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Moral hazard and observability

[PDF] from duke.edu
B Hölmstrom - The Bell Journal of Economics, 1979 - JSTOR
Page 1. Moral hazard and observability Bengt Holmstrom Swedish School of
Economics and Business Administration The role of imperfect information in a
principal-agent relationship subject to moral hazard is considered. A ...
Cited by 5727 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 40 versions

Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design

[PDF] from edegan.com
B Holmstrom, P Milgrom - JL Econ. & Org., 1991 - HeinOnline
In the standard economic treatment of the principal-agent problem, compensation systems
serve the dual function of allocating risks and rewarding productive work. A tension between
these two functions arises when the agent is risk averse, for providing the agent with ...
Cited by 3931 - Related articles - Library Search - All 32 versions

Moral hazard in teams

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
B Holmstrom - The Bell Journal of Economics, 1982 - JSTOR
This article studies moral hazard with many agents. The focus is on two features that are
novel in a multiagent setting: free riding and competition. The free-rider problem implies a
new role for the principal: administering incentive schemes that do not balance the budget ...
Cited by 3893 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 37 versions

Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives

[PDF] from yale.edu
B Holmstrom, P Milgrom - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric …, 1987 - JSTOR
We consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant
absolute risk aversion. The optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of
a vector of N accounts which count the number of times that each of the N kinds of ...
Cited by 2029 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 22 versions

Managerial incentive problems: A dynamic perspective

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B Holmström - Review of Economic Studies, 1999 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. Review of Economic Studies (1999) 66, 169–182 0034-65279900090169
$02.00 © 1999 The Review of Economic Studies Limited Managerial Incentive
Problems: A Dynamic Perspective BENGT HOLMSTRO ¨ M MIT ...
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Financial intermediation, loanable funds, and the real sector

[PDF] from oxfordjournals.org
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B Holmstrom, J Tirole - the Quarterly Journal of economics, 1997 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We study an incentive model of financial intermediation in which firms as well as
intermediaries are capital constrained. We analyze how the distribution of wealth across
firms, intermediaries, and uninformed investors affects investment, interest rates, and the ...
Cited by 1595 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 24 versions

[BOOK] The theory of contracts

[PDF] from fudan.edu.cn
O Hart, B Holmström… - 1986 - econ.fudan.edu.cn
Page 1. Page 2. -- CHAPTER 3 The theory of contracts Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmstrom
lntroduction The past decade has witnessed a growing interest in contract theories of various
kinds. ... Page 3. 72 Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmstrom by and covering a small number of people. ...
Cited by 1455 - Related articles - View as HTML - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 9 versions

The firm as an incentive system

[PDF] from edegan.com
B Holmstrom, P Milgrom - The American Economic Review, 1994 - JSTOR
We explore the twin hypotheses (i) that high-performance incentives, worker ownership of
assets, and worker freedom from direct controls are complementary instruments for
motivating workers, and (ii) that such instruments can be expected to covary positively in ...
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The theory of the firm

[PDF] from edegan.com
BR Holmstrom… - 1989 - books.google.com
Page 214. 8 The theory of the firm Bengt Holmstrom and Jean Tirole I. INTRODUCTION
The theory of the firm has long posed a problem for economists. While substantial
progress has been made on the description and analysis ...
Cited by 982 - Related articles - All 10 versions

Market liquidity and performance monitoring

[PDF] from colorado.edu
B Holmström, J Tirole - Journal of Political Economy, 1993 - JSTOR
Page 1. Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring Bengt Holmstrom Yale University
and Helsinki School of Economics Jean Tirole Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Institut d'Economie Industrielle, and Centre d'Enseignement ...
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The boundaries of the firm revisited

[PDF] from stanford.edu
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B Holmström… - The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1998 - JSTOR
... The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited Bengt Holmstrom and John Roberts W ^ thy do firms exist? ...
In the process, the focus of * Bengt Holmstrom is Paul A. Samuelson Professor of Economics,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts. ...
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Private and public supply of liquidity

[PDF] from uclouvain.be
B Holmstrom, J Tirole - 1996 - nber.org
This paper addresses a basic yet unresolved question: Do claims on private assets provide
sufficient liquidity for an efficient functioning of the productive sector? Or does the State have
a role in creating liquidity and regulating it either through adjustments in the stock of ...
Cited by 819 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 23 versions

A theory of wage dynamics

[PDF] from kelloggexecutives.com
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M Harris… - The Review of Economic …, 1982 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract A dynamic, equilibrium model of long term (implicit) labour contracts under
incomplete but symmetric information is developed. Workers are assumed to be risk averse
and of unknown ability or productivity. Risk neutral firms learn, as do workers, about each ...
Cited by 705 - Related articles - All 23 versions

The internal economics of the firm: Evidence from personnel data

[PDF] from oxfordjournals.org
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G Baker, M Gibbs… - The Quarterly Journal of …, 1994 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We analyze twenty years of personnel data from one firm. The hierarchical structure
is quite simple and stable. Career movements suggest that the employee's rate of learning
and the firm's learning about ability are important. There are promotion “fast tracks.” Exit ...
Cited by 664 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 18 versions

Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the US: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s

[PDF] from unimedia.ac.id
B Holmstrom… - 2001 - nber.org
This paper describes and considers explanations for changes in corporate governance and
merger activity in the United States since 1980. Corporate governance in the 1980s was
dominated by intense merger activity distinguished by the prevalence of leveraged ...
Cited by 626 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 45 versions

Efficient and durable decision rules with incomplete information

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
B Holmström… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric …, 1983 - JSTOR
Page 1. Econometrica, Vol. 51, No. 6 (November, 1983) EFFICIENT AND DURABLE
DECISION RULES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION BY BENGT HOLMSTROM
AND ROGER B. MYERSON1 We compare six concepts ...
Cited by 588 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 15 versions

The wage policy of a firm

[PDF] from oxfordjournals.org
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G Baker, M Gibbs… - The Quarterly Journal of …, 1994 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract Salary data from a single firm are analyzed in an effort to identify the firm's wage
policy. We find that employees are partly shielded against changes in external market
conditions; that wage variation within a job level is large both cross-sectionally and for ...
Cited by 542 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 15 versions

The firm as a subeconomy

[PDF] from unimedia.ac.id
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B Holmstrom - Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1999 - Oxford Univ Press
Abstract This article explores the economic role of the firm in a market economy. The
analysis begins with a discussion and critique of the property rights approach to the theory of
the firm as exposited in the recent work by Hart and Moore ('Property Rights and the ...
Cited by 540 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 18 versions

Managerial incentives and capital management

[PDF] from oxfordjournals.org
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B Holmstrom, JR i Costa - The Quarterly Journal of …, 1986 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract The paper shows how career concerns rather than effort aversion can induce a
natural incongruity in risk preferences between managers and superiors. A model, based on
learning about managerial talent, is developed to study second-best contractual remedies. ...
Cited by 497 - Related articles - Library Search - All 13 versions

Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships

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D Fudenberg, B Holmstrom… - Journal of economic theory, 1990 - Elsevier
Abstract Long-term contracts are valuable only if optimal contracting requires commitment to
a plan today that would not otherwise be adopted tomorrow. We show that commitments are
unnecessary, and hence short-term contracts are sufficient if (1) all public information can ...
Cited by 443 - Related articles - All 13 versions

Agency costs and innovation

Full text - MIT Libraries
B Holmstrom - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1989 - Elsevier
Abstract Stylized facts indicate that small firms are responsible for a disproportionate share
of innovative research. There are many possible explanations for this fact. The paper seeks
to understand this phenomenon as the outcome of an optimal assignment of tasks across ...
Cited by 416 - Related articles - Library Search - All 8 versions

Regulating trade among agents

[PDF] from gu.se
B Holmström, P Milgrom - … of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) …, 1990 - JSTOR
Page 1. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) 146 (1990), 85
105 Zeitschrift ür die gesamte Staatswissenschaft Regulating Trade Among Agents*
by Bengt Holmström and Paul Milgrom /. Introduction Our ...
Cited by 348 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 6 versions

The state of US corporate governance: what's right and what's wrong?

[PDF] from colorado.edu
B Holmstrom… - 2003 - nber.org
The US corporate governance system has recently been heavily criticized, largely as a result
of failures at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and some other prominent companies. Those failures
and criticisms, in turn, have served as catalysts for legislative change (Sarbanes-Oxley Act ...
Cited by 323 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 38 versions

LAPM: A liquidity-based asset pricing model

[PDF] from ntt.edu.vn
B Holmstrom, J Tirole - 1998 - nber.org
The intertemporal CAPM predicts that an asset's price is equal to the expectation of the
product of the asset's payoff and a representative consum substitution. This paper develops
an alternative approach to asset pricing based on industrial and financial corporations' ...
Cited by 281 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 25 versions

Transfer pricing and organizational form

[PDF] from unimedia.ac.id
B Holmstrom, J Tirole - JL Econ. & Org., 1991 - HeinOnline
The transfer pricing issue is typically portrayed as a problem of finding the price or pricing
schedule that comes closest to inducing an efficient level of trade between two divisions of a
firm. The solution is easy if there is a competitive market that can provide a relevant price ...
Cited by 266 - Related articles - Library Search - All 10 versions

Groves' scheme on restricted domains

B Holmström - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1979 - JSTOR
... Page 4. 1140 BENGT HOLMSTROM dimensional parametrized family of valuation
functions in Vi: Vi(vi, vi ) = {vi(d; yi) Ez Vi I yi Ez [0, 111, such that for all d E D (i) vi(d;
0) =vi(d), GOi vi (d; 1)=- vi(d), ... Page 6. 1142 BENGT HOLMSTROM ...
Cited by 235 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 7 versions

The investment banking contract for new issues under asymmetric information: Delegation and the incentive problem

DP Baron… - Journal of Finance, 1980 - JSTOR
Page 1. THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE * VOL. XXXV, NO 5 * DECEMBER 1980 The Investment
Banking Contract For New Issues Under Asymmetric Information: Delegation And The Incentive
Problem DAVID P. BARON AND BENGT HOLMSTROM* ABSTRACT ...
Cited by 212 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 7 versions

Equilibrium long-term labor contracts

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
B Holmstrom - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1983 - JSTOR
The paper presents a labor market equilibrium analysis of implicit contract theory. A two-
period, single-good model is used to propose consistent notions of labor market equilibrium
for long-term employment contracts both when labor is specialized and cannot move in ...
Cited by 183 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 15 versions

A theory of firm scope

[PDF] from oxfordjournals.org
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O Hart, B Holmstrom - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2010 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract The formal literature on firm boundaries has assumed that ex post conflicts are
resolved through bargaining. In reality, parties often simply exercise their decision rights. We
develop a model, based on shading, in which the use of authority has a central role. We ...
Cited by 170 - Related articles - Library Search - All 45 versions

[CITATION] On incentives and control in organizations

BR Holmström - 1977 - Stanford University
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To The Raider Goes The Surplus? A Reexaminationof the Free‐Rider Problem

[PDF] from yale.edu
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B Holmström… - Journal of Economics & …, 1992 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. TO THE RAIDER GOES THE SURPLUS? A REEXAMINATION OF THE FREE-RIDER
PROBLEM BENGT HOLMSTROM AND BARRY NALEBUFF School of Organization and
Management Yale University Box ZA, Yale Sfation N m Haven, CT 06520 ...
Cited by 143 - Related articles - All 9 versions

Contractual models of the labor market

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
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B Holmstrom - The American Economic Review, 1981 - JSTOR
In this paper I discuss some approaches to modelling labor markets as contractually
mediated. The central thesis of such models is that due to market imperfections-absence of
contingent claims for labor and income-wage mediated auction markets will in general not ...
Cited by 115 - Related articles - Library Search - All 13 versions

Internal labor markets: Too many theories, too few facts

Full text - MIT Libraries
G Baker… - The American Economic Review, 1995 - JSTOR
That firms employ internal labor markets, in which wages and careers are partly shielded
from the vagaries of external labor markets, seems well accepted. Yet, Peter Doeringer and
Michael Piore's (1985) seminal work on internal labor markets has had a rather limited ...
Cited by 110 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 7 versions

Liquidity and risk management

[PDF] from utdallas.edu
B Holmström, J Tirole - Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2000 - JSTOR
... BANKING T,E,CTURE Liquidity and Risk Management BENGT HOLMSTROM JEAN TIROLE ...
The authors are grateful to the participants for helpful comments. BENGT HOLMSTROM is Paul
A. Samuelson Professor of Economics at MIT. E-mail: bengt@mit.edu. ...
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The provision of services in a market economy

B Holmstrom - Cambridge University Press, London, 1985 - books.google.com
Services are unlike goods in many regards. Some differences that appear economically
relevant are the following: Services are not storable; service quality is difficult to measure or
observe; the appropriateness of a service may be difficult to verify; service technology is ...
Cited by 105 - Related articles - Library Search

On the duration of agreements

Full text - MIT Libraries
M Harris… - International Economic Review, 1987 - JSTOR
Most observed contracts have an explicitly specified, finite duration. 2 This is an empirical
regularity which applies not only to contracts among factors of production (eg, employment
contracts and leases), but also to many financial contracts (eg, bonds and options). ...
Cited by 77 - Related articles - All 6 versions

Pay without performance and the managerial power hypothesis: A comment

[PDF] from uiowa.edu
B Holmström - 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Page 1. Pay without Performance and the Managerial Power Hypothesis: A Comment
Bengt Holmstrom* Abstract ... 236089. Bengt Holmstrom, Managerial Incentive
Programs—A Dynamic Perspective, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 169 (1999). ...
Cited by 75 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 11 versions

Modeling aggregate liquidity

Full text - MIT Libraries
B Holmstrom, J Tirole - The American Economic Review, 1996 - JSTOR
The possibility that monetary policy can influence real activity through a credit channel has
received wide attention recently (see eg, Ben Bemanke et al., 1994). The presence of a
credit channel presumes that financial markets are imperfect in a way that makes the ...
Cited by 68 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 7 versions

Managerial incentives, investment and aggregate implications: Scale effects

[PDF] from kelloggexecutives.com
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B Holmstrom… - The Review of Economic Studies, 1985 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We explore a managerial model of investment behaviour in which an incentive
problem arises because one input factor (managerial effort) is not publicly observed. We
show that an optimal incentive contract leads to investment levels which are below first- ...
Cited by 53 - Related articles - Library Search - All 11 versions

[CITATION] Hierarchies and compensation: A case study

Full text - MIT Libraries
G Baker, M Gibbs… - European Economic Review, 1993 - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of
further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site ...
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Design of incentive schemes and the new Soviet incentive model

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
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B Holmstrom - European Economic Review, 1982 - Elsevier
The paper investigates the New Soviet Incentive Scheme and managerial target-setting in a
general framework of incentive scheme design. The New Soviet Incentive Scheme is an
example of delegation of decision-making responsibility due to asymmetrically informed ...
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Financing of investment in Eastern Europe: A theoretical perspective

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B Holmström - Industrial and Corporate Change, 1996 - Oxford Univ Press
... Europe: A Theoretical Perspective BENGT HOLMSTROM (Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Department of Economics and Sloan School of Management, and Institute for Policy Reform, USA)
Eastern Europe suffers from a worsening capital shortage problem. ...
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[BOOK] Inside and outside liquidity

[PDF] from queensu.ca
B Holmström, J Tirole - 2011 - books.google.com
Page 1. INSIDE AND OUTSIDE LIQUIDITY Bengt Holmström and Jean Tirole Page 2. Inside
and Outside Liquidity Page 3. Page 4. Inside and Outside Liquidity Bengt Holmström and Jean
Tirole The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England Page 5. ...
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[CITATION] The Nordic model-embracing globalization and sharing risks

TM Andersen, B Holmström, S Honkapohja… - 2007 - ETLA Helsinki
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[PDF] Vision and firm scope

[PDF] from cepr.org.uk
O Hart, B Holmstrom - Unpublished manuscript, 2002 - cepr.org.uk
Abstract The existing literature on firms, based on incomplete contracts and property rights,
emphasizes that the ownership of assets--and thereby firm boundaries--is determined in
such a way as to encourage relationship-specific investments by the appropriate parties. It ...
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[CITATION] Contracts and the market for executives: comment

B Holmstrom - Contract economics, 1992
Cited by 36 - Related articles

[CITATION] The theory of contracts

B Holmstrom, O Hart - advances in economic theory, Fifth World Congress, …, 1987
Cited by 28 - Related articles

[CITATION] Incentive compensation: Practical design from a theory point of view

B Holmstrom - Incentives, cooperation, and risk sharing, 1987
Cited by 24 - Related articles

[PDF] Opacity and the optimality of debt for liquidity provision

[PDF] from upenn.edu
TV Dang, G Gorton… - Work In Progress, 2009 - finance.wharton.upenn.edu
Abstract Asymmetric information can reduce trade (possibly to zero) due to adverse
selection. Symmetric information can facilitate trade. We show that trade between agents is
maximized, and welfare highest, when neither party to a transaction has any information ...
Cited by 27 - Related articles - View as HTML - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 11 versions

[CITATION] Corporate Governance and Takeovers in the US: Making Sense of the 80s and 90s

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B Holmstrom, S Kaplan - Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2001
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[CITATION] Ability, performance and wage differentials

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M Harris… - Review of Economic Studies, 1982
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[CITATION] Imperfect markets for power: competition and residual regulation in the electricity industry

P Joskow, B Holmström, TO Nasser - 1997 - dspace.mit.edu
Page 1. Page 2. Page 3. Page 4. Page 5. Page 6. Page 7. Page 8. Page 9. Page 10. Page 11.
Page 12. Page 13. Page 14. Page 15. Page 16. Page 17. Page 18. Page 19. Page 20. Page
21. Page 22. Page 23. Page 24. Page 25. Page 26. Page 27. Page 28. Page 29. Page 30. Page ...
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[CITATION] Observability and moral hazard

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B Holmstrom - Bell Journal of Economics, 1979
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[CITATION] Handbook of Industrial Organization

B Holmstrom, J Tirole, R Schmalensee… - The Theory of the Firm, 1989
Cited by 18 - Related articles

[CITATION] Common agency and exclusive dealing

B Holmström, P Milgrom - Yale School of Management, Connecticut. Processed, 1988
Cited by 17 - Related articles

Domestic and international supply of liquidity

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B Holmstrom, J Tirole - The American Economic Review, 2002 - JSTOR
In an earlier paper (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998) we offered a simple model of aggregate
liquidity shortages. Because firms cannot pledge their full income stream to investors, the
collateral base of the economy may be too small to support an optimal long-term ...
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[CITATION] Corporate control and the monitoring role of the stock market

B Holmström - 1990 - Yale School of Organization and …
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[CITATION] J. Tirole (1991)." Transfer Pricing and Organizational Form

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B Holmstrom, P Milgrom - Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
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The dangers of too much governance

B Holmstrom… - MIT Sloan Management Review, 2003 - mendeley.com
Abstract Corporate governance problems call for safeguards, but not to the point of hobbling
risk taking and economic growth. Consider the US economy over the past 10 years. The
bursting of the stock market's bubble followed years of corporate restructuring and ...
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[CITATION] The Theory ofContracts

O Hart, B Holmstrom - Advances in …, 1987 - Cam bridge: Cambridge University …
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[CITATION] Discussion of" The Panic of 2007" by Gary Gorton

B Holmström - Organization, 2008 - mendeley.com
... By Bengt Holmstrom, MIT Professor Gorton has given us an exceptionally informative picture
of the nuclear core of the financial crisis – the fragile structure of subprime mortgage-backed
securitization and the chain of derivatives built on top of it. ...
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[CITATION] Moral Hazard in Teams, the Bell Journal of Economics

B Holmstrom - Vol, 1982
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[CITATION] On the duration of agreements

M Harris… - 1983 - Institute for Mathematical Studies in …
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[PDF] Financial Crises and the Optimality of Debt for Liquidity Provision

[PDF] from psu.edu
TV Dang, G Gorton… - Unpublished working paper. Yale …, 2010 - Citeseer
Page 1. 1 Preliminary; Comments Welcome Financial Crises and the Optimality of Debt
for Liquidity Provision+ Tri Vi Dang Mannheim and Yale Gary Gorton Yale and NBER
Bengt Holmström MIT and NBER This Draft: May 15, 2010 Abstract ...
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[CITATION] Examples for and questions about: An Economic (?) Theory of Promises

B Holmström… - 1995 - mimeo
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[CITATION] Wicksell lectures: Inside and outside liquidity

B Holmstrom, J Tirole - 2008 - Forthcoming
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[CITATION] Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of

B Holmstrom, P Milgrom - 1987
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[CITATION] Commentary: The panic of 2007

B Holmstrom - Maintaining Stability in a Changing Financial System, 2008
Cited by 6 - Related articles

[CITATION] Theory of the firm. Handbook for Industrial Organization, Volume 1, 1989. Edited by Richard Schmalensee and Robert D. Willig

B Holmstrom, J Tirole - Elsevier Press
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Why are the wages of job stayers procyclical?

Full text - MIT Libraries
D Shin, K Shin, JG Altonji… - Macroeconomic …, 2008 - Cambridge Univ Press
This paper explains how real wages are procyclical for those who stay with the same
employer. On the basis of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics data for the period from 1974–
1975 to 1990–1991, we find that the substantial wage procyclicality among job stayers is ...
Cited by 6 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 5 versions

[CITATION] The Economics of Corporate Governance

B Holmström - Third Louise and Göran Ehrnrooth Lectures, Swedish …, 1999
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[CITATION] Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the US

H Bengt… - Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2001
Cited by 5 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries

Discussion of economically optimal performance evaluation and control systems

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BR Holmström - Journal of Accounting Research, 1980 - JSTOR
Page 1. Journal of Accounting Research Vol. 18 Supplement 1980 Printed in USA
Discussion of Economically Optimal Performance Evaluation and Control Systems
BENGT R. HOLMSTROM* Recent developments in agency ...
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[CITATION] Agency costs and innovation

B Holmstrom, D Czarnitzki, K Kraft… - RH Day et al., The …, 1993 - en.scientificcommons.org
deutsch english. Publikationsansicht. 17367594. Agency costs and innovation. Holmstrom, Bengt.
Details der Publikation. Download, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V8F-45R2H3Y-
3/2/27f45bdcf9c16f07ab258b80fa490304. Archiv, RePEc (Germany). Typ, article. ...
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[CITATION] Ignorance and the Optimality of Debt for Liquidity Provision

TV Dang, G Gorton… - 2011 - Working Paper, Yale University
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[CITATION] Moral hazard and observability

B Holmstrom - International Library of Critical …, 1999 - EDWARD ELGAR PUBLISHING LTD
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[PDF] Ignorance and the Optimality of Debt for the Provision of Liquidity

[PDF] from mit.edu
TV Dang, G Gorton… - Unpublished manustcript, 2009 - sloanweb.mit.edu
Page 1. 1 Preliminary; Comments Welcome Ignorance and the Optimality of Debt for the
Provision of Liquidity+ Tri Vi Dang Mannheim and Yale Gary Gorton Yale and NBER Bengt
Holmström MIT and NBER This Draft: December 17, 2009 Abstract ...
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[CITATION] A theory of firm scope

H Oliver… - 2002
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Microeconomic Developments and Macroeconomics

Full text - MIT Libraries
M Harris… - The American Economic Review, 1983 - JSTOR
We explore the implications of contract theory with regard to the effectiveness of aggregate
economic policy. More specifically, we consider the relationship between contractually
induced price rigidities and monetary policy. In examining this relationship, we restrict ...
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[CITATION] 979.“Moral Hazard and Observability.”

B Hölmstrom - Bell Journal of Economics
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[CITATION] On Decentralization, Incentives and Control

B Holmström - 1977 - Graduate School of Business, …
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[CITATION] Authority, Compensation and Ownership: The Firm as an Incentive System

B Holmstrom, P Milgrom - forthcoming in the American Economic Review, 1993
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[CITATION] The Theory of the Firm Revisited

Full text - MIT Libraries
B Holmstrom… - J. Econ. Persp., 1998
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[CITATION] Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset

B Holmstrom, P Milgrom - Ownership, and Job Design, JL ECON. & ORG., …, 1991
Cited by 4 - Related articles

[CITATION] On incentives and control in organizations Ph. D

B Holmstrom - 1977 - thesis, Stanford University
Cited by 4 - Related articles

[CITATION] The State of US Corporate Governance: What's Right and What's Wrong?, 15 J

B Holmstrom, S Kaplan - Applied Corp. Fin, 2003
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[CITATION] Measurement Costs and Organization Theory

B Holmstrom, P Milgrom - 1992 - Yale Working Paper Series
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[CITATION] Measurement Costs and Organization Theory: The Firm as a Cluster of Attributes

B Holmström, PR Milgrom… - 1992 - Yale School of Organization and …
Cited by 4 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search

[CITATION] Vision and Scope of the Firm

O Hart, B Holmstrom - unpublished typescript, Harvard and MIT, 2002
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[CITATION] Corporate Governance and Structural Change Challenges to European Corporate Ownership and Control

B Erik, B Holmström, P Högfeldt, EM Milgrom… - SNS Economic Policy …, 2003
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[CITATION] nThe Firm as Incentive System, oAmerican Economic Review, 84

B Holmström, P Milgrom - $991, 1994
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[CITATION] Repeated Moral Hazard with Borrowing and Saving: The Exponential Case

D Fudenberg, B Holmstrom… - 1986 - draft
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[CITATION] Comments on Contracts and the Market for Executives

B Holmstrom - Contract Economics, Blackwell, Cambridge, …, 1992
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[CITATION] Managerial Vision and Firm Scope

O Hart, B Holmström - 2002 - mimeo
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[CITATION] Repo Haircuts: No Title Yet

TV Dang, G Gorton… - 2010 - forthcoming working paper
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[CITATION] nA Theory of Wage Dynamics, oReview of Economic Studies

H Milton, B Holmstrom - Vol, 1982
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[CITATION] A Study of an Internal Labor Market

G Baker, M Gibbs… - 1992 - mimeo, CRDE Conference on …
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[CITATION] mOn the Theory of Delegationn

B Holmstrom - Bayesian Models in Economic Theory, Studies in …, 1984
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[PDF] Managerial Incentives, Investment, and Aggregate Implications. Part I. Scale Effects

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
B Holmstrom… - Mimeographed. Evanston, Ill.: …, 1982 - kellogg.northwestern.edu
Abstract: We explore a managerial model of investment behavior in which an incentive
problem arises because one input factor (managerial effort) is not publicly observed. We
show that an optimal incentive contract leads to investment levels which are below first- ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - All 9 versions

[CITATION] Multi-Task Principal-Agent Problems

B Holmstrom, P Milgrom - Yale School of Organization and Management, 1989
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