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JC Ely… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2002 - Elsevier
E Dekel,
JC Ely… - Review of Economic Studies, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
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JC Ely - Advances in Theoretical Economics, 2002 - degruyter.com
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JC Ely… - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2003 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Page 1. THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Vol. CXVIII August 2003
Issue 3 BAD REPUTATION* JEFFREY C. ELY AND JUUSO VA¨LIMA¨KI We construct
a model where the reputational concern of the long-run ...
JC Ely, J Hörner… - Econometrica, 2005 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. Econometrica, Vol. 73, No. 2 (March, 2005), 377–415 BELIEF-FREE
EQUILIBRIA IN REPEATED GAMES BY JEFFREY C. ELY, JOHANNES HÖRNER,
AND WOJCIECH OLSZEWSKI1 We introduce a class of strategies ...
JC Ely… - journal of Economic Theory, 2001 - Elsevier
JC Ely… - 2006 - tspace.library.utoronto.ca
Page 1. Theoretical Economics 1 (2006), 19–65 1555-7561/20060019 Hierarchies of belief
and interim rationalizability JEFFREY C. ELY Department of Economics, Northwestern University
MARCIN P˛ESKI Department of Economics, University of Chicago ...
KS Chung… - The Review of Economic Studies, 2007 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
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In traditional reputation models, the ability to build a reputation is good for the long-run
player. In [Ely, J., Valimaki, J., 2003. Bad reputation. NAJ Econ. 4, 2; http://www. najecon.
org/v4. htm. Quart. J. Econ. 118 (2003) 785–814], Ely and Valimaki give an example in ...
KS Chung… - URL http://www. kellogg. northwestern. edu/ …, 2002 - sites.google.com
Page 1. Ex-Post Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design ∗ Kim-Sau Chung † and
Jeffrey C. Ely ‡ Department of Economics Northwestern University 2003 Sheridan Road
Evanston IL 60208 May 17, 2006 Abstract We characterize ...
JC Ely… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2005 - Elsevier
MW Cripps,
JC Ely, GJ Mailath… - Econometrica, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. Econometrica, Vol. 76, No. 4 (July, 2008), 909–933 COMMON LEARNING
BY MARTIN W. CRIPPS, JEFFREY C. ELY, GEORGE J. MAILATH, AND LARRY
SAMUELSON1 Consider two agents who learn the value of ...
KS Chung… - Econometrica, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. Econometrica, Vol. 71, No. 3 (May, 2003), 857–871 IMPLEMENTATION WITH
NEAR-COMPLETE INFORMATION By Kim-Sau Chung and Jeffrey C. Ely1 Many
refinements of Nash equilibrium yield solution correspondences ...
JC Ely, T Hossain - American Economic Journal: …, 2009 - ingentaconnect.com
Page 1. 68 American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2009, 1:2, 68–94
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mic.1.2.68 Online auction markets
provide economists with access to an almost textbook marketplace ...
KS Chung… - Discussion Papers, 2000 - ideas.repec.org
Downloadable! No abstract is available for this item.
[CITATION] A note on unawareness
J Ely - 1998 - mimeo, Northwestern University
JC Ely… - The Review of Economic Studies, 2011 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
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J Ely… - Unpublished paper, 2006 - aeaweb.org
Abstract We conducted a field experiment to test the benefit from late bidding (sniping) in
online auction markets. We compared sniping to early bidding (squatting) in auctions for
newly-released DVDs on eBay. Sniping led to a statistically significant increase in our ...
JC Ely, J Hörner… - Econometrica, forthcoming, 2004 - Citeseer
Page 1. Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games∗ Jeffrey C. Ely† Johannes Hörner‡ Wojciech
Olszewski§ March 28, 2004 Abstract We introduce a class of strategies which generalizes
examples constructed in two-player games under imperfect private monitoring. ...
J Ely… - V http://papers. ssrn. com/sol3/papers. cfm, 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: In games with incomplete information, conventional hierarchies of belief are
incomplete as descriptions of the players' information for the purposes of determining a
player's behavior. We show by example that this is true for a variety of solution concepts. ...
S Baliga… - American Economic Journal: …, 2011 - ingentaconnect.com
Page 1. 35 American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 3 (November 2011):
35–67 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mic.3.4.35 In this paper we
present a new theory of the origin of sunk-cost biases and report ...
J Carbajal… - 2010 - uq.edu.au
Abstract We study mechanism design problems in quasi-linear environments where the
envelope theorem and revenue equivalence principle fail due to non-convex and
nondifferentiable valuations. Despite these obstacles, we obtain a characterization of ...
[CITATION] Ex-post incentive compatible mechanism design. URL http://faculty-web. at. northwestern. edu/economics/chung/file/expost
KS Chung… - 2003 - pd f. Working Paper
[CITATION] Strategic demography: the impact of local interaction and mobility on the stability of evolutionary game-theoretic equilibria
JC Ely - 1996 - University of California, Berkeley
JC Ely… - Econometric Society 2004 North American …, 2004 - ideas.repec.org
Downloadable! Wilson (1987) criticizes the existing literature of game theory as relying too much
on common-knowledge assumptions. In reaction to Wilson's critique, the recent literature of
mechanism design has started to employ stronger solution concepts such as dominant strategy ...
[CITATION] Ex-post incentive compatible mechanism design. URL h ttp
KS Chung… - 2002
JC Ely - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2011 - ingentaconnect.com
Page 1. 210 American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 3 (August 2011): 210–231
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mic.3.3.210 In July of 2004, Microsoft
announced that the release of Vista, the next generation ...
[CITATION] Foundations of dominant strategy mechanisms. URL h ttp
KS Chung… - 2003
J Ely… - 2010 - faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu
Abstract We investigate a common-value labor setting in which firms interview a worker prior
to hiring. When firms have private information about the worker's value and interview
decisions are kept private, many firms may enter the market, interview, and hire with ...
[CITATION] A note on unawareness: Negative introspection vs. au introspection (and ku introspection)
YC Chen, J Ely… - 2009 - Mimeo, Northwestern University
[CITATION] Juuso V alimaki. 2003.“Bad Reputation.”
J Ely - Quarterly Journal of Economics
JC Ely - Discussion Papers, 2000 - ideas.repec.org
... [Downloadable!]. Ely, Jeffrey C. & Valimaki, Juuso, 2002. "A Robust Folk Theorem for the
Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 84-105,
January. [Downloadable!] (restricted) Other versions: Jeffrey Ely, 2000. ...
[CITATION] Bad Reputation, 118 Quart
JC Ely… - J. Econ, 2003
J Ely… - Discussion Papers, 2002 - econpapers.repec.org
By Jeffrey Ely and Kim-Sau Chung; Ex-Post Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design.
JC Carbajal… - 2010 - gtcenter.org
Abstract We introduce a characterization of (dominant strategy) implementable allocation
rules based on an integral monotonicity condition. This condition relates valuation
differences with the integral of measurable selections of the subderivative ...
JC Carbajal… - 2011 - uzh.ch
Abstract. We enrich the standard model of optimal contract design between a monopolist
and a continuum of potential buyers under asymmetric information by assuming that
consumers have reference-dependent preferences and loss aversion. In our model, ...
[CITATION] Conceptualization After Kindergarten: My Graduate Thesis in Architecture
JE Botwin - 1990 - Cornell University, January
S Baliga… - 2011 - stagingwww2.lse.ac.uk
Page 1. The Self-Defeating Rationale for Torture ∗ Sandeep Baliga † Jeffrey C.
Ely ‡ November 15, 2011 Abstract We study torture as a mechanism for extracting
information from a suspect who may or may not be informed. ...
D Levine,
J Ely… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2008 - dash.harvard.edu
In traditional reputation models, the ability to build a reputation is good for the long-run
player. In [Ely, J., Valimaki, J., 2003. Bad reputation. NAJ Econ. 4, 2; http://www. najecon.
org/v4. htm. Quart. J. Econ. 118 (2003) 785–814], Ely and Valimaki give an example in ...
... Discussion Paper Number 2035 When is Reputation Bad? by Jeffrey Ely, Drew Fudenberg and
David K. Levine May 2004 Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts ... When is Reputation
Bad? 1 Jeffrey Ely Drew Fudenberg David K. Levine 2 First Version: April 22, 2002 ...
Abstract We investigate a common-value multi-stage labor market in which firms interview
workers prior to hiring. When firms have private information about workers' quality and
interview decisions are kept private, many firms may enter the market, interview, and hire. ...
JC Ely, EJ Green, BL Lipman, D Ray, S Athey… - Wiley Online Library
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YC Chen,
JC Ely… - International Journal of Game Theory, 2011 - Springer
Page 1. Int J Game Theory DOI 10.1007/s00182-011-0287-5 Note on unawareness: Negative
Introspection versus AU Introspection (and KU Introspection) Yi-Chun Chen · Jeffrey C.
Ely · Xiao Luo Accepted: 18 May 2011 © Springer-Verlag 2011 ...
J Hörner, BL Lipman, D Ray, S Athey, T Bergstrom… - Wiley Online Library
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Dec from 10-12 GMT for monthly maintenance. ...
Page 1. Supplementary Appendix to: When is Reputation Bad? Jeffrey Ely Drew
Fudenberg David K. Levine1 November 22, 2005 In Ely, Fudenberg and Levine [2005],
hereafter EFL, we defined an action to vulnerable to a temptation ...
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