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Asymptotic ordinal inefficiency of random serial dictatorship

[PDF] from econtheory.org
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M Manea - Theoretical Economics, 2009 - econtheory.org
Abstract We establish that the fraction of preference profiles for which the random serial
dictatorship allocation is ordinally efficient vanishes for allocation problems with many object
types. We consider also a probabilistic setting where in expectation agents have ...
Cited by 29 - Related articles - All 14 versions

Bargaining in stationary networks

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M Manea - The American Economic Review, 2011 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: We study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network
are randomly matched to bargain. Players who reach agreement are replaced by new
players at the same positions in the network. We show that all equilibria are payoff ...
Cited by 28 - Related articles - All 27 versions

Axioms for deferred acceptance

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F Kojima… - Econometrica, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
The deferred acceptance algorithm is often used to allocate indivisible objects when
monetary transfers are not allowed. We provide two characterizations of agent-proposing
deferred acceptance allocation rules. Two new axioms—individually rational monotonicity ...
Cited by 27 - Related articles - All 12 versions

Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism

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F Kojima… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2010 - Elsevier
The probabilistic serial mechanism (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001 [9]) is ordinally efficient
but not strategy-proof. We study incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism for large
assignment problems. We establish that for a fixed set of object types and an agent with a ...
Cited by 23 - Related articles - All 8 versions

A constructive proof of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem

Full text - MIT Libraries
M Manea - Journal of Economic Theory, 2008 - Elsevier
... Journal of Economic Theory 141 (2008) 276 281 www.elsevier.com/locate/jet Notes, Comments,
and Letters to the Editor A constructive proof of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem Mihai Manea
Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA ...
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Serial dictatorship and Pareto optimality

Full text - MIT Libraries
M Manea - Games and Economic Behavior, 2007 - Elsevier
In a deterministic allocation problem in which each agent is entitled to receive exactly one
object, an allocation is Pareto optimal if and only if it is the outcome of a serial dictatorship.
We extend the definition of serial dictatorship to settings in which some agents may be ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - All 6 versions

Community Enforcement when Players Observe Partners' Past Play,” mimeo

S Takahashi, J Green, F Kojima, G Mailath… - 2008 - Citeseer
Abstract I investigate whether a community can sustain cooperation in the repeated
prisoner's dilemma by having cheaters punished not by their victims but by third parties.
Motivated by systems of credit history reporting, online feedback, and some experimental ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - Cached

[CITATION] Markov Perfect Equilibria in a Model of Bargaining in Networks

D Abreu… - Games Econ. Behav, 2009
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[PDF] Bargaining on networks

[PDF] from stanford.edu
M Manea - 2008 - gsb.stanford.edu
Abstract. We study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected by a network
are randomly matched to bargain over a unit surplus. We prove that for each discount factor
all equilibria are payoff equivalent. The equilibrium payoffs and the set of equilibrium ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 6 versions

Core tâtonnement

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M Manea - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
Two discrete time tâtonnement processes—one featuring successive tâtonnement, the other
featuring simultaneous tâtonnement—for the core of coalitional games with transferable
utility are introduced. For totally balanced games, the successive core tâtonnement ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - All 7 versions

[CITATION] Incentives in the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism, forthcoming

F Kojima… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2008
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[CITATION] A Constructive Proof of The Ordinal Efficiency Welfare Theorem.” forthcoming

M Manea - Journal of Economic Theory, 2006
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[PDF] BARGAINING IN DYNAMIC MARKETS WITH MULTIPLE POPULATIONS

[PDF] from uniandes.edu.co
M Manea - 2011 - economia.uniandes.edu.co
Abstract. We study dynamic markets in which participants are randomly matched to bargain
over the price of a heterogeneous good. There is a continuum of players drawn from a finite
set of types. Players exogenously enter the market over time and then exit upon trading. At ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 5 versions

Unique induced preference representations

M Manea - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2008 - Elsevier
Machina [Machina, MJ, 1984. Temporal risk and the nature of induced preferences. Journal
of Economic Theory 33, 199–231] considers an individual who has to choose from a set of
alternative temporal uncertain prospects, and must take an action before the uncertainty is ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 6 versions

Bargaining and efficiency in networks

[PDF] from stanford.edu
D Abreu… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2011 - Elsevier
We study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network are
randomly matched to bargain over a unit surplus. Players who reach agreement are
removed from the network without replacement. The global logic of efficient matchings and ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 4 versions

Markov equilibria in a model of bargaining in networks

[PDF] from princeton.edu
D Abreu… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2011 - Elsevier
Abstract We study the Markov perfect equilibria (MPEs) of an infinite horizon game in which
pairs of players connected in a network are randomly matched to bargain. Players who
reach agreement are removed from the network without replacement. We establish the ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 4 versions

[CITATION] Competitive Claims and Resource Allocation by Deferred Acceptance

F KOJIMA… - 2007
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[PDF] 1989 Revolution in Romania: A Violent Popular Oust–Certainties and Uncertainties

[PDF] from uni-leipzig.de
M MANEA - uni-leipzig.de
“Twenty years ago, the idyll of the peaceful revolutions against Communism across Eastern
Europe was rudely broken, as Romania suddenly descended into anarchy and
bloodshed”(BBC, 2008). The Romanian Revolution of 1989 was the most spectacularly ...
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[PDF] BARGAINING IN STATIONARY NETWORKS JOB MARKET PAPER

[PDF] from stanford.edu
M MANEA - 2009 - www-prd.gsb.stanford.edu
Abstract. We study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network
are randomly matched to bargain over a unit surplus. Players that reach agreement are
replaced by new players at the same positions in the network. We prove that for each ...
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[BOOK] Remembering the past and preventing crimes against humanity: seminar, Bucharest, Romania 7-10 May 2003

M Manea - 2003 - books.google.com
This publication reports on the discussions of an international seminar, held in Romania in
May 2003, to discuss educational approaches designed to promote awareness of crimes
against humanity, tolerance for diversity and respect for human rights, based upon an ...
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[CITATION] A decade of new history education in Romania: Challenges, scandals, perspectives

L Capita, D Dumitrescu… - After the Wall: History Teaching in europe since, 1989

[CITATION] CHEATING IN REPEATED GAMES WITH BEHAVIORAL TYPES

M MANEA
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Essays on networks, bargaining and matching

M Manea - 2010 - gradworks.umi.com
Abstract: This dissertation consists of four essays in economic theory. The first essay studies
an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network are randomly
matched to bargain over a unit surplus. Players who reach agreement are replaced by ...
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[CITATION] Les avatars d'une «nation ex-communiste»-un regard sur l'historiographie roumaine récente-ADRIAN CIOROIANU

M Manea… - … held at the New Europe College, …, 2002 - New Europe Collège

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