S Callander… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2007 - Elsevier
Despite a pervasive presence in politics, lying has not traditionally played a role in formal
models of elections. In this paper we develop a model that allows candidates in the
campaign stage to misrepresent their policy intentions if elected to office, and in which the ...
MO Jackson… - Review of Economic Studies, 2005 - Wiley Online Library
We characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding offers of strategy
contingent side payments before the game is played. This does not always lead to efficient
outcomes, despite complete information and costless contracting. The characterizations ...
JP Conley… - Games and Economic behavior, 1996 - vanderbilt.edu
Abstract We investigate the domain of comprehensive but not necessarily convex bargaining
problems. Without convexity the Nash solution is not well defined. We propose a new
solution, the Nash Extension, that coincides with the Nash solution when S is convex. We ...
JP Conley… - Economics Letters, 1991 - Elsevier
Abstract We relax the assumption used in axiomatic bargaining theory that the feasible set
be convex. Instead we require only that it be 7 comprehensive. We show that on this domain,
Kalai's (1977) characterization of the egalitarian solution remains true, as does Kalai and ...
L Corchon… - Review of Economic Design, 1996 - Springer
Abstract To overcome deficits of the Lindahl solution concept when the economy does not
exhibit constant returns to scale, Kaneko (1977a) introduced the concept of aratio
equilibrium. Theratio correspondence selects for each economy its set of ratio equilibrium ...
B Chakravorti, WW Sharkey… - Journal of Economics …, 1995 - Wiley Online Library
Chakravorti, B., Sharkey, WW, Spiegel, Y. and Wilkie, S.(1995), A uctioning the A irwave s: T
he C ontest f or B roadband pcs S pectru m. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,
4: 345–373. doi: 10.1111/j. 1430-9134.1995. 00345. x
B Chakravorty, LC Corchon… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2006 - Elsevier
The theory of implementation abounds with mechanisms with intricate systems of rewards
and punishments off-the-equilibrium path. Generally, it is not in the designer's best interest to
go through with the reward/punishment in the “subgame” arising from some disequilibrium ...
D Dimitrios… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1994 - Elsevier
Abstract We introduce an extension of Kaneko′ s ratio equilibrium to the case of economies
with many public and private goods. Specifically, we employ a general production model
where public goods may be inputs in the production of public goods. Using the accounting ...
JM Peha, WH Lehr… - 2007 - repository.cmu.edu
The debate over “network neutrality” has recently emerged as the single most important
communications policy issue—at least within the United States—that is now being debated
around the world. The resolution of this debate may greatly influence what applications ...
JP Conley, R McLean… - Forth coming in Games and …, 2000 - vanderbilt.edu
Abstract We provide a characterization of the Euclidean Yu solution used in the
multiobjective programming literature. This solution minimizes the Euclidean distance
between the utopia point and the feasible set, and is closely related to solutions from the ...
MO Jackson… - 2000 - 129.3.20.41
Abstract We characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding offers of
strategy contingent side payments before the game is played. This does not always lead to
efficient outcomes, despite complete information and costless contracting. The ...
M Richardson… - Journal of Regulatory Economics, 1995 - Springer
An Incremental Incentive Scheme (IIS) encourages some activity by rewarding an agent for
overachieving a base level determined by past performance but not penalizing
underachievement. We examine an IIS R&D subsidy in a dynamic model due to ...
JP Conley, RP McLean… - Social Choice and Welfare, 1996 - Springer
Abstract. In this paper, we provide axiomatic foundations for social choice rules on a domain
of convex and comprehensive social choice problems when agents have cardinal utility
functions. We translate the axioms of three well known approaches in bargaining theory ( ...
[CITATION] The bargaining problem without convexity: Extending the Nash solution
J Conley… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1996
JP Conley… - Review of Economic Design, 1994 - Springer
Abstract Conley and Wilkie (1993) introduced an axiomatization at the Nash extension
bargaining solution defined on a domain of comprehensive but not necessarily convex
problems. In this paper we present a non-cooperative game which implements the Nash ...
Y Spiegel… - Journal of Economics & Management …, 1996 - Wiley Online Library
We examine the question of whether a regulated firm that makes a long-term investment in
infrastructure can credibly signal its private information regarding the future demand for its
output to the capital market. We show that necessary conditions for a separating ...
RP McAfee, J McMillan… - Better living through …, 2010 - books.google.com
In August 1993 President Bill Clinton signed a historic law granting the US Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) the authority to auction spectrum licenses. 1 The origin
of this law dates back to Ronald Coase's 1959 proposal to sell the radio spectrum. ...
[CITATION] The bargaining problem without convexity
JP Conley, S Wilkie… - 1989 - College of Commerce and Business …
L Corchón… - 1994 - mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
R&D, and so in equilibrium, total industry costs are not minimized for the equilibrium level of
industry output. However, when the competitive variable is a strategic complement there is underinvestment
in R&D, see Shapiro [8). In contrast, we are able to show that investment in computers ...
C Beviá, LC Corchón… - Review of Economic Design, 2003 - Springer
1 Departament d'Economia i d'Hist`oria Econ`omica and CODE Universitat Aut`onoma de
Barcelona, Edifici B, 08193 Bellaterra (Barcelona), Spain (e-mail: carmen.Bevia@uub.es) 2 Departamento
de Economıa. Universidad Carlos III Madrid, Calle Madrid 126, 28903 Getafe (Madrid), ...
Summary We examine the set of Pareto-efficient allocations in economies with public goods.
We show that even if preferences are continuous and strongly monotonic, it need not
coincide with the set of weakly efficient allocations. We then study topological properties of ...
[CITATION] 1996! Double implementation of the ratio correspondence by a market mechanism
LC CORCHÓN… - Economic Design
JP Conley… - Social Choice and Welfare, 2012 - Springer
Abstract Rubinstein et al.(Econometrica 60: 1171–1186, 1992) introduced the Ordinal Nash
Bargaining Solution. They prove that Pareto optimality, ordinal invariance, ordinal symmetry,
and IIA characterize this solution. A feature of their work is that attention is restricted to a ...
Y Spiegel… - 2000 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: In this paper we examine the design of nonlinear prices by a multiproduct
monopolist who faces customers with multidimensional but correlated types. We show that
the monopoly can exploit the correlations between consumers' types to design pricing ...
[CITATION] VLies, Damned Lies and Political CampaignsV
S Callender… - 2005 - mimeo, Northwestern University
[CITATION] Spectrum auctions are not a panacea: Theory and evidence of anti-competitive and rent-seeking behavior in FCC rulemakings and auction design (2007)
S Wilkie - Working Paper
P Shan, G Tan, SJ Wilkie… - Review of Industrial Organization, 2012 - Springer
Page 1. Rev Ind Organ DOI 10.1007/s11151-012-9349-5 China's Anti-Monopoly Law:
What is the Welfare Standard? Pingping Shan · Guofu Tan · Simon J. Wilkie · Michael
A. Williams © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2012 ...
M Richardson… - Economic Record, 1986 - Wiley Online Library
In the Economic Record June 198 1 Kleiman and Pincus (K&P) analyze the economic
effects of an incremental export subsidy. In that article they disagreed with the
recommendation of the IAC (1977) and the Report of the Study Group On Structural ...
[CITATION] Explaining Price Anomalies in the PCS License Auctions
S Wilkie - 1997 - Working Paper, Caltech
M Bykowsky, J Levy, W Sharkey, T Waldon… - Review of Industrial …, 2003 - Springer
This article reviews some of the major economic issues faced by the FCC in thelast year. It
focuses on the application of new analytic techniques at the FCC, andidentifies several
areas in which further academic research would be valuable to theFCC.
[CITATION] Towards neutral ground on net neutrality
J Aronson, F Bar… - TPRC 2006: Research Conference on Communication, …, 2006
C Beviá, LC Corchón… - UFAE and IAE Working Papers, 1998 - eco.uc3m.es
1 Departament d'Economia i d'Hist`oria Econ`omica and CODE Universitat Aut`onoma de
Barcelona, Edifici B, 08193 Bellaterra (Barcelona), Spain (e-mail: carmen.Bevia@uub.es) 2 Departamento
de Economıa. Universidad Carlos III Madrid, Calle Madrid 126, 28903 Getafe (Madrid), ...
M Casari… - Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2005 - Springer
Page 1. Journal of Regulatory Economics; 27:1 47–65, 2005 © 2005 Springer Science+Business
Media, Inc. Manufactured in The Netherlands. Sequencing Lifeline Repairs After an Earthquake:
An Economic Approach ∗ MARCO CASARI Purdue University ...
CR Plott, S Wilkie… - 1995 - hss.caltech.edu
Abstract This paper explores the relationship between technology and the policies that
govern competition in the local telephone business. Analysis of competition policies requires
a" long ran" modeling perspective in which not only the entry and exit of firms are allowed ...
By Dimitrios Diamantaras and S. Wilkie; Ratio Equilibrium in the Presence of Many Private Goods.
S Wilkie… - Working Papers, 2002 - econpapers.repec.org
Related works: Working Paper: Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among
Players (2002) Journal Article: Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among
Players (2005) This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items ...
MO Jackson… - Microeconomics, 2002 - ideas.repec.org
We characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding offers of strategy
contingent side payments before the game is played. This does not always lead to efficient
outcomes, despite complete information and costless contracting. The characterizations ...
S Wilkie, Aspen Institute… - 2009 - ntia.doc.gov
In August 2008, the Aspen Institute Communications and Society Program convened 29
experts and leaders in communications policy from government, business, academia, and
the non-profit sector to address how the next Administration of the United States ...
[CITATION] Candidate Flexibility
S Callander… - annual meeting of the Public Choice Society, San …, 2002
M Richardson… - Working Papers, 1988 - econpapers.repec.org
By Martin Richardson and S. Wilkie; INCREMENTAL R$D SUBSIDIES.
[CITATION] Wholesale Access Licensing Promotes Competition AND Could Increase Auction Revenue
S Wilkie
S Wilkie… - Econometric Society 2004 North American …, 2004 - ideas.repec.org
Rubinstein Safra and Thomson (1992) introduced the Ordinal Nash Bargaining Solution.
They proved that Pareto Optimality, Ordinal Invariance, Ordinal Symmetry, and IIA
characterize this solution. They restrict attention to a domain of social choice problem with ...
AS Wilkie - 1979 - en.scientificcommons.org
PJ Reny, SJ Wilkie… - International Journal of Industrial …, 2012 - Elsevier
Delipalla and O'Donnell (2001) contains a formula for the incidence of specific and ad valorem
taxes in a conjectural variations oligopoly model with potentiall.
[CITATION] Second Mover Advantage and Market Entry
DV Tran, DS Sibley… - 2008
S Wilkie - Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
... Introduction to the Special Issue on Telecommunications. Simon Wilkie. Article first published online:
14 SEP 2004. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2004.00178.x. Issue. ... More content like this. Find more
content: like this article. Find more content written by: Simon Wilkie. ...
I Brocas, JD Carrillo… - 2011 - transition.fcc.gov
1 Executive Summary In this study we introduce a model of media market competition to
examine the impact of ownership structure on the performance of the market in terms of
informational efficiency and viewpoint diversity. We adopt the classical mathematical ...
LC Corchón, B Chakravorty… - 2006 - orff.uc3m.es
The theory of implementation abounds with mechanisms with intricate systems of rewards
and punishments off-the-equilibrium path. Generally, it is not in the designer's best interest to
go through with the reward/punishment in the “subgame” arising from some disequilibrium ...
G Aharonovitz, B Allen, M Bhiladwalla, W Bossert… - Economic Design, 1997 - Springer
Dr. Fikret Adaman of Bogazici University has asked to be relieved from his duty as
Administrator of our Editorial Office, a duty which he has cheerfully and effectively carried
from the inception of the journal. Economic Design thanks Dr. Adaman for all his help so ...
S Wilkie… - Economic Theory, 1996 - ideas.repec.org
We examine the set of Pareto-efficient allocations in economies with public goods. We show
that even if preferences are continuous and strongly monotonic, it need not coincide with the
set of weakly efficient allocations. We then study topological properties of the Pareto set. ...
SJ Wilkie - Engineering and Science, 2001 - calteches.library.caltech.edu
Page 1. 28 ENGINEERING & SCIENCE NO . 1 2001 The information revolution has had a
profound impact on the economy but very little impact on economic policy, which is largely still
generated by 19th-century ideas.… Having a 21st-century economy based on ...
S Wilkie… - Papers, 1992 - ideas.repec.org
No abstract is available for this item. ... To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three options: 1. Check below under "Related
research" whether another version of this item is available online. 2. Check on the ...
SJ Wilkie - Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2001 - Wiley Online Library
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S Wilkie - S. Cal. L. Rev., 1995 - HeinOnline
Specificity? provides us with a detailed description of the many legal approaches used in
different countries to oversee the regulation of utilities. Then an analytical framework is
presented to explain different countries' particular choices of legal instrument. The key ...
JP Conley… - ideals.illinois.edu
Abstract An n-person Bargaining Problem consists of a pair (5, d) where SC Rn is a set of
feasible utility vectors which the players may obtain through cooperation, and the point d E
5, called the disagreement-point, is interpreted as the utility that players receive if they fail ...
SJ Wilkie… - International Journal of Communication, 2007 - ijoc.org
Page 1. International Journal of Communication 1 (2007), Feature 147-148 1932-8036/
2007FEA0147 Copyright © 2007 (Simon Wilkie, swilkie@law.usc.edu; Susan Crawford,
scrawford@scrawford.net). ... “Cyberlaw” SIMON WILKIE University of Southern California ...
DS Sibley, S Wilkie… - 2004 - ftc.gov
Abstract We consider two agents, each of which has a long term contract relationship with
the same principal. Prior to the expiration of the contract a new opportunity appears that was
not anticipated at the time of contracting. We assume that if both agents exit the original ...
V Spiesel… - 2000 - kellogg.northwestern.edu
Abstract: In this paper we examine the design of nonlinear prices by a multiproduct
monopolist faces customers with multidimensional but correlated types. We show that the
monopoly can exploit the correlations between consumers' types to design pricing ...
[CITATION] The Nash Bargaining Problem Without Convexity
JP Conley, S Wilkie… - 1991 - University of Illinois at Urbana- …
[CITATION] Sequencing Repairs After an Earthquake: An Economic Approach
M Casari, SJ Wilkie… - 2004 - Pacific Earthquake Engineering …
RP McAfee… - 2006 - colorado.edu
Abstract We examine the effect of a price floor in both the" produce in advance" and"
produce to order" models. In both models we provide an exact formula for the deadweight
loss that is intuitive and geometric. In addition we provide simple and intuitive conditions ...
[CITATION] Joumal of Regulatory Economics; 7: 161-175 (1995)© 1995 Kluwer Academic Publishers
M RICHARDSON… - Journal of regulatory economics, 1995
[CITATION] A Study of success and failure in agricultural development
AS Wilkie - 1978 - University of Reading
S Wilkie - UFAE and IAE Working Papers - ideas.repec.org
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JP Conley… - 1991 - ideals.illinois.edu
Abstract An n-person Bargaining Problem consists of a pair (5, d) where SC ft" is a set of
feasible utility vectors which the players may obtain through cooperation, and the point d£ 5.
called the disagreement point, is interpreted as the utility that players receive if they fail to ...
P Reny, S Wilkie… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: In a 2001 article that appeared in the International Journal of Industrial
Organization, Delipalla and O'Donnell derive a formula for the incidence of an ad valorem or
specific tax in a conjectural variations oligopoly model with potentially asymmetric firms ( ...
[CITATION] On the Boundary Between Possibility and Impossibility in Social Choice
JP Conley, R McLean, S Wilkie… - 1994 - University of Illinois at Urbana- …
LC Corchón, C Beviá… - 2003 - e-archivo.uc3m.es
1 Departament d'Economia i d'Hist`oria Econ`omica and CODE Universitat Aut`onoma de
Barcelona, Edifici B, 08193 Bellaterra (Barcelona), Spain (e-mail: carmen.Bevia@uub.es) 2 Departamento
de Economıa. Universidad Carlos III Madrid, Calle Madrid 126, 28903 Getafe (Madrid), ...
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