G Biglaiser - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1993 - JSTOR
I show that a middleman can be welfare improving in all equilibria in a quite general
bargaining model when adverse selection is present. Conditions are determined for when a
middleman is most likely to be in a market. Examples of the theory are also provided.
G Biglaiser… - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1994 - Elsevier
Abstract We analyze an experience good model with producer moral hazard which is based
on Shapiro (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1983, 98, 659–679). We develop conditions
under which a good will be sold through a middleman instead of being sold directly by the ...
G Biglaiser,
JK Horowitz… - Journal of Regulatory Economics, 1995 - Springer
This paper examines pollution regulation in a dynamic setting with complete information. We
show that tradeable pollution permits may not achieve the social optimum even when the
permit market is perfectly competitive. The reason is that the optimal tradeable permits ...
G Biglaiser… - RAND Journal of Economics, 2000 - JSTOR
We study the dynamics of price regulation for an industry adjusting to exogenous
technological progress. First, we characterize the optimal capacity path and replacement
cycles in a neoclassical investment model. Second, we show that naive rate-of-return ...
B Gary… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1993 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper analyzes competition between two principals for the exclusive services
of an agent of unknown ability. The principals differ in their marginal and average valuations
for the agent′ s input. They compete by offering menus of incentive contracts. A ...
G Biglaiser,
JK Horowitz - Journal of Economics & …, 1994 - Wiley Online Library
We study the firm's incentives to engage in research for pollution-control technologies and to
adopt new technologies that if discovers or that are discov- ered by other firms. Licensing of discoveries
is assumed possible. We also study the regulator's problem in designing optimal ...
G Biglaiser… - RAND Journal of Economics, 2001 - JSTOR
We examine the consequences of allowing a bottleneck input supplier to vertically integrate
downstream and compete with users of the input when the input has a regulated price above
cost. If the supplier maximizes the sum of short-run profits from the downstream market ...
G Biglaiser… - Journal of Public Economics, 1997 - Elsevier
We study the impact of elected officials' re-election concerns on their decisions on whether
to undertake new projects. The value of a project to a jurisdiction depends in part on its
elected official's uncertain ability at providing some public goods. Our main result is that ...
G Biglaiser… - The Rand Journal of Economics, 1995 - JSTOR
In this article, we study the optimal regulation of a dominant firm when an unregulated firm
actively competes. Generally, the existence of an active rival imposes new and binding
constraints on regulatory problems. We characterize optimal policies both when demands ...
G Biglaiser… - RAND Journal of economics, 2003 - JSTOR
Firms compete with prices and qualities in markets where consumers have heterogeneous
preferences and cost characteristics. Consumers demand two goods, which can be supplied
jointly or separately by firms. We consider two strategy regimes for firms: uniform price- ...
G Biglaiser… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
We study job incentives in moonlighting, when public-service physicians may refer patients
to their private practices. Some doctors in the public system are dedicated, and behave
sincerely, but others—the moonlighters—are utility maximizers. Allowing moonlighting ...
G Biglaiser… - Journal of Economics & …, 1999 - Wiley Online Library
We develop a model with heterogeneous buyers and sellers in which the sellers have
private information about their goods' qualities. We show that efficient trading cannot occur
without middlemen. Middlemen can provide two services: one is inspection, and the other ...
G Biglaiser… - 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We analyse a set of simple dynamic models where sellers are capacity constrained
over the length of the model. Buyers act strategically in the market, knowing that their
purchases may affect future prices. The model is examined when there are single and ...
G Biglaiser… - Journal of Regulatory Economics, 1999 - Springer
We study the investment incentives of a regulated, incumbent firm in a deregulation process.
The regulator cannot commit to a long-term regulatory policy, and investment decisions are
taken before optimal regulatory policies are imposed. We characterize the regulated ...
G Biglaiser… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2000 - JSTOR
We study an incentive auction in which multiple principals bid for the exclusive services, or
effort, of a single agent. Each principal has private information about her valuation for these
services, and the agent has private information about his disutility of providing them. We ...
G Biglaiser, J Crémer… - 2010 - ifo.de
We study the consequences of heterogeneity of switching costs in a dynamic model with free
entry and an incumbent monopolist. We prove that even low switching cost customers have
value for the incumbent: when there are more of them its profits increase. Indeed, their ...
G Biglaiser - Problems of Coordination in Economic Activity, 1994 - Springer
What does it mean for players to coordinate in a game theoretic context? Coordination can
be thought of in many different ways. One is that coordination means players find strategies
that are part of the same equilibrium. In a game with multiple equilibria it is easy to ...
[CITATION] Middlemen as Experts, 24 Rand J
G Biglaiser - 1993 - Econ
[CITATION] Adverse Selection with Competitive Selection," August, working paper, University of North Carolina
G Biglaiser… - 1998
G Biglaiser… - Working Papers, 1993 - econpapers.repec.org
Related works: Working Paper: Regulating a Dominant Firm: Quality, Private Information, and
Industry Structure (1993) This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items
with the same title. ... This site is part of RePEc and all the data displayed here is part of ...
JJ Anton… - 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We examine an infinite horizon model of quality growth in a durable goods
monopoly market. The monopolist generates new quality improvements over time and can
sell any available qualities, in any desired bundles, at each point in time. Consumers are ...
J Anton… - 2008 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We examine an infinite horizon model of quality growth in a durable goods
monopoly market. The monopolist generates new quality improvements over time and can
sell any available qualities, in any desired bundles, at each point in time. Consumers are ...
G Biglaiser… - University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, …, 1999 - unc.edu
Abstract We examine a series of models in which an incumbent local phone carrier sells
access to its network to long distance carriers at a regulated price above marginal costs.
When the incumbent maximizes short run prots, consumers are always made better o® ...
G Biglaiser, J Crémer - International Journal of Economic …, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
We consider an infinite horizon game in which a consumer incurs a switching cost when
changing supplier. There is an incumbent firm at the beginning of the game, and a new
entrant in each period, all with a production cost of 0. We identify the set of possible profits ...
JJ Anton… - Economics of Innovation and New …, 2010 - Taylor & Francis
We examine the market power of a seller who repeatedly offers upgraded versions of a
product. In the case of pure monopoly, the seller also controls compatibility across versions.
In the case of an entrant who offers an upgrade, the incumbent seller also controls ...
G Biglaiser,
JK Horowitz - Journal of Regulatory Economics, 1993 - Springer
This paper looks at whether a government regulator should publicly announce the amounts
of pollution emitted by individual firms and plants. Disclosure may be important if there is
incomplete information about firm costs, since pollution levels may be used by the ...
G Biglaiser - Games and Economic Behavior, 1992 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper analyzes noncooperative models in which syndicates form
endogenously. The analysis differs from that of R. Wilson (1968, Econometrica 36m 119–
132) and M. Machina (1985,“The Behavior of Risk Sharers,” mimeo) because an ...
[CITATION] The value of switching costs Working file: swp0000. tex
G Biglaiser, J Crémer… - 2007
S Baker… - 2010 - global.law.duke.edu
Abstract This paper provides an economic model of Vcause lawyering. V Each period an
interest group draws a case at random and decide whether to bring the case to court. The
court decides the legal issue once a case is presented. Until that point, the law remains at ...
[CITATION] Noncooperative coalition formation
GA Biglaiser - 1988 - University of California, San Diego, …
[CITATION] “You won't get rich on switching costs alone” Very preliminary version.
G Biglaiser, J Cremer… - 2003
[CITATION] Asymmetries in the Labor Market
G Biglaiser - 1986 - University of California, Department …
G Biglaiser… - 2004 - cepr.org
We analyse a set of simple dynamic models where sellers are capacity constrained over the
length of the model. Buyers act strategically in the market, knowing that their purchases may
affect future prices. The model is examined when there are single and multiple buyers, ...
JJ Anton… - 2010 - intertic.org
Abstract We examine an infinite horizon model of quality growth in a durable goods
monopoly market. The monopolist generates new quality improvements over time and can
sell any available qualities, in any desired bundles, at each point in time. Consumers are ...
G Biglaiser… - The BE Journal of Economic Analysis & …, 2004 - ideas.repec.org
< p> We examine a club model in which the club's policies are controlled by a
homogeneous group of insiders. Their policy decision is to determine the number they will
admit from two outsider groups. Countries have immigration policies, private clubs have ...
JJAG Biglaiser - 2009 - faculty.fuqua.duke.edu
Abstract We examine the market power of a seller who repeatedly offers upgraded versions
of a product. In the case of pure monopoly, the seller also controls compatibility across
versions. In the case of an entrant who offers an upgrade, the incumbent seller also ...
J Anton, G Biglaiser… - International Journal of …, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
We study the use of inventory when a distributor is better informed about demand than a
manufacturer. We find that when distributor and manufacturer values are interdependent it is
optimal to endow the distributor with some inventory before it obtains its private ...
G Biglaiser… - Econometric Society 2004 North American …, 2004 - ideas.repec.org
We examine a dynamic, durable goods model. A monopolist faces two types of consumers
who value the monopolist's goods differently. The quality of the good improves over time and
an improvement is only valuable to consumers if they have previous improvements. In ...
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