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Core in a simple coalition formation game

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S Banerjee, H Konishi… - Social Choice and Welfare, 2001 - Springer
Abstract. We analyze the core of a class of coalition formation game in which every player's
payoff depends only on the members of her coalition. We first consider anonymous games
and additively separable games. Neither of these strong properties guarantee the ...
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Coalition formation as a dynamic process

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H Konishi… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2003 - Elsevier
We study coalition formation as an ongoing, dynamic process, with payoffs generated as
coalitions form, disintegrate, or regroup. A process of coalition formation (PCF) is an
equilibrium if a coalitional move to some other state can be “justified” by the expectation of ...
Cited by 139 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 26 versions

Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy

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H Konishi, M Le Breton… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1998 - Elsevier
This paper examines the existence of a noncooperative equilibrium in a finite local public
goods economy where consumers have quasi-linear preferences. Jurisdictions consist of
consumers who chose the same public project and finance the cost of production of public ...
Cited by 82 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 14 versions

[PDF] Equilibria in a model with partial rivalry

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H Konishi, M Le Breton… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1997 - upi-yptk.ac.id
The strategies chosen by the players in a non-cooperative game generate a partition of the
set of players into groups of individuals, where the players in each such group make
identical choices. Thus, an equilibrium choice of strategies gives rise to an endogenously ...
Cited by 83 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 10 versions

[PDF] Voting with ballots and feet: Existence of equilibrium in a local public good economy

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H Konishi - Journal of Economic Theory, 1996 - usal.es
This paper proves a general existence theorem for equilibrium in a local public good
economy with free mobility by extending Greenberg and Shitovitz's (J. Econ. Theory 46,
1988, 223 236) approach. Each jurisdiction's collective choice rule is the d-majority voting ...
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Pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a group formation game with positive externalities

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H Konishi, M Le Breton… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1997 - Elsevier
This paper identifies a domain of payoff functions inno spillovernoncooperative games
withPositive externalitywhich admit a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Since in general a
Nash equilibrium may fail to exist, in order to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium, ...
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Free trade networks

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T Furusawa… - Journal of International Economics, 2007 - Elsevier
The paper examines the formation of free trade agreements (FTAs) as a network formation
game. We consider an n-country model in which (possibly asymmetric) countries trade
differentiated industrial commodities. We show that if all countries are symmetric, the ...
Cited by 61 - Related articles - All 7 versions

The endogenous formation of a city: Population agglomeration and marketplaces in a location-specific production economy

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M Berliant… - Regional Science and Urban Economics, 2000 - Elsevier
Much of the literature on the endogenous generation of a city employs increasing returns to
scale in order to obtain agglomeration. In contrast, the model considered here focuses on
the role of marketplaces or trading centers in the agglomeration of population as cities. ...
Cited by 53 - Related articles - All 18 versions

Migration-proof Tiebout equilibrium: existence and asymptotic efficiency

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JP Conley… - Journal of Public Economics, 2002 - Elsevier
Tiebout's basic claim was that when public goods are local, competition between
jurisdictions solves the free riding problem in the sense that equilibria exist and are always
Pareto efficient. Unfortunately, the literature does not quite support this conjecture. For ...
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On the Shapley–Scarf economy: the case of multiple types of indivisible goods

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H Konishi, T Quint… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2001 - Elsevier
We study a generalization of Shapley–Scarf's [Journal of Mathematical Economics 1 (1974)
23–37] economy in which multiple types of indivisible goods are traded. We show that many
of the distinctive results from the Shapley–Scarf economy do not carry over to this model, ...
Cited by 43 - Related articles - All 5 versions

Endogenous trade policy under foreign direct investment

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H Konishi, K Saggi… - Journal of International Economics, 1999 - Elsevier
Using Bernheim and Whinston (1986) common agency game, we endogenize trade policy
in a duopoly composed of a domestic firm and a foreign firm, where both firms influence the
domestic government's trade policy via their contributions. The foreign firm can jump over ...
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On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games

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H Konishi, M Le Breton… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1999 - Elsevier
In this paper we consider two notions of a coalitional deviation: strict deviation, where each
of member of a deviating group is better off, andweak deviation, where at least one member
of a deviating group is better off while all other members are at least as well off. We then ...
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Free trade networks

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T Furusawa… - FEEM Working Paper No. 55.2003, 2003 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: The paper examines the formation of free trade agreements (FTAs) as a network
formation game. We consider a general n-country model in which countries trade
differentiated industrial commodities as well as a numeraire good. Countries may be ...
Cited by 40 - Related articles - Library Search - All 29 versions

Concentration of competing retail stores

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H Konishi - Journal of Urban economics, 2005 - Elsevier
The geographical concentration of stores that sell similar commodities is analyzed using a
two-dimensional spatial competition model. A higher concentration of stores attracts more
consumers with taste uncertainty and low price expectations (a market-size effect), while it ...
Cited by 37 - Related articles - All 16 versions

Formation of hub cities: transportation cost advantage and population agglomeration

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H Konishi - Journal of Urban Economics, 2000 - Elsevier
Many cities are located on rivers or coasts. Such cities developed as transportation hubs or
markets for interregional trade, since these locations provide better access to other regions.
Local products are collected at such hubs, and interregional trade then takes place among ...
Cited by 33 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 14 versions

A Pareto-improving commodity tax reform under a smooth nonlinear income tax

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H Konishi - Journal of Public Economics, 1995 - Elsevier
This paper analyzes the welfare effects of commodity tax reform in an economy with a
nonlinear income tax and linear commodity taxes. The main result is that we can find a tax
reform program that improves every consumer's utility in the Pareto sense unless ...
Cited by 33 - Related articles - All 6 versions

Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems

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H Konishi… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2006 - Elsevier
It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching problems, pairwise-stable matchings
may not be immune to group deviations, unlike in many-to-one matching problems (Blair,
1988). In this paper, we show that pairwise stability is equivalent to credible group stability ...
Cited by 31 - Related articles - All 16 versions

Free mobility equilibrium in a local public goods economy with congestion

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H Konishi, S Weber… - Research in Economics, 1997 - Elsevier
This paper examines a local public goods economy where individuals' tastes are subject to
congestion effects. We prove that if the individuals' utility functions are quasi-linear and all
individuals have a common congestion function, then there exists a free mobility ...
Cited by 29 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 7 versions

Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers

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H Konishi, M Le Breton… - Economic Theory, 1997 - Springer
Summary This paper examines the conditions which guarantee that the set of coalition-proof
Nash equilibria coincides with the set of strong Nash equilibria in the normal form games
withoutspillovers. We find thatpopulation monotonicity properties of the payoff functions, ...
Cited by 29 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 8 versions

FREE TRADE NETWORKS WITH TRANSFERS*

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T Furusawa… - Japanese Economic Review, 2005 - Wiley Online Library
We investigate the network of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) in the context of a
network formation game with transfers. In a previous paper we showed that without
international transfers countries with different industrialization levels cannot sign an FTA, ...
Cited by 28 - Related articles - All 11 versions

Anchor stores

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H Konishi… - Journal of Urban Economics, 2003 - Elsevier
Planned shopping malls usually have one or more department (anchor) stores and multiple
specialized retailers selling substitutable commodities in each commodity category. If
consumers know their taste for the anchor's commodity and its price, but learn about a ...
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Existence of steady-state equilibrium in an overlapping-generations model with production

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H Konishi… - Economic Theory, 1997 - Springer
Summary This paper establishes an existence theorem of a non-trivial (positive capital
stock) steady-state equilibrium in Diamond's (1965) overlapping-generations model with
production by employing the steady-state consumption curve introduced in Ihori (1978). ...
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Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets

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H Konishi… - Social choice and Welfare, 2006 - Springer
Abstract In this paper, we analyze capacity manipulation games in hospital-intern markets
inspired by the real-life entry-level labor markets for young physicians who seek residencies
at hospitals. In a hospital-intern market, the matching is determined by a centralized ...
Cited by 19 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 4 versions

Expanding demand through price advertisement

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H Konishi… - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2002 - Elsevier
Retail stores frequently advertise prices. When consumer search is costly, advertising low
prices expands the number of consumers who visit and buy. We show that this demand
enhancement may offset a retailer's loss in margins from the low price, making ...
Cited by 17 - Related articles - All 12 versions

The unilateral incentives for technology transfers: Predation (and deterrence) by proxy

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A Creane… - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2009 - Elsevier
Joint production between rival firms often entails knowledge transfers without direct
compensation, leaving the question as to why more efficient firms would give their rivals
such an advantage. We find that such transfers are credible mechanisms to make the ...
Cited by 16 - Related articles - All 6 versions

Existence of stationary equilibrium in the markets for new and used durable goods

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H Konishi… - Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2002 - Elsevier
We prove the existence of stationary equilibrium in the primary and secondhand markets for
an indivisible consumer durable in a general model with stochastic degradation and
endogenous scrappage decisions. Unlike Rust (Econometrica 53 (1985) 783), we ...
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[CITATION] A note on public good provision and commodity taxes

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H Konishi - The Economic Studies Quarterly, 1993
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[PDF] Concentration of competing retail stores

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H Konishi - 1999 - bc.edu
Abstract The geographical concentration of stores that sell similar commodities is analyzed
using a two-dimensional spatial competition model. A higher concentration of stores attracts
more consumers with taste uncertainty and low price expectations (a market-size effect), ...
Cited by 12 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 8 versions

Free trade, customs unions, and transfers

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H Konishi, C Kowalczyk… - Social Science Research …, 2003 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: All countries would agree to immediate global free trade if countries were
compensated for any terms-of-trade losses with transfers from countries whose terms-of-
trade improve, and if customs unions were required to have no effects on non-member ...
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Tiebout's tale in spatial economies: Entrepreneurship, self-selection, and efficiency

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H Konishi - Regional Science and Urban Economics, 2008 - Elsevier
This paper establishes the existence and efficiency of equilibrium in a local public goods
economy with spatial structures by formalizing Hamilton's [Hamilton, BW, 1975. Zoning and
property taxation in a system of local governments Urban Studies 12, 205–211] ...
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[PDF] Uniqueness of user equilibrium in transportation networks with heterogeneous commuters

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H Konishi - Transportation science, 2004 - feem-web.it
Abstract This paper discusses uniqueness and efficiency of user equilibrium in
transportation networks with heterogeneous commuters. Daganzo (1983, Transportation
Science) proved the uniqueness of (stochastic) user equilibrium when commuters have ...
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Salience: Agenda choices by competing candidates

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M Berliant… - Public Choice, 2005 - Springer
Which issues are discussed by candidates in an election campaign? Why are some issues
never discussed? Model tractability is lost quickly when dealing with these questions, partly
because of the multidimensional voting inherent in models of multiple issues. Our model ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 19 versions

Contributing or free‐riding? Voluntary participation in a public good economy

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T Furusawa… - Theoretical economics, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
We consider a (pure) public goods provision problem with voluntary participation in a
quasilinear economy. We propose a new hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core
(FRP-core), which endogenously determines a contribution group, public goods provision ...
Cited by 10 - Related articles - All 26 versions

[CITATION] The endogenous formation of a city: Population agglomeration and marketplaces in a location-specific production economy

M Berliant, H Konishi - WORKING …, 1994 - Rochester Center for Economic …
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[PDF] Credible Group-Stability in General Multi-Partner Matching Problems

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H Konishi… - 2003 - wallis.rochester.edu
Abstract Pairwise-stable matching mechanisms are practically used and perform very well in
the real world two-sided matching markets (eg, the US hospital-intern market, and the British
hospital-intern markets: see Roth 1984 and 1991, respectively). It is known, however, that ...
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[CITATION] Hub cities: city formation without increasing returns

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H Konishi - Journal of Urban Economics, 2000
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Quasi-linear utility in a discrete choice model

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H Konishi… - Economics Letters, 1996 - Elsevier
This paper axiomatizes the quasi-linear utility form u (a, n)= v (a)+ n in an environment with a
finite number of alternatives when a consumer's preferences depend on both the
alternatives a and numbers of indivisible homogeneous numeraire goods n.
Cited by 6 - Related articles - All 6 versions

Equilibrium in abstract political economies: with an application to a public good economy with voting

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H Konishi - Social Choice and Welfare, 1996 - Springer
Consider an abstract political economy which has a collective choice rule together with
strategic interactions among players. We prove that there exists an equilibrium in such an
economy by synthesizing an equilibrium existence theorem in generalized games by ...
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[CITATION] The welfare effects of shifting from an indirect tax to a direct tax

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H Konishi - 季刊理論經濟學, 1989 - ci.nii.ac.jp
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[CITATION] Hub cities: city formation without economies of scale

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H Konishi - Journal of Urban Economics, 2000
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Decentralized matching markets with endogenous salaries

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H Konishi… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2008 - Elsevier
In a Shapley–Shubik assignment problem with a supermodular output matrix, we consider
games in which each firm makes a take-it-or-leave-it salary offer to one applicant, and a
match is made only when the offer is accepted by her. We consider both one-shot and ...
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Carpooling and congestion pricing: HOV and HOT lanes

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H Konishi… - Regional Science and Urban Economics, 2010 - Elsevier
It is often argued in the US that HOV (high occupancy vehicle) lanes are wasteful and should
be converted to HOT (high occupancy vehicles and toll lanes). In this paper, we construct a
simple model of commuters using a highway with multiple lanes, in which commuters are ...
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A welfare decomposition in quasi-linear economies

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T Furusawa… - Economics Letters, 2004 - Elsevier
We propose a decomposition of social welfare when consumers have quasi-linear utility
functions under certain conditions satisfied in many models of imperfect competition. Our
decomposition is useful especially when we assess the impact of trade liberalization on ...
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Referrals in search markets

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M Arbatskaya… - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2011 - Elsevier
This paper compares the equilibrium outcomes in search markets with and without referrals.
Although it seems clear that consumers would benefit from referrals, it is not at all clear
whether firms would unilaterally provide information about competing offers since such ...
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9 Group formation in games without spillovers

H Konishi, M Le Breton… - … in the economic theory of the …, 1997 - books.google.com
In many social and economic situations individuals form groups rather than operate on their
own. For example, individuals form communities in order to share the costs of production of
local public goods, or workers join a labour union in order to attain a better working ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - All 2 versions

[PDF] Voluntary Participation and Provision of Public Goods in Large Finite Economies

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H Konishi… - 2010 - fmwww.bc.edu
Abstract We consider a public good provision game with voluntary partic $ ipation. Agents
participating in the game provide a public good and pay the fees according to a mechanism
(allocation rule), while non $ participants can free $ ride on the participants. We examine ...
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Global Free Trade is in the Core of a Customs Union Game*

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H Konishi, C Kowalczyk… - Review of International …, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
We thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments. Konishi thanks KIER in Kyoto
University for their hospitality and financial support. Kowalczyk acknowledges with thanks
support from a sabbatical leave at Tufts. The paper is part of the Globalization Project at ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - All 6 versions

[PDF] On Efficient Jurisdiction Structures in a Simple Local Public Goods Economy with Interjurisdictional Trade

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H Konishi - Economics Bulletin, 2001 - accessecon.com
Abstract This note shows that if commodities are tradable across jurisdictions, then it may be
efficient to have heterogeneously sized jurisdictions, even if (i) consumers are identical,(ii)
there is one private good and one public good,(iii) utility and production functions are not ...
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[CITATION] Free trade, customs unions and transfers

C Kowalczyk, T Sjostrom… - 2003 - mimeo
Cited by 3 - Related articles

[CITATION] Concentration of Competing Retail Stores

K Hideo - 1999 - Boston College, Working Papers in …
Cited by 3 - Related articles

[CITATION] Free Trade, Customs Unions

H Konishi, C Kowalczyk… - 2003 - and Transfers, mimeo
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Stable cartels with a cournot fringe in a symmetric oligopoly

H Konishi… - Keio economic studies, 1999 - ci.nii.ac.jp
抄録 We consider a symmetric cartel formation game where the cartel, once formed, acts as
a Stackelberg quantity leader and the nonmember firms play the Cournot game with respect
to the residual demand. We show the existence of a stable cartel under fairly general ...
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[CITATION] Concentration of Competing Retail Stores “Working Paper

H Konishi - Boston College, 1999
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The Unilateral Incentives for Technology Transfers: Predation by Proxy

A Creane… - Working Papers in Economics, 2007 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: In 1984 GM and Toyota began the joint production of automobiles to much
controversy over its anti-competitive effects. The argument for the joint production was the
considerable efficiency gains GM would obtain. Since then, the anti-trust controversy has ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 5 versions

Distributional considerations of producers' profit in a commodity tax design problem

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Y Iwamoto… - Economics Letters, 1991 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper derives the optimal commodity tax rule in the presence of pure profit in a
setting with many consumers and many firms. The optimal rule depends upon the
distributional characteristics of not only commodity consumption but also production ...
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EFFICIENT MIXED CLUBS: NONLINEAR‐PRICING EQUILIBRIA WITH ENTREPRENEURIAL MANAGERS

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H Konishi - Japanese Economic Review, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
Scotchmer and Wooders show that efficient clubs are homogeneous when consumers are
divisible in Berglas's anonymous crowding model. However, if consumers are not divisible
or if clubs have multiple facilities with economies of scope, mixed clubs are efficient. In ...
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[PDF] Global Free Trade is in the Core of a Customs Union Game

[PDF] from au.dk
H Konishi, C Kowalczyk… - 2003 - au.dk
Abstract This paper shows nonemptiness of the core of a customs union game with a status
quo equilibrium with tariffs by employing an appropriate notion of the core in Kowalczyk and
Sjöström (1994, Economica). Specifically, we find that if customs unions may have no ...
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[PDF] On the Shapley-Scarf economy: the case of multiple types of indivisible goods

[PDF] from socionet.org
H Konishi, T Quint… - Boston College Working Papers in …, 2000 - socionet.org
Abstract We study a generalization of Shapley-Scarf's (1974) economy in which multiple
types of indivisible goods are traded. We show that many of the distinctive results from the
Shapley-Scarf economy do not carry over to this model, even if agents' preferences are ...
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[CITATION] Free Trade Networks

F Taiji… - Unpublished manuscript, 2003
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[CITATION] VFree Trade, Customs Unions, and Transfers, V Social Science Research Net% work, July

H Konishi, C Kowalczyk… - 2003
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[PDF] The dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model: A diagrammatic analysis

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E BOND, K IWASA, K NISHIMURA… - International Journal of …, 2012 - rieti.go.jp
Abstract In this paper, we show that the main results of dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin models
(with non-homothetic preferences) can be derived from diagrams which represent the basic
functions in static models such as the Rybczynski line, income expansion paths, and ...
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[CITATION] Essays in public economics: city formation, local public goods, and tax reform

H Konishi - 1994 - University of Rochester. Department …
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[CITATION] Credible Group Stability in Multi-Partner Matching Problems

MU Ünver… - 2005 Meeting Papers, 2005 - econpapers.repec.org
Related works: Working Paper: Credible Group Stability in Multi-Partner Matching Problems
(2004) Working Paper: Credible Group Stability in Multi-Partner Matching Problems (2003) This
item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
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[CITATION] On the public good provision rule under a nonlinear income tax

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H Konishi - 季刊理論經濟學, 1992 - ci.nii.ac.jp
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Goldilocks and the Licensing Firm: Choosing a Partner when Rivals are Heterogeneous

A Creane… - 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Markets are often characterized with firms of differing capabilities with more
efficient firms licensing their technology to lesser firms. We examine the effects that the
amount of the technology transferred, and the characteristics of the partner have on this ...
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[PDF] Contributing or Free-Riding? A Theory of Endogenous Lobby Formation

[PDF] from accessecon.com
T Furusawa… - Working Papers in Economics, 2008 - accessecon.com
Abstract We consider a two-stage public goods provision game: In the first stage, players
simultaneously decide if they will join a contribution group or not. In the second stage,
players in the contribution group simultaneously offer contribution schemes in order to ...
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[PDF] Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital-Intern Markets

[PDF] from bc.edu
H Konishi… - Boston College Working Papers in …, 2002 - fmwww.bc.edu
Abstract In this paper, we analyze capacity manipulation games in hospitalMintern markets
inM spired by the realMlife entryMlevel labor markets for young physicians who seek
residencies at hospitals. In a hospitalMintern market, the matching is determined by a ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 11 versions

[PDF] Licensing technology to a rival when firms are heterogeneous

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A Creane… - 2009 - bc.edu
Knowledge and technical know-how is transferred between firms in many ways: through
licensing, acquisition of rivals, joint ventures, etc. 1 For example, in the auto market, the joint
production venture between GM and Toyota was partly motivated by giving GM the ...
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[PDF] Entrepreneurial Land Developers: Local Externalities and Mixed Housing Developments

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H Konishi - Boston College Working Papers in Economics, 2011 - bc.edu
► purchase land lot and develop it ► build houses and/or condos having target consumer types
in their mind ► contemplate what combination of the characteristics of housing units would maximize
their profits ... ► purchase land lot and develop it ► build houses and/or condos having ...
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Inverse Elasticity Rule in a Production Efficiency Problem

A Hannagan… - Boston College Working Papers in …, 2011 - ideas.repec.org
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1972) show that production
efficiency is achieved under the optimal commodity tax when profit income is zero. Here, we
consider the simplest possible model to analyze production efficiency in the presence of ...
Cached - All 5 versions

[PDF] Goldilocks and the licensing firm: Choosing

[PDF] from psu.edu
A Creane… - Citeseer
Knowledge and technical know-how is transferred between firms in many ways: through
licensing, acquisition of rivals, joint ventures, etc. 1 For example, in the auto market, the joint
production venture between GM and Toyota (NUMMI) was partly motivated by giving GM ...
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Profit-maximizing matchmaker

[PDF] from bc.edu
CY Ko… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2011 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper considers a resource allocation mechanism that utilizes a profit-
maximizing auctioneer/matchmaker in the Kelso–Crawford (1982)(many-to-one) assignment
problem. We consider general and simple (individualized price) message spaces for firms ...
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[PDF] JEL: D4, L1, L41 Key words: Predation, Technology Transfers

[PDF] from msu.edu
P by Proxy, A Creane… - msu.edu
In 1984 General Motors (at the time the world's largest automaker) and Toyota (number
three) began joint production of vehicles at the New United Motors Manufacturing
Inc.(NUMMI) in Fremont, California. Into this partnerships GM provided the plant and ...
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[PDF] Efficient Mixed Clubs: Nonlinear-Pricing Equilibria with Entrepreneurial

[PDF] from bc.edu
H Konishi - fmwww.bc.edu
Abstract Scotchmer and Wooders (1987) show that efficient clubs are homogeneous when
consumers are divisible in Berglas's (1976) anonymous crowding model. However, if
consumers are not divisible or if clubs have multiple facilities with economies of scope, ...
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[PDF] JEL: D4, L1, L41 Key words: Entry Deterrence, Predation, Technology Transfers

[PDF] from bc.edu
A Creane… - bc.edu
In 1984 General Motors and Toyota began the controversial joint production of vehicles at
the New United Motors Manufacturing Inc.(NUMMI) in Fremont, California. 1 The FTC had
narrowly approved the venture (3 to 2), partly defending the approval on the basis of GM ...
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ELSEVIER Economic Design 2 (1997) 423

G Aharonovitz, B Allen, M Bhiladwalla, W Bossert… - Economic Design, 1997 - Springer
Dr. Fikret Adaman of Bogazici University has asked to be relieved from his duty as
Administrator of our Editorial Office, a duty which he has cheerfully and effectively carried
from the inception of the journal. Economic Design thanks Dr. Adaman for all his help so ...

Contributing or free-riding? A theory of endogenous lobby formation PDF Logo

[PDF] from econstor.eu
T Furusawa… - econstor.eu
Zusammenfassung: We consider a two-stage public goods provision game: In the first stage,
players simultaneously decide if they will join a contribution group or not. In the second
stage, players in the contribution group simultaneously offer contribution schemes in order ...
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[PDF] Choosing a Licensee from Heterogeneous Rivals

[PDF] from bc.edu
A Creane, CY Ko… - Boston College Working Papers in …, 2011 - fmwww.bc.edu
Abstract We examine a firm that can license its production technology to a rival when firms
are heterogeneous in production costs. We show that a complete technology transfer from
one firm to another always in% creases joint profit under weakly concave demand when at ...
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The Unilateral Incentives for Technology Transfers: Predation by Proxy (and Deterrence)

A Creane… - 2007 - socionet.ru
Joint production between rival firms often entails knowledge transfers without direct
compensation, leaving the question as to why more efficient firms would give their rivals such
an advantage. We find that such transfers are credible mechanisms to make the market ...
Cached - All 2 versions

[CITATION] On in-house VE as to construction projects of the East Japan Railway Co.. The development of" giving priority to VE" technique of JR construction.

H KONISHI, Y NOJIRI… - Toko Giho, 1999 - sciencelinks.jp
TOP > J-EAST > List of Journal Titles (T) > Toko Giho (1999) > On in-house VE as to construction
projects of the East Japan Railway Co. . The development of "giving priority to VE" technique
of JR construction. ... On in-house VE as to construction projects of the East Japan ...
Cached

[PDF] Market for Clubs with Congestible Facilities: Nonlinear-Pricing Equilibria with Entrepreneurial

[PDF] from bc.edu
H Konishi - bc.edu
Abstract Scotchmer and Wooders (1987) show that efficient clubs are homogeneous when
consumers are divisible in Berglas's (1976) anonymous crowding model. However, if
consumers are not divisible or if clubs have multiple facilities with economies of scope, ...
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[CITATION] On a Corlett-Hague Rule in an Economy with Pure Profit

Full text - MIT Libraries
H Konishi - 季刊理論經濟學, 1994 - ci.nii.ac.jp
Cached

[PDF] A Model of Two Party Representative Democracy

[PDF] from bc.edu
K Kobayashi… - 2010 - bc.edu
In representative democratic system, parties tend to have support groups from a wide range
of policy spectrum. In many cases, some support group of a party has strong voice in
determining their representative candidates and policies. For example, in the US, the ...
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[PDF] Free-Riding-Proof International Environmental Agreements

[PDF] from rieti.go.jp
T FURUSAWA… - Discussion Papers (by fiscal year), 2011 - rieti.go.jp
Abstract We study international free-riding-proof coalitions to solve trans-boundary
environmental problems such as global warming. We show that the free-riding problem is
rather serious so that a free-riding-proof coalition can consist of only a small number of ...
Related articles - All 2 versions

[CITATION] DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS OF PRODUCERS'PROFIT IN A TAX DESIGN PROBLEM

Y Iwamoto… - ISER Discussion Paper, 1989 - econpapers.repec.org
By Yasushi Iwamoto and Hideo Konishi; DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
OF PRODUCERS' PROFIT IN A TAX DESIGN PROBLEM.
Cached - Library Search - All 6 versions

[PDF] Dixit-Stiglitz approaches to international trade:† Enough is enough

[PDF] from hit-u.ac.jp
JP Conley, R Driskill… - wakame.econ.hit-u.ac.jp
Abstract We show that the Melitz (2003) continuum interpretation of the Dixit-Stiglitz
monopolistic competition model does not represent a reasonable limit of a large finite
economy unless it is built on a micro-foundation of heterogeneous agents. We argue for ...
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Profit-Maximizing Matchmaker

H Konishi… - 2011 - ideas.repec.org
This paper considers a resource allocation mechanism that utilizes a profit-maximizing
auctioneer/matchmaker in the Kelso-Crawford (1982)(many-to-one) assignment problem.
We consider general and simple (individualized price) message spaces for firms' reports ...
Cached - All 5 versions

[PDF] A Dixit-Stiglitz general equilibrium model with oligopolistic markets:† Enough is enough

[PDF] from sinica.edu.tw
JP Conley, R Driskill… - 2011 - econ.sinica.edu.tw
The Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) model of Chamberlainian monopolistic competition model and has
had a enormous impact on research in Industrial Organization, the Economics of
Geography, Monetary and Real Business Cycle, Growth Theory, and International Trade.
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[CITATION] Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Game with Positive Externalities

ML Breton, H Konishi… - GREQAM, 1995 - econpapers.repec.org
By Michel Le Breton, Hideo Konishi and Shlomo Weber; Pure Strategy
Nash Equilibrium in Game with Positive Externalities.
Cached - All 4 versions

Free-Riding-Proof International Environmental Agreements

F Taiji… - Discussion papers, 2011 - ideas.repec.org
We study international free-riding-proof coalitions to solve trans-boundary environmental
problems such as global warming. We show that the free-riding problem is rather serious so
that a free-riding-proof coalition can consist of only a small number of countries. In the ...
Cached - All 3 versions

[PDF] Referrals in Search Markets

[PDF] from bc.edu
MAH Konishi - 2011 - fmwww.bc.edu
Abstract This paper compares the equilibrium outcomes in search markets a la Wolinsky
(1984) with and without referrals. Although it seems clear that consumers would benefit from
referrals, it is not at all clear whether firms would unilaterally provide information about ...
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ELSEVIER Economic Design 2 (1996) 118

J Alcalde, A Alkan, B Allen, M Aoki, PK Bag… - Economic Design, 1996 - Springer
Economic Design would like to thank many colleagues, including those listed below, for their
diligent help in producing its maiden volume, Vol. I. ... Alcalde, Jose Alkan, Ahmet Allen, Beth
Aoki, Masahiko Ba G, Mehmet Ba~l, Erdem Bag, Parimal Kanti Baliga, Sandeep ...

Contributing or Free-Riding? A Theory of Endogenous Lobby Formation

H Konishi… - Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working …, 2008 - bepress.com
ABSTRACT: We consider a two-stage public goods provision game: In the first stage,
players simultaneously decide if they will join a contribution group or not. In the second
stage, players in the contribution group simultaneously offer contribution schemes in order ...
Library Search - All 8 versions

[PDF] A Model of Two Party Representative Democracy: Endogenous Party Formation

[PDF] from hosei.ac.jp
K Kobayashi… - 2011 - mt.tama.hosei.ac.jp
Abstract This paper presents a two party representative democratic model in which voters
choose their parties in order to influence the choice of party representative. After two
candidates are selected as the medians of the parties' support groups, Nature plays to ...
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[PDF] Credible Group-Deviation in Multi-Partner Matching Problems

[PDF] from feem.it
H Konishi, MU Ünver… - 2003 - feem.it
Summary It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching problems, pairwise-stable
matchings may not be immune to group deviations, unlike in many-to-one matching
problems (Blair 1988). In this paper, we show that pairwise stability is equivalent to ...
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Core in a simple coalition formation game

[PDF] from umich.edu
H Konishi, T Sönmez… - 2001 - deepblue.lib.umich.edu
We analyze the core of a class of coalition formation game in which every player's payoff
depends only on the members of her coalition. We first consider anonymous games and
additively separable games. Neither of these strong properties guarantee the existence of ...
Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 2 versions

[CITATION] V JOURNAL_OF Mathematical ECONOMICS

Full text - MIT Libraries
H Konishi, T Quintb… - Journal of mathematical economics, 2001

Expanding Demand through Price Advertisement

M Sandfort… - Boston College Working Papers in …, 2000 - ideas.repec.org
Price advertisement by retail stores is pervasive. If there exist non-negligible costs of
consumer search, a retailer can increase the number of consumers visiting its location by
advertising a low price, thus increasing consumers' expected utilities from search. If the ...
Related articles - Cached - All 7 versions

The On the Shapley-Scarf Economy: Case of Multiple Types of Indivisible Goods

KI Hideo, Q Thomas - ukpmc.ac.uk
We study a generalization of Shapley-Scarf's (1974) economy in which multipletypes of
indivisible goods are traded. We show that many of the distinctive resultsfrom the Shapley-
Scarf economy do not carry over to this model, even if agents' preferences are strict and ...
Cached

Contributing or Free-Riding? Voluntary Participation in a Public Good Economy

F Taiji… - Discussion papers, 2011 - ideas.repec.org
We consider a (pure) public goods provision problem with voluntary participation in a quasi-
linear economy. We propose a new hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core (FRP-
Core), which endogenously determines a contribution group, public goods provision level, ...
Cached - All 3 versions

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