H Moulin - Public Choice, 1980 - Springer
Page 1. On strategy-proofness and single peakedness H. MOULIN* University
Paris-IX Introduction The literature on strategic manipulation of decision schemes,
following the seminal Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [6], must ...
H Moulin - 1986 - books.google.com
Page 1. Hervé Moulin GAME THEORY FUR THE SQCIAI1 SCIENCES SECOND AND
REVISED EDITION STUDIES IN GAME THEORY AND MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS
Page 2. STUDIES IN GAME THEORY AND MATHEMATICAL ...
H Moulin… - Economic Theory, 2001 - Springer
Page 1. Economic Theory 18, 511–533 (2001) Research Articles Strategyproof sharing
of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency * Hervé Moulin1 and Scott
Shenker2 1 Department of Economics, MS 22, Rice University ...
H Moulin… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1992 - JSTOR
A fixed group of n agents share a one input, one output technology with decreasing returns.
We propose the following cost sharing formula. Agent 1 with the lowest demand of output q 1
pays (1/n) th of the cost of nq 1. Agent 2, with the next lowest demand q 2 pays agent 1's ...
H Moulin - 1983 - getcited.org
An academic directory and search engine.
H Moulin - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1979 - JSTOR
The concept of a dominance solvable voting scheme is presented as a weakening of the
strategy-proofness requirement: it relies on successive elimination of dominated strategies
and generalizes the well known concept of" sophisticated voting." Dominance solvable ...
[CITATION] On the uniqueness and stability of Nash's equilibrium in non cooperative games
D Gabay… - 1978 - Université Paris IX-Dauphine, …
H Moulin - 2004 - books.google.com
... Page 4. Page 5. FAIR DIVISION AND COLLECTIVE WELFARE Herve Moulin The MIT Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England Page 6. ... Library of Congress Cataloging-in-
Publication Data Moulin, Herve\ Fair division and collective welfare / Herve Moulin, p. cm. ...
H Moulin - Handbook of social choice and welfare, 2002 - Elsevier
... This is the background image for an unknown creator of an OCR page with image plus hidden
text. Chapter6 AXIOMATIC COST AND SURPLUS SHARING* HERVE MOULIN Rice University
Contents Abstract 290 Keywords 290 Introduction 291 1. Rationing 294 1.1. ...
H Moulin - Social Choice and Welfare, 1986 - Springer
Page 1. Soc Choice Welfare (1986) 3:271-291 ial oiee © Springer-Verlag 1986
Choosing from a Tournament H. Moulin Department of Economics, Virginia
Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA 24061, USA ...
A Bogomolnaia… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2001 - Elsevier
H Moulin - Social Choice and Welfare, 1985 - Springer
Page 1. Social Choice Welfare (1985) 2:147-160 Social Choice .dWelfarc © Springer-Verlag
1985 Choice Functions Over a Finite Set: A Summary* H. Moulin Department of Economics,
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA 24061, USA ...
H Moulin - Social Choice and Welfare, 1999 - Springer
Page 1. Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness Herve Moulin
Department of Economics, Duke University, Box 90097, Durham, NC 27708-0097, USA (e-mail:
moulin@econ.duke.edu) Received: 8 July 1997/Accepted: 22 January 1998 ...
H Moulin - The Review of Economic Studies, 1994 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
... Studies Limited 0034-6527/94/00160305$02.00 Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable
Public Goods HERVE MOULIN Duke University First version received November
1991 ;final version acceptedSeptember 1993 (Eds.) Under the ...
H Moulin - Econometrica, 2000 - Wiley Online Library
... PRIORITY RULES AND OTHER ASYMMETRIC RATIONING METHODS BY HERVE MOULIN 1 ´
In a rationing problem, each agent demands a quantity of a certain commodity and the available
resources fall short of total demand. ... 643 Page 2. HERVE MOULIN ´ 644 ...
M Herve… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1994 - Elsevier
Abstract A finite group of agents share a (one output) production function. A cost sharing rule
allocates the total cost among the users for every conceivable profile of output demands. We
investigate the space of possible cost sharing rules from an axiomatic perspective. We ...
H Moulin - Mathematical Social Sciences, 1984 - Elsevier
Abstract In normal form games with single-valued best reply functions it is shown that
dominance-solvability (resulting from successive elimination of dominated strategies)
implies the global stability of the Cournot tatonnement process. When only two players are ...
H Moulin - Journal of Economic Theory, 1984 - Elsevier
Abstract The bargaining game is proposed where the agents bid fractions of dictatorship that
are used by all non-winners of the auction to threaten acceptance of the winner's proposal.
That procedure non-cooperatively implements the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution.
H Moulin - Journal of Economic Theory, 1988 - Elsevier
... JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY 45, 53-64 (1988) Condorcet's Principle Implies the No Show
Paradox HERVE MOULIN* Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University, Blacksburg, Virginia 24061 Received July 15, 1986; revised June 9, 1987 ...
H Moulin - Journal of Economic Theory, 1985 - Elsevier
... JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY 36, 120-148 (1985) The Separability Axiom and
Equal-Sharing Methods HERVE MOULIN*t Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute
and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia 24061 Received May 1, 1984; revised December ...
M Jackson… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1992 - Elsevier
We provide a game form which undertakes a public project exactly when the total benefit of
the project to individuals in a society outweights its cost. The game form is simple, balanced,
and individually rational. It can be adjusted to distribute cost according to a wide class of ...
H Moulin - Social Choice and Welfare, 1990 - Springer
Two microeconomic models of joint ownership are discussed: the division of unproduced
commodities and the joint production of a single output by a single input. In both models the
two principal interpretations of fairness are Equal Split Guarantee (ESG) and No Envy (NE ...
H Moulin… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1988 - Elsevier
Abstract We consider the problem of fair division in economies where the amount to be
divided may vary. We show that there is no solution to this problem jointly satisfying the
following requirements:(i) Pareto-optimality;(ii) resource monotonicity; an increase in the ...
E Friedman… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1999 - Elsevier
We study cost sharing methods with variable demands of heterogeneous goods, additive in
the cost function and meeting the dummy axiom. We consider four axioms: scale invariance
(SI); demand monotonicity (DM); upper bound for homogeneous goods (UBH) placing a ...
H Moulin - Japanese Economic Review, 1995 - Wiley Online Library
The Shapley value theory is extended to cost functions with multiple outputs (or to
production functions with multiple inputs) where each output is demanded by a different
agent and the level of demand varies. Beyond the Additivity and Dummy axioms ( ...
H Moulin - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1987 - JSTOR
In an economy with one public and one private good, egalitarian-equivalent cost sharing
consists of finding the highest public good level x* such that consuming x* for free yields a
feasible utility distribution. The corresponding feasible allocation (typically unique), called ...
H Moulin - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1992 - JSTOR
... AN APPLICATION OF THE SHAPLEY VALUE TO FAIR DIVISION WITH MONEY BY HERVE
MOULIN We consider the fair division of unproduced goods when monetary compensations are
feasible and utilities are quasi-linear. ... 1331 Page 2. 1332 HERVE MOULIN ...
H Moulin… - The Journal of Political Economy, 1989 - JSTOR
Liberal political philosophy, represented classically by John Locke and today by libertarians,
defends great inequality of economic outcome on the basis that people own themselves and
are entitled to establish private property in the external world by virtue of that self- ...
H Moulin - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1987 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract A binary choice problem with side-payments and quasi-linear utilities is considered.
We study two compensation rules, called social choice functions. The egalitarian rule
divides equally the surplus above the average utility level. The laissez-faire rule chooses ...
H Moulin - Social Choice and Welfare, 1984 - Springer
When preferences are single peaked the choice functions that are independent of irrelevant
alternatives both in Nash's and in Arrow's sense are characterized. They take the Condorcet
winner of the n individual peaks plus at most n-1 fixed ballots (phantom voters). These ...
H Moulin - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1985 - JSTOR
EQUAL SHARING OF THE COOPERATIVE SURPLUS is perhaps the simplest notion of
microeconomic justice. In many contexts, however, this principle is hardly operational:
without an objective numeraire, interpersonal comparisons of welfare increments are not ...
H Moulin - Journal of Public Economics, 1986 - Elsevier
A Bogomolnaia… - Economic Theory, 2002 - Springer
Page 1. Economic Theory 19, 623–635 (2002) Exposita Notes A simple random
assignment problem with a unique solution * Anna Bogomolnaia1 and Hervé Moulin2
1 Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University ...
H Moulin - The Review of Economic Studies, 1990 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
... Comparison of Three Solutions HERVE MOULIN Duke University First version received January
1988; final version accepted January 1990 (Eds.) A given set of agents jointly own and operate
a decreasing returns to scale technology (with a single input and a single output). ...
A Bogomolnaia… - Econometrica, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. Econometrica, Vol. 72, No. 1 (January, 2004), 257–279 RANDOM
MATCHING UNDER DICHOTOMOUS PREFERENCES BY ANNA BOGOMOLNAIA
AND HERVE MOULIN1 We consider bilateral matching problems ...
H Moulin - Journal of Economic Theory, 1991 - Elsevier
... Article Outline. • References. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY 54, 321337 (1991) Welfare
Bounds in the Fair Division Problem HERVE MOULIN* Duke Universav, Durham, North Carolina
27706 Received December 6, 1988; revised September 17, 1990 To any anonymous ...
H Moulin - The Review of Economic Studies, 1981 - JSTOR
Small committees and several aspects of bargaining are formally described as collective
decision making problems played by cooperative agents (who may form coalitions and sign
binding agreements). The key variable in this approach is the distribution of decision ...
H Crès… - Operations Research, 2001 - JSTOR
... PRIORITY HERVE CRES HEC School of Management, 78351 Jouy-en Josas, France,
cres@hec.fr HERVE MOULIN Department of Economics, Rice University, MS 22, P0.
Box 1892, Houston, Texas, 77251-1892, moulin@rice.edu ...
H Moulin - Journal of Economic Theory, 2009 - Elsevier
H Moulin - Journal of Public Economics, 1990 - Elsevier
... References. Journal of Public Economics 43 (1990) 305326. NorthHolland UNIFORM
EXTERNALITIES Two Axioms for Fair Allocation Herve MOULIN* Duke University, Durham,
NC27706, USA Received May 1989, revised version received March 1990 Positive (resp. ...
H Moulin - HANDBOOKS IN ECONOMICS, 2001 - ruf.rice.edu
Page 1. Axiomatic Cost and Surplus-Sharing by Hervé Moulin Rice University August 2001
Prepared for Chapter 6 of the Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 1, K. Arrow, AK Sen,
K. Suzumura, Eds. Detailed comments on an earlier version by RJ Aumann, C. Herrero, ...
H Moulin - Journal of Economic theory, 1981 - europealumni.kellogg.northwestern. …
In this paper we assume that the agents behave non-cooperatively. This assumption alone
is not enough to determine unambiguously the outcome elected by the agents. Given a
particular voting scheme and a particular preference profile of the agents, there are in ...
H Moulin - The Oxford handbook of political economy, 2006 - books.google.com
SOCIAL choice is part and parcel of the formal and axiomatic revolution that took over
economic analysis and, to a lesser degree, political and other social sciences in the middle
of the twentieth century. In the shadow of game theory and of the theory of general ...
H Moulin… - Mathematics of Operations Research, 2002 - JSTOR
... FAIR QUEUING AND OTHER PROBABILISTIC ALLOCATION METHODS HERVE MOULIN AND
RICHARD STONG A server processes one job per unit of time and randomly schedules the jobs
requested by a given set of users; each user may request a different number of jobs. ...
H Moulin - 1997 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: A technology with decreasing marginal costs is used by agents with equal rights.
Each agent demands a quantity of output and costs are divided by means of a fixed formula.
Several such mechanisms are compared for the existence of Nash equilibrium demand ...
HJ Moulin - The Rand Journal of Economics, 1987 - JSTOR
Page 1. RAND Journal of Economics Vol. 18, No. 3, Autumn 1987 A core selection for regulating
a single-output monopoly Herve J. Moulin* We consider a single-output production economy
in which all coalitions of agents have access to the technology. ...
H Moulin - Mathematics of Operations Research, 2007 - ruf.rice.edu
Page 1. On scheduling fees to prevent merging, splitting and transferring of jobs Herve
Moulin Rice University May 2004 Abstract A deterministic server is shared by users with
identical linear wait- ing costs, requesting jobs of arbitrary lengths. ...
D Henriet… - The Rand Journal of Economics, 1996 - JSTOR
To share the fixed cost of a communication network, the private-cost method allocates to
each subscriber the cost of his dedicated terminal devices. The external-cost method shares
the connecting cost of user i among all of his correspondents in proportion to their traffic ...
H Moulin - Journal of mathematical Economics, 1980 - Elsevier
Abstract Implementing a social choice function is to endow the agents involved in a
collective decision problem with a privately owned decision power, in such a way that by
exercising (noncooperatively) this power the agents eventually select the very outcome ...
A Bogomolnaia, H Moulin… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2005 - Elsevier
H Moulin - Economic Theory, 2008 - Springer
Page 1. Econ Theory (2008) 36:379–405 DOI 10.1007/s00199-007-0275-y
RESEARCH ARTICLE The price of anarchy of serial, average and incremental cost
sharing Hervé Moulin Received: 16 August 2006 / Accepted: 30 ...
H Moulin - Frontiers of Game Theory, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1993 - books.google.com
Page 163. 8 On the Fair and Coalitions-Strategyproof Allocation of Private Goods Herve Moulin
1 Introduction We consider resource allocation mechanisms where only the domain of individual
preferences (types) and the number of participating agents are known at the time the ...
H Moulin - Journal of Economic Theory, 1999 - Elsevier
H Moulin - European Economic Review, 1981 - Elsevier
In two-person games in normal, bilateral threats succeed in self-enforcing any imputation.
We discriminate among imputations by looking at various features of deterring threats. As a
result we obtain a classification of two-person games. Finally a duopoly example is ...
H Moulin - Social Choice and Welfare, 2002 - Springer
Page 1. Soc Choice Welfare (2002) 19: 381–413 9999 2002 The proportional random allocation
of indivisible units Hervé Moulin Rice University, Department of Economics, MS 22, PO Box
1892, Houston, TX 77251-1892, USA (e-mail: moulin@rice.edu) ...
H Moulin - The Review of Economic Studies, 1984 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract A first-bid auction to allocate the leadership role is used to choose a public decision
and a balanced set of transfers. The mechanism is shown to implement an equal-sharing of
the surplus above the “average” utility level. At the equilibrium an agent's message ...
A Bogomolnaia… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2010 - Elsevier
H Moulin - Games and Economic Behavior, 1992 - Elsevier
A general model of lower bound (individual rationality) and upper bound axioms for fair
allocation is proposed. The Unanimity welfare function associates to eac.
H Moulin… - Review of Economic Design, 1996 - Springer
Page 1. Economic Design ELSEVIER Economic Design 2 (1997) 399-421 Two
versions of the tragedy of the commons Herv6 Moulin a,,, Alison Watts b a
Department of Economics, Duke University, Box 90097, Durham, NC ...
H Moulin - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1982 - JSTOR
Page 1. Econometrica, Vol. 50, No. 1 (January, 1982) VOTING WITH
PROPORTIONAL VETO POWER BY H. MOULINI We give necessary conditions
for a neutral social choice function to be partially implementable by means ...
H Moulin - 1981 - orton.catie.ac.cr
SIDALC - Servicio de Informacion y Documentacion Agropecuaria de las Americas.
H Moulin… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2005 - Elsevier
Under partial responsibility, the ranking of cost shares should never contradict that of
demands. The Solidarity axiom says that if agent i demands more, j should not pay more if k
pays less. It characterizes the quasi-proportional methods, sharing cost in proportion ...
H Moulin… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2006 - Elsevier
We propose two cost-sharing theories in which agents demand comparable commodities
and are responsible for their own demand. Under partial responsibility, agents are not
responsible for the asymmetries of the cost function: two agents consuming the same ...
H Moulin - The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1992 - JSTOR
Scand. J. of Economics 94 (1), 37-51, 1992 All Sorry to Disagree: A General Principle for the
Provision of Nonrival Goods Herve Moulin * Duke University, Durham, NC, USA Abstract A group
of agents with identical rights but different preferences share the cost of a public good. ...
H Moulin - Mathematical Social Sciences, 1985 - Elsevier
Abstract One way to overcome Arrow's impossibility theorem is to drop the requirement that
the collective preference be transitive. If it is quasi-transitive (strict preferences are transitive)
an oligarchy emerges. If it is only acyclic, many non-oligarchic aggregation rules are ...
H Keiding… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1991 - Elsevier
Abstract A parametric surplus-sharing problem is given by a set X of feasible utility vectors
and a disagreement utility vector d, both depending upon an exogenous parameter. We
examine the existence of a surplus-sharing solution such that the outcomes selected in ...
H Crès… - International economic review, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. ...
H Moulin - … Économiques de Louvain/Louvain Economic Review, 1990 - JSTOR
Notre article examine d'une manière critique quelques résultats axiomatiques récents de
travaux sur l'utilisation des ressources en propriety commune. Ii discute notamment des
problèmes de répartition de biens non-produits et de la production coopérative de biens, ...
H Moulin - Journal of Public Economics, 1981 - Elsevier
... NorthHolland Publishing Company IMPLEMENTING JUST AND EFFICIENT DECISIONMAKING
Herve MOULIN CEREMADE, Universite Paris IX, and Ecole Polytechnique, 75230 Paris Cedex
05, France Received July 1979, revised version received April 1981 In an economy ...
LA Gerard-Varet… - Journal of economic theory, 1978 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your
bookmarks. Correlation and duopoly. LA Gerard-Varet and Herve Moulin (). Journal
of Economic Theory, 1978, vol. 19, issue 1, pages 123-149. Date ...
H Moulin… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1999 - Elsevier
H Moulin - Games and Economic Behavior, 2008 - Elsevier
[CITATION] Strategic interactions in economics: the game theoretic alternative
M Bianchi… - Appraising Economic Theories: Studies in the …, 1991
H Moulin - 2005 - columbia.edu
Page 1. The price of anarchy of serial cost sharing and other methods Hervé Moulin Department
of Economics, Rice University August 2005 Abstract Users share an increasing marginal cost
technology. A method charges non negative cost shares covering costs. ...
H Moulin, Y Sprumont - Revue d'économie politique, 2007 - cairn.info
H Moulin - 1998 - papers.ssrn.com
Page 1. 1 Priority Rules and Other Inequitable Rationing Methods 1. Rationing:
endogeneous demands, exogeneous rights The simple model of rationing discussed
in this paper is perhaps the oldest (O'Neill [1982], Rabinovitch ...
H Moulin - 1998 - papers.ssrn.com
Page 1. Procedural cum Endstate Justice: An Implementation Viewpoint* Hervé Moulin
Department of Economics Duke University Box 90097 Durham NC 27708
moulin@econ.duke.edu Revised March 1997 * This paper is based ...
H Moulin - Mathematics of Operations Research, 1976 - JSTOR
... 1, No. 3, August, 1976 Printed in U.SA. COOPERATION IN MIXED EQUILIBRIUM* HERVE
MOULIN 143 Boulevard Lefebvre, 75015 Paris, France ... 275 (1.6) Page 4. HERVE MOULIN
Therefore, B + AA has equal rows and equal columns, ie, B + A is a constant matrix. ...
H Moulin - Mathematical Social Sciences, 1982 - Elsevier
Abstract Strategic decentralization of collective decision-making is considered when the
agents' behaviour is non-cooperative. Specifically they use dominant, maximin risk-avert or
sophisticated strategies. The existing results applying these equilibrium concepts are ...
[CITATION] Bargaining and noncooperative implementation
H Moulin - Laboratoire d'Econometrie de l'Ecole Polytechnique, 1982
H Moulin - Games and Economic Behavior, 2010 - Elsevier
G De Clippel, H Moulin… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2008 - Elsevier
For impartial division, each participant reports only her opinion about the fair relative shares
of the other participants, and this report has no effect on her own share. If a specific division
is compatible with all reports, it is implemented. We propose a family of natural methods ...
H Moulin - Games and Economic Behavior, 1989 - Elsevier
Abstract We consider surplus-sharing problems where both the disagreement utility vector
and the feasible utility frontier depend monotonically on an exogenous parameter. We
investigate the existence of a monotonic solution to these problems. The two-person case ...
H Moulin… - Journal of Economic Literature, 1996 - pup.princeton.edu
Over the past fifty years game theory has had a major impact on the field of economics. It
was for work in game theory that the 1994 Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded. Although
non-cooperative game theory is better known, the theory of cooperative games has ...
H Moulin… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2003 - Elsevier
The probabilistic distribution of identical successive units amounts to filling an urn with balls
of different colors (one color per agent). The fixed chances methods allocate each unit
independently of the current distribution of shares. The Polya–Eggenberger methods ...
H Moulin - Social Choice and Welfare, 2010 - Springer
Page 1. Soc Choice Welf (2010) 34:193–216 DOI 10.1007/s00355-009-0393-5
ORIGINAL PAPER Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG
mechanisms Hervé Moulin Received: 20 January 2008 / Accepted ...
H Moulin - Operations research, 2007 - or.journal.informs.org
Page 1. OPERATIONS RESEARCH Vol. 55, No. 5, September–October 2007, pp. 876–889
ISSN 0030-364XEISSN 1526-54630755050876 informs® DOI 10.1287/opre.1070.0447 ©
2007 INFORMS Minimizing the Worst Slowdown: Offline, Online ...
H Moulin, KJ Arrow, AK Sen… - 2002 - en.scientificcommons.org
H Moulin… - Economics Letters, 2003 - Elsevier
A Bogomolnaia, R Holzman… - Mathematics of Operations …, 2010 - dl.acm.org
Google, Inc. (search), Subscribe (Full Service), Register (Limited Service,
Free), Login. Search: The ACM Digital Library The Guide. ...
H Moulin - 2006 - med.ces.free.fr
Page 1. Efficient cost sharing with a cheap residual claimant Hervé Moulin* Rice University,
Houston,Texas, USA September 2006 Abstract The residualA mechanism shares efficiently a
one-commodity convex technology and generates a small budget imbalance. ...
[CITATION] Fondation de la théorie des jeux
H Moulin… - 1979 - Hermann
H Moulin… - 1979 - en.scientificcommons.org
[CITATION] Fair Division and Collective Welfare. Number 0262633116 in MIT Press Books
HJ Moulin - 2004 - The MIT Press
H Moulin - UFAE and IAE Working Papers, 1989 - ideas.repec.org
... Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics. Author Info.
MOULIN, H. Additional information is available for the following registered author(s): Herve
Moulin. Abstract. No abstract is available for this item. Download Info. ...
[CITATION] 'Uniform externalities: two axioms for fair allocation
M Herve - Journal of Public Economics, 1990
H Moulin - UFAE and IAE Working Papers, 1989 - ideas.repec.org
... Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics. Author Info.
MOULIN, H. Additional information is available for the following registered author(s): Herve
Moulin. Abstract. No abstract is available for this item. Download Info. ...
O Bochet, R Ilkılıç… - Submitted for publication, 2010 - staff.vwi.unibe.ch
Abstract We consider a model in which a homogeneous commodity (the resource) is shared
by several agents with single-peaked preferences and capacity constraints, and the
resource is coming from different suppliers under arbitrary bilateral feasibility constraints: ...
[CITATION] La stratégie du vote
H Moulin - 1980 - Éditions du Centre national de la …
[CITATION] Fair division and collective welfare
Hervé. Moulin - MIT
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