JS Hastings, R Van Weelden… - 2007 - nber.org
The incentives and outcomes generated by public school choice depend to a large degree
on parents' choice behavior. There is growing empirical evidence that low-income parents
place lower weights on academics when choosing schools, but there is little evidence as ...
J Fox… - Journal of Public Economics, 2010 - Elsevier
We examine the welfare effects of partisanship in a model of checks and balances. An
executive makes a policy proposal and an overseer then decides whether or not to veto the
executive's proposal. Both the executive and the overseer have private information as to ...
M Morelli… - 2011 - iae.csic.es
Abstract. We provide a positive analysis of effort allocation by a politician facing reelection
when voters are uncertain about the politician's preferences on a divisive issue. We then use
this framework to derive normative conclusions on the desirability of transparency, term ...
R Van Weelden - Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2008 - qjps.com
ABSTRACT Most models of pre-vote deliberation assume that voters send messages
simultaneously. In practice, however, communication is almost always sequential. This
review shows that sequential communication makes it even more difficult to induce truthful ...
R Van Weelden - 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: I analyze a model of repeated elections in which a representative voter selects
among candidates with known policy preferences in each period. In addition to having
preferences over policy, the elected candidate would like to use their position to secure ...
J Fox… - Journal of Public Economics, 2011 - Elsevier
We consider whether a career-minded expert would make better decisions if the principal
could observe the consequences of the expert's action. The previous literature has found
that this “transparency of consequence” can only improve the efficacy of the expert's ...
M Morelli… - 2011 - economics.uchicago.edu
Abstract We consider how the incentives for politicians to pander to public opinion depend
on preference heterogeneity and information. As there is greater opportunity for voters to
update their beliefs about the politician's type on a more divisive issue, politicians are ...
[CITATION] Candidates and Credible Promises in Repeated Elections
R Van Weelden - 2009 - working paper
R Van Weelden - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: I consider the welfare implications of divergent platforms in a model of repeated
elections. There are two long-lived candidates who have preferences over policy and also
an opportunity to engage in rent-seeking when in office. Candidates cannot make binding ...
R Van Weelden - 2011 - gradworks.umi.com
First, I analyze a model of repeated elections in which a representative voter selects among candidates
with known policy preferences in each period. In addition to having preferences over policy, the
elected candidate would like to use their position to secure rents at the voter's expense. I ...
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