Page 1. A Kidney Exchange Clearinghouse in New England By ALVIN E. ROTH, TAYFUN
SONMEZ, AND M. UTKU UNVER* In September, 2004, the Renal Transplant Oversight
Committee of New England ap- proved the establishment ...
T Sönmez… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2005 - Elsevier
E Haruvy,
AE Roth… - Journal of Economic Dynamics and …, 2006 - Elsevier
Skip to Main Content. ...
Abstract We present a survey of the emerging literature on the design of matching markets.
We survey the articles on discrete resource allocation problems, their solutions, and their
applications in three related domains. The first domain gives the theoretical background ...
MU Ünver - Journal of Economic dynamics and control, 2001 - Elsevier
H Konishi… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2006 - Elsevier
GR Fréchette,
AE Roth… - The RAND Journal of …, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. ...
J Duffy… - Economic theory, 2006 - Springer
Page 1. DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0570-9 Economic Theory 27, 537–563 (2006)
Asset price bubbles and crashes with near-zero-intelligence traders * John Duffy
1 and M. Utku ¨Unver 2 1 Department of Economics, University ...
A Krishna… - Marketing Science, 2008 - marketsci.highwire.org
Page 1. Vol. 27, No. 2, March–April 2008, pp. 262–282 issn 0732-2399eissn 1526-
548X0827020262 informs® doi 10.1287/mksc.1070.0297 © 2008 INFORMS Research Note
Improving the Efficiency of Course Bidding at Business Schools: Field and Laboratory Studies ...
A Abdulkadiroğlu,
T Sönmez… - Social Choice and Welfare, 2004 - Springer
Page 1. Abstract. A group of friends consider renting a house but they shall first agree on how
to allocate its rooms and share the rent. We propose an auction mechanism for room
assignment-rent division problems which mimics the market mechanism. ...
H Konishi… - Social choice and Welfare, 2006 - Springer
Page 1. Soc Choice Welfare (2006) 27: 3–24 DOI 10.1007/s00355-006-0097-z
ORIGINAL PAPER Hideo Konishi · M. Utku Ünver Games of capacity manipulation
in hospital-intern markets Received: 17 January 2002 / Accepted ...
We analyze mechanisms that are used to allocate dormitory rooms to students at college
campuses. Students consist of newcoming freshmen, who do not currently occupy any
rooms, and more senior students each of whom occupies a room from the previous year. ...
E Haruvy… - Economics Letters, 2007 - Elsevier
T Sönmez,
MU Ünver - Boston College Working Papers in Economics, 2006 - bilkent.edu.tr
Page 1. Kidney Exchange with Good Samaritan Donors: A Characterization Tayfun Sönmez ∗
Boston College M. Utku¨Unver † University of Pittsburgh Abstract We analyze mechanisms
to kidney exchange with good samaritan donors where exchange ...
J Duffy… - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2008 - Elsevier
Patients needing kidney transplants may have willing donors who cannot donate to them
because of blood or tissue incompatibility. Incompatible patient-donor pairs can exchange
donor kidneys with other such pairs. The situation facing such pairs resembles models of ...
E Haruvy,
AE Roth… - 2001 - nber.org
Page 1. Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Research Papers Harvard NOM Research
Paper No. 01-08 October 2001 The Dynamics of Law Clerk Matching: An Experimental and
Computational Investigation of Proposals for Reform of the Market Ernan Haruvy ...
[CITATION] On the survival of some unstable two-sided matching mechanisms: An experimental and computational investigation of the stability hypothesis
MU Ünver - 2001 - working paper, Koç University
H Konishi… - 2003 - wallis.rochester.edu
Abstract Pairwise-stable matching mechanisms are practically used and perform very well in
the real world two-sided matching markets (eg, the US hospital-intern market, and the British
hospital-intern markets: see Roth 1984 and 1991, respectively). It is known, however, that ...
Page 1. NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES UNRAVELING RESULTS FROM COMPARABLE
DEMAND AND SUPPLY: AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION Muriel Niederle Alvin E. Roth
M. Utku Ünver Working Paper 15006 http://www.nber.org/papers/w15006 ...
M Pycia… - UCLA and Boston College, unpublished mimeo, 2009 - nber.org
Page 1. Incentive Compatible Allocation and Exchange of Discrete Resources∗ Marek Pycia†
UCLA M. Utku Ünver‡ Boston College October 7, 2010 Abstract We study the allocation
and exchange of discrete resources without monetary transfers. ...
[CITATION] Practical Market Design: Four Matches-A Kidney Exchange Clearinghouse in New England
[CITATION] A Theory of School Choice Lotteries: Why Ties Should Not Be Broken Randomly
O Kesten,
MU Ünver - Unpublished mimeo, Carnegie Mellon University and …, 2008
Page 1. House Allocation with Existing Tenants: An Equivalence* Tayfun Sönmez†
Koç University M. Utku ˝nverõ Koç University Abstract In this paper we analyze two
house allocation mechanisms each of which is designed ...
[CITATION] 0A kidney exchange clearinghouse in New England, 1 American Economic Review
AE Roth,
T Sönmez… - Papers and Proceedings, 2005
O Kesten, M Kurino… - Boston College Working Papers in …, 2011 - bc.edu
Page 1. Fair and Efficient Assignment via the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism∗ Onur Kesten†
Morimitsu Kurino‡ M. Utku Ünver§ Carnegie Mellon University Maastricht University Boston
College First Draft: April 2010 This Draft: May 2011 Abstract ...
[CITATION] Internet auctions with artificial adaptive agents: Evolution of late and multiple bidding
MU Unver - Computing in Economics and Finance, 2002
F Kojima… - Boston College Working Papers in Economics, 2010 - fmwww.bc.edu
Page 1. The “Boston” School-Choice Mechanism Fuhito Kojima ∗ Stanford University M.
Utku¨Unver † Boston College ‡ October 8, 2011 Abstract The Boston mechanism is a popular
student-placement mechanism in school-choice pro- grams around the world. ...
MU Unver - Computing in Economics and Finance 2001, 2001 - ideas.repec.org
The growing number of auction sites on the internet enable game theorists to ask strategic
questions on rationality of the observed bidding behavior. The most popular of them (eBay,
Amazon. com, AuctionWatch. com and Yahoo!, etc.) operate under similar sets of rules ...
A Krishna, T Sonmez… - Framed Field Experiments, 2004 - econpapers.repec.org
By Aradhna Krishna, Tayfun Sonmez and M. Utku Unver; Efficiency Enhanced Course Bidding:
Evidence from a Field Experiment at the University of Michigan Business School.
CiteSeerX - Document Details (Isaac Councill, Lee Giles, Pradeep Teregowda): Many internet
auction sites implement ascending-bid auctions. Empirically, “late” bidding is frequently observed
in “hard-close auctions. ” In “soft-close auctions, ” late bidding is less frequently observed ...
[CITATION] Dynamic Exchange Mechanisms
MU Ünver - Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming, 2007
E Haruvy,
MU Ünver - Experimental, 2003 - ideas.repec.org
Downloadable! A two-sided matching framework is applied to repeated business-to- business
procurement matches. Both static and dynamic solutions concepts--- namely Gale-Shapley
deferred acceptance algorithm, learning dynamics, and genetic algorithms--- are used to obtain ...
[CITATION] Matching
AE Roth,
T Sönmez… - The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2008
[CITATION] Kidney exchange, Game Theory and Information (EconWPA)
AE Roth,
T Sonmez… - 2003 - … Bureau of Economic Research y The …
J Duffy… - Computational Economics, 2003 - ideas.repec.org
We examine whether a simple agent--based model can generate asset price bubbles and
crashes of the type observed in a series of laboratory asset market experiments beginning
with the work of Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988). We follow the methodology of ...
[CITATION] Forthcoming.“Unraveling Yields Inefficient Matchings: Evidence from Post-Season College Football Bowls.”
G Fréchette, AE Roth… - Rand Journal of Economics
[CITATION] Allocation and Exchange of Discrete Resources: Matching Market Design for House Allocation, Kidney Exchange, and School Choice
MU Ünver… - 2005 Meeting Papers, 2005 - econpapers.repec.org
By M. Utku Ünver and Hideo Konishi; Credible Group Stability in Multi-Partner Matching Problems.
H Konishi… - Boston College Working Papers in …, 2002 - fmwww.bc.edu
Abstract In this paper, we analyze capacity manipulation games in hospitalMintern markets
inM spired by the realMlife entryMlevel labor markets for young physicians who seek
residencies at hospitals. In a hospitalMintern market, the matching is determined by a ...
MU Ünver, L Ehlers, T Sönmez, Y Sprumont… - 2003 - Citeseer
CiteSeerX - Document Details (Isaac Councill, Lee Giles, Pradeep Teregowda): A fair division
problem with indivisible objects and money consists of a set of agents, a set of objects, a value
matrix which shows the value of each agent for each object and a money endowment to be ...
M Kurt, MS Roberts, AJ Schaefer… - Boston College Working …, 2011 - fmwww.bc.edu
Page 1. Valuing Prearranged Paired Kidney Exchanges: A Stochastic Game Approach
Valuing Prearranged Paired Kidney Exchanges: A Stochastic Game Approach Murat
Kurt {muk7@pitt.edu} Department of Industrial Engineering ...
By M. Utku Ünver and Tayfun Sönmez; Course Bidding at Business Schools.
Page 1. Market Mechanisms for Fair Allocation of Indivisible Objects and Money∗ M. Utku Ünver
The University of Pittsburgh† March 2007 Abstract This paper studies the problem of fair allocation
of indivisible objects and money among agents with quasi-linear preferences. ...
J Duffy… - Computing in Economics and Finance 2002, 2002 - ideas.repec.org
No abstract is available for this item. ... To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three options: 1. Check below under "Related
research" whether another version of this item is available online. 2. Check on the ...
By M. Utku Ünver, Alvin Roth and Tayfun Sönmez; Efficient Kidney
Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Structured Market.
SSRN-*Course Bidding at Business Schools by Tayfun Sönmez, M. UTKU ÜNVER.
[CITATION] Computerized matching algorithms to optimize matches and increase opportunities for live donor kidney exchange
MU Unver… - Working Papers, 2005 - econpapers.repec.org
Related works: Working Paper: Ideology and existence of 50%-majority equilibria in multidimensional
spatial voting models (2006) Working Paper: Ideology and Existence of 50%-Majority Equilibria
in Multidimensional Spatial Voting Models (2008) Working Paper: Ideology and existence ...
MU Unver… - Computing in Economics and Finance …, 2001 - ideas.repec.org
This paper investigates private-valuereserve price'auctions when there is a strong bidder in
an n-bidder model. Consider an auction model, in which bidders draw their values from the
same distribution, but then identity of the high-value bidder is revealed. This can be more ...
MA Rees, JE Kopke, RP Pelletier, DL Segev… - kuznets.harvard.edu
Page 1. NINE NON-SIMULTANEOUS EXTENDED ALTRUISTIC DONOR (NEAD)
CHAINS Michael A. Rees,1,2 Jonathan E. Kopke,3 Ronald P. Pelletier,2,4 Dorry
L. Segev,5 Alfredo J. Fabrega,2,6 Jeffrey Rogers,2,7 Oleh G. ...
Page 1. Credible Group-Deviation in Multi-Partner Matching Problems Hideo Konishi
and M. Utku Ünver NOTA DI LAVORO 115.2003 DECEMBER 2003 CTN – Coalition
Theory Network Hideo Konishi, Department of Economics ...
Page 1. Altruistically Unbalanced Kidney Exchange ∗ Tayfun Sönmez † Boston College
M. Utku Ünver ‡ Boston College This Draft: September 2011 Abstract Although a pilot
national live-donor kidney exchange program was recently launched ...
O Kesten,
MU Ünver - Proceedings of the Behavioral and Quantitative …, 2010 - dl.acm.org
Google, Inc. (search). ...
H Crès… - Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2010 - jtp.sagepub.com
Page 1. IDEOLOGY AND EXISTENCE OF 50%-MAJORITY EQUILIBRIA IN
MULTIDIMENSIONAL SPATIAL VOTING MODELS Herve´ Cre`s and M. Utku U¨
nver ABSTRACT When aggregating individual preferences through ...
MU Ünver… - Working Papers, 2004 - econpapers.repec.org
By M. Utku Ünver and Aradhna Krishna; A Field Experiment
on Course Bidding at Business Schools.
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