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Multiple referrals and multidimensional cheap talk

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
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M Battaglini - Econometrica, 2002 - Wiley Online Library
2. Abstract In previous work on cheap talk, uncertainty has almost always been modeled
using a single–dimensional state variable. In this paper we prove that the dimensionality of
the uncertain variable has an important qualitative impact on results and yields interesting ...
Cited by 275 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 32 versions

A dynamic theory of public spending, taxation and debt

[PDF] from escholarship.org
M Battaglini… - 2006 - nber.org
This paper presents a dynamic political economy theory of public spending, taxation and
debt. Policy choices are made by a legislature consisting of representatives elected by
geographically-defined districts. The legislature can raise revenues via a distortionary ...
Cited by 137 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 25 versions

Inefficiency in legislative policy-making: A dynamic analysis

[PDF] from cornell.edu
M Battaglini… - 2005 - nber.org
ABSTRACT This paper develops an infinite horizon model of public spending and taxation
in which policy decisions are determined by legislative bargaining. The policy space
incorporates both productive and distributive public spending and distortionary taxation. ...
Cited by 95 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 22 versions

Long-term contracting with markovian consumers

[PDF] from yale.edu
M Battaglini - American Economic Review, 2005 - JSTOR
To study how a firm can capitalize on a long-term customer relationship, we characterize the
optimal contract between a monopolist and a consumer whose preferences follow a Markov
process. The optimal contract is nonstationary and has infinite memory, but is described ...
Cited by 66 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - BL Direct - All 29 versions

[PDF] Policy advice with imperfectly informed experts

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M Battaglini - Advances in theoretical Economics, 2004 - princeton.edu
Abstract We study policy advice by several experts with noisy private information and biased
preferences. We highlight a trade-off between the truthfulness of the information revealed by
each expert and the number of signals from different experts that can be aggregated to ...
Cited by 63 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 11 versions

Self-control in peer groups

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M Battaglini, R Bénabou… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2005 - Elsevier
Social influences on self-control underlie both self-help groups and many peer interactions
among youths. To understand these phenomena, we analyze how observing each other's
behavior affects individuals' ability to deal with their own impulses. These endogenous ...
Cited by 51 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 37 versions

The swing voter's curse in the laboratory

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M Battaglini, RB Morton… - Review of Economic …, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
This paper reports the first laboratory study of the swing voter's curse and provides insights
on the larger theoretical and empirical literature on “pivotal voter” models. Our experiment
controls for different information levels of voters, as well as the size of the electorate, the ...
Cited by 48 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 41 versions

Efficiency, equity, and timing of voting mechanisms

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M Battaglini, R Morton… - … Political Science Review, 2007 - Cambridge Univ Press
We compare the behavior of voters under simultaneous and sequential voting rules when
voting is costly and information is incomplete. In many political institutions, ranging from
small committees to mass elections, voting is sequential, which allows some voters to ...
Cited by 45 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 31 versions

Sequential voting with abstention

[PDF] from harvard.edu
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M Battaglini - Games and Economic Behavior, 2005 - Elsevier
Dekel and Piccione [2000. Sequential voting procedures in symmetric binary elections. J.
Polit. Economy 108, 34–55] have proven that information cascades do not necessarily affect
the properties of information aggregation in sequential elections: under standard ...
Cited by 45 - Related articles - All 9 versions

The dynamics of distributive politics

[PDF] from caltech.edu
M Battaglini… - Economic Theory, 2007 - Springer
Abstract We study dynamic committee bargaining over an infinite horizon with discounting.
In each period, a committee proposal is generated by a random recognition rule, the
committee chooses between the proposal and a status quo by majority rule, and the voting ...
Cited by 31 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 34 versions

Trust, coordination, and the industrial organization of political activism

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M Battaglini… - Journal of the European Economic …, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract We study political activism by several interest groups with private signals. When
their ideological distance to the policymaker is small, a “low-trust” regime prevails: agents
frequently lobby even when it is unwarranted, taking advantage of the confirmation ...
Cited by 26 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 14 versions

Pareto efficient income taxation with stochastic abilities

Full text - MIT Libraries
M Battaglini… - Journal of Public Economics, 2008 - Elsevier
This paper studies Pareto efficient income taxation in an economy with finitely-lived
individuals whose income generating abilities evolve according to a two-state Markov
process. The study yields three main results. First, when individuals are risk neutral, in any ...
Cited by 25 - Related articles - All 4 versions

Joint production in teams

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M Battaglini - Journal of Economic Theory, 2006 - Elsevier
Consider Holmström's moral hazard in teams problem when there are n agents, each agent i
has an ai-dimensional strategy space and output is m-dimensional. We show that a
compensation mechanism that satisfies budget balance, limited liability and implements ...
Cited by 24 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 13 versions

Fiscal policy over the real business cycle: a positive theory

M Battaglini… - 2008 - nber.org
This paper presents a political economy theory of the behavior of fiscal policy over the
business cycle. The theory predicts that, in both booms and recessions, fiscal policies are
set so that the marginal cost of public funds obeys a submartingale. In the short run, fiscal ...
Cited by 20 - Related articles - Library Search - All 9 versions

Pareto Efficient Income Taxation with Stochastic Abilities

[PDF] from psu.edu
M Battaglini… - 2003 - nber.org
This paper studies Pareto efficient income taxation in an economy with infinitely-lived
individuals whose income generating abilities evolve according to a two-state Markov
process. The study yields two main results. First, when individuals are risk neutral, the ...
Cited by 14 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 9 versions

On the Case for a Balanced Budget Amendment to the US Constitution

M Azzimonti, M Battaglini… - MPRA Paper, 2010 - econpapers.repec.org
This paper uses the political economy model of Battaglini and Coate (2008) to analyze the
impact of a balanced budget rule that requires that legislators do not run deficits. It considers
both a strict rule which cannot be circumvented and a rule that can be overridden by a ...
Cited by 13 - Related articles - Cached - All 2 versions

Optimality and renegotiation in dynamic contracting

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M Battaglini - Games and economic behavior, 2007 - Elsevier
We characterize the optimal renegotiation-proof contract in a dynamic principal–agent
model in which the type of the agent may change stochastically over time. We show that,
under general conditions, the optimal contract with commitment is renegotiation proof ...
Cited by 13 - Related articles - All 13 versions

[PDF] A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt

[PDF] from cornell.edu
M Battaglini… - American Economic Review, …, 2007 - economics.cornell.edu
Abstract This paper presents a dynamic political economy theory of public spending,
taxation and debt. Policy choices are made by a legislature consisting of representatives
elected by geographically-defined districts. The legislature can raise revenues via a ...
Cited by 11 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 11 versions

Information aggregation and strategic abstention in large laboratory elections

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M Battaglini, RB Morton… - The American Economic Review, 2008 - JSTOR
Recent advances in voting theory have shed light on the influence of pivotality on voter
choices when voters have asymmetric private information, and the implications of this for
information aggregation in committees and elections. Of particular interest is the result that ...
Cited by 11 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 35 versions

[PDF] Political institutions and the dynamics of public investment

[PDF] from carloalberto.it
M Battaglini, S Nunnari… - Carlo Alberto Notebooks, 2010 - carloalberto.it
Abstract We present a theoretical model of the provision of a durable public good over an
infinite horizion. In each period, there is a societal endowment of which each of n districts
owns a share. This endowment can either be invested in the public good or consumed. ...
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[CITATION] Dynamic electoral competition and constitutional design

M Battaglini - 2010 - mimeo
Cited by 8 - Related articles

[CITATION] Fiscal Policy over the real business cycle: A positive theory

L Barseghyan, M Battaglini… - 2010 - mimeo
Cited by 8 - Related articles

[CITATION] J. Tirole (2005)“Self-Control in Peer Groups,”

M Battaglini… - Journal of Economic Theory
Cited by 8 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries

[CITATION] VThe Dynamics of Redistributive Politics

M Battaglini… - V Unpublished, 2007
Cited by 6 - Related articles

[PDF] Moral hazard in teams with vector outputs

[PDF] from eea-esem.com
M Battaglini - 2003 - eea-esem.com
Abstract This paper generalizes Holmstrom's moral hazard in teams problem to the case
where the output function is vector-valued. This is a natural assumption in situations where,
for example, the partnership has production lines and there are externalities between ...
Cited by 6 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 2 versions

[CITATION] Pareto Efficient Taxation with Stochastic Abilities

M Battaglini… - Cornell and Princeton mimeo, 2005
Cited by 5 - Related articles

VIII. Should We Trust Banks When They Sit On the Board of Directors?

F Giavazzi… - Corporate governance, financial …, 1998 - books.google.com
In the twenties, when the president of New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Charles
Mellen said he was proud of his' Morgan Collar', his company was only one of the many
controlled by investment banks such as the House of Morgan. As J. Bredford De Long ( ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 5 versions

[CITATION] mFiscal Policy over the Real Business Cycle: A Positive Theory. nMimeo

M Battaglini… - 2008
Cited by 3 - Related articles

[CITATION] Moral hazard in teams

M Battaglini - Journal of Economic Theory, Forthcoming
Cited by 3 - Related articles

[CITATION] VA Dynamic Theory of Spending, Taxation, and Debt

M Battaglini… - V forthcoming American Economic Review, 2008
Cited by 2 - Related articles

The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy

Full text - MIT Libraries
M Battaglini… - Journal of the European Economic …, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract We describe a theory of the collective choice of fiscal policy in dynamic economies
that are subject to aggregate shocks. The theory incorporates realistically complex policy
spaces, rational forward-looking agents, and a rich political decision process. We argue ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 6 versions

[CITATION] mOn the Case for a Balanced Budget Amendment to the US Constitution. nMimeo

A Rezno, MB Marina… - 2008
Cited by 2 - Related articles

The Political Economy of Public Debt

[PDF] from eief.it
Full text - MIT Libraries
M Battaglini - Annu. Rev. Econ., 2011 - annualreviews.org
We survey recent theories of public debt that incorporate political decision making in rich
dynamic environments. These theories provide a new framework with which to interpret
empirical evidence and to assess institutional reforms that may help control political ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - All 5 versions

[PDF] Legislative bargaining and the dynamics of public investment

[PDF] from caltech.edu
M Battaglini, S Nunnari… - Discussion Papers, Research …, 2011 - hss.caltech.edu
A central role of government is the provision of public goods to its citizenry. Most public
goods provided by governments are durable, and hence dynamic in nature. It takes time to
accumulate them, and they depreciate slowly, projecting benefits for many years. ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 13 versions

[CITATION] Self-control in peer groups

R Benabou… - Papers, 2001 - ideas.repec.org
In this paper we study how observing the actions of others affects individuals' ability to exercise
self-control. ... To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is
available, there are three options: 1. Check below under "Related research" whether ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - Cached - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 4 versions

Evaluating and reducing the impact of white matter lesions on brain volume measurements

M Battaglini, M Jenkinson… - Human Brain …, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
MR-based measurements of brain volumes may be affected by the presence of white matter
(WM) lesions. Here, we assessed how and to what extent this may happen for WM lesions of
various sizes and intensities. After inserting WM lesions of different sizes and intensities ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 2 versions

[CITATION] Essays on the economics of information.

M Battaglini - 2001 - en.scientificcommons.org
Publikationsansicht. 6658919. Essays on the economics of information. (2001). Battaglini,
Marco. Abstract. Thesis (Ph. D., Economics)--Northwestern University, 2001. Details der
Publikation. Archiv, OCLC's Experimental Thesis Catalog (United States). ...
Cached - Library Search

A Dynamic theory of electoral competition

M Battaglini - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We present a dynamic model of electoral competition to study the determinants of
fiscal policy. In each period, two parties choose electoral platforms to maximize the expected
number of elected representatives. The electoral platform includes public expenditure, ...
Related articles - All 4 versions

DP3611 Political Activism, Trust, and Coordination

M Battaglini… - 2002 - cepr.org
We study political activism by several agents (lobbyists, unions, etc.) who have private but
imperfect policy-relevant signals, and seek to influence the decisions of a policy maker.
When agents can share information and coordinate their actions, the equilibrium is shown ...
Cached - All 3 versions

DP5458 The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory

M Battaglini, R Morton… - 2006 - cepr.org
This paper reports the first laboratory study of the swing voter's curse and provides insights
on the larger theoretical and empirical literature on'pivotal voter'models. Our experiment
controls for different information levels of voters, as well as the size of the electorate, the ...
Cached - All 3 versions

Fiscal Policy and Unemployment

M Battaglini… - 2011 - nber.org
This paper explores the interaction between fiscal policy and unemployment. It develops a
dynamic economic model in which unemployment can arise but can be mitigated by tax cuts
and public spending increases. Such policies are fiscally costly, but can be financed by ...
Related articles - All 8 versions

DP8633 A Dynamic theory of electoral competition

M Battaglini - 2011 - cepr.org
We present a dynamic model of electoral competition to study the determinants of fiscal
policy. In each period, two parties choose electoral platforms to maximize the expected
number of elected representatives. The electoral platform includes public expenditure, ...
Cached - All 3 versions

The Free Rider Problem: A Dynamic Analysis

[PDF] from caltech.edu
M Battaglini, S Nunnari… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We present a dynamic model of free riding in which n infinitely lived agents choose
between private consumption and contributions to a durable public good g. We characterize
the set of continuous Markov equilibria in economies with reversibility, where investments ...
All 3 versions

DP5014 Optimality and Renegotiation in Dynamic Contracting

M Battaglini - 2005 - cepr.org
We characterize the optimal renegotiation-proof contract in a dynamic Principal-Agent model
in which the type of the agent may change stochastically over time. Contrary to the case with
constant types, the ex ante optimal contract may be renegotiation-proof even if types are ...
Cached - All 3 versions

DP4702 Joint Production in Teams

M Battaglini - 2004 - cepr.org
Consider Holmström. s moral hazard in teams problem when there are n agents, each agent
i has aa (i)-dimensional strategy space and output can be m-dimensional. We show that a
compensation mechanism that satisfies budget balance, limited liability and implements ...
Cached - All 3 versions

DP5291 Efficiency, Equity and Timing in Voting Mechanisms

M Battaglini, R Morton… - 2005 - cepr.org
We compare the behaviour of voters, depending on whether they operate under sequential
and simultaneous voting rules, when voting is costly and information is incomplete. In many
real political institutions, ranging from small committees to mass elections, voting is ...
Cached - All 3 versions

Political activism, trust, and coordination

M Battaglini… - 2002 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We study political activism by several agents (lobbyists, unions, etc.) who have
private but imperfect policy-relevant signals, and seek to influence the decisions of a policy
maker. When agents can share information and coordinate their actions, the equilibrium is ...
Related articles - BL Direct - All 6 versions

Pareto Efficient Income Taxation with Stochastic Abilities

S Coate… - 2004 Meeting Papers, 2004 - ideas.repec.org
This paper studies Pareto e. cient income taxation in an economy with infinitely-lived
individuals whose income generating abilities evolve according to a two-state Markov
process. The study yields two main results. First, when individuals are risk neutral, the ...
Cached - All 4 versions

Edward Vytlacil (University of Chicago Nonparametric Selection Models and the Evaluation of Treatment Parameters Monika Piazzesi (Stanford University) An …

M Battaglini, W Dessein, H Fang… - Wiley Online Library
The Review of Economic Studies administers a travel fund to provide financial support for
economists and econometricians who are at an early stage in their careers and are
travelling to or from Europe to present papers at conferences, workshops, etc. This fund is ...

[PDF] Political Institutions and Investment in Public Infrastructure

[PDF] from uchicago.edu
M Battaglini, S Nunnari… - harrisschool.uchicago.edu
Abstract We present a theoretical model of the provision of a durable public good over an
infinite horizion. In each period, there is a societal endowment of which each of n districts
owns a share. This endowment can either be invested in the public good or consumed. ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 2 versions

On the Case for a Balanced Budget Amendment to the US Constitution

[PDF] from uni-muenchen.de
A Marina, B Marco… - 2010 - mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
This paper uses the political economy model of Battaglini and Coate (2008) to analyze the
impact of a balanced budget rule that requires that legislators do not run deficits. It considers
both a strict rule which cannot be circumvented and a rule that can be overridden by a ...
Related articles - All 3 versions

DP8146 Cheap Talk with Multiple Audiences: an Experimental Analysis

M Battaglini… - 2010 - cepr.org
We examine strategic information transmission in a controlled laboratory experiment of a
cheap talk game with one sender and multiple receivers. We study the change in equilibrium
behavior from the addition of another audience as well as from varying the degree of ...
Cached - All 3 versions

The Free Rider Problem: a Dynamic Analysis

[PDF] from caltech.edu
M Battaglini, S Nunnari… - 2012 - nber.org
ABSTRACT We present a dynamic model of free riding in which n infinitely lived agents
choose between private consumption and contributions to a durable public good g. We
characterize the set of continuous Markov equilibria in economies with reversibility, where ...

DP3149 Self Control in Peer Groups

M Battaglini, R Bénabou… - 2002 - cepr.org
People with a self-control problem often seek relief through social interactions rather than
binding commitments. Thus, in self-help groups like Alcoholics Anonymous, Narcotics
Anonymous etc, members are said to achieve better personal outcomes by mainly sharing ...
Cached - All 3 versions

[CITATION] A Note on Sequential Voting with Abstention

M Battaglini - 2003
Related articles

Proceedings of the twenty second annual congress of the European Economic Association, Budapest, August 2007

G TABELLINI, L GUISO, P SAPIENZA, L ZINGALES… - 2008 - cadmus.eui.eu
Proceedings of the twenty second annual congress of the European
Economic Association, Budapest, August 2007. ...
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