M Kandori… - Econometrica, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
Most theoretical or applied research on repeated games with imperfect monitoring has
focused on public strategies: strategies that depend solely on the history of publicly
observable signals. This paper sheds light on the role of private strategies: strategies that ...
V Bhaskar… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2002 - Elsevier
We analyze repeated prisoners' dilemma games with imperfect private monitoring and
construct mixed trigger strategy equilibria. Such strategies have a simple representation,
where a player's action only depends upon her belief that her opponent (s) are continuing ...
I Obara - Journal of Economic Theory, 2009 - Elsevier
This paper proves a new folk theorem for repeated games with private monitoring and
communication, extending the idea of delayed communication in Compte [O. Compte,
Communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring, Econometrica 66 ( ...
I Obara - The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2008 - homes.chass.utoronto.ca
Abstract Consider a situation in which a principal commits to a mechanism first and then
agents choose unobservable actions before their payoff-relevant types are realized. The
agents' actions may affect not only their payoffs directly but also the distribution of their ...
H Cai… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
1. We thank seminar participants at Brown University, Stanford University, UC Berkeley,
UCLA, UCSB, UC Riverside, UIUC, and USC for helpful comments. We are also grateful to
the editor, Joseph Harrington, and two anonymous referees for their constructive ...
I Obara - Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed …, 2000 - ideas.repec.org
This paper studies repeated partnership games with only two public signals, the game
studied in Radner Myerson and Maskin (1986) except that the stage game is discrete. It is
well known that the public perfect equilibrium (PPE) payoff set is bounded away from the ...
GJ Mailath, I Obara… - Games and economic behavior, 2002 - Elsevier
We describe the maximum efficient subgame perfect equilibrium payoff for a player in the
repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, as a function of the discount factor. For discount factors above
a critical level, every efficient, feasible, individually rational payoff profile can be sustained. ...
D Rahman… - Econometrica, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
This paper studies partnerships that employ a mediator to improve their contractual ability.
Intuitively, profitable deviations must be attributable, that is, there must be some group
behavior such that an individual can be statistically identified as innocent, to provide ...
M Kandori… - … manuscript, University of Tokyo and UCLA, 2004 - econ.ucla.edu
Abstract In the standard model of dynamic interaction, players are assumed to observe
public signals according to some exogenous distributions for free. We deviate from this
assumption in two directions to model monitoring structure in a more realistic way. We ...
D Rahman… - University of Minnesota, Department of …, 2008 - econ.umn.edu
Abstract By allocating different information to team members, secret contracts can provide
better incentives to perform with an intuitive organizational design. For instance, they may
help to monitor monitors, and attain approximately efficient partnerships by appointing a ...
M Kandori… - 2010 - adres.ens.fr
Abstract An equilibrium in a repeated game with imperfect private moitoring is called a finite
state equilibrium, if each player's action on the equilibrium path is given by an automaton
with a finite number of states. We provide a tractable general method to check the ...
R McLean, I Obara… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We consider repeated games with private monitoring that are'close'to repeated
games with public/perfect monitoring. A private monitoring information structure is close to a
public monitoring information structure when private signals can generate approximately ...
M Kandori… - International Journal of Game Theory, 2006 - Springer
Abstract We present a repeated prisoners' dilemma game with imperfect public monitoring,
which exhibits the following paradoxical feature: the (limit) equilibrium payoff set achieves
full efficiency asymptotically as the public signal becomes insensitive to the hidden actions ...
I Obara… - 1999 - cowles.econ.yale.edu
Abstract This paper studies the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring for
arbitrary number of players. It is shown that a mixture of a grim trigger strategy and
permanent defection can achieve an almost e¢ cient outcome for some range of discount ...
[CITATION] Mediated Partnership
I Obara… - Econometrica, 2010
I Obara… - Levine's Bibliography, 2006 - gtcenter.org
This paper characterizes public and private monitoring technologies with respect to which the
efficient outcome is approximately implementable in team production by way of ex post
budget-balanced linear transfers. ... JEL Classification: D21, D23, D82. Keywords: ...
[CITATION] mFirm Reputation and Horizontal Integration, nwork $ ing paper
H Cai… - 2004 - UCLA
I Obara - 2001 - repository.upenn.edu
Abstract This dissertation studies private information in repeated games with imperfect
monitoring. For this class of repeated games, it is typically assumed that all agents/players
share the same information or use only such common information. Although this restriction ...
V Bhaskar… - 2011 - princeton.edu
Abstract This paper studies how a firm can sustain its reputation in the presence of
information lag. In our basis setting, a sequence of customers observe an imperfect signal
about the firmhs past effort except for the ones in the last few periods.
I Obara - atlas-conferences.com
We analyze infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games with imperfect private monitoring,
and construct equilibria where strategies are measurable with respect to players' beliefs
regarding their opponents' continuation strategies. We show that the symmetric efficient ...
I Obara - 2007 - socionet.ru
I Obara - UCLA Economics Online Papers, 2004 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration Hongbin Cai Department Economics
UCLA Ichiro Obara Department Economics UCLA May Abstract study effects horizontal
integration firm reputation environment where customers observe only imperfect signals ...
I Obara, F Zincenko - 2011 - sef.hku.hk
Abstract This paper studies a model of repeated Bertrand competition by firms producing a
homogeneous product, where the discounting rates and marginal costs may vary across
firms. In this setting, we identify the critical level of discount factor such that a collusive ...
A Iwasaki, YJ Joe, M Kandori, I Obara… - 2012 - econ.hit-u.ac.jp
ABSTRACT The present paper investigates repeated games with imperfect private
monitoring, where each player privately receives a noisy observation (signal) of the
opponent's action. Such games have been paid considerable attention in the AI and ...
V Bhaskar… - ucl.ac.uk
Abstract This paper studies how a firm can sustain its reputation when information about its
product quality arrives gradually over time. Our model is of a repeated game with a hidden
state variable, ie the firm's behavior in the past. We study the role of private and public ...
I Obara - 2005 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring Repeated Games Richard McLean
Rutgers University Ichiro Obara UCLA Andrew Postlewaite University Pennsylvania First
version May This version July Abstract For repeated games with noisy private monitoring ...
I Obara - UCLA Economics Online Papers, 2004 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract E ciency Repeated Games Revisited The Role Private Strategies Michihiro Kandori
Department Economics University Tokyo Ichiro Obara Department Economics UCLA
January Abstract Most theoretical applied research repeated games with imperfect ...
I Obara - 2006 - econ.ucla.edu
We present a relatively general model of repeated games first, which will be later
specialized for each different repeated game with different monitoring structure. Stage game
is a standard strategic (normal) form game G={N, A, g}, where N={1, 2,..., n} be the set of ...
[CITATION] On Tacit Collusion among Asymmetric Firms in Bertrand Competition
I Obara, F Zincenko - UCLA, November, 2011
[CITATION] Optimum Contracts and Efficient Partnerships with Private Monitoring
I Obara… - 2006
I Obara… - Levine's Working Paper Archive, 2008 - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of
further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site ...
[CITATION] The Maximum E> cient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated PrisonersG Dilemma
GJ Mailath, I Obara… - 2000
I Obara - UCLA Economics Online Papers, 2003 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract Less More Observability Paradox Repeated Games KANDORI Michihiro Faculty
Economics University Tokyo OBARA Ichiro Department Economics UCLA August Abstract
present repeated prisoners dilemma game with imperfect public monitoring which exhibits ...
I Obara - 1999 - econ.upenn.edu
Abstract This paper studies the repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring for
arbitrary number of players. It is shown that a mixture of a grim trigger strategy and
permanent defection can achieve an almost e¢-cient outcome for some range of discount ...
I Obara - UCLA Economics Online Papers - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract Endogenous Monitoring Michihiro Kandori Department Economics University Tokyo
Ichiro Obara Department Economics UCLA December Abstract the standard model dynamic
interaction players are assumed observe public signals according some exogenous ...
I Obara - 2003 - econ.ucla.edu
In this note, we study an another information structure, imperfect public monitoring. In this
class of model, players cannot observe the other players' actions directly, but can observe
imperfect and public signals about them. There are at least two reasons why this ...
I Obara - UCLA Economics Online Papers - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract Approximate Implementability with Post Budget Balance Ichiro Obara and David
Rahman April Abstract This paper characterizes public and private monitoring technologies
with respect which the efficient outcome approximately implementable team production ...
S Bikhchandani… - 2011 - escholarship.org
Abstract: Consider a mechanism design setting in which agents acquire costly information
about an unknown, payoff-relevant state of nature. Information gathering is covert and the
agents' information is correlated. We investigate conditions under which (i) efficiency and ( ...
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