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The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information

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D Fudenberg… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1986 - JSTOR
When either there are only two players or a" full dimensionality" condition holds, any
individually rational payoff vector of a one-shot game of complete information can arise in a
perfect equilibrium of the infinitely-repeated game if players are sufficiently patient. In ...
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Credit and efficiency in centralized and decentralized economies

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M Dewatripont… - The Review of Economic …, 1995 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We study a credit model where, because of adverse selection, unprofitable projects
may nevertheless be financed. Indeed they may continue to be financed even when shown
to be low-quality if sunk costs have already been incurred. We show that credit ...
Cited by 1100 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 22 versions

Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality*

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E Maskin - The Review of Economic Studies, 1999 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract If A is a set of social alternatives, a social choice rule (SCR) assigns a subset of A to
each potential profile of individuals' preferences over A, where the subset is interpreted as
the set of “welfare optima” A game form (or “mechanism”) implements the social choice ...
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The existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games, I: Theory

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P Dasgupta… - The Review of Economic Studies, 1986 - JSTOR
In this paper and its sequel (Dasgupta and Maskin (1986)) we study the existence of Nash
equilibrium in games where agents' payoff (or utility) functions are discontinuous. Our
enquiry is motivated by a number of recent studies that have uncovered serious existence ...
Cited by 891 - Related articles - Library Search - All 14 versions

Monopoly with incomplete information

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E Maskin… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1984 - JSTOR
Recent theoretical research on principal-agent relationships has emphasized incentive
prob- lems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information
or their inability to monitor each other's actions. Here we concentrate on theformer ...
Cited by 846 - Related articles - All 15 versions

The implementation of social choice rules: Some general results on incentive compatibility

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P Dasgupta, P Hammond… - The Review of Economic Studies, 1979 - JSTOR
If the relevant characteristics of individual agents, such as preferences, happen to be
publicly known, then the social choice rule can be implemented trivially because the choice
set itself is known. The problem of incentive compatibility arises precisely because these ...
Cited by 693 - Related articles - All 13 versions

Unforeseen contingencies and incomplete contracts

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E Maskin, J Tirole - Review of Economic Studies, 1999 - Wiley Online Library
We scrutinize the conceptual framework commonly used in the incomplete contract
literature. This literature usually assumes that contractual incompleteness is due to the
transaction costs of describing—or of even foreseeing—the possible states of nature in ...
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The folk theorem with imperfect public information

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D Fudenberg, D Levine… - Econometrica: Journal of the …, 1994 - JSTOR
We study repeated games in which players observe a public outcome that imperfectly
signals the actions played. We provide conditions guaranteeing that any feasible,
individually rational payoff vector of the stage game can arise as a perfect equilibrium of ...
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Asymmetric auctions

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E Maskin… - Review of Economic Studies, 2000 - Wiley Online Library
The revenue-equivalence theorm for auctions predicts that expected seller revenue is
independent of the bidding rules, as long as equilibrium has the properties that the buyer
with the highest reservation price wins and any buyer with the lowest possible reservation ...
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Renegotiation in repeated games

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J Farrell… - Games and economic behavior, 1989 - Elsevier
Abstract In repeated games, subgame-perfect equilibria involving threats of punishment may
be implausible if punishing one player hurts the other (s). If players can renegotiate after a
defection, such a punishment may not be carried out. We explore a solution concept that ...
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Optimal auctions with risk averse buyers

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E Maskin… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1984 - JSTOR
We characterize a seller's optimal scheme for the sale of an indivisible good to one of n risk
averse buyers. We also compare certain commonly used schemes, such as the high bid and
second bid auctions, under the hypothesis of risk aversion.
Cited by 503 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 10 versions

A theory of dynamic oligopoly, II: Price competition, kinked demand curves, and Edgeworth cycles

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E Maskin, J Tirole - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1988 - JSTOR
We provide game theoretic foundations for the classic kinked demand curve equilibrium and
Edgeworth cycle. We analyze a model in which firms take turns choosing prices; the model
is intended to capture the idea of reactions based on short-run commitment. In a Markov ...
Cited by 500 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 11 versions

Sequential innovation, patents, and imitation

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J Bessen, E Maskin - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
We argue that when innovation is “sequential”(so that each successive invention builds in
an essential way on its predecessors) and “complementary”(so that each potential innovator
takes a different research line), patent protection is not as useful for encouraging ...
Cited by 495 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 94 versions

Understanding the soft budget constraint

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J Kornai, E Maskin… - Journal of Economic Literature, 2003 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: We propose a clarification of the notion of a soft budget constraint, a concept widely
used in the analysis of socialist, transitional, and market economies. Our interpretation is
broad enough to embrace most existing approaches to soft budget constraint phenomena ...
Cited by 486 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 39 versions

Markov perfect equilibrium: I. observable actions

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E Maskin, J Tirole - Journal of Economic Theory, 2001 - Elsevier
We define Markov strategy and Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) for games with observable
actions. Informally, a Markov strategy depends only on payoff-relevant past events. More
precisely, it is measurable with respect to the coarsest partition of histories for which, if all ...
Cited by 432 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 12 versions

Wage inequality and segregation by skill

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M Kremer… - 1996 - nber.org
Evidence from the US, Britain, and France suggests that recent growth in wage inequality
has been accompanied by greater segregation of high-and low-skill workers into separate
firms. A model in which workers of different skill-levels are imperfect substitutes can ...
Cited by 418 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 14 versions

The politician and the judge: Accountability in government

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E Maskin, J Tirole - The American Economic Review, 2004 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: We build a simple model to capture the major virtues and drawbacks of making
public officials accountable (ie, subjecting them to reelection): On the one hand,
accountability allows the public to screen and discipline their officials; on the other, it may ...
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Efficient auctions

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P Dasgupta… - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2000 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We exhibit an efficient auction (an auction that maximizes surplus conditional on all
available information). For private values, the Vickrey auction (for one good) or its Groves-
Clarke extension (for multiple goods) is efficient. We show that the Vickrey and Groves- ...
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The principal-agent relationship with an informed principal, II: Common values

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E Maskin, J Tirole - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1992 - JSTOR
In many circumstances, a principal may have relevant private information when she
proposes a contract to an agent. We analyze such a principal-agent relationship as a
noncooperative game. The principal proposes a contract, which is accepted or rejected by ...
Cited by 342 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 11 versions

A theory of dynamic oligopoly, I: Overview and quantity competition with large fixed costs

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E Maskin, J Tirole - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1988 - JSTOR
The paper introduces a class of alternating-move infinite-horizon models of duopoly. The
timing is meant to capture the presence of short-run commitments. Markov perfect
equilibrium (MPE) in this context requires strategies to depend only on the action to which ...
Cited by 309 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 10 versions

An equilibrium analysis of search and breach of contract, I: Steady states

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PA Diamond… - The Bell Journal of Economics, 1979 - JSTOR
We study the steady-state equilibria of models where individuals meet pairwise in a costly
stochastic search process and negotiate contracts to produce output. Different meetings
yield different outputs, and so an individual in a contract may wish to continue search to ...
Cited by 289 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 14 versions

[CITATION] Optimal multi-unit auctions'

E Maskin… - … LIBRARY OF CRITICAL …, 2000 - EDWARD ELGAR PUBLISHING LTD
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The principal-agent relationship with an informed principal: The case of private values

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E Maskin, J Tirole - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1990 - JSTOR
We analyze the principal-agent relationship when the principal has private information as a
three-stage noncooperative game: contract proposal, acceptance/refusal, and contract
execution. We assume that the information does not directly affect the agent's payoff ( ...
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Implementation and renegotiation

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E Maskin… - Review of Economic Studies, 1999 - Wiley Online Library
Implementation theory attempts to answer the question: When is it possible to design a
game form (also called a mechanism or outcome function) whose equilibrium outcomes are
assured of being optimal with respect to some given criterion of social welfare (called a ...
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The theory of implementation in Nash equilibrium: a survey

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E Maskin - Social goals and social organization: Essays in …, 1985 - books.google.com
The theory of implementation concerns the problem of designing game forms (sometimes
called" mechanisms" or" outcome functions") the equilibria of which have properties that arc
desirable according to a specified criterion of social welfare called a social choice rule. A ...
Cited by 249 - Related articles - All 6 versions

[CITATION] Auctions and privatization

E Maskin - Privatization, 1992 - Tubingen: Mohr
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Equilibrium in sealed high bid auctions

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E Maskin… - Review of Economic Studies, 2000 - Wiley Online Library
There is a voluminous theoretical literature on sealed high-bid auctions (auctions in which
bids are sealed and the high bidder pays his bid). See for example, Vickery (1961), Myerson
(1981), riley and Samuelson (1981), Milgrom and Weber (1982), Mathews (1983), Maskin ...
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Evolution and cooperation in noisy repeated games

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D Fundenberg… - The American Economic Review, 1990 - JSTOR
CDC 2, 2-1, 3 D 3,-1 0, 0 is played only once, the unique equilibrium is for both players to
play D, resulting in the inefficient payoffs (0, 0). If, instead, the game is repeated infinitely
often and the players are not too impatient, there are" cooperative" equilibria in which both ...
Cited by 227 - Related articles - Library Search - All 19 versions

The simple economics of research portfolios

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P Dasgupta… - The Economic Journal, 1987 - JSTOR
One of the most notable discoveries in the sociology of science has been the observation
that similar scientific advances are often made by several individuals and research teams
working independently of one another (see Ogburn and Thomas (i922), and Merton (i96I, ...
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Two remarks on the property-rights literature

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E Maskin, J Tirole - The Review of Economic Studies, 1999 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We first point out that the recent property-rights literature is based on three
assumptions:(1) that contracts are always subject to renegotiation;(2) that the exercise of a
property right confers a private benefit and (3) that parties are risk-neutral. Building on ...
Cited by 192 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 16 versions

Incentives, information, and organizational form

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E Maskin, Y Qian… - The Review of Economic …, 2000 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We model an organization as a hierarchy of managers erected on top of a
technology (here consisting of a collection of plants). In our framework, the role of a manager
is to take steps to reduce the adverse consequences of shocks that affect the plants ...
Cited by 178 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 28 versions

On imperfect information and optimal pollution control

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P Dasgupta, P Hammond… - The Review of Economic Studies, 1980 - JSTOR
The design of incentive schemes for implementing optimal plans in organizations where
information differs across agents has been much studied in recent years;(see, eg Groves
(1973), Weitzman (1974, 1978), Maskin (1977), Kwerel (1977) and the contributions to the ...
Cited by 174 - Related articles - All 8 versions

An example of a repeated partnership game with discounting and with uniformly inefficient equilibria

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R Radner, R Myerson… - The Review of …, 1986 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract In this note we present an example of a repeated partnership game with imperfect
monitoring in which all supergame equilibria with positive discount rates are bounded away
from full efficiency uniformly in the discount rate, provided the latter is strictly positive. On ...
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[CITATION] The theory of incentives: An overview

JJ Laffont, E Maskin - Advances in …, 1982 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge …
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A theorem on utilitarianism

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E Maskin - The Review of Economic Studies, 1978 - JSTOR
In a recent paper [1], d'Aspremont and Gevers establish that if a social welfare functional
(SWFL) satisfies several reasonable properties, and if interpersonal comparisons of
absolute welfare levels are prohibited, although unit interpersonal comparisons of welfare ...
Cited by 151 - Related articles - All 7 versions

Implementation theory

E Maskin… - Handbook of social Choice and Welfare, 2002 - Elsevier
Abstract The implementation problem is the problem of designing a mechanism (game form)
such that the equilibrium outcomes satisfy a criterion of social optimality embodied in a
social choice rule. If a mechanism has the property that, in each possible state of the world ...
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Auction theory with private values

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ES Maskin… - The American Economic Review, 1985 - JSTOR
Page 1. OPEN AND SEALED-BID AUCTIONSt Auction Theory with Private Values
By ERIC S. MASKIN AND JOHN G. RILEY* For many centuries, auctions have been
a common form of selling procedure. Although auction methods ...
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Soft budget constraint theories: From centralization to the market

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E Maskin… - Economics of transition, 2001 - Wiley Online Library
This paper surveys the theoretical literature on the effect of soft budget constraints on
economies in transition from centralization to capitalism; it also reviews our understanding of
soft budget constraints in general. It focuses on the conception of the soft budget ...
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Repeated games with long-run and short-run players

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D Fudenberg, DM Kreps… - The Review of …, 1990 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Page 1. Review of Economic Studies (1990) 57, 555-573 © 1990 The Review of
Economic Studies Limited 0034-6527/90/00340555$02.00 Repeated Games with
Long-run and Short-run Players DREW FUDENBERG Massachusetts ...
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[CITATION] Bargaining, Coalition and Externalities

E Maskin - 2011 - Princeton University Pres
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The efficient market hypothesis and insider trading on the stock market

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JJ Laffont… - Journal of Political Economy, 1990 - JSTOR
Page 1. The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Insider Trading on the Stock Market Jean-Jacques
Laffont University of Toulouse Eric S. Maskin Harvard University We study the behavior of a large
trader with private information about the mean of an asset with a risky return. ...
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A theory of dynamic oligopoly, III: Cournot competition

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E Maskin, J Tirole - European Economic Review, 1987 - Elsevier
We study the Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) of an alternating move, infinite horizon
duopoly model where the strategic variable is quantity. We exhibit a pair of difference-
differential equations that, when they exist, differentiable MPE strategies satisfy. For ...
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Recent theoretical work on the soft budget constraint

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ES Maskin - The American Economic Review, 1999 - JSTOR
... 541-56. Dewatripont, Mathias; Maskin, Eric and Roland, Gerard. "Soft Budget Constraints and Tran-
sition," in Eric Maskin and Andras Simonovits, eds., Planning, shortage, and transformation.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999 (forthcoming). Faure-Grimaud, Antoine. ...
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A differential approach to dominant strategy mechanisms

JJ Laffont… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1980 - JSTOR
This paper shows how a number of questions about dominant strategy mechanisms in
models with public goods can be conveniently formulated as systems of partial differential
equations. The question of the existence of dominant strategy mechanisms with given ...
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Uncertainty and hyperbolic discounting

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P Dasgupta… - The American Economic Review, 2005 - JSTOR
Empirical studies in economics and behavioral ecology suggest that, ceteris paribus,
animals and humans appear to place less weight on the future than on the present, ie, they
act as though they discount future payoffs. Furthermore (and more interestingly), they do ...
Cited by 114 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 23 versions

Optimal nonlinear pricing with two-dimensional characteristics

JJ Laffont, E Maskin… - Information, Incentives and …, 1987 - books.google.com
Most work on nonlinear pricing has modeled consumer differences by a single parameter. In
this chapter we begin the much harder problem of multidimensional differences. Using a
simple model of linear demand, we determine the optimal (ie, revenue-maximizing) price ...
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A Walrasian theory of money and barter

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AV Banerjee… - The Quarterly Journal of …, 1996 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Page 1. THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Vol. CXI November 1996
Issue 4 A WALRASIAN THEORY OF MONEY AND BARTER* ABHIJIT V. BANERJEE
AND ERIC S. MASKIN We study a barter economy in which ...
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[PDF] 14 FEASIBLE NASH IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIAL CHOICE RULES WHEN THE DESIGNER DOES NOT KNOW ENDOWMENTS OR

[PDF] from upenn.edu
L Hurwicz, E Maskin… - The economics of …, 1995 - econ.upenn.edu
The aim of the present paper is to analyze the problem of assuring the feasibility1 of a
mechanism (game form), implementing in Nash equilibrium2 a given social choice rule
abbreviated as (SCR) when the mechanism is constrained as to the way in which it is ...
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[CITATION] A differential approach to expected utility maximizing mechanisms

JJ Laffont, E Maskin - Aggregation …, 1979 - North-Holland, Amsterdam.[162, 164 …
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Disadvantageous oil tariffs and dynamic consistency

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E Maskin… - The American Economic Review, 1990 - JSTOR
A large importer who places relatively greater weight on future than current oil consumption
will import less oil in the future than if it were able to commit itself in advance to future tariffs,
and may find itself worse off than if it were unable to impose tariffs at all. Futures markets ...
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On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games

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D Fudenberg… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1991 - Elsevier
Abstract We show that any feasible, individually rational payoffs of an infinitely repeated
game can arise as subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs if the discount factor is close enough
to one even if mixed strategies are not observable and public randomizations are not ...
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Auctions, development, and privatization: Efficient auctions with liquidity-constrained buyers

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ES Maskin - European Economic Review, 2000 - Elsevier
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The existence of equilibrium with price-setting firms

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E Maskin - The American Economic Review, 1986 - JSTOR
Ever since Joseph Bertrand (1883), economists have been interested in static models of
oligopoly where firms set prices. Francis Edgeworth's 1925 critique of Bertrand recognized,
however, that, except in the case of constant marginal costs, there are serious equilibrium ...
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Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions

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E Maskin… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2003 - Elsevier
For the case of two buyers we show that equilibrium in the sealed high-bid auction is unique
when (i) buyers' reservations prices are drawn independently from distributions with finite
support and positive mass at the lower endpoint;(ii) buyers have private values; and (iii) ...
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[CITATION] On the fair allocation of indivisible goods

E Maskin… - 1986 - Harvard Institute of Economic …
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[CITATION] Implementation and strong Nash equilibrium

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E Maskin - 1978 - dspace.mit.edu
To implement* n SCC, f, is to construct a game form g such that, for all preference profiles
the equilibrium set of g (with respect to some solution concept) coincides with the f-optimal
set. In a recent study [1], I examined the general question of implementing social choice ...
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Theories of the soft budget-constraint

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ES Maskin - Japan and the World Economy, 1996 - Elsevier
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Decision-making under ignorance with implications for social choice

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E Maskin - Theory and Decision, 1979 - Springer
A new investigation is launched into the problem of decision-making in the face of 'complete
ignorance', and linked to the problem of social choice. In the first section the author
introduces a set of properties which might characterize a criterion for decision-making ...
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Contractual contingencies and renegotiation

M Dewatripont… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1995 - JSTOR
In a dynamic model of asymmetric information between the owner of a firm and a manager,
we investigate the optimal set of contingencies on which an incentive contract should
depend when renegotiation is possible. In particular, we characterize the circumstances in ...
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[PDF] Globalization and inequality

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M Kremer… - Development Research Group, …, 2003 - economics.harvard.edu
Supporters of the anti-globalization movement argue that “globalization has dramatically
increased inequality between and within nations”(Mazur, 2000), and in particular that it has
marginalized the poor in developing countries and left behind the poorest countries. ...
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Managing ecosystem resources

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K Arrow, G Daily, P Dasgupta, S Levin… - Environmental …, 2000 - ACS Publications
We explore some of the special problems faced in the management of environmental
resources, paying particular attention to valuation of ecosystem services, externalities,
uncertainty, and nonlinearities characteristic of complex adaptive, highly interconnected ...
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[CITATION] Sequential innovation, patents

J Bessen, E Maskin - 2000 - and imitation. Working Paper 00-01. …
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[PDF] Uniqueness in sealed high bid auctions

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E Maskin… - Harvard University manuscript, 1996 - Citeseer
While much has been written on the theory of auctions, almost all of this work focusses
exclusively on the symmetric equilibrium of an auction in which bidders are symmetric. That
is, two bidders with the same private information have exactly the same beliefs about all of ...
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Public–private partnerships and government spending limits

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E Maskin, J Tirole - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2008 - Elsevier
We consider public–private partnerships, in which a public official selects a project that is
then developed and operated by a private contractor. We derive optimal public accounting
rules when the official's choice among projects is biased by ideology or social ties or ...
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[CITATION] Segregation by Skill and the Rise in Inequality

M Kremer… - Working Papers, 1995 - econpapers.repec.org
By M. Kremer and E. Maskin; Segregation by Skill and the Rise in Inequality.
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[PDF] Contract renegotiation in models of asymmetric information

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M Dewatripont… - European Economic Review, 1990 - webkuliah.unimedia.ac.id
In practice, parties to a contract can usually rewrite the contract's terms if they so choose;
courts do not typically interfere with a mutual agreement to rescind an old contract and
replace it with a new one. A recent body of theoretical work has demonstrated, however, ...
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[CITATION] Majority rule, social welfare functions, and game forms

ES Maskin - Choice, Welfare, and Development (K. Basu, PK …, 1995
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Mechanism design: How to implement social goals

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ES Maskin - The American Economic Review, 2008 - JSTOR
... Page 2. 568 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW JUNE 2008 Condorcet winner) is sometimes
viewed as a natural desideratum (see Partha Dasgupta and Eric Maskin, forthcoming). ... 575 Baliga,
Sandeep, and Eric Maskin. 2003 "Mechanism Design for the ...
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On the robustness of majority rule

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P Dasgupta… - Journal of the European Economic …, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract We show that simple majority rule satisfies five standard and attractive axioms—the
Pareto property, anonymity, neutrality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and (generic)
decisiveness—over a larger class of preference domains than (essentially) any other ...
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Incentives, scale economies, and organizational form

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E Maskin, Y Qian… - Review of Economic Studies, 2000 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract We model organization as the command-and-communication network of managers
erected on top of technology (which is modeled as a collection of plants). In our framework,
the role of a manager is to deal with shocks that affect the plants that he oversees directly ...
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Unemployment with observable aggregate shocks

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SJ Grossman, OD Hart… - 1982 - nber.org
Consider an economy subject to two kinds of shocks:(a) an observable shock to the relative
demand for final goods which causes dispersion in relative prices, and (b) shocks,
unobservable by workers, to the technology for transforming intermediate goods into final ...
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On indescribable contingencies and incomplete contracts

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E Maskin - European Economic Review, 2002 - Elsevier
I examine the theoretical foundations underlying the incomplete contracts literature. A
common justification for the assumption that contracts are not fully contingent on the state of
nature is to point out that some aspects of the state may be unforeseen or indescribable to ...
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[CITATION] Input versus output incentive schemes

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ES Maskin… - Journal of Public Economics, 1985 - econpapers.repec.org
By Eric S. Maskin and John Graham Riley; Input versus output incentive schemes.
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[CITATION] An equilibrium analysis of search and breach of contract, II: A non-steady state example

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PA Diamond… - 1979 - 18.7.29.232
Consider a market where individuals meet pairwise and where a pa i of individuals makes at
most one trade (or carries out at most one project). The market for waterfront summer rentals
is one example. Assume that there are fixed (and equal) numbers of potential landlords ...
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Optimal reservation price in the Vickrey auction

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JJ Laffont… - Economics Letters, 1980 - Elsevier
Economics Letters 6 (1980) 309-313 309 North-Holland Publishing Company OPTIMAL RESERVATION
PRICE IN THE VICKREY AUCTION Jean-Jacques LAFFONT University of Toulouse I, France
Eric MASKIN MIT, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA Received 30 December 1980 The optimal ...
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Mechanism design for the environment

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S Baliga… - Handbook of environmental economics, 2003 - Elsevier
Abstract We argue that when externalities such as pollution are nonexcludable, agents must
be compelled to participate in a “mechanism” to ensure a Pareto-efficient outcome. We
survey some of the main findings of the mechanism-design (implementation-theory) ...
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[CITATION] Social welfare functions on restricted domains

E Maskin - Harvard University and Darwin College, Cambridge, 1976
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Rational expectations with market power-the paradox of the disadvantageous tariff on oil

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E Maskin… - 1978 - ideas.repec.org
The theoretical analysis of exaustible resources has to date largely ignored the" geo-political
realities" which preoccupy policy makers and has concentrated on the logically prior
problem of analyzing market equilibrium in an autarkic economy. Autarky is a useful ...
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The fairest vote of all

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P Dasgupta… - Scientific American, 2004 - nature.com
... The Fairest Vote of all. Partha Dasgupta and Eric Maskin. Abstract. All VOTING SYSTEMS have
drawbacks. ... Chirac and Le Pen—with 36 THE AUTHORS PARTHA DASGUPTA and ERIC MASKIN
frequently collaborate in their research, including recent work on auction theory. ...
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[CITATION] Implementation and renegotiation

E Maskin, J Moore… - 1987
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Auctions and efficiency

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E Maskin - Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory …, 2003 - books.google.com
The allocation of resources is an all-pervasive theme in economics. Furthermore, the
question of whether there exist mechanisms ensuring efficient allocation (ie, mechanisms
that ensure that resources end up in the hands of those who value them most) is of central ...
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Uncertainty and entry deterrence

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ES Maskin - Economic Theory, 1999 - Springer
Page 1. Economic Theory 14, 429–437 (1999) Uncertainty and entry deterrence * Eric S. Maskin
Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA (e-mail:
emaskin@harvard.edu) Received: July 10, 1997; revised version: November 21, 1997 Summary. ...
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Correlated equilibria and sunspots

E Maskin, J Tirole - Journal of Economic Theory, 1987 - Elsevier
Abstract We examine when “sunspots”(uncertainty that has no influence on endowments,
preferences, or technology) can affect equilibrium in a simple two-period, two-commodity,
two-class economy. We find that such an effect is possibly only if the signals (random ...
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[CITATION] Sequential Innovation

J Bessen, E Maskin - Patents, and Imitation, 2000 - http: ww, research on innovation. org …
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[CITATION] The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, II: Applications.

P Dasgupta… - 1982 - en.scientificcommons.org
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[CITATION] Discounted Repeated Games with Unobservable Actions, I: One-sided Moral Hazard

D Fudenberg, E Maskin… - 1986 - Harvard Institute of Economic …
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[PDF] EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF EQUILIBRIUM Ш SEALED HIGH BID AUCTIONS

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E Maskin… - 1986 - econ.ucla.edu
A central assumption underlying almost all of the recent theoretical work on auctions has
been that any two buyers with the same private estimate of the value of object for sale
should have the same beliefs about the estimates of the other buyers. Given this strong ...
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The unity of auction theory: Milgrom's masterclass

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E Maskin - Journal of Economic Literature, 2004 - JSTOR
1. Introduction y any standard measure, auction theory has been an enormous success.
Even after 25 years of intensive work, the literature continues to row at a prodigious, even
accelerating rate; it has spawned much empirical and experimental research; 4 its ...
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[CITATION] The existence of economic equilibria: Continuity and mixed strategies

P Dasgupta… - 1977 - … for mathematical studies in the social …
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[CITATION] Uncertainty, waiting costs, and hyperbolic discounting

P Dasgupta… - 2002 - Beijer International Institute of …
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On the Rationale for Penalty Default Rules

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E Maskin - Fla. St. UL Rev., 2005 - HeinOnline
The legal literature on default rules studies which fall-back provisions the law does or should
prescribe if a contract fails to specify parties' obligations fully in some contingency that
arises. The" does" question is an empirical matter about which I have nothing to say. I will ...
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The invisible hand and externalities

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ES Maskin - The American Economic Review, 1994 - JSTOR
Page 1. The Invisible Hand and Externalities By ERIC S. MASKIN* When economists
contemplate the invisi- ble hand at work, they generally think of competitive markets.
But there are some circumstances in which markets are ...
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[BOOK] A theory of dynamic oligopoly, I: Overview and quantity competition with large fixed costs

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E Maskin, J Tirole - 1982 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract The authors introduce a class of alternating-move, infinite-horizon models of
duopoly. The timing captures the presence of short-run commitment s. They apply this
framework to a natural monopoly in which costs are so large that at most one firm can ...
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[PDF] Multi-good efficient auctions with multi-dimensional information

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P Eso… - 1999 - scholar.harvard.edu
Abstract We show that when multiple goods are sold, an extension of the Groves-Clarke
mechanism (allowing buyers to make their bids contingent on other buyers' valuations) is
efficient in a broad and important class of cases in which buyers have multidimensional ...
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[PDF] Intellectual Property on the Internet: What's Wrong with Conventional Wisdom?

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J Bessen, E Maskin - Cambridge, Mass.: photocopied, 1997 - Citeseer
The growth of the Internet has put pressure on traditional intellectual property protections
such as copyright and patent. Some forms of information, when made accessible on the
Internet, are easily copied. Because the costs of copying are low and because copying is ...
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[CITATION] Monopoly with asymmetric information about quality: Behavior and regulation

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JJ Laffont… - European Economic Review, 1987 - econpapers.repec.org
By Jean-Jacques Laffont and Eric S. Maskin; Monopoly with asymmetric
information about quality: Behavior and regulation.
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Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games

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Full text - MIT Libraries
D Fudenberg… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1990 - Elsevier
Abstract The “perfect Folk Theorem” for discounted repeated games establishes that the sets
of Nash and subgame-perfect equilibrium payoffs are equal in the limit as the discount factor
δ tends to one. We provide conditions under which the two sets coincide before the limit is ...
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Monopolistic quantity rationing

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V Bohm, E Maskin, H Polemarchakis… - The Quarterly Journal of …, 1983 - JSTOR
In this paper we address the question of whether a price-setting monopolist can improve his
welfare by imposing quantity constraints on buyers. We show first that if all buyers are
identical, quantity rations are not useful for the monopolist. We then show by means of an ...
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[PDF] Implementation theory

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E Maskin, T Sjöström… - HANDBOOKS IN …, 2001 - sss.ias.edu
The problem of social decision making when information is decentralized has occupied
economists since the days of Adam Smith. An influential article by Hayek crystallized the
problem. Since “the data from which the economic calculus starts are never for the whole ...
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[PDF] Balanced-budget mechanisms with incomplete information

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D Fudenberg, DK Levine… - URL http://levine. sscnet. …, 1995 - pubmail.dklevine.com
Abstract: We examine mechanism design with transferable utility and budget balance, using
techniques we developed for the study of repeated games. We show that with independent
types, budget balance does not limit the set of social choice functions that can be ...
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