J Kagel… - Common Value Auctions and the Winner's …, 2002 - books.google.com
Auctions are of considerable practical and theoretical importance. 1 In practical terms, the
value of goods exchanged in auctions each year is huge. Governments routinely use
auctions to purchase goods and services, to sell government assets, and to fund the ...
JH Kagel… - The American economic review, 1986 - JSTOR
Experienced bidders show sensitivity to the strategic considerations underlying common
value auctions, but not to item valuation considerations. Auctions with large numbers of
bidders (6-7) produce more aggressive bidding than with small numbers (3-4), resulting in ...
D Levin… - The American Economic Review, 1994 - JSTOR
We model entry incentives in auctions with risk-neutral bidders and characterize a symmetric
equilibrium in which the number of entrants is stochastic. The presence of too many potential
bidders raises coordination costs that detract from welfare. We show that the seller and ...
JH Kagel, RM Harstad… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric …, 1987 - JSTOR
In affiliated private value auctions, each bidder has perfect information regarding his/her
own value for the object at auction, but higher values of the item for one bidder make higher
values for other bidders more likely. We report on a series of experiments examining three ...
JH Kagel… - The Economic Journal, 1993 - JSTOR
A well known theoretical result for independent private value (IPV) auctions is the Revenue-
Equivalence Theorem: English, Dutch, first-and second-price auctions yield the same
expected revenue for risk neutral bidders. More fundamental than this, second-price and ...
BH Baltagi… - The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1986 - JSTOR
A dynamic demand for cigarette consumption is estimated using pooled data of 46 states
over the period 1963 to 1980. A Price elasticity of-0.2 and an insignificant income elasticity is
found using pooled estimation techniques. The" bootlegging" effect is modeled explicitly ...
JH Kagel… - Econometrica, 2001 - Wiley Online Library
2. Abstract We experimentally investigate the sensitivity of bidders demanding multiple units
of a homogeneous commodity to the demand reduction incentives inherent in uniform price
auctions. There is substantial demand reduction in both sealed bid and ascending price ...
D Dyer, JH Kagel… - The Economic Journal, 1989 - JSTOR
Laboratory economics experiments typically use financially motivated students as subjects.
An ongoing issue is whether this is an appropriate subject pool since the students are
typically inexperienced in the types of decision-making required of them in the lab. This ...
JH Kagel… - 2002 - books.google.com
Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and
practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own
distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on ...
D Levin - The American Economic Review, 1990 - JSTOR
The paradigm often used in the study of industrial organization relates market structure to
conduct and performance (eg, FM Scherer, 1980 pp. 4-5). Measures such as concentration
ratios and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index provide partial characterization of structure by ...
YJ Jung, JH Kagel… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1994 - JSTOR
A single monopolist plays a sequence of eight periods against a series of different entrants.
There are two types of monopolists," weak" monopolists whose single-period best response
is to acquiesce after entry, and" strong" monopolists whose dominant strategy is to fight ...
D Levin - Journal of Public Economics, 1985 - Elsevier
Abstract When the production of output causes pollution, we often consider taxation as a
means to reduce it. This paper examines various forms of taxation to control pollution within
Cournot oligopoly. It shows that two commonly used forms can actually increase pollution. ...
G Charness… - 2003 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We examine decision-making under risk in a laboratory experiment. The heart of
our design examines how one's propensity to use Bayes' rule is affected by whether this rule
is aligned with reinforcement or clashes with it. In some cases, we create environments ...
RM Harstad, JH Kagel… - Economics Letters, 1990 - Elsevier
Abstract The number of rivals may be unknown when a bidding strategy is formulated in an
auction. In a symmetric model with risk-neutral bidders holding independent information, we
obtain explicit equilibrium bidding functions for first-price and second-price auctions with ...
D Levin, JH Kagel… - The American economic review, 1996 - JSTOR
An experiment analyzing behavior in English common value auctions is reported. English
auctions raise more revenue than first-price auctions only when bidders do not suffer from a
strong winner's curse. Agents employ other bidders' dropout prices along with their private ...
JH Kagel… - Econometrica, 1999 - Wiley Online Library
Bidding is studied in first-price common value auctions where an insider is better informed
than other bidders (outsiders) about the value of the item. With inexperienced bidders,
having an insider does not materially reduce the severity of the winner's curse compared ...
D Levin… - The Economic Journal, 1996 - JSTOR
The risk-neutral independent-private-values (IPV) auction model produces curious results
regarding the use of reservation prices: no matter how many bidders, the seller should
announce a fixed reservation price above his true value. This is notable since the seller ...
G Charness… - American Economic Journal: …, 2009 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: The Winner's Curse (WC) is a robust and persistent deviation from theoretical
predictions established in experimental economics and claimed to exist in field
environments. Recent attempts to reconcile such deviation include" cursed equilibrium" ...
JH Kagel, D Levin, RC Battalio… - Economic Inquiry, 1989 - Wiley Online Library
KAGEL, JH, LEVIN, D., BATTALIO, RC and MEYER, DJ (1989), FIRST-PRICE COMMON
VALUE AUCTIONS: BIDDER BEHAVIOR AND THE “WINNER'S CURSE”. Economic Inquiry,
27: 241–258. doi: 10.1111/j. 1465-7295.1989. tb00780. x
E Karni… - Journal of Political Economy, 1994 - JSTOR
Using a game-theoretic approach, we examine possible equilibrium explanations of the
often-observed phenomenon that two neighboring restaurants offering similar menus
nevertheless experience vastly different demands. The essential aspect of this analysis is ...
JH Kagel, D Levin… - International Journal of Game Theory, 1995 - Springer
Comparative static tests of Nash bidding theory in second-price common value auctions
show that bidders fail to respond in the right direction to more rivals and to public information
concerning the value of the item. The former provides a clear indication that bidders fail to ...
D Dyer, JH Kagel… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1989 - JSTOR
Results from first-price, sealed-bid auctions, in which there is uncertainty regarding the
number of bidders, are reported. Consistent with recent theoretical findings, concealing
information regarding the number of bidders raises more revenue for the seller than ...
BH Baltagi… - Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 1992 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper estimates a dynamic demand model for cigarettes based on panel data
from 46 American states over the period 1963 to 1988. The first objective is to show some of
the pitfalls of studies that rely on a time series regression of a specific state, or a cross- ...
G Charness, E Karni… - Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2007 - Springer
Abstract This paper reports the results of experiments designed to test whether individuals
and groups abide by monotonicity with respect to first-order stochastic dominance and
Bayesian updating when making decisions under risk. The results indicate a significant ...
JH Kagel… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2005 - Elsevier
We construct a relatively simple model of bidding with synergies and solve it for both open
outcry and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. The essential behavioral forces involved in
these auctions are:(1) A demand reduction force resulting from the monopsony power that ...
JH Kagel… - The American Economic Review, 1991 - JSTOR
In their comment, Robert Hansen and John Lott (1991 p. 360)(hereafter HL) argue that the
violations of Nash-equilibrium bidding theory reported in Kagel and Levin (1986)(hereafter
KL) and related publications (Kagel et al., 1989)" may be a perfectly rational response to ...
JH Kagel… - Handbook of Experimental Economics, 2008 - econ.ohio-state.edu
The first question faced in writing this survey is how to organize it and what to include. There
have been hundreds of papers reporting experimental work on auctions since the 1995
survey published in the first Handbook of Experimental Economics (Kagel, 1995) so that it ...
CM Campbell… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2000 - Elsevier
In existing models of first-price common-value auctions, heterogeneous bidder information
characterized by a well-informed “insider” is detrimental to the seller's revenue. We show
that this is not a general principle. The linkage effect of increased information identified by ...
D Levin… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2004 - Elsevier
We investigate bidders' and seller's responses to ambiguity about the number of bidders in
the first price auction (FPA) and the second price auction (SPA) with independent private
valuations. We model ambiguity aversion using the maxmin expected utility model. We ...
D Levin… - Economics Letters, 1986 - Elsevier
Economics Letters 20 (1986) 315319 315 NorthHolland SYMMETRIC BIDDING IN
SECONDPRICE, COMMONVALUE AUCTIONS Dan LEVIN and Ronald M. HARSTAD University
of Houston, Houston, TX 77004, USA Received 17 October 1985 That secondprice, ...
CM Campbell… - Economic Theory, 2006 - Springer
Summary. Standard auctions are known to be a revenue-maximizing way to sell an object
under broad conditions when buyers are symmetric and have independent private
valuations. We show that when buyers have interdependent valuations, auctions may lose ...
JL Smith… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1996 - upi-yptk.ac.id
This paper ranks first-and second-price, independent value auctions with riskaverse bidders
when entry is endogenous. Unless bidders exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion
(DARA), the``fixed-n''ranking of first-price over secondprice is sustained. However, when ...
RM Harstad… - The Review of Economic Studies, 1985 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract Dominant strategies seldom exist in non-cooperative games. Moulin's concept of a
dominance solvable game generalizes, dominant strategy without dramatic loss in appeal.
We consider a class of common-value auctions characterized by the property that the ...
D Levin… - The American Economic Review, 1991 - JSTOR
The theory of auctions has developed extensively since Robert B. Wilson's (1977) seminal
paper. Due to the complexity of equilibrium strategies, however, empirical researchers have
been slow to incorporate and test the most basic theoretical precepts.'Typical empirical ...
D Levin, J Peck… - The Journal of Industrial Economics, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
We analyze costly quality disclosure with horizontally differentiated products under duopoly
and a cartel, and characterize the effect of competition on disclosure and welfare. We show
that expected disclosure is higher under a cartel than under duopoly, and the welfare ...
G Charness, E Karni… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2010 - Elsevier
This paper reports the results of a series of experiments designed to test whether and to
what extent individuals succumb to the conjunction fallacy. Using an experimental design of
Tversky and Kahneman (1983), it finds that given mild incentives, the proportion of ...
JH Kagel… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2009 - Elsevier
We study three alternative implementations of the Vickrey multi-unit demand auction:
Vickrey's original static sealed-bid auction and two dynamic/Ausubel auctions, with and
without public dropout information reported during the auction. Although implemented by ...
D Levin… - Rand Journal of Economics, 2003 - JSTOR
We consider a simultaneous-move, dynamic-entry game. The fixed cost of entry is private
information. Entering earlier increases the likelihood of being the monopolist but also
increases the likelihood of coordination failure and simultaneous entry. We consider ...
JL Smith… - International Journal of Game Theory, 2002 - Springer
Abstract. Most of the literature on auctions with endogenous entry assumes that, in
equilibrium, the number of entrants is deterministic. We discuss a series of experiments
designed to test the alternative hypothesis that, even in equilibrium, the number of ...
R Eldor… - International Economic Review, 1990 - JSTOR
This paper uses a partial equilibrium analysis to show that a partial trade liberalization may
reduce a country's welfare due to a loss in monopolistic rent if it is carried out by a quota.
The quota can be set by either the foreign or domestic government (it is considered as a ...
JH Kagel… - Economics Letters, 1985 - Elsevier
Abstract Individual bid functions display sensitivity to the strategic considerations inherent in
first-price auctions. However, several formal models, including heterogeneous Nash
equilibrium bidding models with constant relative risk aversion, perform quite poorly.
D Levin - 1986 - getcited.org
An academic directory and search engine.
A Ivanov, D Levin… - The American Economic Review, 2009 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: We experimentally test an endogenous-timing investment model in which subjects
privately observe their cost of investing and a signal correlated with the common investment
return. Subjects overinvest, relative to Nash. We separately consider whether subjects ...
D Levin… - European Economic Review, 2005 - Elsevier
In almost common-value auctions one bidder (the advantaged bidder) has a valuation
advantage over all other (regular) bidders. It is well known that in second-price auctions with
two bidders, even a slight private-value advantage can have an explosive effect on ...
JH Kagel, S Kinross… - Unpublished Paper, 2001 - econ.ohio-state.edu
Abstract We study three alternative versions of the Vickrey (1961) auction in cases where
bidders have multiunit demands: the original, static sealed-bid Vickrey auction and dynamic
Vickrey auctions with and without drop out information reported (Ausubel, 1997). The ...
D Levin… - Journal of economic Theory, 2008 - Elsevier
We study a dynamic investment game with two-dimensional signals, where each firm
observes its continuously distributed idiosyncratic cost of investment and a discrete signal
correlated with common investment returns. We demonstrate that the one-step property ...
GB Charness, D Levin… - 2008 - escholarship.org
Abstract: This paper reports the results of a series of experiments designed to test whether
and to what extent individuals succumb to the conjunction fallacy. Using an experimental
design of Kahneman and Tversky (1983), it finds that given mild incentives, the proportion ...
D Levin - Rand Journal of Economics, 2004 - JSTOR
Recent literature on joint bidding in a single-unit, common-value (CV) auction argues it
enhances competition. Information pooling mitigates adverse selection and thus elevates
bidding and may even increase revenue despite the reduction in the number of bidders. I ...
K Chernomaz… - 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We study, theoretically and experimentally, sealed-bid first-price auctions with and
without package bidding. A global bidder bids for several items and can benefit from
synergies, while local bidders bid for a single item. Package bidding improves (hurts) ...
[CITATION] vEquilibrium in Auctions with Entry. w American Economic Review
D Levin… - June, 1994
D Levin - Economic Inquiry, 1988 - Wiley Online Library
* Associate Professor of Economics, University of Houston. The financial support of the
Center for Public Policy at the University of Houston is gratefully acknowledged. I would like
to thank, without implicating, FM Fisher, R. Schmalensee, my colleague RM Harstad, and ...
A Ivanov, D Levin… - Econometrica, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
We use a second-price common-value auction, called the maximal game, to experimentally
study whether the winner's curse (WC) can be explained by models which retain best-
response behavior but allow for inconsistent beliefs. We compare behavior in a regular ...
[CITATION] Independent private value multi-unit demand auctions: An experiment comparing uniform-price and dynamic Vickrey auctions
JH Kagel… - 1997 - Working paper, University of …
D Levin, J Peck… - Journal of Industrial …, 2005 - economics.sbs.ohio-state.edu
Abstract We analyze costly quality disclosure with horizontally differentiated products under
duopoly and monopoly, and characterize the effect of competition on disclosure and welfare.
Expected disclosure is higher under monopoly than under duopoly. A duopolist faces ...
J Kagel, D Levin… - Working Papers, 1988 - econpapers.repec.org
By John Kagel, D. Levin and Ronald M. Harstad; JUDGMENT, EVALUATION AND INFORMATION
PROCESSING IN SECOND- PRICE COMMON VALUE AUCTIONS.
CM Campbell, JH Kagel… - The American Economic Review, 1999 - JSTOR
James C. Cox et al.(hereafter, ClDS)(1999) have identified an error in the proposed Nash
equilibrium under public information in Kagel and Levin (hereafter, KL)(1986). This naturally
raises the question: What is the correct theoretical benchmark against which to evaluate ...
[CITATION] First-price, sealed-bid, common value auctions: Some initial experimental results
JH Kagel, D Levin, RC Battalio… - Center for Public Policy Discussion …, 1984
[CITATION] Auctions with Entry: An Experimental Investigation
D Levin… - 1995 - Working Paper, Ohio State …
D Levin - American School Board Journal, 1983 - eric.ed.gov
Abstract: Discusses various definitions of computer literacy, including those from the
Minnesota Educational Computing Consortium and LOGO codeveloper Daniel Watt. Notes a
disagreement over whether computer literacy includes programing knowledge. Mentions ...
[CITATION] Revenue raising and information processing in English common value auctions
JH Kagel… - Mimeograph, University of Pittsburgh, 1992
[CITATION] rAlmost Common (Value auctions revisitedr
JH Kagel… - European Economic Review, 2003
D Levin - The American economic review, 2005 - JSTOR
In a sealed bid second-price auction (or English auction) with independent private values,
bidders with a single unit demand truthfully bid their value (stay in the auction until the price
reaches their value and then drop out). The discovery that such bidding is a dominant ...
Y Chen, K Takeuchi, N Kotzian… - University of …, 2005 - yanchen.people.si.umich.edu
Abstract We study two package auction mechanisms in the laboratory, a sealed bid Vickrey
auction and an ascending version of Vickrey called iBEA. Unlike the single-unit Vickrey
where bidders tend to overbid in the laboratory, most of our bidders either underbid or bid ...
SL Rose… - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2008 - Elsevier
With only two bidders, a slight private value advantage in a common value auction is
predicted to have an explosive effect on the allocation and revenue of the auction when
using a second price and/or English clock mechanism. This paper uses the “wallet game” ...
JH Kagel, S Kinross… - Unpublished paper, 2003 - people.hbs.edu
Abstract We study two alternative versions of the Vickrey (1961) auction when bidders have
multi-unit demands: the original, static sealed-bid Vickrey auction and a dynamic Vickrey
auction with drop-out information reported during the auction (Ausubel, 1997). The ...
[CITATION] Lights Return to'Black Broadway'in Northwest Washington, DC
D Levin - The New York Times, 2006
[CITATION] Cournot oligopoly and government regulation
D Levin - the second essay in an unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation …, 1982
D Levin… - Economics Letters, 2008 - Elsevier
We examine hybrid auctions with affiliated private values and risk-averse bidders, and show
that the optimal hybrid auction trades off the benefit of information extraction in the
ascending-bid phase and the cost of reduced competition in the sealed-bid phase.
JH Kagel… - 2001 - econ.ohio-state.edu
* Research support from the Economics and DRMS Divisions of NSF, the Sloan Foundation
and the Russell Sage Foundation are gratefully acknowledged. Special thanks to my
colleagues and my coauthors, especially Dan Levin, who have taught me so much. Much ...
[CITATION] The winner's curse in low price auctions
D Dyer, J Kagcl… - … manuscript, Department of Economics, University of …, 1987
[CITATION] Do Irrelevant Payoffs Affect Behavior When a Dominant Strategy is Available: Experimental Evidence from Second-Price Auctions
S Georganas, D Levin… - 2009 - working paper
JH Kagel… - The New Palgrave Dictionary of, 2009 - econ.ohio-state.edu
Abstract: Experiments permit rigorous testing of auction theory. In single-unit private value
auctions the Revenue Equivalence Theorem fails, but the comparative static predictions of
Nash bidding theory hold, indicating that bidders are responsive to the primary economic ...
[CITATION] Joint Bidding in Multiple-Units Uniform-Price Auctions: Adverse Selection Reduction Versus Demand Reduction."
D Levin - 1996 - Working Paper, Ohio State …
D Levin - Comments on DA-1075, Available at: http://wireless. fcc …, 2000 - wireless.fcc.gov
Consider a simultaneous auction for non-identical assets, such as the simultaneous multi-round
auction the FCC uses to sell spectrum licenses. Adjusting the rules to allow for combined value
bidding may notably improve the allocative efficiency of the auction. That is, allowing a ...
[CITATION] Efficiency and synergy in multi-unit auction with package bidding: An experimental study
K Chernomaz… - Unpublished manuscript. Ohio State University, 2007
D Levin, J Peck… - Economics Letters, 2007 - Elsevier
In an English auction with multi-dimensional signals, a “reversal” may arise: an earlier
dropout may be better news to the seller than a later dropout, and the expected revenue can
be decreasing over some range of clock prices.
D Levin - 1995 - books.google.com
As a war memoir this short book combines a high order of combat journalism with poetry
composed in pauses in the midst of battle, notebook writings too personal to have become
dispatches, and a compelling narrative that binds these threads together. It differs from ...
G Charness… - Levine's Bibliography, 2003 - emlab.berkeley.edu
Abstract: We examine decision-making under risk and uncertainty in a laboratory
experiment. The heart of our design is directed at studying how one's propensity to use
Bayes' rule is affected by whether this rule is aligned with reinforcement or clashes with it. ...
[CITATION] lSymmetric Bidding in Second $ Price
D Levin… - Common $ Value Auctions, mEconomics Letters, 1986
[CITATION] Trade liberalization and imperfect competition: A welfare analysis
R Eldor, D Levin… - 1986 - Foerder Institute for Economic …
[CITATION] JL 1994.“Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry,”
D Levin… - American Economic Review
K Dan Levin… - European Journal of Operational Research, 1982 - Elsevier
Abstract One of the problems facing the commander of support units during a combat
situation is how to plan the deployment of the units under his command. This paper deals
with the tactical problem of how to deploy the support units in order to achieve maximum ...
[CITATION] Awaiting a Full Embrace of Same-Sex Weddings
D Levin - New York Times. http://www. nytimes. com/2010/07/28/ …, 2010
[CITATION] oEntry Coordination, Market Thickness, and Social Welfare: An Experimental Investigation
D Levin… - pInternational Journal of Game Theory, 2002
[CITATION] China's big recycling market is sagging
D Levin - New York Times, 2009
[CITATION] Arriving at Competitive Prices Through Dominance Arguments for Large Auctions
D Levin… - Journal of Economic Theory, to appear, 1992
[CITATION] Demand Reduction in Multiunit Auctions: Comment
D Levin - American Economic Review, 2004
[CITATION] Kagel, VAlmost Common Value Auctions Revisited, V European Economic Review
D Levin… - 2005 - July
[CITATION] Kagel, and Jean-Francois Richard. 1996.“
D Levin… - Effects and Information Processing in English Common …
[CITATION] Francois (1996), lRevenue Effects and Information Processing in English Common Value Auctionsm
D Levin, J Kagel… - American Economic Review
D Levin - American School Board Journal, 1979 - eric.ed.gov
Abstract: After discussing the pros and cons of school-and non-school-sponsored national
athletic competitions, the author presents a list of questions school boards can use in
evaluating whether to let a student athlete participate in a non-school-sponsored sports ...
[CITATION] Auctions with a set of priors: Uncertain number of bidders
E Ozdenoren… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2004
[CITATION] Asymptotic dominance solvability of second-price auctions
D Levin… - 1985 - Working paper. Oct.(University of …
[CITATION] The Winner's Curse and Public Information in
JH Kagel… - 1986
[CITATION] Film Festival in the Cross Hairs
D Levin - New York Times, 2009
D Levin - American School Board Journal, 1979 - eric.ed.gov
EJ201299 - You Might Be Able to Test Teacher Applicants, but No Board
Has Ever Been Able to Test Working Teachers.
[CITATION] The Dream in the Flesh
D Levin - 1953 - GP Putnam's Sons
X Xu, D Levin… - International Journal of Game Theory, 2010 - Springer
Abstract We study a sequential auction of two objects with two bidders, where the winner of
the package obtains a synergy from the second object. If reselling after the two auctions
occurs, it proceeds as either monopoly or monopsony take-it-or-leave-it offer. We find that ...
D Levin - Executive Educator, 1983 - eric.ed.gov
Abstract: Suggests eight steps for training teachers to use computers, including establishing
a computer committee, structuring and budgeting for inservice courses, cooperating with
other schools, and sending some teachers to the computer company's maintenance and ...
S LaFraniere… - New York Times, 2010 - freewebs.com
LOUHE, China—Xu Lindong, a poor village farmer with close-cropped hair and a fourth-
grade education, knew nothing but decades of backbreaking labor. Even at age 50, the rope
of muscles on his arms bespoke a lifetime of hard plowing and harvesting in the fields of ...
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