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User profiles for author:"Alberto Bisin"

alberto bisin

Professor of Economics, New York University
Verified email at nyu.edu
Cited by 2503

The economics of cultural transmission and the dynamics of preferences

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A Bisin… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2001 - Elsevier
This paper studies the population dynamics of preference traits in a model of
intergenerational cultural transmission. Parents socialize and transmit their preferences to
their offspring, motivated by a form of paternalistic altruism (“imperfect empathy”). In such a ...
Cited by 459 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 19 versions

“Beyond the melting pot”: cultural transmission, marriage, and the evolution of ethnic and religious traits

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A Bisin… - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2000 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract This paper presents an economic analysis of the intergenerational transmission of
ethnic and religious traits through family socialization and marital segregation decisions.
Frequency of intragroup marriage (homogamy), as well as socialization rates of religious ...
Cited by 388 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 20 versions

Modeling internal commitment mechanisms and self-control: A neuroeconomics approach to consumption–saving decisions

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J Benhabib… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2005 - Elsevier
We provide a new model of consumption–saving decisions which explicitly allows for
internal commitment mechanisms and self-control. Agents have the ability to invoke either
automatic processes that are susceptible to the temptation of 'over-consuming,'or ...
Cited by 142 - Related articles - All 17 versions

Religious intermarriage and socialization in the United States

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A Bisin, G Topa… - Journal of Political Economy, 2004 - JSTOR
This paper presents an empirical analysis of a choice-theoretic model of cultural
transmission. In particular, we use data from the General Social Survey to estimate the
structural parameters of a model of marriage and child socialization along religious lines ...
Cited by 128 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 18 versions

Moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts

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A Bisin… - RAND Journal of Economics, 2004 - JSTOR
We study equilibria for economies with hidden action in environments in which the agents'
contractual relationships with competing financial intermediaries cannot be monitored (or
are not contractible upon). We fully characterize equilibrium allocations and contracts for ...
Cited by 117 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - BL Direct - All 29 versions

On the cultural transmission of preferences for social status

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A Bisin… - Journal of Public Economics, 1998 - Elsevier
We study the formation of preferences forsocial status' as the result of intergenerational
transmission of cultural traits. We characterize the behavior of parents with preferences for
status in terms of socialization of their children to this particular cultural trait. We show that ...
Cited by 111 - Related articles - Library Search - All 13 versions

Competitive equilibria with asymmetric information

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A Bisin… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1999 - Elsevier
This paper studies competitive equilibria in economies where agents trade in markets for
standardized, non-exclusive financial contracts, under conditions of asymmetric information
(both of the moral hazard and the adverse selection type). The problems for the existence ...
Cited by 104 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 19 versions

Efficient competitive equilibria with adverse selection

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A Bisin… - Journal of political Economy, 2006 - JSTOR
Do Walrasian markets function orderly in the presence of adverse selection? In particular, is
their outcome efficient when exclusive contracts are enforceable? This paper addresses
these questions in the context of a Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance economy. We identify an ...
Cited by 88 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 41 versions

Present-bias, quasi-hyperbolic discounting, and fixed costs

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J Benhabib, A Bisin… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2010 - Elsevier
In this paper we elicit preferences for money–time pairs via experimental techniques. We
estimate a general specification of discounting that nests exponential and hyperbolic
discounting, as well as various forms of present bias, including quasi-hyperbolic ...
Cited by 65 - Related articles - All 14 versions

A model of cultural transmission, voting and political ideology

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A Bisin… - European Journal of Political Economy, 2000 - Elsevier
In this paper, we present a model of cultural transmission of preferences on goods, some of
which are provided publicly through simple majority voting. We emphasize the existence of a
two-way causality between socialization decisions and political outcomes. This generates ...
Cited by 50 - Related articles - All 13 versions

Exclusive contracts and the institution of bankruptcy

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A Bisin… - Economic Theory, 2006 - Springer
Summary. The paper studies the institution of bankruptcy when exclusive contracts cannot
be enforced ex ante, eg, a bank cannot monitor whether the borrower enters into contracts
with other creditors. The institution of bankruptcy enables the bank to enforce its claim to ...
Cited by 49 - Related articles - All 26 versions

Cooperation as a transmitted cultural trait

[PDF] from psu.edu
A Bisin, G Topa… - Rationality and Society, 2004 - rss.sagepub.com
Abstract In this paper, we study an endogenous cultural selection mechanism for
cooperative behavior in a setting where agents are randomly matched in a one-shot
interaction Prisoner's Dilemma, and may or may not have complete information about their ...
Cited by 52 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 11 versions

Managerial hedging and portfolio monitoring

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A Bisin, P Gottardi… - Journal of the European …, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract Incentive compensation induces correlation between the portfolio of managers and
the cash flow of the firms they manage. This correlation exposes managers to risk and hence
gives them an incentive to hedge against the poor performance of their firms. We study the ...
Cited by 48 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 57 versions

[PDF] Cultural transmission

[PDF] from nyu.edu
A Bisin… - The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2005 - nyu.edu
Abstract The economic literature analyzes cultural transmission as the result of interactions
between purposeful socialization decisions inside the family ('direct vertical socialization')
and indirect socialization processes like social imitation and learning ('oblique and ...
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Markets as beneficial constraints on the government

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A Bisin… - Journal of public Economics, 2006 - Elsevier
We study the role of anonymous markets in which trades cannot be monitored by the
government. We adopt a Mirrlees approach to analyze economies in which agents have
private information and a benevolent government controls optimal redistributive tax policy. ...
Cited by 40 - Related articles - All 17 versions

Rational expectations equilibria of economies with local interactions

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A Bisin, U Horst… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2006 - Elsevier
We consider general economies in which rational agents interact locally. The local aspect of
the interactions is designed to represent in a simple abstract way social interactions, that is,
socioeconomic environments in which markets do not mediate all of agents' choices, ...
Cited by 38 - Related articles - All 44 versions

Managerial hedging, equity ownership, and firm value

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VV Acharya… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
Suppose risk-averse managers can hedge the aggregate component of their exposure to
firm's cash-flow risk by trading in financial markets but cannot hedge their firm-specific
exposure. This gives them incentives to pass up firm-specific projects in favor of standard ...
Cited by 36 - Related articles - All 24 versions

[BOOK] 'Bend It Like Beckham': Identity, Socialization and Assimilation

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A Bisin, E Patacchini, T Verdier… - 2006 - econ.nyu.edu
Abstract This paper is about ethnic identity. We first develop a model of identity formation
resulting from the interaction of cultural transmission and socialization inside the family, peer
effects and social interactions, and identity choice. We then put the model to data using ...
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General equilibrium with endogenously incomplete financial markets

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A Bisin - Journal of Economic Theory, 1998 - Elsevier
The present paper studies a class of general equilibrium economies with imperfectly
competitive financial intermediaries and price-taking consumers. Intermediaries optimally
choose the securities they issue and the bid–ask spread they charge. Financial ...
Cited by 34 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 8 versions

Are Muslim immigrants different in terms of cultural integration?

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A Bisin, E Patacchini, T Verdier… - Journal of the European …, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract Using the UK Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities, we document differences
in integration patterns between Muslims and non-Muslims. We find that Muslims integrate
less and more slowly than non-Muslims. In terms of estimated probability of having a ...
Cited by 33 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 12 versions

The economics of cultural transmission and socialization

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A Bisin… - 2010 - nber.org
Cultural transmission arguably plays an important role in the determination of many
fundamental preference traits (eg, discounting, risk aversion and altruism) and most cultural
traits, social norms, and ideological tenets (eg, attitudes towards family and fertility ...
Cited by 30 - Related articles - Library Search - All 12 versions

[PDF] Markets and contracts

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A Bisin, J Geanakoplos, P Gottardi, E Minelli… - Journal of Mathematical …, 2001 - unibs.it
Abstract Economies with asymmetric information are encompassed by an extension of the
model of general competitive equilibrium that does not require an explicit modeling of
private information. Sellers have discretion over deliveries on contracts; this is in common ...
Cited by 26 - Related articles - View as HTML - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 20 versions

[PDF] The distribution of wealth and redistributive policies

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J Benhabib… - New York University, Working Paper, 2006 - nber.org
Abstract We study the dynamics of the distribution of wealth in an Overlapping Generation
economy with bequest and various forms of redistributive taxation. We characterize the
transitional dynamics of the wealth distribution as well as the stationary distribution. We ...
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Empirical models of cultural transmission

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A Bisin… - Journal of the European Economic …, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract This paper reviews several issues concerning an empirical analysis of the
endogenous formation of preferences, as well as cognitive and psychological traits. In
particular we show by means of examples how, with existing data, it is possible to identify ...
Cited by 23 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 5 versions

[PDF] Advertising, mass consumption and capitalism

[PDF] from polarizationandconflict.org
J Benhabib… - manuscript, Department of …, 2002 - polarizationandconflict.org
Western societies have developed into a historically new stage in the evolution of capitalism,
one which is characterized by corporations exercising monopolistic power and sustaining
demand by advertising through the media. While this theme has been emphasized eg, by ...
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[PDF] Work ethic and redistribution: a cultural transmission model of the welfare state

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A Bisin… - Unpublished Manuscript, New York University, 2004 - nyu.edu
Redistributive policies vary a great deal across countries. In particular European
governments redistribute income by means of progressive fiscal policies, labor market and
general social policies much more than the US government. For instance, transfers and ...
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The distribution of wealth and fiscal policy in economies with finitely lived agents

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J Benhabib, A Bisin… - Econometrica, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
We study the dynamics of the distribution of wealth in an overlapping generation economy
with finitely lived agents and intergenerational transmission of wealth. Financial markets are
incomplete, exposing agents to both labor and capital income risk. We show that the ...
Cited by 17 - Related articles - Library Search - All 41 versions

Agents with imperfect empathy may survive natural selection

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A Bisin… - Economics Letters, 2001 - Elsevier
Cultural transmission mechanisms which favor the direct transmission of the parents' traits to
their children may be adaptive to natural selection when opposed to mechanisms in which
the parents choose for the offspring the highest fitness at any time.
Cited by 14 - Related articles - All 17 versions

[PDF] Centralized versus Over The Counter Markets

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V Acharya… - New York University, Working Paper, 2009 - pages.stern.nyu.edu
Abstract The opacity of over-the-counter (OTC) markets–in which a large number of financial
products including credit derivatives trade–appears to have played a central role in the
ongoing financial crisis. We model such OTC markets for risk-sharing in a general ...
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Bend it like Beckham: Ethnic identity and integration

[PDF] from nyu.edu
A Bisin, E Patacchini, T Verdier… - 2010 - nber.org
We propose a theoretical framework to study the determinants of ethnic and religious identity
along two distinct motivational processes which have been proposed in the social sciences:
cultural conformity and cultural distinction. Under cultural conformity, ethnic identity is ...
Cited by 14 - Related articles - Library Search - All 33 versions

[PDF] Self-control and consumption-savings decisions: Cognitive perspectives

[PDF] from unicatt.it
J Benhabib… - New York University, 2002 - istituti.unicatt.it
Abstract We study consumption/saving decisions in an environment in which agents face a
conflict between present and future utility which may require self-control for its resolution. We
derive behavioral foundations for our analysis of self-control from the cognitive sciences, ...
Cited by 13 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 8 versions

Counterparty risk externality: Centralized versus over-the-counter markets

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VV Acharya… - 2011 - nber.org
We model the opacity of over-the-counter (OTC) markets in a setup where agents share
risks, but have incentives to default and their financial positions are not mutually observable.
We show that this setup results in excess" leverage" in that parties take on short OTC ...
Cited by 12 - Related articles - Library Search - All 35 versions

[PDF] An Empirical Analysis of Religious Homogamy and Socialization in the US

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A Bisin, G Topa… - Journal of Political Economy, 2004 - econ.nyu.edu
Abstract This paper presents an empirical analysis of the intergenerational transmission of
religious traits through family socialization and marital segregation decisions. We estimate
an economic model of marriage and socialization using intragroup and intergroup ...
Cited by 12 - Related articles - View as HTML

[PDF] Managerial hedging and incentive compensation in stock market economies

[PDF] from psu.edu
V Acharya… - 2002 - Citeseer
Incentive compensation exposes managers to the risk of their firms. Managers can hedge
their aggregate risk exposure by trading in financial markets, but cannot hedge their
firmspecific exposure. This gives them an incentive to pass up firm-specific projects in ...
Cited by 11 - Related articles - View as HTML - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 7 versions

General competitive analysis with asymmetric information

A Bisin… - Working Papers, 1997 - ideas.repec.org
This paper studies competitive equilibria in economies characterized by the presence of
asymmetric information (both of the moral hazard and the adverse selection type). We
consider economies where non-exclusive contracts (securities) with payoffs dependent on ...
Cited by 11 - Related articles - Cached - Get it from MIT Libraries - BL Direct - All 6 versions

[BOOK] Competitive Equilibria with Asymmetric Information: Existence with Entry Fees

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A Bisin, P Gottardi… - 1999 - econ.as.nyu.edu
Abstract This paper studies competitive equilibria in economies characterized by the
presence of asymmetric information, where non. exclusive contracts with payoffs dependent
on the agents/private information are traded on compet. itive markets. For such economies ...
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The empirical content of models with multiple equilibria in economies with social interactions

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A Bisin, A Moro… - 2011 - nber.org
We study a general class of models with social interactions that might display multiple
equilibria. We propose an estimation procedure for these models and evaluate its efficiency
and computational feasibility relative to different approaches taken to the curse of ...
Cited by 11 - Related articles - Library Search - All 31 versions

[PDF] Hyperbolic discounting: An experimental analysis

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J Benhabib, A Bisin… - New York University …, 2004 - emlab.berkeley.edu
Abstract In this paper we elicit preferences for discounting via experimental techniques. We
then estimate a general specification of discounting that nests exponential and hyperbolic
discounting, as well as various forms of present bias, including quasi% hyperbolic ...
Cited by 11 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 8 versions

[BOOK] Handbook of social economics

J Benhabib, MO Jackson… - 2010 - books.google.com
How do economists understand and measure normal social phenomena? Identifying
economic strains in activities such as learning, group formation, discrimination, and peer
dynamics requires sophisticated data and tools as well as a grasp of prior scholarship. In ...
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[PDF] The empirical content of models with multiple equilibria

[PDF] from repec.org
A Bisin, A Moro… - Microeconomics Seminar, 2002 - repec.org
Abstract We consider a generic environment with (potentially) multiple equilibria and
analyze conditions that allow for the estimation of both the structural parameters and the
“selected equilibrium”. We focus on a “easy to compute” consistent 2-step estimator and ...
Cited by 10 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 7 versions

Are Muslim Immigrants Different in Terms of Cultural Integration?

[PDF] from econstor.eu
A Bisin, E Patacchini, T Verdier… - 2007 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Using the UK Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities, we explore the
determinants of religious identity for Muslims and non-Muslims. We find that Muslims
integrate less and more slowly than non-Muslims. A Muslim born in the UK and having ...
Cited by 10 - Related articles - All 21 versions

Optimal Financial‐Market Integration and Security Design*

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VV Acharya… - The Journal of Business, 2005 - JSTOR
We study 2-period pure-exchange Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) economies with
incomplete financial markets and restricted participation. We characterize the optimal
financial-market structure and efficient innovations consisting of both the introduction of ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 22 versions

[CITATION] Y. Zenou (2008), rAre Muslims Immigrants Different in terms of Cultural Integration? s

A Bisin, E Patacchini… - Journal of the European Economic Association, …
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[PDF] Choice and process: Theory ahead of measurement

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J Benhabib… - Perspectives on the future of economics: …, 2008 - econ.nyu.edu
Abstract Are models and data on choice processes useful as a complement to revealed
preferences in decision theory? We answer this methodological question in the affirmative.
We also argue, however, that progress in neuroeconomics is likely to require relying more ...
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Ethnic identity and labour market outcomes of immigrants in Europe

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A Bisin, E Patacchini, T Verdier… - Economic Policy, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
We study the relationship between ethnic identity and labour market outcomes of non-EU
immigrants in Europe. Using the European Social Survey, we find that there is a penalty to
be paid for immigrants with a strong identity. Being a first generation immigrant leads to a ...
Cited by 8 - Related articles - Library Search - All 19 versions

Cultural transmission, socialization and the population dynamics of multiple‐trait distributions

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A Bisin, G Topa… - International Journal of Economic …, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
Bisin, A., Topa, G. and Verdier, T.(2009), Cultural transmission, socialization and the
population dynamics of multiple-trait distributions. International Journal of Economic Theory,
5: 139–154. doi: 10.1111/j. 1742-7363.2008. 00098. x
Cited by 7 - Related articles - All 8 versions

[PDF] Religious Intermarriage and Socialization in the US

[PDF] from nyu.edu
A Bisin, G Topa… - 2001 - nyu.edu
Abstract This paper presents an empirical analysis of a choiceMtheoretic model of cultural
transmission. In particular, we use data from the General Social Survey to estimate the
structural parameters of a model of marriage and children socialization along religious ...
Cited by 7 - Related articles - View as HTML - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 3 versions

Equilibrium corporate finance

[PDF] from eui.eu
A Bisin, P Gottardi… - 2010 - cadmus.eui.eu
We study a general equilibrium model with production where financial markets are
incomplete. At a competitive equilibrium firms take their production and financial decisions
so as to maximize their value. We show that shareholders unanimously sup-port value ...
Cited by 6 - Related articles - Library Search - All 26 versions

Procrastination, self-imposed deadlines and other commitment devices

[PDF] from uni-muenchen.de
A Bisin… - 2009 - mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
In this paper we model a decision maker who must exert costly effort to complete a single
task by a fixed deadline. Effort costs evolve stochastically in continuous time. The decision
maker will then optimally wait to exert effort until costs are less than a given threshold, the ...
Cited by 6 - Related articles - All 13 versions

Formation and persistence of oppositional identities

[PDF] from su.se
A Bisin, E Patacchini, T Verdier… - CEPR Discussion Paper …, 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We develop a dynamic model of identity formation that explains why ethnic
minorities may choose to adopt oppositional identities (ie some individuals may reject or not
the dominant culture) and why this behavior may persist over time. We first show that the ...
Cited by 6 - Related articles - Library Search - All 12 versions

[PDF] Decentralizing incentive efficient allocations of economies with adverse selection

[PDF] from econometricsociety.org
A Bisin… - Econometric Society World Congress …, 2000 - econometricsociety.org
Abstract We study competitive economies with adverse selection and fully exclusive
contractual relationships. We consider economies where agents are privately informed over
the probability distribution of their endowments, and trade to insure against this ...
Cited by 6 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 8 versions

[CITATION] General equilibrium economies with imperfectly competitive financial intermediaries

A Bisin - 1994 - University of Chicago, Department of …
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A note on the convergence to competitive equilibria in economies with moral hazard

[PDF] from cepr.org
A Bisin, P Gottardi… - 1999 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We examine the conditions under which competitive equilibria can be obtained as
the limit, when the number of strategic traders gets large, of Nash equilibria in economies
with asymmetric information on agents' effort and possibly imperfect observability of ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 31 versions

[PDF] Managerial hedging and equity ownership

[PDF] from nyu.edu
V Acharya… - 2003 - nyu.edu
Risk-averse managers can hedge the aggregate component of their exposure to firm's cash
flow risk by trading in financial markets, but cannot hedge their firm-specific exposure. This
gives them incentives to pass up firm-specific projects in favor of standard projects that ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 12 versions

Social capital, modernization and growth

[PDF] from csic.es
A Bisin, D Guaitoli - 2002 - digital.csic.es
The concept of social capital has been introduced in recent sociological and empirical
economic literature as referring to connections among individuals, social networks and the
norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them. Or, in other words, civic ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - All 12 versions

Markets and contracts

[PDF] from eui.eu
A Bisin, JD Geanakoplos, P Gottardi… - Journal of Mathematical …, 2011 - Elsevier
ABSTRACT: Economies with asymmetric information are encompassed by an extension of
the model of general competitive equilibrium that does not require an explicit modeling of
private information. Sellers have discretion over deliveries on contracts; this is in common ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 19 versions

Public policies and the dynamics of cultural values in the welfare state

A Bisin… - Annales d'économie et de statistique, 2001 - JSTOR
This paper analyzes the dynamics of the distribution of a population of some of the cultural
traits and norms which might be associated to the support for Welfare State as a system for
the provision of public goods and as a redistributive mechanism. Cultural traits and norms ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - BL Direct - All 12 versions

Competitive markets for non-exclusive contracts with adverse selection: The role of entry fees

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Full text - MIT Libraries
A Bisin… - Review of Economic Dynamics, 2003 - Elsevier
This paper studies competitive equilibria in economies characterized by the presence of
asymmetric information, where non-exclusive contracts are traded in competitive markets
and agents may be privately informed over contracts' payoffs. For such economies ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 13 versions

[CITATION] General equilibrium and endogenously incomplete financial markets

A Bisin - DELTA Working Papers, 1994 - ideas.repec.org
No abstract is available for this item. ... To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three options: 1. Check below under "Related
research" whether another version of this item is available online. 2. Check on the ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - Cached - Library Search - All 5 versions

[PDF] Procrastination, Self-imposed Deadlines and Other Commitment Devices: Theory and Experiment

[PDF] from unimaas.nl
A Bisin… - 2008 - personeel.unimaas.nl
Abstract In this paper we model a decision maker who must exert costly effort to complete a
single task by a fixed deadline. Effort costs evolve stochastically in continuous time. The
decision maker optimally waits to exert effort until costs are less than a given threshold, ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 3 versions

[CITATION] Cultural Transmission, Marriage and the Evolution of Ethnic and Religious Traits

A Bisin… - Working Papers, 1998 - econpapers.repec.org
By Alberto Bisin and Thierry A. Verdier; Cultural Transmission, Marriage
and the Evolution of Ethnic and Religious Traits.
Cited by 3 - Related articles - Cached - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - BL Direct - All 4 versions

Optimal Financial Integration and Security Design

V Acharya… - 2000 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We study two-period pure-exchange Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
economies with a given degree of incompleteness of financial markets and given degrees of
restricted participation of agents in the markets.
Cited by 3 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 2 versions

[PDF] The Psychology of Self-control and Consumptionsaving Decisions: Cognitive Perspectives

[PDF] from nyu.edu
J Benhabib… - 2002 - econ.nyu.edu
Abstract We study consumption/saving decisions in an environment in which agents face a
conflict between present and future utility which may require self-control for its resolution. We
derive behavioral foundations for our analysis of self-control from the cognitive sciences, ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - View as HTML

[PDF] Cultural transmission, socialization and the population dynamics of multiple state traits distributions

[PDF] from nyu.edu
A Bisin, G Topa… - 2004 - nyu.edu
Abstract This paper studies the population dynamics of preference traits in a model of
intergenerational cultural transmission. Parents socialize and transmit their preferences to
their offspring with endogenous intensities. Populations concentrated on a single cultural ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 5 versions

[CITATION] OnurOzgur et al.(2004),“Rational Expectations Equilibria of Economies with Local Interactions,”

A Bisin… - Journal of Economic Theory
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[CITATION] Exclusive Contracts and the Institution of Bankruptcy New York University Department of Finance Working Paper No. 270

A Bisin… - 2000
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Entrepreneurial incentives in stock market economies

[PDF] from tinbergen.nl
V Acharya… - 2002 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: A Capital Asset Pricing Model of a stock market economy is examined under
different corporate governance structures in which the objectives of managers and
entrepreneurs in choosing the risk composition of their firms' returns are not aligned with ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 13 versions

[CITATION] Verdier Thierry and Zenou Yves: August 2007.“Are Muslim Immigrants Different in Terms of Cultural Integration?”

A Bisin… - IZA Discussion Paper No
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[PDF] Anonymous Markets and Optimal Policy

[PDF] from nyu.edu
A Bisin… - Unpublished manuscript, Northwestern University …, 2004 - nyu.edu
Abstract Is there a role for anonymous markets in which trades cannot be monitored by the
government? We study an economy in which agents have private information and a
benevolent government controls redistributive tax policy. While unrestricted access to ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 5 versions

[CITATION] The Economics of Cultural Transmission and Socialization. Handbook of Social Economics, Jess Benhabib, Alberto Bisin, Matt Jackson, eds

A Bisin… - 2010 - North-Holland
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[CITATION] At the Roots of Indeterminacy

A Bisin - STUDIES IN RISK AND …, 1997 - KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS
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Dynamic linear economies with social interactions

[PDF] from umontreal.ca
O OZGUR… - 2011 - papyrus.bib.umontreal.ca
Social interactions arguably provide a rationale for several important phenomena, from
smoking and other risky behavior in teens to eg, peer effects in school performance. We
study social interactions in dynamic economies. For these economies, we provide ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - All 11 versions

Social Interactions and Selection

A Bisin… - 2009 - webmeets.com
Abstract Social interactions are interactions not fully mediated through markets, in which an
agent's preferences depend on other agents' actions. We are particularly interested in social
and economic phenomena in which agents prefer to conform their actions to the actions of ...
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[PDF] Information extraction and norms of mutual protection

[PDF] from nyu.edu
A Bisin… - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, …, 2010 - econ.nyu.edu
ABSTRACT We study a class of moral hazard economies in which a principal interacts with
several agents. In these economies first best allocations can be implemented via full in $
formation extraction when side $ trades between agents can be restricted. When instead ...
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[PDF] Other PeopleVs Money: An Experimental Study of the Impact of the Competition for Funds

[PDF] from nyu.edu
M Agranov, A Bisin… - Available from author, 2010 - cess.nyu.edu
Abstract This paper investigates the impact of the competition for funds in capital markets on
the risk taking behavior of fund managers. In doing this we find what we call an lOther
Peopleks Moneymeffect, or a tendency of people to invest the funds of others in riskier ...
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[PDF] Ethnic identity, residential segregation, and labor-market outcomes of immigrants in Europe

[PDF] from nyu.edu
A Bisin, E Patacchini, T Verdier… - Unpublished manuscript, …, 2009 - nyu.edu
Abstract Using data from the European Social Survey on most EU countries, we look at the
relationship between ethnic identity, segregation and employment prospects, as well as at
the individual characteristics associated with a strong ethnic identity. Different measures of ...
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Markets as Beneficial Constraints on the Government

A Rampini… - 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We study the role of anonymous markets in which trades cannot be monitored by
the government. We adopt a Mirrlees approach to analyze economies in which agents have
private information and a benevolent government controls optimal redistributive tax policy. ...
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[PDF] The distribution of wealth in the Blanchard% Yaari model

[PDF] from ntu.edu.sg
J Benhabib, A Bisin… - portal.hss.ntu.edu.sg
Abstract We study the dynamics of the distribution of wealth in an economy with in% finitely
lived agents, inter% generational transmission of wealth, and redistributive fiscal policy. We
show that investment luck and uncertain lifetime can generate a double Pareto wealth ...
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[PDF] Rational Expectations Equilibria in Dynamic Economies with Interacting Agents

[PDF] from kuleuven.be
A Bisin, U Horst… - 2002 - econ.kuleuven.be
Abstract We consider general economies in which rational agents interact locally. The local
aspect of the interactions is designed to capture in a simple abstract way social interactions,
that is, socio-economic environments in which markets do not mediate all of agents' ...
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[PDF] Decentralizing Efficient Allocations in Economies with Adverse Selection

[PDF] from eui.eu
A Bisin… - eui.eu
Abstract We study competitive economies with adverse selection and fully exclusive
contractual relationships. We show that Walrasian equilibria always exist and are efficient for
the general class of adverse selection insurance economies considered by Prescott and ...
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[PDF] Information Extraction, Nonexclusivity and Social Norms

[PDF] from nyu.edu
A Bisin… - 2008 - nyu.edu
ABSTRACT We study a class of moral hazard economies in which a principal interacts with
several agents. In these economies first best allocations can be implemented via full
information extraction when contracts are exclusive, that is when side-trades between ...
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DP3852 Optimal Financial Market Integration and Security Design

VV Acharya… - 2003 - cepr.org
We study two-period pure-exchange Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) economies, for
given degrees of incompleteness of financial markets and given degrees of restricted
participation of agents in the markets. We characterize the optimal financial market ...
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[PDF] Markets for Other PeopleVs Money: An Experimental Study of the Impact of the Competition for Funds

[PDF] from nyu.edu
M Agranov, A Bisin… - 2011 - nyu.edu
Abstract In this paper we experimentally investigate the impact that competing for funds has
on the risk $ taking behavior of laboratory hedge fund managers. We construct a simple
laboratory market for capital among hedge funds where each fund offers a contract that ...
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DP8212 Ethnic Identity and Labor-Market Outcomes of Immigrants in Europe

A Bisin, E Patacchini, T Verdier… - 2011 - cepr.org
Using data from the European Social Survey on most European countries, we look at the
relationship between ethnic identity and employment prospects for immigrants from non-
European countries. We find that a strong attachment to religion is associated with a lower ...
Cached - All 3 versions

[PDF] Government Policy with Time Inconsistent Voters (PRELIMINARY)

[PDF] from bu.edu
AB NYU, AL NYU… - 2011 - bu.edu
Abstract Behavioral economics presents a mpaternalisticnrationale for government
interven& tion. Current literature focuses on benevolent government. This paper introduces
politicians who may indulge/exploit these behavioral biases. We present an analysis of ...
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Cultural Integration of Immigrants in Europe

Y Algan, A Bisin, A Manning… - 2012 - econpapers.repec.org
The concepts of cultural diversity and cultural identity are at the forefront of the political
debate in many western societies. In Europe, the discussion is stimulated by the political
pressures associated with immigration flows, which are increasing in many European ...
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[PDF] Financial Economics I

[PDF] from nyu.edu
A Bisin - 2005 - econ.nyu.edu
The aim of these lecture notes is to provide an introduction to Asset pricing and Corporate finance
in the context of general equilibrium models. While not standard, this approach is consistent
and related to the practice of macro% economics and it has the advantage of facilitating a ...
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[PDF] Decentralizing Efficient Allocations with Adverse Selection: The General Case

[PDF] from eui.eu
A Bisin… - eui.eu
Abstract We study competitive economies with adverse selection and fully exclusive
contractual relationships. We show that Walrasian equilibria always exist and are efficient for
the general class of adverse selection insurance economies considered by Prescott and ...
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[PDF] Notes on Government Policy with Time Inconsistent Voters (VERY PRELIMINARY)

[PDF] from uchicago.edu
AB NYU, AL NYU… - 2010 - economics.uchicago.edu
Abstract. Behavioral economics presents a ppaternalisticqrationale for government inter&
vention. Current literature focuses on benevolent government. This paper introduces
politicians who may indulge/exploit these behavioral biases. We present an analysis of ...
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[CITATION] Essays on asymmetric information and markets

[PDF] from 18.7.29.232
A Bisin, D Acemoglu, PC Ramada - 1997 - 18.7.29.232
The first essay shows how strategic behavior on the part of agents that possess privileged
information results in existence of equilibria with non fully revealing prices. Furthermore,
such equilibria are found to exist in a set of parameters that is open in the parameter ...
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324 Sage Hall SC Johnson Graduate School of Management Cornell University Ithaca, NY 14853 oh33@ cornell. edu

IJ Benhabib, MO Jackson, A Bisin - Sage, 2011 - johnson.cornell.edu
Research: [See my website for an updated list of papers and access to pdf files.]
Publications/Forthcoming: “What Do You Think Would Make You Happier? What Do You Think
You Would Choose?” (2011, with Daniel J. Benjamin, Miles S. Kimball, and Alex Rees- ...
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Government Intervention as an Optimal Response to Government (not Market!) Failure

A Bisin… - 2006 Meeting Papers, 2006 - ideas.repec.org
This paper provides a theory of government intervention, such as government ownership,
regulation, mandatory public schooling, subsidies, and industrial policy, as an optimal policy
response due to the inability to commit not to expropriate private investment or bail agents ...
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DP8054 Bend It Like Beckham: Ethnic Identity and Integration

A Bisin, E Patacchini, T Verdier… - 2010 - cepr.org
We propose a theoretical framework to study the determinants of ethnic and religious identity
along two distinct motivational processes which have been proposed in the social sciences:
cultural conformity and cultural distinction. Under cultural conformity, ethnic identity is ...
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[PDF] Lecture Notes on General Equilibrium

[PDF] from nyu.edu
A Bisin - dimension, 2009 - nyu.edu
Proof. The theorem is a deep mathematical result whose proof is clearly beyond the scope of
this class. Let it suffi ce to say that the proof relies crucially on the boundary property of
excess demand. Adventurous reader might want to look at Mas Colell (1985), section 5, 6, ...
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'Bend It Like Beckham': Identity, Socialization and Assimilation

T Verdier, A Bisin, E Patacchini… - 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We first develop a model of identity formation resulting from the interaction of
cultural transmission and socialization inside the family, peer effects and social interactions,
and identity choice. We then put the model to data using the UK Fourth National Survey of ...
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DP8380 Formation and Persistence of Oppositional Identities

A Bisin, E Patacchini, T Verdier… - 2011 - cepr.org
We develop a dynamic model of identity formation that explains why ethnic minorities may
choose to adopt oppositional identities (ie some individuals may reject or not the dominant
culture) and why this behavior may persist over time. We first show that the prevalence of ...
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[PDF] Intro to Economic analysis

[PDF] from nyu.edu
AB Nyu - nyu.edu
Letes examine the asset pricing equation (2). If there is no uncertainty, that is if the agent is
able to perfectly insure, so that ct (ct"#, or if he is risk neutral, so that u'c! is a constant, qj t
(ßEtxj t"# and the price of asset j is the net present value of its expected payoff at t" $ ...
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DP6453 Are Muslim Immigrants Different in Terms of Cultural Integration?

A Bisin, E Patacchini, T Verdier… - 2007 - cepr.org
Using the UK Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities, we explore the determinants of
religious identity for Muslims and non-Muslims. We find that Muslims integrate less and more
slowly than non-Muslims. A Muslim born in the UK and having spent there more than 50 ...
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[PDF] Social Construction of Preferences: Advertising Ã

[PDF] from nyu.edu
J Benhabib… - 2010 - econ.nyu.edu
Abstract We examine, with the tools of economics, a fundamental tenet of some of the most
recent theoretical work in sociology, which we refer to as the Postmodernist Critique:
preferences are socially constructed, firms exploit their monopoly power through ...
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[PDF] Decentralizing Incentive E! cient Allocations of Economies with Adverse Selection

[PDF] from unimib.it
A Bisin… - statistica.unimib.it
Abstract We study competitive economies with adverse selection and fully exclusive con0
tractual relationships. We model exclusivity by restricting the agents' consump0 tion
possibility set to the set of incentive compatible bundles. In this set0up, we characterize ...
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