My Citations
Scholar Home
  Advanced Scholar Search



Scholar      Create email alertResults 1 - 4 of 4. (0.07 sec) 

[PDF] Optimal dynamic auctions and simple index rules

[PDF] from nus.edu.sg
MM Pai… - Unpublished manuscript, University of …, 2011 - fas.nus.edu.sg
Page 1. Optimal Dynamic Auctions and Simple Index Rules ∗ Mallesh M. Pai †
Rakesh Vohra ‡ January 10, 2011 Abstract A monopolist seller has multiple units
of an indivisible good to sell over a discrete, finite time horizon. ...
Cited by 42 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 26 versions

[PDF] Optimal auctions with financially constrained bidders

[PDF] from nber.org
M Pai… - Discussion Papers, 2008 - nber.org
Abstract We consider an environment where ex-ante symmetric potential buyers of an
indivisible good have liquidity constraints, ie they cannot pay more than their
'budget'regardless of their valuation. A buyer's valuation for the good as well as her ...
Cited by 42 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 36 versions

[PDF] Dynamic Sales to Buyers with Multidimensional Types: Posted Prices & Biased Auctions

[PDF] from lu.se
MM Pai… - 2011 - nek.lu.se
Page 1. Preliminary Extended Abstract Please Do Not Circulate Dynamic Sales to Buyers with
Multidimensional Types: Posted Prices & Biased Auctions Mallesh M. Pai ∗ Rahul Deb † August
22, 2011 ∗Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. ...
Related articles - View as HTML

[PDF] Auction Design with Fairness Concerns: Subsidies vs. Set-Asides

[PDF] from chicagobooth.edu
MM Pai… - 2012 - faculty.chicagobooth.edu
Page 1. Auction Design with Fairness Concerns: Subsidies vs. Set-Asides ∗ Mallesh
M. Pai † Rakesh Vohra ‡ March 7, 2012 Abstract Government procurement and
allocation programs often use subsidies and set- asides favoring ...
View as HTML

 Create email alert



 

About Google Scholar - All About Google - My Citations

©2012 Google