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Auctions with anticipated regret: Theory and experiment

Full text - MIT Libraries
E Filiz-Ozbay… - The American Economic Review, 2007 - JSTOR
Why do we observe overbidding in first price private value auctions? This paper aims to
answer this question, which has been extensively studied in the literature, from a
nonstandard point of view, namely, anticipated regret. William Vickrey (1961) derived risk ...
Cited by 75 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 9 versions

[PDF] Incorporating unawareness into contract theory

[PDF] from tamu.edu
EF Ozbay - 2008 - econwebb.tamu.edu
Abstract Asymmetric awareness of the contracting parties regarding the uncertainty
surrounding them is proposed as a reason for incompleteness in contractual forms. An
insurance problem is studied between a risk neutral insurer, who has superior awareness ...
Cited by 25 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 8 versions

Common-value auctions with liquidity needs: An experimental test of a troubled assets reverse auction

[PDF] from umd.edu
LM Ausubel, P Cramton, E Filiz-Ozbay… - Papers of Peter …, 2009 - works.bepress.com
Abstract We experimentally test alternative auction designs suitable for pricing and removing
troubled assets from banks' balance sheets as part of the financial rescue. Many individual
securities or pools of securities are auctioned simultaneously. Securities that are widely ...
Cited by 7 - Related articles - All 28 versions

[PDF] Fear of losing in dynamic auctions: An experimental study

[PDF] from psu.edu
P Cramton, E Filiz-Ozbay, EY Ozbay… - 2009 - Citeseer
Abstract We analyze the implications of different pricing rules in discrete clock auctions. The
two most common pricing rules are highest-rejected bid (HRB) and lowest-accepted bid
(LAB). Under HRB, the winners pay the lowest price that clears the market; under LAB, the ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 21 versions

Anticipated loser regret in third price auctions

Full text - MIT Libraries
E Filiz-Ozbay… - Economics Letters, 2010 - Elsevier
Losing the auction at an affordable price generates loser regret. In third price auctions if
bidders anticipate loser regret, then in line with the experimental findings, in a symmetric
equilibrium the bids are more than the risk neutral Nash equilibrium.
Cited by 4 - Related articles - All 5 versions

Discrete clock auctions: an experimental study

[PDF] from umd.edu
P Cramton, E Filiz-Ozbay, EY Ozbay… - Experimental …, 2011 - Springer
Abstract We analyze the implications of different pricing rules in discrete clock auctions. The
two most common pricing rules are highest-rejected bid (HRB) and lowest-accepted bid
(LAB). Under HRB, the winners pay the lowest price that clears the market; under LAB, the ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 14 versions

[PDF] Social Image in Public Goods Provision with Real Effort

[PDF] from ku.edu.tr
E Filiz-Ozbay… - TÜSÝAD-Koç University Economic Research …, 2010 - ku.edu.tr
We study public goods game where the contribution efforts are observable. When the
players are observed, they contribute more and free-riding diminishes significantly. On the
other hand, presence of an audience does not affect the performance of players if there is ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 9 versions

[PDF] SOCIAL IMAGE IN PUBLIC GOODS PROVISION WITH EFFORT

[PDF] from umd.edu
E Filiz-Ozbay… - 2011 - econweb.umd.edu
We study a novel public goods game where contributions to the public goods require efforts
which are observable. When the players are observed, they exert more effort to contribute to
the public goods and the free-riding diminishes significantly comparing to the no observer ...
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Auctions with Anticipated Regret

EF Ozbay… - Experimental, 2005 - econpapers.repec.org
This paper demonstrates theoretically and experimentally that in first price auctions,
overbidding with respect to risk neutral Nash equilibrium might be driven from anticipated
loser regret (felt when bidders lose at an affordable price). Different information structures ...
Cached - All 2 versions

[PDF] Fear of Losing in a Clock Auction

[PDF] from umd.edu
P Cramton, E Filiz-Ozbay, EY Ozbay… - 2012 - econweb.umd.edu
Abstract We examine bidding behavior in a clock auction in which price is set by the lowest-
accepted bid and provisional winners are reported each round (the LABpw auction). This
format was used in the India 3G spectrum auction. In the standard theory, the auction ...
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[PDF] Multi-Unit Auctions with Resale

[PDF] from duke.edu
EF Ozbay… - 2010 - web-03.econ.duke.edu
Abstract. We study multi-unit auctions in the presence of resale opportunities among bidders
who have either single-or multi-unit demand. We analyze equilibrium for Vickrey auctions
with separate bidding and with package bidding when the valuations of bidders with ...
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