M Battaglini - Econometrica, 2002 - Wiley Online Library
2. Abstract In previous work on cheap talk, uncertainty has almost always been modeled
using a single–dimensional state variable. In this paper we prove that the dimensionality of
the uncertain variable has an important qualitative impact on results and yields interesting ...
M Battaglini… - 2006 - nber.org
This paper presents a dynamic political economy theory of public spending, taxation and
debt. Policy choices are made by a legislature consisting of representatives elected by
geographically-defined districts. The legislature can raise revenues via a distortionary ...
M Battaglini… - 2005 - nber.org
ABSTRACT This paper develops an infinite horizon model of public spending and taxation
in which policy decisions are determined by legislative bargaining. The policy space
incorporates both productive and distributive public spending and distortionary taxation. ...
M Battaglini - American Economic Review, 2005 - JSTOR
To study how a firm can capitalize on a long-term customer relationship, we characterize the
optimal contract between a monopolist and a consumer whose preferences follow a Markov
process. The optimal contract is nonstationary and has infinite memory, but is described ...
M Battaglini - Advances in theoretical Economics, 2004 - princeton.edu
Abstract We study policy advice by several experts with noisy private information and biased
preferences. We highlight a trade-off between the truthfulness of the information revealed by
each expert and the number of signals from different experts that can be aggregated to ...
M Battaglini, R Bénabou… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2005 - Elsevier
Social influences on self-control underlie both self-help groups and many peer interactions
among youths. To understand these phenomena, we analyze how observing each other's
behavior affects individuals' ability to deal with their own impulses. These endogenous ...
M Battaglini,
RB Morton… - Review of Economic …, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
This paper reports the first laboratory study of the swing voter's curse and provides insights
on the larger theoretical and empirical literature on “pivotal voter” models. Our experiment
controls for different information levels of voters, as well as the size of the electorate, the ...
M Battaglini,
R Morton… - … Political Science Review, 2007 - Cambridge Univ Press
We compare the behavior of voters under simultaneous and sequential voting rules when
voting is costly and information is incomplete. In many political institutions, ranging from
small committees to mass elections, voting is sequential, which allows some voters to ...
M Battaglini - Games and Economic Behavior, 2005 - Elsevier
Dekel and Piccione [2000. Sequential voting procedures in symmetric binary elections. J.
Polit. Economy 108, 34–55] have proven that information cascades do not necessarily affect
the properties of information aggregation in sequential elections: under standard ...
M Battaglini… - Economic Theory, 2007 - Springer
Abstract We study dynamic committee bargaining over an infinite horizon with discounting.
In each period, a committee proposal is generated by a random recognition rule, the
committee chooses between the proposal and a status quo by majority rule, and the voting ...
M Battaglini… - Journal of the European Economic …, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract We study political activism by several interest groups with private signals. When
their ideological distance to the policymaker is small, a “low-trust” regime prevails: agents
frequently lobby even when it is unwarranted, taking advantage of the confirmation ...
M Battaglini… - Journal of Public Economics, 2008 - Elsevier
This paper studies Pareto efficient income taxation in an economy with finitely-lived
individuals whose income generating abilities evolve according to a two-state Markov
process. The study yields three main results. First, when individuals are risk neutral, in any ...
M Battaglini - Journal of Economic Theory, 2006 - Elsevier
Consider Holmström's moral hazard in teams problem when there are n agents, each agent i
has an ai-dimensional strategy space and output is m-dimensional. We show that a
compensation mechanism that satisfies budget balance, limited liability and implements ...
M Battaglini… - 2008 - nber.org
This paper presents a political economy theory of the behavior of fiscal policy over the
business cycle. The theory predicts that, in both booms and recessions, fiscal policies are
set so that the marginal cost of public funds obeys a submartingale. In the short run, fiscal ...
M Battaglini… - 2003 - nber.org
This paper studies Pareto efficient income taxation in an economy with infinitely-lived
individuals whose income generating abilities evolve according to a two-state Markov
process. The study yields two main results. First, when individuals are risk neutral, the ...
M Azzimonti, M Battaglini… - MPRA Paper, 2010 - econpapers.repec.org
This paper uses the political economy model of Battaglini and Coate (2008) to analyze the
impact of a balanced budget rule that requires that legislators do not run deficits. It considers
both a strict rule which cannot be circumvented and a rule that can be overridden by a ...
M Battaglini - Games and economic behavior, 2007 - Elsevier
We characterize the optimal renegotiation-proof contract in a dynamic principal–agent
model in which the type of the agent may change stochastically over time. We show that,
under general conditions, the optimal contract with commitment is renegotiation proof ...
M Battaglini… - American Economic Review, …, 2007 - economics.cornell.edu
Abstract This paper presents a dynamic political economy theory of public spending,
taxation and debt. Policy choices are made by a legislature consisting of representatives
elected by geographically-defined districts. The legislature can raise revenues via a ...
M Battaglini,
RB Morton… - The American Economic Review, 2008 - JSTOR
Recent advances in voting theory have shed light on the influence of pivotality on voter
choices when voters have asymmetric private information, and the implications of this for
information aggregation in committees and elections. Of particular interest is the result that ...
M Battaglini,
S Nunnari… - Carlo Alberto Notebooks, 2010 - carloalberto.it
Abstract We present a theoretical model of the provision of a durable public good over an
infinite horizion. In each period, there is a societal endowment of which each of n districts
owns a share. This endowment can either be invested in the public good or consumed. ...
[CITATION] Dynamic electoral competition and constitutional design
M Battaglini - 2010 - mimeo
[CITATION] Fiscal Policy over the real business cycle: A positive theory
L Barseghyan, M Battaglini… - 2010 - mimeo
[CITATION] J. Tirole (2005)“Self-Control in Peer Groups,”
M Battaglini… - Journal of Economic Theory
[CITATION] VThe Dynamics of Redistributive Politics
M Battaglini… - V Unpublished, 2007
M Battaglini - 2003 - eea-esem.com
Abstract This paper generalizes Holmstrom's moral hazard in teams problem to the case
where the output function is vector-valued. This is a natural assumption in situations where,
for example, the partnership has production lines and there are externalities between ...
[CITATION] Pareto Efficient Taxation with Stochastic Abilities
M Battaglini… - Cornell and Princeton mimeo, 2005
F Giavazzi… - Corporate governance, financial …, 1998 - books.google.com
In the twenties, when the president of New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Charles
Mellen said he was proud of his' Morgan Collar', his company was only one of the many
controlled by investment banks such as the House of Morgan. As J. Bredford De Long ( ...
[CITATION] mFiscal Policy over the Real Business Cycle: A Positive Theory. nMimeo
M Battaglini… - 2008
[CITATION] Moral hazard in teams
M Battaglini - Journal of Economic Theory, Forthcoming
[CITATION] VA Dynamic Theory of Spending, Taxation, and Debt
M Battaglini… - V forthcoming American Economic Review, 2008
M Battaglini… - Journal of the European Economic …, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract We describe a theory of the collective choice of fiscal policy in dynamic economies
that are subject to aggregate shocks. The theory incorporates realistically complex policy
spaces, rational forward-looking agents, and a rich political decision process. We argue ...
[CITATION] mOn the Case for a Balanced Budget Amendment to the US Constitution. nMimeo
A Rezno, MB Marina… - 2008
M Battaglini - Annu. Rev. Econ., 2011 - annualreviews.org
We survey recent theories of public debt that incorporate political decision making in rich
dynamic environments. These theories provide a new framework with which to interpret
empirical evidence and to assess institutional reforms that may help control political ...
M Battaglini,
S Nunnari… - Discussion Papers, Research …, 2011 - hss.caltech.edu
A central role of government is the provision of public goods to its citizenry. Most public
goods provided by governments are durable, and hence dynamic in nature. It takes time to
accumulate them, and they depreciate slowly, projecting benefits for many years. ...
R Benabou… - Papers, 2001 - ideas.repec.org
In this paper we study how observing the actions of others affects individuals' ability to exercise
self-control. ... To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is
available, there are three options: 1. Check below under "Related research" whether ...
M Battaglini, M Jenkinson… - Human Brain …, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
MR-based measurements of brain volumes may be affected by the presence of white matter
(WM) lesions. Here, we assessed how and to what extent this may happen for WM lesions of
various sizes and intensities. After inserting WM lesions of different sizes and intensities ...
M Battaglini - 2001 - en.scientificcommons.org
Publikationsansicht. 6658919. Essays on the economics of information. (2001). Battaglini,
Marco. Abstract. Thesis (Ph. D., Economics)--Northwestern University, 2001. Details der
Publikation. Archiv, OCLC's Experimental Thesis Catalog (United States). ...
M Battaglini - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We present a dynamic model of electoral competition to study the determinants of
fiscal policy. In each period, two parties choose electoral platforms to maximize the expected
number of elected representatives. The electoral platform includes public expenditure, ...
M Battaglini… - 2002 - cepr.org
We study political activism by several agents (lobbyists, unions, etc.) who have private but
imperfect policy-relevant signals, and seek to influence the decisions of a policy maker.
When agents can share information and coordinate their actions, the equilibrium is shown ...
M Battaglini,
R Morton… - 2006 - cepr.org
This paper reports the first laboratory study of the swing voter's curse and provides insights
on the larger theoretical and empirical literature on'pivotal voter'models. Our experiment
controls for different information levels of voters, as well as the size of the electorate, the ...
M Battaglini… - 2011 - nber.org
This paper explores the interaction between fiscal policy and unemployment. It develops a
dynamic economic model in which unemployment can arise but can be mitigated by tax cuts
and public spending increases. Such policies are fiscally costly, but can be financed by ...
M Battaglini - 2011 - cepr.org
We present a dynamic model of electoral competition to study the determinants of fiscal
policy. In each period, two parties choose electoral platforms to maximize the expected
number of elected representatives. The electoral platform includes public expenditure, ...
M Battaglini,
S Nunnari… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We present a dynamic model of free riding in which n infinitely lived agents choose
between private consumption and contributions to a durable public good g. We characterize
the set of continuous Markov equilibria in economies with reversibility, where investments ...
M Battaglini - 2005 - cepr.org
We characterize the optimal renegotiation-proof contract in a dynamic Principal-Agent model
in which the type of the agent may change stochastically over time. Contrary to the case with
constant types, the ex ante optimal contract may be renegotiation-proof even if types are ...
M Battaglini - 2004 - cepr.org
Consider Holmström. s moral hazard in teams problem when there are n agents, each agent
i has aa (i)-dimensional strategy space and output can be m-dimensional. We show that a
compensation mechanism that satisfies budget balance, limited liability and implements ...
M Battaglini,
R Morton… - 2005 - cepr.org
We compare the behaviour of voters, depending on whether they operate under sequential
and simultaneous voting rules, when voting is costly and information is incomplete. In many
real political institutions, ranging from small committees to mass elections, voting is ...
M Battaglini… - 2002 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We study political activism by several agents (lobbyists, unions, etc.) who have
private but imperfect policy-relevant signals, and seek to influence the decisions of a policy
maker. When agents can share information and coordinate their actions, the equilibrium is ...
S Coate… - 2004 Meeting Papers, 2004 - ideas.repec.org
This paper studies Pareto e. cient income taxation in an economy with infinitely-lived
individuals whose income generating abilities evolve according to a two-state Markov
process. The study yields two main results. First, when individuals are risk neutral, the ...
M Battaglini, W Dessein, H Fang… - Wiley Online Library
The Review of Economic Studies administers a travel fund to provide financial support for
economists and econometricians who are at an early stage in their careers and are
travelling to or from Europe to present papers at conferences, workshops, etc. This fund is ...
M Battaglini,
S Nunnari… - harrisschool.uchicago.edu
Abstract We present a theoretical model of the provision of a durable public good over an
infinite horizion. In each period, there is a societal endowment of which each of n districts
owns a share. This endowment can either be invested in the public good or consumed. ...
A Marina, B Marco… - 2010 - mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
This paper uses the political economy model of Battaglini and Coate (2008) to analyze the
impact of a balanced budget rule that requires that legislators do not run deficits. It considers
both a strict rule which cannot be circumvented and a rule that can be overridden by a ...
M Battaglini… - 2010 - cepr.org
We examine strategic information transmission in a controlled laboratory experiment of a
cheap talk game with one sender and multiple receivers. We study the change in equilibrium
behavior from the addition of another audience as well as from varying the degree of ...
ABSTRACT We present a dynamic model of free riding in which n infinitely lived agents
choose between private consumption and contributions to a durable public good g. We
characterize the set of continuous Markov equilibria in economies with reversibility, where ...
M Battaglini, R Bénabou… - 2002 - cepr.org
People with a self-control problem often seek relief through social interactions rather than
binding commitments. Thus, in self-help groups like Alcoholics Anonymous, Narcotics
Anonymous etc, members are said to achieve better personal outcomes by mainly sharing ...
[CITATION] A Note on Sequential Voting with Abstention
M Battaglini - 2003
G TABELLINI, L GUISO, P SAPIENZA, L ZINGALES… - 2008 - cadmus.eui.eu
Proceedings of the twenty second annual congress of the European
Economic Association, Budapest, August 2007. ...
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