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Using Repayment Data to Test Across Models of Joint Liability Lending*

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C Ahlin… - The Economic Journal, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
Theories rationalising joint liability lending are rich in implications for repayment rates. We
exploit this fact to test four diverse models. We show that the models' repayment implications
do not always coincide. For example, higher correlation of output and borrowers' ability to ...
Cited by 152 - Related articles - All 30 versions

Can micro-credit bring development?

[PDF] from microfinancegateway.org
Full text - MIT Libraries
C Ahlin… - Journal of Development Economics, 2008 - Elsevier
We examine the long-run effects of micro-credit on development in an occupational choice
model similar to Banerjee and Newman (JPE, 1993). Micro-credit is modeled as a pure
improvement in the credit market that opens up self-employment options to some agents ...
Cited by 50 - Related articles - All 12 versions

Selection into and across credit contracts: theory and field research

[PDF] from psu.edu
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C Ahlin… - Journal of Econometrics, 2007 - Elsevier
Lenders may choose to encourage borrower side contracting using group, or co-signed,
loans or discourage it using individual loans, so as to make relative performance
comparisons. In this context wealth of the agents relative to outsiders, and wealth ...
Cited by 38 - Related articles - All 29 versions

Are financial development and corruption control substitutes in promoting growth?

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C Ahlin… - Journal of Development Economics, 2008 - Elsevier
While financial development and corruption control have been studied extensively, their
interaction has not. We develop a simple model in which low corruption and financial
development both facilitate the undertaking of productive projects, but act as substitutes in ...
Cited by 34 - Related articles - All 10 versions

Where does microfinance flourish? Microfinance institution performance in macroeconomic context

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C Ahlin, J Lin… - Journal of Development Economics, 2011 - Elsevier
We study whether and how the success of microfinance institutions (“MFI" s) depends on the
country-level context, in particular macroeconomic and macro-institutional features.
Understanding these linkages can make MFI evaluation more accurate and, further, can ...
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Corruption: Political determinants and Macroeconomic effects

CR Ahlin - Working Papers, 1999 - ideas.repec.org
Downloadable! Two aspects of corruption are examined theoretically: its effect on macroeconomic
variables, and its determination from the political environment. Corruption is defined in an
occupational choice model as the extra fees or bribes that must be paid by some entrepreneurs ...
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[PDF] Luck or skill? MFI performance in macroeconomic context

[PDF] from rug.nl
C Ahlin… - BREAD [Bureau for Research and Economic Analysis …, 2006 - rug.nl
Abstract Microfinance institutions (MFI's) are often evaluated for purposes of emulation,
replication, and funding. One potential ingredient of MFI success that has not been
sufficiently explored is the impact of the macroeconomy. This question takes on special ...
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Menu costs and Markov inflation: A theoretical revision with new evidence

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C Ahlin… - Journal of Monetary Economics, 2007 - Elsevier
We revisit a foundational theoretical paper in the menu-cost literature, Sheshinski and Weiss
[1983. Optimum pricing policy under stochastic inflation. Review of Economic Studies 50 (3),
513–529], one of the few to treat stochastic inflation with persistent deviations from trend. ...
Cited by 14 - Related articles - All 7 versions

Bribery, inefficiency, and bureaucratic delay

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C Ahlin… - Journal of Development Economics, 2007 - Elsevier
We examine bribery in a dynamic setting with a partially honest bureaucracy. The presence
of honest officials lowers the bribe that a corrupt official can extract from efficient applicants.
Consequently, efficient applicants may face delays in receiving licenses, or may never ...
Cited by 13 - Related articles - All 10 versions

[CITATION] Corruption, aggregate economic activity and political organization

C Ahlin - University of Chicago, processed, 2000
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[PDF] Effects and (in) tractability of decentralized corruption

[PDF] from msu.edu
C Ahlin - 2005 - msu.edu
Page 1. Effects and (In)tractability of Decentralized Corruption Christian Ahlin Vanderbilt University
c.ahlin@vanderbilt.edu Revised: December 2005 JEL No. D73, H77, O17 Keywords: Corruption;
Decentralization; Electoral Accountability; Optimal Wage Policy Abstract ...
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[CITATION] A note on fractionalization decomposition

C Ahlin - 2005 - Working Paper, October
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[CITATION] Dynamic versus group lending with adverse selection

C Ahlin… - 2007 - April
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[CITATION] Determinants of the prevalence of cooperative borrowing

C Ahlin… - Unpublished paper. Chicago: University of Chicago, 2002
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[PDF] Menu costs and Markov inflation: A theoretical revision with new evidence

[PDF] from u-tokyo.ac.jp
C Ahlin… - Journal of Monetary Economics, …, 2006 - carf.eu-tokyo.ac.jp
Abstract We revisit a foundational theoretical paper in the menu cost literature, Sheshinski
and Weiss (1983), one of the few to treat stochastic inflation with persistent deviations from
trend. In contrast to the original finding, we find that optimal pricing in this environment ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - All 11 versions

[CITATION] Using repayment data to test across models of

C Ahlin… - 2007
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[PDF] Matching for credit: risk and diversification in Thai microcredit groups

[PDF] from lse.ac.uk
C Ahlin - 2009 - sticerd.lse.ac.uk
Abstract How has the microcredit movement managed to push financial frontiers? In a
context in which borrowers vary in unobservable risk, Ghatak (1999, 2000) shows that group-
based, joint liability contracts price for risk more accurately than individual contracts, ...
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[PDF] Dynamic lending vs. group lending in the Ghatak/Stiglitz/Weiss adverse selection model

[PDF] from tufts.edu
C Ahlin… - Mimeo, 2009 - ase.tufts.edu
Abstract We compare the efficiency of group lending and dynamic, individualized lending in
a simple adverse selection model. We find that the information revelation of both types of
unconstrained contracts is similar, but the assumed constraints limit the usefulness of the ...
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[CITATION] Matching for Credit: Risk and Diversification in Thai Micro-borrowing Groups PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE

C Ahlin - 2007
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Optimal Pricing Under Stochastic Inflation: State: Dependent (s, S) Policies

CR Ahlin - Working Papers, 2001 - ideas.repec.org
Downloadable! A model of firm-level optimal pricing under stochastic inflation and fixed costs
of adjusting prices is solved and characterized. In this model, inflation alternates stochastically
between some positive rate g and zero inflation. We find that a single (s,S) band is not optimal ...
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[PDF] The Conditional Gini: Estimation and Application to the Relationship between Wealth, Financial Use, and Income Inequality

[PDF] from yale.edu
C Ahlin… - 2011 - econ.yale.edu
Abstract The Gini measure of inequality can be written as the ratio of dyadic means. We
define the conditional Gini as the ratio of conditional dyadic means. The conditional Gini
shows how inequality varies with observables, both levels and differences. We illustrate ...
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[PDF] PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE

[PDF] from uchicago.edu
C Ahlin - 2006 - economics.uchicago.edu
Abstract In a lending environment of limited liability with unobserved risk types, individual
lending contracts involve safe borrowers cross-subsidizing risky ones, and thus may drive
safe borrowers from the market. Ghatak (1999, 2000) shows that joint liability contracts ...
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[PDF] Group Formation with Fixed Group Size: Complementarity vs Substitutability

[PDF] from duke.edu
C Ahlin - 2012 - ipl.econ.duke.edu
Abstract One-sided matching under transferable utility is well understood when groups of
size two are being formed. In this setting, complementarity or substitutability of types in the
group payoff function pins down key features of the equilibrium matching pattern, without it ...
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[PDF] Optimal Pricing Under Stochastic Inflation

[PDF] from vanderbilt.edu
CR Ahlin - 2001 - vanderbilt.edu
Page 1. OPTIMAL PRICING UNDER STOCHASTIC INFLATION: STATE-DEPENDENT (S,S)
POLICIES by Christian R. Ahlin Working Paper No. 01-W27 November 2001 DEPARTMENT
OF ECONOMICS VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY NASHVILLE, TN 37235 ...
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[PDF] Hotelling Was Right About Snob/Congestion Goods (Asymptotically)

[PDF] from vanderbilt.edu
C Ahlin… - Working Papers, 2006 - vanderbilt.edu
Abstract We add congestion/snobbery to the Hotelling model of spatial competition. For any
firm locations on opposite sides of the midpoint, a pure strategy price equilibrium exists and
is unique if congestion costs are strong enough relative to transportation costs. The ...
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[PDF] The Conditional Gini: Estimation and Inference

[PDF] from duke.edu
C Ahlin… - 2011 - ipl.econ.duke.edu
Abstract The Gini measure of inequality can be written as the ratio of dyadic means. We
define the conditional Gini as the ratio of conditional dyadic means. The conditional Gini
shows how inequality varies with observables, both levels and differences. We illustrate ...
Related articles - View as HTML

[PDF] Group Size Matters in Microlending under Adverse Selection or Moral Hazard

[PDF] from msu.edu
C Ahlin - 2011 - econ.msu.edu
Page 1. Group Size Matters in Microlending under Adverse Selection or Moral Hazard Christian
Ahlin ∗ September 2011 Abstract ∗ Department of Economics, Michigan State University;
ahlinc@msu.edu. All errors are our own. 1 Page 2. 1 Introduction ...
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[PDF] Group Formation under Transferable Utility with Group Size greater than Two: Complementarity vs Substitutability

[PDF] from msu.edu
C Ahlin - 2012 - econ.msu.edu
Abstract One-sided matching under transferable utility is well understood when groups of
size two are being formed. In this setting, complementarity or substitutability of types in the
group payoff function completely pins down key features of the equilibrium matching ...
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[PDF] Dynamic Lending in the Ghatak/Stiglitz/Weiss adverse selection model, with Comparison to Group Lending

[PDF] from msu.edu
C Ahlin… - 2011 - econ.msu.edu
Abstract We derive an optimal dynamic lending contract in a simple adverse selection model
with limited commitment on the borrower side. An optimal contract involves “penalty” rates
after a default, and favorable rates after a success. It also charges higher rates for first-time ...
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ROBERT M. TOWNSEND

C Ahlin - The Economic Journal, 2007 - res.org.uk
Theories rationalising joint liability lending are rich in implications for repayment rates. We
exploit this fact to test four diverse models. We show that the models' repayment implications
do not always coincide. For example, higher correlation of output and borrowers' ability to ...
Cached - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 2 versions

Comment on “A note on the Hotelling principle of minimum differentiation: Imitation and crowd”

Full text - MIT Libraries
C Ahlin - Research in Economics, 2008 - Elsevier
We argue that the minimum differentiation firm location equilibrium and the pure strategy
pricing equilibrium in Di Cintio's [Di Cintio, M., 2007. A note on the Hotelling principle of
minimum differentiation: Imitation and crowd. Research in Economics 61 (3), 122–129]“ ...
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[PDF] How does Micro-credit Work? Risk-Matching, Diversification, and Borrower Selection Preliminary Draft

[PDF] from stanford.edu
C Ahlin - 2007 - stanford.edu
Abstract The micro-credit movement has used innovative lending techniques to push
financial frontiers. Many micro-lenders operate in an environment with no collateral and
limited information about borrowers. If borrowers vary in unobservable risk, individual ...
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[PDF] Product differentiation under congestion or snobbery: Hotelling was right

[PDF] from msu.edu
C Ahlin… - 2009 - msu.edu
Abstract We examine product differentiation in Hotelling's (1929) spatial competition model
modified to include negative network externalities–congestion costs or brand snobbery. The
greater are congestion costs, the less differentiated products can be in equilibrium. In fact, ...
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