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Collusion in hierarchical agency

[PDF] from mit.edu
F Kofman… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1993 - JSTOR
In this model, shareholders can use auditors' reports to contract with a privately-informed
manager. Our imperfect audit technology allows the auditor and the manager to collude.
Auditors are useful only if they have good information and if the manager's liability is high. ...
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On the optimality of allowing collusion

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F Kofman… - Journal of Public Economics, 1996 - Elsevier
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Hedging with futures contracts in a deregulated electricity industry

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E Tanlapco, J Lawarree… - Power Systems, IEEE …, 2002 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Abstract This paper is a statistical study of direct and cross hedging strategies using futures
contracts in an electricity market. A comparison of the strategies is based on the standard
deviation or risk of the values of the hedging positions. Results indicate that the use of ...
Cited by 98 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 5 versions

Collusive auditors

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F Khalil… - The American Economic Review, 1995 - JSTOR
In the last 15 years, principal-agent theory has been applied to a diverse set of topics such
as industrial organization, macroeconomics, regulation, finance, accounting, corporate
governance, and so forth. This theory has become the mainstay for modeling ...
Cited by 63 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 8 versions

A prisoner's dilemma model of collusion deterrence

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F Kofman… - Journal of Public Economics, 1996 - Elsevier
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Input versus output monitoring: who is the residual claimant?

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F Khalil… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1995 - Elsevier
Page 1. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY 66, 139-157 (1995) Input versus Output
Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant?* Fahad Khalil Department of Economics,
University of Washington, Seattle, Washington 98195 ...
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INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTIBLE AUDITORS IN THE ABSENCE OF COMMITMENT*

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F Khalil… - The Journal of Industrial Economics, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
In the absence of commitment to auditing, we study the optimal auditing contract when collusion
between an agent and an auditor is possible. We show that the auditor can be totally useless
if the auditor's independence can be compromised with relative ease. Even very stiff ...
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Catching the agent on the wrong foot: ex post choice of monitoring

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F Khalil… - Journal of Public Economics, 2001 - Elsevier
In a principal-agent model with multiple performance measures, we show that the principal
benefits by choosing ex post which variables will be monitored. If it is too costly for one type
of agent to mimic all performance measures expected from another type, the principal can ...
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Bribery vs. extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils

[PDF] from harvard.edu
F Khalil, J Lawarrée… - Presented at CESifo Area …, 2007 - papers.ssrn.com
Page 1. Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=983246 BRIBERY VS.
EXTORTION: ALLOWING THE LESSER OF TWO EVILS FAHAD KHALIL JACQUES
LAWARRÉE SUNGHO YUN CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1993 ...
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[CITATION] On commitment and collusion in auditing

F Khalil… - Working Papers, 2000 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks. On
Commitment and Collusion in Auditing. Fahad Khalil and Jacques Lawarree. ...
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[PDF] Optimal contract, imperfect output observation, and limited liability

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JP Lawarrée… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1996 - upi-yptk.ac.id
Page 1. Journal of Economic Theory ET2171 journal of economic theory 71, 514
531 (1996) Optimal Contract, Imperfect Output Observation, and Limited Liability*
Jacques P. Lawarree Department of Economics, Box 353330 ...
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Cost observation, auditing and limited liability

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JP Lawarree… - Economics Letters, 1992 - Elsevier
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Organizational flexibility and cooperative task allocation among agents

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J Lawarrée… - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical …, 2005 - ingentaconnect.com
Page 1. 621 Organizational Flexibility and Cooperative Task Allocation among Agents
by JACQUES LAWARRÉE AND DONGSOO SHIN∗ We compare rigid and flexible
organizations when side contracting among agents is possible. ...
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Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils

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F Khalil, J Lawarrée… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. ...
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Exit option in hierarchical agency

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D Kim, J Lawarrée… - International Journal of Industrial …, 2004 - Elsevier
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[CITATION] Une comparaison empirique des performances des secteurs privé et public: le cas des collectes d'imondices en Belgique

J Lawarree - Brussels Economic Review, 1986 - econpapers.repec.org
By Jacques Lawarree; Une comparaison empirique des performances des secteurs privé et public:
le cas des collectes d'imondices en Belgique. ... Jacques Lawarree. Brussels Economic Review,
1986, vol. 109, pages 3-31. Date: 1986 Track citations by RSS feed. ...
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[CITATION] A Prisoner's Dilemma Model of Collusion Deterrence

F Kofman… - Working Papers, 1991 - ideas.repec.org
No abstract is available for this item. ... To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three options: 1. Check below under "Related
research" whether another version of this item is available online. 2. Check on the ...
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[CITATION] Input versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant?

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K Fahad… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1995 - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of
further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site ...
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On the Information-Gathering Role of Firm-Sponsored Training for New Hires

[PDF] from washington.edu
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D Kim… - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical …, 2009 - ingentaconnect.com
Page 1. 281 On the Information-Gathering Role of Firm-Sponsored Training for New
Hires by DOYOUNG KIM AND JACQUES LAWARRÉE∗ According to Becker's
human-capital theory, employers tend to underinvest in general ...
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[PDF] Financial Risk Management in a Competitive Electricity Market

[PDF] from washington.edu
RBCC Liu… - econ.washington.edu
Page 1. Financial Risk Management in a Competitive Electricity Market Roger Bjorgan
Chen-Ching Liu, Fellow Jacques Lawarrée Department of Electrical Engineering
Department of Economics University of Washington, Seattle WA 98195 ...
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[PDF] Applied Microeconomics

[PDF] from cesifo-group.de
F Khalil, J Lawarree… - cesifo-group.de
Abstract When the information used by a principal to monitor an agent is private, ie, non-
verifiable by a third party, the principal has a credibility issue. The principal must convince
the agent that she will not distort the private information. This requirement may lead to an ...
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[PDF] Contracts in Bureaucracies

[PDF] from psu.edu
F Khalil, D Kim… - Working Papers, 2008 - Citeseer
“In the days leading up to September 30, the federal government is Cinderella, courted by
legions of individuals and organizations eager to get grants and contracts from the
unexpended funds still at the disposal of each agency. At midnight on September 30, the ...
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[CITATION] Incentive contracts with strategic agents: three essays in economic theory

JP Lawarrée - 1992 - UMI
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[PDF] Allowing the lesser of two evils: bribery or extortion?

[PDF] from kobe-u.ac.jp
F Khalil, J Lawarrée… - 2006 - rieb.kobe-u.ac.jp
Page 1. Allowing the lesser of two evils: bribery or extortion? Draft November 27, 2006 FAHAD
KHALIL † JACQUES LAWARRÉE ‡ SUNGHO YUN* Abstract Rewards to prevent enforcement
agents from accepting bribes create incentives for extortion. ...
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[CITATION] Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment," in the" Journal of Industrial Economics"(2006)

F Khalil… - Working Papers - University of Washington, …
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[CITATION] Smith, Adam 202

E Helpman, A Heston, M Hinich… - The economics …, 2005 - Oxford University Press, USA

[PDF] Analysis of Electricity Market Rules and Their Effects on Strategic Behavior in a Non-Congestive Grid

[PDF] from washington.edu
KSJL Chen-Ching - econ.washington.edu
Page 1. Analysis of Electricity Market Rules and Their Effects on Strategic Behavior
in a Non-Congestive Grid Karl Seeley Jacques Lawarrée Chen-Ching Liu, Fellow
University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195 Abstract: Earlier ...
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[PDF] Moral Hazard and Limited Liability

[PDF] from econometricsociety.org
J Lawarree, M Van Audenrode - … Society World Congress …, 2000 - econometricsociety.org
Abstract: Real world contracts limit the liabilities of agents by imposing constraints on their
transfers or on their utilities. In an adverse selection model, Sappington (1983) has shown
that the two constraints yield an equivalent problem for the principal. We show that this ...
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[CITATION] Essays in the Economics of Information, Incentives, and the Law

A Finkle, F Khalil… - 2004 - en.scientificcommons.org
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[PDF] Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats

[PDF] from ergonline.org.bd
F Khalil, D Kim… - 2011 - ergonline.org.bd
Abstract We examine the power of incentive schemes in bureaucracies by studying contracts
offered by a bureaucrat to her agent. The bureaucrat operates under a fixed budget and can
engage in policy drift, which we define as inversely related to her intrinsic motivation. We ...
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[CITATION] Analysis of Electricity Market Rules and Their Effects on Strategic Behavior in a Non-Congestive Grid

K Seeley, J Lawarree… - Discussion Papers in …, 1998 - econpapers.repec.org
By Karl Seeley, Jacques Lawarree and Chen-Ching Liu; Analysis of Electricity Market
Rules and Their Effects on Strategic Behavior in a Non-Congestive Grid. ... Congestive
Grid. Karl Seeley, Jacques Lawarree and Chen-Ching Liu. ...
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Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information

F Khalil, J Lawarree… - Working Papers, 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: When the information used by a principal to monitor an agent is private, ie, non-
verifiable by a third party, the principal has a credibility issue. The principal must convince
the agent that she will not distort the private information. This requirement may lead to an ...
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[PDF] Private Monitoring and Collusion

[PDF] from ecares.org
F Khalil, J Lawarree… - ecares.org
Abstract When the information used by a principal to monitor an agent is private, ie, non-
verifiable by a third party, the principal has a credibility issue. The principal must convince
the agent that she will not distort the private information. This requirement may lead to an ...
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COLLUSION ET AUDIT D'ENTREPRISES PUBLIQUES*

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J LAWARRÉE - Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 1989 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. COLLUSION ET AUDIT D'ENTREPRISES PUBLIQUES Par Jacques LAWmE University
of California-Berkeley et Universitd & Li9ge Ces dix dernihres annbs, I'efficacit4 relative des
entreprises publiques et privbes a bt4 au centre d'un dbbat souvent trhs animb. ...
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[CITATION] Optimal Labor Contracts and Unemployment Under Adverse Selection and Imperfect Monitoring

JP Lawarrée… - 1991 - … de recherche sur l'emploi et les …
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Incitations managériales dans les entreprises publiques

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J LAWARREE - Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 1990 - Wiley Online Library
Cette étude fait partie d'un programme de recherches sur les incitations managériales dans
les entreprises publiques, financé dans le cadre du pro gramme «Recherches universitaires
d'aide à la décision politique» des Servi ces de Programmation de la Politique ...
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