M Dufwenberg… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2004 - Elsevier
Many experimental studies indicate that people are motivated by reciprocity. Rabin [Amer.
Econ. Rev. 83 (1993) 1281] develops techniques for incorporating such concerns into game
theory and economics. His theory is developed for normal form games, and he abstracts ...
G Charness, M Dufwenberg - Econometrica, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
We examine experimentally the impact of communication on trust and cooperation. Our
design admits observation of promises, lies, and beliefs. The evidence is consistent with
people striving to live up to others' expectations so as to avoid guilt, as can be modeled ...
M Dufwenberg… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2000 - Elsevier
We measure beliefs in an experimental game. Player 1 may take x< 20 Dutch guilders, or
leave it and let player 2 split 20 guilders between the players. We find that the higher is x
(our treatment variable), the more likely is player 1 to take the x. Out of those who leave ...
M Dufwenberg… - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2000 - Elsevier
The classical price competition model (named after Bertrand), prescribes that in equilibrium
prices are equal to marginal costs. Moreover, prices do not depend on the number of
competitors. Since this outcome is not in line with real-life observations, it is known as the ' ...
P Battigalli… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2009 - Elsevier
The motivation of decision makers who care for various emotions, intentions-based
reciprocity, or the opinions of others may depend directly on beliefs (about choices, beliefs,
or information). Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti [J. Geanakoplos, D. Pearce, E. ...
P Battigalli… - The American economic review, 2007 - JSTOR
" A clear conscience is a good pillow." Why does this old proverb contain an insight? The
emotion of guilt holds a key. Psychologists report that" the prototypical cause of guilt would
be the infliction of harm, loss, or distress on a relationship partner"(Roy Baumeister, ...
M Dufwenberg, T Lindqvist… - American Economic Review, 2005 - JSTOR
History contains many colorful examples where speculative trade in some commodity or
financial asset generated a phase of rapidly increasing prices, followed by a sudden
collapse (see, eg, Edward Chancellor, 1999, or Charles Kindleberger, 2001). One famous ...
M Dufwenberg - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2002 - Elsevier
A benchmark model of a married couple's educational investment yields an inefficient
outcome due to the possibility of opportunistic divorce. Motivated by findings in social
psychology, I use psychological game theory to incorporate belief-dependent guilt ...
M Dufwenberg… - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2006 - Elsevier
We examine experimentally how a person's generosity depends on the degree of anonymity
between giver and recipient, as well as on the parties' sexes. Less is given when the giver is
paid on stage rather than in private; men receive less than women; fewer men than ...
M Dufwenberg… - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2002 - Elsevier
We report experimental results on the importance of information disclosure policy in first-
price sealed-bid auctions. Interaction takes place in 10 periods according to a random-
matching protocol, and we control the level of information feedback bidders receive after ...
M Dufwenberg… - European Economic Review, 2000 - Elsevier
It is well documented that employers refuse to hire workers who offer their services at less
than the prevailing wage. The received explanation is that workers are motivated by
reciprocity–they desire to reward kindness and punish hostility. To refuse an outsider's ...
M Dufwenberg, U Gneezy, W Güth, E Van Damme… - 2000 - radyschool.org
Abstract: In this paper we report experimental results that relate to the reciprocity experiment
of Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995). We consider direct reciprocity, which means to
respond in kind to another person, and indirect reciprocity, understood as rewarding ...
J Apesteguia, M Dufwenberg… - Economic Theory, 2007 - Springer
Abstract Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each
other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote
competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and ...
M Dufwenberg,
S Gächter… - 2006 - econ.eller.arizona.edu
Abstract: Psychological game theory can provide a rational choice explanation of framing
effects; frames influence beliefs, and beliefs influence motivations. We explain this point
theoretically, and explore its empirical relevance experimentally. In a 2× 2-factorial ...
M Dufwenberg… - The Economic Journal, 2001 - Wiley Online Library
We examine the impact of social rewards in an unemployment insurance context. A social
norm requires effort in proportion to perceived talent, but individuals cunningly choose effort
so as to manipulate the perception of their talent. The model predicts that low talented ...
GB Asheim… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2003 - Elsevier
The concept of 'fully permissible sets' is defined by an algorithm that eliminates strategy
subsets. It is characterized as choice sets when there is common certain belief of the event
that each player prefer one strategy to another if and only if the former weakly dominates ...
M Dufwenberg… - Research Papers in Economics, 2002 - Citeseer
Abstract: We examine experimentally how a person's generosity depends on the sex of that
person, on the sex of the person who is the target of the generous act, and on the degree of
anonymity between the interacting parties. In our data fewer men than women give non- ...
M Dufwenberg, W Güth - European Journal of Political Economy, 1999 - Elsevier
Two major methods of explaining economic institutions are compared for the case of a
homogenous quadratic duopoly market. In the indirect evolutionary approach, sellers may
evolve to care for sales, in addition to profit. In the strategic delegation approach, sellers ...
M Dufwenberg… - Econometrica, 2002 - Wiley Online Library
Iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies is an order dependent procedure. It can
also generate spurious Nash equilibria, fail to converge in countable steps, or converge to
empty strategy sets. If best replies are well–defined, then spurious Nash equilibria cannot ...
M Dufwenberg, U Gneezy,
JK Goeree… - Economic Theory, 2007 - Springer
Abstract A potential source of instability of many economic models is that agents have little
incentive to stick with the equilibrium. We show experimentally that this can matter with price
competition. The control variable is a price floor, which increases the cost of deviating from ...
M Dufwenberg… - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2006 - Elsevier
How does gender composition influence team decisions? Our evidence from a group
dictator game is:(i) groups are more generous and equalitarian when women are in majority,
but (ii) the most generous groups are those with two men and one woman.
G Charness, M Dufwenberg - Economics Letters, 2010 - Elsevier
Previous research has demonstrated that people have some degree of aversion to lying. 1 An
important research topic is concerned with why this is the case. Charness and Dufwenberg
(2006) (henceforth, “CD”) suggest that this happens because decision-makers dislike ...
M Dufwenberg, P Heidhues… - The Review of …, 2011 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We study competitive market outcomes in economies where agents have other-
regarding preferences (ORPs). We identify a separability condition on monotone
preferences that is necessary and sufficient for one's own demand to be independent of ...
M Dufwenberg, R Sundaram… - Journal of …, 2010 - researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au
Does performance in strategic settings depend on whether players realize that an optimal
way to play is feasible? We introduce a zero-sum game of perfect information, simple
enough to allow computation of optimal play yet sufficiently complicated that most ...
G Charness, M Dufwenberg - UC Santa Barbara and University of …, 2005 - mail.eaer.org
Uri Gneezy (2005) reports intriguing experimental evidence indicating that people do not
like to lie. His subjects deceive only if they thereby gain a lot, or impose little loss. At first
glance one might think a simple cost of lying is involved. However, as a general ...
M Dufwenberg, H Koskenkylä… - The Scandinavian Journal of …, 1994 - JSTOR
The accumulation of fixed productive capital in the manufacturing industries of Denmark,
Finland, Norway, and Sweden is analyzed for the period 1965-90. Particular attention is
given to the effect of taxes on this process. The following conclusions appear fairly robust ...
GB Asheim… - The Economic Journal, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
We justify the application to extensive games of a model of deductive reasoning based on
three key features:'caution','full belief of opponent rationality', and 'no extraneous restrictions
on beliefs'. We apply the model to several examples, and show that it yields novel ...
G Charness, M Dufwenberg - The American Economic …, 2011 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: We show experimentally that whether and how communication achieves beneficial
social outcomes in a hidden-information context depends crucially on whether low-talent
agents can participate in a Pareto-improving outcome. Communication is effective (and ...
M Dufwenberg,
S Gachter… - Games and Economic …, 2011 - Elsevier
Psychological game theory can provide rational-choice-based framing effects; frames
influence beliefs, beliefs influence motivations. We explain this theoretically and explore
empirical relevance experimentally. In a 2× 2 design of one-shot public good games we ...
M Dufwenberg, U Gneezy… - 1996 - arno.uvt.nl
ABSTRACT: We experimentally investigate the nature of strategic interaction in a 2-player
game. Player 1 may take x Dutch guilders (fx) and end the game (player 2 then gets f 0), or
let player 2 split f 20 between the players. x is a treatment variable taking values of f 4, 7, ...
M Dufwenberg… - Experimental business research, 2005 - Springer
Groups of six females or six males play the minimal effort coordination game for ten periods.
Small differences in coordination are found in the initial stages but not in the final stages.
Besides reporting this result, we raise a methodological issue: Is there a bias in the ...
M Dufwenberg, T Lindqvist, E Moore… - 2003 - udesa.edu.ar
Abstract: We investigate experimentally how the share of experienced traders in
doubleauction asset markets affects trading, in particular the occurrence of bubble-crash
pricing patterns. In each session, six subjects trade in three successive market rounds and ...
[CITATION] Schmidt (2006): The Framing of Games and the Psychology of Strategic Choice
M Dufwenberg, S Gachter… - CeDEx Discussion Paper
M Dufwenberg,
GW Harrison - Experimental Economics, 2008 - Springer
Peter Bohm (1935–2005) was the father of modern field experiments. He clearly understood
and stated the differences between laboratory experiments and experiments with field
counterparts. His research was a clear precursor to the methodology that is now becoming ...
M Dufwenberg, W Güth - Economics Letters, 2000 - Elsevier
Spite involves harming others without good reasons. It may survive in small populations or
on markets with strategic substitutes. We consider situations where selfishness helps
efficiency. Here spite endangers efficiency, but is wiped out by evolutionary forces.
M Dufwenberg, A Smith… - Economic Inquiry, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
When contracts are incomplete or unenforceable, inefficient levels of investment may occur
because of hold-up. If individuals care for negative reciprocity, these problems may be
reduced, as revenge becomes a credible threat. However, negative reciprocity has this ...
[CITATION] Promises, Promises
G Charness, M Dufwenberg - 2003 - IUI Stockholm Working Paper
M Dufwenberg - The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2008 - econ.eller.arizona.edu
Abstract: Traditional game-theoretic models assume that utilities depend only on actions.
This is not sufficient for describing the motivations and choices of decision makers who care
about reciprocity, emotions, or social rewards. Psychological games allow utilities to ...
M Dufwenberg… - Erkenntnis, 1996 - Springer
In certain finite extensive games with perfect information, Cristina Bicchieri (1989) derives a
logical contradiction from the assumptions that players are rational and that they have
common knowledge of the theory of the game. She argues that this may account for play ...
[CITATION] Evolutionary selection dynamics and irrational survivors
J Björnerstedt, P Norman, JW Weibull… - 1994 - Stockholm University
[CITATION] Time-consistent Wedlock with endogenous trust
M Dufwenberg - On Rationality and Belief Formation in Games, Doctoral …, 1995
[CITATION] Discrimination by gender and political correctness
M Dufwenberg… - Unpublished manuscript, 2000
M Dufwenberg, W Güth - 2004 - econ.eller.arizona.edu
Abstract Two traditional assumptions in neo-classical economics have been material self-
interest and (commonly known) decision rationality. Since there is ample contradictory
empirical evidence, many recent attempts have been made to remodel the situation so ...
LJ Chang, A Smith, M Dufwenberg… - Neuron, 2011 - Elsevier
Summary Why do people often choose to cooperate when they can better serve their
interests by acting selfishly? One potential mechanism is that the anticipation of guilt can
motivate cooperative behavior. We utilize a formal model of this process in conjunction ...
M Dufwenberg, U Gneezy… - 1998 - qvar.nek.uu.se
Abstract: The classical price competition model (named after Bertrand), prescribes that in
equilibrium prices are equal to marginal costs. Moreover, prices do not depend on the
number of competitors. Since this outcome is not in line with real-life observations, it is ...
M Dufwenberg, U Gneezy… - … in Understanding Strategic …, 2004 - econ.arizona.edu
Abstract: Previous research has indicated that men and women cope differently with
competition. We test for related effects in the context of a simple price competition game,
controlling for the gender of the competitors and also for the amount of instruction in ...
[CITATION] Hidden information, participation, and communication
G Charness, M Dufwenberg - Unpublished Paper (University of California, Santa …, 2009
M Dufwenberg, G Kirchsteiger… - 1999 - Citeseer
Abstract: It is well-documented that employers refuse to hire workers who offer their services
at less than the prevailing wage. The received explanation is that workers are motivated by
reciprocity they desire to reward kindness and punish hostility. To refuse an outsider's ...
[CITATION] Tie-break rationality and tie-break rationalizability
M Dufwenberg… - 1994 - Department of Economics, Uppsala …
[CITATION] Heike Hennig-Schmidt. 2008
M Dufwenberg… - The Framing of Games and the Psychology of Play.” …, 2008
M Dufwenberg… - 2004 - Citeseer
Abstract: How does a group's gender composition influence its decisions? Economists have
found women to be more generous and egalitarian than men, so one might expect groups
with more women to be more generous/egalitarian. Group polarization, whereby ...
[CITATION] iA Theory of Sequential Reci $ procity, jGames and Economic Behavior, 47
M DuFwenberg… - $298, 2004
M Dufwenberg - The Journal of Economic Education, 2001 - Taylor & Francis
Abstract The author presents a simple technique for teaching the Cournot model to first-year
students. The approach involves demonstrating to the students that out of all rectangles with
a common perimeter, the square has the greatest area. No use is made of derivatives. The ...
M Dufwenberg - Ms, Tilburg University, 1996 - uu.diva-portal.org
ABSTRACT: A simple model of marriage and divorce predicts that no marriages occur. Yet,
in real life, people marry all the time in seemingly similar situations. This discordance is
explained using psychological game theory. An emotional guilt effect is explicitly modeled ...
D Martin - 1999 - ukpmc.ac.uk
: The two major methods of explaining economic institutions, namely by strategic choices or
by (indirect) evolution, are compared for the case of a homogenous quadratic duopoly
market. Sellers either can provide incentives for their agents to care for sales (amounts) or ...
[CITATION] A Theory of Sequential Rationality
M Dufwenberg… - Center for Economic Research, 1998
[CITATION] The role of other-regarding preferences in competitive markets
P Heidhues, G Kirchsteiger, M Dufwenberg… - 2007 - Technical report, University of …
[CITATION] Dynamic psychological games. September 21 2005
P Battigalli… - University of Arizona Working Paper
[CITATION] VGuilt in Games
P Batigalli, M Dufwenberg - V AEA Papers and Proceedings, 2007
M Dufwenberg - Journal of Economic Psychology, 2007 - econ.arizona.edu
Most of economics uses sophisticated analytical methods, but relies on relatively simplistic
assumptions about human nature. Research in neighboring social sciences, by contrast,
generally uses less mathematics while entertaining a richer description of man. ...
[CITATION] forthcoming,“Promises and Partnerships,”
G Charness, M Dufwenberg - Econometrica
[CITATION] Joel Sobel.(2008)" Other-regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium."
M Dufwenberg, P Heidhues, G Kirchsteiger… - CEPR Discussion Paper Series, …
M Dufwenberg, M Stegeman… - 1999 - Citeseer
Abstract: Iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies is an order dependent
procedure. It need not converge in countable steps and may generate spurious Nash
equilibria. If strategy spaces are compact and payoff functions continuous, then order does ...
M Dufwenberg - 1995 - getcited.org
An academic directory and search engine.
M Dufwenberg… - Experimental Economics Center …, 2009 - econ.arizona.edu
Abstract: Does playing a game in class improve students' ability to analyze the game using
game theory? We report results from an experimental design which allows us to test a series
of related hypotheses. We fail to find support for the conjectured learning-enhancing ...
[CITATION] VBroken Promises: An Exper (imentV UC Santa Barbara: Department of Economics, UCSB
G Charness, M Dufwenberg
M Dufwenberg - Economics Letters, 1997 - Elsevier
I study the relations between three old and two new criteria of evolutionary stability in
games: evolutionary stability (Maynard-Smith and Price, 1973), neutral stability
(Maynard-Smith, 1982), robustness against equilibrium entrants (Swinkels, 1992), ...
M Dufwenberg, U Gneezy… - 2000 - socionet.ru
Abstract: A government that regularly procures the services of construction companies wants
to minimize its costs. The instrument it can use is the level of information feedback given to
the firms in the market. Theoretically, the competition between firms is supposed to drive ...
R Blundell, A Abadie, D Acemoglu… - …, 2005 - Wiley Online Library
THE 2006 NORTH AMERICAN SUMMER MEETING of the Econometric Society will be
hosted by the Economics Department of the University of Minnesota and will be held at the
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, from June 22 to June 25, 2006. The program ...
M Dufwenberg, W Güth… - 1997 - nek.uu.se
Abstract: Two major methods of explaining economic institutions, namely by strategic
choices or through (indirect) evolution, are compared for the case of a homogenous
quadratic duopoly market. Sellers either can provide incentives for agents to care for sales ...
M Dufwenberg - 2010 - Citeseer
Abstract: Game theory is a toolkit for examining situations where decision makers influence
each other. I discuss the nature of game-theoretic analysis, the history of game theory, why
game theory is useful for understanding human psychology, and why game theory has ...
G Kirchsteiger… - 2007 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: There is widespread conjecture that distributional concerns like fairness and
altruism, found to shape people's behavior in small group situations, have no impact on
trading in markets with many participants. We explore the issue analytically by considering ...
S Allgood, F Alvarez-Cuadrado, K Anderson… - Heldref Publications
The editor and associate editors are grateful for the help of the following referees from October
11, 2007, to October 10, 2008: ... Sam Allgood University of Nebraska, Lincoln Francisco
Alvarez-Cuadrado McGill University Kim Anderson Oklahoma State University Carlos ...
G Kirchsteiger… - 2007 - ecore.be
Abstract There is widespread conjecture that distributional concerns like fairness and
altruism, found to shape people's behavior in small group situations, have no impact on
trading in markets with many participants. We explore the issue analytically by considering ...
D Martin, K Georg - ukpmc.ac.uk
Many experimental studies indicate that people are motivated by reciprocity. Rabin (1993)
develops techniques for incorporating such concerns into game theory and economics. His
theory isdeveloped for normal form games, and he abstracts from information about the ...
M Obstfeld, AM Taylor, S Ghosal, M Miller… - The Economic …, 2003 - res.org.uk
What determines sovereign risk? We study the London bond market from the 1870s to the
1930s. Our findings support conventional wisdom concerning the low credibility of the
interwar gold standard. Before 1914 gold standard adherence effectively signalled ...
M Dufwenberg - Proceedings of the Behavioral and Quantitative Game …, 2010 - dl.acm.org
Abstract Belief-dependent motivation is important for understanding economic outcomes
regarding eg anxiety & health, status & conformity, vengeance & wage rigidity, and guilt &
contracts. The intellectual/mathematical home for describing belief-dependent motivation ...
M Dufwenberg - Citeseer
Abstract: The author presents a simple technique for teaching the Cournot model to first-year
students. The approach involves demonstrating to the students that out of all rectangles with
a common perimeter, the square has the greatest area. No use is made of derivatives. The ...
M Dufwenberg, P Heidhues, G Kirchsteiger… - 2008 - cepr.org
We study competitive market outcomes in economies where agents have other-regarding
preferences. We identify a separability condition on monotone preferences that is necessary
and sufficient for one's own demand to be independent of the allocations and ...
[CITATION] Why do you hate me?
M Dufwenberg, W Güth - Economics Letters, 2004 - Elsevier Science
G Kirchsteiger… - ULB Institutional Repository, 2000 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks.
Reciprocity and wage undercutting. Georg Kirchsteiger () and Martin Dufwenberg. ...
M Dufwenberg… - 2010 - u.arizona.edu
Abstract: Does playing a game in class improve students' ability to analyze the game using
game theory? We report results from an experimental design which allows us to test a series
of related hypotheses. We fail to find support for the conjectured learning-enhancing ...
GB Asheim… - The Economic Journal, 2003 - res.org.uk
We justify the application to extensive games of a model of deductive reasoning based on
three key features:'caution','full belief of opponent rationality', and 'no extraneous restrictions
on beliefs'. We apply the model to several examples, and show that it yields novel ...
P Battigalli… - 2007 - u.arizona.edu
Abstract This manuscript collects proofs and other material omitted from Dy# namic
Psychological Games, mimeo, November 2007 (DPG). To make it more self% contained, key
definitions and results of the main paper are in% cluded. For the convenience of readers ...
MDHKJ Södersten - 1994 - suomenpankki.fi
Abstract This paper analyzes the accumulation of fixed productive capitai in the
manufacturing industries in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden over the years 1965-
1990. Particular attention is given to the effect of taxes on this process. The following ...
I Informationdiscmatio, E An, D Martin… - ukpmc.ac.uk
We report experimental results on theimportancofinformationdiscmatio policyinfirst-pric
sealed-bidauced-biInteracd--A takesplac in 10 periodsaciods--fi toarandom-matc;--c protoc-
mand wec--AW-; the level ofinformationfeedbac biddersreceveaftereacperiod. When ...
P Battigalli… - 2009 - didattica.unibocconi.it
Abstract Belief&dependent preferences allow to represent the impact of feelings and con&
cerns about the feelings and opinions of others on decision making and strategic behavior.
In Dynamic Psychological Games (JET, 2009, henceforth DPG), we put forward and ...
J Swarthout… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Does playing a game in class improve students' ability to analyze the game using
game theory? We report results from an experimental design which allows us to test a series
of related hypotheses. We fail to find support for the conjectured learning-enhancing ...
M Dufwenberg… - 2009 - econ.arizona.edu
One of us wrote a paper on the human propensity to deceive, reporting evidence that people
lie more when their gain goes up and less when the loss to the other increases. 1 It was
shown how a variety of models–call them the models in set A–can't account for the ...
M Dufwenberg - 2009 - bama.ua.edu
Abstract: Game theory is a toolkit for examining situations where decision makers influence
each other. I discuss the nature of game-theoretic analysis, the history of game theory, why
game theory is useful for understanding human psychology, and why game theory has ...
M Dufwenberg, R Sundaram… - Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 2010 - Elsevier
Does performance in strategic settings depend on whether players realize that an optimal
way to play is feasible? We introduce a zero-sum game of perfect information, simple
enough to allow computation of optimal play yet sufficiently complicated that most ...
S Norms, M Hazard, M Dufwenberg… - The Economic Journal, 2001 - res.org.uk
We examine the impact of social rewards in an unemployment insurance context. A social
norm requires effort in proportion to perceived talent, but individuals cunningly choose effort
so as to manipulate the perception of their talent. The model predicts that low talented ...
[CITATION] Evolutionary Selection Dynamics and Irrational Survivors* Jonas Bjornerstedt1, Martin Dufwenberg2, Peter Norman3, and Jorgen W. Weibull4
J Bjornerstedt, M Dufwenberg… - … interaction: essays in …, 1997 - Springer Verlag
G Charness, M Dufwenberg - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
... Title: Prize good research! Authors: Gary Charness (UCSB) & Martin Dufwenberg (U of Arizona)
Abstract: We propose that rather than financing projects that have been proposed, the NSF
should award prizes for research that has already been done. ...
M Dufwenberg - Economics and Philosophy, 2001 - Cambridge Univ Press
We are always intrigued by investigations of past thought that examine controversies in
terms of their own cultural milieux and conceptual frameworks. It is equally enriching when
the researcher has the erudition to correlate the issues of the past with the evolution of ...
MD andMaroš Servátka - 2011 - cesifo-group.de
Abstract We develop, and experimentally test, a behavioral model of dealmaking which
includes binding contracts and informal agreements as distinct but related special cases.
The key behavioral assumptions are: people are mostly honest; they suffer costs of ...
M Dufwenberg, J Bjornerstedt, P Norman… - … Interaction: Essays in …, 1996 - narcis.nl
KNAW Narcis. Back to search results. Publication Evolutionary Selection Dynamics
and Irrational Survivors (1996). Pagina-navigatie: Main. Title, Evolutionary Selection
Dynamics and Irrational Survivors. Published in, Understanding ...
Create email alert
About Google Scholar - All About Google - My Citations
©2012 Google