C Camerer - 2003 - books.google.com
Game theory, the formalized study of strategy, began in the 1940s by asking how
emotionless geniuses should play games, but ignored until recently how average people
with emotions and limited foresight actually play games. This book marks the first ...
DM Rousseau, SB Sitkin… - Academy of …, 1998 - business.tepper.cmu.edu
Our task is to adopt a multidisciplinary view of trust within and between firms, in an effort to
synthesize and give insight into a fundamental construct of organizational science. We seek
to identify the shared understandings of trust across disciplines, while recognizing that the ...
C Camerer - 1995 - authors.library.caltech.edu
J Henrich, R Boyd, S Bowles, C Camerer… - The American Economic …, 2001 - JSTOR
Recent investigations have uncovered large, consistent deviations from the predictions of
the textbook representation of Homo economicus (Alvin E. Roth et al., 1991; Ernst Fehr and
Simon Gachter, 2000; Colin Camerer, 2001). One problem appears to lie in economists' ...
C Camerer,
G Loewenstein… - Journal of economic …, 2005 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: Neuroeconomics uses knowledge about brain mechanisms to inform economic
analysis, and roots economics in biology. It opens up the" black box" of the brain, much as
organizational economics adds detail to the theory of the firm. Neuroscientists use many ...
C Camerer… - The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1995 - JSTOR
The ultimatum game could not be simpler. Two players are allotted a sum of money. The first
player, now often called the Proposer, offers some portion of the money to the second
player, called the Responder. If the Responder accepts, she gets what was offered, and ...
CF Camerer… - Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1999 - Springer
Page 1. Ž . Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 19:13; 742 1999 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Manufactured in The Netherlands. The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review
and Capital-Labor-Production Framework COLIN F. CAMERER ...
C Camerer… - The American Economic Review, 1999 - JSTOR
Psychological studies show that most people are overconfident about their own relative
abilities, and unreasonably optimistic about their futures (eg, Neil D. Weinstein, 1980; Shelly
E. Taylor and JD Brown, 1988). When assessing their position in a distribution of peers on ...
C Camerer… - Econometrica, 1999 - Wiley Online Library
In 'experience-weighted attraction'(EWA) learning, strategies have attractions that reflect
initial predispositions, are updated based on payoff experience, and determine choice
probabilities according to some rule (eg, logit). A key feature is a parameter δ that weights ...
C Camerer… - Journal of risk and uncertainty, 1992 - Springer
In subjective expected utility (SEU), the decision weights people attach to events are their
beliefs about the likelihood of events. Much empirical evidence, inspired by Ellsberg (1961)
and others, shows that people prefer to bet on events they know more about, even when ...
K Weigelt… - Strategic Management Journal, 1988 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract A corporate reputation is a set of attributes ascribed to a firm, inferred from the firm's
past actions. While the intuition behind reputation-building is hardly new, recent research
has formalized the concept. We review this research and then, using examples, illustrate ...
C Camerer, S Issacharoff,
G Loewenstein… - … of Pennsylvania Law …, 2003 - JSTOR
Regulation by the state can take a variety of forms. Some regulations are aimed entirely at
redistribution, such as when we tax the rich and give to the poor. Other regulations seek to
counteract externalities by restricting behavior in a way that imposes harm on an ...
DW Harless… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric …, 1994 - JSTOR
Page 1. Econometrica, Vol. 62, No. 6 (November, 1994), 1251-1289 THE PREDICTIVE
UTILITY OF GENERALIZED EXPECTED UTILITY THEORIES BY DAVID W. HARLESS
AND COLIN F. CAMERER' Many alternative theories ...
C Camerer - 2004 - books.google.com
Twenty years ago, behavioral economics did not exist as a field. Most economists were
deeply skeptical--even antagonistic--toward the idea of importing insights from psychology
into their field. Today, behavioral economics has become virtually mainstream. It is well ...
J Henrich, R Boyd, S Bowles… - … and brain sciences, 2005 - Cambridge Univ Press
Abstract Researchers from across the social sciences have found consistent deviations from
the predictions of the canonical model of self-interest in hundreds of experiments from
around the world. This research, however, cannot determine whether the uniformity results ...
M Hsu, M Bhatt, R Adolphs, D Tranel… - Science, 2005 - sciencemag.org
B King-Casas, D Tomlin, C Anen, CF Camerer… - Science, 2005 - sciencemag.org
CF Camerer,
TH Ho… - The Quarterly Journal of …, 2004 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Page 1. A COGNITIVE HIERARCHY MODEL OF GAMES* COLIN F. CAMERER
TECK-HUA HO JUIN-KUAN CHONG Players in a game are “in equilibrium” if they
are rational, and accurately predict other players' strategies. In ...
C Camerer, L Babcock… - The Quarterly Journal …, 1997 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract Life-cycle models of labor supply predict a positive relationship between hours
supplied and transitory changes in wages. We tested this prediction using three samples of
wages and hours of New York City cabdrivers, whose wages are correlated within days ...
CF Camerer - The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1997 - JSTOR
Page 1. Journal of Economic Perspectives-Volume 11, Number 4-Fall 1997-Pages
167-188 Progress in Behavioral Game Theory Colin F. Camerer I s game theory meant
to describe actual choices by people and institutions or not? ...
L Babcock,
G Loewenstein, S Issacharoff… - The American Economic …, 1995 - JSTOR
When court trials (or arbitration) are the mechanisms for resolving bargaining impasses, the
costs and risks associated with third-party intervention should motivate settlement (Henry
Farber and Harry Katz, 1979). However, empirical evidence suggests that impasses and ...
CF Camerer - Journal of Risk and uncertainty, 1989 - Springer
Page 1. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty. 2:61-104 (1989) © 1988 Kluwer Academic
Publishers An Experimental Test of Several Generalized Utility Theories COLIN F,
CAlVlERER The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania ...
C Camerer… - Advances in behavioral economics, 2004 - books.google.com
Behavioral economics increases the explanatory power of economics by providing it with
more realistic psychological foundations. This book consists of representative recent articles
in behavioral economics. 1 Chapter 1 is intended to provide an introduction to the ...
CF Camerer… - Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1994 - Springer
Page 1. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 8:167-196 (1994) 9 1994 Kluwer Academic
Publishers Violations of the Betweenness Axiom and Nonlinearity in Probability COLIN
F. CAMERER Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago ...
CF Camerer - Colin F. Camerer, George Loewenstein, and …, 2004 - books.google.com
... Wakker, Peter P., Richard H. Thaler, and Amos Tversky. 1997.“Probabilistic Insurance.” Journal
of Risk and Uncertainty, 15: 5–26. Weber, Martin, and Colin Camerer. In press.“The Disposition
Effect in Securities Trad- ing.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.
M Weber… - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1998 - Elsevier
C Camerer… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1988 - JSTOR
We test whether a model of reputation formation in an incomplete information game, using
sequential equilibrium, predicts behavior of players in an experiment. Subjects play an
abstracted lending game: a B player lends or does not lend; then if B lends, and E player ...
C Camerer,
G Loewenstein… - The Journal of Political Economy, 1989 - JSTOR
In economic analyses of asymmetric information, better-informed agents are assumed
capable of reproducing the judgments of less-informed agents. We discuss a systematic
violation of this assumption that we call the" curse of knowledge." Better-informed agents ...
CF Camerer… - Journal of Policy Analysis and …, 1989 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. Decision Processes for Low Probability Events: Policy Implications Colin F. Camerer
Howard Kunreuther I Abstract This survey describes the impact of judgements and choices about
low probability, high consequence events on the policymaking process. ...
CF Camerer… - Science, 2006 - sciencemag.org
G Loewenstein, S Issacharoff, C Camerer… - The Journal of Legal …, 1993 - JSTOR
Apersistently troubling question in the legal-economic literature is why cases proceed to
trial. Litigation is a negative-sum proposition for the litigants-the longer the process
continues, the lower their aggregate wealth. Although civil litigation is resolved by ...
CF Camerer… - … evidence from fifteen small-scale societies, 2004 - books.google.com
... the Network on the Evolution of Preferences and Social Norms of the MacArthur Foundation,
and the EU-TMR Research Network ENDEAR (FMRX-CTP98-0238). Colin Camerer
acknowledges support of the Pre- ferences Network and NSF grant SES-0078911. Page 82. ...
CF Camerer… - Research on judgment and decision …, 1997 - books.google.com
Page 360. Training and expertise 10 The process-performance paradox in expert judgment: How
can experts know so much and predict so badly? Colin F. Camerer and Eric J. Johnson 1.
Introduction A mysterious fatal disease strikes a large minority of the population. ...
TH Ho, C Camerer… - The American Economic Review, 1998 - JSTOR
Picture a thin country 1000 miles long, running north and south, like Chile. Several natural
attractions are located at the northern tip of the country. Suppose each of n resort developers
plans to locate a resort somewhere on the country's coast (and all spots are equally ...
CF Camerer - The American Economic Review, 1987 - JSTOR
Page 1. Do Biases in Probability Judgment Matter in Markets? Experimental Evidence
By COLIN F. CAMERER* Microeconomic theory typically concerns exchange between
individuals or firms in a market setting. To make predictions ...
RA Weber… - Management Science, 2003 - JSTOR
Page 1. Cultural Conflict and Merger Failure: An Experimental Approach Roberto
A. Weber * Colin E Camerer Department of Social and Decision Sciences, Carnegie
Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213 Division ...
C Camerer - American Journal of Sociology, 1988 - JSTOR
Gift-giving has often puzzled economists, especially because efficient grifts-like cash or
giving exactly what a person asks for-seem crass or inappropriate. It is shown in a formal
game-theoretic model that gifts serve as" signals" of a person's intentions about future ...
C Camerer - Journal of Economic Surveys, 1989 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract. The article considers the possibility that asset prices might deviate from intrinsic
values based on market fundamentals. Three broad categories of theory are surveyed:(a)
growing bubbles (b) fads and (c) information bubbles.'Sunspot'theories are also discussed ...
TA Hare, CF Camerer… - Science, 2009 - sciencemag.org
E Fehr… - Trends in cognitive sciences, 2007 - Elsevier
CF Camerer,
TH Ho… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2002 - Elsevier
C Camerer, A Vepsalainen - Strategic Management Journal, 1988 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract Corporate culture is a set of broad, tacitly understood rules which tell employees
what to do under a wide variety of unimaginable circumstances. We explain how culture can
be economical, and suggest when different types of cultures will flourish.
EJ Johnson, C Camerer, S Sen… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2002 - Elsevier
We did experiments in a three-round bargaining game where the (perfect) equilibrium offer
was 1.25andanequalsplitwas 2.50. The average offer was 2.11.Patternsofinformationsearch(measuredwithacomputerizedinformationdis...
)showlimitedlookaheadratherthanbackwardi....Equilibriumtheorieswhichadjustforsocialutilit...
CF Camerer,
G Loewenstein… - … Scandinavian Journal of …, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. ...
J Henrich, R Boyd, S Bowles… - American Economic …, 2001 - samoa.santafe.edu
Abstract Recent investigations have uncovered large, consistent deviations from the
predictions of the textbook representation of Homo Economicus: in addition to their own
material payoffs, many experimental subjects appear to care about fairness and ...
GP Cachon… - The Quarterly Journal of …, 1996 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Page 1. LOSS-AVOIDANCE AND FORWARD INDUCTION IN EXPERIMENTAL COORDINATION
GAMES GERARD P. CACHON AND COLIN F. CAMERER We report experiments on how players
select among multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria in a coordination game. ...
CF Camerer - Strategic Management Journal, 1991 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 12, 137-I52 (1 991) DOES STRATEGY
RESEARCH NEED GAME THEORY? COLIN F. CAMERER Graduate School of
Business, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, USA c T- ...
CF Camerer - The American Economic Review, 1989 - JSTOR
Page 1. Does the Basketball Market Believe in the 'Hot Hand,'? By COLIN F.
CAMERER* Most people who watch basketball believe in the "hot hand": Players
who make a shot are more likely to hit the next shot than players ...
C Camerer - Experimental Economics, 1998 - Springer
The main objectives of this paper are:(i) To give a pithy, opinionated summary of what has
been learned about bounded rationality in individual decision making from experiments in
economics and psychology (drawing on my 1995 Handbook of Experimental Economics ...
N Ashraf, CF Camerer… - The Journal of Economic …, 2005 - ingentaconnect.com
... “On the Evolutionary Emergence of Optimism.” Discus- sion Paper No. 1304, Northwestern
University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. Henrich,
Joseph, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis, Ernst Fehr and Colin Camerer. 2004. ...
MJ Knez… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1995 - Elsevier
Page 1. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 10, 65-94 (1995) Outside Options
and Social Comparison in Three-Player Ultimatum Game Experiments Marc J. Knez*
Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago AND ...
C Camerer - Strategic Management Journal, 1985 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract Because business policy research has primarily been a series of inductive
generalizations of case studies; theories have been typically ambiguous and untested, and
have not progressed swiftly. Deductive theorizing, by contrast, yields clear, often non- ...
C Camerer - Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 1981 - Elsevier
Abstract Linear models which fit regression equations to clinical judgments, then use the
fitted parts of judgments as “bootstrapped” judgments, have outperformed clinical judgments
in many tasks. Empirically, the phenomenon has been pervasive, but general conditions ...
M Knez… - Strategic Management Journal, 1994 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract We study coordination games with multiple equilibria, in which players are
penalized for picking numbers higher than the minimum anybody picks, and everyone
prefers a larger minimum.'Weakest-link games like this model organizational situations in ...
C Camerer,
E Johnson, T Rymon… - Frontiers of game …, 1993 - books.google.com
Noncooperative game-theoretic models of sequential bargaining give an underpinning to
cooperative solution concepts derived from axioms, and have proved useful in applications
(see Osbome and Rubinstein 1990). But experimental studies of sequential bargaining ...
CF Camerer - Journal of Political Economy, 1998 - JSTOR
Page 1. Can Asset Markets Be Manipulated? A Field Experiment with Racetrack
Betting Colin F. Camerer California Institute of Technology To test whether naturally
occurring markets can be strategically manipulated, $500 and ...
T Tanaka, C Camerer… - 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We conducted experiments in Vietnamese villages to investigate how wealth,
political history, occupation, and other demographic variables (taken from a comprehensive
earlier household survey) are correlated with risk and time discounting measured in ...
R Weber, C Camerer, Y Rottenstreich… - Organization Science, 2001 - JSTOR
This paper reports the results of experiments which examine attributions of leadership
quality. Subjects played an abstract coordination game which is like many organizational
problems. Previous research showed that when larger groups play the game, they rarely ...
C Camerer… - Journal of Business, 1991 - JSTOR
One explanation for the apparent volatility of asset prices is that people overreact to trades
that are uninformative, creating self-generated information" mirages." We test whether
mirages occur in experimental asset markets. There are insiders in only half the periods, ...
M Bhatt… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2005 - Elsevier
M Weber… - OR spectrum, 1987 - Springer
Summary Ever since von Neumann and Morgenstern presented their expected utility theory,
the axioms (assumptions) underlying their theory have been intensely debated and tested.
Recently, a variety of theories have been presented which model preferences by ...
C Camerer - Proceedings of the National Academy of …, 1999 - National Acad Sciences
Abstract “Behavioral economics” improves the realism of the psychological assumptions
underlying economic theory, promising to reunify psychology and economics in the process.
Reunification should lead to better predictions about economic behavior and better policy ...
C Camerer - Insights in Decision Making: A Tribute to Hillel J. …, 1990 - hss.caltech.edu
Steps of subjects/game Data CH Model Thinking game theorists 19.1 19.1 3.7 Caltech 23.0
23.0 3.0 newspaper 23.0 23.0 3.0 portfolio mgrs 24.3 24.4 2.8 econ PhD class 27.4 27.5 2.3
Caltech g= 3 21.5 21.5 1.8 high school 32.5 32.7 1.6 1/2 mean 26.7 26.5 1.5 70 yr olds ...
B Jeffrey, C Colin… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1994 - Elsevier
Abstract Refinements of Nash equilibrium are investigated in two-person signaling game
experiments. The experiments cover several nested refinements: Bayes–Nash, sequential,
intuitive, divine, universally divine, NWBR, and stable. The experimental data suggest that ...
S Kovalchik, CF Camerer, DM Grether… - Journal of Economic …, 2005 - Elsevier
M Knez… - Organizational Behavior and Human Decision …, 2000 - Elsevier
Coordination games have multiple Nash equilibria (ie, sets of strategies which are best
responses to one another). In weak-link coordination games players choose a number 1–7.
Their payoff is increasing in the minimum number (or weakest link) and decreasing in the ...
TH Ho, N Lim… - Journal of Marketing Research, 2006 - JSTOR
Page 1. TECK H. HO, NOAH LIM, and COLIN F. CAMERER* Marketing is an applied
science that tries to explain and influence how firms and consumers behave in markets.
Marketing models are usually applications of standard ...
C Camerer - Journal of Marketing Research, 2005 - JSTOR
This note emphasizes the special role of prospect theory in drawing psychophysical
considerations into theories of decision making with respect to risk. An example of such a
consideration is the dependence of outcome value on a reference point and the increased ...
RA Weber, CF Camerer… - Experimental Economics, 2004 - Springer
Page 1. Experimental Economics, 7:25–48 (2004) cс 2004 Economic Science
Association Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and “Weak
Link” Coordination Games ROBERTO A. WEBER∗ Department ...
C Camerer,
TH Ho - Journal of mathematical psychology, 1998 - Elsevier
In earlier research we proposed an “experience-weighted attraction (EWA) learning” model
for predicting dynamic behavior in economic experiments on multiperson noncooperative
normal-form games. We showed that EWA learning model fits significantly better than ...
C Camerer - Organizational Behavior and Human Decision …, 1992 - Elsevier
Abstract Market experiments designed to test whether individual errors are reduced by
markets generally indicate that errors do make prices or trading volume irrational. For
example, in markets for assets of uncertain value a “representativeness”-based theory ...
C Camerer… - Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1989 - Springer
This article extends the large amount of research on double-oral auction markets to hazards
that produce only losses. We report results from a series of experiments in which subjects
endowed with low-probability losses can pay a premium for insurance protection. Insurers ...
TH Ho, CF Camerer… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
CF Camerer - Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2003 - Elsevier
CF Camerer - The Economic Journal, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. ...
CF Camerer… - Journal of Economic Behavior …, 1999 - authors.library.caltech.edu
Page 1. DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125 THE ECONOMETRICS AND BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS OF ESCALATION OF COMMITMENT A RE-E AMINATION OF STAW ² ...
M Hsu, I Krajbich, C Zhao… - The Journal of …, 2009 - neuro.cjb.net
C Heath, M Knez… - Strategic Management Journal, 1993 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract Over time, members of organizations develop entitlements—preferences about how
they wish to be treated and beliefs about how they should be treated. The formation of
entitlements is an important subject for strategy researchers because employees resist ...
CF Camerer… - 1993 - authors.library.caltech.edu
Page 1. 8 Information, fairness, and efficiency in bargaining Colin F. Camerer and
George Loewenstein Economic theory assumes people strive for efficient agreements
that ben- efit all consenting parties. The frequency of mutually ...
CF Camerer - ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY MONOGRAPHS, 2006 - books.google.com
Page 182. CHAPTER 7 Behavioral Economics∗ Colin F. Camerer Abstract Behavioral economics
uses evidence from psychology and other disciplines to create models of limits on rationality,
willpower and self-interest, and ex- plore their implications in economic aggregates. ...
C Camerer,
T Ho… - The American economic review, 2003 - JSTOR
Noncooperative game theory combines strategic thinking, best-response, and mutual
consistency of beliefs and choices (equilibrium). Hundreds of experiments show that in
actual behavior these three forces are limited, even when subjects are highly motivated ...
C Camerer… - Organizational decision making, 1997 - books.google.com
Classic literature on organizations recognizes that the paramount function of an organization
is the coordination of physical and human assets to produce a good or service (eg, Barnard,
1938; Chisholm, 1989; Schein, 1985). Coordination in this early literature was defined ...
J Henrich, R Boyd, S Bowles,
E Fehr… - … of human sociality: …, 2004 - books.google.com
Page 30. 2 Overview and Synthesis Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles,
Colin F. Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis, and Richard McElreath The 1980s and
1990s have seen an important shift in the model of human ...
C Camerer… - Industrial and Corporate Change, 1996 - Oxford Univ Press
Abstract Management literature focuses on two modes of coordination: formal and informal
structures. Informal structure grants significant discretion to individual actions. Yet two
impediments are related to such flexibility, those created by opportunism and those ...
C Camerer - 1996 - resolver.caltech.edu
This chapter discusses methodological differences in the way economists and psychologists
typically conduct experiments. The main argument is that methodological differences spring
from basic differences in the way knowledge is created and cumulated in the two fields- ...
E Tricomi, A Rangel, CF Camerer… - Nature, 2010 - nature.com
Nature is the international weekly journal of science: a magazine style journal that publishes
full-length research papers in all disciplines of science, as well as News and Views, reviews,
news, features, commentaries, web focuses and more, covering all branches of science and ...
JT Wang, M Spezio… - The American Economic …, 2010 - ingentaconnect.com
Page 1. 984 American Economic Review 100 (June 2010) 984–1007 http://www.aeaweb.org/
articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.3.984 “Why do almost all people tell the truth in ordinary
everyday life?—Certainly not because a god has forbidden them to lie. ...
CF Camerer - U. Chi. L. Rev., 2006 - HeinOnline
Page 1. Wanting, Liking, and Learning: Neuroscience and Paternalism Colin E
Camerert A large number of young children die every year from ingesting poisons
by accident. Revealed-preference theory, the foundation of mi ...
C Camerer,
TH Ho - Games and human behavior: Essays in …, 1999 - books.google.com
How does an equilibrium arise in a game? For decades, the implicit answer to this question
was that players reasoned their way to an equilibrium, or adapted and evolved toward it in
some unspecified way. Theorists have become interested in the specific details of how ...
M Noeth, CF Camerer, CR Plott… - Working Papers, 1999 - ideas.repec.org
... Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics. Author Info.
Noeth, Markus Camerer, Colin F. Plott, Charles R. Webber, Martin. Additional information is
available for the following registered author(s): Colin Camerer. Abstract. ...
C Camerer,
T Ho… - 2002 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper describes a parametric approach to weakening rationality assumptions
in game theory to fit empirical data better. The central features of game theory are: The
concept of a game (players, strategies, information, timing, outcomes); strategic thinking; ...
TH Ho, X Wang… - The Economic Journal, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. Wiley Online Library will be disrupted 3
Dec from 10-12 GMT for monthly maintenance. ...
[CITATION] Nonlinear weighting of probabilities and violations of the betweenness axiom
CF Camerer… - Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1994
[CITATION] Herbert Gintis, eds. 2004
J Henrich, R Boyd, S Bowles, C Camerer… - Foundations of Human Society: …
C Camerer - Advances in behavioral economics, 1990 - resolver.caltech.edu
In this chapter, two studies are reported which test whether simple biases in the probability
judgment of individuals affect their aggregate behavior in markets. A judgment bias is a
systematic error, which does not cancel out when individual judgments are aggregated. ...
C Camerer - 1981 - getcited.org
An academic directory and search engine.
J Henrich, R Boyd, S Bowles, C Camerer… - Working …, 2001 - ideas.repec.org
Experimental behavioral scientists have found consistent deviations from the predictions of
the canonical model of self-interest in over a hundred experiments from around the world.
Prior research cannot determine whether this uniformity results from universal patterns of ...
CM Anderson… - Economic Theory, 2000 - Springer
Page 1. Economic Theory 16, 689–718 (2000) Experience-weighted attraction learning
in sender-receiver signaling games * Christopher M. Anderson and Colin F. Camerer
Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California ...
[CITATION] Creating “expectational assets” in the Laboratory:“Weakest Link” coordination games,”
C Camerer… - Strategic Management Journal, 1994
CF Camerer… - 1993 - authors.library.caltech.edu
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