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A theory of disappointment aversion

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F Gul - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1991 - JSTOR
An axiomatic model of preferences over lotteries is developed. It is shown that this model is
consistent with the Allais Paradox, includes expected utility theory as a special case, and is
only one parameter (β) richer than the expected utility model. Allais Paradox type behavior ...
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Temptation and self‐control

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F Gul… - Econometrica, 2001 - Wiley Online Library
2. Abstract We study a two-period model where ex ante inferior choice may tempt the
decision-maker in the second period. Individuals have preferences over sets of alternatives
that represent second period choices. Our axioms yield a representation that identifies the ...
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Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the Coase conjecture

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F Gul, H Sonnenschein… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1986 - Elsevier
Abstract Subgame-perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller
quotes a price each period. Assume zero costs, positive interest rate, continuum of buyers,
and some technical conditions. If buyers' valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique ...
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Bargaining foundations of shapely value

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F Gul - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1989 - JSTOR
A transferable utility economy in which each agent holds a resource which can be used in
combination with the resources of other agents to generate value (according to the
characteristic function V) is studied using a dynamic model of bargaining. The main ...
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Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes

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F Gul… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1999 - Elsevier
We study economies with indivisibilities that satisfy the gross substitutes (GS) condition. The
simplest example of GS preferences are unit demand preferences. We prove that the set of
GS preferences is the largest set containing unit demand preferences for which the ...
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[PDF] The case for mindless economics

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F Gul… - Foundations of positive and normative …, 2005 - hss.caltech.edu
Abstract Neuroeconomics proposes radical changes in the methods of economics. This
essay discusses the proposed changes in methodology, together with the the
neuroeconomic critique of standard economics. We do not assess the contributions or ...
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Self‐control and the theory of consumption

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F Gul… - Econometrica, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
To study the behavior of agents who are susceptible to temptation in infinite horizon
consumption problems under uncertainty, we define and characterize dynamic self-control
(DSC) preferences. DSC preferences are recursive and separable. In economies with ...
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The English auction with differentiated commodities

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F Gul… - Journal of Economic theory, 2000 - Elsevier
We study economies (with indivisibilities) that satisfy the gross substitutes (GS) condition.
We define an excess demand set with the property that increasing the prices of all goods in
excess demand eventually leads to the smallest Walrasian prices. This procedure is a ...
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Endogenous timing and the clustering of agents' decisions

F Gul… - Journal of Political Economy, 1995 - JSTOR
This paper presents a model in which agents choose an action and a time at which to take
the action. We show that when agents choose when to act, their decisions become clustered
together, giving the appearance of an information cascade, even though information is ...
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Bargaining and reputation

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D Abreu… - Econometrica, 2000 - Wiley Online Library
The paper develops a reputation based theory of bargaining. The idea is to investigate and
highlight the influence of bargaining 'postures' on bargaining outcomes. A complete
information bargaining model a la Rubinstein is amended to accommodate 'irrational ...
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The dynamics of political compromise

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A Dixit, GM Grossman… - Journal of Political Economy, 2000 - JSTOR
We characterize efficient self-enforcing divisions of political or economic surplus between
two parties that interact repeatedly. The party in power can decide the allocation, and the
parties' political strength changes according to a Markov process. We find that the share of ...
Cited by 183 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 6 versions

Rationality and knowledge in game theory

E Dekel… - ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY MONOGRAPHS, 1997 - books.google.com
The concepts of knowledge and rationality have been explicitly applied by economists and
game theorists to obtain no-trade results and to characterize solution concepts of games.
Implicitly these two concepts underlie much recent work in these fields, ranging from ...
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A comment on Aumann's Bayesian view

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F Gul - Econometrica, 1998 - JSTOR
AUMANN (1987) PRESENTS A RESULT which he interprets as establishing that, for those
who adhere to the"... Bayesian view of the world, the notion of equilibrium is an unavoidable
consequence... 2 The purpose of this comment is to refute this claim. An information model ...
Cited by 153 - Related articles - All 9 versions

On delay in bargaining with one-sided uncertainty

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F Gul… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1988 - JSTOR
Recently, attention has been given to a model of two-person bargaining in which the parties
alternate making offers and there is uncertainty about the valuation of one party. The
purpose of the analysis has been to identify delay to agreement with a screening process, ...
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[BOOK] Generalized median voter schemes and committees

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S Barberà, F Gul, E Stacchetti… - 1992 - ssc.upenn.edu
We define 21 multidimensional analogue of a single-peaked preference and generalize the
notion of a median voter scheme. Every onto strategy-proof social choice function on a
single—peaked domain is 21 generalized median voter scheme. Since a single-peaked ...
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Noncooperative collusion in durable goods oligopoly

F Gul - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1987 - JSTOR
Coase conjectured that a durable-goods monopolist who can make offers to sell arbitrarily
frequently will lose the ability to extract positive profits. This result, which has now been
proved, can be attributed to the inability of the monopolist to commit to maintaining ...
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Asymptotic efficiency in large exchange economies with asymmetric information

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F Gul… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1992 - JSTOR
We provide conditions on an exchange economy with asymmetric information that
guarantee that when the economy is replicated sufficiently often, there will be an allocation
which is incentive compatible, individually rational, and nearly efficient. The main theorem ...
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Unobservable Investment and the Hold‐Up Problem

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F Gul - Econometrica, 2001 - Wiley Online Library
2. Abstract We study a two-person bargaining problem in which the buyer may invest and
increase his valuation of the object before bargaining. We show that if all offers are made by
the seller and the time between offers is small, then the buyer invests efficiently and the ...
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Savagés theorem with a finite number of states*

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F Gul - Journal of Economic Theory, 1992 - Elsevier
Conditions which guarantee the existence of a (subjective) expected utility representation of
preferences, when the state space is finite, are presented. The key assumptions are
continuity and an analogue of the independence axiom.
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Harmful addiction

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F Gul… - Review of Economic Studies, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
We construct an infinite horizon model of harmful addiction. Consumption is compulsive if it
differs from what the individual would have chosen had commitment been available. A good
is addictive if its consumption leads to more compulsive consumption of the same good. ...
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A theory of subjective compound lotteries

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H Ergin… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2009 - Elsevier
We develop a Savage-type model of choice under uncertainty in which agents identify
uncertain prospects with subjective compound lotteries. Our theory permits issue preference;
that is, agents may not be indifferent among gambles that yield the same probability ...
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[PDF] A subjective theory of compound lotteries

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H Ergin… - Econometric Society 2004 …, 2004 - europealumni.kellogg.northwestern. …
Abstract We develop a Savage-type model of choice under uncertainty in which agents
identify uncertain prospects with subjective compound lotteries. Our theory permits issue
preference; that is, agents may not be indifferent among gambles that yield the same ...
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Self-control, revealed preference and consumption choice

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F Gul… - Review of Economic Dynamics, 2004 - Elsevier
We provide a time-consistent model that addresses the preference reversals that motivate
the time-inconsistency literature. The model subsumes the behavior generated by the time-
inconsistency approach in finite settings but, unlike the time-inconsistent models, allows ...
Cited by 50 - Related articles - All 20 versions

Random expected utility

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F Gul… - Econometrica, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
We develop and analyze a model of random choice and random expected utility. A decision
problem is a finite set of lotteries that describe the feasible choices. A random choice rule
associates with each decision problem a probability measure over choices. A random ...
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The revealed preference theory of changing tastes

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F Gul… - The Review of Economic Studies, 2005 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We analyse preferences over finite decision problems in order to model decision-
makers with “changing tastes”. we provide conditions on these preferences that identify the
Strotz model of consistent planning. building on an example given by Peleg and Yaari ( ...
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A bound on the proportion of pure strategy equilibria in generic games

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F Gül, D Pearce… - Mathematics of Operations Research, 1993 - JSTOR
... FARUK GUL, DAVID PEARCE AND ENNIO STACCHETTI In a generic finite normal form game
with 2a + 1 Nash equilibria, at least a of the equilibria are nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria
(that is, they involve randomization by some players). 1. Introduction. ...
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[PDF] Rationality and coherent theories of strategic behavior

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F Gul - Journal of Economic Theory, 1996 - princeton.edu
Abstract A non-equilibrium model of rational strategic behavior that can be viewed as a
refinement of (normal form) rationalizability is developed for both normal form and extensive
form games. This solution concept is called a τ-theory and is used to analyze the main ...
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Walrasian equilibrium without complementarities

F Gul… - Papers, 1997 - ideas.repec.org
In this paper we study the problem of ecient production and allocation of indi-visible objects
among a set of consumers. We assume that the agents' preferences depend on the bundle
of objects and the quantity of money they consume. Further-more, we assume that ...
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Partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters

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F Gul… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2009 - Elsevier
We analyze candidate competition when some voters do not observe a candidate's policy
choice. Voters have a personality preference when both candidates offer the same policy. In
equilibrium, the candidate with a personality advantage may get elected with a partisan ...
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[PDF] The simple theory of temptation and self-control

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F Gul… - … of Economics, Princeton University.[130, 131 …, 2005 - princeton.edu
Abstract We analyze a two period model of temptation for a finite choice setting. We
formalize the idea that temptation depends only on the most tempting alternatives and
provide two representations of such preferences. The representation is an ordinal ...
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[CITATION] Rational strategic behavior and the notion of equilibrium

F Gul - 1989 - mimeo, Stanford Graduate School of …
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A nobel prize for game theorists: the contributions of Harsanyi, Nash and Selten

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F Gul - The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1997 - JSTOR
I n 1994, the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences awarded the Nobel Prize in economics to
John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash and Reinhard Selten for their contributions to
noncooperative game theory. This was the first time the academy had awarded a Nobel ...
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[PDF] The war of information

[PDF] from uqam.ca
F Gul… - The Review of Economic Studies, 2010 - economie.uqam.ca
Abstract We analyze a model of political campaigns to examine how parties' access to
funding affects outcomes and voter welfare. Two parties with opposing interests provide
costly information to a voter who must choose between two policies. The flow of ...
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Welfare without happiness

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F Gul… - The American economic review, 2007 - JSTOR
Normative analysis asks how we (as a society) should make trade-offs between individuals.
Behavioral welfare economics extends the scope of this analysis to a single individual,
asking how the individual should trade off potential motives. We argue that any faith in ...
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Betweenness satisfying preferences and dynamic choice

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F Gul… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1990 - Elsevier
Abstract We consider the dynamic choice problem where uncertainty is resolved gradually
(ie, decision trees). We impose consistency on the decision maker by requiring that his
behavior in trees conform to preference maximization over lotteries. We formulate and ...
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A subjective theory of compound lotteries

H Ergin… - J. Econ. Theory, 2009 - Citeseer
Abstract We develop a Savage-type model of choice under uncertainty in which agents
identify uncertain prospects with subjective compound lotteries. Our theory permits issue
preference; that is, agents may not be indifferent among gambles that yield the same ...
Cited by 15 - Related articles - Cached - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 2 versions

Strategic redistricting

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F Gul… - The American Economic Review, 2010 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: Two parties choose redistricting plans to maximize their probability of winning a
majority in the House of Representatives. In the unique equilibrium, parties maximally
segregate their opponents' supporters but pool their own supporters into uniform districts. ...
Cited by 14 - Related articles - All 21 versions

Efficiency and immediate agreement: A reply to Hart and Levy

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F Gul - Econometrica, 1999 - Wiley Online Library
The resources of agents M; N produce a ffow of transferable utility 1y M where is a
characteristic function on the set of all subsets of N. All agents discount the future at rate. The
noncooperative game is as follows: In every period a random meeting takes place ...
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[CITATION] English auctions with multiple goods

F Gul… - unpublished paper, Northwestern University, 1995
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[CITATION] Rationality and Coherent Theories of Strategic Behavior

F Gul - 1991 - en.scientificcommons.org
Publication View. 33004471. Rationality and Coherent Theories of Strategic Behavior. Gul, Faruk.
Publication details. Download, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-45NJNDG-
1/2/034fad84477056b44502c58a90994bbc. Repository, RePEc (Germany). Type, article ...
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[PDF] Interdependent preference models as a theory of intentions

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F Gul… - 2010 - princeton.edu
Abstract We provide a preference framework for situations in which “intentions matter.” A
behavioral type describes the individual's observable characteristics and the individual's
personality. We define a canonical behavioral type space and provide a condition that ...
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[PDF] A Theory of Political Compromises

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A Dixit, GM Grossman… - 1998 - princeton.edu
Abstract We study political compromise founded on tacit cooperation. Two political parties
must share a fixed pie in each of an infinite sequence of periods. In each period, the party in
power has ultimate authority to divide the pie. Power evolves according to a Markov ...
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[CITATION] Uncertainty does not cause delay

F Gul… - 1981 - mimeo
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[CITATION] Two Essays on the Bargaining Foundations of Value Theory

F Gul - 1986 - en.scientificcommons.org
Publikationsansicht. 30679818. Two essays on the bargaining foundations of value theory /
(1986). Gul, Faruk. Abstract. Thesis (Ph.D.)--Princeton University, 1986.. Bibliography: leaf 50.
Details der Publikation. Download, http://worldcat.org/oclc/81065042. ...
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[CITATION] One-Sided Uncertainty Does Not Cause Delay

F Gul… - Miaeo, Stanford University, Graduate School of …, 1985
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[PDF] Forward induction and public randomization

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F Gul… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1996 - upi-yptk.ac.id
The purpose of this paper is to suggest that forward induction is much less powerful than is
usually supposed as a tool for refining noncooperative solution concepts. In any finite
extensive form game having a``stage game''structure, the logic of forward induction is so ...
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[PDF] The revealed preference implications of reference dependent preferences

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F Gul… - manuscript, Princeton University, 2006 - princeton.edu
Abstract Köszegi and Rabin (2005) propose a theory of reference dependent utility in which
the ultimate choice also serves as the reference point. They analyze dynamic choice
problems with uncertainty and interpret their model as a description of the individuals ...
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[CITATION] qA Subjective Theory of Compound Lotteries, rmimeo

H Ergin… - 2004
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[CITATION] Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees for Generalized Single Peaked Domains

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F Gul… - Economic Theory, 1993
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A Comment on Bernheim's Appraisal of Neuroeconomics

F Gul… - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2009 - JSTOR
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2009, 1:2, 42-47 http://www. aeaweb.
org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mic. 1.2.42 ... A Comment on Bernheim's Appraisal of Neuroeconomics1
... This paper comments on "On the Potential of Neuroeconomics: A Critical (but Hopeful) ...
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[CITATION] Walrasian Equilibrium without Consumption Complementarities

F Gul… - 1997 - working paper, Princeton University
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[CITATION] On the Bayesian View in Game Theory and Economics

F Gul - 1991 - Graduate School of Business, …
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[CITATION] Foundations of Dynamic Oligopoly and the Coase Conjecture'

F Gul, H Sonnenschein… - … , Calif.: Stanford University, Graduate School of …, 1985
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[CITATION] Self-control and the theory of consumption, forthcoming in Econometrica

F Gul… - 2004
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[CITATION] and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. 2008.“The Case for Mindless Economics.”

F Gul - The foundations of Positive and Normative Economics: …
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[PDF] Expected Uncertain Utility and Multiple Sources

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F Gul… - 2010 - Citeseer
Abstract Source preference is the assertion that between two prospects yielding the same
distribution of monetary rewards, decision makers may have a strict preference for one over
the other. Evidence on the home bias reveals source preference strong enough to ...
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[CITATION] Strategic Redistricting

W Pesendorfer… - Levine's Bibliography, 2007 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks.
Strategic Redistricting. Wolfgang Pesendorfer () and Faruk Gul. ...
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[CITATION] Bargaining Foundations of Shapley Value

F Gul - INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF …, 1999 - EDWARD ELGAR PUBLISHING LTD
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[CITATION] The case for mindless economics

G Faruk… - The Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics, 2008
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We encourage you to register at your earliest convenience. Partial subsidy is available for travel and local expenses of young economists submitting a paper for a …

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D Abreu, A Banerjee, MK Brunnermeier… - …, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
... Gerard J. van der Berg (Free University Amsterdam) for Econometrics and Empirical Eco- nomics.
This year's Fisher–Schultz Lecture will be given by Faruk Gul (Princeton University). The Laffont
Lecture will be given by Guido Imbens (Harvard Uni- versity). ...

[CITATION] Report of the Editor American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

K Bagwell, D Bergemann, D Duffie, L Einav, F Gul…
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[CITATION] The Canonical Space for Behavioral Types

W Pesendorfer… - Levine's Bibliography, 2007 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks. The
Canonical Space for Behavioral Types. Wolfgang Pesendorfer () and Faruk Gul. ...
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[CITATION] Behavioral Competitive Equilibrium

F Gul, W Pesendorfer… - Working Paper, 1969 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks.
Behavioral Competitive Equilibrium. Faruk Gul, Wolfgang Pesendorfer and Tomasz Strzalecki. ...
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[CITATION] Erratum: Volume 57, Number 1 (1992), in the article Savage's Theorem with a Finite Number of States, by Faruk Gul, pages 99-110

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G Faruk - Journal of Economic Theory, 1993 - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of
further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site ...
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[CITATION] TEMPTATION AND SELF-CONTROL BY FARUK GUL AND WOLFGANG PESENDORFER'

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F GUL - Econometrica, 1933 - G. Banta
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[CITATION] Economic

D Austen-Smith, JS Banks, J Benhahih… - Journal of Economic …, 1976 - Academic Press.
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[PDF] Working Papers in Economic Theory No. 99F1

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F Gul… - 1999 - Citeseer
Abstract: In a two period decision problem, we study individuals who, in the second period,
may be tempted by ex ante inferior choices. Individuals have preferences over sets of
alternatives that represent the feasible choices in the second period. Our axioms yield a ...
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[CITATION] Competitive Redistricting

F Gul… - Levine's Bibliography, 2007 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks.
Competitive Redistricting. Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (). ...
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[CITATION] Economic

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Y Balasko, JS Banks, J Benhabib… - Journal of economic …, 1993 - Academic Press.
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[PDF] Expected Uncertain Utility Theory

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F Gul… - 2010 - Citeseer
Abstract We introduce and analyze expected uncertain utility theory (EUU). A prior and an
interval utility characterize an EUU decision maker. The decision maker transforms each
uncertain prospect into an interval-valued prospect that assigns an interval of prizes to ...
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[CITATION] Self-Control and the Theory of Consumption

W Pesendorfer… - Princeton Economic Theory Papers, 1999 - econpapers.repec.org
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. ...
Related works: Journal Article: Self-Control and the Theory of Consumption (2004) This item
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[CITATION] A comment on Aumann's Bayesian view:``Correlated as an expression equilibrium of Bayesian rationality" by R. Aumann by R. Aumann. With a reply by …

F Gul - Econometrica
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[CITATION] THE CASE FOR

F GUL, W PESENDORFER - The foundations of …, 2008 - Oxford University Press, USA
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Excellence in Refereeing Award

VV Acharya, SN Ali, J Apesteguia, P Arcidiacono… - 209.197.108.139
The American Economic Association would like to congratulate its 2010 American Economic
Review Excellence in Refereeing Award recipients. The award recognizes the outstanding
work of those referees whose service and dedication have contributed to the high quality ...
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[PDF] Electoral Competition with Imperfectly Informed Voters

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F Gul… - 2004 - economics.sas.upenn.edu
Abstract We explore the implications of voter ignorance on policy selection and policy
outcomes in a simple model of party competition. For a simple benchmark case, we show
that voter ignorance has no effect on the election outcome if the electorate is large. We ...
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DP1935 A Theory of Political Compromise

AK Dixit, G Grossman… - 1998 - cepr.org
We study political compromise founded on tacit cooperation. Two political parties must share
a fixed pie in each of an infinite sequence of periods. In each period, the party in power has
ultimate authority to divide the pie. Power evolves according to a Markov process among a ...
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[CITATION] The Shapley value, ed. by Alvin E. Roth: Cambridge[ua], Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988

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F Gul - Journal of economic literature, 1989

[PDF] Behavioral Competitive Equilibrium and Extreme Prices

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F Gul, W Pesendorfer… - 2011 - princeton.edu
Abstract A behavioral competitive equilibrium restricts households ability to tailor their
consumption to the state of the economy. Compared to standard competitive equilibrium, a
behavioral competitive equilibrium yields more consumption risk and extreme price ...
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