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Credibility and Determinism in a Game of Persuasion

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Full text - MIT Libraries
I Sher - Games and Economic Behavior, 2011 - Elsevier
This paper studies a game of persuasion. A speaker attempts to persuade a listener to take
an action by presenting evidence. Glazer and Rubinstein (2006) showed that when the
listener's decision is binary, neither randomization nor commitment have any value for the ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - All 5 versions

Persuasion and limited communication

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I Sher - Levine's Bibliography, 2008 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper studies optimal persuasion. A speaker must decide which arguments to
present and a listener which arguments to accept. Communication is limited in that the
arguments available to the speaker depend on her information. Optimality is assessed ...
Cited by 7 - Related articles - All 14 versions

[PDF] Persuasion and Dynamic Communication

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I Sher - Unpublished Manuscript, 2010 - econ.umn.edu
Abstract A speaker attempts to persuade a listener to accept a request by presenting
evidence. A persuasion rule specifies what evidence is persuasive. This paper compares
static and dynamic rules. We present a single linear program (i) whose solution ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - View as HTML

Partial Identification of Heterogeneity in Preference Orderings Over Discrete Choices

[PDF] from umich.edu
I Sher, JT Fox… - 2011 - nber.org
We study a variant of a random utility model that takes a probability distribution over
preference relations as its primitive. We do not model products using a space of observed
characteristics. The distribution of preferences is only partially identified using cross- ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - Library Search - All 8 versions

[PDF] Price Discrimination Through Communication

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
I Sher… - Discussion Papers, 2011 - execed.kellogg.northwestern.edu
Abstract We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when the buyer may
present evidence relevant to the buyer's value, or when different types of buyer have a
differential ability to communicate. We introduce a dynamic bargaining protocol in which ...
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[PDF] Mediating Disagreement: A Theory of Purely Informational Conflict

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I Sher - 2005 - Citeseer
Abstract. This paper studies purely informational conflict, which is a situation in which
conditional on the acceptance of the same information agents agree about the optimal
course of action, but in which agents' beliefs are in fact inconsistent. The paper presents a ...
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Optimal shill bidding in the VCG mechanism

[PDF] from umn.edu
I Sher - Economic Theory, 2008 - Springer
Abstract This paper studies shill bidding in the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism
applied to combinatorial auctions. Shill bidding is a strategy whereby a single decision-
maker enters the auction under the guise of multiple identities (Yokoo et al. Games Econ ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 22 versions

[PDF] A model of persuasion

[PDF] from lu.se
I Sher - manuscript, Northwestern University, 2006 - nek.lu.se
Abstract This paper continues a project initiated by Glazer and Rubinstein (2001, 2004,
2006) of studying optimal rules of persuasion. A speaker attempts to persuade a listener to
take an action by presenting evidence. The paper performs two tasks. First, I extend ...
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[CITATION] Games with Misconceptions

I Sher - 2001 - University of Texas at Austin
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[CITATION] The syntheticity of mathematics

I Sher - 1997 - Reed College
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[PDF] Optimal Selling Mechanisms on Incentive Graphs

[PDF] from umn.edu
I Sher… - unpublished paper, University of Minnesota, 2010 - econ.umn.edu
Abstract We present a model highlighting one advantage of negotiation over posted prices
from the seller's perspective. In the process, we develop a general methodology for studying
mechanism design with weaker incentive constraints. To do so, we introduce the notion of ...
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[CITATION] Persuasion and the Selection Problem

I Sher - 2007
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