 | Professor of Economics and Political Science, University of Illinois Verified email at uiuc.edu Cited by 944 |
M Messner… - Journal of Public Economics, 2004 - Elsevier
D Bernhardt, S Krasa… - Journal of Public Economics, 2008 - Elsevier
We develop a model in which profits of media firms depend on their audience ratings, and
maximizing profits may involve catering to a partisan audience by suppressing information
that the partisan audience does not like hearing. While voters are rational, understand the ...
T Klumpp… - Journal of Public Economics, 2006 - Elsevier
M Messner… - Review of Economic Studies, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
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MK Polborn - International Review of Law and Economics, 1998 - Elsevier
S Krasa… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2009 - Elsevier
MR Effinger… - European Economic Review, 2001 - Elsevier
M Hoy… - Journal of Public Economics, 2000 - directory.umm.ac.id
Abstract This paper analyzes the effects of additional information in a life insurance market
under adverse selection. Individuals have an incentive to acquire information about their risk
type if their informational status cannot be observed by insurers. In aggregate, however, ...
S Krasa… - 2008 - works.bepress.com
... Available at: http://works.bepress.com/polborn/19 Page 2. Political Competition
between Differentiated Candidates Stefan Krasa Mattias Polborn ∗ July 6, 2010
Abstract We introduce a framework of electoral competition in which ...
Abstract: Consider a setting in which several groups of individuals with common interests
(clubs) compete with each other for recognition by other individuals. Depending on the
context, recognition may be expressed by these other individuals joining a club, or ...
MK Polborn… - Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2006 - qjps.com
Page 1. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2006, 1: 351–371 Informative Positive
and Negative Campaigning ∗ Mattias K. Polborn1,† and David T. Yi2 1Department
of Economics, University of Illinois, 483 Wohlers Hall, 1206 ...
MK Polborn, M Hoy… - The Economic Journal, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
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MK Polborn - The GENEVA Papers on Risk and Insurance-Theory, 1998 - Springer
Page 1. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, 23: 41–48 (1998) c 1998
The Geneva Association A Model of an Oligopoly in an Insurance Market MATTIAS
K. POLBORN polborn@lrz.uni-muenchen.de. University ...
S Krasa… - 2006 - escholarship.org
Abstract We introduce a general framework in which politicians choose a (possibly infinite)
sequence of binary policies. The two competing candidates are exogenously committed to
particular actions on a subset of these issues, while they can choose any policy to ...
S Krasa… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2010 - Elsevier
We introduce a model of electoral competition with office-motivated candidates who are
exogenously committed to particular positions on some issues, while they choose positions
for the remaining issues. A position is majority-efficient if a candidate cannot make a ...
MR Effinger… - Journal of Economics, 1999 - Springer
Page 1. Vol. 69 (1999), No. 1, pp. 53-69 Journal of Economics Zeitschrift fQr
National6konomie 9 Springer-Verlag 1999 - Printed in Austria A Model of Vertically
Differentiated Education Matthias R. Effinger and Mattias K. Polborn ...
T Dragu… - 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: How does electoral accountability affect the effectiveness of terrorism prevention in
a democracy? We analyze the connection between electoral accountability and policy
effectiveness in the context of terrorism prevention. We develop a formal model of an ...
M Polborn - The Review of Economic Studies, 2006 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract This paper analyses a model in which two groups repeatedly compete with each
other for a prize in every time period. We assume that there is a status quo bias: if there is a
fight today, yesterday's winner is in a stronger position than the other group. Hence, a ...
M Messner… - 2002 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: A central problem for the game theoretic analysis of voting is that voting games
have very many Nash equilibria. In this paper, we consider a new refinement concept for
voting games that combines two ideas that appear reasonable for voting games: First, ...
S Krasa… - 2009 - works.bepress.com
Page 1. From the SelectedWorks of Mattias K Polborn January 2009 A political-economy model
of taxation and government expenditures with differentiated candidates ...
MK Polborn… - Review of Economic Studies, 2004 - works.bepress.com
We analyze an overlapping generations model of voting on ``reform projects''. These resemble
investments in that they first require some investment expenditure and later pay off. Since the
time during which old people get the benefit is shorter, or because older people are more ...
E Kessner… - German Economic Review, 2000 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. Abstract. Economists have been concerned with price dispersion for apparently
homogeneous goods for a long time. Many models have been developed which explain price
dispersion by imperfect consumer information about prices in the market. ...
M Messner… - International Journal of Game Theory, 2007 - Springer
Page 1. Int J Game Theory (2007) 35:287–314 DOI 10.1007/s00182-006-0048-z
ORIGINAL PAPER Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and
runoff rule Matthias Messner · Mattias K. Polborn Revised: 23 ...
M Messner… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2003 - Elsevier
M Messner… - 2008 - papers.ssrn.com
Page 1. The option to wait in collective decisions∗ Matthias Messner† Department
of Economics Bocconi University Mattias K. Polborn‡ Department of Economics
University of Illinois December 27, 2007 Abstract We analyze ...
CR Clark, S Clark… - Rationality and society, 2006 - rss.sagepub.com
Page 1. COORDINATION AND STATUS INFLUENCE C. Robert Clark, Samuel Clark
and Mattias K. Polborn ABSTRACT We develop a model to explain why the influence
of higher-status individuals is often accepted even when ...
CR Clark… - Economic Theory, 2006 - Springer
Page 1. DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0588-z Economic Theory 27, 565–581 (2006)
Information and crowding externalities * C. Robert Clark 1 and Mattias K. Polborn
2 1 HEC Montréal, 3000 Côte-Sainte-Catherine, Montréal, QC ...
MK Polborn, M Hoy… - UWO Department of Economics …, 1999 - ideas.repec.org
Downloadable! Genetic tests can be expected to produce a large amount of economically
important information in the future. What are the effects on a life insurance market if more
information becomes available over time, for individuals and possibly also for insurers? Should ...
[CITATION] Three Essays in Insurance Economics
MK Polborn - Dissertationsschrift, Ludwig Maximilians-Universität …, 1997
MK Polborn… - Journal of Public Economics, 2006 - works.bepress.com
Candidates for US presidential elections are determined through sequential elections in single
states, the primaries. We develop a model in which candidates can influence their winning
probability in electoral districts by spending money on campaigning. The equilibrium replicates ...
... Keywords: Supermajority, taxation, constitution, overlapping generations, political economy. JEL
code: D72. *Corresponding author: Mattias Polborn, Department of Economics, University of
Western Ontario, London, Ontario, N6A 5C2, Canada; email: mpolborn@julian.uwo.ca . ...
M Polborn - Unpublished Manu0 script, University of Western …, 2002 - Citeseer
Abstract We consider a market which is protected against entry through legislation. While
one lobby aims at opening the market so that prices decrease, the other lobby wants to
maintain the status quo. The decision whether to open the market or not is made by a ...
[CITATION] Herding and antiherding: A model of reputational differentiation." Forthcoming
M Effinger… - European Economic Review, 1999
S Krasa… - 2011 - works.bepress.com
... Available at: http://works.bepress.com/polborn/26 Page 2. Social ideology and taxes in a
differentiated candidates framework Stefan Krasa∗ Mattias Polborn† June 16, 2011 Abstract
How does ideological polarization on non-economic matters influence the size of govern- ...
[CITATION] Three essays in insurance
M Messner… - Urbana, 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
... Keywords: strategic voting, plurality rule, runoff rule, Duverger's Law and Hypothesis JEL
code: D720. *Corresponding author: Mattias Polborn, Department of Economics, University
of Illinois, Urbana, IL, 61801; email: polborn@uiuc.edu Page 2. ...
G Deltas, H Herrera… - Unpublished manuscript, 2010 - econ.as.nyu.edu
Page 1. A Theory of Learning and Coordination in the Presidential Primary System ∗
George Deltas† Helios Herrera‡ Mattias K. Polborn§ February 22, 2010 Abstract
To analyze the advantages and disadvantages of the US ...
E Kessner… - Zeitschrift für die gesamte …, 1999 - Springer
Die Frage nach dem Zusammenhang zwischen Größe und Kosten von
Versicherungsunternehmen hat in der deutschen Versicherungswissenschaft eine lange
Tradition. Beginnend mit Farny (1960) haben einige Autoren statistische Methoden wie ...
D Bernhardt… - Economics Letters, 2010 - Elsevier
S Krasa… - 2011 - works.bepress.com
... Available at: http://works.bepress.com/polborn/24 Page 2. The relative importance
of cultural and economic issues for the polarization of the US electorate, 1972–2008
Stefan Krasa ∗ Mattias Polborn † July 12, 2011 Abstract ...
T Dragu… - 2010 - cpe.wustl.edu
Abstract We develop a game-theoretic model of interactions among a government, a
representative citizen, and the (non-terrorist) members of the community in which terrorists
have their roots and derive several results. First, security can decrease whenever the ...
C Clark… - 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We consider a dynamic oligopoly model in which a seller may drop out of the
market when demand for its product is insufficient in the first period. Buyers suffer some
disutility if a seller exits the market and so their first period purchase decision does not ...
S Krasa… - 2012 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: One of the most widely discussed phenomena in American politics today is the
perceived increasing partisan divide that splits the US electorate. A central contested
question is whether this diagnosis is actually true, and if so, what is the underlying cause. ...
Page 1. From the SelectedWorks of Mattias K Polborn January 2009 Candidate Competition
and Voter Learning in Sequential Primary Elections: Theory and Evidence ...
T Dragu… - 2011 - works.bepress.com
... Page 2. Political Rulers, Administrators, and the Efficacy of Law1 Tiberiu Dragu Mattias Polborn
University of Illinois August 3, 2011 1We thank Gary Cox, Xiaochen Fan, Pohan Fong, Jim
Kuklinski, and Richard McAdams for useful comments and suggestions. All errors are ours. ...
... Rosolia and Alessandro Secchi for helpful comments. y Corresponding author: Mattias
Polborn, Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario,
N6A 5C2, Canada; email: mpolborn@julian.uwo.ca 1 In... ...
... Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Illinois, 225H David Kinley
Hall, 1407 W. Gregory Drive, Urbana, IL, 61801; email: polborn@uiuc.edu,
phone:217-333-7664. Send all correspondence to professor Mattias Polborn. ...
Abstract In many economic, political and social situations, people with similar backgrounds
or preferences attract. In workplaces, managers tend to hire subordinates from the same
college or business school; at school and college, people tend to make friends or date ...
... Keywords: strategic voting, plurality rule, runoff rule, Duverger's Law and Hypothesis JEL code:
D720. ∗Corresponding author: Mattias Polborn, Department of Economics, University of Illinois,
Urbana, IL, 61801; email: polborn@uiuc.edu Page 3. 1 Introduction ...
We analyze the effects of voter coordination on the equilibrium of voting games. Specifically,
we analyze the concepts of strong equilibrium and coalition–proof equi- librium for plurality rule
and runoff rule elections. We characterize these equilibria in the three candidate case, ...
[CITATION] Public-, and Best-Information equilibria in a model with consumption externalities
CR Clark… - 2003
M Messner… - UWO Department of Economics Working …, 1999 - ideas.repec.org
Downloadable! We analyze an overlapping generations model of voting over ``reform projects''.
These resemble investments in that they first require some investment expenditure and later bring
a payoff; consequently, older people are more conservative (against reforms) than younger ...
MK Polborn… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2003 - works.bepress.com
This paper builds on Cremer's (1986) seminal analysis which shows that (almost) complete
cooperation can be achieved as an equilibrium in a game played by overlapping generations
of players if the institution in which players cooperate is infinitely lived. We analyze a similar model ...
MK Polborn… - Economics of Governance, 2007 - Springer
Page 1. Economics of Governance (2007) 8:263–279 DOI 10.1007/s10101-006-
0019-7 ORIGINAL PAPER Dynamic lobbying conflicts Mattias K. Polborn · Zaruhi
Sahakyan Received: 11 November 2005 / Accepted: 2 January ...
MK Polborn - Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
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[CITATION] Information and Dynamic Adjustment in Life Insurance
M Hoy, A Sadanand… - 1999 - Dept. of Economics, University of …
[CITATION] Endogenous Research Agendas
MR Effinger… - Papers, 1997 - ideas.repec.org
We analyze a model related to the strategic hereding literature where a second expert maximises
his expected second period vvalue by conforming witj a first expert ("herding"). In contrast to the
herdinfg literature we assume that an agent is most valuable if he is the only smart agent ...
T Dragu… - 2012 - netfiles.uiuc.edu
Abstract What is the role of legal limits on executive action, if any, in times of crises when
citizens demand more security and allowing executive officials legal flexibility appears
necessary to achieve it? We develop a game-theoretic model to show that when the ...
Page 1. From the SelectedWorks of Mattias K Polborn October
2011 The option to wait in collective decisions ...
MK Polborn, M Hoy… - Economic Journal, 2006 - works.bepress.com
This paper is concerned with the effects of regulations that prohibit the use of information to
risk-rate premiums in a life insurance market. In particular, new information derived from genetic
tests is likely to become very relevant in the near to medium term future. Many governments ...
M Hoy… - 2006 - aria.org
Page 1. Incorporating behavioral effects in the valuation of medical research and improvements
to public safety (preliminary version - please do not quote) Michael Hoy University of Guelph
Mattias K. Polborn University of Illinois March 14, 2006 Abstract ...
CR Clark… - Journal of Economics & Management …, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
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... Available at: http://works.bepress.com/polborn/22 Page 2. Institutional Constraints
in Times of Crisis: Counter-Terrorism and Electoral Accountability Tiberiu Dragu
Mattias Polborn March 22, 2010 Abstract We develop a game ...
T Dragu… - 2010 - netfiles.uiuc.edu
Abstract Why do government officials act according to the law? In this paper, we develop a
new theory of why elected officials may be constrained by laws and legal rulings that they
can, in principle, ignore. We argue that an independent bureaucracy can render the rule of ...
H Mehlum, K Moene, R Torvik, P Bardhan… - The Economic …, 2006 - res.org.uk
MK Polborn, S Krasa… - Journal of Public …, 2008 - works.bepress.com
... Available at: http://works.bepress.com/polborn/13 Page 2. Political Polarization and
the Electoral Effects of Media Bias Dan Bernhardt Stefan Krasa Mattias Polborn∗ January
24, 2008 forthcoming, Journal of Public Economics Abstract ...
MK Polborn… - Journal of Public Economics, 2004 - works.bepress.com
Consider a situation where a society has to elect an official who provides a public service for
the citizens. Candidates differ in their competence and every potential candidate has private
information about his costs to perform the task of the elected official. We develop a new citizen ...
MK Polborn… - Canadian Journal of Economics/ …, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
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S Krasa… - 2010 - econ.uiuc.edu
Abstract We develop a formal model in which the government provides public goods in
different policy fields for its citizens. We start from the basic premise that two office-motivated
candidates have differential capabilities in different policy fields, and compete by ...
MK Polborn, HH Herrera… - 2011 - works.bepress.com
Page 1. From the SelectedWorks of Mattias K Polborn January 2011 Learning
and Coordination in the Presidential Primary System ...
Abstract: In many important political problems, citizens can directly participate in the political
decision making through a referendum. These settings are often characterized by
uncertainty over the future consequences of the decision, the possibility of learning about ...
[CITATION] Governance and the
M Polborn - 2009
MK Polborn, M Hoy… - The Economic Journal, 2006 - res.org.uk
M Messner… - 2009 - cerge-ei.cz
Page 1. The option to wait in collective decisions and optimal majority rules ∗ Matthias
Messner† Department of Economics Bocconi University Mattias K. Polborn‡ Department
of Economics University of Illinois January 2010 Abstract ...
G Willmann… - status: submitted, 2008 - lirias.kuleuven.be
KULeuven. ...
M Messner… - Working Papers, 2005 - en.scientificcommons.org
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