JC Ely, J Hörner… - Econometrica, 2005 - Wiley Online Library
We introduce a class of strategies that generalizes examples constructed in two-player
games under imperfect private monitoring. A sequential equilibrium is belief-free if, after
every private history, each player's continuation strategy is optimal independently of his ...
J Hörner… - Econometrica, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games under private, almost-perfect
monitoring. Our result covers all finite, n-player games that satisfy the usual full-
dimensionality condition. Mixed strategies are allowed in determining the individually ...
W Olszewski - Journal of Economic Theory, 2004 - Elsevier
The typical sender–receiver game studied in the literature assumes that receiver is
uninformed. I analyze a model where receiver has private information and sender cares to
be perceived as honest. If sender's honesty concerns are strong enough, the model ...
W Olszewski - The Review of Economic Studies, 2007 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract This paper studies a model in which in period 1, a decision-maker chooses a set of
lotteries and in period 2, Nature chooses a lottery from the set chosen by the decision-maker
and the decision-maker consumes the lottery chosen by Nature. Larger sets are ...
KS Chung… - Theoretical Economics, 2007 - econtheory.org
Abstract We give a sufficient condition on the type space for revenue equivalence when the
set of social alternatives consists of probability distributions over a finite set. Types are
identified with real-valued functions that assign valuations to elements of this finite set, ...
W Olszewski… - The Annals of Statistics, 2009 - projecteuclid.org
Abstract A test is said to control for type I error if it is unlikely to reject the data-generating
process. However, if it is possible to produce stochastic processes at random such that, for
all possible future realizations of the data, the selected process is unlikely to be rejected, ...
W Olszewski… - Econometrica, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
The difficulties in properly anticipating key economic variables may encourage decision
makers to rely on experts' forecasts. Professional forecasters, however, may not be reliable
and so their forecasts must be empirically tested. This may induce experts to forecast ...
W Olszewski… - CMS-EMS discussion paper, 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Theories can be produced by experts seeking a reputation for having knowledge.
Hence, a tester could anticipate that theories may have been strategically produced by
uninformed experts who want to pass an empirical test. We show that, with no restriction ...
W Olszewski… - Journal of Public Economic …, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract Political processes may bring about Pareto improvements by increasing income
inequality in a society that produces a public good by voluntary contributions. Proportional
taxation funds a “governing agent.” The most endowed agent is the Condorcet winner for ...
GJ Mailath… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2011 - Elsevier
We prove the perfect-monitoring folk theorem continues to hold when attention is restricted
to strategies with bounded recall and the equilibrium is essentially required to be strict. As a
consequence, the perfect monitoring folk theorem is shown to be behaviorally robust ...
J Hörner… - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2009 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract The folk theorem of repeated games has established that cooperative behavior can
be sustained as an equilibrium in repeated settings. Early papers on private monitoring and
a recent paper of Cole and Kocherlakota (Games and Economic Behavior, 53 [2005], 59– ...
W Olszewski - Games and Economic Behavior, 2004 - Elsevier
I study coalition strategy-proof implementation in public goods environments where agents
may be excluded from enjoying the public good. I characterize individually rational, coalition
strategy-proof mechanisms with the Equal Treatment of Equals property and prove that ...
J Hörner… - forthcoming in the Quarterly …, 2008 - faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu
Abstract The folk theorem of repeated games has established that cooperative behavior can
be sustained as an equilibrium in repeated settings. Early papers on private monitoring and
a recent paper of Cole and Kocherlakota (2005) challenge the robustness of this result, by ...
W Olszewski… - Theoretical Economics, 2007 - econtheory.org
Abstract A decision maker, named Alice, wants to know if an expert has significant
information about payoff-relevant probabilities of future events. The expert, named Bob,
either knows this probability almost perfectly or knows nothing about it. Hence, both Alice ...
D Fudenberg… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2011 - Elsevier
We consider a long-run player facing a sequence of short-run opponents who receive noisy
signals of the long-run player's past actions. We modify the standard, synchronous-action,
model by supposing that players observe an underlying public signal of the opponent's ...
W Olszewski - Games and Economic Behavior, 2003 - Elsevier
An indivisible object is to be allocated at no cost to the agent who values it most. We provide
a simple two-stage mechanism, which implements the desired outcome when it is common
knowledge that the agent who values the object most knows that. At each stage of the ...
W Olszewski - Economics Bulletin, 2007 - accessecon.com
Abstract Recently, there has been made a substantial progress in the analysis of repeated
games with private monitoring. This progress began with introducing a new class of
sequential equilibrium strategies, called belief-free equilibria, that can be analyzed using ...
W Olszewski… - The American Economic Review, 2011 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: We examine Popper's falsifiability within an economic model in which a tester hires
a potential expert to produce a theory. Payments are contingent on the performance of the
theory vis-à-vis data. We show that if experts are strategic, falsifiability has no power to ...
W Olszewski… - manuscript, Northwestern …, 2006 - cs112-b.cs.yale.edu
Abstract The difficulties in properly anticipating key economic variables may encourage
decision makers to rely on experts' forecasts. The experts' forecasts, however, may not be
accurate. So, their forecasts must be empirically tested. This may induce experts to ...
JC Ely, J Hörner… - Econometrica, forthcoming, 2004 - Citeseer
Abstract We introduce a class of strategies which generalizes examples constructed in two-
player games under imperfect private monitoring. A sequential equilibrium is belief-free if,
after every private history, each player's continuation strategy is optimal independently of ...
W Olszewski… - American Economic Journal: …, 2011 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: Recent literature on testing experts shows that it is often impossible to determine
whether an expert knows the stochastic process that generates data. Despite this negative
result, we show that there often exist contracts that allow a decision maker to attain the first ...
W Olszewski - International Journal of Game Theory, 1998 - Springer
I consider two player games, where player 1 can use only pure strategies, and player 2 can
use mixed strategies. I indicate a class of such games with the property that under public
randomization both the discounted and the undiscounted finitely repeated perfect folk ...
W Olszewski - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2011 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: The paper compares conventional and final-offer arbitration. One party is supposed
to make a payment to another party, whose amount depends on a state. Under one
scenario, parties obtain signals about the state, which cannot be recognized by the ...
W Olszewski - Journal of Economic Theory, 2006 - Elsevier
I formalize the notion of equilibrium language, define the relation of having a richer
language, and show the existence of equilibria with maximally rich language. I also study
the stability of equilibria with respect to inflows of messages that can enrich their language ...
W Olszewski… - Proceedings of the National …, 2009 - National Acad Sciences
Abstract Multiple self-proclaimed experts claim that they know the probabilities of future
events. A tester does not know the odds of future events and she also does not know
whether, among the multiple experts, there are some who do know the relevant ...
W Olszewski - Theory and decision, 2011 - Springer
Abstract The paper characterizes axiomatically a class of temptation-driven preferences. The
key (but not the only) novelty of the paper is the idea that the alternative which tempts when
an item x is consumed may not be the same as the alternative which tempts when another ...
[CITATION] How robust is the folk theorem with imperfect public monitoring
J Horner… - 2006 - Working Paper
[CITATION] VA Model of Consumption&Dependent TemptationV mimeo
O Wojciech - 2008
[CITATION] nA Welfare Analysis of Arbitration. oworking paper
W Olszewski - Northwestern Uni& versity, 2006
A Sandroni… - PIER Working Paper Archive, 2008 - ideas.repec.org
Theories can be produced by experts seeking a reputation for having knowledge. Hence, a
tester could anticipate that theories may have been strategically produced by uninformed
experts who want to pass an empirical test. We show that, with no restriction on the ...
[CITATION] Endogenous, Almost Necessary Conditions for Revenue Equivalence Theorem
KC Chung… - 2006 - mimeo
Y Chen… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Do elementary statistics or equilibrium theory deliver any rules of thumb regarding how we should
argue in debates? We suggest a framework for normative analysis of debates. In our
framework, each discussant wants the audience to believe that the actual state coin- ...
W Olszewski - leA, 2009 - faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu
Abstract The paper characterizes axiomatically a class of temptation-driven preferences. The
key (but not the only) novelty of the paper is the idea that the alternative which tempts when
an item x is consumed may not be the same as the alternative which tempts when another ...
[CITATION] Reviews and CommentsWith the intent of stimulating discussion, this section is reserved for book reviews, comments, and letters; your input is welcome. …
W Olszewski - Games and Economic Behavior, 2007 - Elsevier Science
[CITATION] Report of the Editor American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
J Ely, J Horner… - Discussion Papers, 2003 - ideas.repec.org
We introduce a class of strategies which generalizes examples constructed in two-player
games under imperfect private monitoring. A sequential equilibrium is belief-free if, after
every private history, each player. s continuation strategy is optimal independently of his ...
JHW Olszewski - 2005 - econ.yale.edu
Abstract We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games under private, almost#
perfect monitoring. Our result covers all finite, n# player games satisfying the usual full#
dimensionality condition. Mixed strategies are allowed in determining the individually ...
W Olszewski… - faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu
Abstract We study chip strategies in repeated oligopoly games, in which… rms privately
observe their costs of production. The simplest form of chip strategies allows the… rms with
the lowest costs to charge a lower price and serve the entire market. In exchange, the… ...
[CITATION] Rural communities and emerging national identities in Central Europe in the 19th and 20th c.
W Olszewski - Exploring home, neighbouring …, 2008 - Instytut Etnologii i Antropologii …
JC Ely, EJ Green, BL Lipman, D Ray, S Athey… - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. ...
W Olszewski… - 2012 - faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu
Abstract We study the optimal formation of a team of individuals whose output is influenced
by the presence of others on the team. We assume the characteristics of available agents
are known to the principal and the provision of incentives is not an issue, and we study the ...
W Olszewski - Games and Economic Behavior, 2007 - econpapers.repec.org
By Wojciech Olszewski; George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson, Repeated Games and
Reputations: Long-Run Relationships, Oxford University Press,. ... Wojciech Olszewski. Games
and Economic Behavior, 2007, vol. 59, issue 2, pages 408-410. ...
[CITATION] Around the Theory and Politics of Cultural Identity. The Ethnologist's Dilemma at the Beginning of the 21st Century
W Olszewski - … tradition and postmodernity: Polish ethnography at the …, 2003 - Dig
M Aoyagi, V Bali, JS Banks, S Barbera… - lib.uoi.gr
Belen kiı, AS Cooperative games of choosing partners and forming coalitions in the
marketplace.(English summary) 2003k: 91018 Bergantinos, Gustavo (with Sánchez, Estela)
Weighted Shapley values for games in generalized characteristic function form.(English ...
W Olszewski - 1998 - faculty.econ.northwestern.edu
Abstract I study a theoretical model of the market for narcotics, consistent with available
evidence and other studies, where there is a case for regulatory policy. Namely, a ceiling for
the price at which addicted consumers can buy drugs is an example of such a policy. I ...
J Hörner, BL Lipman, D Ray, S Athey, T Bergstrom… - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. Wiley Online Library will be disrupted 3
Dec from 10-12 GMT for monthly maintenance. ...
W Olszewski… - basam-news.info
... Full Text (PDF) Research Article: Wojciech Olszewski and; Alvaro Sandroni. Strategic
Manipulation of Empirical Tests Mathematics of Operations Research 2009 34:57-70;
published online before print January 27, 2009, doi:10.1287/moor.1080.0347. ...
W Olszewski - Journal of classical sociology, 2006 - jcs.sagepub.com
Abstract Ludwik Krzywicki, a classical author of Polish sociology, is generally known and
presented as a Marxist and evolutionary theorist. The present article analyses the past major
presentations and historical reception contexts of Krzywicki's work, and finds that this ...
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