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Optimal contracts when enforcement is a decision variable

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S Krasa… - Econometrica, 2000 - Wiley Online Library
This paper analyzes choice-theoretic costly enforcement in an intertemporal contracting
model with a differentially informed investor and entrepreneur. An intertemporal contract is
modeled as a mechanism in which there is limited commitment to payment and ...
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Monitoring the monitor: An incentive structure for a financial intermediary

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S Krasa… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1992 - Elsevier
This paper studies financial intermediation (ie, delegated monitoring) in a costly state
verification model. There are a finite number of agents, thus the intermediary cannot fully
diversify its portfolio and is subject to default risk. The role of the intermediary is to satisfy ...
Cited by 149 - Related articles - Library Search - All 4 versions

Political polarization and the electoral effects of media bias

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D Bernhardt, S Krasa… - Journal of Public Economics, 2008 - Elsevier
We develop a model in which profits of media firms depend on their audience ratings, and
maximizing profits may involve catering to a partisan audience by suppressing information
that the partisan audience does not like hearing. While voters are rational, understand the ...
Cited by 92 - Related articles - Library Search - All 30 versions

The value allocation of an economy with differential information

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S Krasa… - Differential Information Economies, 2005 - Springer
We analyze the Shapley value allocation of an economy with differential information. Since
the intent of the Shapley value is to measure the sum of the expected marginal contributions
made by an agent to any coalition that he/she belongs to, the value allocation of an ...
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A theory of optimal bank size

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S Krasa… - Oxford Economic Papers, 1992 - JSTOR
RECENT research has studied how the structure of the financial system affects the
transmission of business cycle shocks in an economy. See Gertler (1988) for an excellent
survey of this emerging literature. An equally important but quite different problem is the ...
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Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?

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S Krasa… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2009 - Elsevier
We investigate the welfare effects of policies that increase voter turnout in costly voting
models. In a generalized costly voting model, we show that if the electorate is sufficiently
large, then increasing voter turnout is generically efficient. Increasing turnout in small ...
Cited by 54 - Related articles - All 17 versions

Optimal multilateral contracts

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S Krasa… - Economic Theory, 1994 - Springer
Summary The purpose of this paper is to derive the structure of optimal multilateral contracts
in a costly state verification model with multiple agents who may be risk averse and need not
be identical. We consider two different verification technology specifications. When the ...
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Money and storage in a differential information economy

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M Huggett… - Economic Theory, 1996 - Springer
Summary Is the use of fiat money essential in any efficient organization of exchange? We
investigate this question in economies that are generalizations of the Townsend (1980)
turnpike model that include limited commitment and differential information. We show that ...
Cited by 35 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 8 versions

Political competition between differentiated candidates

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S Krasa… - 2008 - works.bepress.com
Abstract We introduce a framework of electoral competition in which voters have general
preferences over candidates' immutable characteristics (such as gender, race or previously
committed policy positions) and flexible policy positions. Candidates are uncertain about ...
Cited by 35 - Related articles - All 22 versions

[PDF] Majority-efficiency and Competition-efficiency in a Binary Policy Model

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S Krasa… - 2006 - escholarship.org
Abstract We introduce a general framework in which politicians choose a (possibly infinite)
sequence of binary policies. The two competing candidates are exogenously committed to
particular actions on a subset of these issues, while they can choose any policy to ...
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The binary policy model

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S Krasa… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2010 - Elsevier
We introduce a model of electoral competition with office-motivated candidates who are
exogenously committed to particular positions on some issues, while they choose positions
for the remaining issues. A position is majority-efficient if a candidate cannot make a ...
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An elementary proof of the Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz-Shapley theorem

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S Krasa… - Economic Theory, 1994 - Springer
Summary This note provides an elementary short proof of the Knaster-Kuratowski-
Mazurkiewicz-Shapley (KKMS) Theorem based on Brouwer's fixed point theorem. The
usefulness of the KKMS Theorem lies in the fact that it can be applied to prove directly ...
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Unimprovable allocations in economies with incomplete information

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S Krasa - Journal of Economic Theory, 1999 - Elsevier
The paper considers an exchange economy with incomplete information in which agents
can retrade goods until all gains from trade are exhausted. Unimprovable allocations are
defined to be those allocations from which agents would not wish to deviate either by ...
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[PDF] Bankruptcy and firm finance

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S Krasa, T Sharma… - University of Illinois, Urbana- …, 2004 - econ.uiuc.edu
Abstract This paper analyzes how an enforcement mechanism that resembles a court affects
firm finance. The court is described by two parameters that correspond to enforcement costs
and the amount of creditor/debtor protection. We provide a theoretical and quantitative ...
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Bankruptcy and firm finance

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S Krasa, T Sharma… - Economic Theory, 2008 - Springer
Abstract This paper analyzes how an enforcement mechanism that resembles a court affects
firm finance. The court is described by two parameters that correspond to enforcement costs
and the amount of creditor/debtor protection. We provide a theoretical and quantitative ...
Cited by 15 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 8 versions

[CITATION] Optimal contingent bank liquidation under moral hazard

CW Calomiris, CM Kahn… - Working Paper Series, Issues …, 1991 - ideas.repec.org
4. Stanley D. Longhofer, 1994." Bankruptcy rules and debt contracting: on the relative
efficiency of absolute priority, proportionate priority, and first-come, first-served rules,"
Working Paper 9415, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.[Downloadable!]
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Optimal contracts when enforcement is a decision variable: A reply

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S Krasa… - Econometrica, 2003 - JSTOR
IN A SIMPLE DEBT CONTRACT the investor seizes all of a firm's assets when the project
return is below some threshold and receives a constant payment when the return is higher.
Krasa and Villamil (2000) show that simple debt contracts that are optimal (ie., give the ...
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Small firms in the SSBF

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N Herranz, S Krasa… - Annals of Finance, 2009 - Springer
Abstract This paper uses Survey of Small Business Finance data to better understand how
the owners of small firms use decisions about legal organization, firm size, capital structure,
and owner investment in the firm to manage firm risk. The main findings are: Firms with ...
Cited by 12 - Related articles - All 8 versions

Equilibria with options: existence and indeterminacy

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S Krasa… - Journal of economic theory, 1991 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper studies an economy in which trading takes place in spot commodity
markets and incomplete futures markets for assets of various types. There are real assets
(stocks or commodity futures), options on real assets, and a riskless nominal bond. We ...
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A political-economy model of taxation and government expenditures with differentiated candidates

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S Krasa… - 2009 - works.bepress.com
Abstract We develop a model of political competition between two candidates who choose
which level of taxation (and implied government spending) to propose as their election
platform. Candidates differ in the amount of public good they can produce for a given level ...
Cited by 11 - Related articles - All 8 versions

[PDF] Informed finance

[PDF] from uiuc.edu
D Bernhardt… - Manuscript. University of Illinois, 2004 - econ.uiuc.edu
Abstract This paper investigates basic issues in contracting and information acquisition for
entrepreneurial finance. Specifically, we determine how the nature and quality of the
information acquired by a financier, the equilibrium contracting terms, and the allocation of ...
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Existence of competitive equilibria for option markets

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S Krasa - Journal of economic theory, 1989 - Elsevier
Abstract In a general equilibrium model with options, H. Polemarchakis and Bon-Il Ku
(“Options and Equilibrium,” Working Paper, Columbia University 1986) give an example of
an economy where no competitive equilibrium exists. Their model is robust in the sense ...
Cited by 10 - Related articles - All 6 versions

Coalition structure values in differential information economies: is unity a strength?

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S Krasa, A Temimi… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2003 - Elsevier
The coalition structure (CS) value, introduced by Owen [G. Owen, Values of games with a
priori unions, in: Essays in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory, Springer Verlag,
Berlin, 1977] and Hart and Kurz [Econometrica 51 (1983) 1047], generalizes the Shapley ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - All 12 versions

Debt contracts and cooperative improvements

[PDF] from uiuc.edu
S Krasa, T Sharma… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2005 - Elsevier
In this paper, we consider a dynamic game with imperfect information between a borrower
and lender who must write a contract to produce a consumption good. In order to analyze
the game, we introduce the concept of a coalitional perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium ( ...
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[PDF] The impact of entrepreneur characteristics and bankruptcy rules on firm performance

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N Herranz, S Krasa… - University of Illinois (2007, …, 2007 - anasramadan.com
Abstract How important for firm performance are differences in owner's personal
characteristics (risk tolerance or optimism) versus the institutional environment in which the
firm operates (bankruptcy institutions, access to credit or return distributions)? To answer ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 3 versions

Existence and properties of a value allocation for an economy with differential information

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S Krasa… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1996 - Elsevier
We prove the existence of a private value allocation for an economy with differential
information where the commodity space may be infinite dimensional, and there is a
continuum of states. We also discuss the existence, non-existence, and properties of two ...
Cited by 8 - Related articles - All 11 versions

[PDF] The effect of enforcement on firm finance

[PDF] from uiuc.edu
S Krasa, T Sharma… - 2003 - econ.uiuc.edu
Abstract This paper analyzes how an enforcement mechanism that resembles a court affects
firm finance. We construct a model of enforcement which shows the following:(i) Firm default
due to inability to pay and unwillingness to pay are equilibrium phenomena that arise ...
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Informational robustness of competitive equilibria

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S Krasa… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2001 - Elsevier
Consider an exchange economy with complete information. We perturb this economy by
assuming that each agent's observation about the true state of the world is noisy. The paper
investigates the robustness of equilibria of the complete information economy with respect ...
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Non-existence and inefficiency of equilibria with American options

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CM Kahn… - Economic Theory, 1993 - Springer
Summary We analyze two examples of economies with incomplete financial markets. In the
first model we consider a stock and an American put option on the stock. Although there is
only one commodity and asset payoffs therefore do not depend on spot prices, we derive ...
Cited by 6 - Related articles - All 6 versions

[PDF] Entrepreneurs, legal institutions and firm dynamics

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N Herranz, S Krasa… - … for Growth and …, 2009 - socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk
Abstract This paper assesses quantitatively the impact of legal institutions on
entrepreneurial firm dynamics. Owners choose firm size, financial structure and default to
manage risk. We find:(i) Less risk averse entrepreneurs run bigger firms and it is optimal ...
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[PDF] Are entrepreneurs different

[PDF] from wustl.edu
N Herranz, S Krasa… - 2006 - artsci.wustl.edu
Abstract How important for firm performance are differences in owner's personal
characteristics (risk tolerance or optimism) versus the institutional environment in which the
firm operates (bankruptcy institutions, access to credit or return distributions)? To answer ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 3 versions

[PDF] The impact of owners and policy on small firms

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N Herranz, S Krasa… - University of Illinois, Illinois, 2008 - acrobatplanet.com
Abstract How important are differences in owner personal characteristics (risk tolerance or
optimism) versus the environment in which a firm operates (bankruptcy institutions or access
to credit) for firm financial structure, size, owner net-worth and welfare? To answer this ...
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The simple analytics of informed finance

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D Bernhardt… - 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: The paper derives two analytical consequences of informed finance: Equity leads
to under-financing, while debt leads to over-financing. We show that our model can explain
key qualitative and quantitative features of informed venture capital finance in the United ...
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Limited observability as a constraint in contract design

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S Krasa… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
Limited observability is the assumption that economic agents can only observe a finite
amount of information. Given this constraint, contracts among agents are necessarily finite
and incomplete in comparison to the ideal complete contract that we model as infinite in ...
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Social ideology and taxes in a differentiated candidates framework

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S Krasa… - 2011 - works.bepress.com
Abstract How does ideological polarization on non-economic matters influence the size of
government? We analyze this question using a differentiated candidates framework: Two
office-motivated candidates differ in their (fixed) ideological position and their production ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - All 21 versions

[CITATION] Optimal Contarcts with Costly State Verification: The Multilateral Case

S Krasa, AP Villamil… - 1992 - University of Illinois at Urbana- …
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[CITATION] Media of exchange in economies with differential information

M Huggett, S Krasa… - 1993 - University of Illinois at Urbana- …
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[CITATION] The Value Allocation of an Economy with Asymentric Information

S Krasa, AP Yannelis… - 1991 - University of Illinois at Urbana- …
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[CITATION] Optimality of Debt Contracts for Financial Intermediaries

S Krasa - 1989 - Graduate School of Business, …
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Non-existence and inefficiency of equilibria with American options and convertible bonds

CM Kahn… - Discussion Paper Serie A, 1990 - ideas.repec.org
We analyze three different examples of economies with incomplete financial markets. In the
first model we consider a bond and a convertible bond, and in the second model a stock and
an American put option on the stock. Although there is only one commodity and asset ...
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The relative importance of cultural and economic issues for the polarization of the US electorate, 1972--2008

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S Krasa… - 2011 - works.bepress.com
Abstract We develop a simple model in which voters care about both economic
and``cultural''policy (non-economic issues such as abortion). Democrats and Republicans
are ideologically differentiated and choose positions on economic policy to maximize their ...
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[CITATION] Efficiency with incomplete information

S Krasa - Vienna Economics Papers, 1997 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your
bookmarks. Efficiency with Incomplete Information. Stefan KRASA. ...
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[CITATION] Direct Financing, Intermediation and Credit Rationing

S Krasa… - 1988 - Graduate School of Business, …
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[CITATION] Time Consistent Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable

S Krasa, AP Villamil… - 1995 - University of Illinois at Urbana- …
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Elites or Masses? A Structural Model of Policy Divergence, Voter Sorting and Apparent Polarization in US Presidential Elections, 1972-2008

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S Krasa… - 2012 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: One of the most widely discussed phenomena in American politics today is the
perceived increasing partisan divide that splits the US electorate. A central contested
question is whether this diagnosis is actually true, and if so, what is the underlying cause. ...
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[CITATION] Measuring the Monitor: An Incentive Structure for a Financial Intermediary

S Krasa, AP Villamil… - 1991 - University of Illinois at Urbana- …
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[CITATION] Optimal contingent bank liquidation under moral hazard/91-159

[PDF] from illinois.edu
CW Calomiris, C Kahn… - 1991 - ideals.illinois.edu
Abstract This paper uses models of asymmetric information and incentive compatibility to
explain two distinctive features of the arrangements used by banks to obtain financing—
demandable debt and the sequen-tial service constraint. The option of early withdrawal ...

[CITATION] Intertemporal contracts and a theory of optimal auditing/93-122

[PDF] from illinois.edu
S Krasa… - ideals.illinois.edu
Abstract We study optimal signaling and auditing contracts in an intertemporal economy with
asymmetrically informed agents. There is a risk neutral firm and many risk neutral investors.
The firm has limited liability, and wishes to raise finance for a project whose returns follow ...
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[CITATION] Monitoring the monitor: an incentive structure for a financial intermediary/1690

[PDF] from illinois.edu
S Krasa… - 1991 - ideals.illinois.edu
ABSTRACT The purpose of this paper is to extend the bilateral contracting problem studied
in Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985) to an explicit, multilateral contracting
arrangement which resembles banking. We derive the structure of an optimalcontract for a ...
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Political Polarization and the Electoral Effects of Media Bias

MK Polborn, S Krasa… - Journal of Public …, 2008 - works.bepress.com
Abstract Many political commentators diagnose an increasing polarization of the US
electorate into two opposing camps. However, in standard spatial voting models, changes in
the political preference distribution are irrelevant as long as the position of the median ...
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[CITATION] Symposium in Honor of Wayne J. Shafer:... Papers Based on a Conference to Honor... Wayne J. Shafer, Took Place in Urbana, in May of 2008

Symposium in Honor of Wayne J. Shafer. 2008, Urbana … - 2010 - Springer
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[PDF] Competition between heterogeneously capable candidates

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S Krasa… - 2010 - econ.uiuc.edu
Abstract We develop a formal model in which the government provides public goods in
different policy fields for its citizens. We start from the basic premise that two office-motivated
candidates have differential capabilities in different policy fields, and compete by ...
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[CITATION] Non-existence and inefficiency of equilibria with American options and convertiblle bonds/1650

[PDF] from illinois.edu
CM Kahn… - 1990 - ideals.illinois.edu
ABSTRACT We analyze three different examples of economieswith incomplete financial
markets, in the first model we consider a bond and a convertible bond and a convertible
bond, and in the second model a stock and an American put option on the stock. Although ...
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[CITATION] Media of exchange in economies with differential information/93-145

[PDF] from illinois.edu
M Huggett… - 1993 - ideals.illinois.edu
Abstract We study an exchange economy where agents have differential in-formation about
thequality of goods. Differential information generates specific patterns of net-trades where
media of exchange are essential. We provide a rigorous definition of a medium of ...
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[CITATION] The value allocation of an economy with asymentric information/91-149

[PDF] from illinois.edu
S Krasa… - 1991 - ideals.illinois.edu
ABSTRACT We analyze the Shapley value allocation of an economy with differential
information. Since the intent of the Shapley value is to measure the sum of the expected
marginal contributions made by an agent to any coalition that he/she belongs to, the value ...

Enforcement and Firm Finance

A Villamil, S Krasa… - 2004 Meeting Papers, 2004 - ideas.repec.org
The power to enforce rights and obligations in a society is essential. For simplicity,
economists have focused on two extreme forms of enforcement: perfect ex-post enforcement
of contracts by an exogenous un-modeled authority (a``court'') or contracts that are``self- ...
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[PDF] Toward a Quantitative Theory of Informed Finance

[PDF] from uiuc.edu
D Bernhardt… - 2006 - netfiles.uiuc.edu
Abstract We develop a model of informed finance that explains the key qualitative and
quantitative features of informed venture capital finance in the United States. We show that
the two key features of our model—potential investors are better judges than ...
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[CITATION] Intertemporal Contracts and a Theory of Optimal Auditing

S Krasa, AP Villamil… - 1993 - University of Illinois at Urbana- …
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[CITATION] Existence of competitive equilibria for option markets

S Krasa - 1987 - en.scientificcommons.org
Publikationsansicht. 17368019. Existence of competitive equilibria for option markets. Krasa,
Stefan. Details der Publikation. Download, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-
4CYG9VN-BW/2/2607d58752e499d138b9cc1ada3e712b. Archiv, RePEc (Germany). ...
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