 | Professor of Economics, UCSD Verified email at ucsd.edu Cited by 13355 |
When people make donations to privately provided public goods, such as charity, there may
be many factors influencing their decisions other than altruism. As Olson (i965)
noted,'people are sometimes motivated by a desire to win prestige, respect, friendship, ...
J Andreoni - The Journal of Political Economy, 1989 - JSTOR
Models of giving have often been based on altruism. Examples include charity and
intergenerational transfers. The literatures on both subjects have centered around neutrality
hypotheses: charity is subject to complete crowding out, while intergenerational transfers ...
J Andreoni, B Erard… - Journal of economic literature, 1998 - JSTOR
The problem of tax compliance is as old as taxes themselves. Characterizing and explaining
the observed patterns of tax noncompliance, and ultimately finding ways to reduce it, are of
obvious importance to nations around the world. The economics of tax compliance can be ...
J Andreoni… - Econometrica, 2002 - Wiley Online Library
Subjects in economic laboratory experiments have clearly expressed an interest in behaving
unselfishly. They cooperate in prisoners' dilemma games, they give to public goods, and
they leave money on the table when bargaining. While some are tempted to call this ...
J Andreoni - Journal of Public Economics, 1988 - Elsevier
Abstract Laboratory experiments on free riding have produced mixed results. Free riding is
seldom observed with single-shot games; however, it is often approximated in finitely
repeated games. There are two prevailing hypothesis for why this is so: strategies and ...
J Andreoni - The American Economic Review, 1995 - JSTOR
The persistence of cooperation in public-goods experiments has become an important
puzzle for economists. This paper presents the first systematic attempt to separate the
hypothesis that cooperation is due to kindness, altruism, or warm-glow from the ...
J Andreoni… - The Quarterly Journal of …, 2001 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We study gender differences in altruism by examining a modified dictator game with
varying incomes and prices. Our results indicate that the question “which is the fair sex?” has
a complicated answer—when altruism is expensive, women are kinder, but when it is ...
J Andreoni - Journal of Public Economics, 1988 - Elsevier
Abstract Private charity has often been modelled as a pure public good. The results reported
in this paper, however, suggest that this model of altruism fails to confirm even the broadest
empirical observations about charity. In particular, as the size of the economy grows, the ...
J Andreoni… - Journal of public economics, 2001 - Elsevier
Evidence suggests that some pollutants follow an inverse-U-shaped pattern relative to
countries' incomes, a relationship that has been called an 'environmental Kuznets curve'. We
present a simple and straight-forward static model of the microfoundations of this ...
In the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, it is well known that defection in every game is
the unique dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium. This follows from the familiar backward-
induction arguments. Kreps et al.(i 982), however, show that if there is incomplete ...
J Andreoni - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1995 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract Experiments on privately provided public goods generally find that subjects are far
more cooperative than predicted, while experiments on oligopolies and the commons almost
always obtain the Nash-equilibrium predictions, despite being very similar games. This ...
J Andreoni - The American Economic Review, 1993 - JSTOR
This paper presents an experimental test of the proposition that government contributions to
public goods, funded by lump-sum taxation, will completely crowd out voluntary
contributions. It is found that crowding-out is incomplete and that subjects who are taxed ...
J Andreoni - Journal of Political Economy, 1998 - JSTOR
Private providers of public goods, such as charities, invariably enlist fund-raisers to organize
and collect contributions. Common in charitable fund-raising is seed money, either from a
government grant or from a group of “leadership givers,” that launches the fund drive and ...
Abstract: We examine demands for rewards and punishments in a simple proposer-
responder game. The proposer first makes an offer to split a fixed-sized pie. According to the
2 x 2 design, the responder is or is not given a costly option of increasing or decreasing ...
J Andreoni… - Journal of Public Economics, 2004 - Elsevier
Laboratory researchers in economics assiduously protect the confidentiality of subjects.
Why? Presumably because they fear that the social consequences of identifying subjects
and their choices would significantly alter the economic incentives of the game. But these ...
J Andreoni… - American Economic Review, 2003 - JSTOR
Economists have long observed that crowding out of government grants to private charities
is incomplete. The accepted belief is that givers treat the grants as imperfect substitutes for
private giving. We theoretically and empirically investigate a second reason: the strategic ...
J Andreoni - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1991 - JSTOR
Models of the enforcement-compliance relationship have assumed that both the probability
and magnitude of fines are independent choice variables of policy makers. These models
indicate that it may be optimal to monitor with low frequency but to inflict uniformly maximal ...
J Andreoni… - Econometrica, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
A norm of 50–50 division appears to have considerable force in a wide range of economic
environments, both in the real world and in the laboratory. Even in settings where one party
unilaterally determines the allocation of a prize (the dictator game), many subjects ...
J Andreoni… - Handbook of experimental economics results, 2008 - Elsevier
How can an experimenter balance the desire to test a single-shot Nash equilibrium
prediction with the need for repeated experience by subjects? Simply repeating the game
with the same set of subjects may change the nature of equilibrium, since incomplete ...
J Andreoni… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1995 - Elsevier
Experiments on auctions find that subjects make systematic bidding errors that cannot be
explained within the context of Nash equilibrium bidding models. Experimenters and others
have conjectured that learning by subjects could lead to errors consistent with those ...
J Andreoni, E Brown… - Journal of Human Resources, 2003 - jhr.uwpress.org
Abstract We examine how charitable giving is influenced by who in the household is
primarily responsible for giving decisions. Looking first at single-person households, we find
men and women to have significantly different tastes for giving, setting up a potential ...
J Andreoni… - Economic Inquiry, 1998 - Wiley Online Library
Many economists and social scientists have conjectured that individual gifts to charity may
be interdependent. This paper explores empirically how an individual's charitable
contributions may be affected by the giving of others in a “reference group” of similar ...
J Andreoni - Working papers, 2000 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks.
The economics of philanthropy. James Andreoni (). No 2, Working papers from
Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems. Keywords: philanthropy ...
J Andreoni - Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract Why do charities often begin new capital fund drives by announcing a large
contribution by a single wealthy donor? This paper explores the possibility that such
“leadership giving” provides a signal to all other givers that the charity is of high quality. ...
J Andreoni, PM Brown… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2002 - Elsevier
We explore three two-person public goods games with similar equilibrium predictions, but
with different rules of the game, different payoff possibilities, and, as we show, different
choices by subjects. Comparisons among games allow inferences of what may or may not ...
J Andreoni, M Castillo… - American Economic Review, 2003 - JSTOR
The ultimatum game, by its all-or-nothing nature, makes it difficult to discern what kind of
preferences may be generating choices. We explore a game that convexifies the decisions,
allowing us a better look at the indifference curves of bargainers while maintaining the ...
J Andreoni… - Journal of Economic Psychology, 2008 - Elsevier
The existence of a beauty premium in the labor market and the male–female wage gap
suggests that appearance can matter in the real world. We explore beauty and gender in a
public goods experiment and find similar effects. We find a beauty premium, even though ...
J Andreoni - Journal of Public Economics, 1991 - Elsevier
Abstract There are two main concerns about tax amnesty. First, if it is anticipated it may
increase cheating and reduce the efficiency of the tax system. Second, amnesty may be
inequitable by letting cheaters 'off the hook'. However, several federal governments ...
J Andreoni, WG Gale, JK Scholz… - University of Wisconsin– …, 1996 - Citeseer
Charitable activities are widespread in the United States. Almost 70 percent of all
households make contributions of money and property, which in total exceed 1 percent of
GDP. Almost 40 percent of households volunteered in the month prior to a recent national ...
We study three different models in which public goods are supplied by private contributions.
In one of these models, tax-financed government subsidies to private contributions will
definitely increase the equilibrium supply of public goods. In the other two models, ...
J Andreoni… - Proceedings of the National …, 1999 - National Acad Sciences
Abstract We consider a modified Prisoners' Dilemma game in which each agent can offer to
pay the other agent to cooperate. The subgame perfect equilibrium of this two-stage game is
Pareto efficient. We examine experimentally whether subjects actually manage to achieve ...
J Andreoni… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2006 - Elsevier
Experiments have shown that people have a natural taste for cooperation. This paper takes
a first step in understanding how formal and informal institutions might be designed to utilize
these private tastes to facilitate more efficient economic interactions. We examine a twice- ...
JH Miller… - Economics Letters, 1991 - Elsevier
Abstract Free riding experiments have generated many anomalous results that cannot be
explained with standard Nash equilibrium models of public goods. This paper examines the
experiments within the context of evolutionary game theory. This approach models the ...
J Andreoni - Economic Inquiry, 1995 - Wiley Online Library
Ehrlich [1973] is perhaps the best known and most influential study of criminal deterrence.
Ehrlich's structural estimation of a three-equation simultaneous system found large and
significant direct deterrent effects of penalties on crime rates. However, recent theoretical ...
J Andreoni - Journal of Public Economics, 1992 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper considers a simple dynamic model of tax compliance in which people
may face binding borrowing constraints. The model leads to much different conclusions and
policy recommendations than static models. In particular, the government cannot generate ...
Abstract Revealed preference tests are elegant nonparametric tools that ask whether indi&
vidual or aggregate data conform to economic models of optimizing behavior. In designing a
test using revealed preference, however, one faces a vexing tension between ...
This paper studies experimentally how information about rivals' types affects bidding
behavior in first-and second-price auctions. The comparative static hypotheses associated
with information about rivals enables us to test the relevance of such information as well ...
J Andreoni… - Journal of Public Economics, 1993 - Elsevier
Abstract When a heterogeneous group of people provide themselves with a pure public
good the resulting Nash equilibrium outcome will divide the group into contributors and free
riders. This paper proposes a general algorithm for discovering which individuals in the ...
J Andreoni, JH Miller… - 1996 - levine.sscnet.ucla.edu
Abstract. This paper asks whether altruistic choices can be captured in a simple neoclassical
framework with well-behaved preferences for giving. We collect data with several different
prices of altruism and verify that 96 percent of subjects make choices that are consistent ...
J Andreoni - Journal of Public Economics, 2007 - Elsevier
When a single gift goes to a group of recipients, how does giving depend on the size of the
group? This question is important for understanding charitable giving and fund-raising,
public goods provision, family altruism, and more. If we think of the gift as giving up a ...
J Andreoni - The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. …, 2008 - elsa.berkeley.edu
• An explosion of Experimental work, especially on fundraising• Expansion of Behavioral
Economics influence on research• Both lab and field experiments have been influencing
research• Sometimes the research has outstripped the questions.• Like driving too fast for ...
Experimentally elicited discount rates are frequently higher than what one would infer from
market interest rates and seem unreasonable for economic decision-making. Such high
rates have often been attributed to present bias and hyperbolic discounting. A commonly ...
J Andreoni, WT Harbaugh… - The New Palgrave …, 2007 - altruists.org
Unlike experiments on markets or mechanisms, experiments on altruism are about an
individual motive or intention. This raises serious obstacles for research. How do we define
an altruistic act, and how do we know altruism when we see it?
Abstract Theorists and policy analysts have convincingly argued that greater trust makes a
more efficient society by reducing the need for costly contracts. At the same time, some
experiments have suggested that reciprocity is a potent substitute for law when ...
Abstract A norm of 50-50 division appears to have considerable force in a wide range of
economic environments, both in the real world and in the laboratory. Even in settings where
one party unilaterally determines the allocation of a prize (the dictator game), many ...
J Andreoni… - Journal of Public Economics, 2011 - Elsevier
When the government gives a grant to a private charitable organization, do the donors to
that organization give less? If they do, is it because the grants crowd out donors who feel
they gave through taxes (classic crowd out), or is it because the grant crowds out the ...
J Andreoni… - Handbook of experimental economics results, 2008 - Elsevier
In consumer theory, a binary preference ordering embodies three axioms of choice: it must
be complete, reflexive and transitive. If preferences adhere to these axioms, then they can
be characterized by a utility function. If preferences are well-behaved–that is, they are ...
Publikationsansicht. 4298995. Essays on private giving to public goods / (1986). Andreoni,
James. Abstract. Typescript (photocopy).. Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Michigan, 1986.. Includes
bibliographical references (leaves 93-95). Details der Publikation. ...
J Andreoni… - V De'cember 2009b. manuscript, 2010 - econ.ucsd.edu
Abstract Risk and time are intertwined. The present is known while the future is inherently
risky. This is problematic when studying time preferences since uncontrolled risk can
generate apparently present-biased behavior. We systematically manipulate risk in an ...
J Andreoni… - Journal of Public Economics, 2011 - Elsevier
To understand the “pure” incentives of altruism, economic laboratory research on humans
almost always forbids communication between subjects. In reality, however, altruism usually
requires interaction between givers and receivers, which clearly must influence choices. ...
J Andreoni… - Working papers, 1999 - econpapers.repec.org
... Please update your bookmarks. Giving according to GARP: an experimental test of the
rationality of altruism. James Andreoni () and JH Miller Additional contact information JH Miller:
University of Wisconsin-Madison, Social Systems Research Institute. ...
J Andreoni… - Experimental Economics, 2006 - Springer
Abstract We present an experiment designed to separate the two commonplace
explanations for behavior in ultimatum games—subjects' concern for fairness versus the
failure of subgame perfection as an equilibrium refinement. We employ a tournament ...
RH Haveman, M Gabay… - American Economic Review, 1987 - econ.ucsd.edu
Jerry Hausman's 1981 paper in this Review is a clear demonstration that Hicksianbased
estimates of welfare change can be measured exactly from an empirically estimated
demand or supply curve. Presenting such a measure in empirical work is more precise ...
[CITATION] Social Motives to Giving: Can these Explain Fund Raising Institutions?
[CITATION] Giving with impure altruism: Applications to charity and
J Andreoni - 1989
[CITATION] Impure altruism and donations to public goods: A theory of
J Andreoni - 1990
J Andreoni… - Journal of Games and Economic …, 1995 - 万方数据资源系统
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[CITATION] What produces fairness? Some experimental evidence
J Andreoni, P Brown… - Games & Economic Behavior, 2002
[CITATION] Tax Compliance, 36 J
J Andreoni, B Erard… - Econ. Lit, 1998
[CITATION] Private Charity, Public Goods and the Crowding Out Hypothesis
J Andreoni… - 1987 - Center for the Study of Philanthropy …
[CITATION] Fairness, Selfishness and Selfish Fairness: Experiments on Games with Unequal Equilibrium Payoffs
Abstract: The ultimatum game has been the primary tool for studying bargaining behavior in
recent years. However, not enough information is gathered in the ultimatum game to get a
clear picture of responders' utility functions. We analyze a convex ultimatum game in ...
[CITATION] Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving, 100 ECON
J Andreoni - J, 1990
[CITATION] Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines: Should the Penalty Fit the Crime?, 22 RAND J
J Andreoni - OF ECON, 1991
[CITATION] Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm
J Andreoni - 1990
Risk and time are intertwined. The present is known while the future is inherently risky.
Discounted expected utility provides a simple, coherent structure for analyzing decisions in
intertemporal, uncertain environments. However, we document robust violations of ...
J Andreoni… - Levine's Working Paper Archive, 2010 - Citeseer
Abstract In the study of decision making under risk, preferences are assumed to be
continuous. We present a model of discontinuous preferences over certain and uncertain
outcomes. Using existing parameter estimates for certain and uncertain utility, five ...
[CITATION] Criminal Deterrence
J Andreoni - Economic Inquiry, 1995
[CITATION] Rational Cooperation in the Finitely
J Andreoni… - 1993
[CITATION] LEVINSON, Arik The Simple Analytics of the Environmental Kuznets Curve
J ANDREONI - NBER Working Paper, 1998
[CITATION] VImpure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm'Glow GivingV The Economic Journal, 1990
J Andreoni - Vol
J Andreoni… - American Economic Journal: …, 2012 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: People often see the same evidence but draw opposite conclusions, becoming
polarized over time. More surprisingly, disagreements persist even when they are commonly
known. We derive a model and present an experiment showing that opinions can diverge ...
[CITATION] Trust, Reciprocity, and Contract Enforcement: Experiments on
J Andreoni - 2005
[CITATION] VGiving with impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian equivalenceV The Journal of Political Economy, 1989
J Andreoni - Vol
[CITATION] The simple analytics of the Environmental
J Andreoni… - 2001
[CITATION] IRS as Loan Shark: The Optimality of Tax Evasion in the Presence of Borrowing Constraints
J Andreoni - Social Systems Research Institute working paper, 1989
[CITATION] Philanthropy, Economics of
J Andreoni - International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral …, 2001
[CITATION] Private charity, public goods, and the crowding out hypothesis, University of Wisconsin
J Andreoni - Social Systems Research Institute, Working paper, 1987
[CITATION] Warm Glow and Cold Prickle: the impact of framing on cooperation in experiments
J Andreoni - the Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1995
[CITATION] sPhilanthropy. t In Handbook of Giving, Altruism, and Reciprocity, Volume 2, ed. Serge&Christophe Kolm, and Jean Mercier Ythier, 1201u65
J Andreoni - 2006 - Elsevier, North Holland
J Andreoni, M Castillo… - Working papers, 2000 - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of
further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site ...
[CITATION] 0Which is the Fair Sex? 1
J Andreoni… - Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2001
[CITATION] iRational Cooperation in the Finitely Re $ peated Prisonerhs Dilemma: Experimental Evidence, jThe Economic Journal, 103
J Andreoni… - $585, 1993
[CITATION] Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated
JA Andreoni… - 1993
[CITATION] Tax Com& pliance
J Andreoni, B Erard… - Journal of Economic Literature, XXXVI, 818&860, 1998
[CITATION] forthcoming. Is Crowding Out Due Entirely to Fundraising? Evidence from a Panel of Charities
J Andreoni… - Journal of Public Economics
Abstract We re-introduce an experimental device, the uncertainty equivalent, that provides a
direct test of the independence axiom's critical implication of linearityin-probability. In a
within-subject experiment with both uncertainty and certainty equivalents we demonstrate ...
[CITATION] VPhilanthropy. V in S&C. Kolm and J. Mercier Ythier, eds., Handbook of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism
J Andreoni - 2007 - Amsterdam: North Holland, pp. …
J Andreoni - Working papers, 1989 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks. IRS
AS LOAN SHARK: TAX COMPLIANCE WHEN BORROWING CONSTRAINTS ARE POSSIBLE.
James Andreoni (). Working papers from Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems. ...
Experimental work on preferences over risk has typically considered choices over a small
number of discrete options, some of which involve no risk. Such experiments often
demonstrate contradictions of standard expected utility theory. We reconsider this ...
[CITATION] forthcoming.“Which is the fair Sex? Gender Differences in Altruism”
J Andreoni… - Quarterly Journal of Economics
[CITATION] sPhilanthropy. tin SC Kolm and JM Mercier, eds., Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity
J Andreoni - 2006 - Amsterdam: Elsevier/North'Holland
[CITATION] forthcoming.“Charitable Giving by Married Couples: Who Decides and Why Does It Matter?”
J Andreoni, E Brown… - Journal of Human Resources
[CITATION] Chairable Giving
J Andreoni - New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2007
[CITATION] The Carrot or the Stick: Rewards
J Andreoni, W Harbaugh… - Punishments, and Cooperation, 2003
[CITATION] Philanthropy, Handbook of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism, SC
J Andreoni - Kolm and J. Mercier Ythier, eds, 2006
[CITATION] Partners versus strangers: the effect of random rematching in public goods experiments. Handbook of Experimental Economics Results. C. Plott and V. …
J Andreoni… - 2007 - Amsterdam Netherlands: Elsevier …
[CITATION] Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental research
J Andreoni… - preparation for the second edition of the Handbook of …
[CITATION] Charitable giving. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, edited by Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume
J Andreoni - 2008 - Palgrave Macmillan (Basingstoke …
[CITATION] The simple analytics of the
J Andreoni… - 2001
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