G Charness… - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2002 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract Departures from self-interest in economic experiments have recently inspired
models of “social preferences.” We design a range of simple experimental games that test
these theories more directly than existing experiments. Our experiments show that ...
G Charness, M Dufwenberg - Econometrica, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
We examine experimentally the impact of communication on trust and cooperation. Our
design admits observation of promises, lies, and beliefs. The evidence is consistent with
people striving to live up to others' expectations so as to avoid guilt, as can be modeled ...
J Brandts… - Experimental Economics, 2000 - Springer
Abstract In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyze whether responses
to favorable and unfavorable actions depend on the elicitation procedure. In our hot
treatment the second player responds to the first player's observed action while in our cold ...
G Charness - Journal of Labor Economics, 2004 - JSTOR
The gift-exchange game has established that, in the laboratory, higher wages offered by an
employer lead to considerably more costly effort provision. However, it is unclear whether
this behavior reflects reciprocity or other forms of social preferences. This article tests ...
G Charness… - 2000 - escholarship.org
Abstract: Departures from pure self interest in economic experiments have recently inspired
models of" social preferences". We conduct experiments on simple two-person and three-
person games with binary choices that test these theories more directly than the array of ...
G Charness… - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2008 - Elsevier
The standard procedure in experimental economics maintains anonymity among laboratory
participants, yet many field interactions are conducted with neither complete anonymity nor
complete familiarity. When we are involved in interactive situations in the field, we usually ...
G Charness… - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2001 - Elsevier
Some current utility models presume that people are concerned with their relative standing
in a reference group. Yet how widespread is this influence? Are some types of people more
susceptible to it than others are? Using simple binary decisions and self-reported ...
G Charness,
L Rigotti… - 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: People who are members of a group and identify with it behave differently from
people who perceive themselves as isolated individuals. This difference depends on two
main factors. First, preferences over outcomes change with the degree of identification ...
G Charness - Games and Economic Behavior, 2000 - Elsevier
The effectiveness of pre-play communication in achieving efficient outcomes has long been
a subject of controversy. Aumann conjectures that, in a variant of the Stag Hunt game,“an
agreement to play [the efficient outcome] conveys no information about what the players ...
J Brandts… - The Economic Journal, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
We study how two dimensions of market conditions affect behaviour in experimental gift-
exchange markets with repeated interaction. First, we consider the impact of competitive
imbalance, by varying whether there is an excess supply of firms or an excess supply of ...
G Charness - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2000 - Elsevier
Previous indirect evidence suggests that impulses towards pro-social behavior are
diminished when an external authority is responsible for an outcome. The responsibility-
alleviation effect states that a shift of responsibility to an external authority dampens ...
G Charness - 2002 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Papers such as Akerlof and Yellen (1990) and Rabin (1993) argue that
considerations such as fairness and reciprocity are important in individual decision-making.
The gift-exchange game (Fehr, Kirchsteiger & Reidl, 1993, and many others) has ...
G Charness, GR Frechette… - Experimental Economics, 2004 - Springer
The gift-exchange game is a form of sequential prisoner's dilemma, developed by Fehr et
al.(1993), and popularized in a series of papers by Ernst Fehr and co-authors. While the
European studies typically feature a high degree of gift exchange, the few US studies ...
G Charness… - 2003 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We examine decision-making under risk in a laboratory experiment. The heart of
our design examines how one's propensity to use Bayes' rule is affected by whether this rule
is aligned with reinforcement or clashes with it. In some cases, we create environments ...
J Brandts… - Management Science, 2003 - JSTOR
This paper presents evidence that the willingness to punish an unfair action is sensitive to
whether this action was preceded by a deceptive message. One player first sends a
message indicating an intended play, which is either favorable or unfavorable to the other ...
G Charness, E Haruvy - Games and Economic Behavior, 2002 - Elsevier
Considerable experimental evidence suggests that non-pecuniary motives must be
addressed when modeling behavior in economic contexts. Recent theories of non-pecuniary
motives can be classified as altruism-, equity-, or reciprocity-based. We outline the ...
G Charness… - American Economic Journal: …, 2009 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: The Winner's Curse (WC) is a robust and persistent deviation from theoretical
predictions established in experimental economics and claimed to exist in field
environments. Recent attempts to reconcile such deviation include" cursed equilibrium" ...
G Charness, P Kuhn - Journal of Labor Economics, 2007 - JSTOR
We study worker behavior in an efficiency-wage environment in which coworkers' wages
can influence a worker's effort. Theoretically, we show that an increase in workers'
responsiveness to coworkers' wages should lead profit-maximizing firms to compress ...
G Charness… - Economic Inquiry, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
Using financial incentives, we study how portfolio choice (how much to invest in a risky
asset) depends on three well-known behavioral phenomena: ambiguity aversion, the
illusion of control, and myopic loss aversion. We find evidence that these phenomena are ...
G Charness… - Econometrica, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
Can incentives be effective in encouraging the development of good habits? We investigate
the post-intervention effects of paying people to attend a gym a number of times during one
month. In two studies we find marked attendance increases after the intervention relative ...
G Charness… - The Economic Journal, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
Do people care about intentions–even when good intentions do not produce good results?
In our experiments we find that rates of punishment and reward react strongly to intentions
(the wage a firm decides to pay) and more modestly to distributional outcomes (the higher ...
G Charness, E Haruvy… - Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 2007 - Elsevier
We explore the effects of social distance in experiments conducted over the Internet on three
continents, in classroom laboratory sessions conducted in Israel and Spain, and in computer
sessions pairing participants from different states, one in Texas and the other in California. ...
G Charness, M Corominas-Bosch… - Journal of Economic …, 2007 - Elsevier
We consider bargaining in a bipartite network of buyers and sellers, who can only trade with
the limited number of people with whom they are connected. We perform an experimental
test of a graph-theoretic model that yields unique predictions about equilibrium prices for ...
G Charness, E Karni… - Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2007 - Springer
Abstract This paper reports the results of experiments designed to test whether individuals
and groups abide by monotonicity with respect to first-order stochastic dominance and
Bayesian updating when making decisions under risk. The results indicate a significant ...
J Brandts… - Experimental Economics, 2011 - Springer
Abstract In this paper, we present a first survey of the literature regarding whether the
strategy method, in which a responder makes conditional decisions for each possible
information set, leads to different experimental results than does the more standard direct- ...
G Charness… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2005 - Elsevier
Participants in experimental games typically can only choose actions, without making
comments about other participants' future actions. In sequential two-person games, we allow
first movers to express a preference between responder choices. We find that responder ...
G Charness… - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2002 - Elsevier
Many authors have discussed an apparent shift to a new employment contract characterized
by less commitment between employer and employee, and closer ties between wages
within the enterprise and those in the external labor market. We study the issue of when ...
G Charness… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
We study games played between groups of players, where a given group decides which
strategy it will play through a vote by its members. When groups consist of two voting
players, our games can also be interpreted as network-formation games. In experiments ...
G Charness, P Kuhn - Handbook of Labor Economics, 2011 - Elsevier
Abstract This chapter surveys the contributions of laboratory experiments to labor
economics. We begin with a discussion of methodological issues: when (and why) is a lab
experiment the best approach; how do laboratory experiments compare to field ...
G Charness… - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2009 - Elsevier
We explore play between groups where one member of each 2-person group dictates the
play of that group and is therefore responsible for the payoff of the other group member. We
compare this to play when the game is the same, but each person is playing only for ...
A Cabrales… - Nº.: Working papers; 2000, 2000 - e-archivo.uc3m.es
It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentivecompatible mechanisms
on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this
assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful ...
G Charness, GR Frechette… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2007 - Elsevier
We test a two-stage compensation mechanism for promoting cooperation in Prisoner's
Dilemma games. Players first simultaneously choose binding non-negative amounts to pay
their counterparts for cooperating, and then play the induced game knowing these ...
G Charness, R Cobo-Reyes… - Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 2008 - Elsevier
This paper explores the effect of the possibility of third-party intervention on behavior in a
variant of the Berg et al.[Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., McCabe, K., 1995. Trust, reciprocity and social
history. Games and Economic Behavior 10, 122–142]“Investment Game”. A third-party's ...
G Charness… - 2007 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Are men more willing to take financial risks than women? The answer to this
important question is not clear from the existing literature. We propose a novel approach to
this issue, in which we both assemble the data from many experiments with thousands of ...
G Charness… - 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We study worker and firm behavior in an environment where worker effort could
depend on co-workers' wages. Theoretically, we show that an increase in workers''concerns'
with co-workers' wages should lead profit-maximizing firms to compress wages under ...
G Charness, E Haruvy… - 2003 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We explore the effects of social distance in experiments conducted over the
Internet on three continents, in classroom laboratory sessions conducted in Israel and Spain,
and in computer sessions pairing participants from different states-one in Texas and the ...
[CITATION] Kagel. 2004. How robust is laboratory gift exchange
G Charness, GR Frechette… - Experimental Economics, 2001
[CITATION] Hot and cold decisions and reciprocity in experiments with sequential games
G Charness… - The American Economic Review, 2009 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: There is economic pressure to postpone the retirement age, but employers are still
reluctant to employ older workers. We investigate the comparative behavior of juniors and
seniors in experiments conducted both onsite with the employees of two large firms and in ...
G Charness, M Dufwenberg - Economics Letters, 2010 - Elsevier
Previous research has demonstrated that people have some degree of aversion to lying. 1 An
important research topic is concerned with why this is the case. Charness and Dufwenberg
(2006) (henceforth, “CD”) suggest that this happens because decision-makers dislike ...
G Charness, E Karni… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2010 - Elsevier
This paper reports the results of a series of experiments designed to test whether and to
what extent individuals succumb to the conjunction fallacy. Using an experimental design of
Tversky and Kahneman (1983), it finds that given mild incentives, the proportion of ...
G Charness… - 2003 - escholarship.org
Abstract: Do people care about intentions? Good intentions often do not produce good
results when a person tries to do something nice for someone else. In this paper, we ask
under what circumstances do people pay attention to outcomes and under what ...
G Charness - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2000 - Elsevier
This paper investigates whether information about generosity or fairness can be useful in
reducing dispute costs and enhancing bargaining efficiency. Subjects were first screened
using a dictator game, with the allocations chosen used to separate participants into two ...
G Charness, M Dufwenberg - UC Santa Barbara and University of …, 2005 - mail.eaer.org
Uri Gneezy (2005) reports intriguing experimental evidence indicating that people do not
like to lie. His subjects deceive only if they thereby gain a lot, or impose little loss. At first
glance one might think a simple cost of lying is involved. However, as a general ...
G Charness, P Kuhn - 2005 - nber.org
We study worker and firm behavior in an efficiency-wage environment where co-workers'
wages may potentially influence a worker's effort. Theoretically, we show that an increase in
workers' responsiveness to co-workers' wages should lead profit-maximizing firms to ...
G Charness… - Economics Letters, 2004 - Elsevier
In some environments, a player only learns the choice of another player if he or she
undertakes a risky choice. While costless preplay communication (cheap talk) has been
found to be effective in experimental coordination games, participants have typically ...
G Charness… - The Economic Journal, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
Our laboratory study of risk sharing without commitment captures the main features of a
simple model of voluntary insurance. Participants are paired in matches with stochastic
endings. Each period they receive fixed endowments and one of the pair (randomly-drawn ...
G Charness… - 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We test an assortative mechanism whereby groups are formed endogenously,
through the use of voting. Once formed, groups play a public-goods game, where the social
value of an incremental contribution to the group account increases with the size of the ...
[CITATION] Gender differences in financial risk-taking
G Charness… - Available at SSRN: http://ssrn. com/abstract, 2004
G Charness, MC Villeval - 2007 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: The population of most developed societies is graying. As life expectancy
increases and the large baby-boom generation approaches retirement age, this has critical
consequences for maintaining a high standard of living and the sustainability of pension ...
G Charness… - 2000 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Are people concerned with their relative standing in a reference group? Do certain
types care more about this than others? Little work has been done to identify underlying
determinants for an inclination to make social comparisons and to explain variation across ...
A Cabrales, G Charness… - Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 2003 - Elsevier
We perform an experimental test of a modification of the controversial canonical mechanism
for Nash implementation, using three subjects in non-repeated groups, as well as three
outcomes, states of nature, and integer choices. We find that this mechanism successfully ...
G Charness… - Unpublished Manuscript, 2000 - Citeseer
Abstract: Departures from pure self-interest in economic experiments have recently inspired
models of “social preferences”. We conduct experiments on simple games that test these
theories more directly than the array of games conventionally considered. Our ...
G Charness, M Dufwenberg - The American Economic …, 2011 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: We show experimentally that whether and how communication achieves beneficial
social outcomes in a hidden-information context depends crucially on whether low-talent
agents can participate in a Pareto-improving outcome. Communication is effective (and ...
G Charness, E Haruvy - Journal of Managerial Psychology, 2000 - emeraldinsight.com
Abstract: A self-serving bias occurs when people subconsciously alter their perceptions
about what is fair or right in a manner that serves their own interests. Perceptions of what
constitutes “fair performance” may well vary according to one's role in the employment ...
G Charness,
N Garoupa - Journal of Economics & …, 2000 - Wiley Online Library
We conduct an experimental study of sales of insider information about an asset's future
value, where the insiders cannot purchase the underlying asset. We examine whether such
information is purchased, the quality of the information provided, and the subsequent ...
G Charness… - Interfaces, 2002 - JSTOR
We tested the effects of various policy rules on retailer behavior in laboratory experiments
conducted at Hewlett-Packard Laboratories. Our experimental design models the
multifaceted contemporary market for consumer computer products and is quite complex, ...
GB Charness, D Levin… - 2008 - escholarship.org
... Page 2. On the Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment: New Experimental Evidence
Gary Charness, University of California, Santa Barbara Edi Karni, Johns Hopkins
University Dan Levin, The Ohio State University October 11, 2008 ...
Abstract: In this paper, we survey the literature regarding whether the strategy method, in
which a responder makes conditional decisions for each possible information set, leads to
different experimental results than does the more standard direct-response method, in ...
G Charness, D Masclet… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: In this paper, we investigate individuals' investment in status in an environment
where no monetary return can possibly be derived from reaching a better relative position.
We use a real-effort experiment in which we permit individuals to learn and potentially ...
G Charness… - 1998 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: The effectiveness of pre-play communication in achieving efficient outcomes has
long been a subject of controversy. In some environments, cheap talk may help to achieve
coordination. However, Aumann conjectures that, in a variant of the Stag Hunt game, a ...
[CITATION] Gift-exchange with excess supply and excess demand
J Brandts… - 1999 - mimeo, Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona
J Brandts, G Charness - 1999 - digital.csic.es
We use a two-person 3-stage game to investigate whether people choose to punish or
reward another player by sacrificing money to increase or decrease the other person's
payoff. One player sends a message indicating an intended play, which is either favorable ...
[CITATION] Expressed Preferences and Reciprocity in Experimental Games
G Charness… - 2001 - mimeo
A Cabrales… - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2011 - Elsevier
We devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in a hidden-information context. A
principal offers one of three possible contract menus to a team of two agents of unknown
skill levels, with both agents' participation needed for production. We observe numerous ...
G Charness, N Du… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2011 - Elsevier
Trust is an essential component of good social outcomes and effective economic
performance. Reputation on the trustee's past behavior in the same role has proven to be
greatly effective at raising the level of trust. In this study, we show that providing ...
[CITATION] Promises, Promises
G Charness, M Dufwenberg - 2003 - IUI Stockholm Working Paper
J Brandts, A Cabrales… - Economic Theory, 2007 - Springer
Abstract The Dixit (Econ J 90: 95–106, 1980) hypothesis that incumbents use investment in
capacity to deter potential entrants has found little empirical support. Bagwell and Ramey (J
Econ 27: 660–680, 1996) propose a model where, in the unique game-theoretic ...
G Charness… - Economic Journal, 2004 - econ.uqam.ca
ABSTRACT We investigate risk sharing without commitment by designing an experiment to
match a simple model of voluntary insurance between two agents when aggregate income
is constant. Participants are matched in pairs. Each period, they receive their income with ...
G Charness, P Kuhn… - 2010 - nber.org
In labor markets, the ratchet effect refers to a situation where workers subject to performance
pay choose to restrict their output, because they rationally anticipate that firms will respond
to higher output levels by raising output requirements or cutting pay. We model this effect ...
G Charness… - 2001 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Costless and non-binding pre-play communication (cheap talk) has been found to
often be effective in achieving efficient outcomes in experimental games. However, in
previous two-player experimental games each player was informed about both his payoff ...
[CITATION] Bargaining on networks: an experiment
G Charness, M Corominas Bosch - Materia (s), 2005
Abstract: The Dixit (1980) hypothesis that incumbents use investment in capacity to deter
potential entrants has found little empirical support. Bagwell and Ramey (1996) propose a
model where, in the unique game-theoretic prediction based on forward induction or ...
[CITATION] Alternative dispute resolution and the settlement gap
G Charness - Dispute Resolution: Bridging the Settlement Gap, 1996
[CITATION] Endogenous group formation and public goods provision: Exclusion, exit, mergers
G Charness… - 2008 - and Redemption
G Charness… - Available at SSRN, Social Science …, 2006 - homepage.ntu.edu.tw
Abstract: We test a mechanism whereby groups are formed endogenously, through the use
of voting. Once formed, groups play a public-goods game, where there are economies of
scale: the social value of an incremental contribution to the group account increases with ...
[CITATION] The hidden costs of control: Comment
G Charness, R Cobo-Reyes,
N Jimenez… - 2009 - Mimeo
G Charness… - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2011 - Elsevier
Abstract Are men more willing to take financial risks than women? The answer to this
question has immediate relevance for many economic issues. We assemble the data from
10 sets of experiments with one simple underlying investment game. Most of these ...
J Brandts, A Cabrales… - 2003 - e-archivo.uc3m.es
While the theoretical industrial organization literature has long argued that excess capacity
can be used to deter entry into markets, there is little empirical evidence that incumbent firms
effectively behave in this way. Bagwell and Ramey (1996) propose a game with a specific ...
N Burger, G Charness… - Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 2011 - Elsevier
Self-control problems have recently received considerable attention from economic
theorists. We conducted two studies involving behavioral interventions expected to affect
performance, providing some of the first experimental data in this area. In the first we ...
G Charness, A Rustichini - Games and Economic Behavior, 2011 - Elsevier
We study experimentally how males and females differ in the way same-gender peers
observing their action affects their social behavior. In our experiment, people play a
Prisoner's Dilemma game with a partisan audience watching the choice. Two groups ...
[CITATION] Some simple tests of social preferences and a new model
G Charness… - 2000 - Discussion Paper, University of …
We study whether people's preferences in an unbalanced market are affected by whether
they are on the excess supply side or the excess demand side of the market. Our analysis is
based on the comparison of behavior between two types of experimental gift exchange ...
G DeAngelo… - Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2012 - Springer
Abstract We conduct laboratory experiments to investigate the effects of deterrence
mechanisms under controlled conditions. The effect of the expected cost of punishment of an
individual's decision to engage in a proscribed activity and the effect of uncertainty on an ...
[CITATION] Forthcoming.“What's in a Name? Anonymity and Social Distance in Dictator and Ultimatum games.”
G Charness… - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
G Charness… - 2010 - idv.sinica.edu.tw
Gary Charness & Chun-Lei Yang* September 30, 2011 Abstract: We test a mechanism
whereby groups are formed voluntarily, through the use of voting. These groups play a
public-goods game, where efficiency increases with group size (up to a limit, in one ...
[CITATION] Hidden information, participation, and communication
G Charness, M Dufwenberg - Unpublished Paper (University of California, Santa …, 2009
A Cabrales, G Charness - 2006 - hal.archives-ouvertes.fr
We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of competition on optimal
contracts in a hidden-information context. In our benchmark case, each principal is matched
with one agent of unknown type. In our second treatment, a principal can select one of ...
[CITATION] Overconfidence, Subjectivity, and Self-Deception
G Charness, A Rustichini… - 2010 - Discussion paper, UC Santa …
[CITATION] Exit, Exclusion, and Mergers: Endogenous Group Formation and Public Goods Provision
C Gary… - University of California Santa Barbara, 2006
[CITATION] Strong Evidence for Gender Differences in Investment
C Gary… - 2007 - … Paper available at SSRN: http//ssrn. …
[CITATION] Attribution and reciprocity in a simulated labor market
G Charness - Economics Working Papers, 1996
G Charness… - Levine's Bibliography, 2003 - emlab.berkeley.edu
Abstract: We examine decision-making under risk and uncertainty in a laboratory
experiment. The heart of our design is directed at studying how one's propensity to use
Bayes' rule is affected by whether this rule is aligned with reinforcement or clashes with it. ...
G DeAngelo… - Manuscript, University of Santa Barbara, 2009 - economics.ca
Abstract: We conduct laboratory experiments to investigate the effects of deterrence
mechanisms under controlled conditions. The effect of the expected cost of punishment of an
individual's decision to engage in a proscribed activity and the effect of uncertainty on an ...
G Charness,
L Rigotti… - 2003 - time.dufe.edu.cn
Abstract We study the effect of the mere presence of an audience on the behavior of people
involved in a strategic interaction. In our laboratory experiment, two active participants play
the game and receive payoffs determined by their choices, while inactive participants ...
[CITATION] Forthcoming.“The Role of Responsibility in Strategic Risk-Taking.”
G Charness… - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
[CITATION] Changes in Careers and Wage Structures at Large American Employers
DI Levine, D Belman, G Charness, E Groshen… - Kalamazoo, MI: Upjohn …, 2003
G Charness, A Rustichini… - 2005 - dse.unibo.it
Abstract: We conduct experiments to examine the determinants of overconfidence, and the
degree to which it reflects self-image (consumption or ego utility,) social image (utility from
the perceptions of others), or perhaps-unconscious strategic concerns. First, we observe ...
G Charness… - University of California at Santa …, 2007 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We explore play between groups where one member of each 2-person group
dictates the play of that group and is therefore responsible for the payoff of the other group
member. We compare this to play when the game is the same, but each person is playing ...
G Charness,
L Rigotti… - 2003 - escholarship.org
Abstract Social facilitation describes the effect on performance due to the mere presence of
others. Here we study the effect of the mere presence of an audience on the behavior of
people involved in a strategic interaction and on the performance of institutions. In our ...
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