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User profiles for author:"Jeffrey Ely"

Jeffrey Ely

northwestern university
Verified email at northwestern.edu
Cited by 1211

A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma

[PDF] from bc.edu
JC Ely… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2002 - Elsevier
Cited by 159 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 26 versions

Evolution of Preferences1

[PDF] from tau.ac.il
E Dekel, JC Ely… - Review of Economic Studies, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
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Cited by 129 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 26 versions

Local conventions

[PDF] from dklevine.com
JC Ely - Advances in Theoretical Economics, 2002 - degruyter.com
Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation: ...
Cited by 125 - Related articles - All 10 versions

Bad reputation

[PDF] from oxfordjournals.org
JC Ely… - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2003 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Page 1. THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Vol. CXVIII August 2003
Issue 3 BAD REPUTATION* JEFFREY C. ELY AND JUUSO VA¨LIMA¨KI We construct
a model where the reputational concern of the long-run ...
Cited by 123 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 48 versions

Belief‐Free Equilibria in Repeated Games

[PDF] from hec.fr
JC Ely, J Hörner… - Econometrica, 2005 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. Econometrica, Vol. 73, No. 2 (March, 2005), 377–415 BELIEF-FREE
EQUILIBRIA IN REPEATED GAMES BY JEFFREY C. ELY, JOHANNES HÖRNER,
AND WOJCIECH OLSZEWSKI1 We introduce a class of strategies ...
Cited by 94 - Related articles - All 20 versions

Nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences

[PDF] from upi-yptk.ac.id
JC Ely… - journal of Economic Theory, 2001 - Elsevier
Cited by 85 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 14 versions

Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability

[PDF] from utoronto.ca
JC Ely… - 2006 - tspace.library.utoronto.ca
Page 1. Theoretical Economics 1 (2006), 19–65 1555-7561/20060019 Hierarchies of belief
and interim rationalizability JEFFREY C. ELY Department of Economics, Northwestern University
MARCIN P˛ESKI Department of Economics, University of Chicago ...
Cited by 71 - Related articles - All 19 versions

Foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
KS Chung… - The Review of Economic Studies, 2007 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
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Cited by 67 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 49 versions

When is reputation bad?

[PDF] from ufpr.br
J Ely, D Fudenberg… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2008 - Elsevier
In traditional reputation models, the ability to build a reputation is good for the long-run
player. In [Ely, J., Valimaki, J., 2003. Bad reputation. NAJ Econ. 4, 2; http://www. najecon.
org/v4. htm. Quart. J. Econ. 118 (2003) 785–814], Ely and Valimaki give an example in ...
Cited by 64 - Related articles - All 96 versions

[PDF] Ex-post incentive compatible mechanism design

[PDF] from google.com
KS Chung… - URL http://www. kellogg. northwestern. edu/ …, 2002 - sites.google.com
Page 1. Ex-Post Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design ∗ Kim-Sau Chung † and
Jeffrey C. Ely ‡ Department of Economics Northwestern University 2003 Sheridan Road
Evanston IL 60208 May 17, 2006 Abstract We characterize ...
Cited by 59 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 6 versions

Evolution in Bayesian games I: theory

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
JC Ely… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2005 - Elsevier
Cited by 37 - Related articles - All 21 versions

Common learning

[PDF] from ucl.ac.uk
MW Cripps, JC Ely, GJ Mailath… - Econometrica, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. Econometrica, Vol. 76, No. 4 (July, 2008), 909–933 COMMON LEARNING
BY MARTIN W. CRIPPS, JEFFREY C. ELY, GEORGE J. MAILATH, AND LARRY
SAMUELSON1 Consider two agents who learn the value of ...
Cited by 27 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 86 versions

Implementation with Near‐Complete Information

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
KS Chung… - Econometrica, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. Econometrica, Vol. 71, No. 3 (May, 2003), 857–871 IMPLEMENTATION WITH
NEAR-COMPLETE INFORMATION By Kim-Sau Chung and Jeffrey C. Ely1 Many
refinements of Nash equilibrium yield solution correspondences ...
Cited by 28 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 23 versions

Sniping and squatting in auction markets

[PDF] from utoronto.ca
JC Ely, T Hossain - American Economic Journal: …, 2009 - ingentaconnect.com
Page 1. 68 American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2009, 1:2, 68–94
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mic.1.2.68 Online auction markets
provide economists with access to an almost textbook marketplace ...
Cited by 26 - Related articles - All 8 versions

[CITATION] Efficient and dominance solvable auctions with interdependent valuations

KS Chung… - Discussion Papers, 2000 - ideas.repec.org
Downloadable! No abstract is available for this item.
Cited by 18 - Related articles - Cached - All 5 versions

[CITATION] A note on unawareness

J Ely - 1998 - mimeo, Northwestern University
Cited by 11 - Related articles

Critical types

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JC Ely… - The Review of Economic Studies, 2011 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
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Cited by 10 - Related articles - All 15 versions

[PDF] Sniping and squatting in auction markets

[PDF] from aeaweb.org
J Ely… - Unpublished paper, 2006 - aeaweb.org
Abstract We conducted a field experiment to test the benefit from late bidding (sniping) in
online auction markets. We compared sniping to early bidding (squatting) in auctions for
newly-released DVDs on eBay. Sniping led to a statistically significant increase in our ...
Cited by 10 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 6 versions

[PDF] Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games

[PDF] from psu.edu
JC Ely, J Hörner… - Econometrica, forthcoming, 2004 - Citeseer
Page 1. Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games∗ Jeffrey C. Ely† Johannes Hörner‡ Wojciech
Olszewski§ March 28, 2004 Abstract We introduce a class of strategies which generalizes
examples constructed in two-player games under imperfect private monitoring. ...
Cited by 6 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 41 versions

Hierarchies of Belief and Interim Rationalizability

[PDF] from upenn.edu
J Ely… - V http://papers. ssrn. com/sol3/papers. cfm, 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: In games with incomplete information, conventional hierarchies of belief are
incomplete as descriptions of the players' information for the purposes of determining a
player's behavior. We show by example that this is true for a variety of solution concepts. ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - All 13 versions

Mnemonomics: The Sunk Cost Fallacy as a Memory Kludge

[PDF] from gtcenter.org
S Baliga… - American Economic Journal: …, 2011 - ingentaconnect.com
Page 1. 35 American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 3 (November 2011):
35–67 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mic.3.4.35 In this paper we
present a new theory of the origin of sunk-cost biases and report ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - All 12 versions

[PDF] Mechanism design without revenue equivalence

[PDF] from uq.edu.au
J Carbajal… - 2010 - uq.edu.au
Abstract We study mechanism design problems in quasi-linear environments where the
envelope theorem and revenue equivalence principle fail due to non-convex and
nondifferentiable valuations. Despite these obstacles, we obtain a characterization of ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 7 versions

[CITATION] Ex-post incentive compatible mechanism design. URL http://faculty-web. at. northwestern. edu/economics/chung/file/expost

KS Chung… - 2003 - pd f. Working Paper
Cited by 3 - Related articles

[CITATION] Strategic demography: the impact of local interaction and mobility on the stability of evolutionary game-theoretic equilibria

JC Ely - 1996 - University of California, Berkeley
Cited by 3 - Related articles

Foundations of dominant strategy mechanisms

JC Ely… - Econometric Society 2004 North American …, 2004 - ideas.repec.org
Downloadable! Wilson (1987) criticizes the existing literature of game theory as relying too much
on common-knowledge assumptions. In reaction to Wilson's critique, the recent literature of
mechanism design has started to employ stronger solution concepts such as dominant strategy ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - Cached - All 7 versions

[CITATION] Ex-post incentive compatible mechanism design. URL h ttp

KS Chung… - 2002
Cited by 2 - Related articles

Kludged

[PDF] from kelloggexecutives.com
JC Ely - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2011 - ingentaconnect.com
Page 1. 210 American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 3 (August 2011): 210–231
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mic.3.3.210 In July of 2004, Microsoft
announced that the release of Vista, the next generation ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - All 48 versions

[CITATION] Foundations of dominant strategy mechanisms. URL h ttp

KS Chung… - 2003
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[PDF] Adverse Selection and Unraveling in Common-Value Labor Markets

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
J Ely… - 2010 - faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu
Abstract We investigate a common-value labor setting in which firms interview a worker prior
to hiring. When firms have private information about the worker's value and interview
decisions are kept private, many firms may enter the market, interview, and hire with ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 12 versions

[CITATION] A note on unawareness: Negative introspection vs. au introspection (and ku introspection)

YC Chen, J Ely… - 2009 - Mimeo, Northwestern University
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[CITATION] Juuso V alimaki. 2003.“Bad Reputation.”

J Ely - Quarterly Journal of Economics
Cited by 2 - Related articles

Correlated equilibrium and private monitoring

JC Ely - Discussion Papers, 2000 - ideas.repec.org
... [Downloadable!]. Ely, Jeffrey C. & Valimaki, Juuso, 2002. "A Robust Folk Theorem for the
Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 84-105,
January. [Downloadable!] (restricted) Other versions: Jeffrey Ely, 2000. ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - Cached - All 6 versions

[CITATION] Bad Reputation, 118 Quart

JC Ely… - J. Econ, 2003
Cited by 1 - Related articles

[CITATION] Ex-Post Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design

J Ely… - Discussion Papers, 2002 - econpapers.repec.org
By Jeffrey Ely and Kim-Sau Chung; Ex-Post Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design.
Cited by 1 - Related articles - Cached - All 4 versions

[PDF] Implementation and revenue equivalence without differentiability

[PDF] from gtcenter.org
JC Carbajal… - 2010 - gtcenter.org
Abstract We introduce a characterization of (dominant strategy) implementable allocation
rules based on an integral monotonicity condition. This condition relates valuation
differences with the integral of measurable selections of the subderivative ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 3 versions

[PDF] Optimal Contracts for Loss Averse Consumers

[PDF] from uzh.ch
JC Carbajal… - 2011 - uzh.ch
Abstract. We enrich the standard model of optimal contract design between a monopolist
and a continuum of potential buyers under asymmetric information by assuming that
consumers have reference-dependent preferences and loss aversion. In our model, ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 9 versions

[CITATION] Conceptualization After Kindergarten: My Graduate Thesis in Architecture

JE Botwin - 1990 - Cornell University, January

[PDF] The Self-Defeating Rationale for Torture

[PDF] from lse.ac.uk
S Baliga… - 2011 - stagingwww2.lse.ac.uk
Page 1. The Self-Defeating Rationale for Torture ∗ Sandeep Baliga † Jeffrey C.
Ely ‡ November 15, 2011 Abstract We study torture as a mechanism for extracting
information from a suspect who may or may not be informed. ...
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When is Reputation Bad?

[PDF] from harvard.edu
D Levine, J Ely… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2008 - dash.harvard.edu
In traditional reputation models, the ability to build a reputation is good for the long-run
player. In [Ely, J., Valimaki, J., 2003. Bad reputation. NAJ Econ. 4, 2; http://www. najecon.
org/v4. htm. Quart. J. Econ. 118 (2003) 785–814], Ely and Valimaki give an example in ...
Related articles - All 3 versions

When is Reputation Bad?

D Fudenberg, JC Ely… - Harvard Institute of Economic …, 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
... Discussion Paper Number 2035 When is Reputation Bad? by Jeffrey Ely, Drew Fudenberg and
David K. Levine May 2004 Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts ... When is Reputation
Bad? 1 Jeffrey Ely Drew Fudenberg David K. Levine 2 First Version: April 22, 2002 ...
Related articles - All 2 versions

[PDF] Hiring in Labor Markets with Information Revelation

[PDF] from idei.fr
J Ely… - 2009 - idei.fr
Abstract We investigate a common-value multi-stage labor market in which firms interview
workers prior to hiring. When firms have private information about workers' quality and
interview decisions are kept private, many firms may enter the market, interview, and hire. ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 3 versions

Martin J. Osborne, Department of Economics, University of Toronto, martin. osborne@ utoronto. ca

JC Ely, EJ Green, BL Lipman, D Ray, S Athey… - Wiley Online Library
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Note on unawareness: Negative Introspection versus AU Introspection (and KU Introspection)

YC Chen, JC Ely… - International Journal of Game Theory, 2011 - Springer
Page 1. Int J Game Theory DOI 10.1007/s00182-011-0287-5 Note on unawareness: Negative
Introspection versus AU Introspection (and KU Introspection) Yi-Chun Chen · Jeffrey C.
Ely · Xiao Luo Accepted: 18 May 2011 © Springer-Verlag 2011 ...
Related articles

Martin J. Osborne, Department of Economics, University of Toronto, martin. osborne@ utoronto. ca

J Hörner, BL Lipman, D Ray, S Athey, T Bergstrom… - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. Wiley Online Library will be disrupted 3
Dec from 10-12 GMT for monthly maintenance. ...

[PDF] Supplementary Appendix to: When is Reputation Bad

[PDF] from dklevine.com
J Ely, D Fudenberg… - Levine's Working Paper Archive, 2005 - dklevine.com
Page 1. Supplementary Appendix to: When is Reputation Bad? Jeffrey Ely Drew
Fudenberg David K. Levine1 November 22, 2005 In Ely, Fudenberg and Levine [2005],
hereafter EFL, we defined an action to vulnerable to a temptation ...
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