A Hortacsu… - Journal of Political Economy, 2010 - JSTOR
We propose an estimation method to bound bidders' marginal valuations in discriminatory
auctions using individual bid-level data and apply the method to data from the Turkish
Treasury auction market. Using estimated bounds on marginal values, we compute an ...
D McAdams - Econometrica, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
An isotone pure strategy equilibrium exists in any game of incomplete information in which
each player's action set is a finite sublattice of multidimensional Euclidean space, types are
multidimensional and atomless, and each player's interim expected payoff function ...
D McAdams - Economics Letters, 2007 - Elsevier
In some uniform-price auctions, the auctioneer decides how much to sell after the bidding.
Auctioneer expected profit and social welfare can each be strictly higher in all equilibria
given such “adjustable supply” than in all equilibria given any fixed quantity and reserve ...
D McAdams - The Review of Economic Studies, 2006 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract In two-sided multi-unit auctions having a variety of payment rules, including uniform-
price and discriminatory auctions, a monotone pure-strategy equilibrium (MPSE) exists
when bidders are risk neutral with independent multi-dimensional types and ...
PD McAdams - 2002 - dukespace.lib.duke.edu
The uniform-price auction is used in many regional electricity procurement auctions and its
“collusive-seeming equilibria” have been linked to potential exercise of market power. Such
equilibria do not exist, however, if a small amount of cash is split among rationed bidders. ...
D McAdams… - 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: In this paper, we consider a seller who faces several buyers and lacks access to an
institution to credibly close a sale. If buyers anticipate that the seller may negotiate further,
they will prefer to wait before making their best and final offers. This in turn induces the ...
D McAdams - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
... Journal of Economic Theory 136 (2007) 144 166 www.elsevier.com/locate/jet Uniqueness in
symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation David McAdams MIT Sloan School of Management,
Cambridge, MA 02142, USA Received 5 August 2005; final version received 3 July ...
[CITATION] Characterizing equilibria in asymmetric first-price auctions
D McAdams - Manuscript, available at http://www. mit. edu/mcadams, 2003
D McAdams - 2000 - Citeseer
Abstract. The fixed-supply unifo mp ice auction su# esf om existence of" collusive-seeming
equilib ia" in which all bidde sd amatically shade thei bids and ve y low p ices may be
ealized. Ou main esult is that such equilib ia do not exist in a family of" money-p ize pe tu ...
JTE Chapman, D McAdams… - Typescript. Iowa City, …, 2006 - faculty.fuqua.duke.edu
Abstract Deciding whether bidders at auctions are playing a best response is perhaps one of
the most fundamental questions faced by empirical workers employing the structural
econometric approach. Investigations of this question depend heavily on whether the true ...
Y Hu, D McAdams… - Economics Working Paper Archive, 2009 - krieger2.jhu.edu
Abstract We propose a novel methodology for nonparametric identification of first-price
auction models with independent private values, which accommodates auction-specific
unobserved heterogeneity and bidder asymmetries, based on recent results from the ...
D McAdams… - Inquiry, 2007 - inquiryjournalonline.org
Abstract This paper analyzes some of the perverse incentives that may arise under the
current Medicare prescription drug benefit design. In particular, risk adjustment for a stand-
alone prescription drug benefit creates perverse incentives for prescription drug plans ...
D McAdams - International Journal of Game Theory, 2007 - Springer
Abstract I study monotonicity of equilibrium strategies in first-price auctions with asymmetric
bidders, risk aversion, affiliated types, and interdependent values. Every mixed-strategy
equilibrium is shown to be outcome-equivalent to a monotone pure-strategy equilibrium ...
D McAdams… - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2007 - Elsevier
In many negotiations, rules are soft in the sense that the seller and/or buyers may break
them at some cost. When buyers have private values, we show that the cost of such
opportunistic behavior (whether by the buyers or the seller) is borne entirely by the seller ...
D McAdams - Journal of Econometrics, 2008 - Elsevier
Bidders' values in discriminatory and uniform-price auctions are not necessarily point-
identified under the assumptions of equilibrium bidding and independent private values, but
meaningful policy analysis can proceed from bounds on bidder values. This paper ...
D McAdams - 1999 - Citeseer
Abstract When supply is fixed in advance, the uniform-price share auction is vulnerable to
“collusive-seeming equilibria” in which the realized price is less than a lower bound on all
bidder's per share value vi. Our main result is that no collusive-seeming equilibria exist in ...
D McAdams - Economics Letters, 2007 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: In the uniform-price auction with adjustable supply, the seller decides how much to
sell after receiving the bids so as to maximize its ex post profit. Given N bidders and
adjustable supply, all equilibria of the uniform-price auction lead to price on order 1/N3 ...
D McAdams - Levine's Working Paper Archive, 2010 - nber.org
Abstract This paper characterizes the welfare-maximizing equilibrium performance and
duration of stochastic partnerships, in an economy in which partners choose each period
costly observable efforts, voluntary wages, and whether to leave the relationship to be re- ...
D McAdams - MIT Sloan Working Paper No. 4522-05, 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: In uniform-price auctions, the seller sometimes retains flexibility to adjust the total
quantity sold after receiving the bids, or simply lacks the ability to commit to a schedule of
reserve prices (or supply curve). In this paper, I show that the seller raises more revenue ...
D McAdams… - MIT Sloan Working Paper No. 4546-05, …, 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper explores the possibility of solving supply chain capacity allocation
problems using internal markets among employees of the same company. Unlike earlier
forms of transfer pricing, IT now makes it easier for such markets to involve many ...
D McAdams - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
Except for well-studied special cases in which bidders have single-unit demand or bidders
are risk-neutral with independent private values, equilibria of uniform-price auctions with
private values need not possess familiar monotonicity properties. In particular, equilibria in ...
[CITATION] Modifying the Uniform Price Auction to Reduce Potential Exercise of Market Power
D McAdams - 2002 - MIT
[CITATION] Partial Identification in Multi-Unit Auctions
D McAdams - 2006 - Mimeo, Sloan School of …
[CITATION] Identification and testable restrictions in private value multi-unit auctions
D McAdams - 2005 - Mimeo, MIT
JTE Chapman, D McAdams… - The American economic review, 2007 - JSTOR
Expected revenue and allocative efficiency are two of the most important considerations in
auction design. The Revenue Equivalence Theorem provides conditions under which many
singleobject auctions generate the same expected revenue, but theory provides little ...
[CITATION] Characterizing Equilibria in Asymmetric First Price Auction
MA David - 2004 - Working paper, MIT
[CITATION] Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Symmetric First Price Auction
MA David - 2004 - Working paper, MIT
[CITATION] Essays in Multi-Unit Bargaining
D McAdams - 2001 - Ph. D. dissertation, Stanford …
[CITATION] Partial Identification and Testable Restrictions in Multiple Unit Auctions
D McAdams - 2007 - Working Paper MIT Sloan Working …
[CITATION] Forthcoming.“Who Pays When Auction Rules are Bent?”
D McAdams… - International Journal of Industrial Organization
D McAdams - 2002 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Multi-object auctions differ in an important way from single-object auctions. When
bidders have multi-object demand, equilibria can exist in which bids decrease as values
increase! Consider a model with n bidders who receive affiliated one-dimensional types t ...
D McAdams - 2002 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Every mixed strategy equilibrium is outcome equivalent to a monotone pure
strategy equilibrium in asymmetric first-price auctions in which n bidders have affiliated, one-
dimensional, atomless types and interdependent values.
[CITATION] Uniqueness in Symmetric First Price Auctions
D McAdams - 2004 - mimeo MIT
[CITATION] Characterizing Equilibria in n-Bidder First-Price Auctions
D McAdams - 2003 - mimeo, MIT Sloan School of …
[CITATION] Storage in internal markets
D McAdams - manuscript, available at, 2005
[CITATION] t Characterizing Equilibria in Asymmetric First Price Auctionu Working paper
MA David - 2004 - MIT
DL McAdams - 2001 - en.scientificcommons.org
[CITATION] Lack of commitment in uniform-price auctions
D McAdams - 2004 - Working Paper, MIT
Y Hu, J Hopkins, D McAdams… - 2011 - econ2.jhu.edu
Abstract We propose a novel methodology for identification of first-price auctions, when
bidders' private valuations are independent conditional on one-dimensional unobserved
heterogeneity. We extend the existing literature (Li and Vuong (1998), Krasnokutskaya ( ...
[CITATION] Detecting Best Response Violations in Uniform-Price Auctions Preliminary: comments welcome
D McAdams - 2004
G Lopomo, LM Marx, D McAdams… - faculty.fuqua.duke.edu
Abstract Carbon allowance auctions are a component of existing and proposed regional cap-
and-trade programs in the US and are also included in recent bills in the US Congress that
would establish a national cap-and-trade program in the US to regulate greenhouse ...
D McAdams, Y Hu… - Working Papers, 2010 - ideas.repec.org
We propose a novel methodology for nonparametric identification of first-price auction
models with independent private values, which allows for one-dimensional auctionspecific
unobserved heterogeneity, based on recent results from the econometric literature on ...
W Baumol, K Arrow, S Athey, J Baker, C Bazelon… - 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: The signatories to this document are economists who have studied
telecommunications, auctions, and competition policy. While we may disagree about the
stimulus package, we believe that it is important to implement mechanisms that make ...
D McAdams - Encyclopedia of Bioterrorism Defense - Wiley Online Library
The Baader-Meinhof Gang (BMG) was a West German left-wing terrorist group that strove to
create a Marxist–Leninist state by using urban guerrilla tactics against what it considered to
be the representatives of imperialist exploitation and oppression. The BMG went through ...
D McAdams… - 2005 - rwj.berkeley.edu
Abstract We consider a setting in which one seller solicits offers from several buyers, the
seller is unable to commit to a mechanism, and delay is costly. In a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium, buyers' offers increase from round to round until the seller finally accepts an ...
[CITATION] One-with-Many Bargaining and the Role of Rich and Lazy Intermediaries Preliminary and incomplete
D McAdams… - 2005
D McAdams - 2009 - Citeseer
Abstract The standard monopoly pricing problem is re-considered when the buyer's type (eg
age, income, experience) can be credibly disclosed at some cost. In the optimal sales
mechanism with costly disclosure, the seller posts a “sticker price” available to any buyer, ...
[CITATION] Detecting Best Response Violations in Discriminatory Auctions Preliminary: comments welcome
D McAdams - 2004
D McAdams - faculty.fuqua.duke.edu
Page 1. The Timing of Moves in 2x2 Games David McAdams 1 Duke University Abstract ... “Lazy
Husband”, and “Sir Robin's Minstrel”; two having two PSNE, called 1Fuqua School of Business,
Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, david.mcadams@duke.edu. ...
D McAdams - 2011 - faculty.fuqua.duke.edu
Abstract This paper endogenizes bidders' beliefs about their competition in a symmetric first-
price auction with independent private values, by allowing bidders to decide whether to
participate publicly or secretly. When public participation is more costly, bidders only ...
[CITATION] Adjustable Supply in Uniform-Price Auctions
D McAdams - 2005
D McAdams - Economics Letters, 2011 - Elsevier
Suppose that bidders may publicly choose not to learn their values prior to a second-price
auction with costly bidding. All equilibria with truthful bidding exhibit bidder ignorance when
the number of bidders is sufficiently small. Ignorance considerations also affect the optimal ...
G Lopomo, LM Marx… - … Economics and Policy, 2011 - reep.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract Carbon allowance auctions are a component of existing and proposed regional cap-
and-trade programs in the United States and are also included in recent proposed bills in
the US Congress that would establish a national cap-and-trade program to regulate ...
Expected revenue and allocative efficiency are two of the most important considerations in
auction design. The Revenue Equivalence Theorem provides conditions under which many
single-object auctions generate the same expected revenue, but theory provides little ...
[CITATION] A Theory of Sticker Prices preliminary
D McAdams - 2005
D McAdams - Working Papers, 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: The standard monopoly pricing problem is re-considered when the buyer can
disclose his type (eg age, income, experience) at some cost. In the optimal sales mechanism
with costly disclosure, the seller posts a price list, including a sticker price" available to any ...
D McAdams - Levine's Working Paper Archive, 2010 - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of
further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site ...
MIT David McAdams - 2005 - faculty.fuqua.duke.edu
Abstract This paper studies discriminatory and uniform price auctions, the two most common
“multi-unit auctions” for selling multiple identical objects. In such auctions, the distribution of
bidder values is only partially identified from the distribution of bids. Given (asymmetric ...
CD Kolstad, C Carraro, ME Kahn, R Stavins… - intl-reep.oxfordjournals.org
Editorial A Word from the Editor Charles D. Kolstad. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . ... Articles Divergences in Long-Run Trends in the Prices of Energy and Energy Services
Roger Fouquet. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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