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Nomination processes and policy outcomes

[PDF] from caltech.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
MO Jackson, L Mathevet… - Quarterly Journal of …, 2007 - authors.library.caltech.edu
We provide a set of new models of three different processes by which political parties
nominate candidates for a general election: nominations by party leaders, nominations by a
vote of party members, and nominations by a spending competition among potential ...
Cited by 24 - Related articles - All 16 versions

A contraction principle for finite global games

[PDF] from utexas.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
L Mathevet - Economic Theory, 2010 - Springer
Abstract I provide a new proof of uniqueness of equilibrium in a wide class of global games. I
show that the joint best-response in these games is a contraction. The uniqueness result
then follows as a corollary of the contraction principle. Furthermore, the contraction- ...
Cited by 10 - Related articles - All 9 versions

[PDF] Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments

[PDF] from ohio-state.edu
PJ Healy… - Unpublished paper, Department …, 2008 - healy.econ.ohio-state.edu
ABSTRACT. We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian
allocations and whose Nash equilibria are dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive
dynamics. We argue that supermodularity is not a desirable stability criterion in this ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 14 versions

Supermodular mechanism design

[PDF] from utoronto.ca
Full text - MIT Libraries
L Mathevet - Theoretical Economics, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
This paper introduces a mechanism design approach that allows dealing with the multiple
equilibrium problem, using mechanisms that are robust to bounded rationality. This
approach is a tool for constructing supermodular mechanisms, ie, mechanisms that induce ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - All 15 versions

Sentiments and rationalizability

[PDF] from uni-muenchen.de
L Mathevet - 2010 - mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
Sentiments are characteristics of players' beliefs. I propose two notions of sentiments,
confidence and optimism, and I study their role in shaping the set of rationalizable strategy
profiles in (incomplete information) games with complementarities. Confidence is related ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - All 8 versions

Selection, learning, and nomination: essays on supermodular games, design, and political theory

[PDF] from caltech.edu
LA Mathevet - 2008 - thesis.library.caltech.edu
... Essays on Supermodular Games, Design, and Political Theory Thesis by Laurent Mathevet In
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy California Institute
of Technology ... Page 2. ii c 2008 Laurent Mathevet All Rights Reserved Page 3. iii ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - Library Search - All 5 versions

Beliefs and rationalizability in games with complementarities

[PDF] from uni-muenchen.de
L Mathevet - 2012 - mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
We propose two characteristics of players' beliefs and study their role in shaping the set of
rationalizable strategy profiles in games with incomplete information. The first characteristic,
type-sensitivity, is related to how informative a player thinks his type is. The second ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - All 7 versions

[PDF] Sand in the Wheels: A Dynamic Global Game Approach

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
L Mathevet… - 2011 - kellogg.northwestern.edu
Abstract We study the impact of frictions on the prevalence of systemic crises. Agents
privately learn about a fixed payoff parameter, and repeatedly adjust their investments while
facing transaction costs in a dynamic global game. The model has a rich structure of ...
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[PDF] Sand in the Wheels: A Global Game Approach Preliminary and Incomplete

[PDF] from eea-esem.com
L Mathevet… - 2011 - eea-esem.com
Abstract We study a dynamic global game with frictions in which agents privately learn about
a fixed payoff parameter and repeatedly adjust their investment positions. The model has a
rich structure of externalities: payoffs may depend on the volume of aggregate investment, ...
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[PDF] AN AXIOMATIC APPROACH OF REPEATED INTERACTIONS

[PDF] from utexas.edu
L MATHEVET - 2012 - webspace.utexas.edu
ABSTRACT. This paper proposes an axiomatic approach to study two-player infinitely
repeated games. A solution is a correspondence that maps the set of stage games into the
set of infinite sequences of action profiles. We suggest that a solution should satisfy two ...
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[PDF] Finite Supermodular Design with Interdependent Valuations

[PDF] from utexas.edu
L Mathevet… - 2011 - webspace.utexas.edu
Abstract This paper studies supermodular mechanism design in environments with arbitrary
(finite) type spaces and interdependent valuations. In these environments, the designer
often has to use Bayesian equilibrium as a solution concept, since ex post implementation ...
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A simple axiomatics of dynamic play in repeated games

[PDF] from uni-muenchen.de
L Mathevet - 2012 - mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
This paper proposes an axiomatic approach to study two-player infinitely repeated games. A
solution is a correspondence that maps the set of stage games into the set of infinite
sequences of action profiles. We suggest that a solution should satisfy two simple axioms: ...
Related articles - All 5 versions

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