D Abreu - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1988 - JSTOR
This paper presents a systematic framework for studying infinitely repeated games with
discounting, focussing on pure strategy (subgame) perfect equilibria. It introduces a number
of concepts which organize the theory in a natural way. These include the idea of an ...
D Abreu, D Pearce… - Econometrica: Journal of the …, 1990 - JSTOR
This paper investigates pure strategy sequential equilibria of repeated games with imperfect
monitoring. The approach emphasizes the equilibrium value set and the static optimization
problems embedded in extremal equilibria. A succession of propositions, central among ...
D Abreu - Journal of Economic Theory, 1986 - Elsevier
Abstract General propositions established in Abreu (Ph. D. thesis, Princeton University,
October 1983) are applied to the analysis of optimal punishments and constrained Pareto
optimal paths of symmetric oligopolistic supergames. A remarkably simple 2-dimensional ...
D Abreu… - Econometrica, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
We present a model in which an asset bubble can persist despite the presence of rational
arbitrageurs. The resilience of the bubble stems from the inability of arbitrageurs to
temporarily coordinate their selling strategies. This synchronization problem together with ...
D Abreu, D Pearce… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1986 - Elsevier
Abstract There exist optimal symmetric equilibria in the Green-Porter model [4, 8] having an
elementary intertemporal structure. Such an equilibrium is described entirely by two subsets
of price space and two quantities, the only production levels used by firms in any ...
D Abreu,
A Rubinstein - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1988 - JSTOR
We study two person infinitely repeated games in which players seek to minimize the
complexity of their strategies. Players' preferences are assumed to depend both on repeated
game payoffs and the complexity of the strategies they use. The model considered is that ...
D Abreu… - Journal of Financial Economics, 2002 - Elsevier
We argue that arbitrage is limited if rational traders face uncertainty about when their peers
will exploit a common arbitrage opportunity. This synchronization risk—which is distinct from
noise trader risk and fundamental risk—arises in our model because arbitrageurs become ...
D Abreu,
P Milgrom… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric …, 1991 - JSTOR
In a repeated partnership game with imperfect monitoring, we distinguish among the effects
of (1) reducing the interest rate,(2) shortening the period over which actions are held fixed,
and (3) shortening the lag with which accumulated information is reported. All three ...
D Abreu… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1992 - JSTOR
We investigate the implementation of social choice functions in complete information
environments. We consider social choice functions (scf's) which map from a finite set of
preference profiles to lotteries over alternatives, and require virtual implementation in ...
D Abreu… - Econometrica, 2000 - Wiley Online Library
The paper develops a reputation based theory of bargaining. The idea is to investigate and
highlight the influence of bargaining 'postures' on bargaining outcomes. A complete
information bargaining model a la Rubinstein is amended to accommodate 'irrational ...
D Abreu… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1991 - JSTOR
Reformulate the classical implementation problem à la Maskin (1977) as follows. Think of a
social choice correspondence as a mapping from preference profiles to lotteries over some
finite set of alternative. Say that a soical choice function f is virtually implementable in ...
D Abreu… - Journal of Economic theory, 1990 - Elsevier
Abstract We present a necessary and almost sufficient condition for subgame perfect
implementation of social choice correspondences. In societies with at least three individuals,
any social choice correspondence which satisfies no veto power and our necessary ...
D Abreu, PK Dutta… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric …, 1994 - JSTOR
WE ARE CONCERNED here with perfect" folk theorems" for infinitely repeated games with
complete information. Folk theorems assert that any feasible and individually rational payoff
vector of the stage game is a (subgame perfect) equilibrium payoff in the associated ...
A Dilip… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1994 - Elsevier
Abstract We study implementation of social choice functions when the planner can
randomize and impose arbitrarily small fines on players. In complete information
environments with three or more players, it is shown that any social choice function is ...
D Abreu - Dissertation Abstracts International Part A: Humanities …, 1984 - csa.com
The thesis analyzes optimal (in the sense of most severe) credible punishments/penal codes
in infinitely repeated games with discounting. This analysis is important because it leads to a
characterization of the class of perfect equilibria of such supergames. An implication of the ...
D Abreu, Harvard Institute of Economic Research - 1984 - ima.umn.edu
Abstract A particularly elementary class of strategy profiles, simple strategy profiles, is shown
to suffice to obtain all subgame perfect equilibrium outcome paths of infinitely repeated
games with discounting. Essential to the argument are the related notions of an optimal ...
D Abreu, DW Pearce… - 1989 - princeton.edu
Abstract: In this paper we discuss the conceptual foundations of one approach to modelling
renegotiation in repeated games. Renegotiation-proof equilibria are viewed as social
conventions that players continue to find beneficial after every history. The theory can be ...
D Abreu, DG Pearce - Journal of Economic Theory, 1984 - Elsevier
Abstract The mutual compatibility of four recently discussed axioms on solution concepts for
extensive form games is explored. Two subsets of the axioms are shown to be inconsistent.
Our results underline the importance of the information lost in moving from the extensive ...
D Abreu… - Econometrica, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
We would like to thank Ennio Stacchetti for his help and seminar participants at numerous
universities for their comments. We are grateful to the editor and the anonymous referees,
who, in addition to making many helpful suggestions, were instrumental in shifting the ...
D Abreu,
R Sethi - Games and Economic Behavior, 2003 - Elsevier
A large and growing literature on reputation in games builds on the insight that the
possibility of one or more players being boundedly rational can have significant effects on
equilibrium behavior. This literature leaves unexplained the presence of behavioral ...
D Abreu… - Princeton Economic Theory Papers (00f2), 2002 - Citeseer
Abstract By arriving at self-enforcing agreements, agents in an ongoing strategic situation
create surplus that benefits them both. Little is known about how that surplus will be divided.
This project concerns the role of reputation formation in such environments. It studies a ...
[CITATION] Repeated Games with Discounting
D Abreu - Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1983
D Abreu… - Econometrica, 1992 - JSTOR
WE ARE MOST GRATEFUL to Glazer and Rosenthal for the attention they have paid to our
work (Abreu and Matsushima (1992a, b, c)). In the process of criticizing our mechanism, they
have provided an elegant exposition of it which usefully supplements our own efforts. The ...
M Casari, D Abreu, D Pearce… - Journal of …, 2007 - Cambridge Univ Press
This article examines changes in institutions that protected property rights in the Alps
between the thirteenth and the nineteenth century and, in particular, alternative
management systems adopted for the common pastures and forests in about 200 ...
D Abreu, D Pearce, E Stacchetti… - 1989 - cowles.econ.yale.edu
ABSTRACT It seems reasonable to suppose that in repeated games in which
communication is possible, play is determined through a process of negotiation and
renegotiation as events unfold. In the absence of a satisfying theory of players' bargaining ...
D Abreu, Harvard Institute of Economic Research - 1985 - en.scientificcommons.org
Publication View. 33005539. Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames. Abreu, Dilip.
Publication details. Download, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-4D5NJ90-
9/2/b525b8c95877d885f34ac1fbebd5f400. Repository, RePEc (Germany). Type, article. ...
[CITATION] Extremal Equilibria of Oligopolistic Supergames''Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 39 (1986), pp. 191-225.—
D Abreu - On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with …, 1988
[CITATION] 0On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting. 1 Econometrica
D Abreu - March, 1988
D Abreu… - Discussion Papers, 1991 - ideas.repec.org
No abstract is available for this item. ... To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three options: 1. Check below under "Related
research" whether another version of this item is available online. 2. Check on the ...
[CITATION] gVirtual Implementation in Nash Equilib# rium. h Econometrica
D Abreu… - Volume, 1991
[CITATION] Optimal Cartel Equilibria with
D Abreu, D Pearce… - 1986
D Abreu… - Levine's Working Paper Archive, 2006 - dklevine.com
Abstract Consider a two $ person intertemporal bargaining problem in which players choose
actions and collect payoffs while bargaining proceeds. Theory is silent regarding how the
surplus is likely to be split, because a folk theorem applies. Perturbing such a game with a ...
[CITATION] Markov Perfect Equilibria in a Model of Bargaining in Networks
D Abreu… - Games Econ. Behav, 2009
[CITATION] VToward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring,) Econometrica, 58.5
D Abreu, D Pearce… - 1990 - September
[CITATION] L. Smith (1994)." The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition,"
D Abreu… - Econometrica
D Abreu, D Bernheim… - Work, 2005 - princeton.edu
Abstract Case studies of self-enforcing cooperation in repeated interactions usually find that
the punishments inflicted on deviators are mild to start with, and increase only if there is
evidence of persistent deviation. We model this using a combination of imperfect ...
[CITATION] Reputation and Bargaining
D Abreu… - 1994 - Princeton mimeo
[CITATION] A Perspective on Renegotiation in
D Abreu… - 1991
D Abreu… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Consider repeated two-player games with perfect information and discounting. We
provide an algorithm that computes the set of payoff pairs V* of all pure strategy subgame
perfect equilibria with public randomization. The algorithm provides significant efficiency ...
D Abreu, PK Dutta… - 1993 - dspace.mit.edu
Abstract The Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) folk theorem for discounted re-peated games
assumes that the set of feasible payoffs is full dimensional. We obtain the same conclusion
using a weaker condition. This condition is that no pair of players has equivalent von ...
[CITATION] Crashes and Bubbles
D Abreu… - Econometrica
[CITATION] 0Extremal Equilibria of Oligopolistic Supergames, 1 JourM nal of Economic Theory
D Abreu - Vol, 1986
[CITATION] VA Behavioral Model of Bargaining with Endogenous Types
D Abreu… - 2003 - working paper, Princeton University
DG Pearce, D Abreu… - Cowles Foundation Discussion …, 1989 - ideas.repec.org
It seems reasonable to suppose that in repeated games in which communications is
possible, play is determined through a process of negotiation and renegotiation as events
unfold. In the absence of a satisfying theory of players' bargaining power, it is unclear how ...
D Abreu… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2011 - Elsevier
We study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network are
randomly matched to bargain over a unit surplus. Players who reach agreement are
removed from the network without replacement. The global logic of efficient matchings and ...
D Abreu… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2011 - Elsevier
Abstract We study the Markov perfect equilibria (MPEs) of an infinite horizon game in which
pairs of players connected in a network are randomly matched to bargain. Players who
reach agreement are removed from the network without replacement. We establish the ...
D Abreu, D Pearce… - 2011 - files.nyu.edu
Abstract. A two-person infinite-horizon bargaining model where one of the players may have
either of two discount factors, has a multiplicity of perfect Bayesian equilibria. Introducing the
slightest possibility that either player may be one of a rich variety of stationary behavioral ...
The Annual Meetings of these two academic associations will be run in parallel, under a
single local organization. By registering for LAMES 2009, participants will be welcome to
attend to all sessions of both meetings. Andrés Neumeyer (UTDT) is the conference ...
D Abreu, D Pearce… - 1989 - dido.wss.yale.edu
ABSTRACT It seems reasonable to suppose that in repeated games in which
communication is possible, play is determined through a process of negotiation and
renegotiation as events unfold. In the absence of a satisfying theory of players' bargaining ...
DG Pearce, D Abreu… - Cowles Foundation Discussion …, 1988 - ideas.repec.org
In a repeated partnership game with imperfect monitoring, we distinguish among the effects
of (1) shortening the period over which actions are held fixed,(2) increasing the frequency
with which accumulated information is reported, and (3) reducing the amount of ...
D Abreu,
A Rubinstein - STICERD-Theoretical Economics …, 1987 - econpapers.repec.org
By Dilip Abreu and Ariel Rubinstein; The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated
Games with Finite Automata (Now published in Econometrica, 56 (1988), pp.1. ... 56
(1988), pp.1259-1282.). Dilip Abreu and Ariel Rubinstein (). ...
[CITATION] Game Equilibrium Models: Social and Political Interaction
D Abreu, I Eshel… - 1991 - Springer
[CITATION] Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
D Abreu, H Matsushima - …, 1999 - EDWARD ELGAR PUBLISHING LTD
[CITATION] Cumulative Index1
D ABREU, D PEARCE, AR ADMATI… - Journal of economic …, 1986 - Academic Press
D Abreu, FH Room, I Adelman, B Berkeley… - …, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
FELLOWS OF THE ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY January 2003 Andrew B. Abel, Department of
Finance, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, 3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
19104-6367 (1991). Dilip Abreu, Department of Economics, Princeton University, Fisher ...
D Abreu… - 1992 - lev1101.dklevine.com
1. Introduction We are concerned here with" folk theorems" for repeated games with
complete information. Such theorems establish that in the limit with little or no discounting
any feasible and individually rational payoff of the stage game is an equilibrium payoff of ...
[CITATION] Burleson, BR 60 Burns, RR 60 Butler 240 Butterfield, P. 66 Caesar 344
D Abreu, P Ackerman, D Alderman… - The economics of …, 1995 - Edward Elgar Pub
[CITATION] Synchronization Risk and Delayed Arbitrage (Digest Summary)
D Abreu… - CFA Digest, 2003 - CFA Institute
D Pearce… - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We enrich a simple two-person bargaining model by introducing" behavioral types"
who concede more slowly than does the average person in the economy. The presence of
behavioral types profoundly influences the choices of optimizing types. In equilibrium, ...
D Abreu… - 2011 - econ.as.nyu.edu
Abstract Consider repeated two-player games with perfect information and discounting. We
provide an algorithm that computes the set of payoff pairs V∗ of all pure strategy subgame
perfect equilibria with public randomization. The algorithm provides significant efficiency ...
D Abreu… - Levine's Working Paper Archive, 2009 - econ.as.nyu.edu
Nash (1953) considers a scenario in which two players may choose their strate% gies
independently, but in which contractual enforcement is available both for strategic
agreements the two players may come to, and for threats each player makes about what ...
D ABREU… - Econometrica, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
(*) Indicates a Fellow who is “inactive” (is not current member of the Society). Total: 603 fellows
(139 “inactive”) ANDREW B. ABEL, Department of Finance, University of Pennsylvania,
Whar- ton School, 3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104-6367 (1991). ...
[CITATION] A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with Endogenous
D Abreu… - 2000
[CITATION] DAVID PEARCE
D ABREU - Journal of economic theory, 1993 - Academic Press.
[CITATION] COULES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS AT YALE UNIVERSITY
In a repeated partnership game with imperfect monitoring, we distinguish among the effects
of (l) shortening the period over which actions are held fixed,(2) increasing the frequency
with which accumulated information is reported, and (3) reducing the amount of ...
D ABREU, FH Room, I ADELMAN… - Econometrica, 2005 - Wiley Online Library
(*) Indicates a Fellow who is “inactive” (is not a current member of the Society). Total: 593 fellows
(143 “inactive”). ANDREW B. ABEL, Department of Finance, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton
School, 3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104-6367 (1991). DILIP ...
A Dilip - 2003 - socionet.ru
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