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Setting the right prices for the wrong reasons

[PDF] from yale.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
C Hellwig… - Journal of Monetary Economics, 2009 - Elsevier
Nominal price adjustment is studied in an environment with firm-specific and aggregate
shocks to economic fundamentals and incomplete, dispersed information. Firms update their
expectations about fundamentals based on their own cash flows (revenues and wages). ...
Cited by 23 - Related articles - All 14 versions

[PDF] Heterogeneous Information and Labor Market Fluctuations

[PDF] from uci.edu
V Venkateswaran - 2011 - pigammamu.ss.uci.edu
Abstract I introduce dispersed information in a search and matching model of the labor
market, where firms are hit by aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity shocks. The latter
induce larger responses in recruiting activity than the former-because aggregate shocks ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 25 versions

[CITATION] Efficiency of Information Acquisition in a Price-Setting Model

LG Llosa… - 2011 - Discussion paper, UCLA
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[PDF] Heterogeneous Information and the Labor Market

[PDF] from upf.edu
V Venkateswaran - Ariel, 2011 - econ.upf.edu
Abstract I introduce dispersed information in a search and matching model of the labor
market, where firms are hit by aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity shocks. The latter
induce larger responses in recruiting activity than the former-because aggregate shocks ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 15 versions

[PDF] Hayek Vs Keynes: Dispersed Information and Market Prices in a Price-Setting Model

[PDF] from harrisdellas.net
C Hellwig… - 2011 - harrisdellas.net
Abstract We examine the role of dispersed knowledge about fundamentals in the presence
of market-generated information. Our main theoretical result is a “Hayekian benchmark”,
defined by conditions under which dispersed information has no effect on outcomes. In a ...
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[PDF] EFFICIENCY OF INFORMATION ACQUISITION IN COORDINATION GAMES

[PDF] from google.com
LG LLOSA… - 2011 - sites.google.com
Abstract We study the efficiency of information acquisition decisions in models with
dispersed information. In a general beauty contest setting with payoff externalities, we show
that information choice is typically inefficient because agents do not fully internalize the ...
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