JS Banks… - American Political Science Review, 2000 - JSTOR
We provide a general theory of collective decision making, one that relates social choices to
the strategic incentives of individuals, by generalizing the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model of
bargaining to the multidimensional spatial model. We prove existence of stationary ...
J Banks… - Social choice and strategic decisions, 2005 - Springer
We unify and extend much of the literature on probabilistic voting in two-candidate elections.
We give existence results for mixed and pure strategy equilibria of the electoral game. We
prove general results on optimality of pure strategy equilibria vis-a-vis a weighted ...
J Duggan… - Social Choice and Welfare, 2000 - Springer
Abstract. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem on the manipulability of social-choice rules
assumes resoluteness: there are no ties, no multi-member choice sets. Generalizations
based on a familiar lottery idea allow ties but assume perfectly shared probabilistic beliefs ...
J Duggan… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2001 - Elsevier
We model voting in juries as a game of incomplete information, allowing jurors to receive a
continuum of signals. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of the game, and
give a condition under which no asymmetric equilibria exist under unanimity rule. We offer ...
J Duggan - Economics & Politics, 2000 - Wiley Online Library
An infinite sequence of elections with no term limits is modelled. In each period a challenger
with privately known preferences is randomly drawn from the electorate to run against the
incumbent, and the winner chooses a policy outcome in a one-dimensional issue space. ...
JS Banks, J Duggan… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2002 - Elsevier
We prove that the support of mixed strategy equilibria of two-player, symmetric, zero-sum
games lies in the uncovered set, a concept originating in the theory of tournaments, and the
spatial theory of politics. We allow for uncountably infinite strategy spaces, and as a ...
J Duggan - Journal of economic theory, 1999 - Elsevier
A general theorem on “extending” binary relations to linear (or strict linear) orders is proved.
The well-known result that every partial order can be written as the intersection of linear
orders in which it is embedded is obtained as a special case, as are several other ...
J Duggan - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1997 - JSTOR
Allowing for incomplete information, this paper characterizes the social choice functions that
can be approximated by the equilibrium outcomes of a mechanism: incentive compatibility is
necessary and almost sufficient for virtual Bayesian implementability. In conjunction with a ...
JS Banks… - Quarterly Journal of Political …, 2006 - authors.library.caltech.edu
We present a general model of legislative bargaining in which the status quo is an arbitrary
point in a multidimensional policy space. In contrast to other bargaining models, the status
quo is not assumed to be bad for all legislators, and delay may be Pareto efficient. We ...
J Duggan… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2005 - Elsevier
In the multi-dimensional spatial model of elections with two policy-motivated candidates, we
prove that the candidates must adopt the same policy platform in equilibrium. Moreover,
when the number of voters is odd, if the gradients of the candidates' utility functions point ...
JS Banks, JR Duggan… - 2001 - rochester.edu
... Jeffrey S. Banks Division of Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology
Pasadena CA 91125 John Duggan Department of Political Science University of Rochester
Rochester NY 14627 Original: April 4, 2000 Revised: June 17, 2002 ...
S Cho… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2003 - Elsevier
We prove uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining with
quadratic utilities, for an arbitrary common discount factor. For general concave utilities, we
prove existence and uniqueness of a “minimal” stationary equilibrium and of a “maximal” ...
JS Banks, J Duggan… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2006 - Elsevier
This paper extends the theory of the core, the uncovered set, and the related undominated
set to a general set of alternatives and an arbitrary measure space of voters. We investigate
the properties of social preferences generated by simple games; we extend results on ...
J Duggan… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2012 - Elsevier
Abstract We prove existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in an infinite-horizon
model of legislative policy making in which the policy outcome in one period determines the
status quo for the next. We allow for a multidimensional policy space and arbitrary smooth ...
JS Banks… - Quarterly Journal of Political …, 2008 - authors.library.caltech.edu
We propose a general model of repeated elections. In each period, a challenger is chosen
from the electorate to run against an incumbent politician in a majority-rule election, and the
winner then selects a policy from a multidimensional policy space. Individual policy ...
J Duggan… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1996 - Elsevier
We prove the existence and uniqueness of the weak saddle, a solution due to Shapley, for a
class of zero-sum games including tournament games, as defined by Laffond, Laslier, and
Le Breton. We then show that the minimal covering set of a tournament, proposed by Dutta ...
J Duggan - University of Rochester mimeo, 2000 - johnduggan.net
Abstract This paper studies competition between two office-motivated candidates when
voters vote probabilistically and candidates maximize expected plurality or they maximize
probability of winning. Every symmetric equilibrium under probability of winning is an ...
D Bernhardt, J Duggan… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2007 - Elsevier
This paper formulates and analyzes a general model of elections in which candidates
receive private signals about voters' preferences prior to committing to political platforms. We
fully characterize the unique pure-strategy equilibrium: After receiving her signal, each ...
JS Banks… - Social Choice and Welfare, 2006 - Springer
Abstract We prove a lemma characterizing majority preferences over lotteries on a subset of
Euclidean space. Assuming voters have quadratic von Neumann–Morgenstern utility
representations, and assuming existence of a majority undominated (or “core”) point, the ...
J Duggan… - The American economic review, 2002 - JSTOR
Markets to allocate pollution rights play an important role in current efforts to control pollution
efficiently (the Environmental Protection Agency has allowed firms to trade pollution permits
since 1977), and this role is likely to grow as pollution abatement efforts intensify. It is clear ...
J Duggan - Social Choice and Welfare, 2007 - Springer
Abstract Suppose a strict preference relation fails to possess maximal elements, so that a
choice is not clearly defined. I propose to delete particular instances of strict preferences
until the resulting relation satisfies one of a number of known regularity properties ( ...
[CITATION] Stationary equilibria in a bargaining model of social choice
JS Banks… - Typescript, University of Rochester, 1998
J Duggan… - Social Choice and Welfare, 2001 - Springer
Abstract. We investigate refinements of two solutions, the saddle and the weak saddle,
defined by Shapley (1964) for two-player zero-sum games. Applied to weak tournaments,
the first refinement, the mixed saddle, is unique and gives us a new solution, generally ...
J Bergin… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1999 - Elsevier
The goal of non-cooperative foundations is to provide credible non-cooperative models of
negotiation and coalition formation whose equilibrium outcomes agree with a given
cooperative solution. Here we argue that this goal is best achieved by explicitly modeling ...
J Duggan… - International Journal of Game Theory, 2006 - Springer
Abstract We analyze an infinitely repeated version of the Downsian model of elections. The
folk theorem suggests that a wide range of policy paths can be supported by subgame
perfect equilibria when parties and voters are sufficiently patient. We go beyond this result ...
J Duggan - The Oxford handbook of political economy. Oxford …, 2006 - rochester.edu
Elections, as the institution through which citizens choose their political agents, are at the
core of representative democracy. It is therefore appropriate that they occupy a central
position in the study of democratic politics. The formal analysis of elections traces back to ...
JS Banks… - Typescript, University of Rochester, 2003 - survey.caltech.edu
Abstract We present a general model of legislative bargaining in which the status quo is an
arbitrary point in a multidimensional policy space. In contrast to other bargaining models, the
status quo is not assumed to be “bad,” and delay may be Pareto efficient. We prove ...
J Duggan… - … . Available at http://mail. rochester. edu/ …, 2005 - politics.as.nyu.edu
Abstract We prove existence of mixed strategy electoral equilibrium in the multidimensional
Downsian model of elections. We do so by modelling voters explicitly as players, enabling
us to resolve discontinuities in the game between the candidates, which have proved a ...
D Bernhardt, J Duggan… - … Political Science Review, 2009 - Cambridge Univ Press
Abstract Electoral platform convergence is perceived unfavorably by both the popular press
and many academic scholars. Arguably, to paraphrase,“it does not provide enough choice”
between candidates. This article provides a formal account of the perceived negative ...
S Cho… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2009 - Elsevier
We give a game-theoretic foundation for the median voter theorem in a one-dimensional
bargaining model based on Baron and Ferejohn's [D. Baron, J. Ferejohn, Bargaining in
legislatures, Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. 83 (1989) 1181–1206] model of distributive politics. We ...
[CITATION] A bargaining model of policy-making
JS Banks… - Unpublished manuscript. University of Rochester, 2001
D Bernhardt, J Duggan… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2009 - Elsevier
We study elections in which two candidates poll voters about their preferred policies before
taking policy positions. In the essentially unique equilibrium, candidates who receive
moderate signals adopt more extreme platforms than their information suggests, but ...
J Duggan - Social Choice and Welfare, 2006 - Springer
Abstract Existence of a “simple” pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium is established in
a model of endogenous agenda formation and sophisticated voting; upper hemicontinuity of
simple equilibrium outcomes is demonstrated; and connections to the set of undominated, ...
J Duggan - Unpublished manuscript, 2005 - johnduggan.net
Elections, as the institution through which citizens choose their political agents, are at the
core of representative democracy. It is therefore appropriate that they occupy a central
position in the study of democratic politics. The formal analysis of elections traces back to ...
J Duggan… - 2002 - rochester.edu
Abstract We analyze an infinitely repeated version of the Downsian model of elections. The
folk theorem suggests that a wide range of policy paths can be supported by subgame
perfect equilibria when parties and voters are sufficiently patient. We go beyond this result ...
J Duggan… - unpublished paper, 1997 - rochester.edu
Page 1. DOMINANCE-BASED SOLUTIONS FOR STRATEGIC FORM GAMES John Duggan
Department of Political Science and Department of Economics University of Rochester Michel
Le Breton Greqam-Leqam Université d'Aix Marseille 2 and Institut Universitaire de France ...
J Duggan - Economic Theory, 2003 - Springer
Summary. I construct a general model of social planning problems, including mixed
production economies and regulatory problems with negative externalities as special cases,
and I give simple mechanisms for Nash implementation under three increasingly general ...
J Duggan - Review of Economic Design, 1998 - Springer
Abstract. When agents have quasi-linear preferences, every incentive compatible social
choice function can be implemented by a simple extensive form mechanism, even if agents
are allowed to use mixed strategies. The second stage of the mechanism, which is used to ...
J Duggan… - The Review of Economic …, 2011 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We develop a theory of media slant as a systematic filtering of political news that
reduces multidimensional politics to the one-dimensional space perceived by voters.
Economic and political choices are interdependent in our theory: expected electoral ...
JP Duggan - Recherche, 1991 - lavoisier.fr
Livre: A History of the Irish Army DUGGAN John.
JR Duggan… - 2001 - en.scientificcommons.org
Publikationsansicht. 883605. Non-cooperative Games Among Groups (2001). Duggan, John.
Abstract. A model of group interaction that combines the theory of Nash equilibrium (across
groups) and the theory of social choice (within groups) is investigated. ...
J Duggan - Unpublished, April, 1997 - rochester.edu
The theory of choice has given us a full understanding of how rationality, formulated as the
maximization of a fixed binary relation, is reflected in regularities exhibited by choices from a
variable feasible set. In the literature on tournaments, solutions are often constructed to ...
J Duggan - Economic Theory, 1996 - Springer
Summary Gibbard has shown that a social choice function is strategy-proof if and only if it is
a convex combination of dictatorships and pair-wise social choice functions. I use geometric
techniques to prove the corollary that every strategy-proof and sovereign social choice ...
J Duggan - Games and Economic Behavior, 2007 - Elsevier
A theorem on existence of mixed strategy equilibria in discontinuous zero-sum games is
proved and applied to three models of elections. First, the existence theorem yields a mixed
strategy equilibrium in the multidimensional spatial model of elections with three voters. A ...
JM Duggan - The Medical Journal of Australia, 1999 - ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
1. Med J Aust. 1999 Feb 1;170(3):121-4. Quality in healthcare in the United Kingdom: lessons
for Australia. Duggan JM. Princeton Medical Centre, Hamilton, NSW. duggan@hunterlink.net.
au. Comment in Med J Aust. 1999 May 17;170(10):507. Med J Aust. ...
JS Banks, J Duggan… - 2002 - urresearch.rochester.edu
Abstract This paper extends the theory of the core, the uncovered set, and the related
undominated set to a general set of alternatives and an arbitrary measure space of voters.
We investigate the properties of social preferences generated by simple games, we ...
J Duggan… - Working Papers, 1992 - econpapers.repec.org
... Please update your bookmarks. Strategic Manipulability is Inescapable: Gibbard-Satterthwaite
without Resoluteness. John Duggan and Thomas Schwartz. No 817, Working Papers from
California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. ...
J Duggan - Journal of Economic Theory, 1996 - Elsevier
I prove a version of Arrow's theorem for public good environments assuming that individuals
have standard economic preferences and that the domain of feasible sets consists of the
convex, compact, comprehensive subsets of alternatives. This improves a result of ...
J Duggan… - Social Choice and Welfare, 2011 - Springer
Abstract We develop and implement a collocation method to solve for an equilibrium in the
dynamic legislative bargaining game of Duggan and Kalandrakis 2008, unpublished
manuscript. We formulate the collocation equations in a quasi-discrete version of the ...
J Duggan - 2002 - rochester.edu
Abstract Existence of a\ simple" pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium is established in
a model of endogenous agenda formation and sophisticated voting; upper hemicontinuity of
simple equilibrium outcomes is demonstrated; and connections to the set of undominated, ...
J Duggan - 2004 - rochester.edu
Abstract This note considers a property, called “limited shared weak preferences”(LSWP), in
the context of a model in which agents have linear utility functions defined on a polyhedron
of alternatives. As special cases, we capture the distributive politics model with ...
J Duggan - Social Choice and Welfare, 1997 - Springer
Abstract. Hansson (1969) sets forth four conditions satisfied by no generalized social welfare
function (GSWF), a mapping from profiles of individual preferences to arbitrary social
preference relations. Though transitivity is not imposed on social preferences, one of ...
[CITATION] Endogenous Amendment Agendas and Open Rule Legislatures
J Duggan - 2001 - working paper. University of …
[CITATION] Fair, Kind and True: INU and WH
John][Duggan… - 1896 - Scranton Republican print.
[CITATION] Social Choice and Strategic Decisions
…, John. Duggan - Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
JF Duggan - Dick. L. Rev., 1993 - HeinOnline
Page 1. The Use and Abuse of Peer Review Organizations in Pennsylvania: An Analysis of the
Private Enterprise Peer Review System Under The Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law
of 1990 When you talk to a lawyer, he blames it on the insurance agent. . . . ...
D Austen-Smith, JR Duggan… - 2005 - books.google.com
... Rochester, NY David Austen-Smith December, 2004 John Duggan Page 9. Preface IX Jeffrey
S. Banks Publications and Papers Articles 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10. ... A bargaining model of collective
choice,(with John Duggan), American Political Science Review, 2000, 94: 733* 788. ...
[CITATION] Francesco Squintani.“Electoral Competition with Privately-Informed Candidates.”
D Bernhardt… - 2004 - Mimeo, 2004. 2 3One can show that …
[CITATION] The Indeterminacy of Elections with Policy-Motivated Candidates and a Single Issue Dimension
J Duggan… - 2004 - mimeo
D Bernhardt, J Duggan… - Typescript. University of …, 2003 - unina.stidue.net
Abstract We consider a model of elections in which two office-motivated candidates receive
private signals about the median voter's location prior to taking policy positions. When a
pure strategy equilibrium exists, it is unique: after receiving a signal each candidate ...
[CITATION] Predicting College Grades
College Entrance Examination Board, JM Duggan… - 1963
[CITATION] Learning by Objectives: A Teachers' Guide
AD Carroll, JE Duggan… - 1978 - Hutchinson
J Duggan - Economics Letters, 2006 - Elsevier
This note considers the unidimensional electoral model in which two candidates seek to
maximize their vote totals and do not observe the preferences of the voters. I show that there
is a unique equilibrium and, in equilibrium, both candidates locate at the median of the ( ...
[CITATION] Style investing with ETFs: Growth and value plays
P Mazzilli, D Kittsley, J Duggan… - Morgan Stanley Equity Research Report, 2002
[CITATION] An Electoral Model with Adverse Selection and Heterogeneous Voters
J Duggan - annual meeting of the Public Choice Society in New …, 1993
[CITATION] VElectoral Competition with Policy% Motivated CandidatesV
D John… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2005
D Bernhardt, J Duggan, F Squintani… - The Political Economy …, 2009 - warwick.ac.uk
Abstract This paper reviews some of the recent growing literature on rational choice models
of polling. We focus on research branches that address:(i) the strategic incentives of polled
citizens to report honestly, when citizens internalize how candidates will use that ...
[CITATION] Candidate Objectives and Electoral Equilibrium” forthcoming
J Duggan - 2004 - … of Political Economy, edited by Barry …
[CITATION] An Introduction to Quality Assurance for Clinicians: Discussion Paper
JM Duggan… - 1994 - The Royal Australasian College of …
JM Duggan - The Medical journal of Australia, 1987 - ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
1. Med J Aust. 1987 Apr 6;146(7):366-7. Father Brown and the case of Australian
medicine. Duggan JM. PMID: 3561292 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]. MeSH
Terms. Australia; Delivery of Health Care/economics*; Humans.
JM Duggan… - Medical journal of Australia, 2005 - mja.com.au
Jump to Navigation. ...
J Duggan - preprint, 2010 - johnduggan.net
These notes are a brief introduction to the problem of social choice: a group of individuals,
with possibly conflicting preferences, must make a collective choice from a given set of
alternatives. Section 1 provides some preliminaries, including a variety of different ...
J Duggan… - 1995 - johnduggan.net
Abstract Existing bogosity results for monotonic social choice rules use the assumption of
resoluteness—that social choices are singleton sets in every situation. As a result they do
not apply to most interesting social choice rules. We show that monotonicity is bogus ...
J Duggan - Unpublished manuscript, 2004 - rochester.edu
Abstract This note considers a property, called “limited shared weak preferences”(LSWP), in
the context of a model with linear utility functions defined on a polyhedron of alternatives. As
special cases, we capture the distributive politics model with externalities in consumption, ...
J Duggan… - 2008 - nova.itam.mx
Abstract We formalize the concept of media slant as a relative emphasis on different issues
of political interest by the media, and we illustrate the effects of the media choice of slant on
political outcomes and economic decisions in a rational expectations model. In a two $ ...
[CITATION] Disclosure, Self-esteem, and Public Perception in Gays and Lesbians
SJ Duggan - 2003
[CITATION] Factors relating to parenting by non-heterosexual fathers
SJ Duggan - 2007 - University of Toronto (Canada)
[CITATION] Technology, Industry, and Transportation
J Duggan…
[CITATION] The Loan of a Fiver
J Duggan - 2001 - Minerva Press
J Duggan… - Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
We consider a general plurality voting game with multiple candidates, where voter
preferences over candidates are exogenously given. In particular, we allow for arbitrary
voter indifferences, as may arise in voting subgames of citizen-candidate or locational ...
P Barelli… - RCER Working Papers, 2011 - johnduggan.net
Abstract. We prove existence and purification results for equilibria in which players choose
extreme points of their feasible actions in a class of strategic environments exhibiting a
product structure. We assume finite-dimensional action sets and allow for infinite- ...
W Allen, D Bernhardt, J Duggan… - 2008 - Citeseer
Abstract Electoral platform convergence is perceived unfavorably by both the popular press
and many academic scholars. This paper provides a formal account of these perceived
negative effects. We show that when parties do not know voters' preferences perfectly, ...
J Duggan - 1896 - books.google.com
It may be necessary then to declare in this intro duction that New Discoveries and true
investigations in the subjects discussed will be the sole aim and purpose of the writer. For
nearly three centuries the Shakespeare Plays, Bonnets, and Poems have been before the ...
[CITATION] The theory of implementation of socially optimal decisions in economics: London[ua], Macmillan, 1996
J Duggan - The economic journal, 1998
[CITATION] Mixed Strategy Equilibrium and Deep Covering in Multidimensional Electoral Competition Preliminary and Incomplete Do Not Cite
J Duggan… - 2004
PJ Duggan - 1998 - nlc-bnc.ca
Abstract: This thesis examines the content of Francis Galton's (1 822-1 91 1)
correspondence to Charles Darwin (1 809-1 882) between 1869 and 1882. Darwin
published his theory of evolution by natural selection in his 1859 The Origin of Soecies. ...
[CITATION] The last days of Justice Tierry
TJ Duggan - 1990 - University of Nebraska, Lincoln
[CITATION] EMERGING SIGNIFICANCE OF MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVES IN NEW JERSEY PUBLIC SECTOR: SCOPE OF NEGOTIATIONS
J DUGGAN - Journal of collective negotiations in the public …, 1981 - Baywood Pub. Co.
[CITATION] 250 years at Highfield Co. Kildare: a short history of the Duggan family
J Duggan - 1997 - Highfield Publications
JJ Duggan - 1964 - en.scientificcommons.org
J Duggan… - Wallis Working Papers, 2007 - ideas.repec.org
We provide game-theoretic foundations for the median voter theorem in a one-dimensional
bargaining model based on Baron and Ferejohn's (1989) model of distributive politics. We
prove that, as the agents become arbitrarily patient, the set of proposals that can be ...
[CITATION] The National Gay Rights Coalition: Year Three: A Report
J Duggan - 1978 - National Gay Rights Coalition
JF Duggan - Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses, 2001 - sir.sagepub.com
Page 1. © 2002 Canadian Corporation for Studies in Religion / Corporation
Canadienne des Sciences Religieuses Visions of the divine in an Anishinabe Catholic
community JOHN F. DUGGAN John F. Duggan is a lecturer ...
[CITATION] A factor analysis of reading ability, personality traits and academic achievement
JM Duggan - 1957 - Yale University
JM Duggan… - 1963 - eric.ed.gov
ED032009 - Predicting College Grades. A Computation Workbook for Estimating Freshmen
Grade Averages from High School Records and College Board Scores.
J Duggan… - 1992 - writing.caltech.edu
Abstract The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem on the manipulability of collective-choice
procedures treats only of resolute procedures. Few real or reasonable procedures are
resolute. We prove a generalization of Gibbard-Satterthwaite that covers the nonresolute ...
J Duggan, T Kalandrakis… - Wallis Working Papers, 2008 - ideas.repec.org
We specify and compute equilibria of a dynamic policy-making game between a president
and a legislature under insitutional rules that emulate those of the US Constitution. Policies
are assumed to lie in a two-dimensional space in which one issue dimension captures ...
J Duggan - 2003 - rochester.edu
Abstract We present a general model of legislative bargaining in which the status quo is an
arbitrary point in a multidimensional policy space. In contrast to other bargaining models, the
status quo is not assumed to be\ bad," and delay may be Pareto e±cient. We prove ...
[CITATION] The feasibility of introducing a risk management program to reduce liability and ultimate job costs for a construction company
J Duggan - 1992 - New York Institute of Technology
J Duggan - 2009 - johnduggan.net
Jeffrey Scot Banks was a scholar who made wide-ranging contributions to economics and
political science. He was born in 1958, received his BA in Political Science from the
University of California Los Angeles in 1982, and received his PhD in Social Science from ...
Create email alert
About Google Scholar - All About Google - My Citations
©2012 Google