@hec.fr. ...
J Horner… - Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. …, 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We characterize optimal selling protocols/equilibria of a game in which an Agent
first puts hidden effort to acquire information and then transacts with a Firm that uses this
information to take a decision. We determine the equilibrium payoffs that maximize ...
J Horner, LR Ngai… - 2004 - eprints.lse.ac.uk
This paper shows that state control of some industries may have contributed to the increase
in European unemployment from the 1970s to the early 1990s. We develop a simple model
with both publicly-run and privately-run enterprises and show that when economic ...
J Horner, M Morelli… - Cowles Foundation Discussion …, 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper brings mechanism design to the study of conflict resolution in
international relations. We determine when and how unmediated communication and
mediation reduce the ex ante probability of conflict, in a simple game where conflict is due ...
O Gossner… - Discussion Papers, 2006 - kellogg.northwestern.edu
Page 1. When is the individually rational payoff in a repeated game equal to the
minmax payoff? ∗ Olivier Gossner and Johannes Hörner November 21, 2006 Abstract
We study the relationship between a player's (stage game ...
J Horner… - 2008 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We consider the problem of a monopolist who must sell her inventory before some
deadline, facing n buyers with independent private values. The monopolist posts prices but
has no commitment power. The seller faces a basic trade-off between imperfect price ...
S Callander… - 2005 Meeting Papers, 2005 - dklevine.com
Abstract That later agents follow the herd of earlier actions is a central insight of research
into economic cascades and social learning. We consider a variant of the standard model in
which agents are differentially informed and observe only the market shares of the ...
J Hörner - forthcoming in Review of Economic Studies, 1999 - ssc.upenn.edu
Page 1. A Perpetual Race to Stay Ahead¤ Johannes Hörner Department of Economics University
of Pennsylvania November 1999 Abstract This paper presents a model of dynamic competition
between two firms that repeat- edly engage in an innovative activity over time. ...
[CITATION] How robust is the folk theorem with imperfect public monitoring
J Horner… - 2006 - Working Paper
D Gerardi, J Horner… - Cowles Foundation Discussion …, 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We examine the buyer-seller problem under different levels of commitment. The
seller is informed of the quality of the good, which affects both his cost and the buyer's
valuation, but the buyer is not. We characterize the allocations that can be achieved ...
[CITATION] Mediation and Peace. Cowles foundation
J Horner, M Morelli… - Unpublished manuscript, 2010
This Discussion Paper is issued under the auspices of the Centre's research programme in INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION and PUBLIC POLICY. Any opinions expressed here are those of the
author(s) and not those of the Centre for Economic Policy Research. Research ...
[CITATION] Forthcoming.“A War of Attrition with Endogenous Effort Levels.”
J Horner… - Economic Theory
J Hörner, D Rosenberg… - 2006 - kellogg.northwestern.edu
Page 1. On a Markov Game with Incomplete Information Johannes Hörner ", Dinah
Rosenberg4, Eilon Solan5and Nicolas Vieille36 January 24, 2006 Abstract We
consider an example of a Markov game with lack of information ...
[CITATION] jMediated Cheap Talk, khttp
M Goltsman, J Hörner, G Pavlov… - 2007
J Hörner, S Lovo… - 2009 - studies2.hec.fr
... Yale University, 30 Hillhouse Ave., New Haven, CT 06520, USA. johannes.horner@yale.edu.
‡HEC School of Management, Paris and GREGHEC, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas, France.
lovo@hec.fr. §HEC School of Management, Paris and GREGHEC, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas, France. ...
H Herrera… - 2008 - econ.puc-rio.br
... In this case, for instance, Date: First Version: December 1th 2007, This Version: 11th August 2008.
Herrera: SIPA, Columbia University. Email: hhh2108@columbia.edu. Hörner: Yale University.
Email: johannes.horner@yale.edu. Page 2. Social Learning with a Hidden Action 2 ...
O Gossner… - Journal of economic theory, 2010 - Elsevier
J Hörner, S Lovo… - 2009 - gtcenter.org
... There is a finite set of players N = {1,...,N} and finite state space is K = {1,...,K}. Each player i has
a finite action set Ai and a payoff function ui : K × A → R. Each player is also endowed with a
partition Ii of K. ∗Cowles Foundation, Yale University. johannes.horner@yale.edu. ...
A Bonatti… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper develops a model of career concerns. The worker's skill is revealed
through output, and wage is based on expected output, and so on assessed ability.
Specifically, work increases the probability that a skilled worker achieves a one-time ...
[CITATION] Report of the Editor American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
[CITATION] Managing Strategic Buyers Managing Strategic Buyers (pp. 379-425) Contains supplements
J Hörner, L Samuelson, GD Libecap,
D Lueck… - The Journal of Political …, 2011 - JSTOR
O Gossner… - 2007 - vanderbilt.edu
Page 1. When is the lowest individually rational payoff in a repeated game equal to the min
max payoff? ∗ Olivier Gossner and Johannes Hörner March 30, 2007 Abstract This note studies
the relationship between a player's (stage game) minmax payoff and ...
J Hörner… - Economic Theory, 2011 - Springer
Page 1. Econ Theory (2011) 47:1–27 DOI 10.1007/s00199-010-0524-3 RESEARCH
ARTICLE A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels Johannes Hörner · Nicolas
Sahuguet Received: 28 October 2008 / Accepted: 15 February ...
O Gossner… - 2006 - mcgill.ca
Page 1. When is the reservation value in a repeated game equal to the minmax
payoff? ∗ Olivier Gossner and Johannes Hörner October 20, 2006 Abstract We study
the relationship between a player's minmax payoff and his ...
DP7989 Should Auctions Be Transparent? Author(s ...
A Bonatti… - 2011 - mailhost.econ.yale.edu
... assistance. †MIT Sloan School of Management, 100 Main Street, Cambridge MA
02412, USA bonatti@mit.edu. ‡Yale University, 30 Hillhouse Ave., New Haven,
CT 06520, USA, johannes.horner@yale.edu. 1 Page 2. partner ...
J Ely, J Horner… - Discussion Papers, 2003 - ideas.repec.org
We introduce a class of strategies which generalizes examples constructed in two-player
games under imperfect private monitoring. A sequential equilibrium is belief-free if, after
every private history, each player. s continuation strategy is optimal independently of his ...
J Hörner… - Journal of Quantitative Linguistics, 2007 - Taylor & Francis
J Horner, S Takahashi… - 2012 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper provides a dual characterization of the limit set of perfect public
equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games (in particular, repeated games) as the discount
factor tends to one. As a first corollary, the folk theorems of Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin ...
J Hörner, S Takahashi… - 2011 - princeton.edu
... N. Vieille gratefully acknowledges financial support from Fondation HEC. †Yale University,
30 Hillhouse Ave., New Haven, CT 06520, USA, johannes.horner@yale.edu. ‡Princeton
University, Fisher Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA, satorut@princeton.edu. ...
J Horner - Economic Review, 2006 - public.econ.duke.edu
... Yale University Social Science Research Fund, 2001. WP Carey Prize for Best Doctoral
Dissertation in Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 2001 (shared with Johannes
Horner). Review of Economic Studies European Tour, May 2000. ...
JC Ely, EJ Green, BL Lipman, D Ray, S Athey… - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. ...
... heski@nyu.edu; 212 998 0533 (tel); 212 995 4218 (fax). †Hörner: Department of
Economics, Yale University, 30 Hillhouse Ave., New Haven CT 06517, USA.
johannes.horner@yale.edu; 203 432-5352 (tel); 203 432-6167 (fax). 1 Page 2. ...
J Hörner… - 1999 - Citeseer
Page 1. Dynamic All-pay Auctions¤ Johannes Hörner and Nicolas Sahuguet
Department of Economics University of Pennsylvania October 7, 1999 Abstract In
wars of attrition, players choose how long they bid, but not how much. ...
J Hörner, D Rosenberg, E Solan… - econstor.eu
Page 1. econstor www.econstor.eu Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW –
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW –
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics Nutzungsbedingungen ...
VV Acharya, SN Ali, J Apesteguia, P Arcidiacono… - 209.197.108.139
The American Economic Association would like to congratulate its 2010 American Economic
Review Excellence in Refereeing Award recipients. The award recognizes the outstanding
work of those referees whose service and dedication have contributed to the high quality ...
J Hörner, S Lovo… - 2012 - studies2.hec.fr
... We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the HEC Foundation. †Yale University,
30 Hillhouse Ave., New Haven, CT06520, USA. johannes.horner@yale.edu. ‡HEC,Paris
and GREGHEC, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas, France. lovo@hec.fr. ...
J Hörner, BL Lipman, D Ray, S Athey, T Bergstrom… - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. Wiley Online Library will be disrupted 3
Dec from 10-12 GMT for monthly maintenance. ...
J Hörner… - 2011 - gtcenter.org
... Clearly, no such fixed-point characterization exists in the case of finitely repeated games, as the
(public perfect) equilibrium payoff set is not independent of the number of periods left. ∗Yale
University, 30 Hillhouse Ave., New Haven, CT 06520, USA, johannes.horner@yale.edu. ...
JA Horner - 2000 - repository.upenn.edu
This dissertation addresses several economic questions related to dynamic competition. In the
first chapter, I consider repeated games with both moral hazard and adverse selection in which
a continuum of agents compete. It is shown that equilibria with reputation--in which high ...
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