D Quint… - Economics Letters, 2005 - Elsevier
We present a dynamic entry game, in which entry costs become sunk gradually. In
equilibrium the most profitable firms enter, as they commit faster not to exit. This rationalizes
an equilibrium selection assumption often employed in the empirical entry literature.
D Quint - Economics Letters, 2008 - Elsevier
In private-value ascending auctions, the winner's willingness to pay is not observed, leading
to underidentification of many econometric models. I calculate tight bounds on expected
revenue and optimal reserve price for the case of symmetric and affiliated private values.
L Boerner… - 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper studies the market microstructure of pre-industrial Europe. In particular
we investigate the institution of the broker in markets and fairs, and develop a unique data
set of approximately 1100 sets of brokerage rules in 42 merchant towns in Central and ...
G Caruana, L Einav… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
This paper presents a new non-cooperative approach to multilateral bargaining. We
consider a demand game with the following additional ingredients:(i) there is an exogenous
deadline, by which bargaining has to end;(ii) prior to the deadline, players may ...
Abstract This paper empirically studies the consequences of unobserved heterogeneity on
auction design. Unobserved heterogeneity in the objects for sale induces correlation among
bidders' valuations, which violates the standard modeling assumption of independence. ...
Abstract We introduce and apply a new nonparametric approach to identification and
inference on data from ascending auctions. We exploit variation in the number of bidders
across auctions to nonparametrically identify and estimate useful bounds on seller profit ...
D Quint - Discussion Papers, 2009 - ssc.wisc.edu
Abstract. Several recent technological standards have been accompanied by patent pools–
arrangements to license multiple patentholders' relevant intellectual property as a package.
A key distinction made by regulators–between patents essential to a standard and patents ...
D Quint - 2010 - ssc.wisc.edu
Abstract. I study price competition in settings where end products are combinations of
components supplied by different monopolists, nesting standard models of perfect
complements and imperfect substitutes. I show sufficient conditions for a discrete-choice ...
[CITATION] Common-value Auctions with two bidders
D Quint - 2006 - Stanford University, Department of …
D Quint - 2009 - ssc.wisc.edu
Abstract. Several recent technological standards were accompanied by patent pools–
arrangements to license relevant intellectual property as a package. A key distinction made
by regulators–between patents essential to a standard and patents with substitutes–has ...
Y Lien… - 2011 - ylien.com
Abstract We examine two-bidder sealed-bid auctions for two objects, one more valuable
than the other, and unit demand. The auction has a single “aggregate” reserve price, which
must be met by the combination of winning bids, and each bidder can bid on both objects ...
D Quint - 2008 - ssc.wisc.edu
In private-value ascending auctions, the winning bidder's willingness to pay is not observed.
Under assumptions weaker than independent private values, the joint distribution of bidder
valuations is not identified (see Athey and Haile (2002)), so the expected revenue at a ...
D Quint - Economic Theory, 2010 - Springer
Abstract I compare the value of information acquired secretly with information acquired
openly prior to a first-price common-value auction. Novel information (information which is
independent of the other bidder's private information) is more valuable when learned ...
Abstract When unobserved heterogeneity across auctions induces correlation in bidder
valuations, the assumptions of the “standard model” are violated and ascending auctions
are underidentified. We develop techniques to identify the relevant primitives when bidder ...
Y Lien… - Environment, 2011 - ssc.wisc.edu
We are in the environment of Lien and Quint (2011). There are two objects for sale, one
large and one small. There are two bidders, with types ti which are independent and drawn
from the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. A bidder with type ti values the big object at U (ti) ...
Applying the insights from the theory of auctions to real world settings requires an empirical
knowledge of the primitives that define the game being played by bidders. In the case of
private value auctions, a key primitive of interest is the latent distribution of private values ...
A Gandhi… - 2009 - stanford.edu
The combined assumptions that the number of bidders participating in an auction is
independent of the characteristics of the auction itself, and that the bidders have symmetric
and independently distributed private values, play a critical role in the classical theory of ...
[CITATION] THE EFFECT OF CORRELATION ON OPTIMAL PRIVATE-VALUE ASCENDING AUCTIONS
D Quint - 2007
C van Bochove, L Boerner… - econstor.eu
Zusammenfassung: This paper studies Anglo-Dutch premium auctions used in the
secondary market for financial securities in eighteenth-century Amsterdam, Europe's
financial capital at the time. An Anglo-Dutch premium auction consists of an English ...
D Quint… - 2009 - ssc.wisc.edu
Abstract A central question in the bargaining literature is the identification of potential causes
of inefficiency, either due to delays or to failure to realize all potential gains from trade. A key
source of the latter type of inefficiency is the existence of private information. We study ...
L Boerner, C Van Bochove… - 2012 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper studies Anglo-Dutch premium auctions used in the secondary market
for financial securities in eighteenth-century Amsterdam, Europe's financial capital at the
time. An Anglo-Dutch premium auction consists of an English auction followed by a Dutch ...
D Quint - 2007 - gradworks.umi.com
Abstract: I model a number of multi-player strategic environments, and examine the effects of
market structure, information, and inference on the prices that are realized in equilibrium. I
present a theoretical model of patent pools in a setting with a single core technology with ...
[CITATION] Nonparametric Testing in Auctions: Are Private Values Really Independent?
Y Lien… - Environment, 2011 - ssc.wisc.edu
We are in the environment of Lien and Quint (2011). There are two objects for sale, one
large and one small. There are two bidders, with types ti which are independent and drawn
from the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. A bidder with type ti values the big object at U (ti) ...
C van Bochove… - 2012 - wiwiss.fu-berlin.de
Abstract. This paper studies Anglo-Dutch premium auctions used in the secondary market
for financial securities in eighteenth-century Amsterdam, Europe's financial capital at the
time. An Anglo-Dutch premium auction consists of an English auction followed by a Dutch ...
[CITATION] COMMON-VALUE AUCTIONS WITH TWO BIDDERS: WHEN TO BRAG ABOUT WHAT YOU KNOW
D Quint - 2008
Abstract In this paper, we introduce and apply an approach to testing independence of
values in standard auction settings. We show that the widely-used assumption that private
values are independent (IPV) has testable implications in both first-price and English ...
[CITATION] Bidding Reversals in a Multiple-Good Auction with Global Reserve Price
Y Lien… - 2008
PD McSwiggen, PL Bowers, D Suárez, D Quint… - 1998 - projecteuclid.org
... New cases of almost periodic factorization of triangular matrix functions. Daniel
Quint, Leiba Rodman and Ilya M. Spitkovsky; 73-102. ...
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