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[CITATION] Equilibria, the core, and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good

M Wooders - Journal of Economic Theory, 1978 - ideas.repec.org
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further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site ...
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The Tiebout hypothesis: near optimality in local public good economies

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M Wooders - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1980 - JSTOR
Over two decades ago, Charles Tiebout conjectured that in economies with local public
goods, consumers" vote with their feet" and that this" voting" creates an approximate" market-
type" equilibrium. He hypothesized that this approximate equilibrium is" nearly" optimal ...
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Competitive equilibrium and the core in club economies with anonymous crowding

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S Scotchmer… - Journal of Public Economics, 1987 - Elsevier
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Sophisticated entry in a model of spatial competition

BC Eaton… - The Rand Journal of Economics, 1985 - JSTOR
Page 1. Rand Journal of Economics Vol. 16, No. 2, Summer 1985 Sophisticated entry
in a model of spatial competition B. Curtis Eaton* and Myrna Holtz Wooders* We
analyze free-entry equilibrium in a model of spatial competition ...
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The core of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions: the model and some results

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M Kaneko… - Mathematical Social Sciences, 1986 - Elsevier
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Continuum economies with finite coalitions: Core, equilibria, and widespread externalities

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PJ Hammond, M Kaneko… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1989 - Elsevier
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A Tiebout theorem

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MH Wooders - Mathematical Social Sciences, 1989 - Elsevier
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Networks and farsighted stability

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FH Page, MH Wooders… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2005 - Elsevier
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Tiebout economies with differential genetic types and endogenously chosen crowding characteristics

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JP Conley… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2001 - Elsevier
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Equivalence of games and markets

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MH Wooders - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1994 - JSTOR
Page 1. Econometrica, Vol. 62, No. 5 (September, 1994), 1141-1160 EQUIVALENCE OF GAMES
AND MARKETS' BY MYRNA HOLTZ WOODERS2 The author proves an equivalence between
large games with effective small groups of players and games generated by markets. ...
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Equivalence of the core and competitive equilibrium in a Tiebout economy with crowding types

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JP Conley… - Journal of Urban Economics, 1997 - Elsevier
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A necessary and sufficient condition for the compactness of individually rational and feasible outcomes and the existence of an equilibrium

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FH Page… - Economics letters, 1996 - Elsevier
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Approximate cores of large games

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MH Wooders… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric …, 1984 - JSTOR
Page 1. ECONOMETRICA VOLUME 52 NOVEMBER, 1984 NUMBER 6
APPROXIMATE CORES OF LARGE GAMES BY MYRNA HOLTZ WOODERS AND
WILLIAM R. ZAMEI The core of a game, which is an abstraction of the ...
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Multijurisdictional economies, the Tiebout Hypothesis, and sorting

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MH Wooders - Proceedings of the National Academy of …, 1999 - National Acad Sciences
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Equivalence of Lindahl equilibrium with participation prices and the core

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MH Wooders - Economic Theory, 1997 - Springer
Page 1. Economic Theory 9, 115-127 (1997) Econom/c Theory 9 Springer-Verlag 1997
Equivalence of Lindahl equilibrium with participation prices and the core* Myrna Holtz Wooders
Department of Economics, University of Toronto, M5S 1A1, CANADA ...
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Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs

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A Kovalenkov… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2003 - Elsevier
We introduce the framework of parameterized collections of games with and without
sidepayments and provide three nonemptiness of approximate core theorems. The
parameters bound (a) the number of approximate types of players and the size of the ...
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[BOOK] Near-Markets and Market Games

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M Shubik, MH Wooders… - 1982 - 128.36.236.35
Page 1. Note: COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS AT YALE
UNIVERSITY Box 2125, Yale Station New Haven, Connecticut 06520 COWLES
FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 657 Cowles Foundation ...
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Large games and economies with effective small groups

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MH Wooders - NATO ASI SERIES D BEHAVIOURAL AND …, 1994 - books.google.com
Page 155. Chapter XII Large Games and Economies with Effective Small Groups
MYRNA H. WOODERS 1 Introduction Our social and economic life is carried out within
groups—firms, families, market-places, and clubs, for example. ...
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The core of a continuum economy with widespread externalities and finite coalitions: from finite to continuum economies

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M Kaneko… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1989 - Elsevier
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Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games

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FH Page… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2009 - Elsevier
We introduce a model of network formation whose primitives consist of a feasible set of
networks, player preferences, rules of network formation, and a dominance relation on
feasible networks. Rules may range from noncooperative, where players may only act ...
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Income distribution and firm formation

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E Bennett… - Journal of Comparative Economics, 1979 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper investigates equilibria associated with alternative income-distribution
schemes in economies where firm formation is endogenous. The income realizable by a firm
depends upon the membership of the firm. An entrepreneurial equilibrium, where agents ...
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Tax competition reconsidered

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MH Wooders, B Zissimos… - 2001 - wrap.warwick.ac.uk
... Author(s): Amritta Dhillon, Myrna Wooders(Warwick) and Ben Zissimos Article Title: Tax
Competition Reconsidered Year of publication: 2007 Link to published version: http://www.
ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/jpet/2007/00000009/00000003 /art00001;jsessionid ...
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Epsilon cores of games with limited side payments: nonemptiness and equal treatment

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A Kovalenkov… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2001 - Elsevier
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Stability of jurisdiction structures in economies with local public goods

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MH Wooders - Mathematical Social Sciences, 1988 - Elsevier
Individuals of different types can form groups, ie jurisdictions, for the purposes of collective
consumption and production of local public goods by the membe.
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Inconsequential arbitrage

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FH Page, MH Wooders… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2000 - Elsevier
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Large games: Fair and stable outcomes

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MH Wooders… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1987 - Elsevier
We establish that for a broad class of large games with sidepayments, fair out-comes are
nearly stable. More precisely, the Shapley value of a large game is in.
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The nonemptiness of thef-core of a game without side payments

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M Kaneko… - International Journal of Game Theory, 1996 - Springer
Page 1. International Journal of Game Theory (1996) 25:245-258 Game Theory The
Nonemptiness of the f-Core of a Game Without Side Payments 1 MAMORU KANEKO
Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute ...
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Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes

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N Allouch… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2008 - Elsevier
We model an economy with clubs (or jurisdictions) where individuals may belong to multiple
clubs and where clubs sizes are arbitrary—clubs may be restricted to consist of only one or
two persons, or as large as the entire economy, or anything in-between. Notions of price- ...
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[PDF] Taste-homogeneity of optimal jurisdictions in a Tiebout economy with crowding types and endogenous educational investment choices

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JP Conley, M Wooders… - Ricerche …, 1996 - vanderbilt.edu
Abstract We examine a local public goods economy with differentiated crowding. The main
innovation is that we assume that the crowding effects of agents are a result of choices that
agents make. For example, agents may be crowded (positively or negatively) by the skills ...
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The partnered core of an economy and the partnered competitive equilibrium

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FH Page… - Economics Letters, 1996 - Elsevier
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Inessentiality of large groups and the approximate core property: an equivalence theorem

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MH Wooders - Economic Theory, 1992 - Springer
Page 1. Econ. Theory 2, 129-147 (1992) Economic Theory 9 Springer-Verlag 1992 Inessentiality
of large groups and the approximate core property: an equivalence theorem* Myrna Holtz
Wooders** Department of Economics, University of Toronto, 150 St. ...
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Hotelling tax competition

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MH Wooders… - 2003 - wrap.warwick.ac.uk
Page 1. HOTELLING TAX COMPETITION Myrna Wooders And Ben Zissimos No 668 WARWICK
ECONOMIC RESEARCH PAPERS ... Page 2. Hotelling Tax Competition1 Myrna Wooders University
of Warwick Ben Zissimos University of Birmingham Preliminary draft: June 2002 ...
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Tax competition reconsidered

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A Dhillon, M Wooders… - Journal of Public Economic …, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
In a classic model of tax competition, this paper shows that the level of public good provision
and taxation in a decentralized equilibrium can be efficient or inefficient with either too much
or too little public good provision. The key is whether there exists a unilateral incentive to ...
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[BOOK] Monotonicity in games that exhaust gains to scale

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S Scotchmer, MH Wooders… - 1988 - warwick.ac.uk
Page 1. 1 MONOTONICITY IN GAMES THAT EXHAUST GAINS TO SCALE Suzanne
Scotchmer and Myrna Holtz Wooders Working Papers in Economics E-89-23 The
Hoover Institution Stanford University August 1989 This ...
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Public good differentiation and the intensity of tax competition

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B Zissimos… - Journal of Public Economics, 2008 - Elsevier
We show that, in a setting where tax competition promotes efficiency, variation in the extent
to which firms can use public goods to reduce costs brings about a reduction in the intensity
of tax competition. This in turn brings about a loss of efficiency. In this environment, a ' ...
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Anonymous Lindahl pricing in a Tiebout economy with crowding types

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JP Conley… - Canadian Journal of Economics, 1998 - JSTOR
Page 1. Anonymous Lindahl pricing in a Tiebout economy with crowding types JOHN
P. CONLEY University of Illinois MYRNA H. W OO DERS University of Toronto
Abstract. The 'crowding types' model of a local public goods ...
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[CITATION] Arbitrage in markets with unbounded short sales: necessary and sufficient conditions for nonemptiness of the core and existence of equilibrium

FH Page Jr… - UFAE and IAE Working Papers, 1994 - ideas.repec.org
... Author Info. Page, FHJr. Wooders, MH. Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s): Myrna Wooders. Abstract. No abstract is available for this item. Download
Info. To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. ...
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Approximate cores of replica games and economies:: Part II: Set-up costs and firm formation in coalition production economies

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M Shubik… - Mathematical Social Sciences, 1983 - Elsevier
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First and second welfare theorems for economies with collective goods

V Barham… - Topics in public economics: …, 1998 - books.google.com
Page 81. CHAPTER 3 First and second welfare theorems for economies with collective
goods* Vicky Barham and Myrna H. Wooders 1. Introduction In a seminal contribution,
Tiebout (1956) argued that local public goods could ...
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[PDF] Optimal and equilibrium groups

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S Scotchmer… - Harvard University Department of …, 1986 - warwick.ac.uk
Page 1. OPTIMAL AND EQUILIBRIUM GROUPS Suzanne Scotchmer* Myrna Holtz
Wooders** Discussion Paper 1251 July 1, 1986 Abstract We discuss economies with
complementarities and/or crowding in production or consumption. ...
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Arbitrage, equilibrium, and gains from trade: A counterexample

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PK Monteiro, FH Page… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1997 - Elsevier
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[CITATION] Hedonic independence and taste-homogeneity of optimal jurisdictions in a Tiebout economy with crowding types

JP Conley, MH Wooders… - 1996 - University of Illinois at Urbana- …
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Behavioral conformity in games with many players

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M Wooders, E Cartwright… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2006 - Elsevier
In the literature of psychology and economics it is frequently observed that individuals tend
to conform in their behavior to that of similar individuals. A fundamental question is whether
the outcome of such conformity can be consistent with self-interest. We propose that this ...
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Widespread externalities and perfectly competitive markets: examples

M Kaneko… - Imperfections and behavior in economic …, 1994 - Springer
Page 1. 4 WIDESPREAD EXTERNALITIES AND PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MARKETS:
EXAMPLES ABSTRACT Mamoru Kaneko Myrna H. Wooders* Department of Economics Virginia
Polytechnic Institute and State University Blacksburg, Virginia, USA ...
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Networks and clubs

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FH Page Jr… - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2007 - Elsevier
We formulate a club model where players' have identical single-peaked preferences over
club sizes as a network formation game. For situations with “many” clubs, we provide
necessary and sufficient for non-emptiness of the farsighted core and the direct (or myopic ...
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Anonymous price taking equilibrium in Tiebout economies with a continuum of agents: Existence and characterization

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N Allouch, JP Conley… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2009 - Elsevier
We introduce a model of a local public goods economy with a continuum of agents and
jurisdictions with finite but unbounded populations, where the set of possible projects for
each jurisdiction/club is unrestricted in size. Under boundedness of per capita payoffs, ...
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Anonymous pricing in Tiebout economies and economies with clubs

J Conley… - Topics in Public Finance, 1998 - books.google.com
Page 109. CHAPTER 4 Anonymous pricing in Tiebout economies and economies
with clubs* John P. Conley and Myrna H. Wooders 1. Introduction One of the persistent
problems in public economics is how to achieve efficient ...
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Dynamic club formation with coordination

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T Arnold… - 2002 - wrap.warwick.ac.uk
... Tone Arnold And Myrna Wooders No 640 ... Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim,
70593 Stuttgart, Germany tone@uni-hohenheim.de Myrna Wooders Department of Economics,
University of Warwick, UK, M.Wooders@warwick.ac.uk First version: February 2002 ...
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The partnered core of a game with side payments

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PJ Reny, E Winter… - Social Choice and Welfare, 2009 - Springer
Abstract An outcome of a game is partnered if there are no asymmetric dependencies
between any two players. For a cooperative game, a payoff is in the partnered core of the
game if it is partnered, feasible and cannot be improved upon by any coalition of players. ...
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Laws of scarcity for a finite game-exact bounds on estimations

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A Kovalenkov… - Economic Theory, 2005 - Springer
Summary. A “law of scarcity” is that scarceness is rewarded. We demonstrate laws of scarcity
for cores and approximate cores of games. Furthermore, we show that equal treatment core
payoff vectors satisfy a condition of cyclic monotonicity. Our results are developed for ...
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Strategic basins of attraction, the farsighted core, and network formation games

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FH Page… - WARWICK ECONOMIC RESEARCH …, 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Page 1. This paper can be downloaded without charge at: The Fondazione Eni Enrico
Mattei Note di Lavoro Series Index: http://www.feem.it/Feem/Pub/Publications/WPapers/
default.htm Social Science Research Network Electronic ...
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[PDF] Arbitrage with price-dependent preferences: equilibrium and market stability

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FH Page Jr… - Fields Institute Communications, 1999 - warwick.ac.uk
Page 1. Fields Institute Communications Volume 23, 1999 Arbitrage with
Price-Dependent Preferences: Equilibrium and Market Stability Frank H. Page, Jr.
Department of Finance University of Alabama Tuscaloosa, Alabama ...
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On the growth-maximizing distribution of income

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AJ Robson… - International Economic Review, 1997 - JSTOR
This paper presents an unconventional argument based on population growth to bolster
marginal productivity theory. There is an economy with a single output produced from a
number of different types of labor. Each type of labor is reproduced from that type itself and ...
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Social conformity and equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players

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MH Wooders, E Cartwright… - 2002 - wrap.warwick.ac.uk
... Myrna Wooders Edward Cartwright And Reinhard Selten No 636 ... Myrna Wooders
Department of Economics University of Warwick Coventry CV4 7AL, UK M.Wooders@
warwick.ac.uk http://www.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/Economics/wooders/ ...
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Axiomatization of ratio equilibria in public good economies

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A Van Den Nouweland, S Tijs… - Social Choice and Welfare, 2002 - Springer
Page 1. Soc Choice Welfare (2002) 19: 627–636 9999 2002 Axiomatization of ratio
equilibria in public good economies Anne van den Nouweland1, S. Tijs2, Myrna H.
Wooders3 1 Department of Economics, University of Oregon ...
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[BOOK] Anonymous pricing in public goods economies

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JP Conley, MH Wooders… - 1995 - vanderbilt.edu
... and Myrna Wooders** June 1997 ... Published version appears as: John Conely and Myrna Wooders,
”Anonymous Pricing in Public Goods Economies”, in Topics in Public Economics, D. Pines, E.
Sadka, and I. Zilcha, editors, Cambridge University Press, 1997pp. 89-120. ...
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[PDF] The partnered core of an economy

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FH Page… - 1995 - cba.ua.edu
Page 1. The Partnered Core of an Economy* by Frank H. Page Jr. Department of
Finance University of Alabama Myrna Holtz Wooders t Department of Economics
University of Toronto Working Paper No. 245 Working Paper ...
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[PDF] Equilibria, the core, and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good: A Correction

[PDF] from warwick.ac.uk
M Wooders - Journal of Economic Theory, 1981 - warwick.ac.uk
Shortly after the publication of the August 1978 issue of the Journal of Economic Theory,
containing [4], I had occasion to reread the proof of one of the subsidiary theorems of the
paper {Theorem 2). To my acute chagrin, I discovered some flaws in the proof of that ...
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[CITATION] Large games are market games. 1. Large finite games

M Wooders - 1988 - ideas.repec.org
Did you know? RePEc data is maintained by each archive holder on its own website. Nothing
is held centrally. ... No abstract is available for this item. ... To our knowledge, this item is not
available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options: 1. Check ...
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On large games with bounded essential coalition sizes

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E Winter… - International Journal of Economic …, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
1. This paper originally appeared as “On large games with bounded coalition sizes,”(with E.
Winter), University of Bonn, Sonderforschungsbereich 303 Discussion Paper A-317 (1990,
revised 1991). We are grateful to an anonymous referee for helpful comments and to ...
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[CITATION] Convergence of the core to competitive outcomes in economies with public goods

University of Toronto. Dept. of Economics… - 1993 - Dept. of Economics and Institute for …
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[BOOK] The Attribute Core, Core Convergence, and Small Group Effectiveness: The Effects of Property Rights Assignments on the Attribute Core

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MH Wooders… - 1993 - eea-esem.com
... effectiveness( The effects of property rights assignments on the attribute core Myrna Wooders
W Department of Economics, University of Warwick, e mail M.Wooders@warwick.ac.uk First
version: September 1992 _ Current version: March 2003. Abstract ...
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[BOOK] Approximating games and economies by markets

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MH Wooders… - 1994 - warwick.ac.uk
Page 1. Approximating Games and Economies by Markets ∗ Myrna Holtz WOODERS†
Department of Economics, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada, M5S 1A1 e-mail
mwooders@epas.utoronto.ca iefa6@cc.uab.es April 1994, June 1999 Abstract ...
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[CITATION] Equivalence of Tiebout equilibrium and the core in a model with crowding types,'

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J Conley… - Journal of Urban Economics, 1997
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On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players

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E Cartwright… - 2003 - wrap.warwick.ac.uk
... Edward Cartwright And Myrna Wooders No 686 WARWICK ECONOMIC RESEARCH PAPERS
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS ... Coventry CV4 7AL, UK EJCartwright@warwick.ac.uk Myrna
Wooders Department of Economics University of Warwick Coventry CV4 7AL, UK ...
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[CITATION] Properties of quasi-cores and quasi-equilibria in coalition economies

M Wooders - 1977 - State University of New York, …
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Club networks with multiple memberships and noncooperative stability

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FH Page… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2010 - Elsevier
Modeling club structures as bipartite directed networks, we formulate the problem of club
formation with multiple memberships as a noncooperative game of network formation and
identify conditions on network formation rules and players' network payoffs sufficient to ...
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Evolution & voting: how nature makes us public spirited

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JP Conley, A Toossi… - 2001 - wrap.warwick.ac.uk
Page 1. Evolution & Voting: How Nature Makes us Public Spirited John P. Conley1 University
of Illinois jpconley@uiuc.edu Ali Toossi University of Illinois toossi@students.uiuc.edu Myrna
Wooders University of Warwick ecsdz@warwick.ac.uk Revised: November 2001 ...
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An axiomatization of the core for finite and continuum games

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E Winter… - Social Choice and Welfare, 1994 - Springer
Page 1. Soc Choice Welfare (1994) 11 : 165-175 Social Choice JWelfare ©
Springer-Verlag 1994 An axiomatization of the core for finite and continuum games*
Eyal Winter 1 and Myrna Holtz Wooders 2 Department of Economics ...
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Cyclic games: an introduction and some examples

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R Selten… - Games and economic behavior, 2001 - Elsevier
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Social conformity in games with many players

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M Wooders, E Cartwright… - FEEM Working Paper No. …, 2003 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: In the literature of psychology and economics it is frequently observed that
individuals tend to imitate similar individuals. A fundamental question is whether the
outcome of such imitation can be consistent with self-interested behaviour. We propose ...
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Comparative statics and laws of scarcity for games

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A Kovalenkov… - Rationality and Equilibrium, 2006 - Springer
A “law of scarcity” is that scarceness is rewarded. We demonstrate laws of scarcity for cores
and approximate cores of games. Furthermore, we demonstrate conditions under which all
payoffs in the core of any game in a parameterized collection have an equal treatment ...
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On purification of equilibrium in Bayesian games and expost Nash equilibrium

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E Cartwright… - International Journal of Game Theory, 2009 - Springer
Abstract Treating games of incomplete information, we demonstrate that the existence of an
ex post stable strategy vector implies the existence of an approximate Bayesian equilibrium
in pure strategies that is also expost stable. Through examples we demonstrate the ' ...
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[PS] The Tiebout Hypothesis: On the Existence of Pareto E cient Competitive Equilibrium

[PS] from utoronto.ca
JP Conley… - 1997 - repec.economics.utoronto.ca
Page 1. The Tiebout Hypothesis: On the Existence of Pareto E cient Competitive Equilibrium
John P. Conley Department of Economics, University of Illinois Myrna Holtz Wooders Department
of Economics, University of Toronto April 1997, This version: May 1998. Abstract ...
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[CITATION] The core of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions: Nonemptiness with bounded sizes of coalitions

M Kaneko… - 1985 - Dept. of Economics and Institute for …
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A further extension of the KKMS theorem

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Y Kannai… - Mathematics of Operations Research, 2000 - JSTOR
Page 1. MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH Vol. 25, No. 4, November
2000, pp. 539-551 Printed in USA A FURTHER EXTENSION OF THE KKMS
THEOREM YAKAR KANNAI AND MYRNA H. WOODERS Reny and ...
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[PDF] But what have you done for me lately? Commercial Publishing, Scholarly Communication, and Open-Access

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JP Conley… - Economic Analysis and Policy, 2010 - eap-journal.com
Abstract: We discuss our experience in both commercial and open-access publishing. We
argue that, in the papyrocentric (paper-centered) era before 1990, commercial publishers
served a useful and necessary purpose. In the electronic era, post 2000, the academy has ...
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[BOOK] Advances in the theory of large cooperative games and applications to club theory; The side payments case,"

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A Kovalenkov… - 2003 - books.google.com
While the notion that individuals will act in their own self interests is fundamental to game
theory and also to economics, the notion that if there are potential gains to be realized from
cooperation then individuals will attempt to capture these gains is also fundamental. ...
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19 UTILITY THEORIES IN COOPERATIVE GAMES

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M Kaneko… - Handbook of Utility Theory: …, 2004 - books.google.com
Page 401. 19 UTILITY THEORIES IN COOPERATIVE GAMES Mamoru Kaneko*
and Myrna H. Wooders** * University of Tsukuba ** University of Warwick Contents
1 Introduction 1067 2 Games with Side Payments 1068 2.1 ...
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[CITATION] A game equilibrium model of thin markets

R Selten… - Discussion Paper Serie B, 1990 - econpapers.repec.org
By Reinhard Selten and Myrna Wooders; A game equilibrium model of thin markets.
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Memetics and voting: how nature may make us public spirited

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JP Conley, A Toossi… - International Journal of Game Theory, 2006 - Springer
Abstract We consider the classic puzzle of why people turn out for elections in substantial
numbers even though formal analysis strongly suggests that rational agents would not vote.
If one assumes that voters do not make systematic mistakes, the most plausible ...
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Endogenous network dynamics

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F Page… - 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: In all social and economic interactions, individuals or coalitions choose not only
with whom to interact but how to interact, and over time both the structure (the “with whom”)
and the strategy (“the how”) of interactions change. Our objectives here are to model the ...
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[CITATION] On Aumann's Markets with a Continuum of Traders: the Continuum, Small Group Effectiveness, and Social Homogeneity

University of Toronto. Dept. of Economics… - 1994 - Dept. of Economics and Institute for …
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[PDF] Arbitrage and global cones; Global cones are not open

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P Monteiro, FH Page Jr… - University of Alabama …, 1995 - cba.ua.edu
Page 1. Arbitrage and Global Cones: Global Cones Are Not Open by Paulo K. Monteiro,
Frank H. Page, Jr., and Myrna Holtz Wooders Working Paper No. 254 Working Paper
Series Department of Economics, Finance and Legal ...
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Arbitrage and global cones: Another counterexample

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PK Monteiro, FH Page Jr… - Social Choice and Welfare, 1999 - Springer
Page 1. Soc Choice Welfare (1999) 16: 337±346 Arbitrage and global cones: Another
counterexample* Paulo K. Monteiro1, Frank H. Page, Jr.2,**, Myrna H. Wooders3,***
1CORE, 34 voie du Roman Pays, B-1348 Louvain-la ...
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The battle of the sexes over distribution of male surplus

[PDF] from warwick.ac.uk
MH Wooders… - 2001 - wrap.warwick.ac.uk
Page 1. THE BATTLE OF THE SEXES OVER THE DISTRIBUTION OF MALE SURPLUS Myrna
Wooders And Hugo van den Berg No 610 ... Page 2. The battle of the sexes over the distribution
of male surplus¤ Myrna Wooders Department of Economics, University of Warwick, ...
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Correlated equilibrium and behavioural conformity

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E Cartwright… - 2004 - wrap.warwick.ac.uk
Page 1. Correlated equilibrium and behavioural conformity Edward Cartwright and Myrna Wooders
No 732 WARWICK ECONOMIC RESEARCH PAPERS ... Canterbury CT2 7NP, UK
EJCartwright@kent.ac.uk Myrna Wooders Department of Economics University of Warwick ...
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[PDF] Mass-economies with vital small coalitions; the f-core approach

[PDF] from yale.edu
PJ Hammond, M Kaneko… - Cowles Foundation …, 1985 - dido.wss.yale.edu
Page 1. COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS AT YALE
UNIVERSITY Box 2125, Yale Station New Haven, Connecticut 06520 COWLES
FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 752 Note: Cowles Foundation ...
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Social conformity and bounded rationality in arbitrary games with incomplete information: some first results

[PDF] from warwick.ac.uk
E Cartwright… - 2003 - wrap.warwick.ac.uk
... And Myrna Wooders No 672 ... Myrna Wooders Department of Economics University of Warwick
Coventry CV4 7AL, UK M.Wooders@warwick.ac.uk http://www.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/Economics/
wooders/ First version: January 2002 This version: August 2003 Abstract ...
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Some first results for noncooperative pregames: social conformity and equilibrium in pure strategies

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MH Wooders, R Selten… - 2001 - wrap.warwick.ac.uk
... IN PURE STRATEGIES Myrna Wooders Reinhard Selten Edward Cartwright No 589 ... Social
Conformity and Equilibrium in Pure Strategies∗ A revision of University of Warwick Department
of Economics WP #589 Myrna Wooders† Department of Economics University of Warwick ...
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Arbitrage and equilibrium in economies with externalities

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C Le Van, FH Page… - Journal of Global Optimization, 2001 - Springer
Page 1. Journal of Global Optimization 20: 309–321, 2001. © 2001 Kluwer Academic
Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. 309 Arbitrage and Equilibrium in Economies
with Externalities⋆ CUONG LE VAN1, FRANK H. PAGE ...
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Relaxing tax competition through public good differentiation

[PDF] from warwick.ac.uk
B Zissimos… - 2005 - wrap.warwick.ac.uk
Relaxing Tax Competition through Public Good Differentation Ben Zissimos and Myrna Wooders
No 737 WARWICK ECONOMIC RESEARCH PAPERS ... Relaxing Tax Competition through Public
Good Differentiation1 Ben Zissimos 2 Myrna Wooders 3 Vanderbilt University ...
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[CITATION] The e-core of an N-person game

M Wooders - State University of New York at Stony Brook Working …, 1979
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[PDF] On the theory of equalizing differences; Increasing abundances of types of workers may increase their earnings

[PDF] from vanderbilt.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
E Cartwright… - Economics Bulletin, 2001 - vanderbilt.edu
Abstract The theory of equalising differences recognises that wage differentials may be
required to equalise the attractiveness of alternative occupations. We examine this theory
using the Conley/Wooders' crowding types' model. The crowding types model ...
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On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players

Full text - MIT Libraries
E Cartwright… - International Journal of Game Theory, 2009 - Springer
Abstract We demonstrate that, if there are sufficiently many players, any Bayesian
equilibrium of an incomplete information game can be “ε-purified”. That is, close to any
Bayesian equilibrium there is an approximate Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies. Our ...
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The law of demand in tiebout economies

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E Cartwright, JP Conley… - 2005 - wrap.warwick.ac.uk
Page 1. The Law of Demand in Tiebout Economies Edward Cartwright, John Conley and Myrna
Wooders No 734 WARWICK ECONOMIC RESEARCH PAPERS ... Canterbury, CT2 7NP, UK John
Conley and Myrna Wooders Department of Economics Vanderbilt University ...
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Epsilon cores of games and economies with limited side payments

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A Kovalenkov… - 1999 - wrap.warwick.ac.uk
Page 1. Epsilon cores of games and economies with limited side payments.¤ Alexander
Kovalenkovy Department of Economics, Gardner Hall, University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3305, USA Myrna Holtz Woodersz ...
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[PDF] Representing games as coalition production economies with public goods

[PDF] from warwick.ac.uk
A Meseguer-Artola, MH Wooders… - 2003 - wrap.warwick.ac.uk
Page 1. REPRESENTING GAMES AS COALITION PRODUCTION ECONOMIES WITH PUBLIC
GOODS Antoni Meseguer-Artola Myrna Holtz Wooders And Juan-Enrique Martinez-Legaz No
669 WARWICK ECONOMIC RESEARCH PAPERS DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS ...
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[CITATION] Semi-public Good Economies

M Wooders - 1976 - … Bureau, State University of New York
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[PDF] Subgame perfect cooperation in an extensive game

[PDF] from vanderbilt.edu
P Chander… - Working Papers, 2010 - vanderbilt.edu
Abstract This paper brings together two of the most important solution concepts of game
theory–subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game and the core of a
cooperative game. Our approach rests on two fundamental ideas:(1) Given an extensive ...
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