My Citations
Scholar Home
  Advanced Scholar Search



Scholar      Create email alertResults 1 - 50 of 50. (0.18 sec) 

Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure

[PDF] from ust.hk
Full text - MIT Libraries
JB Van Huyck, RC Battalio… - The American Economic Review, 1990 - JSTOR
Page 1. Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure
By JOHN B. VAN HUYCK, RAYMOND C. BATTALIO, AND RICHARD 0. BEIL*
Deductive equilibrium methods-such as Rational Expectations ...
Cited by 904 - Related articles - All 14 versions

Sovereign debt as a contingent claim: Excusable default, repudiation, and reputation

H Grossman… - 1989 - nber.org
... Herschel Grossman John Van Huyck Department of Economics Department of Economics Brown
University Texas A&M University Providence, RI 02912 College Station, TX 77843 Page 3. History
suggests the following stylized facts about defaults on Sovereign debt: ...
Cited by 367 - Related articles - Library Search - All 11 versions

Strategic uncertainty, equilibrium selection, and coordination failure in average opinion games

[PDF] from oxfordjournals.org
Full text - MIT Libraries
JB Van Huyck, RC Battalio… - The Quarterly Journal of …, 1991 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Page 1. STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY, EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION, AND
COORDINATION FAILURE IN AVERAGE OPINION GAMES* JOHN B. VAN HUYCK
RAYMOND C. BATTALIO RICHARD 0. BEIL Deductive equilibrium ...
Cited by 342 - Related articles - All 9 versions

Optimization incentives and coordination failure in laboratory stag hunt games

[PDF] from upenn.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
R Battalio, L Samuelson… - Econometrica, 2001 - Wiley Online Library
THE SPECIFICATION OF THE FEASIBLE strategies and preferences that define a strategic-
form game, together with the assumption that players are substantively rational, provides a
powerful framework for analyzing strategic behavior. This framework in turn can be ...
Cited by 123 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 24 versions

Adaptive behavior and coordination failure

[PDF] from economicscience.us
Full text - MIT Libraries
JB Van Huyck, JP Cook… - Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 1997 - Elsevier
Cited by 96 - Related articles - All 11 versions

Credible assignments in coordination games

JB Van Huyck, AB Gillette… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1992 - Elsevier
Cited by 95 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 5 versions

ON THE ORIGIN OF CONVENTION: EVIDENCE FROM COORDINATION GAMES*

Full text - MIT Libraries
JB Van Huyck, RC Battalio… - The Economic Journal, 1997 - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. Wiley Online Library will be disrupted 4
Feb from 10-12 GMT for monthly maintenance. ...
Cited by 74 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 11 versions

Selection dynamics, asymptotic stability, and adaptive behavior

[PDF] from ucsd.edu
JB Van Huyck, JP Cook… - Journal of Political Economy, 1994 - JSTOR
Page 1. Selection Dynamics, Asymptotic Stability, and Adaptive Behavior John B.
Van Huyck Texas A&M University Joseph P. Cook Technical University-Varna
Raymond C. Battalio Texas A&M University Selection dynamics ...
Cited by 69 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - BL Direct - All 7 versions

Commitment versus discretion in the peasant-dictator game

[PDF] from exeter.ac.uk
Full text - MIT Libraries
JB Van Huyck, RC Battalio… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1995 - Elsevier
Page 1. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 10, 143-170 (1995) Commitment versus
Discretion in the Peasant-Dictator Game John B. Van Huyck, Raymond С Battalio,
and Mary F. Walters Texas A&M University, College Station ...
Cited by 63 - Related articles - All 6 versions

Strategic similarity and emergent conventions: Evidence from similar stag hunt games

Full text - MIT Libraries
FW Rankin, JB Van Huyck… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2000 - Elsevier
Cited by 59 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 9 versions

History's role in coordinating decentralized allocation decisions

DJ Meyer, JB Van Huyck, RC Battalio… - Journal of Political …, 1992 - JSTOR
Page 1. History's Role in Coordinating Decentralized Allocation Decisions Donald J.
Meyer Western Michigan University John B. Van Huyck, Raymond C. Battalio, and
Thomas R. Saving Texas A&M University What causes individual ...
Cited by 51 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 6 versions

On the origin of convention: evidence from symmetric bargaining games

Full text - MIT Libraries
J Van Huyck, R Battalio, S Mathur… - International Journal of …, 1995 - Springer
We use a dynamical systems approach to model the origin of bargaining conventions and
report the results of a symmetric bargaining game experiment. Our experiment also provides
evidence on the psychological salience of symmetry and efficiency. The observed ...
Cited by 46 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 5 versions

Selection dynamics and adaptive behavior without much information

[PDF] from psu.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
JB Van Huyck, RC Battalio… - Economic Theory, 2007 - Springer
Page 1. Economic Theory (2007) 33: 53–65 DOI 10.1007/s00199-007-0209-8
SYMPOSIUM John B. Van Huyck · Raymond C. Battalio · Frederick W. Rankin
Selection dynamics and adaptive behavior without much information ...
Cited by 42 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 13 versions

Seigniorage, inflation, and reputation

Full text - MIT Libraries
HI Grossman… - Journal of Monetary Economics, 1986 - Elsevier
This paper derives a reputational equilibrium for inflation in a model in which the sovereign
obtains valuable seigniorage by issuing fiat money in exchange for.
Cited by 38 - Related articles - All 11 versions

Evidence on the equivalence of the strategic and extensive form representation of games

[PDF] from economicscience.us
Full text - MIT Libraries
DJ Cooper… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2003 - Elsevier
Cited by 38 - Related articles - All 26 versions

Evidence on learning in coordination games

Full text - MIT Libraries
JB Van Huyck, RC Battalio… - Experimental Economics, 2007 - Springer
Page 1. Exp Econ (2007) 10: 205–220 DOI 10.1007/s10683-007-9175-z Evidence on learning
in coordination games John B. Van Huyck · Raymond C. Battalio · Frederick W. Rankin Published
online: 25 August 2007 © Economic Science Association 2007 ...
Cited by 29 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 7 versions

Tacit cooperation, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure: Evidence from repeated dominance solvable games

[PDF] from ucsd.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
JB Van Huyck, JM Wildenthal… - Games and Economic …, 2002 - Elsevier
Cited by 28 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 11 versions

[PDF] Is reputation a substitute for commitment in the peasant-dictator game?

[PDF] from economicscience.us
J Van Huyck, RC Battalio… - … manuscript, Texas A&M …, 2001 - economicscience.us
Abstract: In this paper we use the experimental method to determine whether reputation is a
substitute for commitment in the Peasant-Dictator game. Reputation is an imperfect
substitute for commitment in the experiment. It is less efficient on average. Its effectiveness ...
Cited by 27 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 2 versions

[BOOK] Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation

HI Grossman… - 1985 - en.scientificcommons.org
Cited by 22 - Related articles - Cached - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 3 versions

Dynamic monetary control and interest rate stabilization

Full text - MIT Libraries
TF Cosimano… - Journal of Monetary Economics, 1989 - Elsevier
Interest rate stabilization results in an instrument shortage that complicates monetary control
by introducing strategic considerations into the Trading Desk's.
Cited by 19 - Related articles - All 5 versions

Estimating bounded rationality and pricing performance uncertainty

[PDF] from psu.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
C Nicholas McKinney… - Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 2007 - Elsevier
Cited by 13 - Related articles - All 8 versions

Credible assignments can improve efficiency in laboratory public goods games

[PDF] from economicscience.us
Full text - MIT Libraries
B Seely, J Van Huyck… - Journal of Public Economics, 2005 - Elsevier
This paper reports an experiment investigating how assignments improve economic
efficiency in a modified version of the standard voluntary-contributions mechanism. The
experiment uses a non-binding message that makes common information assignments in ...
Cited by 14 - Related articles - All 10 versions

[CITATION] Saving (1992)“History's Role in Coordinating Decentralized Allocation Decisions: Laboratory Evidence on Repeated Binary Allocation Games,”

Full text - MIT Libraries
DJ Meyer, JB Van Huyck, RC Battalio… - Journal of Political Economy
Cited by 11 - Related articles

[PDF] Evidence on learning in coordination games

[PDF] from psu.edu
J Van Huyck, R Battalio… - Texas A&M University Economics …, 1996 - Citeseer
Abstract: This paper reports an experiment designed to detect the influence of strategic
uncertainty on behavior in order statistic coordination games, which arise when a player's
best response is an order statistic of the cohort's action combination. Unlike previous ...
Cited by 11 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 4 versions

Nominally Sovereign Debt, Risk Shifting, and Reputation

H Grossman… - 1994 - nber.org
... issue nominal debts? Herschel Grossman Department of Economics Brown University
Providence, RI 02912 John Van Huyck Department of Economics Texas A&M
University College Station, TX 77843 Page 3. Over the course ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - Library Search - All 6 versions

[PDF] Risk dominance, payoff dominance and probabilistic choice learning

[PDF] from dklevine.com
R Battalio, L Samuelson… - Laser-script, 1997 - pubmail.dklevine.com
Abstract: This paper reports an experiment comparing three stag hunt games that have the
same best-response correspondence. The games have the same expected payoff from the
mixed equilibrium, but differ in the pecuniary incentive a player has to play a best ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 11 versions

Prudence, justice, benevolence, and sex: evidence from similar bargaining games

[PDF] from psu.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
J Van Huyck… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2002 - Elsevier
Most learning experiments involve repeated play of exactly the same situation and, hence,
can not discriminate between learning to use a deductive principle and other forms of
routine learning. In this paper, subjects confront a sequence of similar, but not identical, ...
Cited by 8 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 19 versions

Emergent conventions in evolutionary games

J Van Huyck - Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, 2008 - Elsevier
A stranger in a foreign land often finds those around him incomprehensible. He may not
understand what they say. They laugh or frown at what he does. Above all it is difficult for a
stranger to give or receive help from the people he meets. Conventions make those ...
Cited by 7 - Related articles - All 4 versions

Does seeing more deeply into a game increase one's chances of winning?

Full text - MIT Libraries
CN McKinney… - Experimental economics, 2006 - Springer
Page 1. Exp Econ (2006) 9:297–303 DOI 10.1007/s10683-006-9129-x Does seeing
more deeply into a game increase one's chances of winning? C. Nicholas McKinney
Jr. · John B. Van Huyck Received: 24 January 2005 / Revised ...
Cited by 6 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 8 versions

[CITATION] Optimization incentives and coordination failure in laboratory stag hunt games

Full text - MIT Libraries
JB Van Huyck, RC Battalio… - Econometrica, 2001
Cited by 4 - Related articles

[CITATION] Credible Assignments in Non-cooperative Games

JB Van Huyck, AB Gillette… - Texas A&M University working paper, 1988
Cited by 4 - Related articles

Nominal sovereign debt, risk shifting, and reputation

Full text - MIT Libraries
HI Grossman… - Journal of Economics and Business, 1993 - Elsevier
This paper analyzes a reputational equilibrium in a model in which nominal sovereign debt
serves to shift risk associated with the unpredictability of tax reven.
Cited by 4 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 6 versions

Coordination failure in market statistic games

[PDF] from economicscience.us
J Van Huyck… - Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, 2008 - Elsevier
A central question in economics is how do markets coordinate the behavior of anonymous
decision makers in a many person decentralized economy. Economic theory has
traditionally addressed the question using the equilibrium method, which abstracts away ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - All 11 versions

[CITATION] VIs Reputation a Substitute for Commitment in the Peasant'Dictator Game

JB Van Huyck, RC Battalio… - V manu'script, 2001
Cited by 3 - Related articles

[CITATION] Contributions and Crowd-Out of Public Goods: Competing Models and Experimental Evidence

T Gronberg, A Luccasen… - Unpublished manuscript, 2003
Cited by 3 - Related articles - All 2 versions

[CITATION] Frederick w. Rankin. 1997." On the Origin of Convention: Evidence from Coordination Games."

Full text - MIT Libraries
JB van Huyck… - The Economic Journal
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[CITATION] Sovereign debt as a contingent claim: Excusable default, repudiation, and reputation, Brown University, Providence

H Grossman… - 1985 - RI
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[CITATION] A retrospective on the classical gold standard, 1821-1931: A review essay

Full text - MIT Libraries
JB Van Huyck - Journal of Monetary Economics, 1987 - econpapers.repec.org
By John B. Van Huyck; A retrospective on the classical gold standard, 1821-1931: A review essay.
Cited by 2 - Related articles - Cached - All 5 versions

What Does it Take to Eliminate the use of a Strategy Strictly Dominated by a Mixture?

Full text - MIT Libraries
J Van Huyck, F Rankin… - Experimental economics, 1999 - Springer
This paper reports an experiment to determine whether subjects will learn to stop using a
strictly dominated strategy that can be an above average reply. It is difficult to find an
experimental design that eliminates the play of the strictly dominated strategy completely. ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 10 versions

[PDF] The Crowding-Out of Public Goods: Competing Models and Experimental Evidence

[PDF] from tamu.edu
TJ Gronberg, RA Luccasen, TL Turocy… - 2010 - econweb.tamu.edu
Page 1. The Crowding-Out of Public Goods: Competing Models and Experimental Evidence
Timothy J. Gronberg Texas A&M University R. Andrew Luccasen* Mississippi University for
Women Theodore L. Turocy University of East Anglia John B. Van Huyck ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 2 versions

[CITATION] Seigniorage, sovereign debt, and reputation

JB Van Huyck - 1986 - Brown University
Cited by 1 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search

[PDF] Does seeing deeper into a game actually increase ones chances of winning?

[PDF] from economicscience.us
CN McKinney Jr… - 2004 - economicscience.us
Abstract: This paper investigates whether the variation in estimated rationality bounds is
correlated with the probability of winning when playing against another person in games that
exceed both players estimated rationality bound. Does seeing deeper into a game matter ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 5 versions

[PDF] DOES PLAYING AGAINST AN ERROR PRONE OPPONENT INFLUENCE LEARNING?

[PDF] from vassar.edu
CN McKinney Jr… - 2004 - irving.vassar.edu
Abstract: When learning to play a game well, does it help to play against an opponent who
makes the same sort of mistakes one tends to make or is it better to play against a
procedurally rational algorithm, which never makes mistakes? A procedurally rational ...
Related articles - View as HTML

Royal Economic Society

CY Horioka, DJ Cooper, S Garvin, JH Kagel… - The Economic …, 1997 - res.org.uk
Cached - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 2 versions

Royal Economic Society

JB Van Huyck, RC Battalio… - The Economic Journal, 1997 - res.org.uk
Cached - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 2 versions

[CITATION] 2002 NORTH AMERICAN WINTER MEETING OF THE ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY

Full text - MIT Libraries
L Ausubel, S Berry, U Yale, A Case, PA Chiappori… - Econometrica, 1933 - G. Banta

[PDF] WHAT DOES IT TAKE TO ELIMINATE

[PDF] from psu.edu
J Van Huyck, F Rankin… - 1998 - Citeseer
Abstract: This paper reports an experiment to determine whether subjects will learn to stop
using a strictly dominated strategy that can be an above average reply. It is difficult to find an
experimental design that eliminates the play of the strictly dominated strategy completely. ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 4 versions

Are tax-financed contributions to a public good completely crowded-out? Experimental evidence

[PDF] from uea.ac.uk
TJ Gronberg, RA Luccasen, TL Turocy… - Journal of Public …, 2012 - Elsevier
We report the results of a laboratory experiment on crowd-out in a voluntary contribution
mechanism public goods game. In our setting, a standard argument state.
Get it from MIT Libraries

Introduction to Issue of Experimental Economics in Honor of Raymond C. Battalio

Full text - MIT Libraries
JH Kagel… - Experimental Economics, 2007 - Springer
... The first paper is one of a series of papers on coordination games that Ray and John Van Huyck
collaborated on, in this case with their student Bill Rankin. This paper is illustrative of the interplay
between experiments and theory designed to or- ganize experimental results. ...
Related articles - BL Direct - All 5 versions

[PDF] STRATEGIC SIMILARITY AND EMERGENT CONVENTIONS

[PDF] from economicscience.us
FW Rankin… - 1996 - economicscience.us
... 1996-1998 by the authors. All rights reserved. Page 2. 2 Running Head: Emergent
Conventions. Corresponding Author: John Van Huyck, Department of Economics, Texas
A&M University, College Station, TX 77843-4228. john.vanhuyck@tamu.edu ...
Related articles - All 3 versions

 Create email alert



 

About Google Scholar - All About Google - My Citations

©2012 Google