T Dunne, MJ Roberts… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1988 - JSTOR
This article summarizes the patterns of firm entry, growth, and exit in the four-digit US
manufacturing industries over the period 1963-1982. Entrants are disaggregated into new
firms, existing firms that diversify into an industry by opening new production facilities, and ...
T Dunne, MJ Roberts… - The Quarterly Journal of …, 1989 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract This paper examines the patterns of postentry employment growth and failure for
over 200,000 plants that entered the US manufacturing sector in the 1967–1977 period. The
postentry patterns of growth and failure vary significantly with observable employer ...
L Samuelson - 1998 - books.google.com
Evolutionary game theory is one of the most active and rapidly growing areas of research in
economics. Unlike traditional game theory models, which assume that all players are fully
rational and have complete knowledge of details of the game, evolutionary models ...
GJ Mailath… - 2006 - books.google.com
Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists
have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances
in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a ...
J Gale, KG Binmore… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1995 - Elsevier
This paper studies interactive learning processes that are subject to constant perturbations
or “noise.” We argue that payoffs in the Ultimatum Game are such that responders are more
apt to be “noisy” than are proposers and show that as a result the learning process readily ...
I Eshel, L Samuelson… - American Economic Review, 1998 - JSTOR
We study a population of agents, each of whom can be an Altruist or an Egoist. Altruism is a
strictly dominated strategy. Agents choose their actions by imitating others who earn high
payoffs. Interactions between agents are local, so that each agent affects (and is affected ...
T Dunne, MJ Roberts… - Journal of Labor Economics, 1989 - JSTOR
This article quantifies the role of plant construction, expansion, contraction, and closing in
generating net and gross changes in US manufacturing employment over the 1963-82
period. A new longitudinal data set, constructed from the plant-level observations ...
KG Binmore… - Journal of economic theory, 1992 - Elsevier
Abstract We consider a game in which “meta-players” choose finite automata to play a
repeated stage game. Meta-players' utilities are lexicographic, first increasing in the (limit-of-
the-means) payoffs of the repeated game and second decreasing in the number of states ...
L Samuelson… - Journal of economic theory, 1992 - Elsevier
Abstract We examine dynamic models of evolutionary selection processes on asymmetric
two-player games. Conditions are established under which dynamic selection processes will
yield outcomes that respect iterated strict dominance. The addition of a stability ...
GJ Mailath… - Review of Economic Studies, 2001 - Wiley Online Library
We examine a market in which long-lived firms face a short-term incentive to exert low effort,
but could earn higher profits if it were possible to commit to high effort. There are two types of
firms,“inept” firms who can only exert low effort, and “competent” firms who have a choice ...
EW Bond… - The American Economic Review, 1986 - JSTOR
When establishing new plants overseas, multinational firms are often offered substantial
investment incentives by host countries. Examples of the types of subsidies offered by host
countries include reduced tax rates in the early years of operation, cash grants, subsidized ...
MJ Roberts… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1988 - JSTOR
This article develops a dynamic model of nonprice competition in an oligopolistic industry,
and uses it to analyze advertising competition in the US cigarette industry. The model
generalizes existing studies by allowing advertising to affect both firm market shares and ...
K Binmore… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1997 - Elsevier
This paper examines an evolutionary model in which the primary source of “noise” that
moves the model between equilibria is not arbitrarily improbable mutations but mistakes in
learning. We model strategy selection as a birth–death process, allowing us to find a ...
EW Bond… - The Rand Journal of Economics, 1984 - JSTOR
A monopoly producer of a durable good is examined under the (previously uninvoked)
assumption that the good depreciates, and hence that replacement sales must occur if a
fixed stock of the good is to be maintained. We find two ways in which the no-depreciation ...
K Binmore… - … of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) …, 1994 - JSTOR
This paper seeks to close the gap between the models of man used by economists and
sociologists. The problem of the evolution of social norms is identified with the equilibrium
selection problem in game theory. Adopting such a view requires that sociologists be ...
EW Bond… - The Economic Journal, 1989 - JSTOR
Capital exporting countries often allow taxes paid to foreign governments by firms investing
abroad to be credited against domestic tax liabilities rather than simply deducted as costs
from taxable income. Only the portion of gross tax obligations that exceeds foreign tax ...
K Chatterjee… - The Review of Economic …, 1987 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract This paper examines an infinite horizon bargaining model, incorporating five
features: two-sided incomplete information (with potentially information-revealing strategies),
an infinite horizon, uncertainly concerning the potential gains from trade, an illumination of ...
G Nöldeke… - Games and economic behavior, 1993 - dklevine.com
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 5, 425-454 (1993) An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward
and Forward Induction* Georg Nöldeke Department of Economics, Princeton University,
Princeton, New Jersey 08544 AND Larry Samuelson Department of Economics, ...
KG Binmore, L Samuelson… - Games and economic behavior, 1995 - Elsevier
We examine an evolutionary process based on an explicit model of choice in which agents
occasionally make mistakes in choosing their strategies. If the population size is sufficiently
large, then the deterministic replicator dynamics provides a good approximation of the ...
V Bier, S Oliveros… - Journal of Public Economic …, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
2. We thank the editor, associate editor, and two referees for comments. This research was
supported by the United States Department of Homeland Security through the Center for
Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE) under grant number EMW- ...
K Binmore, J McCarthy, G Ponti… - Journal of Economic …, 2002 - Elsevier
This paper reports experiments with one-stage and two-stage alternating-offers bargaining
games. Payoff-interdependent preferences have been suggested as an explanation for
experimental results that are commonly inconsistent with players' maximizing their ...
L Samuelson - Econometrica, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
Preferences exhibit relative consumption effects if a person's satisfaction with their own
consumption appears to depend upon how much others are consuming. This paper
examines a model of an evolutionary environment in which Nature optimally builds ...
K Binmore… - The Review of Economic …, 1999 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract This paper develops an approach to equilibrium selection in game theory based on
studying the learning process through which equilibrium is achieved. The differential
equations derived from models of interactive learning typically have stationary states that ...
R Battalio, L Samuelson… - Econometrica, 2001 - Wiley Online Library
THE SPECIFICATION OF THE FEASIBLE strategies and preferences that define a strategic-
form game, together with the assumption that players are substantively rational, provides a
powerful framework for analyzing strategic behavior. This framework in turn can be ...
L Samuelson - Journal of Economic Theory, 1994 - Elsevier
Abstract We investigate an evolutionary process that is continually perturbed by" mutations."
If the support of the (unique) stochastically stable distribution is a singleton, then it must be a
Nash equilibrium. If one element of a" mutation-connected component" of Nash equilibria ...
L Samuelson - Games and Economic Behavior, 1992 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper establishes five results. First, the common knowledge of admissibility is
not equivalent to iterated admissibility. Second, there exist games in which the common
knowledge of admissibility does not uniquely determine which strategies should be ...
L Samuelson - Journal of Economic Literature, 2005 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: This paper explores the questions of how economic theory can be used to design
and interpret experiments and how experimental results can be used to construct and
interpret economic theories. The relationship between economic theory and experiments ...
L Samuelson - The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2002 - JSTOR
I ntroduced byJohn von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1944), energized by the addition
ofJohn Nash's (1950) equilibrium concept, and popularized by the strategic revolution of the
1980s, noncooperative game theory has become a standard tool in economics. In the ...
MW Cripps, GJ Mailath… - Econometrica, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
We study the long-run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public
monitoring. It is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that
does not play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types. Thus, a player ...
LJ Mirman, L Samuelson… - International Economic Review, 1993 - JSTOR
We examine a monopoly facing an uncertain demand and maximizing profits over a two-
period horizon. Conditions are developed under which the firm will find it optimal to"
experiment," or adjust initial prices or quantities away from their myopically optimal level in ...
L Samuelson - Journal of Economic Literature, 2004 - JSTOR
1. Introduction It is common to introduce the subtleties that arise in modeling knowledge with
an illustration of the following kind. Alice and Bob are waiting for an interview with a
mercurial potential employer, each wearing a red hat whose color they have forgotten in ...
L Samuelson - Journal of Economic Theory, 2001 - Elsevier
This paper studies decision makers characterized by a stock of models, or analogies, who
respond to strategic interactions by applying what appear to be the most suitable models;
balancing the gains from more sophisticated decisionmaking against the cost of placing ...
J Mirman Leonard, S Larry… - Journal of Economic …, 1994 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper studies a duopoly market in which firms can draw inferences concerning
(uncertain) market demand from observations of their outputs and market price. Firms may
adjust their outputs away from myopically optimal levels to affect the informativeness of the ...
BW Ickes… - The Rand Journal of Economics, 1987 - JSTOR
Many complex organizations, such as planned Soviet enterprises and the US military,
routinely transfer employees between jobs. Since this sacrifices job-specific human capital,
the practice is puzzling. This article shows that regular job transfers may be part of an ...
GJ Mailath, L Samuelson… - American Economic Review, 2000 - JSTOR
We consider a market with" red" and" green" workers, where labels are payoff irrelevant.
Workers may acquire skills. Skilled workers search for vacancies, while firms search for
workers. A unique symmetric equilibrium exists in which color is irrelevant. There are also ...
L Samuelson - Journal of International Economics, 1982 - Elsevier
Abstract A multinational firm faced with 'arm's length'limitations on its transfer prices is
examined, where the limitations are determined by the firm's marginal cost and intracountry
prices. Such a firm is shown to manipulate its production and sales in order to gain a more ...
K Chatterjee… - Operations Research, 1988 - JSTOR
Chatterjee and Samuelson (1987) recently examined a noncooperative game-theoretic
bargaining model with two-sided incomplete information and an infinite horizon. Results
were obtained from the model with the help of restrictions on agents' strategies. This paper ...
G Nöldeke… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1997 - Elsevier
In his work on signaling, Spence proposed a dynamic model of a market in which a buyer
revises prices in light of experience and in which sellers, with private information about their
types, choose utility-maximizing signals given these prices. We follow Spence's ...
GJ Mailath, L Samuelson… - 1998 - ssc.wisc.edu
Abstract We construct a model in which a firm's reputation must be built gradually, is
managed, and dissipates gradually unless appropriately maintained. Consumers purchase
an experience good from a firm whose unobserved effort affects the probability distribution ...
J Dearden, BW Ickes… - The American economic review, 1990 - JSTOR
Hierarchical organizations often perform poorly in inducing the adoption of innovations. We
examine a principal offering contracts to agents who make unobservable effort and adoption-
of-innovation choices (yielding moral hazard), who occupy jobs of differing, unobserved ...
GJ Mailath, L Samuelson… - Econometrica: Journal of the …, 1993 - JSTOR
Different extensive form games with the same reduced normal form can have different
information sets and subgames. This generates a tension between a belief in the strategic
relevance of information sets and subgames and a belief in the sufficiency of the reduced ...
K Binmore… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2006 - Elsevier
Theories of focal points typically assume that games are accompanied by labelings or
“frames” that relate the actions in the game to the environment in which the game is played.
Attention then focuses on how players can exploit framing information to identify focal ...
L Samuelson - Journal of Economic Theory, 2001 - upi-yptk.ac.id
Normal-form games are commonly interpreted as describing situations in which strategy
choices are effectively simultaneous, in the sense that each player must choose without
knowing the other's choice. Suppose, however, that before the game is played Player 1 ( ...
L Samuelson - The Review of Economic Studies, 1992 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract This paper develops an explanation of why bargainers often terminate negotiations
in disagreement in spite of positive expected gains from continued negotiation. The key to
the analysis is a model which embeds bargaining activity within a market. Agents are ...
K Binmore, M Piccione… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1998 - Elsevier
This paper characterizes modified evolutionarily stable strategies (messes) in Rubinstein's
alternating-offers, infinite-horizon bargaining game. We show that a mess causes agreement
to be achieved immediately, with neither player willing to delay the agreement by one ...
T Dunne, MJ Roberts… - JL & Econ. S233, 1989 - HeinOnline
* We are grateful to John Hause, David Levy, and an anonymous referee for helpful
comments. This research was supported by National Science Foundation (NSF) grants SES-
84-01460 and SES-86-05844 and was conducted at the Center for Economic Studies of ...
J Andreoni… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2006 - Elsevier
Experiments have shown that people have a natural taste for cooperation. This paper takes
a first step in understanding how formal and informal institutions might be designed to utilize
these private tastes to facilitate more efficient economic interactions. We examine a twice- ...
S Bhattacharya, K Chatterjee… - Oxford Economic Papers, 1986 - JSTOR
IN THE last decade, the literature on equilibrium models of research and development (R &
D) has addressed the problem of strategic interactions in the adoption of innovations with
known distributions of payoffs. This line of inquiry is exemplified by the work of Fudenberg ...
EW Bond… - Journal of International Economics, 1989 - Elsevier
Abstract Once a firm has installed a plant in a host country, the country will have an incentive
to reopen negotiations concerning tax rates. This paper examines the incentives for the
country to commit to not reopening negotiations. A commitment deters the firm from ...
L Samuelson… - Theoretical Economics, 2006 - econtheory.org
Abstract Human utility embodies a number of seemingly irrational aspects. The leading
example in this paper is that utilities often depend on the presence of salient unchosen
alternatives. Our focus is to understand why an evolutionary process might optimally lead ...
L Samuelson - Public Choice, 1984 - Springer
We construct a spatial election model in which candidates inherit initial positions in the
strategy space, presumably from previous political activity, and they are restricted to
strategies close to their initial positions. We establish sufficient conditions for the existence ...
K Chatterjee… - International Journal of Game Theory, 1990 - Springer
A generalization of the Nash demand game is examined. Agents make simultaneous offers
in each period as to how a pie is to be divided. Incompatible offers send the game to the next
period, while compatible offers end the game with a split-the-difference trade. The set of ...
W Baer… - World Development, 1981 - Elsevier
Abstract This article suggests that the linkage between industrial modernization and
significant service sector employment gains has not been adequately considered and that
such consideration might lead to a re-evaluation of the labour absorption argument which ...
GJ Mailath, L Samuelson… - Economic Theory, 1997 - Springer
It is now common to interpret the Nash equilibria of a game as a description of equilibrium behavior
of populations of agents who are randomly matched to play that game. In particular, if there is
one population for each player in the underlying game and if the pattern of matching is ...
L Samuelson - Journal of Economic Literature, 2005 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: This is a review article of Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments
and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies (Oxford University Press
2004) edited by Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr ...
K Binmore… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2001 - Elsevier
We examine a version of Rubinstein's Electronic Mail Game in which the noisy
communications technology is voluntary and costly. Multiple Nash equilibria exist, including
an equilibrium in which messages are ignored, and an equilibrium in which only one ...
K Binmore, L Samuelson… - Games and economic behavior, 2003 - Elsevier
This paper examines evolutionary equilibrium selection in bargaining models. We show that
random best-response and continuous best-response learning dynamics give rise to
(different) simple sufficient conditions for identifying outcomes as stochastically stable. ...
K Binmore, C Proulx, L Samuelson… - The Economic …, 1998 - Wiley Online Library
A long tradition in economics assumes that any potential gains from trade will be exploited.
This emphasis on efficiency clashes with the possibility that hard bargaining over the
division of the surplus may cause some potential deals to be lost. We examine an Outside ...
L Samuelson - Games and Economic Behavior, 1991 - Elsevier
Abstract Because the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is too strict in
asymmetric games, the more general limit ESS concept was proposed by Selten. This paper
provides a characterization of the limit ESS concept, showing that a strategy profile is a ...
K Binmore… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2001 - Elsevier
Selten (1980, J. Theoret. Biol., 84, 93–101) showed that no mixed equilibria are
evolutionarily stable when players can condition their strategies on their roles in a game.
Alternatively, Harsanyi's (1973, Int. J. Game Theory, 2, 1–23) purification argument implies ...
K Binmore… - European Economic Review, 1994 - Elsevier
Which equilibria should command our attention in a game with multiple equilibria? Attempts
to solve this equilibrium selection problem have recently turned from the invention of
equilibrium refinements to evolutionary models of games. Unfortunately, the basic ...
MW Cripps,
JC Ely, GJ Mailath… - Econometrica, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
Cripps thanks the Economic and Social Research Council (UK) via ELSE, and Mailath and
Samuelson thank the National Science Foundation (Grants SES-0350969 and SES-
0549946, respectively) for financial support. We thank Stephen Morris, the editor, and ...
M Perry… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1994 - JSTOR
We examine noncooperative bargaining between two agents, one of whom (agent 1)
represents a constituency. Under" closed-door" bargaining, constituents must approve the
final bargaining agreement. In the" open-door" case, constituents may also terminate ...
MW Cripps, GJ Mailath… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring,
Cripps et al.[Imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations, Econometrica 72 (2004)
407–432] showed that an informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot ...
J Horner… - 2012 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes
experiments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The
agent's actions are hidden, and the principal cannot commit to future actions. The ...
JW Friedman… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1990 - Elsevier
Abstract Earlier efforts by Friedman examined infinite horizon oligopolies trying (and failing)
to show existence of subgame perfect Nash equilibria with the firms' strategies being
continuous reaction functions. Here, in a typical game theoretic model with discounting, ...
AJ Robson… - The American economic review, 2007 - JSTOR
We focus on intertemporal preferences here, arising out of the evolutionary implications of
different reproductive strategies or life histories. An agent's life history specifies the agent's
number and timing (and in a richer model, quality) of offspring. Evolution will select the life ...
EW Bond… - Economics Letters, 1987 - Elsevier
Abstract We consider the optimal sales policy for a monopoly seller of a durable good in a
non-stationary rational expectations equilibruim with replacement sales. We show that
Coase's conjecture that the monopolist will sell the competitive stock as period length ...
LJ Mirman, L Samuelson… - Economic Theory, 1993 - Springer
Summary This paper examines a repeated duopoly market with heterogeneous outputs.
Firms have (common) prior beliefs over the values of an unknown parameter of each firm's
demand curve. Firms cannot observe rivals' quantities, but can observe market prices, ...
W Friedman James… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1994 - Elsevier
Abstract Friedman and Samuelson (1990, Games Econ. Behav. 2, 304–324) have recently
shown that continuous reaction functions can support nontrivial outcomes as subgame
perfect equilibria in repeated games. This paper examines continuous reaction functions ...
AJ Robson… - The Social Economics Handbook, 2010 - sfu.ca
Abstract. This paper, prepared for the forthcoming The Social Economics Handbook (Jess
Benhabib, Alberto Bisin and Matthew Jackson, editors, Elsevier Press), surveys recent work
on the evolutionary origins of preferences. We are especially interested in the ...
EW Bond… - Economica, 1987 - JSTOR
A commonly cited finding in the innovation literature is that a monopoly tends to innovate too
little. This paper examines the role in supporting this result played by an assumption that has
attracted relatively little attention: that the monopoly produces a nondurable good. We ...
L Samuelson… - Working papers, 2001 - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of
further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site ...
L Samuelson - Economics Letters, 1993 - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of
further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site ...
L Samuelson - International Journal of Game Theory, 1987 - Springer
An intuitive expectation is that in a finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, the players will
achieve mutual cooperation in at least some periods. Existing explanations for equilibrium
cooperation (with agents perfectly informed of one another's characteristics) require that ...
L Samuelson - The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 1996 - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to
view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are
not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
LJ Mirman… - The Economic Journal, 1989 - JSTOR
An inside trader possesses private information on which the trader would like to capitalise.
Unfortunately, doing so may reveal the information and erode the alleged advantage
conferred by holding it. As an idealized example, assume someone has' inside ...
GJ Mailath, L Samuelson… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1997 - Elsevier
A strategy profile of a normal form game is proper if and only if it is quasi-perfect in every
extensive form (with that normal form). Thus, properness requires optimality along a
sequence of supporting trembles, while sequentiality only requires optimality in the limit. A ...
AJ Robson… - The American Economic Review, 2009 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: We examine the evolutionary foundations of intertemporal preferences. When all
the risk affecting survival and reproduction is idiosyncratic, evolution selects for agents who
maximize the discounted sum of expected utility, discounting at the sum of the population ...
A Postlewaite, L Samuelson… - The Review of …, 2008 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We examine an economy in which the cost of consuming some goods can be
reduced by making commitments that reduce flexibility. We show that such consumption
commitments can induce consumers with risk-neutral underlying utility functions to be risk ...
L Samuelson - Public Choice, 1987 - Springer
This study tests for the existence of a revealed-preference phenomenon in recent
congressional elections. A revealed-preference analysis predicts that if candidate one
defeats incumbent candidate two, then candidate one has been revealed preferred to ...
I Eshel, DK Herreiner, L Samuelson… - … methods & research, 2000 - smr.sagepub.com
Abstract In a population with a local interaction structure, where individuals interact with their
neighbors and learning is by way of imitating a successful neighbor, cooperation is shown to
be a stable strategy that cannot easily be eliminated from the population.
A Postlewaite, L Samuelson… - 2004 - nber.org
We examine an economy in which the cost of consuming some goods can be reduced by
making commitments to consumption levels independent of the state. For example, it is
cheaper to produce housing services via owner-occupied than rented housing, but the ...
L Samuelson - Working papers, 1991 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks.
How to Tremble if you Must. Larry Samuelson. Working papers from Wisconsin Madison -
Social Systems. Keywords: economic models; economic ...
L Samuelson… - Economics Letters, 1992 - Elsevier
Economics Letters 38 (1992) 5560 55 NorthHolland Search costs and prices Larry Samuelson
University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wi 53706, USA Tanbo Zhang Penn State University, University
Park, PA 16802, USA Received 29 August 1991 Accepted 21 October 1991 This paper ...
L Samuelson - Economics Letters, 1987 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper demonstrates that non-trivial subgame perfect duopoly equilibria can be
supported by continuous reaction functions when previous-period actions of both firms are
arguments of reaction functions. Continuity imposes essentially no restrictions on the set ...
Abstract We formulate a dynamic learning-and-adjustment model of a market in which
sellers choose signals that potentially reveal their types. If the dynamic process selects a
unique limiting outcome, then that outcome must be an undefeated equilibrium; though to ...
L Samuelson - Journal of Economic Theory, 1985 - Elsevier
Abstract Probabilistic choice models often invoke a behavioral assumption referred to as the
independence from irrelevant alternatives. The implications of this condition have not been
fully developed in probabilistic choice contexts. It is well known that nonpathological ...
GJ Mailath, A Postlewaite… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2005 - Elsevier
We examine contemporaneous perfect ɛ-equilibria, in which a player's actions after every
history, evaluated at the point of deviation from the equilibrium, must be within ɛ of a best
response. This concept implies, but is stronger than, Radner's ex ante perfect ɛ- ...
J Hörner… - The Journal of Political Economy, 2011 - JSTOR
We consider the problem of a monopolist who must sell her inventory before some deadline,
facing buyers with independent private values. The seller faces a basic trade-off between
imperfect price discrimination and maintaining an effective reserve price. When there is ...
L Samuelson… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2003 - Elsevier
We explore the interaction between evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences. To
do so, we define a limit Nash equilibrium for a lexicographic game as the limit of Nash
equilibria of nearby games with continuous preferences. Nash equilibria of lexicographic ...
L Samuelson… - History of Political Economy, 1986 - Duke Univ Press
Marx's posthumous expositors attempted to specify the dynamic characteristics of the
capitalist economies described by Marx. For example, Otto Bauer endeavored to
demonstrate the possibility of sustained growth in a closed capitalist economy with an ...
[CITATION] The Impact of Plant Failure on Employment Growth in the US Manufacturing Sector
T Dunne, M Roberts… - unpublished paper, Pennsylvania State …, 1987
V Bier, S Oliveros… - Journal of Public …, 2006 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract CHOOSING WHAT PROTECT Strategic defensive allocation against unknown
attacker Vicki Bier Department Industrial Engineering University Wisconsin Engineering
Drive Madison Wisconsin Bier engr wisc edu Santiago Oliveros Department Economics ...
G Nöldeke… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
This paper presents simple sufficient conditions under which optimal bunches in adverse-selection
principal-agent problems can be characterized without using optimal control theory. ... [1] D.
Baron and R. Myerson, Regulating a monopolist with unknown cost. Econometrica, 50 ...
G Mailath, A Postlewaite… - 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Different markets are cleared by different types of prices---a universal price for all
buyers and sellers in some markets, seller-specific prices that are uniform across buyers in
others, and personalized prices tailored to both the buyer and the seller in yet others. We ...
JW Friedman… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1994 - Elsevier
Abstract In Friedman and Samuelson (1990, Games Econ. Behav. 2, 304–324) we showed
that there exist subgame perfect equilibria for infinitely repeated games in which the
equilibrium strategy combinations are continuous. This paper extends these results by ...
R Battalio, L Samuelson… - Laser-script, 1997 - pubmail.dklevine.com
Abstract: This paper reports an experiment comparing three stag hunt games that have the
same best-response correspondence. The games have the same expected payoff from the
mixed equilibrium, but differ in the pecuniary incentive a player has to play a best ...
GN LDEKE… - Journal of Theoretical Biology, 2003 - Elsevier
We examine a strategic-choice handicap model in which males send costly signals to
advertise their quality to females. Females are concerned with the net viability of the male
with whom they mate, where net viability is a function of the male's quality and signal. We ...
[CITATION] Latin America in the post-import-substitution era
W Baer… - 1977 - Elsevier Science & Technology
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