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Dynamic mechanism design: Revenue equivalence, profit maximization and information disclosure

A Pavan, I Segal… - 2008 - Citeseer
Abstract This paper examines the problem of how to design incentive-compatible
mechanisms in environments in which the agents' private information evolves stochastically
over time and in which decisions have to be made in each period. The environments we ...
Cited by 34 - Cached

Dynamic mechanism design: Incentive compatibility, profit maximization and information disclosure

A Pavan, I Segal… - 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We examine the design of incentive-compatible screening mechanisms for
dynamic environments in which the agents' types follow a (possibly non-Markov) stochastic
process, decisions may be made over time and may affect the type process, and payoffs ...
Cited by 37 - Related articles - All 9 versions

Secrecy versus patenting

[PDF] from 209.197.108.139
Full text - MIT Libraries
K Kultti, T Takalo… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
We develop an equilibrium search model of innovation with the possibility of multiple
independent discovery. We distinguish innovations from ideas, and we view patents as
probabilistic property rights that are constrained by the innovators' option to keep the ...
Cited by 30 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 14 versions

Simultaneous model of innovation, secrecy, and patent policy

[PDF] from elisanet.fi
Full text - MIT Libraries
K Kultti, T Takalo… - The American economic review, 2006 - JSTOR
Multiple innovators can and do come up with the same invention independently. A famous
case is the telephone: two hours after Alexander Graham Bell filed a patent application for it,
another application for the same invention arrived at the patent office. Many scholars, such ...
Cited by 21 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 15 versions

[PDF] A folk theorem with markovian private information

[PDF] from duke.edu
JF Escobar… - 2009 - public.econ.duke.edu
Abstract. We consider repeated Bayesian two-player games in which the players' types
evolve according to an irreducible Markov chain, type transitions are independent across
players, and players have private values. The main result shows that, with communication, ...
Cited by 16 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 24 versions

[BOOK] Secrecy versus Patenting

[PDF] from ku.dk
K Kultti, T Takalo… - 2003 - econ.ku.dk
Abstract: We develop a general equilibrium search model of innovation, where innovators
invest in R&D, and the likelihood of making an innovation increases with the investment.
There is a possibility of multiple independent discovery, and the market behaviour is ...
Cited by 7 - Related articles - View as HTML - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 2 versions

Ironing without control

[PDF] from psu.edu
J Toikka - Journal of Economic Theory, 2011 - Elsevier
I extend Myersonʼs [R. Myerson, Optimal auction design, Math. Oper. Res. 6 (1981) 58–73]
ironing technique to more general objective functions. The approach is based on a
generalized notion of virtual surplus which can be maximized pointwise even when the ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 6 versions

[CITATION] nDynamic Mechanism Design: Incentive Com& patibility, Profit Maximization and Information Disclosureo

A Pavan, I Segal… - 2011 - mimeo Northwestern University and …
Cited by 3 - Related articles

[CITATION] A folk theorem with markovian private information. 2009

J Escobar… - Unpublished working paper
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[PDF] Revenue equivalence, profit maximization, and transparency in dynamic mechanisms

[PDF] from yale.edu
I Segal… - 2007 - aida.econ.yale.edu
Abstract We consider the problem of designing incentive# compatible mechanisms in a
general dynamic environment in which agents receive serially correlated private in#
formation over time and decisions may be made over time. The private information is ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 6 versions

[PDF] Cross-Licensing and Collusive Behavior¤

[PDF] from takalo.net
K Kulttiy, T Takalo… - 2006 - takalo.net
Abstract Exchange of patents between firms increasingly influence competition. Such cross-
licensing deals have traditionally raised antitrust concerns, since they can be used to control
market shares and prices, and create entry barriers. We argue that cross-licensing is a ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 4 versions

[PDF] Mechanisms for repeated bargaining

[PDF] from stanford.edu
A Skrzypacz… - Unpublished manuscript, 2012 - stanford.edu
Abstract We study a repeated version of the Myerson-Satterthwaite bilateral bargaining
problem with serially correlated types and agents that can be informed not only about their
current type but also the evolution of their future types. We provide necessary and ...
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[PDF] Patents Hinder Collusion

[PDF] from eea-esem.com
J Toikka& - 2004 - eea-esem.com
Page 1. Patents Hinder Collusion Klaus Kultti' University of Helsinki Tuomas Takalo(
Bank of Finland and University of Toulouse Juuso Toikka& Helsinki School of
Economics and FDPE December 9, 2004 Abstract We argue ...
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[PDF] Patience and Persistence in Repeated Trade

[PDF] from princeton.edu
A Skrzypacz… - 2012 - princeton.edu
Abstract We study a repeated version of the Myerson-Satterthwaite bilateral bargaining
problem with serially correlated types. We show that effi cient, unsubsidized, and individually
rational trade is possible if and only if the expected dynamic virtual surplus from the effi ...
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Secrecy Versus Patenting

J Toikka, K Kultti… - 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Conflicting research exists regarding patents andintellectual property rights (IPRs).
To clarify previous research, thisstudy examines how the patent system and inventor secrecy
impact uponinnovation, information spreading, and welfare. A literature reviewregarding ...

Patents and strategic firm behavior

J Toikka - 2004 - helda.helsinki.fi
In this thesis we analyze how patent policy affects the strategic behavior of firms. We
develop an infinite horizon model of innovation where each period firms are randomly
matched to ideas which can be developed into innovations. The model allows for ...
Cached - All 4 versions

[PDF] Dynamic Mechanism Design: Revenue Equivalence, Profit Maximization and Information Disclosure Preliminary and incomplete.

[PDF] from yale.edu
A Pavan, I Segal… - 2008 - cowles.econ.yale.edu
Abstract This paper examines the problem of how to design incentive $ compatible
mechanisms in environments in which the agentshprivate information evolves stochastically
over time and in which decisions have to be made in each period. The environments we ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 7 versions

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