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Vertical separation

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G Bonanno… - The Journal of Industrial Economics, 1988 - JSTOR
A simple duopoly model is used to show the advantage to a manufacturer of selling his
product through an independent retailer (vertical separation) rather than directly to
consumers (vertical integration). Vertical separation is profitable insofar as it induces more ...
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Intensity of competition and the choice between product and process innovation

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G Bonanno… - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1998 - Elsevier
Two questions are examined within a model of vertical differentiation. The first is whether
cost-reducing innovations are more likely to be observed in regimes of more intense
(Bertrand) or less intense (Cournot) competition. We find that there are cost-reducing ...
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Location choice, product proliferation and entry deterrence

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G Bonanno - The Review of Economic Studies, 1987 - JSTOR
Within a slightly modified version of Hotelling's model we reconsider the claim that the threat
of entry induces existing firms to produce a larger number of products than they would
otherwise. We show that entry deterrence, although optimal, need not be achieved ...
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Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic foundations of game theory

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P Battigalli… - Research in Economics, 1999 - Elsevier
We provide a self-contained, selective overview of the literature on the role of knowledge
and beliefs in game theory. We focus on recent results on the epistemic foundations of
solution concepts, including correlated equilibrium, rationalizability in dynamic games, ...
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The logic of rational play in games of perfect information

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G Bonanno - Economics and Philosophy, 1991 - Cambridge Univ Press
For the past 20 years or so the literature on noncooperative games has been centered on
the search for an equilibrium concept that expresses the notion of rational behavior in
interactive situations. A basic tenet in this literature is that if a “rational solution” exists, it ...
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[PDF] Vertical differentiation with Cournot competition

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G Bonanno - Economic Notes, 1986 - econ.ucdavis.edu
In this paper we reconsider the problem of whether two firms in the same market would
choose to produce a homogeneous product or differentiated products. This problem was first
studied by Hotelling (1929) in a model where the type of product differentiation is that ...
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GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY WITH IMPERFECT COMPETITION1

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G Bonanno - Journal of Economic Surveys, 1990 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract. This survey is organized as follows. I. Introduction. II. The main issues. III. Negishi's
model. IV. Objective demand in the Cournot-Nash framework. V. Objective demand in the
Bertrand-Nash framework. VI. The assumption of quasi-concavity of the profit functions. VII ...
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How to make sense of the common prior assumption under incomplete information

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G Bonanno… - International Journal of Game Theory, 1999 - Springer
Abstract. Recent contributions have questioned the meaningfulness of the Common Prior
Assumption (CPA) in situations of incomplete information. We characterize the CPA in terms
of the primitives (individuals' belief hierarchies) without reference to an ex ante stage. The ...
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Vertical restraints in a model of vertical differentiation

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P Bolton… - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1988 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We consider the case of a manufacturer who sells a homogeneous good to retailers
who compete in prices and “cum-sales” or “post-sales” services. We show that the optimal
linear-price contract is inefficient from the point of view of the vertical structure and that ...
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Branching time, perfect information games, and backward induction

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G Bonanno - Games and Economic Behavior, 2001 - Elsevier
The logical foundations of game-theoretic solution concepts have so far been explored
within the confines of epistemic logic. In this paper we turn to a different branch of modal
logic, namely temporal logic, and propose to view the solution of a game as a complete ...
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Limited knowledge of demand and oligopoly equilibria

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G Bonanno… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1985 - Elsevier
Abstract In a standard model of oligopoly with differentiated products, the existence of an
equilibrium at which the first-order conditions for profit maximisation are simultaneously
satisfied for all firms is proved and this is done without imposing any restrictions on the ...
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Modal logic and game theory: two alternative approaches

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G Bonanno - Risk Decision and Policy, 2002 - Cambridge Univ Press
Abstract Two views of game theory are discussed:(1) game theory as a description of the
behavior of rational individuals who recognize each other's reationality and reasoning
abilities, and (2) game theory as an internally consistent recommendation to individuals ...
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Oligopoly equilibria when firms have local knowledge of demand

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G Bonanno - International Economic Review, 1988 - JSTOR
The notion of Nash equilibrium in static oligopoly games is based on the assumption that
each firm knows its entire demand curve (and, therefore, its entire profit function). It is much
more likely, however, that firms only have some idea of the outcome of small price ...
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Memory and perfect recall in extensive games

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G Bonanno - Games and Economic Behavior, 2004 - Elsevier
The notion of perfect recall in extensive games was introduced by Kuhn [in: Contributions to
the Theory of Games, Vol. 2, 1953, p. 193], who interpreted it as “equivalent to the assertion
that each player is allowed by the rules of the game to remember everything he knew at ...
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[PDF] A syntactic approach to rationality in games with ordinal payoffs

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G Bonanno - Proc. of LOFT, 2008 - economics.ucdavis.edu
Abstract We consider strategic-form games with ordinal payoffs and provide a syntactic
analysis of common belief/knowledge of rationality, which we define axiomatically. Two
axioms are considered. The first says that a player is irrational if she chooses a particular ...
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Assessing the Truth Axiom under incomplete information

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G Bonanno… - Mathematical social sciences, 1998 - Elsevier
Within an incomplete information framework (where the primitives are the individuals' belief
hierarchies) the Truth Axiom is stated locally as the hypothesis that no individual has any
false beliefs and that this fact is common belief. We decompose thisTruth Condition'into ...
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[PDF] Synchronic information, knowledge and common knowledge in extensive games

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P Battigalli… - RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS- …, 1999 - economics.ucdavis.edu
The language of extensive games is complex and rich. It allows one to express such notions
as the order of moves, the information a player has when it is her turn to move, etc. It is not,
however, a sufficiently rich language in the sense that there are meaningful and natural ...
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[HTML] Belief revision in a temporal framework

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G Bonanno - New Perspectives on Games and Interaction, 2009 - books.google.com
Abstract We study a branching-time temporal logic of belief revision where the interaction of
belief and information is modeled explicitly. The logic is based on three modal operators: a
belief operator, an information operator and a next-time operator. We consider three logics ...
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[CITATION] Industrial structure in the new industrial economics

G Bonanno… - 1990 - Oxford University Press, USA
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Monopoly equilibria and catastrophe theory

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G Bonanno - Australian Economic Papers, 1987 - Wiley Online Library
The possibility that agents may react discontinuously to continuous changes in their
environment docs not seeiii to have becn sufficiently investigated in the literature. Intuition
suggests that continuously changing causes should produce continuous cflccts. As a ...
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On the logic and role of Negative Introspection of Common Belief

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G Bonanno… - Mathematical social sciences, 1998 - Elsevier
We provide two local characterizations of Negative Introspection of Common Belief (NI). The
first shows NI to be equivalent to the conjunction of Truth of individuals' belief about what is
commonly believed (TCB) and common belief in TCB. According to the second, NI ...
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Rational beliefs in extensive games

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G Bonanno - Theory and decision, 1992 - Springer
Given an extensive game, with every node x and every player ia subset ki (x) of the set of
terminal nodes is associated, and is given the interpretation of player i's knowledge (or
information) at node x. A belief of player i is a function that associates with every node x an ...
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Players' information in extensive games

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G Bonanno - Mathematical Social Sciences, 1992 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper suggests a way of formalizing the amount of information that can be
conveyed to each player along every possible play of an extensive game. The information
given to each player i when the play of the game reaches node x is expressed as a subset ...
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Temporal interaction of information and belief

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G Bonanno - Studia Logica, 2007 - Springer
Abstract The temporal updating of an agent's beliefs in response to a flow of information is
modeled in a simple modal logic that, for every date t, contains a normal belief operator B t
and a non-normal information operator I t which is analogous to the 'only knowing'operator ...
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On Stalnaker's notion of strong rationalizability and Nash equilibrium in perfect information games

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G Bonanno… - Theory and decision, 1998 - Springer
Counterexamples to two results by Stalnaker (Theory and Decision, 1994) are given and a
corrected version of one of the two results is proved. Stalnaker's proposed results are:(1) if at
the true state of an epistemic model of a perfect information game there is common belief ...
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Entry deterrence with uncertain entry and uncertain observability of commitment*

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G Bonanno - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1988 - Elsevier
The standard approach to the issue of strategic entry deterrence is based on the assumption
that if the incumbent does not precommit entry will take place with certainty, while if he does
precommit entry will be deterred with certainty. In this note we allow for the possibility that ...
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Divergence of choices despite similarity of characteristics: An application of catastrophe theory

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G Bonanno… - European journal of operational …, 1988 - Elsevier
Abstract In this paper we use catastrophe theory to analyse situations in which agents with
similar characteristics and objectives and facing identical or similar environments make
choices which are considerably different. We first provide two simple analytical examples ...
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Fundamental agreement: A new foundation for the Harsanyi doctrine

G Bonanno… - 1996 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: The" Harsanyi Doctrine" asserts that differences in individuals' beliefs are to be
attributed entirely to differences in information. In its embodiment as a Common Prior
assumption it is central to the economics of information and the foundations of game ...
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Extensive forms and set-theoretic forms

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G Bonanno - Economics Letters, 1991 - Elsevier
Abstract We show that the set of choices in an extensive-form game is isomorphic to a class
of subsets of the set of initially possible outcomes. This enables us to introduce a new game-
form which we call the set-theoretic form. We show that a set-theoretic form can be ...
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Information, knowledge and belief

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G Bonanno - Bulletin of Economic Research, 2002 - Wiley Online Library
The paper models information as possibilities consistent with signals received from the
environment. Knowledge is obtained by reasoning about the signals received as well as
those that might have been received but were not. The term 'knowledge'is used to refer to ...
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[CITATION] Deterrence, observability and awareness

G Bonanno - ECONOMIC NOTES-SIENA-, 1992 - MONTE DEI PASCHI DI SIENA
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[CITATION] Topics in oligoply

G Bonanno - unpublished Ph. D. thesis, London School of …, 1985
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[BOOK] Logic and the Foundations of Game and Devision Theory-Loft 8: 8th International Conference, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, July 3-5, 2008, Revised Selected …

G Bonanno - 2010 - books.google.com
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Logic
and the Foundations of the Theory of Game and Decision Theory, LOFT8 2008, held in
Amsterdam, The Netherlands, July 2008. This volume is based on a selection of the ...
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ADVERTISING, PERCEIVED QUALITY AND STRATEGIC ENTRY DETERRENCE AND ACCOMODATION (*)

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G Bonanno - Metroeconomica, 1986 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract. When faced with the choice between two brands of a homogeneous good,
consumers—cetevis paribus—have been observed to prefer the brand with which they have
become familiar through advertising to the unadvertised brand. Some consumers are ...
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The coverability problem in input-output systems

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G Bonanno - Economics Letters, 1993 - Elsevier
Abstract The notion of a vector replacement system, developed in the computer science
literature, is used to analyze the reachability problem in integer-valued input-output models.
An integer-valued input-output system with initial resources is a 5-tuple left angle bracket ...
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Memory of past beliefs and actions

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G Bonanno - Studia Logica, 2003 - Springer
G. Bonanno Figure 1. Figure 2. П to name properties of frames and the letter X to name axioms
(we avoid P and A because the former is used for the past operator and the latter to denote
actions). In this paper we take a more general point of view and model memory as the ...
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[CITATION] Product Proliferation and Entry Deterrence Revisited

G Bonanno - STICERD-Theoretical Economics Paper Series, 1985 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks. Product
Proliferation and Entry Deterrence Revisited. Giacomo Bonanno (). ...
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[CITATION] On the Interpretation of Taxes in the Pivotal Mechanism

G Bonanno - ECONOMIC NOTES-SIENA-, 1992 - MONTE DEI PASCHI DI SIENA
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[CITATION] Topics in oligopoly: local equilibria, choice of product quality, entry deterrence

G Bonanno… - 1985
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Introduction to the special Issue of Economics and Philosophy on Neuroeconomics

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G Bonanno, C List, B Tungodden… - Economics and …, 2010 - Cambridge Univ Press
The past fifteen years or so have witnessed considerable progress in our understanding of
how the human brain works. One of the objectives of the fast-growing field of neuroscience
is to deepen our knowledge of how the brain perceives and interacts with the external ...
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[CITATION] Branching Time Logic

G Bonanno - Perfect Information Games and Backward Induction, …, 1998
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A syntactic characterization of perfect recall in extensive games

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G Bonanno - Research in Economics, 2003 - Elsevier
We provide a syntactic characterization of the property of perfect recall in extensive games. The
language we use is basic temporal logic with the addition of a knowledge operator for every
player. ... Author Keywords: Extensive games; Basic temporal logic; Memory; Perfect recall.
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[CITATION] Knowledge, rationality and equilibrium in extensive games

G Bonanno - Papers, 1994 - ideas.repec.org
No abstract is available for this item. ... To our knowledge, this item is not available for
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[CITATION] Knowledge And Beliefs In Extensive Games

G Bonanno - Working Papers, 1990 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks.
KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEFS IN EXTENSIVE GAMES. Giacomo Bonanno (). Working
Papers from California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs. ...
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[CITATION] Existence of Local and Infinitesimal Nash Equilibria in Two-person Games with Applications to Duopoly

G Bonanno - 1983 - Associazione Borsisti Luciano Jona
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Systematic judgment aggregators: An algebraic connection between social and logical structure

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D Eckert, F Herzberg, G Bonanno… - Proceeding of the …, 2009 - drops.dagstuhl.de
Abstract We present several results that show that systematic (complete) judgment
aggregators can be viewed as both (2-valued) Boolean homomorphisms and as syntatic
versions of reduced (ultra) products. Thereby, Arrovian judgment aggregators link the ...
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[PDF] Modeling Production with Petri Nets

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G Bonanno - ECONOMIC NOTES-SIENA-, 1995 - econ.ucdavis.edu
Abstract The purpose of this paper is to bring to the attention of economists a tool of analysis,
known as Petri nets, which was developed in the computer science literature. Although, from
a purely formal point of view, Petri nets are not a new tool, they do seem to provide a new ...
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[CITATION] The logic of shared belief, public rumor, public shared belief and common belief

G Bonanno - Working Papers, 1994 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks. The
Logic of Shared Belief, Public Rumor, Public Shared Belief and Common Belief. Giacomo
Bonanno (). Working Papers from California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs. ...
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[PDF] Introduction to the semantics of belief and common belief

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G Bonanno… - Department of Economics, 1997 - economics.ucdavis.edu
Abstract We provide an introduction to interactive belief systems from a qualitative and
semantic point of view. Properties of belief hierarchies are formulated locally. Among the
properties considered are" Common belief in no error"(which has been shown to have ...
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[CITATION] Sudden and surprising changes of attitude during negotiations

G Bonanno - First Annual Congress of the European Economic …, 1986
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[CITATION] Synchronic Information and Common Knowledge in Extensive Games

P Battigalli… - Papers, 1993 - ideas.repec.org
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Reply to Vilks

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G Bonanno - Economics and Philosophy, 1994 - Cambridge Univ Press
Service Announcement Due to essential infrastructure maintenance work, users may
experience intermittent access issues on Tuesday14th June 2011 between 7: 00am GMT
and 8: 00am GMT. We apologise for any inconvenience this may cause.
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[PDF] Intersubjective consistency of beliefs and the logic of common belief

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G Bonanno… - Working Papers, 1995 - econ.ucdavis.edu
Abstract'We characterize the class of n-person belief systems for which common belief has
the properties of the strongest logic of belief, KD45. The characterizing condition states that
individuals are not too mistaken in their beliefs about common beliefs. It is shown to be ...
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[CITATION] Intensity of competition and the choice between product

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B Haworth… - International journal of industrial …, 1998 - dialnet.unirioja.es
... Intensity of competition and the choice between product. Autores: Barry Haworth, Giacomo
Bonanno; Localización: International journal of industrial organization, ISSN 0167-7187, Vol.
16, Nº. 4, 1998 , págs. 495-510. Fundación Dialnet. Acceso de usuarios registrados. ...
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[CITATION] On the Choice Between Process and Product Innovation

G Bonanno… - Working Papers, 1994 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks. On
the Choice Between Process and Product Innovation. Giacomo Bonanno () and B. Haworth.
Working Papers from California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs. ...
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[CITATION] An Axiomatic Approach to Equilibrium in Extensive Games

G Bonanno - Working Papers, 1994 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks.
An Axiomatic Approach to Equilibrium in Extensive Games. Giacomo Bonanno (). Working
Papers from California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs. ...
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Elizabeth Anderson is Arthur F. Thurnau Professor and Associate Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. She is the …

C Amsperger, RE Backhouse, P Battigalli, C Beed… - Cambridge Univ Press
Christian Amsperger holds a Ph. D. in economics from the University of Louvainla-Neuve
and is currently a research fellow of the Belgian National Science Foundation (FNRS). He
works at the Chaire Hoover d'Ethique Economique et Sociale and teaches political ...

Introduction To The Special Issue Of Economics And Philosophy On Ambiguity Aversion

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G Bonanno, M van Hees, C List… - Economics and …, 2009 - Cambridge Univ Press
The paradigm for modelling decision-making under uncertainty has undoubtedly been the
theory of Expected Utility, which was first developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1944) and later extended by Savage (1954) to the case of subjective uncertainty. The ...
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Does Egalitarianism Have a Future?

G Bonanno, J Roemer, L Putterman, W Hai… - Working Papers - ideas.repec.org
This paper surveys the evidence, theoretical and empirical, relating to the possibility of
achieving more egalitarian distributions of income than are typical in modern societies. The
first four parts of the paper (Introduction, Improving efficiency an equality, The ownership ...
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[CITATION] Revealed preference, iterated belief revision and solutions of dynamic games

G Bonanno - 2009
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[CITATION] Imperfectly Observable Commitment

G Bonanno - Papers, 1990 - ideas.repec.org
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[PDF] A dynamic epistemic characterization of backward induction without counterfactuals

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G Bonanno - 2012 - economics.ucdavis.edu
Abstract The analysis of rational play in dynamic games is usually done within a static
framework that specifies a player's initial beliefs as well as his disposition to revise those
beliefs conditional on hypothetical states of information. We suggest a simpler approach, ...
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[PDF] A note on the subtleties of Bayesian inference

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G Bonanno - ECONOMIC NOTES-SIENA-, 1997 - econ.ucdavis.edu
The Bayesian approach plays a central role in economics, decision theory and game theory.
Bayesianism is usually characterized as the philosophical view that probability can be
interpreted subjectively and that the rational way to assimilate information into one's ...
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Datta, Manjira Achieve price stability can Stein, Jerome L. Action: evidence on relative Milner. Simon

A Saunders, DP Hewitt, E Funkhouser, M Feldstein… - Cambridge Univ Press
This section contains an index of current working papers by permuted title. The permuted title
entry is followed by the name of the primary author. A complete bibliographic listing can be found
by consulting the corresponding entry for the primary author in the author index. As an ...

[CITATION] Nash Versus Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium: The Role of Information

G Bonanno - Working Papers, 1992 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks. Nash
Versus Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium: The Role of Information. Giacomo Bonanno (). Working
Papers from California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs. ...
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Economics & Philosophy

G Bonanno, M van Hees… - Cambridge Univ Press
(EBOR) is a leading European publication addressing all legal aspects of business
organization. The journal is a platform for articles, case-notes and book reviews to stimulate
scholarly debate and to reflect the speed of how developments in the field translate into ...
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[CITATION] ECONOMICS 221A: INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION

G Bonanno - 2007
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Can good news lead to a more pessimistic choice of action?

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G Bonanno - Theory and decision, 1988 - Springer
Adapting a definition introduced by Milgrom (1981) we say that a signal about the
environment is good news relative to some initial beliefs if the posterior beliefs dominate the
initial beliefs in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance (the assumption being that ...
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[CITATION] Logic and the foundations of the theory of games and decisions: introduction

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G Bonanno… - Research in Economics, 2003 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks. Logic
and the foundations of the theory of games and decisions: introduction. Giacomo Bonanno ()
and Wiebe van der Hoek. Research in Economics, 2003, vol. 57, issue 3, pages 185-188. ...
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[CITATION] General Equilibrium Theory With Imperfect Competition: A Non-Technical Survey

G Bonanno - Papers, 1989 - ideas.repec.org
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Assessing The Truth Axiom Under Incomplete Information

K Nehring… - Working Papers - ideas.repec.org
Within an incomplete information framework (where the primitives are the individuals''belief
hierarchies) we investigate the intersubjective implications of the assumption that it is
common belief that no individual has any false beliefs (a key component of the Truth ...
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[PDF] Information processing, rational beliefs and social interaction (10w2133)

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G Bonanno, J Delgrande, R Goebel, J Lang… - 2010 - dev.birs.ca
The study of the mathematical aspects of belief formation, information processing and
rational belief change is of central importance in a number of different fields, namely artificial
intelligence, computer science, game theory, logic, philosophy and psychology. The area ...
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Information, rational beliefs and equilibrium refinements

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G Bonanno - Ricerche Economiche, 1994 - Elsevier
Abstract Given an extensive game G, three subsets of the normal-form equivalence class of
G are defined: the subset of simultaneous games [denoted by Sim (G)] the subset of
subgame-proserving quasi-simultaneous games [denoted by SubSim (G)] and, finally, the ...
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[CITATION] Special Issue: Logic and the Foundations of the Theory of Games and Decisions

G Bonanno… - 2001 - Blackwell
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Varieties of interpersonal compatibility of beliefs

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G Bonanno… - 1999 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: The logic of common belief does not always reflect the logic of individual beliefs. In
particular, the Negative Introspection property fails at the common belief level, that is, it can
happen than either is A commonly believed nor is it common belief that A is not commonly ...
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Varieties of Interpersonal Compatibility of Beliefs

K Nehring, G Bonanno… - Working Papers - ideas.repec.org
The logic of common belief does not always reflect the logic of individual beliefs. In
particular, the Negative Introspection property fails at the common belief level, that is, it can
happen that neither is A commonly believed nor is it common belief that A is not commonly ...
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Logic and the Foundations of the Theory of Games and Decisions: Introduction*

[PDF] from ucdavis.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
G Bonanno - Synthese, 2005 - Springer
This special issue of Knowledge, Rationality and Action contains a selection of papers presented
at the sixth conference on “Logic and the Foundations of the Theory of Games and
Decisions” (LOFT6), which took place in Leipzig, in July 2004. The LOFT conferences ...
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09351 Abstracts Collection--Information processing, rational belief change and social interaction}

[PDF] from dagstuhl.de
G Bonanno, J Delgrande, H Rott… - … , rational belief change … - drops.dagstuhl.de
Abstract From 23.08. to 27.08. 2009, the Dagstuhl Seminar 09351``Information processing,
rational belief change and social interaction''was held in Schloss Dagstuhl~--~ Leibniz
Center for Informatics. During the seminar, several participants presented their current ...
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MARTIN VAN HEES, University of Groningen, The Netherlands CHRISTIAN LIST, London School of Economics, UK BERTIL TUNGODDEN, Norwegian School of …

G BONANNO - Cambridge Univ Press
Economics and Philosophy is a journal that publishes articles and book reviews in all areas
linking economics and philosophy. These include the methodology and epistemology of
economics, the foundations of decision theory and game theory, the nature of rational ...
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The editors would like to thank our editorial assistant Ann Broome and all the following for generously giving their time as referees in the year ending in July 1995. …

R Arneson, M Bacharach, R Backhouse, B Barry… - Cambridge Univ Press
Cambridge Journals. Home; CJO Mobile; Contact Us; Site Map; Help; FAQ; Accessibility;
Register. Basket; Log in. User Log-in; Athens Log-in; Institutional Log-in. Username or
Email Address: Password: Remember me. Forgot your Password? ...
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Rationality and Coordination, Bicchieri Cristina. Cambridge University Press, 1994, xiii+ 270 pages.

G Bonanno - Economics and Philosophy, 1995 - Cambridge Univ Press
... Giacomo Bonanno a1. a1 University of California, Davis. ... Giacomo Bonanno (1995) Economics
and Philosophy, Volume 11, Issue 02, October 1995 pp 359-366 http://journals.cambridge.
org/abstract_S026626710000345X. Giacomo Bonanno (1995). ...
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MARTIN VAN HEES, University of Groningen, The Netherlands CHRISTIAN LIST, London School of Economics, UK FRANçOIS MANIqUET, Université catholique de …

G BONANNO - Cambridge Univ Press
Economics and Philosophy is a journal that publishes articles and book reviews in all areas
linking economics and philosophy. These include the methodology and epistemology of
economics, the foundations of decision theory and game theory, the nature of rational ...
All 2 versions

[PDF] Reply toSocial Cost and Groves Mechanisms'

[PDF] from ucdavis.edu
G Bonanno - ECONOMIC NOTES-SIENA-, 2002 - econ.ucdavis.edu
In my 1992 paper in Economic Notes, I argued that the traditional heuristic interpretation of
taxes in the pivotal mechanism (in terms of the utility loss imposed by the taxed individual on
the rest of society) is not correct, since it takes into account only the effect that the ...
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Logic and the Foundations of the Theory of Games and Decisions: Introduction

Full text - MIT Libraries
G Bonanno… - Bulletin of Economic Research, 2001 - Wiley Online Library
... Logic and the Foundations of the Theory of Games and Decisions: Introduction.
Giacomo Bonanno 1 ,; Wiebe Van Der Hoek 2. Article first published online: 16 DEC
2002. DOI: 10.1111/1467-8586.00132. Blackwell Publishers ...
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A syntactic approach to rationality in games PDF Logo

[PDF] from econstor.eu
G Bonanno - 2007 - econstor.eu
Zusammenfassung: We consider strategic-form games with ordinal payoffs and provide a
syntactic analysis of common belief/knowledge of rationality, which we define axiomatically.
Two axioms are considered. The first says that a player is irrational if she chooses a ...
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[CITATION] If He Does Not Know. Will He Know That He Does Not Know?

G Bonanno - Working Papers, 1989 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks. IF HE
DOES NOT KNOW. WILL HE KNOW THAT HE DOES NOT KNOW? Giacomo Bonanno (). Working
Papers from California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs. ...
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[PDF] Epistemic Foundations of Solution Concepts in Game Theory: An Introduction

[PDF] from ucdavis.edu
G Bonanno… - Department of Economics, 1997 - econ.ucdavis.edu
Abstract We give an introduction to the literature on the epistemic foundations of solution
concepts in game theory. Only normal-form games are considered. The solution concepts
analyzed are rati~ naliz~ ability, strong rationalizability, correlated equilibrium and Nash ...
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[CITATION] Logic and the Foundations of the Theory of Games and Decisions: Introduction;... Papers Presented at the Fourth Conference on Logic and the …

G Bonanno… - 2001 - Blackwell
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Pierluigi Barrotta is researcher in philosophy of science at the University of Pisa. He studied philosophy at Pisa and economics at the LSE and Cambridge (UK). He is …

P Boltuc, G Bonanno… - Cambridge Univ Press
Peter Boltuc holds a doctorate from Warsaw University and is completing a second doctorate
in political and social philosophy at Bowling Green State University. He has studied on a
Fulbright scholarship at Princeton, has been a visiting scholar at Oxford and has ...

Fundamental Agreement: A new foundation for the Harsanyi Doctrine

K Nehring, G Bonanno… - Working Papers - ideas.repec.org
The" Harsanyi Doctrine" asserts that differences in individuals''beliefs are to be attributed
entirely to differences in information. In its embodiment as a Common Prior assumption it is
central to the economics of information and the foundations of game theory. This paper ...
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[PDF] ECONOMICS OF UNCERTAINTY AND INFORMATION

[PDF] from ucdavis.edu
G Bonanno - econ.ucdavis.edu
It is hard to think of decisions where the outcome can be predicted with certainty. For
example, the decision to buy a house involves several elements of uncertainty: Will house
prices increase or decrease in the near future? Will the house require expensive repairs? ...
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09351 Executive Summary--Information processing, rational belief change and social interaction}

[PDF] from dagstuhl.de
G Bonanno, J Delgrande, H Rott… - … belief change and …, 2009 - drops.dagstuhl.de
Abstract From August 23, 2009 to August 27, 2009, the Dagstuhl Seminar 09351"
Information processing, rational belief change and social interaction" was held at the
International Conference and Research Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl. During the ...
All 4 versions

[CITATION] Rational belief equilibria

G Bonanno - ECONOMIC NOTES-SIENA-, 1993 - MONTE DEI PASCHI DI SIENA
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