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Efficient use of information and social value of information

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GM Angeletos… - Econometrica, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
This paper analyzes equilibrium and welfare for a tractable class of economies (games) that
have externalities, strategic complementarity or substitutability, and heterogeneous
information. First, we characterize the equilibrium use of information: complementarity ...
Cited by 182 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 28 versions

Transparency of information and coordination in economies with investment complementarities

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
GM Angeletos… - 2004 - nber.org
How do public and private information affect equilibrium allocations and social welfare in
economies with investment complementarities? And what is the optimal transparency in the
information conveyed, for example, by economic statistics, policy announcements, or ...
Cited by 129 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 30 versions

Dynamic global games of regime change: Learning, multiplicity, and the timing of attacks

[PDF] from bme.hu
Full text - MIT Libraries
GM Angeletos, C Hellwig… - Econometrica, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
Global games of regime change—coordination games of incomplete information in which a
status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attack it—have been
used to study crises phenomena such as currency attacks, bank runs, debt crises, and ...
Cited by 110 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 27 versions

On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
G Calzolari… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2006 - Elsevier
This paper studies the exchange of information between two principals who contract
sequentially with the same agent, as in the case of a buyer who purchases from multiple
sellers. We show that when (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in the ...
Cited by 102 - Related articles - All 33 versions

Signaling in a global game: Coordination and policy traps

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
GM Angeletos, C Hellwig… - 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper introduces signaling in a global game so as to examine the
informational role of policy in coordination environments such as currency crises and bank
runs. While exogenous asymmetric information has been shown to select a unique ...
Cited by 83 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 21 versions

Coordination and policy traps

[PDF] from espol.edu.ec
GM Angeletos, C Hellwig… - 2003 - nber.org
This paper examines the ability of a policy maker to control equilibrium outcomes in an
environment where market participants play a coordination game with information
heterogeneity. We consider defense policies against speculative currency attacks in a ...
Cited by 63 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 46 versions

Monopoly with resale

[PDF] from eea-esem.com
Full text - MIT Libraries
G Calzolari… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
We examine the intricacies associated with the design of revenue-maximizing mechanisms
for a monopolist who expects her buyers to resell. We consider two cases: resale to a third
party who does not participate in the primary market and interbidder resale, where the ...
Cited by 58 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 39 versions

Policy with dispersed information

[PDF] from mit.edu
GM Angeletos… - 2007 - nber.org
This paper studies policy in a class of economies in which information about commonly-
relevant fundamentals--such as aggregate productivity and demand conditions--is dispersed
and can not be centralized by the government. In these economies, the decentralized use ...
Cited by 49 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 47 versions

Tilting the supply schedule to enhance competition in uniform-price auctions

[PDF] from feem.it
Full text - MIT Libraries
M LiCalzi… - European Economic Review, 2005 - Elsevier
Uniform-price auctions of a divisible good in fixed supply admit underpricing equilibria,
where bidders submit high inframarginal bids to prevent competition on prices. The seller
can obstruct this behavior by tilting her supply schedule and making the amount of ...
Cited by 43 - Related articles - Library Search - All 16 versions

Dynamic mechanism design: Revenue equivalence, profit maximization and information disclosure

A Pavan, I Segal… - 2008 - Citeseer
Abstract This paper examines the problem of how to design incentive-compatible
mechanisms in environments in which the agents' private information evolves stochastically
over time and in which decisions have to be made in each period. The environments we ...
Cited by 34 - Cached

[PDF] Optimal Design of Privacy Policies1

[PDF] from unicatt.it
G Calzolari… - 2001 - istituti.unicatt.it
Abstract In this paper we examine a contracting environment where two principals
sequentially interact with a common agent. We endogenize the information ow between the
two contractual relationships and show how an upstream principal may bene t from ...
Cited by 35 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 6 versions

Dynamic mechanism design: Incentive compatibility, profit maximization and information disclosure

A Pavan, I Segal… - 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We examine the design of incentive-compatible screening mechanisms for
dynamic environments in which the agents' types follow a (possibly non-Markov) stochastic
process, decisions may be made over time and may affect the type process, and payoffs ...
Cited by 37 - Related articles - All 9 versions

Socially optimal coordination: Characterization and policy implications

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
GM Angeletos… - 2006 - nber.org
In recent years there has been a growing interest in macro models with heterogeneity in
information and complementarity in actions. These models deliver promising positive
properties, such as heightened inertia and volatility. But they also raise important ...
Cited by 29 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 21 versions

Sequential contracting with multiple principals

[PDF] from unibo.it
Full text - MIT Libraries
A Pavan… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2009 - Elsevier
This paper considers dynamic games in which multiple principals contract sequentially and
non-cooperatively with the same agent. We first show that when contracting is private, ie
when downstream principals do not observe the mechanisms offered upstream and the ...
Cited by 21 - Related articles - All 14 versions

Beauty contests and irrational exuberance: A neoclassical approach

[PDF] from psu.edu
GM Angeletos, G Lorenzoni… - 2010 - nber.org
The arrival of new, unfamiliar, investment opportunities is often associated with “exuberant”
movements in asset prices and real economic activity. During these episodes of high
uncertainty, financial markets look at the real sector for signals about the profitability of the ...
Cited by 18 - Related articles - Library Search - All 19 versions

Long-term contracting in a changing world

[PDF] from econstor.eu
A Pavan - 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: I study the properties of optimal long-term contracts in an environment in which the
agent's type evolves stochastically over time. The model stylizes a buyer-seller relationship
but the results apply quite naturally to many contractual situations including regulation and ...
Cited by 13 - Related articles - All 9 versions

Truthful revelation mechanisms for simultaneous common agency games

[PDF] from 134.245.92.14
Full text - MIT Libraries
A Pavan… - American Economic Journal: …, 2010 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: We introduce new revelation mechanisms for simultaneous common agency
games which, although they do not always permit a complete equilibrium characterization,
do facilitate the characterization of the equilibrium outcomes that are typically of interest in ...
Cited by 14 - Related articles - All 14 versions

Information Dynamics and Equilibrium Multiplicity in Global Games of Regime Change

[PDF] from yale.edu
GM Angeletos, C Hellwig… - 2004 - nber.org
Global games of regime change--that is, coordination games of incomplete information in
which a status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attacks it--have
been used to study crises phenomena such as currency attacks, bank runs, debt crises, ...
Cited by 11 - Related articles - Library Search - All 40 versions

[PDF] Dynamic managerial compensation: On the optimality of seniority-based schemes

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
D Garrett… - 2010 - faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu
Abstract We characterize the firm's optimal contract for a manager who faces costly effort
decisions and whose ability to generate profits for the firm changes stochastically over time.
The optimal contract is obtained as the solution to a dynamic mechanism design problem ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - View as HTML

[PDF] Efficiency and welfare in economies with incomplete information

[PDF] from yale.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
GM Angeletos… - Econometrica, 2007 - cowles.econ.yale.edu
Abstract This paper examines a class of economies with externalities, strategic
complementarity or substitutability, and incomplete information. We first characterize efficient
allocations and compare them to equilibrium. We show how the optimal degree of ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 7 versions

Defense policies against currency attacks: On the possibility of predictions in a global game with multiple equilibria

GM Angeletos, A Pavan… - 2007 - ideas.repec.org
This paper studies defense policies in a global-game model of speculative currency attacks.
Although the signaling role of policy interventions sustains multiple equilibria, a number of
novel predictions emerge which are robust across all equilibria.(i) The central bank ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - Cached - All 5 versions

Managerial turnover in a changing world

[PDF] from nd.edu
D Garrett… - 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We characterize a firm's profit-maximizing turnover policy in an environment where
managerial productivity changes stochastically over time and is the managers' private
information. Our key positive result shows that the productivity level that the firm requires ...
Cited by 8 - Related articles - All 18 versions

[PDF] A markovian revelation principle for common agency games

[PDF] from unibo.it
A Pavan… - 2002 - dse.unibo.it
Abstract. In contracting games where multiple principals interact with a common agent,
standard revelation mechanisms have been shown to be inadequate to characterize the set
of equilibrium allocations. This paper introduces a Markovian Revelation Principle for ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 4 versions

Dynamic Managerial Compensation: a Mechanism Design Approach

[PDF] from carloalberto.org
D Garrett… - 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We characterize the optimal incentive scheme for a manager who faces costly effort
decisions and whose ability to generate profits for the firm varies stochastically over time.
The optimal contract is obtained as the solution to a dynamic mechanism design problem ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - All 24 versions

[PDF] Learning, multiplicity and timing of attacks in a dynamic global game of regime change

[PDF] from upf.edu
GM Angeletos, C Hellwig… - Unpublished paper, MIT, UCLA, …, 2006 - econ.upf.edu
Abstract Global games of regime change–coordination games of incomplete information in
which a status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attacks it–have
been used to study crises phenomena such as currency attacks, bank runs, debt crises, ...
Cited by 6 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 2 versions

[CITATION] On the dynamics of information, coordination, and regime change

GM Angeletos, C Hellwig… - Econometrica, 2004
Cited by 6 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries

On the use of menus in sequential common agency

[PDF] from unibo.it
Full text - MIT Libraries
G Calzolari… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2008 - Elsevier
We illustrate, by means of two examples, why assuming the principals offer simple menus (ie
collections of payoff-relevant alternatives) as opposed to more general mechanisms may
preclude a complete characterization of the set of equilibrium outcomes in certain ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - All 12 versions

[PDF] Price discrimination in many-to-many matching markets

[PDF] from upenn.edu
R Gomes… - URL http://faculty. wcas. …, 2011 - economics.sas.upenn.edu
Abstract We study second-degree price discrimination in markets where the product traded
by the monopolist is access to other agents. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions
for the welfareand the profit-maximizing mechanisms to employ a single network or a ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 32 versions

[CITATION] Preempting Speculative Currency Attacks: Robust Predictions in a Global-Game with Multiple Equilibria

GM Angeletos… - 2011 - working paper, Northwestern …
Cited by 4 - Related articles

[PDF] Information Dynamics and Multiplicity in Global Games of Regime Change

[PDF] from yale.edu
GM Angeletos, A Hellwig… - NBER Working Paper, 2004 - aida.econ.yale.edu
Abstract Global games of regime change—that is, coordination games of incomplete
information in which a “status quo” is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents
attacks it—have been used to study crises phenomena such bank runs, currency attacks, ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 6 versions

Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games

G Calzolari… - 2007 - ideas.repec.org
In games in which multiple principals contract simultaneously and non-cooperatively with
the same agent, standard direct revelation mechanisms in which the agent reports his type
(ie his exogenous private information) have been proven inadequate to characterize the ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - Cached - All 4 versions

[CITATION] Forthcoming.“Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity and Timing of Attacks.”

GM Angeletos, C Hellwig… - Econometrica
Cited by 3 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries

[CITATION] Efficient Use of Information and Welfare Analysis with Complementarities and Asymmetric Information

GM Angeletos… - 2005 - mimeo MIT
Cited by 3 - Related articles

[CITATION] nDynamic Mechanism Design: Incentive Com& patibility, Profit Maximization and Information Disclosureo

A Pavan, I Segal… - 2011 - mimeo Northwestern University and …
Cited by 3 - Related articles

[PDF] A Rational Theory of Irrational Exuberance

[PDF] from carloalberto.org
GM Angeletos, G Lorenzoni… - 2008 - carloalberto.org
Abstract The arrival of new, unfamiliar, investment opportunitiesp eg, internet commerce,
emerging markets, novel financial instrumentsp is often associated with large, mexuberant,
nmovements in asset prices and real investment. While irrational explanations of these ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 9 versions

[PDF] Robust predictions in global games with multiple equilibria: defense policies against currency attacks

[PDF] from psu.edu
GM Angeletos, C Hellwig… - Discussion Papers, 2008 - Citeseer
Abstract This paper studies defense policies in a global-game model of speculative currency
attacks. Although the signaling role of policy interventions sustains multiple equilibria, a
number of novel predictions emerge which are robust across all equilibria.(i) The central ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 7 versions

Sequential Contracts and Information Transmission Between Principals

G Calzolari… - Econometric Society World Congress 2000 …, 2000 - ideas.repec.org
We consider games of incomplete information where a common agent sequentially interacts
with two principals. In this setting we show that the Revelation Principle applies: there is no
loss of generality in assuming that the two principals restrict attention to direct revelation ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - Cached - All 4 versions

[CITATION] Beauty Contests

GM Angeletos, G Lorenzoni… - 2006 - mimeo MIT
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[CITATION] Monopoly with Resale, forthcoming in Rand Journal of Economics

G Calzolari… - 2006
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[CITATION] The Value of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities

GM Angeletos… - 2003 - Mimeo, Massachusetts Institute of …
Cited by 2 - Related articles - All 2 versions

[PDF] Efficient use of information and welfare analysis in economies with complementarities and asymmetric information

[PDF] from uni-bocconi.it
GM Angeletos… - Manuscript, MIT, 2005 - igier.uni-bocconi.it
Abstract This paper analyzes equilibrium and welfare for a tractable class of economies with
externalities, strategic complementarity or substitutability, and incomplete information. We
first characterize the equilibrium use of information and show how strategic payoff effects ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 20 versions

Learning in a Repeated Global Game of Regime Change and the Dynamics of Crisis

G Angeletos, C Hellwig… - Manuscript UCLA Economics …, 2006 - mendeley.com
... Save PDF to library · Related research 2 readers. Information Dynamics and Equilibrium
Multiplicity in Global Games of Regime Change. GM Angeletos, Christian Hellwig, Alessandro
Pavan in National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series (2004). ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - Cached - All 6 versions

[CITATION] Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change

GM Angeletos, C Hellwig… - Econometrica, forthcoming, 2006
Cited by 1 - Related articles

Efficiency and Welfare with Complementarities and Asymmetric Information

[PDF] from mecon.gov.ar
GM Angeletos… - 2005 - nber.org
This paper examines equilibrium and welfare in a tractable class of economies with
externalities, strategic complementarity or substitutability, and incomplete information. In
equilibrium, complementarity amplifies aggregate volatility by increasing the sensitivity of ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 10 versions

[PDF] Optimal Taxation and Occupational Choice: The Redistributive Role of Production Ineffi-ciencies

[PDF] from cesifo-group.de
JM Lozachmeur, R Gomes… - cesifo-group.de
Abstract This paper considers a model where agents are heterogeneous in their abilities to
work in two sectors of the economy. Agents compare wage levels and the tax burden across
professions, and then choose which sector to join along with their labor supply in their ...
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[CITATION] Policy in Economies with Dispersed Information

GM Angeletos… - 2007
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Defense policies against currency attacks: on the possibility of predictions in a global game with multiple equilibria PDF Logo

[PDF] from econstor.eu
GM Angeletos, C Hellwig… - econstor.eu
Zusammenfassung: This paper studies defense policies in a global-game model of
speculative currency attacks. Although the signaling role of policy interventions sustains
multiple equilibria, a number of novel predictions emerge which are robust across all ...
Related articles - All 2 versions

[PDF] Defense Policies Against Currency Attacks

[PDF] from ucla.edu
GM Angeletos, C Hellwig… - 2007 - econ.ucla.edu
Abstract This paper studies defense policies in a global-game model of speculative currency
attacks. Although the signaling role of policy interventions sustains multiple equilibria, a
number of novel predictions emerge which are robust across all equilibria.(i) The central ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 2 versions

Coordination and policy traps PDF Logo

[PDF] from econstor.eu
GM Angeletos, C Hellwig… - econstor.eu
Zusammenfassung: This paper examines the ability of a policy maker to control equilibrium
outcomes in a global coordination game; applications include currency attacks, bank runs,
and debt crises. A unique equilibrium is known to survive when the policy is exogenously ...
Related articles - All 2 versions

[CITATION] Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Common Agency Games

A Pavan… - 2006
Related articles

Dynamic Interaction Between Mechanism Designers: the Role of Information Sharing

A Pavan - atlas-conferences.com
This paper examines a dynamic contracting environment where two mechanism designers
sequentially interact with a common agent. The agent has private information that affects the
decisions and the payoffs of all players. In this setting, optimal contracts can be derived ...
Cached - All 2 versions

[PDF] Policy with Dispersed Information

[PDF] from iese.edu
A Pavan - 2007 - iese.edu
Abstract This paper studies policy in a class of economies in which information about
commonly# relevant fundamentals is dispersed and can not be centralized by the
government. In these economies, the equilibrium use of information can fail to be effi cient ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 3 versions

[CITATION] Preemptive Policies Against Currency Attacks

GM Angeletos
Related articles - All 2 versions

[PDF] 1 Global games

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
A Pavan - 2009 - faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu
Global games are games of incomplete information in which the uncertainty about the
underlying payoff structure is “large” in the sense that players do not exclude ex-ante any
possible payoff profile (although certain profiles may well be considered more likely than ...
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[PDF] Policy with Dispersed Information on Aggregate Shocks

[PDF] from nber.org
GM Angeletos… - 2008 - nber.org
Abstract Information regarding commonly-relevant fundamentals (such as aggregate
productivity and demand conditions) is widely dispersed in society, is only imperfectly
aggregated through prices or other indicators of aggregate activity, and can not be ...
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[PDF] Endogenous Information and Welfare

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
L Colombo, G Femminis… - 2012 - faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu
Abstract We study equilibrium information acquisition in a flexible framework with strategic
complementarity or substitutability. First we relate the (in) effi ciency in the acquisition of
private information to the (in) effi ciency in the equilibrium response to private and public ...
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On the Dynamics of Information, Coordination and Regime Change

A Pavan, GM Angeletos… - 2004 Meeting Papers, 2004 - ideas.repec.org
This paper examines how the dynamics of information influences the dynamics of
coordination in an environment with strategic complementarities and heterogeneous
expectations. We consider a simple dynamic global game of regime change, in which the ...
Cached - All 4 versions

DP6562 Sequential Contracting with Multiple Principals

G Calzolari… - 2007 - cepr.org
This paper considers dynamic games in which multiple principals contract sequentially and
non-cooperatively with the same agent and provides characterization results useful for
applications. Our benchmark model is one of private contracting in which downstream ...
Cached - All 3 versions

[PDF] Optimal vs Effi cient Managerial Turnover

[PDF] from webmeets.com
D Garrett… - webmeets.com
Abstract We characterize the optimal contract for a firm hiring a succession of managers
whose ability to generate profits for the firm changes stochastically over time. The focus is on
the interac# tion between the compensation scheme used to screen the managersitypes ...
Related articles - View as HTML

[PDF] Socially Optimal Coordination: Characterization and Policy Implications!

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
A Pavan - 2006 - faculty.econ.northwestern.edu
Abstract In recent years there has been a growing interest in macro models with
heterogeneity in information and complementarity in actions. These models deliver
promising positive properties, such as height# ened inertia and volatility. But they also ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 3 versions

[CITATION] Essays on Auctions and Mechanism Design

A Pavan - 2001

[PDF] Dynamic Mechanism Design: Revenue Equivalence, Profit Maximization and Information Disclosure Preliminary and incomplete.

[PDF] from yale.edu
A Pavan, I Segal… - 2008 - cowles.econ.yale.edu
Abstract This paper examines the problem of how to design incentive $ compatible
mechanisms in environments in which the agentshprivate information evolves stochastically
over time and in which decisions have to be made in each period. The environments we ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 7 versions

[PDF] Information Transmission between Principals1

[PDF] from unicatt.it
G Calzolari… - 2000 - istituti.unicatt.it
Abstract This paper examines a contracting environment where two principals sequentially
interact with a common agent. The agent's private information includes his exogenous" type"
and all payoff-relevant decisions that result from his upstream contracting activity. We ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 4 versions

Martin J. Osborne, Department of Economics, University of Toronto, martin. osborne@ utoronto. ca

J Hörner, BL Lipman, D Ray, S Athey, T Bergstrom… - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. Wiley Online Library will be disrupted 3
Dec from 10-12 GMT for monthly maintenance. ...

[PDF] Many-to-Many Matching Design and Price Discrimination

[PDF] from eea-esem.com
R Gomes… - 2011 - eea-esem.com
Abstract This paper studies second-degree price discrimination in matching markets, that is,
in markets where the product sold by the monopolist is access to other agents. In order to
investigate the optimality of a large variety of pricing strategies, we allow for any many-to- ...
Related articles - View as HTML

[PDF] Policy in a Global Coordination Game: Multiplicity vs Robust Predictions

[PDF] from csef.it
GM Angeletos, C Hellwig… - 2006 - csef.it
Abstract This paper is a positive study of defense policies against coordinated attacks. The
policy exercise is embedded in a global game that stylizes the role of coordination in
applications such as currency crises and bank runs. Previous work has documented that ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 2 versions

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