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Pairwise kidney exchange

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AE Roth, T Sönmez… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2005 - Elsevier
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A kidney exchange clearinghouse in New England

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AE Roth, T Sönmez… - American Economic Review, 2005 - JSTOR
Page 1. A Kidney Exchange Clearinghouse in New England By ALVIN E. ROTH, TAYFUN
SONMEZ, AND M. UTKU UNVER* In September, 2004, the Renal Transplant Oversight
Committee of New England ap- proved the establishment ...
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House allocation with existing tenants: An equivalence

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T Sönmez… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2005 - Elsevier
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The dynamics of law clerk matching: An experimental and computational investigation of proposals for reform of the market

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E Haruvy, AE Roth… - Journal of Economic Dynamics and …, 2006 - Elsevier
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COURSE BIDDING AT BUSINESS SCHOOLS*

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T Sönmez, MU Ünver - International Economic Review, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
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[PDF] Matching, allocation, and exchange of discrete resources

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T Sönmez, MU Unver - Forthcoming in Handbook of Social …, 2009 - econ.uzh.ch
Abstract We present a survey of the emerging literature on the design of matching markets.
We survey the articles on discrete resource allocation problems, their solutions, and their
applications in three related domains. The first domain gives the theoretical background ...
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Backward unraveling over time: The evolution of strategic behavior in the entry level British medical labor markets

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MU Ünver - Journal of Economic dynamics and control, 2001 - Elsevier
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Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems

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H Konishi… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2006 - Elsevier
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Unraveling yields inefficient matchings: evidence from post‐season college football bowls

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GR Fréchette, AE Roth… - The RAND Journal of …, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. ...
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Asset price bubbles and crashes with near-zero-intelligence traders

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J Duffy… - Economic theory, 2006 - Springer
Page 1. DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0570-9 Economic Theory 27, 537–563 (2006)
Asset price bubbles and crashes with near-zero-intelligence traders * John Duffy
1 and M. Utku ¨Unver 2 1 Department of Economics, University ...
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Research Note—Improving the Efficiency of Course Bidding at Business Schools: Field and Laboratory Studies

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A Krishna… - Marketing Science, 2008 - marketsci.highwire.org
Page 1. Vol. 27, No. 2, March–April 2008, pp. 262–282 issn 0732-2399eissn 1526-
548X0827020262 informs® doi 10.1287/mksc.1070.0297 © 2008 INFORMS Research Note
Improving the Efficiency of Course Bidding at Business Schools: Field and Laboratory Studies ...
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Room assignment-rent division: A market approach

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A Abdulkadiroğlu, T Sönmez… - Social Choice and Welfare, 2004 - Springer
Page 1. Abstract. A group of friends consider renting a house but they shall first agree on how
to allocate its rooms and share the rent. We propose an auction mechanism for room
assignment-rent division problems which mimics the market mechanism. ...
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Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets

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H Konishi… - Social choice and Welfare, 2006 - Springer
Page 1. Soc Choice Welfare (2006) 27: 3–24 DOI 10.1007/s00355-006-0097-z
ORIGINAL PAPER Hideo Konishi · M. Utku Ünver Games of capacity manipulation
in hospital-intern markets Received: 17 January 2002 / Accepted ...
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House allocation with existing tenants: A characterization

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T Sonmez, MU Unver - Games and Economic Behavior, 2010 - Elsevier
We analyze mechanisms that are used to allocate dormitory rooms to students at college
campuses. Students consist of newcoming freshmen, who do not currently occupy any
rooms, and more senior students each of whom occupies a room from the previous year. ...
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Equilibrium selection and the role of information in repeated matching markets

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E Haruvy… - Economics Letters, 2007 - Elsevier
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[PDF] Kidney exchange with good samaritan donors: A characterization

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T Sönmez, MU Ünver - Boston College Working Papers in Economics, 2006 - bilkent.edu.tr
Page 1. Kidney Exchange with Good Samaritan Donors: A Characterization Tayfun Sönmez ∗
Boston College M. Utku¨Unver † University of Pittsburgh Abstract We analyze mechanisms
to kidney exchange with good samaritan donors where exchange ...
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Internet auctions with artificial adaptive agents: A study on market design

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J Duffy… - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2008 - Elsevier
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Efficient kidney exchange: Coincidence of wants in a structured market

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AE Roth, T Sonmez… - 2005 - nber.org
Patients needing kidney transplants may have willing donors who cannot donate to them
because of blood or tissue incompatibility. Incompatible patient-donor pairs can exchange
donor kidneys with other such pairs. The situation facing such pairs resembles models of ...
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[PDF] Negotiations, Organizations and Markets

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E Haruvy, AE Roth… - 2001 - nber.org
Page 1. Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Research Papers Harvard NOM Research
Paper No. 01-08 October 2001 The Dynamics of Law Clerk Matching: An Experimental and
Computational Investigation of Proposals for Reform of the Market Ernan Haruvy ...
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[CITATION] On the survival of some unstable two-sided matching mechanisms: An experimental and computational investigation of the stability hypothesis

MU Ünver - 2001 - working paper, Koç University
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[PDF] Credible Group-Stability in General Multi-Partner Matching Problems

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H Konishi… - 2003 - wallis.rochester.edu
Abstract Pairwise-stable matching mechanisms are practically used and perform very well in
the real world two-sided matching markets (eg, the US hospital-intern market, and the British
hospital-intern markets: see Roth 1984 and 1991, respectively). It is known, however, that ...
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Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation

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M Niederle, AE Roth… - 2009 - nber.org
Page 1. NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES UNRAVELING RESULTS FROM COMPARABLE
DEMAND AND SUPPLY: AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION Muriel Niederle Alvin E. Roth
M. Utku Ünver Working Paper 15006 http://www.nber.org/papers/w15006 ...
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[PDF] Incentive Compatible Allocation and Exchange of Discrete Resources

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M Pycia… - UCLA and Boston College, unpublished mimeo, 2009 - nber.org
Page 1. Incentive Compatible Allocation and Exchange of Discrete Resources∗ Marek Pycia†
UCLA M. Utku Ünver‡ Boston College October 7, 2010 Abstract We study the allocation
and exchange of discrete resources without monetary transfers. ...
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[CITATION] Practical Market Design: Four Matches-A Kidney Exchange Clearinghouse in New England

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AE Roth, T Sonmez, MU Unver - American …, 2005 - Princeton, NJ: American Economic …
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[CITATION] A Theory of School Choice Lotteries: Why Ties Should Not Be Broken Randomly

O Kesten, MU Ünver - Unpublished mimeo, Carnegie Mellon University and …, 2008
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[PDF] House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence

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T Sönmez, MU Ünver - Games Econ. Behav., forthcoming, doi, 2001 - 129.3.20.41
Page 1. House Allocation with Existing Tenants: An Equivalence* Tayfun Sönmez†
Koç University M. Utku ˝nverõ Koç University Abstract In this paper we analyze two
house allocation mechanisms each of which is designed ...
Cited by 6 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 6 versions

[CITATION] 0A kidney exchange clearinghouse in New England, 1 American Economic Review

AE Roth, T Sönmez… - Papers and Proceedings, 2005
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[PDF] Fair and Efficient Assignment via the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism

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O Kesten, M Kurino… - Boston College Working Papers in …, 2011 - bc.edu
Page 1. Fair and Efficient Assignment via the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism∗ Onur Kesten†
Morimitsu Kurino‡ M. Utku Ünver§ Carnegie Mellon University Maastricht University Boston
College First Draft: April 2010 This Draft: May 2011 Abstract ...
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[CITATION] Internet auctions with artificial adaptive agents: Evolution of late and multiple bidding

MU Unver - Computing in Economics and Finance, 2002
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[PDF] The 'Boston'School Choice Mechanism

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F Kojima… - Boston College Working Papers in Economics, 2010 - fmwww.bc.edu
Page 1. The “Boston” School-Choice Mechanism Fuhito Kojima ∗ Stanford University M.
Utku¨Unver † Boston College ‡ October 8, 2011 Abstract The Boston mechanism is a popular
student-placement mechanism in school-choice pro- grams around the world. ...
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Internet Auctions with Artificial Adaptive Agents

MU Unver - Computing in Economics and Finance 2001, 2001 - ideas.repec.org
The growing number of auction sites on the internet enable game theorists to ask strategic
questions on rationality of the observed bidding behavior. The most popular of them (eBay,
Amazon. com, AuctionWatch. com and Yahoo!, etc.) operate under similar sets of rules ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - Cached - All 3 versions

[CITATION] Efficiency enhanced course bidding: Evidence from a field experiment at the University of Michigan Business School

A Krishna, T Sonmez… - Framed Field Experiments, 2004 - econpapers.repec.org
By Aradhna Krishna, Tayfun Sonmez and M. Utku Unver; Efficiency Enhanced Course Bidding:
Evidence from a Field Experiment at the University of Michigan Business School.
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Internet Auctions with ArtiÞcial Adaptive Agents: On Evolution of Late Bidding∗

MU Ünver - 2003 - Citeseer
CiteSeerX - Document Details (Isaac Councill, Lee Giles, Pradeep Teregowda): Many internet
auction sites implement ascending-bid auctions. Empirically, “late” bidding is frequently observed
in “hard-close auctions. ” In “soft-close auctions, ” late bidding is less frequently observed ...
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[CITATION] Dynamic Exchange Mechanisms

MU Ünver - Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming, 2007
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Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Business-to-Business Matching Markets

E Haruvy, MU Ünver - Experimental, 2003 - ideas.repec.org
Downloadable! A two-sided matching framework is applied to repeated business-to- business
procurement matches. Both static and dynamic solutions concepts--- namely Gale-Shapley
deferred acceptance algorithm, learning dynamics, and genetic algorithms--- are used to obtain ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - Cached - All 4 versions

[CITATION] Matching

AE Roth, T Sönmez… - The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2008
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[CITATION] Kidney exchange, Game Theory and Information (EconWPA)

AE Roth, T Sonmez… - 2003 - … Bureau of Economic Research y The …
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Asset price bubbles and crashes with near-zero-intelligence traders: towards an understanding of laboratory findings

J Duffy… - Computational Economics, 2003 - ideas.repec.org
We examine whether a simple agent--based model can generate asset price bubbles and
crashes of the type observed in a series of laboratory asset market experiments beginning
with the work of Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988). We follow the methodology of ...
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[CITATION] Forthcoming.“Unraveling Yields Inefficient Matchings: Evidence from Post-Season College Football Bowls.”

G Fréchette, AE Roth… - Rand Journal of Economics
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[CITATION] Allocation and Exchange of Discrete Resources: Matching Market Design for House Allocation, Kidney Exchange, and School Choice

T Sönmez, MU Unver - Handbook of Social Economics, Elsevier
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[CITATION] Credible Group Stability in Multi-Partner Matching Problems

MU Ünver… - 2005 Meeting Papers, 2005 - econpapers.repec.org
By M. Utku Ünver and Hideo Konishi; Credible Group Stability in Multi-Partner Matching Problems.
Cited by 1 - Related articles - Cached - All 4 versions

[PDF] Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital-Intern Markets

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H Konishi… - Boston College Working Papers in …, 2002 - fmwww.bc.edu
Abstract In this paper, we analyze capacity manipulation games in hospitalMintern markets
inM spired by the realMlife entryMlevel labor markets for young physicians who seek
residencies at hospitals. In a hospitalMintern market, the matching is determined by a ...
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Market Mechanisms for Fair Division with Indivisible Objects and Money∗

MU Ünver, L Ehlers, T Sönmez, Y Sprumont… - 2003 - Citeseer
CiteSeerX - Document Details (Isaac Councill, Lee Giles, Pradeep Teregowda): A fair division
problem with indivisible objects and money consists of a set of agents, a set of objects, a value
matrix which shows the value of each agent for each object and a money endowment to be ...
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[PDF] Valuing Prearranged Paired Kidney Exchanges: A Stochastic Game Approach

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M Kurt, MS Roberts, AJ Schaefer… - Boston College Working …, 2011 - fmwww.bc.edu
Page 1. Valuing Prearranged Paired Kidney Exchanges: A Stochastic Game Approach
Valuing Prearranged Paired Kidney Exchanges: A Stochastic Game Approach Murat
Kurt {muk7@pitt.edu} Department of Industrial Engineering ...
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[CITATION] Course Bidding at Business Schools

MU Ünver, T Sönmez - Working Papers, 2003 - econpapers.repec.org
By M. Utku Ünver and Tayfun Sönmez; Course Bidding at Business Schools.
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[PDF] Market Mechanisms for Fair Allocation of Indivisible Objects and Money

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MU Ünver - 2007 - bc.edu
Page 1. Market Mechanisms for Fair Allocation of Indivisible Objects and Money∗ M. Utku Ünver
The University of Pittsburgh† March 2007 Abstract This paper studies the problem of fair allocation
of indivisible objects and money among agents with quasi-linear preferences. ...
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[CITATION] Asset Price Bubbles and Crashes With Zero--Intelligence Traders

J Duffy… - Computing in Economics and Finance 2002, 2002 - ideas.repec.org
No abstract is available for this item. ... To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three options: 1. Check below under "Related
research" whether another version of this item is available online. 2. Check on the ...
Cached - All 3 versions

[CITATION] Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Structured Market

MU Ünver, A Roth… - Working Papers, 2005 - econpapers.repec.org
By M. Utku Ünver, Alvin Roth and Tayfun Sönmez; Efficient Kidney
Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Structured Market.
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Date posted: March 01, 2010; Last revised: March 01, 2010 Suggested Citation

Full text - MIT Libraries
T Sönmez, MU Ünver - International Economic Review, 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
SSRN-*Course Bidding at Business Schools by Tayfun Sönmez, M. UTKU ÜNVER.

[CITATION] Computerized matching algorithms to optimize matches and increase opportunities for live donor kidney exchange

SL Saidman, AE Roth, T Sonmez, MU Unver… - Human Immunology, 2005 - Elsevier
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[CITATION] Ideology and Existence of 50%-Majority Equilibria in Multidimensional Spatial Voting Models

MU Unver… - Working Papers, 2005 - econpapers.repec.org
Related works: Working Paper: Ideology and existence of 50%-majority equilibria in multidimensional
spatial voting models (2006) Working Paper: Ideology and Existence of 50%-Majority Equilibria
in Multidimensional Spatial Voting Models (2008) Working Paper: Ideology and existence ...
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Reserve Price Auctions with a Strong Bidder

MU Unver… - Computing in Economics and Finance …, 2001 - ideas.repec.org
This paper investigates private-valuereserve price'auctions when there is a strong bidder in
an n-bidder model. Consider an auction model, in which bidders draw their values from the
same distribution, but then identity of the high-value bidder is revealed. This can be more ...
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NINE NON-SIMULTANEOUS EXTENDED ALTRUISTIC DONOR (NEAD) CHAINS

MA Rees, JE Kopke, RP Pelletier, DL Segev… - kuznets.harvard.edu
Page 1. NINE NON-SIMULTANEOUS EXTENDED ALTRUISTIC DONOR (NEAD)
CHAINS Michael A. Rees,1,2 Jonathan E. Kopke,3 Ronald P. Pelletier,2,4 Dorry
L. Segev,5 Alfredo J. Fabrega,2,6 Jeffrey Rogers,2,7 Oleh G. ...
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[PDF] Credible Group-Deviation in Multi-Partner Matching Problems

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H Konishi, MU Ünver… - 2003 - feem.it
Page 1. Credible Group-Deviation in Multi-Partner Matching Problems Hideo Konishi
and M. Utku Ünver NOTA DI LAVORO 115.2003 DECEMBER 2003 CTN – Coalition
Theory Network Hideo Konishi, Department of Economics ...
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[PDF] Altruistically Unbalanced Kidney Exchange

[PDF] from bc.edu
T Sönmez, MU Ünver - Boston College Working Papers in Economics, 2011 - bc.edu
Page 1. Altruistically Unbalanced Kidney Exchange ∗ Tayfun Sönmez † Boston College
M. Utku Ünver ‡ Boston College This Draft: September 2011 Abstract Although a pilot
national live-donor kidney exchange program was recently launched ...
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Lottery mechanism design for school choice

O Kesten, MU Ünver - Proceedings of the Behavioral and Quantitative …, 2010 - dl.acm.org
Google, Inc. (search). ...

Ideology and existence of 50%-majority equilibria in multidimensional spatial voting models

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H Crès… - Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2010 - jtp.sagepub.com
Page 1. IDEOLOGY AND EXISTENCE OF 50%-MAJORITY EQUILIBRIA IN
MULTIDIMENSIONAL SPATIAL VOTING MODELS Herve´ Cre`s and M. Utku U¨
nver ABSTRACT When aggregating individual preferences through ...
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[CITATION] A Field Experiment on Course Bidding at Business Schools

MU Ünver… - Working Papers, 2004 - econpapers.repec.org
By M. Utku Ünver and Aradhna Krishna; A Field Experiment
on Course Bidding at Business Schools.
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