K Chatterjee… - Operations Research, 1983 - JSTOR
This paper presents and analyzes a bargaining model of bilateral monopoly under
uncertainty. Under the bargaining rule proposed, the buyer and the seller each submit
sealed offers that determine whether the good in question is sold and the transfer price. ...
K Chatterjee, B Dutta, D Ray… - The Review of …, 1993 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We explore a sequential offers model of n-person coalitional bargaining with
transferable utility and with time discounting. Our focus is on the efficiency properties of
stationary equilibria of strictly superadditive games, when the discount factor δ is ...
K Chatterjee… - The Review of Economic …, 1987 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract This paper examines an infinite horizon bargaining model, incorporating five
features: two-sided incomplete information (with potentially information-revealing strategies),
an infinite horizon, uncertainly concerning the potential gains from trade, an illumination of ...
K Chatterjee… - Econometrica, 2000 - Wiley Online Library
We investigate the effect of introducing costs of complexity in the n-person unanimity
bargaining game. As is well-known, in this game every individually rational allocation is
sustainable as a Nash equilibrium (also as a subgame perfect equilibrium if players are ...
S Seshadri, K Chatterjee… - Marketing Science, 1991 - JSTOR
Relationships between buying and selling organizations in business markets are varied and
complex. One important relationship is procurement, or the type of alliance that buyers form
with sellers to fulfill their purchasing needs. Multiple sourcing is often proposed to prevent ...
K Chatterjee… - Operations Research, 1988 - JSTOR
Chatterjee and Samuelson (1987) recently examined a noncooperative game-theoretic
bargaining model with two-sided incomplete information and an infinite horizon. Results
were obtained from the model with the help of restrictions on agents' strategies. This paper ...
DE Klotz… - Management Science, 1995 - JSTOR
The issue of maintaining competition over time in a repeated procurement setting is
important for both government and private sector buyers. The US Department of Defense
has experimented with splitting production quantities between two or more contractors in ...
S Bhattacharya, K Chatterjee… - Oxford Economic Papers, 1986 - JSTOR
IN THE last decade, the literature on equilibrium models of research and development (R &
D) has addressed the problem of strategic interactions in the adoption of innovations with
known distributions of payoffs. This line of inquiry is exemplified by the work of Fudenberg ...
GE Bolton, K Chatterjee… - Management Science, 2003 - JSTOR
Complexity of communication is one of the important factors that distinguishes multilateral
negotiation from its bilateral cousin. We investigate how the communication configuration
affects a three-person coalition negotiation. Restricting who can communicate with whom ...
K Chatterjee… - International Journal of Game Theory, 1990 - Springer
A generalization of the Nash demand game is examined. Agents make simultaneous offers
in each period as to how a pie is to be divided. Incompatible offers send the game to the next
period, while compatible offers end the game with a split-the-difference trade. The set of ...
K Chatterjee… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1998 - Elsevier
This paper considers a model of bargaining in which the seller makes offers and the buyer
can search (at a cost) for an outside option; the outside option cannot be credibly
communicated, and the seller's offer is recallable by the buyer for one period. There are ...
K Chatterjee… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1998 - Elsevier
This paper analyzes the effect of competition for bargaining partners on the prices that
prevail in thin markets, as well as how the matches are simultaneously determined. Three
trading processes or bargaining procedures are described. In all the variants that we ...
K Chatterjee… - 2001 - books.google.com
In the last twenty-five years, game theory has been applied to a growing number of practical
problems: from antitrust analysis to monetary policy; from the design of auction institutions to
the structuring of incentives within firms; from patent races to dispute resolution. The ...
K Chatterjee - Game-theoretic models of bargaining, 1985 - books.google.com
This essay serves as an introduction to recent work on noncooperative game-theoretic
models of two-player bargaining under incomplete information. The objective is to discuss
some of the problems that motivated formulation of these models, as well as cover some of ...
K Chatterjee - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1982 - JSTOR
One simple instance of the kind of bargaining situation we wish to consider is provided in
negotiations between a buyer and a seller who have to determine a price at which a single
indivisible good is to be exchanged. Each participant typically has a reservation price that ...
S Bandyopadhyay… - The Economic Journal, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
We survey some of the major advances in coalition theory in recent years. We then look at
the recent applications of the theory in the area of political economy and touch upon some
important theoretical and applied open questions in the field.
K Chatterjee… - Decision Sciences, 1982 - Wiley Online Library
ABSTRACT This paper formulates and analyzes models of two-party bargaining behavior
where each side possesses private information about its preferences that is unavailable to
the other. We examine the strategic behavior that bargainers might exhibit when ...
[CITATION] The Simple Economics of Bargaining
K Chatterjee… - Boston University, School of Management, Working …, 1979
K Chatterjee… - 2000 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: The paper studies agents' investment decisions between general and specific
investments under different ownership structures in a thin, decentralized market where each
agent's decision affects the decisions and welfare of other (otherwise unrelated) agents ...
KK Chatterjee - 1976 - getcited.org
An academic directory and search engine.
K Chatterjee… - American Economic Journal: …, 2009 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: We consider the following two-period problem of self-control. In the first period, an
individual has to decide on the set of feasible choices from which she will select one in the
second period. In the second period, the individual might choose an alternative that she ...
[CITATION] Coalition formation, communication, and coordination: An exploratory experiment
GE Bolton, K Chatterjee - Wise choices: …, 1996 - Harvard Business School Press, …
K Chatterjee… - RAND Journal of Economics, 2004 - JSTOR
We analyze an R&D race in which, in each period, two firms each choose which of two
research projects to invest in. Each observes the other's past choices and so strategic
search is possible. Equilibrium is efficient if the projects differ only in their probability of ...
K Chatterjee… - Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1984 - jcr.sagepub.com
Abstract This article reviews experimental work on two party bargaining where a bargainer
has information unavailable to the other party. The situation is one where the bargaining is
on a single issue only and is distributive,(ie, the negotiations are on the sharing or ...
[CITATION] A model of academic tenure
K Chatterjee… - 2001 - mimeo, 11 December
K Chatterjee… - International Journal of Research in Marketing, 1986 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper reviews some major concepts in game theory and indicates how they
may apply to marketing science. The theory of games provides a framework for addressing
problems of competitive strategies and of buyer-seller interactions. These issues are ...
K Chatterjee… - American Economic Journal: …, 2007 - econ.la.psu.edu
Abstract We consider the following two-period problem of self-control. In the first period, an
individual has to decide on the set of feasible choices from which she will select one in the
second period. In the second period, the individual might choose an alternative that she ...
K Chatterjee… - Working Papers, 1999 - 131.111.165.101
Abstract We investigate the effect of introducing costs of complexity in the n-person
unanimity bargaining game. In particular, the paper provides a justification for stationary
equilibrium strategies in the class of games where complexity costs matter. As is well- ...
S Gauvin,
GL Lilien… - Theory and Decision, 1990 - Springer
ABSTRACT. This paper presents the results of an experiment on negotiation, designed to measure
the impact of (1) computerized training and (2) information on negotiators' performance The paper
is structured as follows. First, we review the literature on negotiation training. Second, we ...
K Chatterjee - Group Decision and Negotiation, 1996 - Springer
Abstract This article seeks to examine the insights for practice that can be obtained from the
recent work in explicit, extensive-form models of bargaining. I discuss the results of the
theory and compare them to the advice often given to practitioners. Also included are ...
K Chatterjee, S Morton… - Pareto Optimality, Game Theory And …, 2008 - Springer
This chapter constructs and analyzes a simple auditing model in order to answer questions
concerning three principal issues:(i) the information contained in the report,(ii) commitment
to the audit policy, and (iii) audit effort. The approach taken is based on the concept of ...
J Feng… - University of Florida, 2005 - econ.la.psu.edu
Abstract Under what circumstances will an auctioneer be better off selling his inventory
sequentially, rather than selling them all in a single auction? If bidders come sequentially,
there is an obvious reason to sell items sequentially. However, even when all bidders ...
K Chatterjee… - The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2007 - econ.hku.hk
Abstract The paper studies agents' general or specific investment decisions under different
ownership structures in a thin, decentralized market where each agent's decision affects the
decisions and welfare of other agents mainly through indirect market linkages. It focuses ...
[CITATION] Menu Choice, Environmental Cues and Temptation: A
K Chatterjee… - Multiple Selves” Approach to Self-control,” working …, 2005
K Chatterjee… - European journal of operational research, 1988 - Elsevier
Abstract We consider the situation where two players compete to obtain a valuable object,
eg a stand of timber in a competitive, sealed-bid environment. Prior to submitting a bid, each
player may sample the stand while incurring a common, non-zero cost for each ...
K Chatterjee, G Kersten… - Management …, 1991 - mansci.journal.informs.org
... User Name Password Sign In. Introduction to the Focussed Issue on Group Decision and
Negotiation. Kalyan Chatterjee,; Gregory Kersten and; Melvin F. Shakun. Center for Research
in Conflict and Negotiation, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania 16802 ...
DE Klotz… - Group Decision and Negotiation, 1995 - Springer
We show that splitting an award can result in lower expected procurement costs, even in a
one-time procurement setting, as long as entering the bidding competition is costly. For
sufficiently risk-averse bidders, the split award mechanism provides additional insurance ...
K Chatterjee… - The Pennsylvania State University, mimeo, 2005 - econ.la.psu.edu
Abstract This paper considers the effect of linkage between bargains that a single buyer has
with two suppliers of different items. The buyerks valuation is private information but it is
commonly known that one of the items is worth twice as much to the buyer as the other. ...
KB Saha, N Singh, U Chatterjee Saha, J Roy… - Rural Remote …, 2007 - rrh.org.au
Page 1. © KB Saha, N Singh, U Chatterjee Saha, J Roy, 2007. A licence to publish this material
has been given to ARHEN http://www.rrh.org.au 1 ORIGINAL RESEARCH Male involvement
in reproductive health among scheduled tribe: experience from Khairwars of central India ...
[CITATION] The theory of bargaining
K Chatterjee - Microeconomic Theory (Amsterdam: Kluwer Nijhoff, …, 1986
K Chatterjee… - Economic Theory, 2011 - Springer
Abstract Models with subjective state spaces have been extremely useful in capturing novel
psychological phenomena that consist of both a preference for flexibility and for commitment.
Interpreting the utility representations of preferences as capturing these phenomena ...
K Chatterjee - Group Decision and Negotiation, 2002 - Springer
This paper is an introduction to the field of strategic complexity and its uses in game theory,
giving particular emphasis to my own recent work with Hamid Sabourian (Chatterjee and
Sabourian 2000a, b). This area of research is an example of the many fruitful exchanges ...
[CITATION] lBargaining under Two# sided Incomplete Information: The Unrestricted Offers Case, mOp" erations Research
K Chatterjee… - Vol, 1988
K Chatterjee… - 2008 - grizzly.la.psu.edu
Abstract Citation patterns in many academic disciplines have displayed a pattern of
connections similar to those observed in many other different real-world contexts, such as
links on the world-wide web. The various models that have been proposed to generate ...
S Bandyopadhyay… - The BE Journal of Theoretical …, 2010 - degruyter.com
We consider the effect of giving incentives to ordinary citizens to report potential criminal
activity. Additionally we look at the effect of'profiling'and biased reporting. If police single out
or profile a group for more investigation, then crime in the profiled group decreases. If a ...
K Chatterjee… - Group Decision and Negotiation, 1995 - Springer
In April 1992, the Center for Research in Conflict and Negotiation at The Pennsylvania State
University held a symposium on International Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances. The
purpose of the symposium was to take a cross-disciplinary look at economic and ...
K Chatterjee… - 2004 - econ.psu.edu
Abstract Lifelong employment commitments are a relatively uncommon employment
contract. We find that three factors can explain their existence in academia s (i) non%
contractibility of output,(ii) discipline% specific investment by a faculty member that ...
K Chatterjee… - Economics Letters, 2008 - Elsevier
Let (X) be a topological vector space and C⊂X be metrisable. Typical elements of C will be denoted
by x, y, z and p, q, r etc. The zero vector in (X) will be denoted by θ and let d be a metric generating
the topology. We are interested in preference relations on C, ie binary relations ≽ ⊂ C × ...
J Feng… - 2003 - Citeseer
Abstract This paper explores whether an auctioneer can benefit by dividing his stock of items
into identical lots and auctioning off the lots sequentially, rather than selling them all in one
auction. As for most auction houses, the auctioneer is not a monopolistic seller who can ...
S Bandyopadhyay, K Chatterjee… - 2010 - qjps.com
ABSTRACT We study a game-theoretic model where three political parties (left, median and
right) can form coalitions both before and after the election. Before the election, coalitions
can commit to a seat-sharing arrangement, but not to a policy platform or a division of ...
[CITATION] Indian English: Problems of identity
KK Chatterjee - Quest, 1976
[CITATION] Signalling Through Price Choice in a Repeated Principal-Agent Problem with Asymmetric Information About Agency Quality
K Chatterjee… - 1984 - Mimeo
[CITATION] lWhen Does Competition Lead to Effi cient Investments
K Chatterjee… - 2000 - m mimeo, School of Economics and …
[CITATION] A one-stage distributive bargaining game
K Chatterjee - 1978 - Division of Research, Graduate …
[CITATION] lA Model of Academic Tenure, mmimeo Penn State Department of Economics
K Chatterjee… - 2003
[CITATION] lRubinstein Auctions: On Competition for Bargaining Partners, mGames and Economic Behavior, 23
K Chatterjee… - 1998 - May
[CITATION] One auction or two: simultaneous vs. sequential sales in the auctions with multiple units
J Feng… - … of Economics, Pennsylvania State University Working …, 2002
K Chatterjee… - 2010 - wrap.warwick.ac.uk
Social networks representing the pattern of social interactions-who talks to or who observes
whom-play a crucial role as a medium for the spread of information, ideas, diseases,
products. Someone in the population may be struck with an infection or may adopt a new ...
[CITATION] Complexity and Multi-Person Bargaining
H Sabourian… - Econometrica, 2000
K Chatterjee… - 2005 - econ.hku.hk
Abstract This paper explores the interplay between choice of investment type (specific vs.
general), bargaining extensive form and endogenous outside options in the framework of
incomplete contracts introduced formally in the work of Grossman, Hart and Moore. We ...
[CITATION] Renaissance and Modernity: Tagore in Perspective
K Chatterjee - Review of National Literatures: India, 1979
G Anandalingam, K Chatterjee… - Journal of the Operational …, 1987 - JSTOR
This paper examines the problem of choosing an organization structure for decision-making
for two-level organizations under various information conditions. Decentralized decision-
making (DDM), centralized decision-making with reporting by division (CDRD), and ...
T Bandyopadhyay, K Chatterjee… - Game Theory and …, 2002 - Springer
In this paper, we have sought to analyze the intuitive notion that prices often serve as a
signal of product quality. We have shown that even in a model with no opportunities for
single period signalling, an equilibrium exists in which price partially signals quality. We ...
K Chatterjee… - 2006 - econ.psu.edu
The Expected Utility Theorem is the cornerstone of axiomatic choice under uncertainty. However
traditional proofs rely mostly on the algebraic properties induced by the Inde- pendence and
von Neumann-Morgenstern continuity axioms (see, for instance, Kreps, 1988, pp. 66). We ...
[CITATION] Bargaining Under Incomplete Information, 31 Op
K Chatterjee… - 1983 - RES
[CITATION] Pre-election Coalitions and Post-election Bargaining
S Bandyopadhyay, K Chatterjee… - Discussion papers in Economics, …, 2010
S Bandyopadhyay, K Chatterjee… - DEPARTMENT OF …, 2006 - bham.ac.uk
Abstract We examine the effects of giving incentives for people to report crime on crime
rates. In particular, we look at what happens when the costs of reporting are negligible and
the cost of being interrogated by the police are high in a rational choice model of crime ...
J Feng… - 2008 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Under what circumstances will a seller be better of selling his inventory
sequentially, rather than selling them all in a single auction? If buyers come sequentially,
there is an obvious reason to sell items sequentially. However, we show that even (1) ...
K Chatterjee - Handbook of Group Decision and Negotiation, 2010 - Springer
This chapter describes the major ideas contributed to the study of negotiation by non-
cooperative game theory. Several different lines of research are described, including the
strategy for making demands, the role of time, and the more recent analyses of coalitional ...
K Chatterjee… - Mathematical Social Sciences, 2011 - Elsevier
We consider concave and Lipschitz continuous preference functionals over monetary
lotteries. We show that they possess an envelope representation, as the minimum of a
bounded family of continuous vN-M preference functionals. This allows us to use an ...
[CITATION] Game theory methods and marketing applications
K Chatterjee… - 1984 - College of Business Administration, …
J Feng… - Decision Support Systems, 2010 - Elsevier
Under what circumstances will a seller be better off selling the inventory sequentially, rather
than selling it all in a single auction? Does it benefit the seller to reveal how many auctions
there will be? We study a uniform-price auction, in which bidders demand no more than ...
K Chatterjee… - ideals.illinois.edu
Nash responded to the multiplicity of equilibria in the one-shot simultaneous-offers or" Nash
demand" game by examining the equilibria of slightly perturbed games, with particular
importance attached to the limit of these equilibria as the perturbations become arbitrarily ...
KK Chatterjee - 1974 - getcited.org
An academic directory and search engine.
K Chatterjee… - 2011 - wrap.warwick.ac.uk
This paper studies a model of diffusion in a fixed, finite connected network. There is an
interested party that knows the quality of the product or idea being propagated and chooses
an implant in the network to influence other agents to buy or adopt. Agents are either" ...
K Chatterjee… - 2010 - kelley.indiana.edu
Social networks representing the pattern of social interactions-who talks to or who observes
whom-play a crucial role as a medium for the spread of information, ideas, diseases,
products. Someone in the population may be struck with an infection or may adopt a new ...
K Chatterjee… - 2005 - econ.la.psu.edu
Abstract In an earlier paper, we showed that a new complexity measure on strategies,
response complexity, implied that strategies chosen in equilibrium were stationary or
minimally complex, in the unanimity bargaining game. In this paper, we explore alternative ...
WKK CHAN… - Taylor & Francis
Page 1. OTHER PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED (The inclusion of a book in this list does not preclude
its subsequent review) AMIRSADEGHI, HOSSEIN, ed. assisted by FERRIER, RWTwentieth
Century Iran. London, Heinemann, 1977. Pp. 299. Illus. Preface. Notes. Maps. ...
KK Chatterjee - The Journal of General Education, 1975 - JSTOR
Page 1. THE RENAISSANCE ANALOGY AND ENGLISH EDUCATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY INDIA Kalyan K. Chatterjee The introduction of English
education into India interests us today because it illustrates two civilizations ...
[CITATION] Optimal bargaining procedures: an experimental study
K Chatterjee… - 1982 - College of Business Administration, …
[CITATION] Bargaining, Competition and En cient Investment
K Chatterjee… - 2005
U Akgun, J Alm, P Arocena, E Basker, S Belenzon… - 2012 - Springer
The Review of Industrial Organization relies on its Board of Editors and leading schol- ars in
the field for thoughtful and constructive referee reports. We acknowledge the generous assistance
of the following individuals, in addition to the Board of Editors, over the course of 2011: ...
K Chatterjee… - 2012 - econ.la.psu.edu
Abstract We study models of the formation of citation networks in a setting where
authors/firms care about their citations and are rational. The effect of these two features on
the diffusion of useful ideas in a setting with complete information about past citations ...
[CITATION] John Colet as a humanist and educator
KK Chatterjee - 1971 - University of Wisconsin--Madison
S Bandyopadhyay… - The Economic Journal, 2006 - res.org.uk
We survey some of the major advances in coalition theory in recent years. We then look at
the recent applications of the theory in the area of political economy and touch upon some
important theoretical and applied open questions in the field.
[CITATION] How Communication Channels Influence Multilateral Bargaining: An Experimental Investigation
GE Bolton, K Chatterjee… - 1997 - Division of Research, Harvard …
[CITATION] WILLIAM SAMUELSON
K CHATTERJEE - Bargaining with incomplete information, 1992 - Academic Pr
K Chatterjee… - INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF …, 2000 - time.dufe.edu.cn
This paper presents and analyzes a bargaining model of bilateral monopoly under
uncertainty. Under the bargaining rule proposed, the buyer and the seller each submit
sealed offers that determine whether the good in question is sold and the transfer price. ...
[CITATION] Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity: Economic Theory
K Chatterjee, H Sabourian… - 1997 - University of Cambridge
B Weel, GJ Berg,
J Van Reenen, L Borghans… - The Economic …, 2006 - res.org.uk
The emergence and rapid diffusion of information and communication technology is the
most radical technological transformation of the last couple of decades and has had an
enormous economic impact. This bundle of four articles contains research that discusses ...
P Letizia, K Chatterjee… - personal.psu.edu
Liberal returns policies permit consumers to return products to the retailer even when those
products are not defective. Once returned to the store, the products can follow one of two
reverse channels, where either the manufacturer or the retailer resells or salvages the ...
P Letizia, K Chatterjee… - personal.psu.edu
We address the problem of a manufacturer selling to a retailer who faces consumer returns.
The manufacturer has to decide whether to invest in improving product quality where this
investment can yield either a reduction of the number of returns (high-type) or have no ...
K Chatterjee… - The Warwick Economics Research Paper …, 2006 - warwick.ac.uk
Abstract We study the relationship between bargaining and competition with incomplete
information. We consider a model with two uninformed and identical buyers and two sellers.
One of the sellers has a privately-known reservation price, which can either be Low or ...
[CITATION] JOHN COLET AND RENAISSANCE HUMANISM
KK CHATTERJEE - Bulletin of the Department of English, 1972 - Calcutta University
[CITATION] inaan Journal ofAmencan Studies. Vol. 26, No. 1, Winter 1996, pp. 9-16 Copyright© by American Studies Research Centre. lSSN 0019-5030. TAGORE'S …
KK Chatterjee - Indian journal of American …, 1996 - American Studies Research Centre
K Chatterjee… - 2005 - else.econ.ucl.ac.uk
Abstract In an earlier paper, we showed that a new complexity measure on strategies,
response complexity, implied that strategies chosen in equilibrium were stationary or
minimally complex, in the unanimity bargaining game. In this paper, we explore alternative ...
K Chatterjee… - The BE Journal of Theoretical …, 2012 - degruyter.com
In a model of decision making over sets of alternatives, we consider an agent who conceives
of the different utilities she will receive (depending on the state of mind she is in, her
subjective state) when she finally makes a choice from the set. Her uncertainty is ...
[CITATION] MARLOW'S TRAGIC VISION IN LORD JIM
K CHATTERJEE - Bulletin of the Department of English, 1972 - Calcutta University
K Chatterjee… - 2008 - capcp.psu.edu
Abstract Citation patterns in many academic disciplines have displayed a pattern of
connections similar to those observed in many other different real-world contexts, such as
links on the world-wide web. The various models that have been proposed to generate ...
K Chatterjee - ANQ: A Quarterly Journal of Short Articles, Notes, …, 2009 - Taylor & Francis
(EDITORS'NOTE: This essay is the author's own translation of chapter 13, the final chapter of
his book Rabindranath O Paschatya Kabyalok, published in Bengali by Subornorekha Press
in Kolkata in 2008. The editors are grateful to Professor Chatterjee for his willingness to ...
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