T Tsoulouhas… - American Journal of Agricultural …, 1999 - ajae.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract This article analyzes optimal livestock production contracts between an integrator
company and many independent growers in three similar industries: broiler, turkey, and
swine. The analysis provides an explanation for the simultaneous existence of distinct ...
A Agrawal, CR Knoeber… - Journal of Corporate Finance, 2006 - Elsevier
We argue that outsiders are handicapped (chosen only if markedly better than the best
insider) in Chief Executive Officer (CEO) successions to strengthen the incentive that the
contest to become CEO provides inside candidates. Handicapping implies are that a firm ...
T Tsoulouhas… - American Journal of Agricultural …, 2001 - ajae.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract Grower discontent with tournaments as mechanisms for settling poultry contracts
can largely be attributed to the group composition risk that tournaments impose on growers.
This article focuses on the welfare effects of a widely advocated regulatory proposal to ...
T Tsoulouhas, CR Knoeber… - Economic Theory, 2007 - Springer
Abstract Should a firm favor insiders (handicap outsiders) when selecting a CEO? One
reason to do so is to take advantage of the contest to become CEO as a device for providing
current incentives to employees. An important reason not to do so is that this can reduce ...
T Tsoulouhas - Journal of economic behavior & organization, 2004 - cenet.org.cn
Abstract The paper analyzes the optimality of relative performance evaluation via two-part
piece rate tournaments in incentive contracting with multiple agents and two-sided moral
hazard. If the agents are risk-averse, it is shown that a tournament is optimal only when ...
C Mezzetti… - International journal of industrial organization, 2000 - Elsevier
We show that precontractual gathering of information by the uninformed party in a
transaction benefits the favorable types of the informed party by allowing them to separate
from the unfavorable types. Complete separation of types can only occur if the informed ...
TC Tsoulouhas - Explorations in Economic History, 1992 - Elsevier
The aim of this paper is to explain English population and technological changes from 1550
to 1839. The model developed in this paper endogenizes technological.
[CITATION] CEO succession: insiders versus outsiders
A Agrawal, CR Knoeber… - University of Alabama. College of …, 2000
T Tsoulouhas… - Economics Bulletin, 2007 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper compares relative performance evaluation via tournaments to absolute
performance evaluation via piece rates when agents are heterogeneous ex post, to make
the point that agent heterogeneity compromises the insurance function of tournaments. In ...
CM Kahn… - Economic Theory, 1999 - Springer
Summary. We examine the strategic role of information transmission in a repeated principal-
agent relationship where the agent produces information that is useful to the principal. The
agent values continuous employment for the principal because he makes a relationship- ...
T Tsoulouhas - Economica, 1999 - Wiley Online Library
This paper investigates the interaction between a privately informed firm's contracts for
labour and its contracts for credit. The analysis shows that if the worker has no ex post
outside opportunities, or if the liquidation value of the firm is large, then the credit contract ...
K Marinakis… - Working Paper Series, 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: A highly acclaimed result in contract theory is that tournaments are superior to
piece rate contracts when the agents are risk averse and their production activities are
subject to a relatively large common shock. The reason is that tournaments allow the ...
T Tsoulouhas, A Agrawal… - 2000 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Firms tend to promote insiders to the CEO position rather than to hire outsiders.
This paper explains this phenomenon by developing a framework in which firms value the
incentive that the contest to become CEO provides to current employees, but also want the ...
A Agrawal, CR Knoeber… - 2001 - hubcap.clemson.edu
Abstract About 80% of the time, firms select insiders to become CEO. We argue that
handicapping of outsiders partially accounts for this tendency to promote from within.
Outside candidates may be handicapped (chosen only if markedly better than the best ...
T Tsoulouhas - European Economic Review, 1996 - Elsevier
This paper investigates the interaction between a firm's contracts for labor and its contracts
for credit under asymmetric information and limited liability, when workers are either always
committed to their contract or they lack the power to commit ex post because arbitrage ...
[CITATION] Integrator Contract with Many Agents and Bankruptcy
T Theofanis… - American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1999
K Marinakis… - 2008 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: A celebrated result in the theory of tournaments is that relative performance
evaluation (tournaments) is a superior compensation method to absolute performance
evaluation (piece rate contracts) when the agents are risk-averse, the principal is risk- ...
[CITATION] Commitment in labor and credit contracts with asymmetric information, bankruptcy and extensive form gaming
TC Tsoulouhas - 1993 - University of Illinois at Urbana- …
C Knoeber, T Tsoulouhas - 2011 - contesttheory.org
Abstract In a deterministic contest or all-pay auction, all rents are dissipated when
information is complete and contestants are identical. As one contestant becomes" stronger",
that is, values the prize more, total expenditures are known to decrease monotonically. ...
C Knoeber, T Tsoulouhas - 2011 - contesttheory.org
Abstract The paper examines the chance of winning a Tullock-contest when participants
differ in both their talent and their attitude towards risk. For the case of CARA preferences, it
is shown that the winning probability may be higher for a low-skilled agent with a low ...
[CITATION] Tournaments, Contests and Relative Performance Evaluation (2007, Vol. 29, No. 21.)
C Knoeber, T Tsoulouhas…
DM Holthausen… - Economic Theory, 2008 - Springer
Abstract Current literature has largely ignored the fact that some organizations are highly
selective when admitting new agents while others are more open. In addition, some
organizations audit or sort agent behavior within the organization more aggressively than ...
T Tsoulouhas - Economics Bulletin, 2007 - econpapers.repec.org
... Theofanis Tsoulouhas () and Theofanis Tsoulouhas () Additional contact information Theofanis
Tsoulouhas: North Carolina State University Theofanis Tsoulouhas: North Carolina State
University Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Theofanis Tsoulouhas (). ...
C Knoeber, T Tsoulouhas - 2011 - contesttheory.org
Abstract A multi-stage model on the course of war is presented: Individual battles are
modeled as private value all-pay auctions with asymmetric combatants of two opposing
teams. These auctions are placed within a multi-stage framework with a tug-of-war ...
K Marinakis… - Journal of Economics, 2008 - Springer
Abstract A celebrated result in the theory of tournaments is that relative performance
evaluation (tournaments) is a superior compensation method to absolute performance
evaluation (piece rate contracts) when the agents are risk-averse, the principal is risk- ...
[CITATION] English Demographic Change from 1550-1839: A New Look
TC Tsoulouhas… - 1990 - University of Illinois at Urbana- …
E Dinopoulos… - 2012 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: In this paper, we construct a North-South general equilibrium model of offshoring,
highlighting the nexus among effort-based labor productivity, heterogeneous offshoring
costs and the structure of wages. Offshoring is modeled as international transfer of ...
C Knoeber, T Tsoulouhas - 2011 - contesttheory.org
Abstract This paper studies incentive contracting in a market with R&D spillovers and
Cournot competition. It examines the effect of spillovers on contractual choices and
addresses the question of whether the standard result that profits are higher under full ...
T Tsoulouhas - ideas.repec.org
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T Tsoulouhas - Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
2. Abstract The papers in this symposium reflect several of the directions taken by current
research on tournaments, contests and relative performance evaluation. The papers help us
understand the implications of agent heterogeneity on the incentives of agents to perform ...
C Knoeber, T Tsoulouhas - 2011 - contesttheory.org
Abstract This project aims to find out whether the most skilled candidates receive promotion
proposals in promotion tournaments or in fact the most overconfident ones. Up to now this
question has only been answered theoretically: Several models predict that ...
C Knoeber, T Tsoulouhas - 2011 - contesttheory.org
Abstract We study a best-of-three all-pay contest with two teams in which the first team to win
two games wins the contest. Each team has a value of winning the contest as well as a value
of winning a single game. It is assumed that a team's value of winning a game in its home ...
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