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A theory of endogenous coalition structures

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D Ray… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1999 - Elsevier
Consider an environment with widespread externalities, and suppose that binding
agreements can be written. We study coalition formation in such a setting. Our analysis
proceeds by defining on a partition function an extensive-form bargaining game. We ...
Cited by 376 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 25 versions

Equilibrium binding agreements

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D Ray… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1997 - Elsevier
We study equilibrium binding agreements, the coalition structures that form under such
agreements, and the efficiency of the outcomes that result. We analyze such agreements in
a context where the payoff to each player depends on the actions of all other players. Thus ...
Cited by 343 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 18 versions

[PDF] Coalitional power and public goods

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D Ray… - Journal of Political Economy, 2001 - are.berkeley.edu
We study the provision of public goods when all agents have complete information and can
write binding agreements. This framework is in deliberate contrast to a traditional view of the
free-rider problem based on hidden information or voluntary provision. We focus on ...
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Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core

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R Vohra - Journal of Economic Theory, 1999 - Elsevier
We consider an exchange economy in which agents possess private information at the time
of engaging in state contingent contracts. While communication of private information is
permitted, the true information state is not verifiable. The enforcement of contracts is, ...
Cited by 101 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 15 versions

Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey

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F Forges, E Minelli… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2002 - Elsevier
This paper provides a general overview of the literature on the core of an exchange
economy with asymmetric information. Incentive compatibility is emphasized in studying
core concepts at the ex ante and interim stage. The analysis includes issues of non- ...
Cited by 82 - Related articles - Library Search - All 16 versions

Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments

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B Dutta, A Sen… - Review of Economic Design, 1994 - Springer
Abstract This paper identifies a class of mechanisms, called elementary mechanisms, which
are (in a precisely defined sense) the “simplest” mechanisms that can implement efficient
outcomes in economic environments. The class of social choice correspondences that can ...
Cited by 73 - Related articles - Library Search - All 5 versions

Non-cooperative implementation of the core

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R Serrano… - Social Choice and Welfare, 1997 - Springer
Abstract. The aim of this paper is to examine the non-cooperative basis of the core. We
provide mechanisms that are motivated closely by the very description of the core, and have
the property that their non-cooperative equilibrium outcomes coincide with the core. For ...
Cited by 69 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 14 versions

The ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects

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F Forges, JF Mertens… - Econometrica, 2002 - Wiley Online Library
In a differential information economy with quasi–linear utilities, monetary transfers facilitate
the fulfillment of incentive compatibility constraints: the associated ex ante core is generically
nonempty. However, we exhibit a well–behaved exchange economy in which this core is ...
Cited by 64 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 29 versions

A consistent bargaining set

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B Dutta, D Ray, K Sengupta… - Journal of economic theory, 1989 - Elsevier
Abstract Both the core and the bargaining set fail to satisfy a natural requirement of
consistency. In excluding imputations to which there exist objections, the core does not
assess the “credibility” of such objections. The bargaining set goes a step further. Only ...
Cited by 61 - Related articles - All 8 versions

An extension of the second welfare theorem to economies with nonconvexities and public goods

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MA Khan, R Vohra - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1987 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract In this paper we report a generalization of the results of Foley and Guesnerie on the
second welfare theorem to economies with arbitrary nonconvex production sets. The nature
of marginal cost prices in such economies is clarified through the use of the Clarke ...
Cited by 59 - Related articles - All 6 versions

On a general existence theorem for marginal cost pricing equilibria

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DJ Brown, GM Heal, M Ali Khan… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1986 - Elsevier
Abstract We report a generalization of recent results on the existence of marginal cost
pricing equilibria (MCPE) in economies with an increasing returns to scale industry. Our
result makes no ad hoc assumptions which force the equilibrium to be on the efficiency ...
Cited by 42 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 18 versions

On the existence of equilibria in economies with increasing returns

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R Vohra - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1988 - Elsevier
Abstract We provide a result on the existence of equilibria in economies with non-convex
production sets. The principal assumption is a boundary condition and an income
hypothesis on a subset of the production sets. As corollaries of our main results, we obtain ...
Cited by 37 - Related articles - All 5 versions

On the inefficiency of two-part tariffs

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R Vohra - The Review of Economic Studies, 1990 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract The partial equilibrium literature on two-part tariffs suggests that if a commodity is
produced under increasing returns, efficiency can be achieved through marginal cost pricing
and a suitable choice of “entry fees”(fixed charge) which may vary from consumer to ...
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An existence theorem for a bargaining set

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R Vohra - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1991 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper considers non-transferable utility games and provides sufficient
conditions for the existence of the bargaining set introduced in Mas-Colell (1989). Our main
assumption is weak balancedness. This assumption is weaker than balancedness and is ...
Cited by 34 - Related articles - Library Search - All 5 versions

Equilibrium in abstract economies without ordered preferences and with a measure space of agents

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MA Khan, R Vohra - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1984 - Elsevier
Abstract We report a generalization of Aumann's (1966) existence theorem to economies
without ordered preferences and with externalities in consumption. Our work can
alternatively be viewed as a generalization of the Shafer–Sonnenschein (1975) theorem ...
Cited by 33 - Related articles - All 5 versions

On the failure of core convergence in economies with asymmetric information

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R Serrano, R Vohra… - Econometrica, 2001 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. Ž . Econometrica, Vol. 69, No. 6 November, 2001 , 16851696 ON THE FAILURE OF
CORE CONVERGENCE IN ECONOMIES WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BY ROBERTO
SERRANO, RAJIV VOHRA, AND OSCAR VOLIJ 1 1. INTRODUCTION ...
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On Kakutani's fixed point theorem, the KKMS theorem and the core of a balanced game

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L Shapley, R Vohra - Economic Theory, 1991 - Springer
Summary We provide elementary proofs of Scarf's theorem on the non-emptiness of the core
and of the KKMS thoerem, based on Kakutani's fixed point theorem. We also show how
these proofs can be modified to apply a coincidence theorem of Fan instead of Kakutani's ...
Cited by 26 - Related articles - All 6 versions

Some limitations of virtual Bayesian implementation

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R Serrano… - Econometrica, 2001 - Wiley Online Library
Ž Ž.. AS IS WELL KNOWN, Maskin monotonicity Maskin 1977 is a necessary condition for a
social choice correspondence to be Nash implementable. In economic environments with at
least three agents and a private good, this condition is also sufficient for Nash Ž. Ž. ...
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A simple model of coalitional bidding

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IK Cho, K Jewell… - Economic Theory, 2002 - Springer
Summary. We analyze a model of coalitional bidding in which coalitions form endogenously
and compete with each other. Since the nature of this competition influences the way in
which agents organize themselves into coalitions, our main aim is to characterize the ...
Cited by 27 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 11 versions

Marginal cost pricing under bounded marginal returns

R Vohra - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1992 - JSTOR
While there are now many results on the existence of marginal cost pricing equilibrium, we
argue that they are unsatisfactory in one important respect. They typically make a survival
assumption which is stated as a condition on the production equilibria of the economy. ...
Cited by 21 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 6 versions

A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation

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R Serrano… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2005 - Elsevier
We provide a characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation in pure strategies for
environments satisfying no-total-indifference. A social choice function in such environments
is virtually Bayesian implementable if and only if it satisfies incentive compatibility and a ...
Cited by 20 - Related articles - All 24 versions

Incomplete information, credibility and the core

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B Dutta, R Vohra - Mathematical Social Sciences, 2005 - Elsevier
An appropriate (interim) notion of the core for an economy with incomplete information
depends on the amount of information that coalitions can share. The coarse and fine core,
as originally defined by Wilson (1978)[Wilson, R., 1978. Information, Efficiency and the ...
Cited by 20 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 7 versions

Equity and efficiency in non-convex economies

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R Vohra - Social Choice and Welfare, 1992 - Springer
The objective of this paper is to consider the following question. Does the presence of
increasing returns introduce a fundamental trade-off between equity and efficiency
objectives? We show that if the no-envy notion of Foley (1967) is taken as the equity ...
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A characterization of egalitarian equivalence

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B Dutta, R Vohra - Economic Theory, 1993 - Springer
Summary Consider a solution (an allocation rule) for an economy which satisfies the
following criteria:(1) Pareto efficiency,(2) monotonicity, in the sense that if the set of
attainable allocations of the economy becomes larger then the solution makes no ...
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Bargaining and bargaining sets

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R Serrano… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2002 - Elsevier
We argue that, in exchange economies, various versions of the bargaining set cannot be
implemented in Nash equilibrium. We then propose an extensive form mechanism that
exactly implements the Aumann–Davis–Maschler bargaining set in subgame perfect ...
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On the existence of Lindahl-Hotelling equilibria

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MA Khan, R Vohra - Journal of Public Economics, 1987 - Elsevier
Abstract We consider an economy characterized by the simultaneous presence of public
goods and many increasing returns to scale firms. We formalize a notion of equilibrium,
termed a Lindahl-Hotelling equilibrium, in which producer prices are marginal cost prices ...
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On the existence of Lindahl equilibria in economies with a measure space of non-transitive consumers

MA Khan, R Vohra - Journal of Economic Theory, 1985 - Elsevier
Abstract We present a generalization of Roberts' theorem on the existence of Lindahl
equilibria in economies with a measure space of agents. The principal contribution of this
paper is methodological. We show that by formulating the problem in what we consider to ...
Cited by 14 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 5 versions

[CITATION] Binding agreements and coalitional bargaining

D Ray… - J Econ Theory, 1995
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Optimal regulation under fixed rules for income distribution

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R Vohra - Journal of Economic Theory, 1988 - Elsevier
Abstract It is by now well known that if arbitrary lump sum transfers are feasible, then the
optimal regulation of firms involves marginal cost pricing. Here, we consider optimal
regulation in an economy in which lump sum taxation is possible but the income ...
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[CITATION] Efficient resource allocation under increasing returns

R Vohra… - 1991 - Stanford Institute for Theoretical …
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[PDF] Incomplete information, credibility and the core

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B Dutta, R Vohra - Working Papers, 2001 - econ.brown.edu
Abstract. An appropriate (interim) notion of the core for an economy with incomplete
information depends on the amount of information that coalitions can share. The coarse and
fine core, as originally defined by Wilson (1978), correspond to two polar cases, involving ...
Cited by 8 - Related articles - View as HTML - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 12 versions

Information transmission in coalitional voting games

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R Serrano… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
A core allocation of a complete information economy can be characterized as one that would
not be unanimously rejected in favor of another feasible alternative by any coalition. We use
this test of coalitional voting in an incomplete information environment to formalize a ...
Cited by 8 - Related articles - All 15 versions

Local public goods as indivisible commodities

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R Vohra - Regional Science and Urban Economics, 1987 - Elsevier
Abstract A sharper version of Ellickson's (1979) result on the existence of an approximate
Tichout equilibrium is shown to be true under much weaker assumptions. It is also shown
that there exists a second-best policy regarding the bundle of public goods each local ...
Cited by 7 - Related articles - All 5 versions

Local public goods and average cost pricing

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R Vohra - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1984 - Elsevier
Abstract Existence of a compensated Tiebout equilibrium is proved for an economy with a
measure space of consumers. This result is then extended to show the existence of
equilibrium for an economy with natural monopolies and contestable markets.
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[PDF] Implementing the Mas-Colell bargaining set

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R Serrano… - investigaciones económicas, 2002 - funep.es
We provide a mechanism that approximately implements the Mas-Colell bargaining set in
subgame perfect equilibrium. The mechanism is based on the definition of the Mas-Colell
bargaining set, and respects feasibility in and out of equilibrium. Key words: Mas-Colell ...
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[CITATION] On the impossibility of implementation under incomplete information

R Serrano… - Working Papers, 1999 - econpapers.repec.org
By Roberto Serrano and Rajiv Vohra; On the Impossibility of
Implementation under Incomplete Information.
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Efficiency in an Economy with Fixed Costs

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A Dall'Olio… - Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2001 - Wiley Online Library
It is by now well known that in an economy with increasing returns, first-best efficiency may
be impossible to attain through an equilibrium concept based on market prices, even if firms
are regulated to follow marginal cost pricing. We examine the efficiency issue in a special ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 9 versions

The incentive compatible core of a quasi-linear economy

F Forges, JF Mertens… - THEMA Working Papers, 2000 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract THE INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE CORE QUASI LINEAR ECONOMY FRANCOISE
FORGESy JEAN FRANCOIS MERTENSz AND RAJIV VOHRAx Date May Mathematics
Subject Classi cation B JEL Classi cation numbers Key words and phrases Core ...
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Equilibrium binding agreements

D Ray… - 1983 - Citeseer
Abstract this paper is to study equilibrium binding agreements, the coalition structures that
form under such agreements, and the efficiency of the outcomes that result. The approach
that we take is in the spirit of cooperative game theory, in the sense that the concept of ...
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[CITATION] Increasing returns, public goods and general equilibrium theory

R Vohra - 1983 - en.scientificcommons.org
Publikationsansicht. 5340584. Increasing returns, public goods and general equilibrium
theory. (1983). Vohra, Rajiv. Abstract. Thesis--Johns Hopkins Univ., 1983..
Photocopy.--Ann Arbor, Mich.,--Edward Elgar, in association with ...
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Impementing the Mas-Colell bargaining set

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R Vohra… - Investigaciones económicas, 2002 - doaj.org
Résumé: We provide a mechanism that approximately implements the Mas-Colell
bargaining set in subgame perfect equilibrium. The mechanism is based on the definition of
the Mas-Colell bargaining set, and respects feasibility in and out of equilibrium.
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Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games

R Vohra… - … Economics Working Paper No. 2005-01, 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: A core allocation of a complete information economy can be characterized as one
that would not be unanimously rejected in favor of another feasible alternative by any
coalition. We use this test of coalitional voting in an incomplete information environment to ...
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[CITATION] Civil Conflict: Ended Or Never Ending?

A Idzik, GOH Katona… - Working Papers, 1999 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks. Civil
Conflict: Ended Or Never Ending? Adam Idzik, Gyula OH Katona and Rajiv Vohra (). No
99-33, Working Papers from Brown University, Department of Economics. ...
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[CITATION] An extension of the second welfare theorem to economies with nonconvexities and public goods/BEBR 1290

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MA Khan, R Vohra - ideals.illinois.edu
Abstract In this paper, we report a generalization of the results of Foley and Guesnerie on
the second welfare theorem to economies with arbitrary nonconvex production sets. The
nature of marqinal cost prices in such economies is clarified through the use of the Clarke ...
Related articles - All 2 versions

Information transmission in coalitional voting games

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R Serrano… - Nº.: UC3M Working Paper. Economics …, 2005 - e-archivo.uc3m.es
A core allocation of a complete information economy can be characterized as one that would
not be unanimously rejected in favor of another feasible alternative by any coalition. We use
this test of coalitional voting in an incomplete information environment to formalize a ...
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The aggregate production function of an industry with generalized-Leontief cost functions at the micro level

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R Vohra - Economics Letters, 1981 - Elsevier
Abstract It is shown that Houthakker's (1955–1956) result, which is based on fixed capacity
and Leontief technology at the micro level, extends to the case where firms have
generalized Leontief cost functions and U shaped cost curves.
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[CITATION] Pareto optimal allocations of non-convex economies in locally convex spaces/1373

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MA Khan, R Vohra - 1987 - ideals.illinois.edu
Abstract. We extend the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics to economies
with non-convex production sets, public goods and with an ordered locally convex space of
commodities. Our work, applies the hypertangent cone to this problem and ...
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Efficiency in an Economy with Fixed Costs: A Sequential Approach

A Dall'Olio… - 1998 - mendeley.com
Abstract It is by now well known that in an economy with increasing returns, first-best
efficiency may be impossible to attain through an equilibrium concept based on market
prices, even if firms are regulated to follow marginal cost pricing. We examine the ...
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[HTML] NHS Evidence

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R Vohra - library.nhs.uk
Carotid endarterectomy (CEA), usually with a patch, has been the cornerstone of treatment
of symptomatic carotid stenosis over the last three decades. This is based on the results of
two major trials-ECST 1 and NASCET 2 conducted in Europe and the USA. Since the ...
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[CITATION] On the Existence of Lindahl and Lindahl--Hotelling Equilibria

MA Khan, R Vohra… - 1987 - College of Commerce and Business …
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Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium Implementation

R Vohra… - Econometric Society 2004 North American …, 2004 - ideas.repec.org
Multiplicity of Mixed Bayesian Equilibria in Mechanisms Roberto Serrano and Rajiv Vohra
The literature on implementation with incomplete information has often left out the
consideration of mixed-strategy equilibria. This is particularly problematic for a research ...
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[PDF] A Consistent Bargainin

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K SENGUPTA… - JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1989 - Citeseer
Both the core and the bargaining set fail to satisfy a natural requirement of consistency. In
excluding imputations to which there exist objections, the core does not assess the
“credibility” of such objections. The bargaining set goes a step further. Only objections ...
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[CITATION] NBER General Equilibrium Conference

R Vohra - Economics Bulletin, 2001 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks.
NBER General Equilibrium Conference. Rajiv Vohra (). Economics Bulletin, 2001, vol.
28, issue 27, pages A0. Date: 2001 Track citations by RSS feed. ...
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The supremum argument in the new approach to the existence of equilibrium in vector lattices

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MA Khan, R Tourky… - Economics Letters, 1999 - Elsevier
In this note, we present conditions under which the supremum argument of Mas-Colell and
Richard (1991) is not needed in the proof of the second fundamental theorem of welfare
economics, and thereby in the proof of the existence of competitive equilibrium in infinite- ...
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Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core

R Vohra, B Dutta - … University Economics Working Paper No. 2003 …, 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: An appropriate (interim) notion of the core for an economy with incomplete
information depends on the amount of information that coalitions can share. The coarse and
fine core, as originally defined by Wilson (1978), correspond to two polar cases, involving ...
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[CITATION] Published in Econometrica, 69,(2001), 1685-1696 On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information

R Serrano, R Vohra…
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[CITATION] On the existence of Lindahl and Lindahl--Hotelling equilibria/1375

[PDF] from illinois.edu
MA Khan, R Vohra - 1987 - ideals.illinois.edu
Abstract: We consider an economy characterized by the simultaneous presence of public
goods and many increasing returns to scalefirms. We formalize a notion of equilibrium,
termed a Lindahl-Hotelling equilibrium, in which producer prices are marginal cost prices ...
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[CITATION] Strategy, Competition, and Cooperation Saturday March 10, 2012

R Vohra - 2012 - vanderbilt.edu
... Professor Alethea Barbaro, UCLA Professor Glenn Ellison, MIT Professor Andrew Lo, MIT
Professor Rajiv Vohra, Brown University Attendance is free and open to all Registration is required
Now accepting applications for short talks and posters from undergraduates ...
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Incomplete Information

D Bhaskar, V Rajiv - ukpmc.ac.uk
An appropriate (interim) notion of the core for an economy withincomplete information
depends on the amount of information that coalitionscan share. The coarse and fine core, as
originally defined by Wilson (1978), correspond to two polar cases, involving no ...
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Course Overview

R Vohra - Economics, 1860 - econ.brown.edu
General Equilibrium Theory studies the allocation of resources resulting from the interaction
of several economic agents (consumers and producers). The analysis considers all
commodities and all agents simultaneously. In a free market economy, which is the main ...
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