My Citations
Scholar Home
  Advanced Scholar Search



Scholar      Create email alertResults 1 - 21 of 21. (0.11 sec) 

Foundations of intrinsic habit formation

[PDF] from tau.ac.il
Full text - MIT Libraries
K Rozen - Econometrica, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
We provide theoretical foundations for several common (nested) representations of intrinsic
linear habit formation. Our axiomatization introduces an intertemporal theory of weaning a
decision-maker from her habits using the device of compensation. We clarify differences ...
Cited by 28 - Related articles - All 40 versions

[PDF] Rationalizing choice with multi-self models

[PDF] from harvard.edu
A Ambrus… - Unpublished paper, Yale University.[ …, 2009 - economics.harvard.edu
Abstract To facilitate systematic study of multi-self (or group) decision making, this paper
proposes a framework that encompasses a variety of models proposed in economics,
psychology, and marketing. We model choice as arising from the aggregation of a ...
Cited by 10 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 14 versions

[PDF] Revealed conflicting preferences

[PDF] from ucl.ac.uk
A Ambrus… - Levine's Working Paper Archive, 2008 - econ.ucl.ac.uk
Abstract We model a DM as a collection of utility functions (selves, rationales) and an
aggregation rule (a theory of how selves are activated by choice sets). The DM's choice
function is rationalized by a collection of selves and an aggregator if it selects the unique ...
Cited by 7 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 17 versions

Conflict Leads to Cooperation in Nash Bargaining

[PDF] from 128.36.236.35
K Rozen - Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1641, Yale …, 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We consider a multilateral Nash demand game where short-sighted players come
to the bargaining table with requests for both coalition partners and the potentially generated
resource. We prove that group learning leads with probability one to complete cooperation ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - All 20 versions

Disappointment Cycles

[PDF] from upenn.edu
D Dillenberger… - PIER Working Paper Archive, 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We propose a model of history dependent disappointment aversion (HDDA),
allowing the attitude of a decision-maker (DM) towards disappointment at each stage of a T-
stage lottery to evolve as a function of his history of disappointments and elations in prior ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - All 22 versions

[BOOK] Need I Remind You?: Monitoring with Collective Memory

[PDF] from najecon.com
DA Miller… - 2009 - najecon.com
Abstract We consider a team setting where forgetful players with limited memories have
costly but socially efficient tasks to complete. Each teammate promises to complete some
subset of the tasks, and strategically memorizes her own promises as well as a subset of ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - View as HTML - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 11 versions

[PDF] Optimism and Pessimism with Expected Utility

[PDF] from yale.edu
D Dillenberger, A Postlewaite… - Cowles Foundation …, 2011 - econ.yale.edu
Abstract Savage (1954) provided axioms on preferences over acts that were equivalent to
the existence of an expected utility representation. We show that there is a continuum of
other “expected utility” representations in which for any act, the probability distribution over ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 16 versions

[CITATION] lRationalizing Choice with Multi

A Ambrus… - Self Models. mMimeo, 2009
Cited by 2 - Related articles

Monitoring with collective memory: Forgiveness for optimally empty promises

[PDF] from yale.edu
DA Miller… - Unpublished manuscript, Yale University, 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We study optimal contracting in a team setting with moral hazard, where
teammates promise to complete socially efficient but costly tasks. Teammates must monitor
each other to provide incentives, but each team member has limited capacity to allocate ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - All 16 versions

A 'Dual'-Improved Shortcut to the Long Run

[PDF] from yale.edu
K Rozen - Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, 2008 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: I use the theories of duality and optimal branchings to find a necessary and
sufficient characterization of stochastically stable limit sets (SSLS) that helps improve the
radius-modified coradius test of Ellison (2000). The improved shortcut I offer may permit ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - All 23 versions

Rationalizing Choice with Multi-Self Models

[PDF] from yale.edu
A Ambrus… - Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, 2008 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: To facilitate systematic study of multi-self decision making, this paper proposes an
axiomatic framework that encompasses a variety of models proposed in economics,
psychology, and marketing. We model a decision-maker as a collection of utility functions ( ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - All 12 versions

[PDF] Conflict Leads to Cooperation in Nash Bargaining: Supplemental Result on Evolutionary Dynamics

[PDF] from yale.edu
K Rozen - 2009 - econ.yale.edu
Abstract These notes provide an evolutionary analysis of the learning model in Rozen
(2010) and show that the stochastically stable allocations are those interior core allocations
that minimize maximum individual wealth. This corresponds to a long-run lexicographic ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML

History-Dependent Risk Attitude

YC Submitter, D Dillenberger… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We propose a model of history-dependent risk attitude (HDRA), allowing the
attitude of a decision-maker (DM) towards risk at each stage of a T-stage lottery to evolve as
a function of his history of disappointments and elations in prior stages. We establish an ...
Related articles

Optimism and Pessimism with Expected Utility, Second Version

D Dillenberger, A Postlewaite… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Savage (1954) provided a set of axioms on preferences over acts that were
equivalent to the existence of an expected utility representation. We show that in addition to
this representation, there is a continuum of other. expected utility. representations in which ...
Related articles - All 4 versions

Optimally empty promises and endogenous supervision

[PDF] from ucsd.edu
D Miller… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We study optimal contracting in a team setting with peer monitoring and moral
hazard. This environment reflects stylized characteristics of production environments with
complex tasks: agents have many opportunities to shirk, task-level monitoring is needed to ...
Related articles - All 14 versions

Essays on foundations of habit formation and evolutionary games

K Rozen - 2007 - gradworks.umi.com
Abstract: In the first chapter we provide axiomatic foundations for several common (nested)
representations of intrinsic linear habit formation. Our axiomatization introduces a revealed
preference theory of weaning a decision-maker from her habits using the device of ...
Cached - Library Search

[PDF] DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS YALE UNIVERSITY

[PDF] from yale.edu
K Rozen - 2008 - mailhost.econ.yale.edu
Abstract We consider a Nash demand game where N players come to the bargaining table
with requests for coalition partners and a potentially generated resource. We show that
group learning leads to complete cooperation and an interior core allocation with ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 7 versions

History-Dependent Risk Attitude

[PDF] from upenn.edu
D Dillenberger… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We propose a model of history-dependent risk attitude (HDRA), allowing the
attitude of a decision-maker (DM) towards risk at each stage of a T-stage lottery to evolve as
a function of his history of disappointments and elations in prior stages. We establish an ...
Related articles - All 28 versions

Contributing or Free-Riding? A Theory of Endogenous Lobby Formation

K Rozen - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We consider a two-stage public goods provision game: In the first stage, players
simultaneously decide if they will join a contribution group or not. In the second stage,
players in the contribution group simultaneously offer contribution schemes in order to ...
Related articles

[PDF] Monitoring with collective memory

[PDF] from lse.ac.uk
DA Miller… - 2009 - sticerd.lse.ac.uk
Abstract We propose a model in which teammates promise to complete socially efficient
tasks; each task is an activity that a single person must exert costly effort to complete
properly, but can be “botched” effortlessly. Each team member has limited capacity to ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 5 versions

[PDF] Bounded Rationality and Limited Datasets: Testable Implications, Identifiability, and Out-of-Sample Prediction

[PDF] from brown.edu
G de Clippel… - 2012 - econ.brown.edu
Abstract In recent years, several intriguing theories of bounded rationality have been
proposed. This paper aims to understand these theories when the available choice data
may be limited, as is the case in most practical settings. How does one tell if observed ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 3 versions

 Create email alert



 

About Google Scholar - All About Google - My Citations

©2012 Google