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Abstract When bids do not represent binding commitments, the use of a first price sealed bid
auction favors those bidders who are less penalized from reneging on their bids. These
bidders are the most likely to win but also the most likely to default on their bid. In this ...
[CITATION] Collusion in Average Bid Auctions
TG Conley… - 2010 - mimeo
TG Conley… - 2011 - ssc.wisc.edu
Abstract This paper studies entry and bidding in procurement auctions were contracts are
awarded to the bid closest to a trimmed average bid. We characterize equilibrium under
competition and show that it is weak due to strong incentives for cooperation. We present ...
F Decarolis - Rivista di Politica Economica, 2003 - ssc.wisc.edu
The idea that there is a relation between democracy and economic development is very old.
The formulation of the principle according to which democracy is a political system that
works only in countries that have reached a certain level of development is generally ...
F Decarolis, C Giorgiantonio… - Questioni di Economia e …, 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Despite successive reforms, public procurement in Italy is still highly fragmented
and vulnerable to collusion, corruption and ex-post renegotiation. Other defects are found in
the planning stages of the works. These problems are due in part to the regulations on the ...
F Decarolis - 2011 - ssc.wisc.edu
Economics 761 is a topics course in Industrial Organization and Market Design. The course
will mostly deal with the analysis of auctions from an empirical perspective. The first aim of
the course is to present the recent advances in the structural estimation approach to ...
Abstract Despite successive reforms, public procurement in Italy is still highly fragmented
and vulnerable to collusion, corruption and ex-post renegotiation. Other defects are found in
the planning stages of the works. These problems are due in part to the regulations on the ...
Auctions are supposed to procure the best deal money can buy. Yet, practitioners who
procure complex contracts by auction are well aware of some basic pitfalls. One concern is
that winning bids may not reflect the quality of the bidder but strategic behavior like low- ...
F Altissimo, C Antonelli, G Ardizzi, V Atella… - RIVISTA DI POLITICA …, 2006 - faronet.it
The papers submitted for publication in the Rivista di Politica Economica are evaluated by
two anonymous referees who do not know the identity of the authors. The role of these
experts is fundamental to ensure the quality of the papers that will then be published in the ...
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