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Learning, mutation, and long run equilibria in games

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M Kandori, GJ Mailath… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric …, 1993 - JSTOR
Page 1. Econometrica, Vol. 61, No. 1 (January, 1993), 29-56 LEARNING, MUTATION,
AND LONG RUN EQUILIBRIA IN GAMES BY MICHIHIRO KANDORI, GEORGE J.
MAILATH, AND RAFAEL ROB We analyze an evolutionary ...
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Social norms, savings behavior, and growth

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HL Cole, GJ Mailath… - Journal of Political economy, 1992 - JSTOR
Page 1. Social Norms, Savings Behavior, and Growth Harold L. Cole Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis and University of Pennsylvania George J. Mailath and Andrew
Postlewaite University of Pennsylvania We argue that ...
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[BOOK] Repeated games and reputations: long-run relationships

GJ Mailath… - 2006 - books.google.com
Page 1. Repeated Games and Reputations LONG-RUN RELATIONSHIPS George Mailath Larry
Samuelson Page 2. Repeated Games and Reputations LONG-RUN RELATIONSHIPS George ].
Mailath Larry Samuelson Page 3. Repeated Games and Reputations Page 4. ...
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Asymmetric information bargaining problems with many agents

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GJ Mailath… - The Review of Economic …, 1990 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Page 1. Review of Economic Studies (1990) 57, 351-367 © 1990 The Review of
Economic Studies Limited 0034.6527/90/00220351$02.00 Asymmetric Information
Bargaining Problems with Many Agents GEORGE J. MAILATH ...
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Who wants a good reputation?

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GJ Mailath… - Review of Economic Studies, 2001 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. Review of Economic Studies (2001) 68, 415–441 0034-65270100180415$02.00  2001
The Review of Economic Studies Limited Who Wants a Good Reputation? GEORGE J. MAILATH
Uniûersity of Pennsylûania and LARRY SAMUELSON Uniûersity of Wisconsin ...
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Do people play Nash equilibrium? Lessons from evolutionary game theory

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GJ Mailath - Journal of Economic Literature, 1998 - JSTOR
Page 1. Journal of Economnic Literature Vol. XXXVI (September 1998), pp.
1347-1374 Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons From Evolutionary Game
Theory GEORGE J. MAILATH' 1. Introduction AT THE SAME TIME ...
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[PDF] Belief-based refinements in signalling games

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GJ Mailath, M Okuno-Fujiwara… - Journal of Economic …, 1993 - ssc.upenn.edu
Page 1. JOURNAL OK ECONOMIC THEORY 60, 241-276 (1993) Belief-Based
Refinements in Signalling Games* George J. Mailath Department of Economics, 3718
Locust Walk, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania ...
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Incentive compatibility in signaling games with a continuum of types

GJ Mailath - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1987 - JSTOR
Page 1. Econometrica, Vol. 55, No. 6 (November, 1987), 1349-1365 INCENTIVE
COMPATIBILITY IN SIGNALING GAMES WITH A CONTINUUM OF TYPES1 BY
GEORGE J. MAILATH2 This paper provides two results that are ...
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Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders

GJ Mailath… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1991 - Elsevier
We show that efficient collusion by any subset of bidders in second price private value auctions
is possible, even when the bidders are heterogeneous. An import.
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Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory

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GJ Mailath - Journal of economic theory, 1992 - Elsevier
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Repeated games with almost-public monitoring

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GJ Mailath… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2002 - Elsevier
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Imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations

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MW Cripps, GJ Mailath… - Econometrica, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. Econometrica, Vol. 72, No. 2 (March, 2004), 407–432 IMPERFECT
MONITORING AND IMPERMANENT REPUTATIONS BY MARTIN W. CRIPPS,
GEORGE J. MAILATH, AND LARRY SAMUELSON1 We study the long ...
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[PDF] Incorporating concern for relative wealth into economic models

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HL Cole, GJ Mailath… - Federal Reserve Bank of …, 1995 - mpls.frb.org
Page 1. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review Vol. 19, No. 3,
Summer 1995, pp. 12–21 Incorporating Concern for Relative Wealth Into Economic
Models Harold L. Cole George J. Mailath Andrew Postlewaite ...
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Endogenous inequality in integrated labor markets with two-sided search

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GJ Mailath, L Samuelson… - American Economic Review, 2000 - JSTOR
Page 1. Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-Sided Search By GEORGE
J. MAILATH, LARRY SAMUELSON, AND AVNER SHAKED* We consider a market with "red"
and "green" workers, where labels are payoff irrelevant. Workers may acquire skills. ...
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Class systems and the enforcement of social norms1

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HL Cole, GJ Mailath… - Journal of Public Economics, 1998 - Elsevier
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Simultaneous signaling in an oligopoly model

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GJ Mailath - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1989 - JSTOR
Page 1. SIMULTANEOUS SIGNALING IN AN OLIGOPOLY MODEL* GEORGE J.
MAILATH I. INTRODUCTION This paper studies a dynamic model of differentiated
oligopoly in which all firms have private information about their ...
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Efficient non-contractible investments in large economies

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HL Cole, GJ Mailath… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2001 - Elsevier
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[BOOK] Your reputation is who you're not, not who you'd like to be

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GJ Mailath, L Samuelson… - 1998 - ssc.wisc.edu
Page 1. Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be* George J.
Mailath Department of Economics 3718 Locust Walk University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297 gmailath@econ. sas. upenn.edu ...
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Extensive form reasoning in normal form games

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GJ Mailath, L Samuelson… - Econometrica: Journal of the …, 1993 - JSTOR
Page 1. Econometrica, Vol. 61, No. 2 (March, 1993), 273-302 EXTENSIVE FORM
REASONING IN NORMAL FORM GAMES BY GEORGE J. MAILATH, LARRY
SAMUELSON, AND JEROEN M. SWINKELS1'2 Different extensive ...
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Workers versus firms: Bargaining over a firm's value

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GJ Mailath… - The Review of Economic …, 1990 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Page 1. Review of Economic Studies (1990) 57, 369-380 © 1990 The Review of Economic Studies
Limited 0034-6527/90/00230369$02.00 Workers Versus Firms: Bargaining Over a Firm's Value
GEORGE J. MAILATH and ANDREW POSTLEWAITE University of Pennsylvania ...
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SOCIAL ASSETS*

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GJ Mailath… - International Economic Review, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. ...
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Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring

[PDF] from econtheory.org
G Mailath… - … Discussion Paper No. 1479; PIER Working …, 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have
histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public-
monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible ...
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[PDF] Financing Losers in Competitive Markets1

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AB Abel… - 1990 - finance.wharton.upenn.edu
Page 1. FINANCING LOSERS IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS by Andrew B. Abel
George J. Mailath 2-90 RODNEY L. WHITE CENTER FOR FINANCIAL RESEARCH
The Wharton School University of Pennsylvania Philadelphia ...
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[CITATION] Laws and authority

G Mailath, S Morris… - Yale University, 2001
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Correlated equilibria and local interactions

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GJ Mailath, L Samuelson… - Economic Theory, 1997 - Springer
... There is a fixed and "local" * This work was done while George Mailath and Larry
Samuelson were visiting the University of Bonn, whose hospitality is gratefully
acknowledged. We thank Ken Binmore for helpful dis- cussions. ...
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Purification in the infinitely-repeated prisoners' dilemma

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V Bhaskar, GJ Mailath… - Review of Economic Dynamics, 2008 - Elsevier
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Private strategies in finitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring

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G Mailath, S Matthews… - 2001 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We present three examples of finitely repeated games with public monitoring that
have sequential equilibria in private strategies, ie, strategies that depend on own past
actions as well as public signals. Such private sequential equilibria can have features ...
Cited by 32 - Related articles - All 15 versions

Common learning

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MW Cripps, JC Ely, GJ Mailath… - Econometrica, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. Econometrica, Vol. 76, No. 4 (July, 2008), 909–933 COMMON LEARNING
BY MARTIN W. CRIPPS, JEFFREY C. ELY, GEORGE J. MAILATH, AND LARRY
SAMUELSON1 Consider two agents who learn the value of ...
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An abstract two-period game with simultaneous signaling--Existence of separating equilibria

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GJ Mailath - Journal of Economic Theory, 1988 - Elsevier
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Investment and concern for relative position

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HL Cole, GJ Mailath… - Review of Economic Design, 2001 - Springer
Page 1. Rev. Econ. Design 6, 241–261 (2001) c Springer-Verlag 2001 Investment
and concern for relative position Harold L. Cole1,2, George J. Mailath3 Andrew
Postlewaite3 1 Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank ...
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Business strategy, human capital, and managerial incentives

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GJ Mailath, V Nocke… - Journal of Economics & …, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. ...
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[PDF] Efficient non-contractible investments in finite economies

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HL Cole, GJ Mailath… - Advances in Theoretical …, 2001 - econ.upenn.edu
Page 1. Advances in Theoretical Economics Volume 1, Issue 1 2001 Article 2 Efficient
Non-Contractible Investments in Finite Economies Harold Linh Cole ∗ George J. Mailath
† Andrew Postlewaite ‡ ∗Minneapolis Federal Reserve ...
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Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships

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MW Cripps, GJ Mailath… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
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The social context of economic decisions

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GJ Mailath… - Journal of the European Economic …, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS George J. Mailath
University of Pennsylvania Andrew Postlewaite University of Pennsylvania Abstract
The social context can have a large impact on economic decisions. ...
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[BOOK] Efficient non-contractible investments

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HL Cole, GJ Mailath, A Postlewaite… - 1998 - research.mpls.frb.fed.us
Page 1. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Research Department Staff Report 253 August
1998 Efficient Non contractible Investments Harold L. Cole Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
George J. Mailath University of Pennsylvania Andrew Postlewaite ...
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Repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: Notes on a coordination perspective

GJ Mailath… - CARESS Working Papres, 1998 - ideas.repec.org
Downloadable! In repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, players can use public signals
to perfectly coordinate their behavior. Our study of repeated games with imperfect private
monitoring focusses on the coordination problem that arises without public signals. We present ...
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Market selection and asymmetric information

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GJ Mailath… - Review of Economic Studies, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
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How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium?

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GJ Mailath, L Samuelson… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1997 - Elsevier
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The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

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GJ Mailath, I Obara… - Games and economic behavior, 2002 - Elsevier
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Folk Theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring

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GJ Mailath… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2011 - Elsevier
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[CITATION] When do regulators close banks? When should they?

GJ Mailath… - Working Papers, 1993 - econpapers.repec.org
By George J. Mailath and Loretta J. Mester; When do regulators close banks? When should they?
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Response to" Aristocratic Equilibria"

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HL Cole, GJ Mailath… - The Journal of Political Economy, 1995 - JSTOR
Page 1. Response to "Aristocratic Equilibria" Harold L. Cole Federal Reserve Bank
of Minneapolis George J. Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite University of Pennsylvania
A major point of Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992) is ...
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Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria

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GJ Mailath, A Postlewaite… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2005 - Elsevier
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Pricing in Matching Markets

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G Mailath, A Postlewaite… - 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Different markets are cleared by different types of prices---a universal price for all
buyers and sellers in some markets, seller-specific prices that are uniform across buyers in
others, and personalized prices tailored to both the buyer and the seller in yet others. We ...
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[CITATION] Perpetual randomness in evolutionary economics

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GJ Mailath - Economics Letters, 1993 - econpapers.repec.org
By George J. Mailath; Perpetual randomness in evolutionary economics.
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On the behavior of separating equilibria of signaling games with a finite set of types as the set of types becomes dense in an interval

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GJ Mailath - Journal of economic theory, 1988 - Elsevier
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The incentive costs of internalizing externalities

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G Mailath, V Nocke… - 2002 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We present a dynamic agency model in which changes in the structure of a firm
affect its value due to altered incentives. There may be disadvantages in merging two firms
even when such a merger allows the internalization of externalities between the two firms. ...
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[CITATION] Endogenous Sequencing of Firm Decisions

GJ Mailath - 1988 - University of Pennsylvania
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When the punishment must fit the crime: Remarks on the failure of simple penal codes in extensive-form games

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G Mailath, V Nocke… - CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4793, 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: In repeated normal-form games, simple penal codes (Abreu 1986, 1988) permit an
elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of
simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. We provide two examples ...
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Sunk investments lead to unpredictable prices

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G Mailath, A Postlewaite… - 2003 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We study transactions that require investments before trading in a competitive
market, when forward contracts fixing the transaction price are absent. We show that, despite
the market being perfectly competitive and subject to arbitrarily little uncertainty, the ...
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[CITATION] Correlated equilibria as network equilibria

GJ Mailath, L Samuelson… - Discussion Paper Serie …, 1993 - econpapers.repec.org
By George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson and A. Shaked; Correlated equilibria as network equilibria.
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Community Enforcement when Players Observe Partners' Past Play,” mimeo

S Takahashi, J Green, F Kojima, G Mailath… - 2008 - Citeseer
Abstract I investigate whether a community can sustain cooperation in the repeated
prisoner's dilemma by having cheaters punished not by their victims but by third parties.
Motivated by systems of credit history reporting, online feedback, and some experimental ...
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[CITATION] Volker Nocke, and Lucy White (2008)'When the punishment must fit the crime: Remarks on the failure of simple penal codes in extensiveform games.'

GJ Mailath - Mimeo, University of Oxford
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The impact of asymmetric information on entry deterrence: An example

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GJ Mailath - Economics Letters, 1991 - Elsevier
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A Foundation for Markoiv Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games

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V Bhaskar, G Mailath… - 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We study perfect information games with an infinite horizon played by an arbitrary
number of players. This class of games includes infinitely repeated perfect information
games, repeated games with asynchronous moves, games with long and short run ...
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[PDF] Maintaining authority

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GJ Mailath, S Morris… - Manuscript, University of …, 2007 - princeton.edu
Page 1. Maintaining Authority George J. Mailath University of Pennsylvania Stephen
Morris Princeton University Andrew Postlewaite University of Pennsylvania
September 26, 2007 1. Introduction The authority of a leader is ...
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[CITATION] Evolutionary game theory. Special issue of J

GJ MAILATH - Journal of Economic Theory, 1992
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[PDF] Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships

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MW Cripps, GJ Mailath… - 2005 - hss.caltech.edu
Page 1. Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships∗ Martin W. Cripps John
M. Olin School of Business Washington University in St. Louis St. Louis, MO 63130-4899
cripps@olin.wustl.edu George J. Mailath Department of Economics ...
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[CITATION] Welfare in a Simultaneous Signaling Duopoly Model

GJ Mailath… - 1985 - University of Pennsylvania, Center …
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Pricing and investments in matching markets

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G Mailath, A Postlewaite… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Different markets are cleared by different types of prices--seller-specific prices that
are uniform across buyers in some markets, and personalized prices tailored to the buyer in
others. We examine a setting in which buyers and sellers make investments before ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - All 19 versions

[CITATION] Volker Nocke, and Lucy White

GJ Mailath - When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on …, 2008
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Does competitive pricing cause market breakdown under extreme adverse selection?

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GJ Mailath… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2008 - Elsevier
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[CITATION] 0Social Assets. 1 University of Pennsylvania, Department of Economics

GJ Mailath… - Manuscript, February, 2002
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[CITATION] Andrew Postlewaite (2001a). hEffi cient Non# Contractible Investments in Large Economiesi

HL Cole… - Journal of Economic Theory
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Reputation effects

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GJ Mailath - PIER Working Paper Archive, 2007 - papers.ssrn.com
Page 1. by http://ssrn.com/abstract=1023658 George J. Mailath “Reputation Effects”
PIER Working Paper 07-034 Penn Institute for Economic Research Department
of Economics University of Pennsylvania 3718 Locust Walk ...
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[CITATION] Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

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GJ Mailath… - Review of Economic Dynamics, 2004
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[CITATION] Bargaining and investment in a two sided matching model

HL Cole, GJ Mailath… - Manuscript. University of Pennsylvania, 1995
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Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability: New Results and Classic Applications

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GJ Mailath… - PIER Working Paper Archive, 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Page 1. Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1683471 by http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1683471 George J. Mailath and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden “Incentive Compatibility and
Differentiability: New Results and Classic Applications” PIER Working Paper 10-032 ...
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[CITATION] Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices

A Postlewaite, G Mailath… - University of Pennsylvania (http://www. ssc. …, 2003
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[PDF] A Reformulation of a Criticism of The Intuitive Criterion and Forward Induction

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GJ Mailath - manuscript, University of Pennsylvania, 1988 - economics.sas.upenn.edu
Page 1. A Reformulation of a Criticism of The Intuitive Criterion and Forward Induction
George J. Mailath University of Pennsylvania gmailath@econ.upenn.edu April 1988
(references updated July 2002) The intuitive criterion ...
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[CITATION] Separating Equilibria in Signaling Games: Incentive Compatibility, Existence with Simultaneous Signaling, Welfare and Convergence

GJ Mailath - 1985 - Princeton University
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[CITATION] Aristocratic Equilibria: Response

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HL Cole, GJ Mailath… - Journal of Political Economy, 1995 - ideas.repec.org
Downloadable (with restrictions)! No abstract is available for this item.
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[CITATION] Endogenous Sequencing of Firm Decisions

G Mailath… - 1990 - Department of Economics, University …
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9. The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Monitoring

GJ Mailath… - Repeated Games and Reputations, 2006 - ingentaconnect.com

13. Almost Public Monitoring Games

GJ Mailath… - Repeated Games and Reputations, 2006 - ingentaconnect.com

II. Games with (Imperfect) Public Monitoring

GJ Mailath… - Repeated Games and Reputations, 2006 - ingentaconnect.com

[PDF] 6# HIRR} iÜ>-\ õ 5] qáÜ êÑÑ0Ñp Investment and Concern for Relative Position

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HL Cole, GJ Mailath… - 2000 - economics.sas.upenn.edu
Page 1. 6#HIRR }iÜ>-\õ 5]qáÜ êÑÑ0Ñp Investment and Concern for Relative Position
Harold L. Cole Research Department Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 250
Marquette Ave. Minneapolis, MN 55480 hlc@res.mpls.frb.fed.us ...
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Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives, Second Version

G Mailath, V Nocke… - PIER Working Paper No. 03- …, 2003 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We posit that the value of a manager's human capital depends on the firm's
business strategy. The resulting interaction between business strategy and managerial
incentives affects the organization of business activities, both the internal organization of ...
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[CITATION] Signaling Games: An Introduction

GJ Mailath… - 1990 - University of Pennsylvania, Center …
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'Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets' Second Version

G Mailath, A Postlewaite… - 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Different markets are cleared by different types of prices-seller-specific prices that
are uniform across buyers in some markets, and personalized prices tailored to the buyer in
others. We examine a setting in which buyers and sellers make investments before ...
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[PDF] Economics 703: Microeconomics II Modelling Strategic Behavior1

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GJ Mailath - 2011 - economics.sas.upenn.edu
Page 1. Economics 703: Microeconomics II Modelling Strategic Behavior1 George J. Mailath
Department of Economics University of Pennsylvania December 7, 2011 1Copyright December
7, 2011 by George J. Mailath. Page 2. ii ii Page 3. Contents Contents iii ...
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16. Reputations with Long-Lived Players

GJ Mailath… - Repeated Games and Reputations, 2006 - ingentaconnect.com

11. Applications

GJ Mailath… - Repeated Games and Reputations, 2006 - ingentaconnect.com

Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships, Second Version

M Cripps, G Mailath… - PIER Working Paper No. 04- …, 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public
monitoring, Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) showed that an informed player facing
short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation for playing a ...
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[PDF] Correction to the proof of Lemma 9.4. 2 in Repeated Games and Reputations by George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson (OUP 2006) September 21, 2008

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GJ Mailath - 2008 - ssc.upenn.edu
Page 1. Correction to the proof of Lemma 9.4.2 in Repeated Games and Reputations
by George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson (OUP 2006) September 21, 2008 Claim
9.4.3 (on page 308) is false. We thank Songzi Du for bringing ...
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[CITATION] Notes, Comments, and Letters to the Editor

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GJ MAILATH - Journal of economic theory, 1993 - Academic Press
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[PDF] CARESS Working Paper# 95-14 Incorporating Concern for Relative Wealth into Economic Models

[PDF] from upenn.edu
HL Cole… - 1995 - economics.sas.upenn.edu
Page 1. CARESS Working Paper #95-14 Incorporating Concern for Relative Wealth into Economic
Models by Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite UNIVERSITY of
PENNSYLVANIA Center for Analytic Research in Economics and the Social Sciences ...
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Social Assets, Second Version

G Mailath… - PIER Working Paper No. 04-025, 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We present a model incorporating both social and economic components, and
analyze their interaction. The notion of a social asset, an attribute that has value only
because of the social institutions governing society, is introduced. In the basic model, ...
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3. The Folk Theorem with Perfect Monitoring

GJ Mailath… - Repeated Games and Reputations, 2006 - ingentaconnect.com

Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring, Second Version

G Mailath… - … Discussion Paper No. 1479R; PIER Working …, 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have
histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public
monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible ...
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[CITATION] The Distribution of Value in the Firm

GJ Mailath - 1989 - … -Davidson Center for the Study of the …
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17. Finitely Repeated Games

GJ Mailath… - Repeated Games and Reputations, 2006 - ingentaconnect.com

5. Variations on the Game

GJ Mailath… - Repeated Games and Reputations, 2006 - ingentaconnect.com

[BOOK] Structural indifference in normal form games

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
GJ Mailath, L Samuelson… - 1993 - europealumni.kellogg.northwestern. …
Page 1. Discussion Paper No. 1042 STRUCTURAL INDIFFERENCE IN NORMAL
FORM GAMES by George J. Mailath Larry Samuclson and Jemen M. Swinkels April
1993 Page 2. Structural Indifference in Normal Form Games ...
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[CITATION] Surplus Sharing and Pricing in Matching Markets

G Mailath… - 2005 Meeting Papers, 2005 - ideas.repec.org
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[PDF] Sunk Investments Induce Price Uncertainty1

[PDF] from wustl.edu
GJ Mailath, A Postlewaite… - 2003 - artsci.wustl.edu
Page 1. Sunk Investments Induce Price Uncertainty1 George J. Mailath2 Andrew
Postlewaite3 Larry Samuelson4 April 4, 2003 Preliminary and Incomplete Abstract
We study transactions that require investments before trading ...
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[PDF] The Econometric Society Annual Reports: Report of the Editors of the Monograph Series

[PDF] from econometricsociety.org
Full text - MIT Libraries
A Chesher… - Econometrica, 2009 - econometricsociety.org
The Econometric Society Annual Reports: Report of the Editors of the Monograph Series. Andrew
Chesher, George Mailath Econometrica 77:11, 357-359, The Econometric Society, 1/2009.
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Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, Second Version

V Bhaskar, GJ Mailath… - Levine's Bibliography, 2007 - papers.ssrn.com
Page 1. by http://ssrn.com/abstract=1008474 V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath, and
Stephen Morris “Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma” Second
Version PIER Working Paper 07-024 Penn Institute for Economic ...
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Report of the Editors of the Monograph Series

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Full text - MIT Libraries
GJ Mailath… - Econometrica, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
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[CITATION] 6# HIRR} iÜ>-\ õ 5] qáÜ ęŅŅ0ŅK Market Selection and Asymmetric Information

GJ Mailath… - 2000
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