My Citations
Scholar Home
  Advanced Scholar Search



Scholar      Create email alertResults 1 - 100 of about 176. (0.23 sec) 

On strategy-proofness and single peakedness

Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin - Public Choice, 1980 - Springer
Page 1. On strategy-proofness and single peakedness H. MOULIN* University
Paris-IX Introduction The literature on strategic manipulation of decision schemes,
following the seminal Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [6], must ...
Cited by 420 - Related articles - Library Search - All 3 versions

[BOOK] Game theory for the social sciences

H Moulin - 1986 - books.google.com
Page 1. Hervé Moulin GAME THEORY FUR THE SQCIAI1 SCIENCES SECOND AND
REVISED EDITION STUDIES IN GAME THEORY AND MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS
Page 2. STUDIES IN GAME THEORY AND MATHEMATICAL ...
Cited by 373 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 4 versions

Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency

[PDF] from icir.org
Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin… - Economic Theory, 2001 - Springer
Page 1. Economic Theory 18, 511–533 (2001) Research Articles Strategyproof sharing
of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency * Hervé Moulin1 and Scott
Shenker2 1 Department of Economics, MS 22, Rice University ...
Cited by 298 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 21 versions

Serial cost sharing

H Moulin… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1992 - JSTOR
A fixed group of n agents share a one input, one output technology with decreasing returns.
We propose the following cost sharing formula. Agent 1 with the lowest demand of output q 1
pays (1/n) th of the cost of nq 1. Agent 2, with the next lowest demand q 2 pays agent 1's ...
Cited by 253 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - BL Direct - All 10 versions

[CITATION] The strategy of social choice

H Moulin - 1983 - getcited.org
An academic directory and search engine.
Cited by 249 - Related articles - Cached - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 2 versions

Dominance solvable voting schemes

H Moulin - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1979 - JSTOR
The concept of a dominance solvable voting scheme is presented as a weakening of the
strategy-proofness requirement: it relies on successive elimination of dominated strategies
and generalizes the well known concept of" sophisticated voting." Dominance solvable ...
Cited by 241 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 6 versions

[CITATION] On the uniqueness and stability of Nash's equilibrium in non cooperative games

D Gabay… - 1978 - Université Paris IX-Dauphine, …
Cited by 203 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 2 versions

[BOOK] Fair division and collective welfare

H Moulin - 2004 - books.google.com
... Page 4. Page 5. FAIR DIVISION AND COLLECTIVE WELFARE Herve Moulin The MIT Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England Page 6. ... Library of Congress Cataloging-in-
Publication Data Moulin, Herve\ Fair division and collective welfare / Herve Moulin, p. cm. ...
Cited by 196 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 7 versions

Axiomatic cost and surplus sharing

H Moulin - Handbook of social choice and welfare, 2002 - Elsevier
... This is the background image for an unknown creator of an OCR page with image plus hidden
text. Chapter6 AXIOMATIC COST AND SURPLUS SHARING* HERVE MOULIN Rice University
Contents Abstract 290 Keywords 290 Introduction 291 1. Rationing 294 1.1. ...
Cited by 187 - Related articles - All 7 versions

Choosing from a tournament

[PDF] from umn.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin - Social Choice and Welfare, 1986 - Springer
Page 1. Soc Choice Welfare (1986) 3:271-291 ial oiee © Springer-Verlag 1986
Choosing from a Tournament H. Moulin Department of Economics, Virginia
Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA 24061, USA ...
Cited by 171 - Related articles - Library Search - All 3 versions

A new solution to the random assignment problem

[PDF] from upi-yptk.ac.id
Full text - MIT Libraries
A Bogomolnaia… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2001 - Elsevier
Cited by 153 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 11 versions

Choice functions over a finite set: A summary

[PDF] from umn.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin - Social Choice and Welfare, 1985 - Springer
Page 1. Social Choice Welfare (1985) 2:147-160 Social Choice .dWelfarc © Springer-Verlag
1985 Choice Functions Over a Finite Set: A Summary* H. Moulin Department of Economics,
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA 24061, USA ...
Cited by 135 - Related articles - Library Search - All 9 versions

Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness

[PS] from duke.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin - Social Choice and Welfare, 1999 - Springer
Page 1. Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness Herve Moulin
Department of Economics, Duke University, Box 90097, Durham, NC 27708-0097, USA (e-mail:
moulin@econ.duke.edu) Received: 8 July 1997/Accepted: 22 January 1998 ...
Cited by 135 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 16 versions

Serial cost-sharing of excludable public goods

Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin - The Review of Economic Studies, 1994 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
... Studies Limited 0034-6527/94/00160305$02.00 Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable
Public Goods HERVE MOULIN Duke University First version received November
1991 ;final version acceptedSeptember 1993 (Eds.) Under the ...
Cited by 126 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 6 versions

Priority rules and other asymmetric rationing methods

[PDF] from uibk.ac.at
Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin - Econometrica, 2000 - Wiley Online Library
... PRIORITY RULES AND OTHER ASYMMETRIC RATIONING METHODS BY HERVE MOULIN 1 ´
In a rationing problem, each agent demands a quantity of a certain commodity and the available
resources fall short of total demand. ... 643 Page 2. HERVE MOULIN ´ 644 ...
Cited by 119 - Related articles - All 9 versions

Average cost pricing versus serial cost sharing: an axiomatic comparison

Full text - MIT Libraries
M Herve… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1994 - Elsevier
Abstract A finite group of agents share a (one output) production function. A cost sharing rule
allocates the total cost among the users for every conceivable profile of output demands. We
investigate the space of possible cost sharing rules from an axiomatic perspective. We ...
Cited by 114 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 7 versions

Dominance solvability and Cournot stability

Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin - Mathematical Social Sciences, 1984 - Elsevier
Abstract In normal form games with single-valued best reply functions it is shown that
dominance-solvability (resulting from successive elimination of dominated strategies)
implies the global stability of the Cournot tatonnement process. When only two players are ...
Cited by 113 - Related articles - Library Search - All 6 versions

Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution

H Moulin - Journal of Economic Theory, 1984 - Elsevier
Abstract The bargaining game is proposed where the agents bid fractions of dictatorship that
are used by all non-winners of the auction to threaten acceptance of the winner's proposal.
That procedure non-cooperatively implements the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution.
Cited by 106 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 6 versions

Condorcet's principle implies the no show paradox

Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin - Journal of Economic Theory, 1988 - Elsevier
... JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY 45, 53-64 (1988) Condorcet's Principle Implies the No Show
Paradox HERVE MOULIN* Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University, Blacksburg, Virginia 24061 Received July 15, 1986; revised June 9, 1987 ...
Cited by 104 - Related articles - All 5 versions

The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods

H Moulin - Journal of Economic Theory, 1985 - Elsevier
... JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY 36, 120-148 (1985) The Separability Axiom and
Equal-Sharing Methods HERVE MOULIN*t Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute
and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia 24061 Received May 1, 1984; revised December ...
Cited by 98 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 5 versions

Implementing a public project and distributing its cost*

[PDF] from kelloggexecutives.com
Full text - MIT Libraries
M Jackson… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1992 - Elsevier
We provide a game form which undertakes a public project exactly when the total benefit of
the project to individuals in a society outweights its cost. The game form is simple, balanced,
and individually rational. It can be adjusted to distribute cost according to a wide class of ...
Cited by 99 - Related articles - Library Search - All 11 versions

Fair division under joint ownership: recent results and open problems

Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin - Social Choice and Welfare, 1990 - Springer
Two microeconomic models of joint ownership are discussed: the division of unproduced
commodities and the joint production of a single output by a single input. In both models the
two principal interpretations of fairness are Equal Split Guarantee (ESG) and No Envy (NE ...
Cited by 90 - Related articles - Library Search - All 5 versions

Can everyone benefit from growth?* 1:: Two difficulties

Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1988 - Elsevier
Abstract We consider the problem of fair division in economies where the amount to be
divided may vary. We show that there is no solution to this problem jointly satisfying the
following requirements:(i) Pareto-optimality;(ii) resource monotonicity; an increase in the ...
Cited by 85 - Related articles - All 5 versions

Three methods to share joint costs or surplus

[PDF] from psu.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
E Friedman… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1999 - Elsevier
We study cost sharing methods with variable demands of heterogeneous goods, additive in
the cost function and meeting the dummy axiom. We consider four axioms: scale invariance
(SI); demand monotonicity (DM); upper bound for homogeneous goods (UBH) placing a ...
Cited by 78 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 17 versions

ON ADDITIVE METHODS TO SHARE JOINT COSTS*

Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin - Japanese Economic Review, 1995 - Wiley Online Library
The Shapley value theory is extended to cost functions with multiple outputs (or to
production functions with multiple inputs) where each output is demanded by a different
agent and the level of demand varies. Beyond the Additivity and Dummy axioms ( ...
Cited by 77 - Related articles - All 10 versions

Egalitarian-equivalent cost sharing of a public good

H Moulin - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1987 - JSTOR
In an economy with one public and one private good, egalitarian-equivalent cost sharing
consists of finding the highest public good level x* such that consuming x* for free yields a
feasible utility distribution. The corresponding feasible allocation (typically unique), called ...
Cited by 76 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 7 versions

An application of the Shapley value to fair division with money

H Moulin - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1992 - JSTOR
... AN APPLICATION OF THE SHAPLEY VALUE TO FAIR DIVISION WITH MONEY BY HERVE
MOULIN We consider the fair division of unproduced goods when monetary compensations are
feasible and utilities are quasi-linear. ... 1331 Page 2. 1332 HERVE MOULIN ...
Cited by 72 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - BL Direct - All 8 versions

Public ownership of the external world and private ownership of self

H Moulin… - The Journal of Political Economy, 1989 - JSTOR
Liberal political philosophy, represented classically by John Locke and today by libertarians,
defends great inequality of economic outcome on the basis that people own themselves and
are entitled to establish private property in the external world by virtue of that self- ...
Cited by 70 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 6 versions

The pure compensation problem: egalitarianism versus laissez-fairism

[PDF] from oxfordjournals.org
Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1987 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract A binary choice problem with side-payments and quasi-linear utilities is considered.
We study two compensation rules, called social choice functions. The egalitarian rule
divides equally the surplus above the average utility level. The laissez-faire rule chooses ...
Cited by 68 - Related articles - All 6 versions

Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences

Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin - Social Choice and Welfare, 1984 - Springer
When preferences are single peaked the choice functions that are independent of irrelevant
alternatives both in Nash's and in Arrow's sense are characterized. They take the Condorcet
winner of the n individual peaks plus at most n-1 fixed ballots (phantom voters). These ...
Cited by 63 - Related articles - All 3 versions

Egalitarianism and utilitarianism in quasi-linear bargaining

H Moulin - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1985 - JSTOR
EQUAL SHARING OF THE COOPERATIVE SURPLUS is perhaps the simplest notion of
microeconomic justice. In many contexts, however, this principle is hardly operational:
without an objective numeraire, interpersonal comparisons of welfare increments are not ...
Cited by 62 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 5 versions

Characterizations of the pivotal mechanism

Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin - Journal of Public Economics, 1986 - Elsevier
Cited by 59 - Related articles - All 5 versions

A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution

Full text - MIT Libraries
A Bogomolnaia… - Economic Theory, 2002 - Springer
Page 1. Economic Theory 19, 623–635 (2002) Exposita Notes A simple random
assignment problem with a unique solution * Anna Bogomolnaia1 and Hervé Moulin2
1 Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University ...
Cited by 59 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 6 versions

Joint ownership of a convex technology: comparison of three solutions

Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin - The Review of Economic Studies, 1990 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
... Comparison of Three Solutions HERVE MOULIN Duke University First version received January
1988; final version accepted January 1990 (Eds.) A given set of agents jointly own and operate
a decreasing returns to scale technology (with a single input and a single output). ...
Cited by 55 - Related articles - All 6 versions

Random matching under dichotomous preferences

[PDF] from rochester.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
A Bogomolnaia… - Econometrica, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. Econometrica, Vol. 72, No. 1 (January, 2004), 257–279 RANDOM
MATCHING UNDER DICHOTOMOUS PREFERENCES BY ANNA BOGOMOLNAIA
AND HERVE MOULIN1 We consider bilateral matching problems ...
Cited by 51 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 11 versions

Welfare bounds in the fair division problem

Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin - Journal of Economic Theory, 1991 - Elsevier
... Article Outline. • References. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY 54, 321337 (1991) Welfare
Bounds in the Fair Division Problem HERVE MOULIN* Duke Universav, Durham, North Carolina
27706 Received December 6, 1988; revised September 17, 1990 To any anonymous ...
Cited by 46 - Related articles - Library Search - All 8 versions

The proportional veto principle

Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin - The Review of Economic Studies, 1981 - JSTOR
Small committees and several aspects of bargaining are formally described as collective
decision making problems played by cooperative agents (who may form coalitions and sign
binding agreements). The key variable in this approach is the distribution of decision ...
Cited by 42 - Related articles - Library Search - All 6 versions

Scheduling with opting out: improving upon random priority

H Crès… - Operations Research, 2001 - JSTOR
... PRIORITY HERVE CRES HEC School of Management, 78351 Jouy-en Josas, France,
cres@hec.fr HERVE MOULIN Department of Economics, Rice University, MS 22, P0.
Box 1892, Houston, Texas, 77251-1892, moulin@rice.edu ...
Cited by 40 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - BL Direct - All 9 versions

Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects

[PDF] from rice.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin - Journal of Economic Theory, 2009 - Elsevier
Cited by 44 - Related articles - All 6 versions

Uniform externalities:: Two axioms for fair allocation

Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin - Journal of Public Economics, 1990 - Elsevier
... References. Journal of Public Economics 43 (1990) 305326. NorthHolland UNIFORM
EXTERNALITIES Two Axioms for Fair Allocation Herve MOULIN* Duke University, Durham,
NC27706, USA Received May 1989, revised version received March 1990 Positive (resp. ...
Cited by 38 - Related articles - All 5 versions

[PDF] Axiomatic cost and surplus sharing

[PDF] from rice.edu
H Moulin - HANDBOOKS IN ECONOMICS, 2001 - ruf.rice.edu
Page 1. Axiomatic Cost and Surplus-Sharing by Hervé Moulin Rice University August 2001
Prepared for Chapter 6 of the Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 1, K. Arrow, AK Sen,
K. Suzumura, Eds. Detailed comments on an earlier version by RJ Aumann, C. Herrero, ...
Cited by 37 - Related articles - View as HTML - BL Direct - All 9 versions

[PDF] Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
H Moulin - Journal of Economic theory, 1981 - europealumni.kellogg.northwestern. …
In this paper we assume that the agents behave non-cooperatively. This assumption alone
is not enough to determine unambiguously the outcome elected by the agents. Given a
particular voting scheme and a particular preference profile of the agents, there are in ...
Cited by 37 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 12 versions

Social choice

H Moulin - The Oxford handbook of political economy, 2006 - books.google.com
SOCIAL choice is part and parcel of the formal and axiomatic revolution that took over
economic analysis and, to a lesser degree, political and other social sciences in the middle
of the twentieth century. In the shadow of game theory and of the theory of general ...
Cited by 37 - Related articles - All 5 versions

Fair queuing and other probabilistic allocation methods

[PDF] from rice.edu
H Moulin… - Mathematics of Operations Research, 2002 - JSTOR
... FAIR QUEUING AND OTHER PROBABILISTIC ALLOCATION METHODS HERVE MOULIN AND
RICHARD STONG A server processes one job per unit of time and randomly schedules the jobs
requested by a given set of users; each user may request a different number of jobs. ...
Cited by 37 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - BL Direct - All 10 versions

Cost sharing under increasing returns: a comparison of simple mechanisms

H Moulin - 1997 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: A technology with decreasing marginal costs is used by agents with equal rights.
Each agent demands a quantity of output and costs are divided by means of a fixed formula.
Several such mechanisms are compared for the existence of Nash equilibrium demand ...
Cited by 36 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 11 versions

A core selection for regulating a single-output monopoly

HJ Moulin - The Rand Journal of Economics, 1987 - JSTOR
Page 1. RAND Journal of Economics Vol. 18, No. 3, Autumn 1987 A core selection for regulating
a single-output monopoly Herve J. Moulin* We consider a single-output production economy
in which all coalitions of agents have access to the technology. ...
Cited by 35 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 8 versions

[PDF] On scheduling fees to prevent merging, splitting, and transferring of jobs

[PDF] from rice.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin - Mathematics of Operations Research, 2007 - ruf.rice.edu
Page 1. On scheduling fees to prevent merging, splitting and transferring of jobs Herve
Moulin Rice University May 2004 Abstract A deterministic server is shared by users with
identical linear wait- ing costs, requesting jobs of arbitrary lengths. ...
Cited by 32 - Related articles - View as HTML - BL Direct - All 16 versions

Traffic-based cost allocation in a network

D Henriet… - The Rand Journal of Economics, 1996 - JSTOR
To share the fixed cost of a communication network, the private-cost method allocates to
each subscriber the cost of his dedicated terminal devices. The external-cost method shares
the connecting cost of user i among all of his correspondents in proportion to their traffic ...
Cited by 31 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - BL Direct - All 12 versions

Implementing efficient, anonymous and neutral social choice functions

Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin - Journal of mathematical Economics, 1980 - Elsevier
Abstract Implementing a social choice function is to endow the agents involved in a
collective decision problem with a privately owned decision power, in such a way that by
exercising (noncooperatively) this power the agents eventually select the very outcome ...
Cited by 30 - Related articles - Library Search - All 5 versions

Collective choice under dichotomous preferences

[PDF] from upf.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
A Bogomolnaia, H Moulin… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2005 - Elsevier
Cited by 30 - Related articles - All 15 versions

The price of anarchy of serial, average and incremental cost sharing

[PDF] from psu.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin - Economic Theory, 2008 - Springer
Page 1. Econ Theory (2008) 36:379–405 DOI 10.1007/s00199-007-0275-y
RESEARCH ARTICLE The price of anarchy of serial, average and incremental cost
sharing Hervé Moulin Received: 16 August 2006 / Accepted: 30 ...
Cited by 29 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 8 versions

On the fair and coalitions-strategyproof allocation of private goods

H Moulin - Frontiers of Game Theory, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1993 - books.google.com
Page 163. 8 On the Fair and Coalitions-Strategyproof Allocation of Private Goods Herve Moulin
1 Introduction We consider resource allocation mechanisms where only the domain of individual
preferences (types) and the number of participating agents are known at the time the ...
Cited by 27 - Related articles

Rationing a commodity along fixed paths

[PDF] from upi-yptk.ac.id
Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin - Journal of Economic Theory, 1999 - Elsevier
Cited by 27 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 14 versions

Deterrence and cooperation: A classification of two-person games

Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin - European Economic Review, 1981 - Elsevier
In two-person games in normal, bilateral threats succeed in self-enforcing any imputation.
We discriminate among imputations by looking at various features of deterring threats. As a
result we obtain a classification of two-person games. Finally a duopoly example is ...
Cited by 25 - Related articles - All 5 versions

The proportional random allocation of indivisible units

[PDF] from rice.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin - Social Choice and Welfare, 2002 - Springer
Page 1. Soc Choice Welfare (2002) 19: 381–413 9999 2002 The proportional random allocation
of indivisible units Hervé Moulin Rice University, Department of Economics, MS 22, PO Box
1892, Houston, TX 77251-1892, USA (e-mail: moulin@rice.edu) ...
Cited by 23 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 9 versions

The conditional auction mechanism for sharing a surplus

Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin - The Review of Economic Studies, 1984 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract A first-bid auction to allocate the leadership role is used to choose a public decision
and a balanced set of transfers. The mechanism is shown to implement an equal-sharing of
the surplus above the “average” utility level. At the equilibrium an agent's message ...
Cited by 23 - Related articles - All 7 versions

Sharing a minimal cost spanning tree: Beyond the Folk solution

[PDF] from rice.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
A Bogomolnaia… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2010 - Elsevier
Cited by 23 - Related articles - All 8 versions

Welfare bounds in the cooperative production problem

H Moulin - Games and Economic Behavior, 1992 - Elsevier
A general model of lower bound (individual rationality) and upper bound axioms for fair
allocation is proposed. The Unanimity welfare function associates to eac.
Cited by 22 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 5 versions

Two versions of the tragedy of the commons

[PS] from duke.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin… - Review of Economic Design, 1996 - Springer
Page 1. Economic Design ELSEVIER Economic Design 2 (1997) 399-421 Two
versions of the tragedy of the commons Herv6 Moulin a,,, Alison Watts b a
Department of Economics, Duke University, Box 90097, Durham, NC ...
Cited by 22 - Related articles - All 15 versions

Voting with proportional veto power

H Moulin - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1982 - JSTOR
Page 1. Econometrica, Vol. 50, No. 1 (January, 1982) VOTING WITH
PROPORTIONAL VETO POWER BY H. MOULINI We give necessary conditions
for a neutral social choice function to be partially implementable by means ...
Cited by 22 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 5 versions

[CITATION] Théorie des jeux pour l'économie et la politique

H Moulin - 1981 - orton.catie.ac.cr
SIDALC - Servicio de Informacion y Documentacion Agropecuaria de las Americas.
Cited by 92 - Related articles - Cached - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search

On demand responsiveness in additive cost sharing

[PDF] from psu.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2005 - Elsevier
Under partial responsibility, the ranking of cost shares should never contradict that of
demands. The Solidarity axiom says that if agent i demands more, j should not pay more if k
pays less. It characterizes the quasi-proportional methods, sharing cost in proportion ...
Cited by 20 - Related articles - All 18 versions

Responsibility and cross-subsidization in cost sharing

[PDF] from umontreal.ca
Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2006 - Elsevier
We propose two cost-sharing theories in which agents demand comparable commodities
and are responsible for their own demand. Under partial responsibility, agents are not
responsible for the asymmetries of the cost function: two agents consuming the same ...
Cited by 19 - Related articles - Library Search - All 16 versions

All sorry to disagree: a general principle for the provision of nonrival goods

H Moulin - The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1992 - JSTOR
Scand. J. of Economics 94 (1), 37-51, 1992 All Sorry to Disagree: A General Principle for the
Provision of Nonrival Goods Herve Moulin * Duke University, Durham, NC, USA Abstract A group
of agents with identical rights but different preferences share the cost of a public good. ...
Cited by 19 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 5 versions

From social welfare ordering to acyclic aggregation of preferences

Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin - Mathematical Social Sciences, 1985 - Elsevier
Abstract One way to overcome Arrow's impossibility theorem is to drop the requirement that
the collective preference be transitive. If it is quasi-transitive (strict preferences are transitive)
an oligarchy emerges. If it is only acyclic, many non-oligarchic aggregation rules are ...
Cited by 18 - Related articles - All 5 versions

The solidarity axiom in parametric surplus-sharing problems

Full text - MIT Libraries
H Keiding… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1991 - Elsevier
Abstract A parametric surplus-sharing problem is given by a set X of feasible utility vectors
and a disagreement utility vector d, both depending upon an exogenous parameter. We
examine the existence of a surplus-sharing solution such that the outcomes selected in ...
Cited by 18 - Related articles - All 6 versions

Commons with increasing marginal costs: random priority versus average cost*

Full text - MIT Libraries
H Crès… - International economic review, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. ...
Cited by 18 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 9 versions

Interpreting common ownership

H Moulin - … Économiques de Louvain/Louvain Economic Review, 1990 - JSTOR
Notre article examine d'une manière critique quelques résultats axiomatiques récents de
travaux sur l'utilisation des ressources en propriety commune. Ii discute notamment des
problèmes de répartition de biens non-produits et de la production coopérative de biens, ...
Cited by 17 - Related articles

Implementing just and efficient decision-making

Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin - Journal of Public Economics, 1981 - Elsevier
... NorthHolland Publishing Company IMPLEMENTING JUST AND EFFICIENT DECISIONMAKING
Herve MOULIN CEREMADE, Universite Paris IX, and Ecole Polytechnique, 75230 Paris Cedex
05, France Received July 1979, revised version received April 1981 In an economy ...
Cited by 17 - Related articles - All 5 versions

[CITATION] Correlation and duopoly

LA Gerard-Varet… - Journal of economic theory, 1978 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your
bookmarks. Correlation and duopoly. LA Gerard-Varet and Herve Moulin (). Journal
of Economic Theory, 1978, vol. 19, issue 1, pages 123-149. Date ...
Cited by 16 - Related articles - Cached - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 5 versions

Distributive and additive costsharing of an homogeneous good

Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1999 - Elsevier
Cited by 15 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 12 versions

Proportional scheduling, split-proofness, and merge-proofness

[PDF] from rice.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin - Games and Economic Behavior, 2008 - Elsevier
Cited by 15 - Related articles - All 6 versions

[CITATION] Strategic interactions in economics: the game theoretic alternative

M Bianchi… - Appraising Economic Theories: Studies in the …, 1991
Cited by 14 - Related articles

[PDF] The price of anarchy of serial cost sharing and other methods

[PDF] from columbia.edu
H Moulin - 2005 - columbia.edu
Page 1. The price of anarchy of serial cost sharing and other methods Hervé Moulin Department
of Economics, Rice University August 2005 Abstract Users share an increasing marginal cost
technology. A method charges non negative cost shares covering costs. ...
Cited by 15 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 4 versions

Fair allocation of production externalities: recent results

[PDF] from rice.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin, Y Sprumont - Revue d'économie politique, 2007 - cairn.info
Cited by 13 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 16 versions

Priority rules and other inequitable rationing methods

H Moulin - 1998 - papers.ssrn.com
Page 1. 1 Priority Rules and Other Inequitable Rationing Methods 1. Rationing:
endogeneous demands, exogeneous rights The simple model of rationing discussed
in this paper is perhaps the oldest (O'Neill [1982], Rabinovitch ...
Cited by 13 - Related articles - All 6 versions

Procedural cum endstate justice: an implementation viewpoint

[PS] from duke.edu
H Moulin - 1998 - papers.ssrn.com
Page 1. Procedural cum Endstate Justice: An Implementation Viewpoint* Hervé Moulin
Department of Economics Duke University Box 90097 Durham NC 27708
moulin@econ.duke.edu Revised March 1997 * This paper is based ...
Cited by 13 - Related articles - All 12 versions

Cooperation in mixed equilibrium

H Moulin - Mathematics of Operations Research, 1976 - JSTOR
... 1, No. 3, August, 1976 Printed in U.SA. COOPERATION IN MIXED EQUILIBRIUM* HERVE
MOULIN 143 Boulevard Lefebvre, 75015 Paris, France ... 275 (1.6) Page 4. HERVE MOULIN
Therefore, B + AA has equal rows and equal columns, ie, B + A is a constant matrix. ...
Cited by 12 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 3 versions

Non-cooperative implementation: A survey of recent results

Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin - Mathematical Social Sciences, 1982 - Elsevier
Abstract Strategic decentralization of collective decision-making is considered when the
agents' behaviour is non-cooperative. Specifically they use dominant, maximin risk-avert or
sophisticated strategies. The existing results applying these equilibrium concepts are ...
Cited by 12 - Related articles - Library Search - All 5 versions

[CITATION] Bargaining and noncooperative implementation

H Moulin - Laboratoire d'Econometrie de l'Ecole Polytechnique, 1982
Cited by 11 - Related articles

An efficient and almost budget balanced cost sharing method

[PDF] from rice.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin - Games and Economic Behavior, 2010 - Elsevier
Cited by 11 - Related articles - All 7 versions

Impartial division of a dollar

[PDF] from yale.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
G De Clippel, H Moulin… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2008 - Elsevier
For impartial division, each participant reports only her opinion about the fair relative shares
of the other participants, and this report has no effect on her own share. If a specific division
is compatible with all reports, it is implemented. We propose a family of natural methods ...
Cited by 11 - Related articles - All 26 versions

Monotonic surplus sharing: Characterization results

H Moulin - Games and Economic Behavior, 1989 - Elsevier
Abstract We consider surplus-sharing problems where both the disagreement utility vector
and the feasible utility frontier depend monotonically on an exogenous parameter. We
investigate the existence of a monotonic solution to these problems. The two-person case ...
Cited by 10 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 5 versions

Cooperative microeconomics: A game-theoretic introduction

Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin… - Journal of Economic Literature, 1996 - pup.princeton.edu
Over the past fifty years game theory has had a major impact on the field of economics. It
was for work in game theory that the 1994 Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded. Although
non-cooperative game theory is better known, the theory of cooperative games has ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - Cached - BL Direct - All 3 versions

Filling a multicolor urn: An axiomatic analysis

[PDF] from rice.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2003 - Elsevier
The probabilistic distribution of identical successive units amounts to filling an urn with balls
of different colors (one color per agent). The fixed chances methods allocate each unit
independently of the current distribution of shares. The Polya–Eggenberger methods ...
Cited by 8 - Related articles - All 10 versions

Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms

Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin - Social Choice and Welfare, 2010 - Springer
Page 1. Soc Choice Welf (2010) 34:193–216 DOI 10.1007/s00355-009-0393-5
ORIGINAL PAPER Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG
mechanisms Hervé Moulin Received: 20 January 2008 / Accepted ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - All 7 versions

Minimizing the worst slowdown: Offline, online

[PDF] from informs.org
Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin - Operations research, 2007 - or.journal.informs.org
Page 1. OPERATIONS RESEARCH Vol. 55, No. 5, September–October 2007, pp. 876–889
ISSN 0030-364XEISSN 1526-54630755050876 informs® DOI 10.1287/opre.1070.0447 ©
2007 INFORMS Minimizing the Worst Slowdown: Offline, Online ...
Cited by 6 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 24 versions

Axiomatic Cost and Surplus Sharing. Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare

H Moulin, KJ Arrow, AK Sen… - 2002 - en.scientificcommons.org
Cited by 5 - Related articles - Cached

Characterization of additive cost sharing methods

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
H Moulin… - Economics Letters, 2003 - Elsevier
Cited by 5 - Related articles - Library Search - All 27 versions

Sharing the cost of a capacity network

Full text - MIT Libraries
A Bogomolnaia, R Holzman… - Mathematics of Operations …, 2010 - dl.acm.org
Google, Inc. (search), Subscribe (Full Service), Register (Limited Service,
Free), Login. Search: The ACM Digital Library The Guide. ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - All 4 versions

[PDF] Efficient cost sharing with a cheap residual claimant

[PDF] from free.fr
H Moulin - 2006 - med.ces.free.fr
Page 1. Efficient cost sharing with a cheap residual claimant Hervé Moulin* Rice University,
Houston,Texas, USA September 2006 Abstract The residualA mechanism shares efficiently a
one-commodity convex technology and generates a small budget imbalance. ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 2 versions

[CITATION] Fondation de la théorie des jeux

H Moulin… - 1979 - Hermann
Cited by 16 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search

[CITATION] La convexité dans les mathématiques de la décision: optimisation et théorie micro-économique

H Moulin… - 1979 - en.scientificcommons.org
Cited by 15 - Related articles - Cached - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 2 versions

[CITATION] Fair Division and Collective Welfare. Number 0262633116 in MIT Press Books

HJ Moulin - 2004 - The MIT Press
Cited by 4 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries

[CITATION] Welfare bounds and fair allocation of private goods

H Moulin - UFAE and IAE Working Papers, 1989 - ideas.repec.org
... Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics. Author Info.
MOULIN, H. Additional information is available for the following registered author(s): Herve
Moulin. Abstract. No abstract is available for this item. Download Info. ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - Cached - Library Search - All 4 versions

[CITATION] 'Uniform externalities: two axioms for fair allocation

Full text - MIT Libraries
M Herve - Journal of Public Economics, 1990
Cited by 4 - Related articles

[CITATION] Uniform Externalities: two axioms for fair allocation

H Moulin - UFAE and IAE Working Papers, 1989 - ideas.repec.org
... Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics. Author Info.
MOULIN, H. Additional information is available for the following registered author(s): Herve
Moulin. Abstract. No abstract is available for this item. Download Info. ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - Cached - Library Search - All 5 versions

[PDF] Egalitarianism under earmark constraints

[PDF] from unibe.ch
O Bochet, R Ilkılıç… - Submitted for publication, 2010 - staff.vwi.unibe.ch
Abstract We consider a model in which a homogeneous commodity (the resource) is shared
by several agents with single-peaked preferences and capacity constraints, and the
resource is coming from different suppliers under arbitrary bilateral feasibility constraints: ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 10 versions

[CITATION] La stratégie du vote

H Moulin - 1980 - Éditions du Centre national de la …
Cited by 11 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search

[CITATION] Fair division and collective welfare

Hervé. Moulin - MIT
Get it from MIT Libraries

 Create email alert



1

2

Next


 

About Google Scholar - All About Google - My Citations

©2012 Google