A Bogomolnaia… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2002 - Elsevier
We consider the partitioning of a society into coalitions in purely hedonic settings, ie, where
each player's payoff is completely determined by the identity of other members of her
coalition. We first discuss how hedonic and nonhedonic settings differ and some sufficient ...
A Bogomolnaia… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2001 - Elsevier
A random assignment is ordinally efficient if it is not stochastically dominated with respect to
individual preferences over sure objects. Ordinal efficiency implies (is implied by) ex post (ex
ante) efficiency. A simple algorithm characterizes ordinally efficient assignments: our ...
A Bogomolnaia… - Economic Theory, 2002 - Springer
Summary. All agents have the same ordinal ranking over all objects, receiving no object
(opting out) may be preferable to some objects, agents differ on which objects are worse
than opting out, and the latter information is private. The Probabilistic Serial assignment, ...
A Bogomolnaia… - Econometrica, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
We consider bilateral matching problems where each person views those on the other side
of the market as either acceptable or unacceptable: an acceptable mate is preferred to
remaining single, and the latter to an unacceptable mate; all acceptable mates are welfare ...
A Bogomolnaia, H Moulin… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2005 - Elsevier
Agents partition deterministic outcomes into good or bad. A mechanism selects a lottery over
outcomes (time-shares). The probability of a good outcome is the canonical utility. The
utilitarian mechanism averages over outcomes with largest “approval”. It is efficient, ...
A Bogomolnaia, R Deb… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2005 - Elsevier
We consider the problem of efficiently allocating several indivisible objects between agents
who are to receive at most one object and whose preferences are private information. We
examine this standard “assignment” problem from the perspective of mechanism design ...
A Bogomolnaia… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2010 - Elsevier
Several authors recently proposed an elegant construction to divide the minimal cost of
connecting a given set of users to a source. This folk solution applies the Shapley value to
the largest reduction of the cost matrix that does not affect the efficient cost. It is also ...
S Barbera, A Bogomolnaia… - Mathematical Social …, 1998 - Elsevier
We consider social choice rules which select a lottery over outcomes for each profile of
individual preferences. Agents are assumed to have preferences over lotteries satisfying the
axioms of expected utility. We exhibit a large class of rules satisfying strategy-proofness. ...
A Bogomolnaia, M Le Breton, A Savvateev… - Economic Theory, 2008 - Springer
Abstract We consider a finite society with of individuals distributed along the real line. The
individuals form jurisdictions to consume public projects, equally share their costs and, in
addition, bear a transportation cost to the location of the project. We examine a core and ...
A Bogomolnaia… - Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2005 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract We study the problem of locating multiple public facilities when each member of
society has to be assigned to exactly one of these facilities. Individuals' preferences are
assumed to be single-peaked over the interval of possible locations and negatively ...
A Bogomolnaia, R Holzman… - Mathematics of Operations …, 2010 - dl.acm.org
Abstract We consider a communication network where each pair of users requests a
connection guaranteeing a certain capacity. The cost of building capacity is identical across
pairs. Efficiency is achieved by any maximal cost spanning tree. We construct cost sharing ...
A Bogomolnaia, M Le Breton… - Journal of Public …, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
2. We wish to thank Myrna Wooders, the anonymous referee and an associate editor of this
journal for their useful comments. The third author wishes to acknowledge the financial
assistance of the Russian State Leading School Support through Grant# NSh-1939.2003. ...
[CITATION] Incentive-compatible assignment on the full preference domain
A Bogomolnaia, L Ehlers… - J. Econ. Theory, forthcoming. doi, 2005
[CITATION] Medians and Lotteries [Microforma]: Strategy-proof Social Choice Rules for Restricted Domains
A Bogomolnaia… - 1999 - Publicacions de la Universitat …
A Bogomolnaia, M Le Breton… - CORE Discussion …, 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: In this note we consider a society that partitions itself into disjoint jurisdictions, each
choosing a location of its public project and a taxation scheme to finance it. The set of public
project is multi-dimensional, and their costs could vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. We ...
H Moulin… - Working Papers, 2001 - ideas.repec.org
We consider bilateral matching problems where each person views those on the other side
of the market as either acceptable or unacceptable: an acceptable mate is preferred to
remaining single, and the latter to an unacceptable mate; all acceptable mates are welfare ...
M HervÃ… - Economics Bulletin, 2001 - ideas.repec.org
We consider bilateral matching problems where each person views those on the other side
of the market as either acceptable or unacceptable: an acceptable mate is preferred to
remaining single, and the latter to an unacceptable mate all acceptable mates are welfare- ...
A Savvateev, A Bogomolnaia, M Le Breton… - Working Papers, 2005 - ideas.repec.org
In this note we consider a society that partitions itself into disjoint jurisdictions, each
choosing a location of its public project and a taxation scheme to finance it. The set of public
project is multi-dimensional, and their costs could vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. We ...
A Bogomolnaia - 2001 - econ.haifa.ac.il
Abstract We consider bilateral matching problems where each person views those on the
other side of the market as either acceptable or unacceptable: an acceptable mate is
preferred to remaining single, and the latter to an unacceptable mate; all acceptable ...
A Bogomolnaia… - 1998 - Citeseer
Abstract We consider the partitioning of a society into coalitions in purely hedonic settings;
ie, where each player's payo is completely determined by the identity of other members of
her coalition. We rst discuss how hedonic and non-hedonic settings di er and some su ...
A Bogomolnaia, M Le Breton, A Savvateev… - 2005 - idei.fr
Abstract This paper examines a model of multi-jurisdictional formation where individuals'
characteristics are uniformly distributed over the finite interval. Every jurisdiction chooses a
location of a public good and equally shares the cost of production among its residents. ...
H Moulin… - Economics Bulletin, 2001 - econpapers.repec.org
We consider bilateral matching problems where each person views those on the other side
of the market as either acceptable or unacceptable: an acceptable mate is preferred to
remaining single, and the latter to an unacceptable mate all acceptable mates are welfare- ...
S Wever, A Savvateev, M Le Breton… - Economics …, 2005 - ideas.repec.org
In this note we consider a society that partitions itself into disjoint jurisdictions, each
choosing a location of its public project and a taxation scheme to finance it. The set of public
project is multi-dimensional, and their costs could vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. We ...
A Bogomolnaia - Victoria, 2004 - atlas-conferences.com
We consider the variant of coalition formation model, where a society is divided into groups,
and each group subsequently chooses a public project from the unidimensional set, over
which individuals have single-peaked preferences, as well as the way to finance this ...
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