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Envelope theorems for arbitrary choice sets

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P Milgrom… - Econometrica, 2002 - Wiley Online Library
2. Abstract The standard envelope theorems apply to choice sets with convex and
topological structure, providing sufficient conditions for the value function to be differentiable
in a parameter and characterizing its derivative. This paper studies optimization with ...
Cited by 417 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 40 versions

Complexity and renegotiation: A foundation for incomplete contracts

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I Segal - Review of Economic Studies, 1999 - Wiley Online Library
The paper considers a hold-up model where only one of n future trading opportunities will
prove to be efficient, and where ex post renegotiation of the ex ante contract cannot be
prevented. As the environment becomes more complex (n→∞), the outcome under any ...
Cited by 378 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 11 versions

Naked exclusion: comment

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IR Segal… - The American economic review, 2000 - JSTOR
... Segal: Department of Economics, Landau Building, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305
(e-mail: ilya.segal@stanford.edu); Whinston: Department of Eco- nomics, Northwestern University,
2003 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208 (e-mail: mwhinston@nwu.edu). ...
Cited by 263 - Related articles - All 13 versions

Contracting with externalities

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I Segal - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1999 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract The paper studies contracting between one principal and N agents in the presence
of multilateral externalities. When the principal commits to publicly observed bilateral
contracts, inefficiencies arise due to the externalities on agents' reservation utilities. In ...
Cited by 266 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 26 versions

Exclusive contracts and protection of investments

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IR Segal… - RAND Journal of Economics, 2000 - JSTOR
... debate. In many major US cities, the leading computerized ticketer, Ticketmaster, had
exclusive contracts with * Stanford University; iLya.segaL@ stanford.edu. **
Northwestern University and NBER: mwhinston@northwestern.edu. ...
Cited by 159 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - BL Direct - All 16 versions

The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices

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N Nisan… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2006 - Elsevier
We show that any communication finding a value-maximizing allocation in a private-
information economy must also discover supporting prices (in general personalized and
nonlinear). In particular, to allocate L indivisible items between two agents, a price must ...
Cited by 153 - Related articles - All 20 versions

Monopoly and soft budget constraint

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IR Segal - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1998 - JSTOR
Page 1. RAND Journal of Economics Vol. 29, No. 3, Autumn 1998 pp. 596-609 Monopoly and
soft budget constraint Ilya R. Segal* A benevolent government may decide to subsidize an
unprofitable monopoly whose profits do not capture all the social surplus from its production. ...
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Robust predictions for bilateral contracting with externalities

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I Segal… - Econometrica, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
The paper studies bilateral contracting between one principal and N agents when each
agent's utility depends on the principal's unobservable contracts with other agents. We show
that allowing deviations to menu contracts from which the principal chooses bounds ...
Cited by 106 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 14 versions

The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold‐up and Risk Sharing)

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I Segal… - Econometrica, 2002 - Wiley Online Library
The paper studies the implementation problem, first analyzed by Maskin and Moore (1999),
in which two agents observe an unverifiable state of nature and may renegotiate inefficient
outcomes following play of the mechanism. We develop a first-order approach to ...
Cited by 97 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 18 versions

Antitrust in innovative industries

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I Segal… - 2005 - nber.org
We study the effects of antitrust policy in industries with continual innovation. A more
protective antitrust policy may have conflicting effects on innovation incentives, raising the
profits of new entrants, but lowering those of continuing incumbents. We show that the ...
Cited by 81 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 36 versions

Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: Divide and conquer?

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I Segal - Journal of Economic Theory, 2003 - Elsevier
The paper studies bilateral contracting between N agents and one principal, whose trade
with each agent generates externalities on other agents. It examines the effects of
prohibiting the principal from (i) coordinating agents on her preferred equilibrium, and (ii) ...
Cited by 77 - Related articles - All 16 versions

Optimal pricing mechanisms with unknown demand

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I Segal - The American economic review, 2003 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: The standard profit-maximizing multiunit auction intersects the submitted demand
curve with a preset reservation supply curve, which is determined using the distribution from
which the buyers' valuations are drawn. However, when this distribution is unknown, a ...
Cited by 75 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 27 versions

Collusion, Exclusion, and Inclusion in Random‐Order Bargaining

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I Segal - Review of Economic Studies, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
This paper examines the profitability of three types of integration in a cooperative game
solved by a random-order value (eg the Shapley value). Collusion between players i and j is
a contract merging their resources in the hands of one of them, say i. This contract can be ...
Cited by 64 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 18 versions

Dynamic mechanism design: Revenue equivalence, profit maximization and information disclosure

A Pavan, I Segal… - 2008 - Citeseer
Abstract This paper examines the problem of how to design incentive-compatible
mechanisms in environments in which the agents' private information evolves stochastically
over time and in which decisions have to be made in each period. The environments we ...
Cited by 34 - Cached

Dynamic mechanism design: Incentive compatibility, profit maximization and information disclosure

A Pavan, I Segal… - 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We examine the design of incentive-compatible screening mechanisms for
dynamic environments in which the agents' types follow a (possibly non-Markov) stochastic
process, decisions may be made over time and may affect the type process, and payoffs ...
Cited by 37 - Related articles - All 9 versions

The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets

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I Segal - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
The paper examines the communication requirements of social choice rules when the
(sincere) agents privately know their preferences. It shows that for a large class of choice
rules, any minimally informative way to verify that a given alternative is in the choice rule is ...
Cited by 32 - Related articles - All 21 versions

What makes them click: Empirical analysis of consumer demand for search advertising

[PDF] from psu.edu
P Jeziorski, I Segal - SSRN eLibrary, 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We study users' response to sponsored-search advertising using data from
Microsoft's Live AdCenter distributed in the" Beyond Search" initiative. We estimate a
structural model of utility maximizing users, which quantifies" user experience" based on ...
Cited by 22 - Related articles - All 23 versions

The communication cost of selfishness

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R Fadel… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2009 - Elsevier
We consider how many bits need to be exchanged to implement a given decision rule when
the mechanism must be ex post or Bayesian incentive compatible. For ex post incentive
compatibility, the communication protocol must reveal enough information to calculate ...
Cited by 21 - Related articles - Library Search - All 25 versions

[PDF] Optimal information disclosure

[PDF] from nber.org
L Rayo… - Work, 2009 - nber.org
Abstract A kSenderl (internet advertising platform, seller, rating agency, or school) has a
probabil $ ity distribution over kprospectsl (internet ads, products, bonds, or students). Each
prospect is characterized by its profitability to the Sender and its relevance to a kReceiverl ...
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[BOOK] Naked exclusion and buyer coordination

IR Segal, MD Whinston… - 1996 - en.scientificcommons.org
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[CITATION] Essays on commitment, renegotiation, and incompleteness of contracts

IR Segal - 1995 - en.scientificcommons.org
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Public vs. private enforcement of antitrust law: A survey

I Segal… - Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working …, 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: There are two basic approaches to deterring socially harmful behavior: with the
threat of litigation by private parties or with enforcement by public agencies. Both
approaches are used in most countries, but in varying degrees. Private litigation is ...
Cited by 17 - Related articles - BL Direct

[CITATION] The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices, 2006

N Nisan… - the Journal of Economic Theory
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Designing efficient mechanisms for dynamic bilateral trading games

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S Athey… - The American economic review, 2007 - JSTOR
This paper studies the problem of allocating a good between two players in each period of
an infinite-horizon game. The players' valuations in each period are private information, and
the valuations change over time. We analyze two special cases for the dynamics of ...
Cited by 12 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 20 versions

A simple status quo that ensures participation (with application to efficient bargaining)

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I Segal… - Theoretical Economics, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
We consider Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanisms with independent types and either
private values or interdependent values that satisfy a form of “congruence.” We show that in
these settings, interim participation constraints are satisfied when the status quo is the ...
Cited by 11 - Related articles - All 26 versions

Communication in economic mechanisms

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
I Segal - ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY MONOGRAPHS, 2006 - books.google.com
This chapter considers the problem of finding allocations that satisfy certain social goals
when economic agents have private information regarding their preferences. This problem
has been discussed since at least the early 20thcentury debate on alternative economic ...
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[CITATION] Modeling the managerial task

IR Segal - 1996 - mimeo
Cited by 9 - Related articles

[CITATION] Exclusive Dealing and Protection of Investments

I Segal… - draft, Department of Economics, University of California …, 1997
Cited by 9 - Related articles

The communication cost of selfishness: ex post implementation

[PDF] from stanford.edu
R Fadel… - Proceedings of the 10th conference on Theoretical …, 2005 - dl.acm.org
Abstract We consider the communication complexity of implementing a given decision rule
when the protocol must also calculate payments to motivate the agents to be honest in an ex
post equilibrium (agents' payoffs are assumed to be quasi-linear in such payments). We ...
Cited by 8 - Related articles - All 6 versions

[CITATION] Naked Exclusion

Full text - MIT Libraries
IR Segal, MD Whinston - American …, 2000 - AMERICAN ECONOMIC …
Cited by 7 - Related articles - BL Direct

[CITATION] VThe Mirrless Approach to Mechanism Design With Renegotiation

I Segal… - V Econometrica, 2002
Cited by 7 - Related articles

[PDF] Property Rights

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
I Segal… - 2008 - faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu
Every organization, whether a firm, a nonprofit organization, or a society, must confront two
basic problems. The first is the creation of incentives for efficient behavior among its
members. The second is the efficient allocation among those members of the resources ...
Cited by 6 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 24 versions

[CITATION] Incomplete Contracts in Investment Models∗

D García, R Brusco, B Hermalin, H Lel… - 2001 - Citeseer
... Download as a PDF. Download Links. [diego-garcia.dartmouth.edu]. Save to List; Add to Collection;
Correct Errors; Monitor Changes. by Diego García , Ro Brusco , Ben Hermalin , Hayne Lel , Stefan
Reichelstein , Rafael Repullo , Mark Rubinstein , Ilya Segal , Matthew Spiegel. ...
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[CITATION] Exclusive dealing and specific investments

I Segal… - Harvard University and University of California, …, 1997
Cited by 5 - Related articles

[CITATION] RComplexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Con tracts,"

I Segal - 1995 - Harvard University, mimeo
Cited by 4 - Related articles

[PDF] An Expected-Efficient Status Quo Allows Efficient Bargaining

[PDF] from psu.edu
I Segal… - Theoretical Economics, forthcoming, 2009 - Citeseer
Abstract In a general model of asymmetric" information bargaining with in" dependent
private values and quasilinear utilities, effi cient bargaining is possible when the status" quo
allocation (the distribution of prop" erty rights) is the expected effi cient allocation. The only ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 36 versions

[CITATION] VProperty Rights, V prepared for Handbook of Organizational Economics (Gibbons and Roberts, Eds)

I Segal… - 2010 - Elsevier
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[CITATION] Renegotiation in Agency Contracts: The Value of Information,"

I Segal… - 1995 - mimeo, Harvard University
Cited by 4 - Related articles

[CITATION] nDynamic Mechanism Design: Incentive Com& patibility, Profit Maximization and Information Disclosureo

A Pavan, I Segal… - 2011 - mimeo Northwestern University and …
Cited by 3 - Related articles

[CITATION] What Makes Them Click: Empirical Analysis of Consumer Demand for Internet Search Advertising

I Segal… - Estimate a structural model of consumer demand for …, 2009
Cited by 3 - Related articles

[CITATION] Naked exclusive contracts and buyer coordination

IВ Segal… - Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion …, 1780
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[CITATION] Designing Dynamic Mechanisms

Full text - MIT Libraries
S Athey… - American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 2007
Cited by 2

[CITATION] Lectures on Contract Theory

I Segal… - 2002 - Stanford University
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[CITATION] A Unified View of Agency and Trade Under Renegotiation

AS Edlin, BE Hermalin, I Segal… - 1997 - Mimeo
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[CITATION] Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON

I Segal - STUD, 1999
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[CITATION] A Theory of Incomplete Contracting Based On Out of Contract Renegotiations

I Segal - 1994 - working paper, Harvard University
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[CITATION] iAn Effi cient Dynamic Mechanism, j unpublished manuscript

S Athey… - 2006 - Stanford University, January
Cited by 2 - Related articles

Nash implementation with little communication

[PDF] from utoronto.ca
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IR Segal - Theoretical Economics, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
... Ilya R. Segal: ilya.segal@stanford.edu I am grateful to Steven Williams, Jeffrey Ely (the co-editor),
two anonymous referees, and participants of the 2007 NBER Conference on General Equilibrium
for their comments, and to Kester Tong for excellent research assistance. ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - All 19 versions

[PDF] Revenue equivalence, profit maximization, and transparency in dynamic mechanisms

[PDF] from yale.edu
I Segal… - 2007 - aida.econ.yale.edu
Abstract We consider the problem of designing incentive# compatible mechanisms in a
general dynamic environment in which agents receive serially correlated private in#
formation over time and decisions may be made over time. The private information is ...
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[PDF] Information Revelation in Economic Mechanisms

[PDF] from caltech.edu
I Segal - sisl.caltech.edu
This survey considers the problem of finding allocations that satisfy certain social goals
when economic agents have private information regarding their preferences. This problem
has been discussed as early as in the early 20th century debate on alternative economic ...
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[CITATION] Multi-Player and Multi-Round Auctions W ith Severely

L Blumrosen, N Nisan
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[PDF] Competitive Effects of Staggered Contracts

[PDF] from idei.fr
I Segal… - 2006 - idei.fr
A Florida# based startup ErinMedia that provides TV ratings using data cap# tured from the
viewershdigital cable boxes filed suit in the US District Court in Tampa against the
established market leader Nielsen Media Re# search, which develops ratings by ...
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[CITATION] The Communication Requirements of E¢ cient Allocations and Supporting Lindahl Prices¤

N Nisan… - 2003
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[PDF] Dynamic Mechanism Design: Revenue Equivalence, Profit Maximization and Information Disclosure Preliminary and incomplete.

[PDF] from yale.edu
A Pavan, I Segal… - 2008 - cowles.econ.yale.edu
Abstract This paper examines the problem of how to design incentive $ compatible
mechanisms in environments in which the agentshprivate information evolves stochastically
over time and in which decisions have to be made in each period. The environments we ...
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Property Rights

[PDF] from onion.to
M Whinston… - 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This is a survey of some theories of property rights, prepared for the Handbook of
Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press, edited by R. Gibbons and J. Roberts.
A central feature of property rights is that they influence economic efficiency not (only) ...
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