 | Department of Economics, Northwestern University Verified email at northwestern.edu Cited by 128 |
R Siegel - Econometrica, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
This paper studies a class of games,“all-pay contests,” which capture general asymmetries
and sunk investments inherent in scenarios such as lobbying, competition for market power,
labor-market tournaments, and R&D races. Players compete for one of several identical ...
Abstract: This paper investigates equilibrium behavior in a class of games that models
asymmetric competitions with unconditional and conditional investments. Such competitions
include lobbying settings, labor-market tournaments, and R&D races, among others. I ...
Abstract: This paper studies equilibrium behavior in a class of games that models
asymmetric multiprize competitions in which players' costs are non-decreasing. Such costs
accommodate head starts, which capture incumbency advantages, prior investments, and ...
[CITATION] Forthcoming. Asymmetric Contests with Conditional Investments
J Ely… - 2010 - faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu
Abstract We investigate a common-value labor setting in which firms interview a worker prior
to hiring. When firms have private information about the worker's value and interview
decisions are kept private, many firms may enter the market, interview, and hire with ...
Abstract: I show that a unique equilibrium exists in a two-player all-pay auction with
asymmetric independent discrete signal distributions and asymmetric interdependent
valuations. The proof is constructive, and the construction is simple to implement as a ...
Abstract This paper studies equilibrium behavior in a class of games that models asymmetric
multiprize competitions in which players' costs are non-decreasing. Such costs
accommodate head starts, which can be used to model incumbency advantages, prior ...
[CITATION] Has Mindfulness Been Oversold?
R Siegel… - Psychotherapy Networker, 2012
Y Salant… - 2012 - business-school.exeter.ac.uk
Abstract We study the efficient allocation of a divisible asset when reallocation is costly.
Each of two individuals is initially allocated a share of an asset. The individuals' valuations
for the asset are uncertain at the time of the initial allocation. After the uncertainty is ...
R Siegel - 2011 - faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu
Abstract This note considers participation in deterministic contests for m≥ 1 identical prizes,
which employ an auction-like rule to determine the winners. In most papers that investigate
such models, participation by precisely m+ 1 players is associated with players having ...
R Siegel - 2008 - economics.sas.upenn.edu
Many competitions are characterized by asymmetries among competitors. One example is
the competition for promotions. Promotion decisions are often based on employees'
productivity and effort, as well as on tenure and quality of relationships with superiors. ...
Page 1. Asymmetric Contests with Interdependent Valuations and Incomplete
Information Ron Siegel∗ March 2011 Abstract I show that a unique equilibrium exists
in a two-player all-pay auction with asym- metric independent ...
Abstract We investigate a common-value multi-stage labor market in which firms interview
workers prior to hiring. When firms have private information about workers' quality and
interview decisions are kept private, many firms may enter the market, interview, and hire. ...
Page 1. Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1754181 Participation
in Contests Ron Siegel∗ Department of Economics Northwestern University February
2011 1 Introduction Some real-world competitions induce ...
J González-Dıaz… - 2012 - faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu
Abstract Bulow and Levin's (2006)“Matching and Price Competition” studies a matching
model in which hospitals compete for interns by offering wages. We relax the assumption of
symmetric linear costs and compare the pricing equilibrium that results to the firm-optimal ...
R Siegel - 2011 - faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu
Abstract I show that Siegel's (2009) payoff result holds when players' utilities are
nonmonotonic. This happens, for example, in competitions for promotions in which workers
are intrinsically motivated, and in research and development races in which better ...
J González-Díaz… - 2009 - Citeseer
Abstract We relax the assumption of symmetric linear costs in B&L's (2006)“Matching and
Price Competition” and compare the pricing equilibrium that results to the firmoptimal
competitive equilibrium. With linear and asymmetric costs, competition may not be ...
Abstract: I consider competitions in which, conditional on winning or losing, the effort
exerted by a competitor does not necessarily decrease his payoff. This happens, for
example, in competitions for promotions in which workers are intrinsically motivated, and ...
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