My Citations
Scholar Home
  Advanced Scholar Search



Scholar      Create email alertResults 1 - 93 of 93. (0.30 sec) 

Bad politicians

[PDF] from columbia.edu
F Caselli… - 2001 - nber.org
We present a simple theory of the quality (competence and honesty) of elected officials. Our
theory offers four main insights. Low-quality citizens have a'comparative advantage'in
pursuing elective office, because their market wages are lower than those of high-quality ...
Cited by 218 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 47 versions

Demand competition and policy compromise in legislative bargaining

[PDF] from columbiauniversity.net
M Morelli - American Political Science Review, 1999 - JSTOR
I propose a new majoritarian bargaining model in which more than one implicit proposal can
be on the table at the same time. Institutional differences from system to system affect the
order of play, the equilibrium majorities, and the policy outcome. The ex post distribution of ...
Cited by 131 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 13 versions

Party formation and policy outcomes under different electoral systems

[PDF] from columbia.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
M Morelli - Review of Economic Studies, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
I introduce a model of representative democracy with strategic parties, strategic candidates,
strategic voters and multiple districts. If policy preferences are similar across districts and not
too concentrated within districts, then the number of effective parties is larger under ...
Cited by 126 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 42 versions

Self enforcing voting in international organizations

[PDF] from harvard.edu
G Maggi… - 2003 - nber.org
Some international organizations are governed by unanimity rule, some others by a majority
system. Still others have moved from one system to the other over time. The existing voting
models, which generally assume that decisions made by voting are perfectly enforceable, ...
Cited by 73 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 43 versions

Network formation with sequential demands

[PDF] from columbia.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
S Currarini… - Review of Economic Design, 2000 - Springer
Abstract. This paper introduces a non-cooperative game-theoretic model of sequential
network formation, in which players propose links and demand payoffs. Payoff division is
therefore endogenous. We show that if the value of networks satisfies size monotonicity, ...
Cited by 71 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 23 versions

Political bias and war

[PDF] from escholarship.org
MO Jackson… - The American Economic Review, 2007 - JSTOR
We examine how countries' incentives to go to war depend on the" political bias" of their
pivotal decision makers. This bias is measured by a decision maker's risk/reward ratio from a
war compared to that of the country at large. If there is no political bias, then there are ...
Cited by 73 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - BL Direct - All 33 versions

Occupational choice and dynamic incentives

[PDF] from lse.ac.uk
Full text - MIT Libraries
M Ghatak, M Morelli… - Review of Economic Studies, 2001 - Wiley Online Library
We study an overlapping generations version of the principal-agent problem, where
incentive contracts are determined in general equilibrium. All individuals are workers when
young, but have a choice between becoming entrepreneurs or remaining workers when ...
Cited by 69 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 18 versions

Gamson's Law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory

[PDF] from columbia.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
GR Fréchette, JH Kagel… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2005 - Elsevier
We compare Gamson's Law, a popular empirical model of legislative bargaining, with two
non-cooperative bargaining models in three players divide the dollar games in which no
player has enough votes to form a winning coalition on their own. Both of the game ...
Cited by 48 - Related articles - All 24 versions

Behavioral identification in coalitional bargaining: An experimental analysis of demand bargaining and alternating offers

[PDF] from columbia.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
G Frechette, JH Kagel… - Econometrica, 2005 - Wiley Online Library
Alternating-offer and demand bargaining models of legislative bargaining make very
different predictions in terms of both ex ante and ex post distribution of payoffs, as well as in
the role of the order of play. The experiment shows that actual bargaining behavior is not ...
Cited by 44 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 33 versions

Nominal bargaining power, selection protocol, and discounting in legislative bargaining

[PDF] from ohio-state.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
G Frechette, JH Kagel… - Journal of Public Economics, 2005 - Elsevier
The comparative static predictions of the Baron and Ferejohn [Baron, DP, and Ferejohn,
JA,(1989). Bargaining in legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (4), 1181–1206]
model better organize behavior in legislative bargaining experiments than Gamson's Law. ...
Cited by 37 - Related articles - All 11 versions

Strategic militarization, deterrence and wars

[PDF] from kermit-project.org
M Jackson… - 2008 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We study countries choosing armament levels and then whether or not to go to war.
We show that if the costs of war are not overly high or low, then all equilibria must involve"
dove,"" hawk," and" deterrent" strategies and the probability of war is positive (but less ...
Cited by 33 - Related articles - All 31 versions

Entrepreneurial talent, occupational choice, and trickle up policies

[PDF] from lse.ac.uk
Full text - MIT Libraries
M Ghatak, M Morelli… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
We study market inefficiencies and policy remedies when agents choose their occupations,
and entrepreneurial talent is subject to private information. Untalented entrepreneurs
depress the returns to entrepreneurship because of adverse selection. The severity of this ...
Cited by 30 - Related articles - All 33 versions

Incumbents' interests and gender quotas

[PDF] from harvard.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
GR Fréchette, F Maniquet… - American Journal of …, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
1. We are highly indebted to Joan Scott for inspiring us and for many discussions on the
parity movement in France. We are grateful to the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton
for giving us the opportunity to start this project. Comments by Matt Jackson, Dean Lacy, ...
Cited by 28 - Related articles - All 29 versions

The demand bargaining set: general characterization and application to majority games

Full text - MIT Libraries
M Morelli… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2003 - Elsevier
The cooperative solution concept introduced here, the demand bargaining set, contains the
core and is included in the Zhou bargaining set, eliminating the “dominated” coalition
structures. The demand vectors belonging to the demand bargaining set are self-stable. In ...
Cited by 19 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 4 versions

[BOOK] Credit rationing, wealth inequality, and allocation of talent

[PDF] from lse.ac.uk
M Ghatak, M Morelli, T Sjöström… - 2002 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We study an economy where agents are heterogeneous in terms of observable
wealth and unobservable talent. Adverse selection forces creditors to ask for collateral. We
study the two-way interaction between rationing in the credit market and the wages offered ...
Cited by 18 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 24 versions

Retrading in market games

[PDF] from warwick.ac.uk
Full text - MIT Libraries
S Ghosal, M Morelli - Journal of Economic Theory, 2004 - Elsevier
When agents are not price takers, they typically cannot obtain an efficient real location of
resources in one round of trade. This paper presents a non-cooperative model of imperfect
competition where agents can retrade allocations, consistent with Edgeworth's idea of ...
Cited by 17 - Related articles - All 26 versions

[BOOK] Strategic mass killings

[PDF] from csic.es
J Esteban, M Morelli, D Rohner… - 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Since World War II there have been about fifty episodes of large-scale mass killings
of civilians and massive forced displacements. They were usually meticulously planned and
independent of military goals. We provide a model where conflict onset, conflict intensity ...
Cited by 13 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 54 versions

3 The reasons for wars: an updated survey

[PDF] from kermit-project.org
MO Jackson… - … Handbook on the Political Economy of …, 2011 - books.google.com
Why do wars occur and recur, especially in cases when the decisions involved are made by
careful and rational actors? There are many answers to this question. Given the importance
of the question, and the wide range of answers, it is essential to have a perspective on the ...
Cited by 15 - Related articles - All 14 versions

Pork versus public goods: an experimental study of public good provision within a legislative bargaining framework

[PDF] from eui.eu
GR Fréchette, JH Kagel… - Economic Theory, 2009 - Springer
Abstract We experimentally investigate a legislative bargaining model with both public and
particularistic goods. Consistent with the qualitative implications of the model: there is near
exclusive public good provision in the pure public good region, in the pure private good ...
Cited by 10 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 21 versions

Turnout and power sharing

[PDF] from eui.eu
H Herrera… - 2010 - cadmus.eui.eu
Differences in electoral rules and/or legislative, executive or legal institutions across
countries induce different mappings from election outcomes to distributions of power. We
explore how these different mappings affect voters' participation in a democracy. ...
Cited by 10 - Related articles - Library Search - All 49 versions

Incumbents' interests, voters' bias and gender quotas

[PDF] from 130.104.5.100
G Frechette, F Maniquet… - 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: The adoption of gender quotas in party lists has been a voluntary decision by many
parties in many countries, and is now a subject of discussion in many others. The Parity Low
passed in France in 2001 is particularly interesting because for the first time the quota was ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - All 21 versions

The Demand Bargaining Set...

[PDF] from columbia.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
M Morelli… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2003 - works.bepress.com
Abstract The cooperative solution concept introduced here, the demand bargaining set,
contains the core and is included in the Zhou bargaining set, eliminating the “dominated”
coalition structures. The demand vectors belonging to the demand bargaining set are self- ...
Cited by 7 - Related articles - All 21 versions

[BOOK] Economic integration as a partition function game

[PDF] from uchicago.edu
M Morelli, P Penelle… - 1997 - harrisschool.uchicago.edu
Abstract We analyze the problem of economic integration using a cooperative approach. By
explicitly introducing time as an endogenous variable, we make sharp predictions about the
timing of admission to coalitions, about the equilibrium coalition structure, about the ...
Cited by 7 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 9 versions

[PDF] Re-election through division

[PDF] from csic.es
M Morelli… - 2011 - iae.csic.es
Abstract. We provide a positive analysis of effort allocation by a politician facing reelection
when voters are uncertain about the politician's preferences on a divisive issue. We then use
this framework to derive normative conclusions on the desirability of transparency, term ...
Cited by 6 - Related articles - View as HTML - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 9 versions

Dynamic Incentives, Occupational Choice, and the American Dream

M Ghatak, M Morelli… - Papers, 2000 - ideas.repec.org
This paper introduces an overlapping generations model of the principal-agent problem. all
individuals are workers when young, but have a choice between becoming entrepreneurs or
remaining workers when old. Bargaining power and incentive contracts in the principle- ...
Cited by 6 - Related articles - Cached - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 4 versions

[PDF] War, transfers, and political bias

[PDF] from georgetown.edu
MO Jackson… - California Institute of Technology mimeo, 2005 - georgetown.edu
Abstract We examine the incentives for countries to go to war as they depend on the
comparison of how much their pivotal decision-makers have at risk compared to how much
they stand to gain from a war. How this ratio compares to the country at large is what we ...
Cited by 6 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 7 versions

Competitive nonlinear taxation and constitutional choice

[PDF] from eui.eu
Full text - MIT Libraries
M Morelli, H Yang… - American Economic Journal: …, 2012 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: In an economy where agents have different productivities and mobility, we
compare a unified nonlinear optimal taxation with the equilibrium taxation that would be
chosen by two competing tax authorities if the same economy were divided into two states. ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - Library Search - All 57 versions

[BOOK] Provision Point Mechanisms and Over Provision of Public Goods

[PDF] from iastate.edu
M Morelli, L Vesterlund… - 2000 - econ.iastate.edu
Abstract Charities often let the sum of contributions determine the quantity of services to
provide. Some organizations, however, have the option of setting a minimum threshold
necessary for provision of the public good, allowing donors to pledge donations ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - View as HTML - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 14 versions

Natural Resource Distribution and the Multiple Forms of Civil War

[PDF] from eui.eu
M Morelli… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We examine how natural resource location, rent sharing and fighting capacities of
different groups matter for ethnic conflict. A new type of bargaining failure due to multiple
types of potential conflicts (and hence multiple threat points) is identified. The theory ...
Cited by 6 - Related articles - All 27 versions

[PDF] Ideology and Information in Policy Making

[PDF] from uchicago.edu
M Morelli… - 2011 - economics.uchicago.edu
Abstract We consider how the incentives for politicians to pander to public opinion depend
on preference heterogeneity and information. As there is greater opportunity for voters to
update their beliefs about the politician's type on a more divisive issue, politicians are ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 14 versions

Approval quorums dominate participation quorums

[PDF] from eui.eu
F Maniquet… - 2010 - cadmus.eui.eu
We study direct democracy with population uncertainty. Voters' participation is often among
the desiderata by the election designer. A participation quorum is a threshold on the fraction
of participating voters below which the status quo is kept. We show that participation ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - Library Search - All 14 versions

Mediation and Peace

[PDF] from eui.eu
J Horner, M Morelli… - Cowles Foundation Discussion …, 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper brings mechanism design to the study of conflict resolution in
international relations. We determine when and how unmediated communication and
mediation reduce the ex ante probability of conflict, in a simple game where conflict is due ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - All 44 versions

[CITATION] Moral hazard and overlapping generations with endogenous occupational choice

M Ghatak, M Morelli… - 1997 - ideas.repec.org
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding
the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a
registered author of this item, you may also want to check the" citations" tab in your profile, ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - Cached - Library Search - All 4 versions

[PDF] IncumbentsY Interests, VotersY Bias and Gender Quotas

[PDF] from gwdg.de
F Maniquet… - 2006 - webdoc.sub.gwdg.de
Abstract The adoption of gender quotas in party lists has been a voluntary decision by many
parties in many countries, and is now a subject of discussion in many others. The Parity Law
passed in France in 2001 is particularly interesting beM cause for the first time the quota ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 3 versions

[PDF] Endogenous affirmative action: Gender bias leads to gender quotas

[PDF] from ias.edu
F Maniquet, M Morelli… - Economics Working Papers, 2005 - sss.ias.edu
Abstract The adoption of gender quotas in electoral lists, like the recent “parity law” in
France, can be fully rationalized on the basis of the self interest of male incumbent
politicians. This paper explains why the parity law was approved in its form and, at the ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 27 versions

[CITATION] Provision point mechanisms and over provision of public goods

M Menietti, M Morelli… - 2009 - Working Paper, Department of …
Cited by 3 - Related articles

[CITATION] Dynamic Incentives, Occupational Mobility and the American Dream

G Maitreesh, M Morelli… - 1997 - mimeo, Department of Economics, …
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[BOOK] Stable demands and bargaining power in majority games

[PDF] from feem.it
M Morelli… - 1998 - feem.it
Abstract This paper provides a cooperative as well as a non-cooperative analysis of
weighted majority games. The cooperative solution concept introduced here, the Stable
Demand Set, yields a meaningful selection within the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set, it ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - View as HTML - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 2 versions

[CITATION] Policy Stability under Different Electoral Systems

M Morelli… - Working Papers, 2000 - econpapers.repec.org
By Massimo Morelli and Michele Tertilt; Policy Stability under Different Electoral Systems.
Cited by 2 - Related articles - Cached - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 4 versions

Demand commitment and legislative bargaining: a response

Full text - MIT Libraries
M Morelli - American Political Science Review, 2007 - Cambridge Univ Press
The main motivation for my 1999 paper was to provide a simple model of legislators'
strategic interaction when they derive utility from both private goods and common policy
decisions. The previous literature had focused either on the divide-the-dollar purely ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 2 versions

[CITATION] 0SelfMenforcing Voting in International Organizations1

G Maggi… - NBER working paper, 2003
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[CITATION] Pork Versus Public Goods: An Experimental Study of Public Good Provision Within a Legislative Bargaining Framework." mimeo

G Frechette, JH Kagel… - 2007
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[CITATION] Mediation and Peace. Cowles foundation

J Horner, M Morelli… - Unpublished manuscript, 2010
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[PDF] Participation versus approval quorums

[PDF] from accessecon.com
F Maniquet… - 2008 - accessecon.com
Abstract We study large elections with quorums, when there is population uncertainty. A
participation quorum is a threshold on the fraction of participating voters below which the
status quo is kept. We show that participation quorums produce incentive for partisans of ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 2 versions

[CITATION] VParty Formation and Policy Outcome Under Different Electoral RulesV

M Morelli - Review of Economic Studies, 2004
Cited by 2 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries

[CITATION] The Handbook on the Political Economy of War (forthcoming), chapter The Reasons for War: An Updated Survey

MO Jackson… - The Reasons for War: An Updated Survey, 2009
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[PDF] Caucuses and Primaries under Proportional Representation

[PDF] from expeconatcirano.qc.ca
D Epstein, M Morelli… - 2008 - expeconatcirano.qc.ca
Abstract We study a multi-district competition between two candidates when the winner is
determined by the majority of total delegates obtained in the various states. The assignment
of delegates in each state is proportional to the percentage of votes obtained by the two ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 16 versions

[CITATION] Credit Rationing

M Ghatak, M Morelli… - Wealth Inequality, and Allocation of Talent, 2002
Cited by 1 - Related articles

Can Market Failure Cause Political Failure?

[PDF] from smu.edu.sg
MS Aney, M Ghatak… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We study how inefficiencies of market failure may be further amplified by political
choices made by interest groups created in the inefficient market. We take an occupational
choice framework, where agents are endowed heterogeneously with wealth and talent. In ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - All 42 versions

Institutional design and conflict: an introduction

Full text - MIT Libraries
M Morelli - Review of Economic Design, 2009 - Springer
Among the prevalent objectives that we should set for our society, reduction of conflicts of all
kinds is probably one of the easiest to agree upon. Any social contract that establishes
peaceful ways to resolve disputes can Pareto-dominate, for some appropriate transfers or ...
All 10 versions

DP8533 Can Market Failure Cause Political Failure

M Aney, M Ghatak… - 2011 - cepr.org
We study how inefficiencies of market failure may be further amplified by political choices
made by interest groups created in the inefficient market. We take an occupational choice
framework, where agents are endowed heterogeneously with wealth and talent. In our ...
Cached - All 3 versions

DP2402 Bad Politicians

F Caselli… - 2000 - cepr.org
We present a simple theory of the quality of elected officials. Quality has (at least) two
dimensions: competence and honesty. Voters prefer competent and honest policymakers, so
high-quality citizens have a greater chance of being elected to office. But low-quality ...
Cached - All 3 versions

[PDF] Mediation and Strategic Militarization

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
A Meirowitz, M Morelli, KW Ramsay… - 2012 - kellogg.northwestern.edu
Abstract This paper challenges the received wisdom that mediation is a weak institution.
Much of this perspective is supported by variations of three arguments. First, mediators often
do not have access to privileged information, beyond what is relayed to them by ...
View as HTML

Signalling, Incumbency Advantage, and Optimal Reelection Thresholds

F Caselli, TE Cunningham, M Morelli… - 2012 - nber.org
Much literature on political behavior treats politicians as motivated by reelection, choosing
actions to signal their types to voters. We identify two novel implications of models in which
signalling incentives are important. First, because incumbents only care about clearing a ...
Related articles - All 6 versions

[PDF] 1. Mas-Colell A., Whinston MD, and Green JR, 1995, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford; 2. Reny P. and Jehle, Advanced Microeconomic Theory, Ad-disen Wesley.

[PDF] from eui.eu
M Morelli - eui.eu
• Course Objectives: This course introduces you to market failures such as asymmetric
information, externalities, public goods, and agency problems. Topics include: models of
asymmetric information in markets, including screening, signaling, and lemons; markets ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 2 versions

Fiscal Union Consensus Design under the Risk of Autarky

[PDF] from columbia.edu
J Luque, M Morelli… - 2011 - works.bepress.com
Abstract Inspired by the current debate over the future of the monetary union in Europe, this
paper provides a simple model for the determination of the conditions of survival of the
common good, which requires the creation of an effective fiscal union. Countries that ...
Related articles - All 20 versions

[CITATION] General Equilibrium Incentives and the American Dream

M Ghatak, M Morelli… - Harvard Institute of Economic …, 1997 - ideas.repec.org
No abstract is available for this item. ... To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three options: 1. Check below under "Related
research" whether another version of this item is available online. 2. Check on the ...
Cached - Library Search - BL Direct - All 4 versions

[CITATION] Comparing Gamson's Law with Demand Bargaining as a Model of Legislative Bargaining¤

JH Kagel, M Morelli - 2004
Related articles

Game-theoretic definitions of fairness and the contractualistic foundations of justice

Full text - MIT Libraries
M Morelli… - Research in Economics, 1997 - Elsevier
We discuss game-theoretic interpretations of Rawls's theory of justice with special reference
to the choice of the most appropriate solution concept. We show that Core-like solution
concepts, as the one proposed by Laden (1991, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 20, 189– ...
BL Direct - All 6 versions

[CITATION] Institutional Design and Conflict, Special Issue of Review of Economic Design, 2009, 13, 3

M MORELLI - 2009 - en.scientificcommons.org
Publikationsansicht. 55978753. Institutional Design and Conflict, Special Issue of Review
of Economic Design, 2009, 13, 3 (2009). MORELLI, Massimo. Details der Publikation.
Download, http://hdl.handle.net/1814/13754. Herausgeber, Springer. ...
Cached - All 2 versions

[CITATION] Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems Massimo Morelli

M Morelli - Rational Choice Politics: Social choice, equilibrium and …, 2009 - SAGE
Related articles

[PDF] Retrading and Constrained Optimality with Incomplete Markets

[PDF] from ohio-state.edu
S Ghosal, M Morelli - 2002 - econ.ohio-state.edu
Abstract When asset markets are incomplete, the competitive equilibrium allocations are
(generically) constrained suboptimal. In this paper, we study a decentralized mechanism to
effect a Pareto-improving reallocation of assets. In addition, we show a new positive result: ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 3 versions

[CITATION] Coalition formation and payoff distribution in majority games

M Morelli - 1997 - ideas.repec.org
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding
the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a
registered author of this item, you may also want to check the" citations" tab in your profile, ...
Cached - Library Search - All 4 versions

The Stable Demand Set General Characterization and Application to Majority Games

[PDF] from ohio-state.edu
M Morelli… - Ohio State University Working Paper No. …, 2001 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: The cooperative solution concept introduced here, the Stable Demand Set,
contains the Core and is included in the Zhou Bargaining Set, eliminating the" dominated"
coalition structures. The demand vectors belonging to the Stable Demand Set are self- ...
Related articles - All 7 versions

DP8552 Fiscal Union Consensus Design under the Risk of Autarky

J Luque, M Morelli… - 2011 - cepr.org
Inspired by the current debate over the future of the monetary union in Europe, this paper
provides a simple model for the determination of the conditions of survival of the common
good, which requires the creation of an effective fiscal union. We highlight the importance ...
Cached - All 2 versions

FISCAL UNION CONSENSUS DESIGN UNDER THE THREAT OF AUTARKY

J Luque, M Morelli… - Centre for Economic Policy …, 2011 - works.bepress.com
Abstract Inspired by the current debate over the future of the monetary union in Europe, this
paper provides a simple model for the determination of the conditions of survival of the
common good, which requires the creation of an effective fiscal union. We highlight the ...

Washington Insider

M MONTERO, JJ VIDAL-PUGA, M MORELLI… - Cambridge Univ Press
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) released two sets of previously classified historical documents
detailing some of the most infamous activities by the agency involving overseas assassination
plots, kidnapping, and domestic spying. The material is being released in response to a ...
All 2 versions

[PDF] Formal Comparative Politics and Constitutional Design

[PDF] from columbia.edu
M Morelli - columbia.edu
This course covers recent models of democratic policy making, with particular emphasis on
the comparison of institutional systems used across liberal democracies. Government
policies are decided by elected politicians, who are assumed to be rational and strategic. ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 6 versions

Issues in Multi-Dimensional Legislative Bargaining: Collective vs. Particularistic Goods

J Kagel… - 2007 - kb.osu.edu
In this project, Kagel and Morelli examine legislative bargaining on two dimensions-–
particularistic goods and collective goods, or public interest goods that benefit society as a
whole. The results of their two game theory experiments run counter to what standard ...
Cached - All 5 versions

Incumbents' Interests, Voters' Bias and Gender Quotas

F Guillaume R, M François… - Discussion Papers (ECON …, 2006 - ideas.repec.org
The adoption of gender quotas in party lists has been a voluntary decision by many parties
in many countries, and is now a subject of discussion in many others. The Parity Law passed
in France in 2001 is particularly interesting because for the first time the quota was set at ...
Cached - All 2 versions

[CITATION] The case for a fiscal union beyond the Eurobond

J Luque, M Morelli… - 2011 - works.bepress.com
... The case for a fiscal union beyond the Eurobond. Jaime Luque, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Massimo Morelli, Columbia University José Tavares, Nova School of Business and Economics.
Suggested Citation. Jaime Luque, Massimo Morelli, and José Tavares. ...

[CITATION] Essays on coalition formation, and surplus sharing

M Morelli - 1996 - en.scientificcommons.org
Publication View. 6762497. Essays on coalition formation, and surplus sharing / (1996). Morelli,
Massimo. Abstract. Thesis (Ph. D.)--Harvard University, 1996.. Includes bibliographical references.
Publication details. Download, http://worldcat.org/oclc/48984975. ...
Cached - Library Search

Incumbents' interests and gender quotas

GR Frhette, F Maniquet… - Discussion Papers, 2007 - ideas.repec.org
The adoption of mandatory gender quotas in party lists has been a subject of discussion in
many countries. Since any reform obviously requires the approval of a (sometimes qualified)
majority of incumbent legislators' votes, keeping an eye on incumbents' interests and ...
Cached - All 4 versions

[CITATION] Nominal Bargaining Power, Selection Protocol and Discounting in Legislative Bargaining¤

JH Kagel, M Morelli - 2004
Related articles - All 2 versions

[PDF] LOVE THY IMMIGRANT A COMPLEMENTARITY THEORY OF IMMIGRATION POLICY

[PDF] from iea-world.com
J Esteban, M Morelli… - iea-world.com
Abstract We introduce a model in which industrial production requires skilled and unskilled
labor in fixed proportions, and we explore the consequences of this complementarity for the
determination of immigration policies in countries that vary in terms of total factor ...
Related articles - View as HTML

[PDF] Secessionist and Centrist Conflicts: the Role of Natural Resource Rents!

[PDF] from sgvs.ch
M Morelli… - 2009 - sgvs.ch
Abstract We examine how the distribution of natural resources and the relative capacities of
different groups can account for different types of ethnic conflict. The presence of a minority
ethnic group in a region that is rich in natural resources can fuel secessionist conflict if ...
Related articles - View as HTML

The Stable Demand Set: General Characterization and Application to Weighted Majority Games

M Montero… - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract The cooperative solution concept introduced here, the Stable Demand Set, contains
the Core and is included in the Zhou Bargaining Set, eliminating the dominated coalition
structures. In the class of constant-sum homogeneous weighted majority games the Stable ...
Cached - All 2 versions

[PDF] DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

[PDF] from caltech.edu
H Herrera, M Morelli… - 2011 - hss.caltech.edu
Abstract. Differences in electoral rules and/or legislative, executive or legal institutions
across countries induce different mappings from election outcomes to distributions of power.
We explore how these different mappings affect votersqparticipation in a democracy. ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 5 versions

[PDF] Handicapping Politicians: the optimal majority rule in incumbency elections

[PDF] from columbia.edu
F Caselli, T Cunningham, M Morelli… - 2011 - econ.columbia.edu
Abstract We present a model of electoral competition between an incumbent and a
challenger in which everything is symmetric except that voters receive more information
about the quality of the incumbent than that of the challenger. The information is received ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 2 versions

[PDF] Bureau for Research in Economic Analysis of Development

[PDF] from duke.edu
M Ghatak, M Morelli… - 2003 - ipl.econ.duke.edu
ABSTRACT We study an economy where agents are heterogeneous in terms of observable
wealth and unobservable talent. Adverse selection forces creditors to ask for collateral. We
study the two-way interaction between rationing in the credit market and the wages offered ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 2 versions

DP8832 Signalling, Incumbency Advantage, and Optimal Reelection Thresholds

F Caselli, T Cunningham, M Morelli… - 2012 - cepr.org
Much literature on political behavior treats politicians as motivated by reelection, choosing
actions to signal their types to voters. We identify two novel implications of models in which
signalling incentives are important. First, because incumbents only care about clearing a ...
Cached - All 3 versions

Informs, Debates, and Educates about the Eurozone

M Morelli, J Luque… - Politics, 2011 - works.bepress.com
Does it really take “extraordinary events” to bring eurozone countries to accept more fiscal
coordination in a monetary union? The answer is no. Even with the outbreak of the financial
crisis in 2007, and the ensuing debt crisis in Europe, there was still an understanding that ...
Get it from MIT Libraries

Institutional Design and Conflict

M MORELLI - 2009 - cadmus.eui.eu
Among the prevalent objectives that we should set for our society, reduction of conflicts of all
kinds is probably one of the easiest to agree upon. Any social contract that establishes
peaceful ways to resolve disputes can Pareto-dominate, for some appropriate transfers or ...
Cached - Library Search

[CITATION] Adverse Selection, Occupational Choice, and Endogenous Outside Options

M Ghatak, M Morelli… - 2005
Related articles

[CITATION] Retrading in Market Games

M Morelli, S Ghosal - Working Papers, 2001 - econpapers.repec.org
Related works: Working Paper: Retrading in Market Games (2002) Journal Article: Retrading
in market games (2004) This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items
with the same title. ... This site is part of RePEc and all the data displayed here is part of ...
Cached - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 4 versions

[PDF] CEP Discussion Paper No 1122 February 2012 Signalling, Incumbency Advantage, and Optimal Reelection Rules

[PDF] from lse.ac.uk
F Caselli, T Cunningham, M Morelli… - 2012 - cep.lse.ac.uk
Abstract Much literature on political behavior treats politicians as motivated by reelection,
choosing actions to signal their types to voters. We identify two novel implications of models
in which signalling incentives are important. First, because incumbents only care about ...
Related articles - View as HTML

[CITATION] L'unione fiscal svolta per l'Europa

J Luque, M Morelli… - 2011 - works.bepress.com
... L'unione fiscal svolta per l'Europa. Jaime Luque, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Massimo
Morelli, Columbia University José Tavares, Nova School of Business and Economics.
Suggested Citation. Jaime Luque, Massimo Morelli, and José Tavares. ...

[PDF] The Geography of Inter-State Resource Wars

[PDF] from princeton.edu
F Caselli, M Morelli… - 2012 - princeton.edu
Abstract We establish a theoretical as well as empirical framework to assess the role of
resource endowments and their geographic location for inter-State conflict. The main
predictions of the theory are that conflict tends to be more likely when at least one country ...
View as HTML

Bad Politicians

M Massimo - ukpmc.ac.uk
We present a simple theory of the quality of elected officials. Quality has (at least) two
dimensions: competence and honesty. Voters prefer competent and honest policymakers, so
high-quality citizens have a greater chance of being elected to office. But low-quality ...
Cached

[PDF] POLS G8821:“Topics in International Relations and Rational Choice” Spring 2008

[PDF] from columbia.edu
M Morelli - 2008 - columbia.edu
The first part of the course will be on the rationalist explanations of bargaining breakdown
and bilateral conflict, including the analysis of leaders' selection, strategic militarization, and
other variables at the boundary between domestic and international choices. The second ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 3 versions

[CITATION] Endogenous A±rmative Action: Gender Bias Leads to Gender Quotas¤

F Maniquet, M Morelli…
Related articles

Can Market Failure Cause Political Failure?

S Madhav, M Ghatak, M Morelli - … -Economic Organisation and …, 2011 - ideas.repec.org
We study how inefficiencies of market failure may be further amplified by political choices
made by interest groups created in the inefficient market. We take an occupational choice
framework, where agents are endowed heterogeneously with wealth and talent. In our ...
Cached - All 4 versions

[PDF] Signalling, Incumbency Advantage, and Optimal Reelection Rules

[PDF] from lse.ac.uk
F Caselli, T Cunningham, M Morelli… - 2012 - personal.lse.ac.uk
Abstract Much literature on political behavior treats politicians as motivated by reelection,
choosing actions to signal their types to voters. We identify two novel implications of models
in which signalling incentives are important. First, because incumbents only care about ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 5 versions

 Create email alert



 

About Google Scholar - All About Google - My Citations

©2012 Google