ML Bech… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2003 - Elsevier
We use a game theoretical framework to analyze the intraday behavior of banks with respect
to settlement of interbank claims in a real-time gross settlement setting. The game played by
banks depends upon the intraday credit policy of the central bank and it encompasses two ...
R Garratt… - Econometrica, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
In standard auctions resale creates a role for a speculator—a bidder who is commonly
known to have no use value for the good on sale. We study this issue in environments with
symmetric independent private-value bidders. For second-price and English auctions the ...
R Garratt… - Journal of Political Economy, 1994 - JSTOR
This paper describes a contract theory of public finance of college education that explains
why everyone pays for the college education of a lucky minority. The contract provides
gambles that families desire. Optimizing the contract determines the taxes paid by all ...
R Garratt,
M Walker… - 2004 - escholarship.org
Abstract: When second-price auctions have been conducted in the laboratory, most of the
observed bids have been “overbids”(bids that exceed the bidder's value) and there are very
few underbids. Few if any of the subjects in those experiments had any prior experience ...
R Garratt - Economic Theory, 1995 - Springer
Summary In economies with indivisible commodities, consumers tend to prefer lotteries in
commodities. A potential mechanism for satisying these preferences is unrestricted
purchasing and selling of lotteries in decentralized markets, as suggested in Prescott and ...
R Garratt… - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2009 - Elsevier
We use experimental methods to investigate what factors contribute to breakdowns in
coordination among a bank's depositors. Subjects in our experiment decide whether to
leave their money deposited in a bank or withdraw it early; a bank run occurs when there ...
M Bech… - 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We show how the interbank payment system can become illiquid following wide-
scale disruptions. Two forces are at play in such disruptions-operational problems and
changes in participants' behavior. We model the interbank payment system as an n-player ...
R Garratt… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1996 - Elsevier
Lotteries are introduced in the exchange model of Shapley and Scarf (J. Math. Econ. 1
(1974), 23-37). In competition, traders buy and sell probabilities on houses. When
considering the core, feasible allocations of the economy and blocking allocations of ...
R Garratt, T Keister, CZ Qin… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2002 - Elsevier
We analyze sunspot-equilibrium prices in nonconvex economies with perfect markets and a
continuous sunspot variable. Our primary result is that every sunspot equilibrium allocation
can be supported by prices that, when adjusted for probabilities, are constant across ...
R Garratt… - Economics Bulletin, 2003 - econ.ucsb.edu
Abstract This paper looks at cooperation structures that result from a strategic game where
players make simultaneous proposals for cooperation. We identify cooperation structures
that maximize the potential of the game, and show how the outcome of potential maxr ...
R Garratt… - Journal of Risk and Insurance, 1996 - JSTOR
Upper limits in property insurance contracts can result directly from the consumer's demand
for them. They are demanded because the consumer has options to convert or move out of
damaged property rather than merely to restore it to its previous condition and occupy it. In ...
R Garratt… - 2003 - escholarship.org
Abstract: This paper contributes to the literature on second-price auctions with resale. We
add speculators—bidders with value zero—to the standard symmetric independent private
values environment. There always exists a continuum of inefficient equilibria that are ...
R Garratt,
M Walker… - 2002 - econ.ucsb.edu
Abstract When second-price auctions have been conducted in the laboratory, most of the
observed bids have been overbids (bids that exceed the bidder, s value) and there are very
few underbids. Few if any of the subjects in those experiments had any prior experience ...
R Garratt… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1997 - Elsevier
Given a game, the set of joint lotteries over partitions of the agents of any subgame induces
a subset of the vectors of balancing weights for the subgame. Games whose subgames are
all balanced with respect to these vectors of balancing weights are called totally L- ...
R Garratt - The Journal of Economic Education, 2000 - Taylor & Francis
In this article, I describe an experiment that demonstrates the dynamic process that leads to
long-run equilibrium in a multimarket setting. In the experiment, each student plays the part
of a farmer who has to decide each period whether to supply one unit of corn, wheat, rice, ...
R Garratt - 2005 - escholarship.org
Abstract: We use experimental methods to investigate the extent to which breakdowns in
coordination can lead to bank runs. Subjects decide whether to leave money deposited in a
bank or withdraw it early; a run occurs when there are too many early withdrawals. We ...
R Garratt, T Keister… - International Economic Review, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
Sunspot equilibrium and lottery equilibrium are two stochastic solution concepts for
nonstochastic economies. We compare these concepts in a class of completely
finite,(possibly) nonconvex exchange economies with perfect markets, which requires ...
Abstract: Recently, economists have argued that a bank's importance within the financial
system depends not only on its individual characteristics but also on its position within the
banking network. A bank is deemed to be" central" if, based on our network analysis, it is ...
R Garratt - Canadian Journal of Economics, 1997 - JSTOR
The paper shows how the presence of an indivisible good can cause a divisible good to be
inferior and possibly Giffen. Indivisibility is shown to be central to a discussion by JR Hicks
on inferior goods.///Indivisibilités, biens inférieurs et biens Giffen. On montre comment la ...
R Garratt… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2002 - Elsevier
In nonconvex environments, a sunspot equilibrium can sometimes be destroyed by the
introduction of new extrinsic information. We provide a simple test for determining whether or
not a particular equilibrium survives, or is robust to, all possible refinements of the state ...
R Garratt… - 2004 - escholarship.org
Abstract: The experimental economics literature on second-price sealed-bid private value
auctions has established that subjects typically bid more than their value, despite the fact
that value bidding is a dominant strategy in such auctions. Moreover, the laboratory ...
R Garratt, CZ Qin, J Parco… - … Review, Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. …, 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: A model of coalition government formation is presented in which inefficient, non-
minimal winning coalitions may form in Nash equilibrium. Predictions for five games are
presented and tested experimentally. The experimental data support potential ...
R Garratt, CZ Qin… - Games and Economic …, 2000 - econ.ucsb.edu
Abstract We consider markets in which agents supply their time or the services of a capital
good, and the duration of the market is limited. We show that a coalitional game can be
generated by such a market if and only if the charac0 teristic function of the game is ...
R Garratt - Journal of Economic Theory, 1992 - Elsevier
Abstract [7.], 348–354] gives an example of a static general equilibrium economy with lump-
sum taxes and transfers in which the set of equilibrium money prices is not connected. Here
an example is presented, based on that of Peck, in which for a given tax policy the ...
R Garratt… - The GENEVA Papers on Risk and Insurance- …, 2000 - Springer
The paper examines property insurance contracts in which consumers choose the upper
limit on coverage. Exclusions are of two types, and both reduce the demand for insurance of
the included perils. A practical implication is that an insurer can raise the demand for fire ...
R Garratt… - Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 1995 - Elsevier
The idea that simple lump-sum taxes and transfers may encounters multiplicity and
instability of equilibria and counter-intuitive utility changes has long been recognized. Using
information about the equilibrium manifold, we construct a finite sequence of lump-sum ...
R Garratt - … Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d' …, 2005 - Wiley Online Library
This paper describes how indivisible goods can be Giffen goods. 1 The ideas are explicated
through the story of Oliver. Oliver has an exciting, expensive lifestyle in the big city of
Toronto. He would gladly continue it, but realizes he cannot afford to do so given his ...
R Garratt, T Tröger… - 2006 - econ.ucsb.edu
Abstract In second-price or English auctions involving symmetric, independent, private-value
bidders the equilibrium outcome may not be efficient if resale is allowed. In addition to the
efficient, symmetric equilibrium there exist inefficient, asymmetric equilibria in which the ...
R Garratt… - Economics Bulletin, 2007 - ideas.repec.org
We specify an adjustment process that converges to the set of potential-maximizing strategy
profiles for 3-player cooperation-formation games or n-player cooperation-formation games
based on a superadditive characteristic function. Our analysis provides a justification for ...
[CITATION] uCollusion via Resale, vStaff General Research Papers 12829
R Garratt, T Tröger… - Iowa State University, Department of Economics, 2007
[CITATION] John Wooders, 2007.“Behavior in Second-Price Auctions by Highly Experienced eBay Buyers and Sellers,”
R Garratt… - Working Paper
R Garratt, JM Marshall… - 1995 - en.scientificcommons.org
deutsch english. Publication View. 37519462. Supplemental Health Insurance. Rod Garratt,;
John M. Marshall. Publication details. Repository, RePEc (Germany). Type, preprint. About
ScientificCommons Imprint Contact Register URL Help.
[CITATION] hPublic Finance of Private Goods: The Case of College Education. iJournal of Political Economy
R Garratt… - 1994 - Vol
R Garratt… - Journal of Risk and Insurance, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
Existing insurance theory fails when applied to real property because it does not account for
variations in the economic environment. The article studies optimal property insurance in the
presence of two sources of variation: equity risk and conversion risk. Equity risk is ...
R Garratt… - 2001 - econ.ucsb.edu
Abstract The paper compares models of insurance of real property when owners may
convert damaged property to another use instead of restoring it to the preЛdamage use. First
it describes the optimum insurance. The main result is that the deductible and the upper ...
R Garratt… - 2001 - feem-web.it
Abstract This paper looks at cooperation structures that result from a strategic game where
players make simultaneous proposals for cooperation. We characterize the solutions to the
game, and provide a justification in terms of a simple learning/adjustment process for ...
R Garratt… - 1996 - econ.ucsb.edu
Abstract The paper studies contracts involving lotteries for the purpose of trading an
indivisible good. The contracts allow players to reach agree0 ments for trading the good
even if the reservation price of the poten0 tial buyer is below that of the potential seller. In ...
R Garratt - Economics Bulletin - accessecon.com
Abstract This paper looks at cooperation structures that result from a strategic game where
players make simultaneous proposals for cooperation. We identify cooperation structures
that maximize the potential of the game, and show how the outcome of potential ...
R Garratt… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1994 - Elsevier
Abstract We provide a condition for testing non-concavifiability of preference relations that
utilizes the marginal rate of substitution. The result is derived from Kannai's Proposition 2.1
(ii) in Journal of Mathematical Economics 4, 1977, pp. 1-56.
R Garratt… - Education Economics, 1995 - Taylor & Francis
A family considers whether it might, at a point some years in the future, send its child to
college. At that future point, the child's pre-college achievement determines the potential
gain in human capital and the probability of completion. Years before the family reaches ...
R Garratt… - 1999 - escholarship.org
Abstract The paper studies optimal property insurance in the presence of equity risk and
conversion risk. Equity risk is randomness of the value of a property. It tends to raise demand
for conventional insurance on the property by effectively increasing the risk aversion of the ...
R Garratt - Economics Bulletin - accessecon.com
Abstract We specify an adjustment process that converges to the set of potential−
maximizing strategy profiles for 3− player cooperation− formation games or n− player
cooperation− formation games based on a superadditive characteristic function. Our ...
R Garratt… - 2005 - econstor.eu
Zusammenfassung: In standard auctions with symmetric, independent private value bidders
resale creates a role for a speculator? a bidder who is commonly known to have no use
value for the good on sale. For second-price and English auctions the efficient value- ...
Abstract We describe classroom experiments designed to test and illustrate matching
mechanisms outlined in Gale and Shapley (1962). Two methods are presented, one in
which rankings are provided and one in which they are supplied by the students.
R Garratt - 2001 - econ.ucsb.edu
Abstract This paper presents an example of an economy that has a unique com0 petitive
equilibrium despite the fact that there is a freely produced good, production is reversible,
and consumers are be satiated on the boundary of their consumption sets. The example ...
T Tröger, R Garratt, C Zheng - Bonn Econ …, 2008 - troeger.vwl.uni-mannheim.de
Page 1. Collusion via Resale Thomas Tröger, University of Bonn (joint work with Rod Garratt,
University of California at Santa Barbara, and Charles Zheng, Iowa State University) January
8, 2009 1 Page 2. Collusion in Auctions: Auctions are used when -seller has market power ...
R Garratt… - 1992 - en.scientificcommons.org
R Garratt, K Shell… - 1993 - econ.ucsb.edu
Abstract We describe some static economies for which a (certainty) Walrasian equilibrium
does not exist but a sunspot equilibrium does exist. Our work depends on the indivisibility of
a freely produced good in economies with similar consumers.
ML Bech… - 2006 - riksbank.se
Abstract We show how the interbank payment system can become illiquid following wide-
scale disruptions. Two forces are at play in such disruptions–operational problems and
changes in participants' behavior. We model the interbank payment system as an n-player ...
R Garratt, T Tröger… - 2006 - homes.chass.utoronto.ca
Abstract We construct a continuum of inefficient, asymmetric equilibria of symmetric,
independent, private-value second-price auctions where the auction winner can offer the
item for resale to the losers. For the case where the reserve price in the initial auction ...
R Garratt - University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics …, 1994 - econ.ucsb.edu
Abstract It is shown that if a consumer is allowed to undertake a gamble in money prior to
making a consumption decision then her expected demand curve for an indivisible good can
be upward sloping. The result is contrary to standard theory that defines a reservation ...
R Garratt… - 1999 - econ.ucsb.edu
In recent years, female participation in the labor force has increased substantially and the
type of occupations they enter into has changed. More and more, women are pursuing
careers that require higher levels of education, and they are entering into marriages ...
G Antinolfi, J Bigelow, L Bossi… - … on Financial Fragility: …, 2009 - karlshell.com
Karl Shell has been the Thorne Professor of Economics at Cornell University since 1986.
Shell has been the editor of the Journal of Economic Theor y since its founding in 1968. In
2000, JET opened a second office to handle the increased editorial workload. The editor ...
R Garratt, JM Marshall… - 1999 - aria.org
Exclusions are part of any property insurance. A prototypically simple contract covers losses
from a single peril but excludes losses from all other perils and, typically, from the insured
peril in some instances. Alternatively, a complex contract like any of the forms of ...
R Garratt… - University of California at Santa …, 1994 - en.scientificcommons.org
R Garratt… - University of California at Santa …, 1994 - en.scientificcommons.org
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