A Galeotti, S Goyal, MO Jackson… - Review of …, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
In contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection, a player's well-
being depends on his or her own action as well as on the actions taken by his or her
neighbours. We provide a framework to analyse such strategic interactions when ...
D Gerardi… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
We analyze a model of jury decision making in which jurors deliberate before casting their
votes. We consider a wide range of voting institutions and show that deliberations render
these equivalent with respect to the sequential equilibrium outcomes they generate. In ...
MO Jackson… - The American economic review, 2007 - JSTOR
Situations in which agents' choices depend on choices of those in close proximity, be it
social or geographic, are ubiquitous. Selecting a new computer platform, signing a political
petition, or even catching the flu are examples in which social interactions have a ...
D Gerardi… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2008 - Elsevier
The goal of this paper is to illustrate the significance of information acquisition in mechanism
design. We provide a stark example of a mechanism design problem in a collective choice
environment with information acquisition. We concentrate on committees that are ...
L Yariv - 2002 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Psychological experiments demonstrate that people exhibit a taste for consistency.
Individuals are inclined to interpret new evidence in ways that confirm their pre-existing
beliefs. They also tend to change their beliefs to enhance the desirability of their past ...
MO Jackson… - Economie publique/Public …, 2006 - economiepublique.revues.org
We analyze a model of diffusion on social networks. Agents are connected according to an
undirected graph (the network) and choose one of two actions (eg, either to adopt a new
behavior or technology or not to adopt it). The return to each of the actions depends on ...
D Gerardi… - Yale University Typescript, 2003 - economics.sas.upenn.edu
Abstract The goal of this paper is to analyze collective decision making with communication.
We concentrate on decision panels that are comprised of a collection of agents sharing a
common goal, having a joint task, and possessing the ability to communicate at no cost. ...
L Einav… - The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2006 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: In this paper, we focus on the effects of surname initials on professional outcomes
in the academic labor market for economists. We begin our analysis with data on faculty in
all top 35 US economics departments. Faculty with earlier surname initials are significantly ...
Abstract: This paper uses a new data set on domestic child adoption to document the
preferences of potential adoptive parents over born and unborn babies relinquished for
adoption by their birth mothers. We show that adoptive parents exhibit significant biases in ...
JK Goeree, MA McConnell, T Mitchell… - American Economic …, 2010 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: We combine survey data on friendship networks and individual characteristics with
experimental observations from dictator games. Dictator offers are primarily explained by
social distance, giving follows a simple inverse distance law. While student demographics ...
Abstract. We study a simple model of a decentralized market game in which firms make
directed offers to workers. We identify three components of the market game that are key in
determining whether stable matches can arise as equilibrium outcomes. The first is related ...
MO Jackson… - in Handbook of Social Economics, edited by J. …, 2010 - Citeseer
How we act, as well as how we are acted upon, are to a large extent influenced by our
relatives, friends and acquaintances. This is true of which profession we decide to pursue,
whether or not we adopt a new technology, as well as whether or not we catch the flu. In ...
D Laibson… - V Society for Economic Dynamics Meeting …, 2004 - scholar.harvard.edu
Abstract We show that competitive markets protect consumers from many forms of
exploitation, even when consumers have non/standard preferences. We analyze a
competitive dynamic economy in which consumers have arbitrary time/separable ...
Abstract. We use a revealed preference approach to disentangle conformity, an intrinsic
taste to follow others, from information driven herding. We provide observations from a
series of sequential decision making experiments in which subjects choose the type of ...
L Yariv - 2002 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: A large body of experimental data demonstrates that people's beliefs influence
their well-being beyond the indirect effect through the actions taken. I present a model that
incorporates beliefs into an agent's utility function. The paper provides axiomatic ...
E Solan… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2004 - Elsevier
We consider normal form games in which two players decide on their strategies before the
start of play and Player 1 can purchase noisy information about his opponent's decisions
concerning future response policies (ie, spy on his opponent). We give a full ...
JK Goeree, MA McConnell, T Mitchell… - Unpublished …, 2007 - Citeseer
Abstract We combine data collected on friendship networks and individual characteristics
with experimental observations from a sequence of dictator games run at an all-girls school
in Pasadena, California. Our analysis provides two sets of insights. First, we find that ...
We study a simple model of a decentralized market game in which firms make directed offers
to workers. We focus on markets in which agents have aligned preferences. When agents
have complete information or when there are no frictions in the economy, there exists an ...
L Yariv - 2004 - hss.caltech.edu
Abstract I analyze majority voting in common value two-option environments where voters
have private information, the quality of which depends on the size of the electorate. Unlike
the standard results in the voting literature, I show that, even asymptotically, information ...
D Gerardi… - The American Economic Review, 2008 - JSTOR
In many environments, expertise is costly. Costs can manifest themselves in numerous
ways, ranging from the time that is required for a financial consultant to study companies'
performances, to the resources necessary for academic referees to produce ...
E Lehrer… - Mathematics of operations research, 1999 - JSTOR
Two players engage in a repeated game with incomplete information on one side, where the
underlying stage-games are zero-sum. In the case where players evaluate their stage-
payoffs by using different discount factors, the payoffs of the infinitely repeated game are ...
JB White, EJ Langer, L Yariv… - Journal of Adult Development, 2006 - Springer
Social comparisons may seem to serve several positive functions, including self-
enhancement. Frequent social comparisons, however, have a dark side. Two studies
examined the relationship between frequent social comparisons and destructive emotions ...
M Baccara, A Imrohoroglu… - American Economic …, 2009 - apps.olin.wustl.edu
Abstract We study the effects of network externalities on a unique matching protocol for
faculty in a large US professional school to offices in a new building. We collected
institutional, web, and survey data on faculty's attributes and choices. We first identify the ...
D Gerardi, MA McConnell, J Romero… - Carlo Alberto …, 2009 - carloalberto.org
Abstract. Institutions designed to increase turnout appeal to democratic sentiments but are
highly debated as they entail two potentially countervailing effects. While generating more
pieces of information, they may decrease the average voter's information quality. We ...
L Yariv - 2001 - mendeley.com
Abstract The psychology literature indicates that people exhibit cognitive biases implying a
taste for consistency. Two particular biases are dealt with in this paper. Confirmatory bias
refers to the phenomenon of people interpreting new evidence in ways that confirm their ...
JK Goeree… - Econometrica, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
We study the effects of deliberation on collective decisions. In a series of experiments, we
vary groups' preference distributions (between common and conflicting interests) and the
institutions by which decisions are reached (simple majority, two-thirds majority, and ...
Abstract: We study the effects of deliberation on collective decisions. In a series of
experiments, we vary groups' preference distributions (between common and conflicting
interests) and the institutions by which decisions are reached (simple majority, two-thirds ...
[CITATION] 007.“Deliberative Voting.”
D Gerardi… - Journal of Economic theory
M Jackson… - 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We examine collective decisions over streams of consumption. Individuals all
consume the same stream and evaluate it according to time discounted and smooth utility
functions. We show that if individuals differ in their time discount factors, the only way to ...
[CITATION] mAn Experimental Study of Jury Deliberation, nmimeo
JK Goeree… - 2007 - Caltech
[CITATION] Forthcoming.“Network Games,”
A Galeotti, S Goyal, M Jackson, F Vega-Redondo… - Review of Economic Studies
[CITATION] oAn Experimental Study of Collective Deliberation, pEconomet# rica, forthcoming
J Goeree… - 2010
[CITATION] oNetwork Games, pReview of Economic Studies
L Yariv - Vol, 2010
[CITATION] Putting Your Ballot Where Your Mouth IsQAn Analysis of Collective Choice with Communication
D Gerardi… - Manuscript, Yale University, 2002
[CITATION] A Simple 1/d Law of Giving
JK Goeree, M McConnell, T Mitchell, T Tromp… - 2006 - Mimeo
D Gerardi… - 2007 - sites.carloalberto.org
Our optimization problem falls under the class of problems known as parametric linear
programs. In particular, notice that the solution is continuous in the cost c (see, for instance,
Zhang and Liu [1990]). The goal is to show that when p is su# ciently close to one the ...
L Yariv - International Journal of Game Theory, 1997 - Springer
We show that even when the information structure is independent of the state of nature, the
value of then-stage zero-sum game with incomplete information is not necessarily
monotonie with respect to the length of the game. More precisely, we give an example of ...
M Agranov,
J Goeree, J Romero… - 2012 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We use laboratory experiments to test for one of the foundations of the rational
voter paradigm-that voters respond to probabilities of being pivotal. We exploit a setup that
entails stark theoretical effects of information concerning the preference distribution (as ...
L Yariv - atlas-conferences.com
The psychological literature indicates that people exhibit cognitive biases leading to
misinterpretation of new information in a way that is consistent with their past hypotheses
and with their past actions. We offer a model that incorporates these observations into an ...
D Gerardi… - Levine's Working Paper Archive, 2003 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks. Putting
Your Ballot Where you Mouth Is: An Analysis of Collective Choice. Dino Gerardi and Leeat Yariv. ...
AB NYU, AL NYU… - 2011 - bu.edu
Abstract Behavioral economics presents a mpaternalisticnrationale for government
interven& tion. Current literature focuses on benevolent government. This paper introduces
politicians who may indulge/exploit these behavioral biases. We present an analysis of ...
MO Jackson… - on Computational Social Choice ( … - ccc.cs.uni-duesseldorf.de
We examine collective decisions over streams of consumption. Agents all consume the
same stream and evaluate it according to time discounted and smooth utility functions. We
show that if agents differ in their time discount factors, then the only way to aggregate their ...
AL NYU… - 2012 - hss.caltech.edu
Abstract Behavioral economics presents a “paternalistic” rationale for government
intervention. Current literature focuses on benevolent government. This paper studies the
desirability of varying degrees of government intervention when government decisions ...
AB NYU, AL NYU… - 2010 - economics.uchicago.edu
Abstract. Behavioral economics presents a ppaternalisticqrationale for government inter&
vention. Current literature focuses on benevolent government. This paper introduces
politicians who may indulge/exploit these behavioral biases. We present an analysis of ...
This paper uses a new data set on domestic child adoption to document the preferences of
potential adoptive parents over born and unborn babies relinquished for adoption by their
birth mothers. We show that adoptive parents exhibit significant biases in favor of girls and ...
L Yariv - The Economic Journal, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
... A Theory of Case-Based Decisions. Leeat Yariv. Article first published online: 15 AUG 2008. DOI:
10.1111/1468-0297.t01-8-00105. Issue. The Economic Journal. ... More content like this. Find more
content: like this article. Find more content written by: Leeat Yariv. ...
MB NYU, ACW NYU… - 2009 - 128.36.236.74
Abstract This paper uses a new data set on domestic child adoption to document the
preferences of potential adoptive parents over born and unborn babies relinquished for
adoption by their birth mothers. We show that adoptive parents exhibit significant biases in ...
AB NYU, AL NYU… - 2011 - econ.umd.edu
Abstract Behavioral economics presents a “paternalistic” rationale for government
intervention. Current literature focuses on benevolent government. This paper introduces
politicians who may indulge/exploit these behavioral biases. We present an analysis of ...
This paper uses a new data set on child-adoption matching to document the preferences of
potential adoptive parents over US-born and unborn children relinquished for adoption by
their birth mothers. We show that adoptive parents exhibit significant preferences in favor ...
[CITATION] A theory of case-based decisions: Cambridge[ua]: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2001
L Yariv - The economic journal, 2003
This paper uses a new data set on child-adoption matching to document the preferences of
potential adoptive parents over US-born and unborn children relinquished for adoption by
their birth mothers. We show that adoptive parents exhibit significant preferences in favor ...
M Baccara… - 2012 - apps.olin.wustl.edu
In this Appendix we study the information sharing application analyzed in Section 5 of the
paper when information is costly. This is relevant to many environments, ranging from
focused wine or book clubs (in which participants have to jointly provide resources, be it ...
L Yariv… - 2004 Meeting Papers, 2004 - ideas.repec.org
This paper explores the extent to which markets constrain intertemporal preferences. First,
we show that without transaction costs, agents are immune to exploitation in competitive
markets. In particular, a sequence of trades leaving any market participant strictly worse off ...
E Shmaya… - hss.caltech.edu
Abstract. The analysis of lab data entails a joint test of the underlying theory and of
subjectslconjectures regarding the experimental design itself, how subjects frame the
experiment. We provide a theoretical framework for analyzing the impacts of such ...
E Lehrer… - Interfaces, 1999 - dl.acm.org
Seagate Software provides tools and applications for managing and accessing information.
In 1995, Seagate Technology began building the company using a strategy of acquiring
software companies with synergistic products for information, network, and storage...
L Yariv - 2001 - en.scientificcommons.org
Publikationsansicht. 34909483. Essays in information economics / (2001). Yariv, Leeat.
Abstract. Thesis (Ph. D., Department of Economics)--Harvard University, 2001.. Includes
bibliographical references (leaves 163-172). Details der Publikation. ...
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