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Search with learning: understanding asymmetric price adjustments

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H Yang… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
In many retail markets, prices rise faster than they fall. We develop a model of search with
learning to explain this phenomenon of asymmetric price adjustments. By extending our
static game analysis to the dynamic setting, we demonstrate that asymmetric price ...
Cited by 50 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 17 versions

Group purchasing, nonlinear tariffs, and oligopoly

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HP Marvel… - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2008 - Elsevier
Loyalty discounts are nonlinear tariffs that condition rebates or marginal prices on meeting
aggregate purchase or market share targets. These discounts are widespread, and are often
the impetus for consumers to form buying groups, or group purchase organizations (GPOs ...
Cited by 23 - Related articles - All 13 versions

Nonlinear pricing, market coverage, and competition

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H Yang… - Theoretical Economics, 2008 - econtheory.org
Abstract This paper considers a nonlinear pricing framework with both horizontally and
vertically differentiated products. By endogenizing the set of consumers served in the
market, we are able to study how increased competition affects nonlinear pricing, in ...
Cited by 20 - Related articles - All 22 versions

COLLUSION, FLUCTUATING DEMAND, AND PRICE RIGIDITY*

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M Hanazono… - International Economic Review, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
We study an infinitely repeated Bertrand game in which an iid demand shock occurs in each
period. Each firm receives a private signal about the demand shock at the beginning of each
period. At the end of each period, all information but the private signals becomes public. ...
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Long-term relationships as safeguards

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R Rob… - Economic Theory, 2010 - Springer
Abstract We analyze a repeated prisoners' dilemma game played in a community setting
with heterogeneous types. The setting is such that individuals choose whether to continue
interacting with their present partner, or separate and seek a new partner. Players' types ...
Cited by 15 - Related articles - All 30 versions

[PDF] Nonlinear pricing, contract variety, and competition

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H Yang… - Unpublished paper, e Ohio State University, 2006 - econ.ohio-state.edu
Abstract This paper studies how increased competition affects nonlinear pricing, in particular
the variety of contracts offered by firms. We present a model with both horizontally and
vertically differentiated products, with the set of consumers served in the market being ...
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[PDF] Nonstationary relational contracts

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H Yang - Ohio State University, 2009 - Citeseer
Abstract We develop a model of nonstationary relational contracts in order to study internal
wage dynamics. Workers are heterogenous and each workers' ability is both private
information and fixed for all time. Learning therefore occurs within employment ...
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[PDF] An economic theory of grade inflation

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H Yang… - University of Pennsylvania, 2003 - economics.sas.upenn.edu
Abstract We present a formal analysis of grade inflation. In a labor market where firms must
rely on job applicants' college transcripts to assign them to jobs, universities can choose to
grade-inflate, ie, give good grades to its bad students, thus helping them secure better ...
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[PDF] Long-Term Relationships as Safeguards; Can dishonest types induce honest behavior?

[PDF] from upenn.edu
R Rob… - 2003 - economics.sas.upenn.edu
Abstract We consider a repeated, community, prisoner's dilemma game. After playing the
component prisoner's dilemma game in some period a player observes her partner's action
and can choose to separate from the partner and seek a new partner or to continue ...
Cited by 6 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 6 versions

Efficiency Wages and Subjective Performance Pay

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H Yang - Economic Inquiry, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
This paper studies optimal relational contracts in motivating workers in a market setting. We
find that labor markets with higher turnover costs will use more subjective performance pay
and less efficiency wages and that in those markets, the total wage payment is lower and ...
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Competitive nonlinear taxation and constitutional choice

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M Morelli, H Yang… - American Economic Journal: …, 2012 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: In an economy where agents have different productivities and mobility, we
compare a unified nonlinear optimal taxation with the equilibrium taxation that would be
chosen by two competing tax authorities if the same economy were divided into two states. ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - Library Search - All 57 versions

Dynamic entry and exit with uncertain cost positions

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M Hanazono… - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2009 - Elsevier
We study the dynamics of entry and exit based on firms' learning about their relative cost
positions. Each firm's marginal cost of production is its own private information, thereby
facing ex ante uncertainty about its cost position. The (inelastic) market demand can ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - All 14 versions

[PDF] Cheap Talk with Two Senders and Complementary Information

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A McGee… - 2009 - econ.ohio-state.edu
Abstract This paper studies a cheap talk model with two senders having partial and non-
overlapping private information communicating with an uninformed receiver. The two
senders' private information is complementary in the sense that the marginal impact of one ...
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[PDF] Nonlinear Pricing with Competition

[PDF] from ohio-state.edu
H Yang… - 2006 - economics.sbs.ohio-state.edu
Abstract This paper studies how increased competition affects nonlinear pricing, in particular
the number of contracts offered by firms. We present a model with both horizontally and
vertically differentiated products, with the set of consumers served in the market being ...
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[PDF] Efficiency Wages and Performance Pay

[PDF] from upenn.edu
H Yang - 2003 - economics.sas.upenn.edu
Abstract This paper studies optimal wage contracts for motivating workers in a market
setting. There are three ways to motivate workers: efficiency wages at the cost of a wage
premium; objective performance pay at the cost of effort distortion; subjective performance ...
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INVESTMENT CYCLES, STRATEGIC DELAY, AND SELF‐REVERSING CASCADES*

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J Peck… - International Economic Review, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
We study investment cycles in a social learning model, where investment returns fluctuate
according to a Markov process. In our Waiting Game, agents observe the investment history
and a private signal correlated with the current period's investment return. Agents then ...
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[CITATION] kNonlinear Pricing

H Yang… - Market Coverage, and Competition. l Theoretical …, 2008
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[PDF] Investment Cycles, Strategic Delay, and Self-Correcting Cascades

[PDF] from cornell.edu
J Peck… - 2007 - gs.cornell.edu
Abstract We study investment cycles and information flows in a model of social learning in
which investment returns fluctuate according to a Markov process. In our Waiting Game,
agents observe the investment history and a private signal correlated with the current ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 3 versions

[PDF] Relational Contracts with Adverse Selection

[PDF] from upenn.edu
H Yang - University of PennsylvaniaWorking paper, 2003 - econ.upenn.edu
Abstract We develop a relational contract model in order to study contract dynamics in labor
and credit market relationships. For concreteness, the model is framed in a labor market
setting. Workers are heterogenous and each workers' ability is both private information ...
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[PDF] Short-lived Teams with Mutual Monitoring

[PDF] from upenn.edu
H Yang - 2003 - economics.sas.upenn.edu
Abstract We show that the free-riding problem in short-lived teams is not as severe as
previously thought. Two critical conditions are: team members can observe each other's
effort periodically, which makes mutual monitoring possible; technology is convex ( ...
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Information aggregation and investment cycles with strategic complementarity

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H Yang - Economic Theory, 2010 - Springer
Abstract This paper studies the interaction between information aggregation and investment
cycles with investments exhibiting strategic complementarity. The composition of information
aggregation varies across different phases of cycles, which in turn affects the course of ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - All 12 versions

[PDF] A Summary on “Collusion, Fluctuating Demand, and Price Rigidity”

[PDF] from kyoto-u.ac.jp
M Hanazono… - 数理解析研究所講究録, 2005 - kurims.kyoto-u.ac.jp
Abstract We study an infinitely repeated Bertrand game in which an Li. d. demand shock
occurs in each period. Each firm receives a private signal about the demand shock at the
beginning of each period. At the end of each period, information about both the underlying ...
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[PDF] Targeted Search and the Long Tail Effect

[PDF] from ohio-state.edu
H Yang - 2011 - econ.ohio-state.edu
Abstract This paper develops a new search model to explain the long tail effect. Search
targetibil# ity or the quality of search is explicitly modeled. Consumers are searching for right
products within right categories. Mainstream consumers are distinguished from long tail ...
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Essays on relational contracts and repeated games

H Yang - 2004 - repository.upenn.edu
Abstract This dissertation studies the role of market friction in overcoming moral hazard in
market settings without information flows. It consists of four chapters. The first chapter
introduces the general topic. The second chapter studies optimal wage contracts for ...
Cached - All 3 versions

[PDF] Competitive Nonlinear Pricing and Contract Variety

[PDF] from ohio-state.edu
J Shen, H Yang… - 2011 - econ.ohio-state.edu
Abstract We analyze markets with both horizontally and vertically differentiated products
under both monopoly and duopoly. In the base model with two consumer types, we identify
conditions under which entry prompts an incumbent to expand or contract its low end of ...
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[CITATION] Efficiency Wages and Performance Pay: The Impacts of Turnover Costs on Relational Contracts

H Yang - 2007
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