A Greif - The American economic review, 1993 - JSTOR
This paper presents an economic institution which enabled 11th-century traders to benefit
from employing overseas agents despite the commitment problem inherent in these
relations. Agency relations were governed by a coalition--an economic institution in which ...
A Greif - Journal of political economy, 1994 - JSTOR
Lacking an appropriate theoretical framework, economists and economic historians have
paid little attention to the relations between culture and institutional structure. This limits the
ability to address a question that seems to be at the heart of developmental failures: Why ...
A Greif - 2006 - books.google.com
It is widely believed that current disparities in economic, political, and social outcomes reflect
distinct institutions. Institutions are invoked to explain why some countries are rich and
others poor, some democratic and others dictatorial. But arguments of this sort gloss over ...
A Greif - Journal of economic history, 1989 - Cambridge Univ Press
This article examines the economic institution utilized during the eleventh century to facilitate
complex trade characterized by asymmetric information and limited legal contract
enforceability. The geniza documents are employed to present the" coalition," an ...
A Greif,
P Milgrom… - Journal of political economy, 1994 - JSTOR
We interpret historical evidence in light of a repeated-game model to conclude that merchant
guilds emerged during the late medieval period to allow rulers of trade centers to commit to
the security of alien merchants. The merchant guild developed the theoretically required ...
A Greif… - American Political Science Review, 2004 - Cambridge Univ Press
Abstract This paper asks (a) why and how institutions change,(b) how an institution persists
in a changing environment, and (c) how processes that it unleashes lead to its own demise.
The paper shows that the game-theoretic notion of self-enforcing equilibrium and the ...
A Greif - The American Economic Review, 1998 - JSTOR
Among the most fundamental questions of institutional economics are: Why do societies
evolve along distinct institutional trajectories? Why do societies often fail to adopt the
institutional structure of more successful ones? How may we examine the interrelations ...
A Greif - Handbook of new institutional economics, 2005 - Springer
Markets rest upon institutions. The development of market-based exchange relies on the
support of two institutional pillars that are, in turn, shaped by the development of markets.
Research in the field of new institutional economics has largely focused upon one such ...
R Bates, A Greif… - Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2002 - jcr.sagepub.com
Abstract In stateless societies, coercion is privately provided; violence is employed to
engage in, and to defend against, predation. At best, violence results in mere redistribution;
being destructive, it more often results in a loss of social welfare. When organized, ...
A Greif - European Review of Economic History, 2000 - Cambridge Univ Press
Abstract For individuals to enter mutually beneficial exchange relationships they have to
recognise them as such and they have to be able to commit to fulfil their contractual
obligations. The ways in which a society's institutions mitigate this fundamental problem of ...
A Greif - 97-037, 1997 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper presents a micro-level historical and theoretical analysis of Genoa's
economic and political history during the twelfth and thirteenth century by examining the
factors influencing the extent to which its political system was self-enforcing and their ...
A Greif - The American Economic Review, 1992 - JSTOR
International trade theory distances itself from an examination of the institutions that govern
trade. To it, trade is determined by endowments, technology, preferences, and the nature of
the competition in international markets. Historical institutional analysis indicates, however ...
A Greif - in Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference …, 1997 - Citeseer
Abstract author. They do not necessarily represent Neoclassical economics maintains that a
legal system is required to foster anonymous exchange and hence efficiency. In contrast,
social scientists from other disciplines emphasize the importance of informal contract ...
A Greif - The Journal of Economic History, 1994 - Cambridge Univ Press
Abstract Although the late medieval Commercial Revolution is considered to be a watershed
in the economic history of Europe, the analysis of the interrelationship between political and
economic systems in bringing about this period of economic growth has been neglected. ...
A Greif - 1997 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper discusses the three approaches within economic history that utilizes
micro-economic theory to examine institutions, their nature, change, and efficiency: the Neo-
classical Economics approach, the New Institutional Economic History approach, and ...
A Greif - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics ( …, 2002 - JSTOR
This paper utilizes historical evidence and game theory to examine institutions that fostered
intercommunity impersonal exchange during the late medieval period. It presents the
community responsibility system that functioned throughout Europe and supported ...
A Greif, E Kandel, Stanford University. School of Law… - 1993 - pdf.usaid.gov
Recently a Russian plant manager signed a multi-million-dollar contract with a Western
company to supply equipment for his plant. Several days later the company officials found
out to their astonishment that an identical contract had been signed with their competitor. ...
RH Bates, A Greif, M Levi, JL Rosenthal… - The American Political …, 2000 - JSTOR
In Analytic Narratives, we attempt to address several issues. First, many of us are engaged
in in-depth case studies, but we also seek to contribute to, and to make use of, theory. How
might we best proceed? Second, the historian, the anthropologist, and the area specialist ...
A Greif - 2003 - stanford.edu
Page 1. Institutions: Theory and History Comparative and Historical Institutional Analysis Avner
Greif Stanford University March 05 version. Forthcoming Cambridge University Press. Page 2.
Contents Preface Part I Preliminaries 1 Introduction 2 Institutions and Transactions ...
A Greif - in The Frontiers of the New Institutional Economics, 1997 - Citeseer
Abstract This paper utilizes transaction cost economics, game theory, and insights from
sociology and psychology to conduct a comparative historical study of the institutional
structure of two late Medieval societies, one from the Muslim world and one from the Latin ...
A Greif - Chi. J. Int'l L., 2004 - HeinOnline
ABSTRACT Impartial legal enforcement provided by the state is considered necessary for
impersonal exchange,'implying that the scope of enforcement determines the extent of the
market and hence the division of labor and related efficiency gains. Yet, the development ...
A Greif - The American Economic Review, 1997 - JSTOR
Cliometrics emerged 40 years ago to combine economic theory and quantitative analysis for
the advancement of history and economics. As an intellectual movement, it aspired to
enhance the study of past economies by subjecting them to the rigor of economic theory ...
A Greif - The American economic review, 2006 - JSTOR
There is a vast amount of literature that considers the importance of the family as an
institution. Little attention, however, has been given to the impact of the family structure and
its dynamics on institutions. This limits our ability to understand distinct institutional ...
A Greif - Handbook of game theory with economic applications, 2002 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper surveys the small, yet growing, literature that uses game theory for
economic history analysis. It elaborates on the promise and challenge of applying game
theory to economic history and presents the approaches taken in conducting such an ...
A Greif - Industrial and corporate change, 1996 - Oxford Univ Press
Abstract Despite the diversity of economic environments and organizations utilized
throughout history, historical studies of organizations and organizational innovations, by and
large, have concentrated on the very recent past. Arguably, this reflects the perception that ...
[CITATION] Historical institutional analysis
A Greif - 2002 - Cambridge University Press, …
A Greif - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics ( …, 1995 - JSTOR
It has been argued that"[w] estern wealth began with the growth of European trade and
commerce which started in the twelfth century in Italy..."(Rosenberg and Birdzell [1986, 35]).
Many factors made this beginning possible, not the least of which was the decline of the ...
A Greif - Communities and markets in economic development, 2001 - books.google.com
Communities and markets are considered by economists as alternative modes of governing
transactions. In contrast, this paper calls attention to the importance of considering them as
complements. In economic development and economic history, the view that communities ...
A Greif, Universität München… - 2008 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Edwards and Ogilvie (2008) dispute the empirical basis for the view (Greif, eg,
1989, 1994, 2006) that multilateral reputation mechanism mitigated agency problems
among the eleventh century Maghribi traders. They assert that the relations among ...
[CITATION] The Merchant Gild as a Nexus of Contracts
A Greif,
PR Milgrom, BR Weingast… - 1990 - John M. Olin Program in Law and …
[CITATION] Genoa and the Maghribi traders: Historical and comparative institutional analysis
A Greif - Book manuscript, 1998
A Greif, G Tabellini… - 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: How to sustain cooperation is a key challenge for any society. Different social
organizations have evolved in the course of history to cope with this challenge by relying on
different combinations of external (formal and informal) enforcement institutions and ...
A Greif - 1998 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Existing works on the economic implications of social structures examined the
effect of intra-community information and contract enforcement institutions on personal
exchange among that community's members. In contrast, this paper examines the extent ...
A Greif - Journal of Economic History, 1991 - JSTOR
The subject of my dissertation is medieval trade organization. The basic question addressed
concerns the emergence, operation, and evolution of nonmarket economic institutions that
enabled merchants to increase trade efficiency by operating through overseas agents.' ...
A Greif - Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. …, 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper presents an institution-the Community Responsibility System (CRS)-
which has been a missing link in our understanding of market development. The CRS
fostered market expansion throughout pre-modern Europe by providing the contract ...
[CITATION] Cultural Beliefs as a Common Resource in an Integrating World
A Greif - Dasgupta, P., Mäler, K.-G. & Vercelli, A, 1997
[CITATION] Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: a Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualistic Societies
G Avner - The Journal of Political Economy, 1994
A Greif - The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2006 - JSTOR
This occasional feature will discuss episodes and events drawn from economic history that
have lessons for current topics in policy and research. Responses to this column and
suggestions for future ones should be sent to Kenneth Sokoloff, c/o Journal of Economic ...
YG de Lara, A Greif… - The American Economic Review, 2008 - JSTOR
Evidence indicates that prosperity increases with the rule of law that limits abuse by public
officials. Less is known, however, about how to foster such rule of law in developing
countries. Constitutional theory views the problem as one of coordinating the citizenry." ...
[CITATION] Institutions: Theory and History. Comparative and Historical Institutional Analysis
A Greif - 2005 - Cambridge University Press: …
[CITATION] Informal contract enforcement: lessons from medieval trade
A Greif - 1997 - John M. Olin Program in Law and …
M Casari, D Abreu, D Pearce… - Journal of …, 2007 - Cambridge Univ Press
This article examines changes in institutions that protected property rights in the Alps
between the thirteenth and the nineteenth century and, in particular, alternative
management systems adopted for the common pastures and forests in about 200 ...
A Greif - 2007 - books.google.com
This chapter presents a conjecture regarding the origin of constitutionalism, why it was
historically insufficient to protect property rights, and why it was nevertheless positively
correlated with prosperity. Theories of constitutionalism focus on constitutional rules and ...
[CITATION] The Influence of Past Institution on its Rate of Change: Institutional Perpetuation and Endogenous Institutional Change
A Greif - Conference of the International Society for New …, 2001
[CITATION] contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade: the Maghribi traders' coalition
G Avner - The American Economic Review, 1993
[CITATION] Trading institutions and the commercial revolution in medieval Europe
A Greif - Economics in a changing world, 1994
[CITATION] The Islamic equilibrium: legitimacy and political, social, and economic outcomes
A Greif - 2001 - working paper, Stanford University
[CITATION] Institutions and the path to economic modernity: Lessons from medieval trade
A Greif - 2006 - Cambridge: Cambridge University …
[CITATION] Markets and Legal Systems: The Development of Markets in Late Medieval Europe and the Transition from Community Responsibility to an Individual …
A Greif… - 1995 - … and the Informal Sector, University of …
A Greif - INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF CRITICAL …, 1997 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract This paper integrates game-theoretical and sociological concepts to conduct a
comparative historical analysis of the relations between culture and institutions. It indicates
the importance of culture, and in particular cultural beliefs, in determining institutions, in ...
A Greif… - Journal of Comparative Economics, 2010 - Elsevier
Why, how, and under what conditions do moral beliefs persist despite institutional pressure
for change? Why do the powerful often fail to promote the morality of their authority? This
paper addresses these questions by presenting the role of crypto-morality in moral ...
A Greif… - Unpublished working paper, …, 1995 - www-siepr.stanford.edu
Abstract: In contrast to recent work in Regional Economics which emphasizes the role of an
industry's scale in generating agglomeration economies, this paper emphasizes the
importance of an industry's composition, that is, the number of firms generating ...
[CITATION] Toward political economy of implementation: the impact of administrative power on institutional and economic developments
A Greif - Institutions and growth. Harvard University Press, …, 2008
A Greif - Available at ssrn. com/abstract, 2008 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: What causes distinct trajectories of market development? Why did the modern
market economy, characterized by impersonal exchange, first emerge in the West? This
paper presents a theory of market development and evaluates it based on the histories of ...
[CITATION] Analytic narratives
H Bates Robert, A Greif, M Levi… - 1998 - Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton …
A Greif - 2005 - lavoisier.fr
Plus d'un million de titres à notre catalogue ! ... Date de parution : 01-2006 Langue : ANGLAIS
Paperback Disponible chez l'éditeur (délai d'approvisionnement : 10 jours). ... Part I.
Preliminaries: 1. Introduction, 2. Institutions and transactions, Part II. Institutions as ...
[CITATION] The institutional foundations of Genoa's economic growth: self-enforcing political relations, organizational innovations, and economic growth during the …
A Greif - Manuscript. Stanford University, 1995
A Greif, R Bates… - World Bank-Princeton Workshop on the …, 2000 - Citeseer
Addressing the relationship between political order and development, Samuel Huntington
(1968, p. 1) once stated,“the most important… distinction among countries concerns not their
forms of government but their degree of government.” Events in Angola, Afghanistan, ...
[CITATION] How do Self-enforcing Institutions Endogenously Change
A Greif… - Unpublished manuscript, Stanford University, 2003
[CITATION] On the Historical Development and Social Foundations of Institutions that Facilitate Impersonal Exchange
A Greif - 1997 - Working paper, Stanford University
[CITATION] Institutional structure and economic development: economic history and the new institutionalism
A Greif - Forthcoming in Frontiers of Institutional Analysis. …, 1995
A Greif, M Levi, JL Rosenthal… - Princeton: Princeton, 1998 - 202.120.227.5
Abstract Students of comparative politics have long faced a vexing dilemma: how can social
scientists draw broad, applicable principles of political order from specific historical
examples? In Analytic Narratives, five senior scholars offer a new and ambitious ...
[CITATION] Institutional Infrastructure and Economic Development: Reflection from the Commercial Revolution'
A Greif - 1992 - Stanford University (California), …
A Greif - 2004 - Citeseer
... Download Links. [www.esnie.org]. Save to List; Add to Collection; Correct Errors; Monitor Changes.
by Avner Greif. ... MISC{Greif04self-enforcinginstitutions:, author = {Avner Greif}, title = {Self-enforcing
Institutions: Comparative and Historical Institutional Analysis }, year = {2004} }. ...
[CITATION] Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence from the Geniza Documents
A Greif - Berkeley Seminar on Institutional Economics (Oct. …, 1989
[CITATION] Cultural Beliefs as a Common Resource in an Integrating World: An Example from the Theory and History of Collectivist and Individualist Societies,"
A Greif - The Economics of, 1991
[CITATION] Institutions, Markets, and Games
A Greif - Foreword, in: TESOC, 2005
[CITATION] Forthcoming. Institutions: Theory and History
A Greif - Book Manuscript. Contracted with Cambridge …
RH BATES, A GREIF… - Politics from anarchy to …, 2004 - books.google.com
THIS CHAPTER seeks to deepen our understanding of the process of development by
exploring the political economy of kinship societies. Looking first at the economics, it
emphasizes the manner in which families link labor and land in the process of production ...
[CITATION] Jean-Laurent. 1998
RH Bates, A Greif… - Analytic Narratives
[CITATION] sOrganizing Violence: Wealth
A Greif, R Bates… - Power, and Limited Government, spresented at the …, 2000
[CITATION] Reputation and Economic Institutions in Medieval Trade: Evidences from the Geniza Documents
A Greif - Journal of Economic History, 1989
[CITATION] Forthcoming. Historical Institutional Analysis
A Greif - Cambridge: Cambridge University …
A Greif - Annales, 1998 - JSTOR
Recent development of game theory has enabled expanding the analysis of historical
institutions to examine self-enforcing, non-market institutions. This paper provides a brief
methodological discussion of Historical Institutional Analysis that utilizes game theory for ...
[CITATION] Institutions and endogenous institutional change: historical institutional analysis
A GREIF - Seminário Brasileiro da Nova Economia Institucional, 2001 - Brasil Campinas
[CITATION] Historical Institutionalist Analysis
A Greif - Unpublished manuscript, Stanford, CA, 2001
[CITATION] Historical institutional analysis: game theory and non-market self-enforcing institutions during the late medieval period
A Greif - Forthcoming in the Annales, 1997
[CITATION] De Lara and Saumitra Jha, 2008,“The Administrative Foundations of Self-Enforcing Constitutions”
A Greif… - American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings
[CITATION] The Emergence of Institutions to Protect Property Rights
A Greif - Handbook on New Institutional Economics, 2005
[CITATION] A Theory of Moral Authority: Moral Choices under Moral Networks Externalities
A Greif - 2010 - Stanford University
CP Kindleberger… - Journal of Economic Literature, 1997 - questia.com
Within this project there have been eight major conferences on coun- tries, regions, or specific
issues. After two conferences in Luxembourg and at Harvard University of a more general
character, there have been meet- ings on specific topics: "The Vitality of Central and ...
A Greif… - 2001 - icos.groups.si.umich.edu
Abstract Why and how does an institution influence its rate of change? How does an
institution influence its ability to persist in a changing environment and how does it lead to its
own demise? These questions frustrate the study of self-enforcing institutions in which ...
A Greif, M Iyigun… - 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We analyze the role of risk-sharing institutions in transitions to modern economies
Transitions requires individual-level risk-taking in pursuing productivity-enhancing activities
including using and developing new knowledge. Individual-level, idiosyncratic risk implies ...
[CITATION] nd Institutions: Theory and History
A Greif - Cambridge: Cambridge University …
[CITATION] Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders, 49J
A Greif - ECON. HIST, 1989
A Greif… - Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy and …, 2011 - Springer
Recent scholarship has demonstrated the power of the rational choice framework for
advancing our understanding of institutions and institutional change. Stimulated by these
developments, the conceptual frameworks employed by scholars studying institutions ...
[CITATION] Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal. and Barry R. Weingast. 1998. Analytic Narratives
RH Bates… - Princeton, NJ: Princeton University …
[CITATION] Contracting
A Greif - Enforcement and Efficiency: Economics Beyond the …, 1996
[CITATION] Sicilian Jews During the Muslim Period (827-1061)
A Greif - Hebrew and Arabic], Master's thesis, Tel Aviv University, 1985
[CITATION] Institutions and history
A Greif - 2006 - Cambridge University Press …
[CITATION] The Merchant Guild as a Nexus of Contracts
PR Milgrom, A Greif… - 1991 - Hoover Working Paper
[CITATION] Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade, 2006
A Greif - New York: Cambridge University …
[CITATION] Barry Weingast,(1991)," The Merchant Guild as a Nexus of Contracts
A Greif… - Stanford, mimeo
[CITATION] The Game-Theoretic Revolution in Comparative and Historical Institutional Analysis; manuscript, Department of Economics, Stanford University
A Greif - 2002
[CITATION] Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the
A Greif - 1989
[CITATION] Endogenous Institutions and Game-Theoretic Analysis
A Greif - Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy, 2006
[CITATION] Historical Institutional Analysis: Interdisciplinary Approach for the Study of Self-enforcing and Self-reinforcing Economic Institutions and their Dynamics
A Greif - Cambridge: Cambridge University …
[CITATION] The Institutional Foundations of Markets and States: Genoa and the Maghribi Traders during the Late Medieval Period
A Greif - Forthcoming
[CITATION] Handbook of New Institutional Economics, 727w786
A Greif - 2005 - Springer
[CITATION] The Influence of Past Institution on Its Rate of Change: Institutional Perpetuation and Endogenous Institutional Change, chapter 7 in Historical Institutional …
A Greif - Forthcoming CUP. URL= http://wwwecon. stanford. edu …, 2000
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