I Brocas… - The American Economic Review, 2008 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: Based on recent neuroscience evidence, we model the brain as a dual-system
organization subject to three conflicts: asymmetric information, temporal horizon, and
incentive salience. Under the first and second conflicts, we show that the uninformed ...
I Brocas… - 2003 - books.google.com
Psychologists and economists often ask similar questions about human behaviour. This
volume brings together contributions from leaders in both disciplines. The editorial
introduction discusses methodological differences between the two which have until now ...
I Brocas - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2003 - Elsevier
In this paper, two upstream innovators invest to improve process innovations used by two
downstream producers. At the beginning of the game, each innovator licenses its technology
to one producer and they can agree to integrate vertically. Then, investment takes place ...
I Brocas… - Journal of Economics & Management …, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
We analyze investment by a population of hyperbolic discounting entrepreneurs. In order to
avoid inefficient procrastination, agents with good prospects about their chances of success
may choose to forego free information and to invest boldly. This explains an excessive ...
I Brocas… - Journal of Sports Economics, 2004 - jse.sagepub.com
Abstract This article argues that a rigorous application of simple game theory tools may
provide unambiguous predictions about the behavior of teams in sports. As an illustration,
the authors analyze the merits of two controversial changes in soccer rules, namely, the “ ...
I Brocas… - European Economic Review, 2000 - Elsevier
The paper reviews the main findings on individual decision making under time inconsistent
preferences, incomplete information, and different learning environments. First, when agents
choose whether to learn or not, avoiding costless information can be their optimal strategy. ...
I Brocas… - Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2001 - Springer
We analyze the decision of individuals with time-inconsistent preferences to invest in
projects yielding either current costs and future benefits or current benefits and future costs.
We show that competition between agents for the same project mitigates the tendency to ...
I Brocas - 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We analyze optimal auction design in the presence of negative externalities. We
assume that externalities are a function of both the valuation of the agent who suffers it and
the valuation of the agent who obtains the good. This introduces two different sources of ...
I Brocas, JD Carrillo… - … SERIES-CENTRE FOR …, 1999 - cepr.org
Abstract We analyze the investment decision of a population of time inconsistent
entrepreneurs who overweight current payoffs relative to future returns. We show that, in
order to avoid inefficient procrastination, agents may find it optimal to keep optimistic ...
I Brocas… - 2002 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This Paper studies a model where individuals have imperfect self-knowledge and
learning is costly. It shows that the endogenous decision to collect information before taking
an action creates a systematic and testable bias in the aggregate behaviour of agents in ...
I Brocas… - The American Economic Review, 2008 - JSTOR
Economies has traditionally relied on revealed preferences (and, occasionally, on verbal
reports) to understand the desires of people. Another source of information has been
developed in recent years: the direct observation of choice processes. This mechanism, ...
I Brocas… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
An individual (the leader) with free access to information decides how much public evidence
to collect. Conditional on this information, another individual with conflicting preferences (the
follower) undertakes an action that affects the payoff of both players. In this game of ...
I Brocas - Theory and decision, 2003 - Springer
In this paper, we study the auction to allocate an indivisible good when each potential buyer
has a private and independent valuation for the item and suffers a negative externality if a
competitor acquires it. In that case, the outside option of each buyer is mechanism- ...
I Brocas… - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2005 - Elsevier
We consider a hyperbolic discounting agent. At each period, he can undertake an
irreversible consumption decision that yields an uncertain current benefit and a delayed
cost. If he decides to defer consumption for the future, some information exogenously ...
I Brocas… - 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
In experiments, people do not always appear to think very strategically or to infer the
information of others from their choices. To understand this thinking process further, we use"
Mousetracking" to record which game payoffs subjects look at, for how long, in games of ...
I Brocas - The Journal of Industrial Economics, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
A regulator offers a cooperation contract to two firms to develop a research project. The
contract provides incentives to encourage skill-sharing and coordinate subsequent efforts.
Innovators must get informational rents to disclose their privately known skills, which ...
I Brocas… - The Psychology of Economic Decisions, 2003 - books.google.com
There is considerable evidence that most smokers overestimate the risk of lung cancer, most
entrepreneurs underestimate the risk of failure of their business activities, and most people
overestimate the risk of transmission of the HIV virus during unprotected sexual ...
I Brocas, K Chan… - The American economic review, 2006 - JSTOR
Water utilities are reminiscent of network industries and are characterized by important fixed
costs. These factors contribute to a single firm serving an area justifying public intervention
on pricing. About one-fourth of US water utilities are private and subject to regulation. ...
I Brocas… - CEPR DP, 1998 - Citeseer
Abstract We consider a hyperbolic discounting agent. At each period, he can undertake an
irreversible consumption decision that yields an uncertain current benefit and a delayed
cost. If he decides to defer it for the future, some information exogenously flows in. We ...
I Brocas… - University of Southern California, 2004 - law.bepress.com
Abstract This paper presents a model where individuals have imperfect information about
their preferences (or the environment) and there is an opportunity cost of learning. It shows
that the endogenous decision to collect information before taking an action creates a ...
I Brocas… - 1999 - www-rcf.usc.edu
Abstract We study an R&D game in which a research unit undertakes a (non-observable)
research effort and, if an innovation is obtained, auctions licenses of the invention to a pool
of producers. We assume that each producer has a private valuation for the license and ...
I Brocas… - CEPR Discussion Papers, 1999 - ideas.repec.org
We analyze the decision of individuals with time inconsistent preferences who undertake
irreversible activities yielding either a current cost and a future benefit or a current benefit
and a future cost. We first show that, when benefits come earlier than costs, the individual ...
I Brocas, T Persson… - 2000 - books.google.com
What determines the size and form of redistributive programs, the extent and type of public
goods provision, the burden of taxation across alternative tax bases, the size of government
deficits, and the stance of monetary policy during the course of business and electoral ...
[CITATION] Workbook to Accompany Political Economics by T. Persson and G. Tabellini
I Brocas, M Castanheira, R Razin… - 2000 - MIT Press
[CITATION] D., 2004, Entrepreneurial boldness and excessive investment
I Brocas… - Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
I Brocas, JD Carrillo… - 2002 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This note argues that a rigorous application of simple game theory may provide
unambiguous yet non-trivial theoretical insights about the behaviour of players in simple
games. This contrasts with a commonly held view that many predictions in applied game ...
I Brocas… - 2008 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Building on evidence from neurobiology and neuroscience, we model the
physiological limitations faced by individuals in the process of decision-making that starts
with sensory perception and ends in action selection. The brain sets a neuronal threshold, ...
I Brocas, JD Carrillo, CF Camerer… - 2010 - bellarmine2.lmu.edu
Abstract In experiments, people do not always appear to infer the information of other
players from their choices. To understand this thinking process further, we use
“Mousetracking” to record which game payoffs subjects look at, and for how long, in ...
I Brocas, JD Carrillo… - Economic Theory, 2009 - Springer
Abstract We consider a model where two adversaries can spend resources in acquiring
public information about the unknown state of the world in order to influence the choice of a
decision maker. We characterize the sampling strategies of the adversaries in the ...
[CITATION] Biased decision-making by agents with unbiased beliefs
I Brocas… - University of Southern California Working Paper, 2005
I Brocas… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2011 - Elsevier
Abstract We build on research from neurobiology to model the process through which the
brain maps outside evidence into decisions. The sensory system encodes information
through cell-firing. Cell-firing is measured against a threshold, and an action is triggered ...
I Brocas… - Journal of Economics & Management …, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
This paper presents a model where individuals have imperfect information and there is an
opportunity cost of learning. It shows that the endogenous decision to collect costly
information before taking an action has a systematic effect on choices. More precisely, ...
I Brocas - 2009 - www-bcf.usc.edu
Abstract This article assesses the potential benefits of including findings from neurobiology
in economic decision-making models. First, we emphasize that the evidence supports both
'expected utility-like'theory and 'Bayesian-like'information acquisition theory. Second, we ...
I Brocas - Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2005 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract An agent undertakes a nonobservable first-stage effort. The principal observes
whether the effort results in a successful project or not. If the project succeeds, only the firm
observes its interim quality, and can further improve it with a nonobservable second-stage ...
I Brocas, JD Carrillo… - 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We study in the laboratory a series of first price sealed bid auctions of a common
value good. Bidders face three types of information: private information, public information
and common uncertainty. Auctions are characterized by the relative size of these three ...
I Brocas - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
In this model, a principal decides whether to produce one indivisible good and which
characteristics it contains. Agents are differentiated along two substitutable dimensions: a
vertical parameter that captures their valuation for the good, and a horizontal parameter ...
[CITATION] INFORMATION, REGLEMENTATION ET RECHERCHE ET DEVELOPPEMENT
ISABELLE. BROCAS - 1997
I Brocas… - 2005 - cepr.org
We analyse an agency model where one individual decides how much evidence he collects.
We assume that he has free access to information, but all the news acquired becomes
automatically public. Conditional on the information disclosed, a second individual with ...
I Brocas - www-rcf.usc.edu
There are two firms in the market producing an identical product. If both firms charge the
same price, then total demand is given by D (p)= 40-p. The cost structure of each firm is
summarized by the cost function C (q)= 10q where q is the quantity produced by that firm.
I Brocas - 2006 - cepr.org
I consider a model where a principal decides whether to produce one unit of an indivisible
good (eg a private school) and which characteristics it will contain (emphasis on language
or science). Agents (parents) are differentiated along two substitutable dimensions: a ...
[CITATION] Rationality and Well-being
I Brocas - 2008 - Oxford University Press
I Brocas, CF Camerer, JD Carrillo… - www-rcf.usc.edu
The recent financial crisis that developed in the real estate market illustrates how individuals
and groups can neglect to fully analyze the economic environment in which they make
decisions. At times, shortsighted strategies are corrected by market forces. In other cases, ...
I Brocas - www-bcf.usc.edu
Abstract I study an allocation mechanism of a single item in the presence of type-dependent
externalities between bidders. The type-dependency introduces countervailing incentives
and the allocation sometimes requires that types in an interior subset obtain their ...
I Brocas - www-bcf.usc.edu
Abstract I analyze optimal auction design in the presence of linear type-dependent negative
externalities. I characterize the properties of the optimal mechanism when externalities are
“strongly decreasing” and “increasing” in the agent's valuation and I discuss its ...
I Brocas, JD Carrillo… - 2011 - transition.fcc.gov
1 Executive Summary In this study we introduce a model of media market competition to
examine the impact of ownership structure on the performance of the market in terms of
informational efficiency and viewpoint diversity. We adopt the classical mathematical ...
I Brocas - Theory and decision, 2011 - Springer
Abstract In this paper, we analyze an intra-personal game where a decision-maker is
summarized by a succession of selves. Selves may (or may not) have conflicting interests,
and earlier selves may have imperfect knowledge of the preferences of future selves. At ...
M Castanheira, I Brocas, R Razin… - ULB Institutional …, 2000 - econpapers.repec.org
By Micael Castanheira, Isabelle Brocas, Ronny Razin and David Strömberg; Workbook
to accompany political economics: explaining economic policy. ... Micael Castanheira (),
Isabelle Brocas, Ronny Razin and David Strömberg. ...
I Brocas… - University of Southern California, 2005 - law.bepress.com
Abstract We analyze an agency model where one individual decides how much evidence he
collects. We assume that he has free access to information, but all the news acquired
become automatically public. Conditional on the information disclosed, a second ...
I Brocas… - 2002 - cepr.org
This note argues that a rigorous application of simple game theory may provide
unambiguous yet non-trivial theoretical insights about the behaviour of players in simple
games. This contrasts with a commonly held view that many predictions in applied game ...
[CITATION] Economics and Psychology
I Brocas… - 2002 - Oxford University Press
I Brocas, JD Carrillo… - 2009 - cepr.org
We consider a model where two adversaries can spend resources in acquiring public
information about the unknown state of the world in order to influence the choice of a
decision maker. We characterize the sampling strategies of the adversaries in the ...
I Brocas… - 1999 - temporaryaddress.cepr.org
We analyze the investment decision of a population of time inconsistent entrepreneurs who
overweight current payoffs relative to future returns. We show that, in order to avoid
inefficient procrastination, agents may find it optimal to keep optimistic priors about their ...
I Brocas, C Camerer, JD Carrillo… - 2009 - cepr.org
In experiments, people do not always appear to think very strategically or to infer the
information of others from their choices. To understand this thinking process further, we use"
Mousetracking" to record which game payoffs subjects look at, for how long, in games of ...
JD Carrillo… - Levine's Bibliography, 2007 - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of
further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site ...
I Brocas… - idei.fr
In recent years, economics has experienced an inflow of refreshing insights thanks to the
addition of elements from behavioral psychology into formal models. It would be naıve to
believe that, in previous decades, economists did not realize the limitations imposed by a ...
I Brocas - www-bcf.usc.edu
A-There are two types of consumers in the population: type θ1 in proportion λ and type θ2>
θ1 in proportion 1-λ. The utility of a consumer of type θ is θV (q)-T where q is the quantity he
consumes and T the payment he makes for this quantity. Moreover V (q)=[1-(1-q) 2]/2. Last ...
M Dewatripont, I Brocas… - ULB Institutional Repository, 2004 - ideas.repec.org
No abstract is available for this item. ... To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three options: 1. Check below under "Related
research" whether another version of this item is available online. 2. Check on the ...
I Brocas, JD Carrillo… - 2010 - cepr.org
We study in the laboratory a series of first price sealed bid auctions of a common value
good. Bidders face three types of information: private information, public information and
common uncertainty. Auctions are characterized by the relative size of these three ...
I Brocas - www-bcf.usc.edu
You are the single supplier of a good and the market is not regulated. You serve a total of
100 customers. You know that 75% of them are moderately happy with your product (type 1
customers) and 25% are very satisfied (type 2 customers). After a consumer satisfaction ...
I Brocas… - 2002 - cepr.org
This Paper studies a model where individuals have imperfect self-knowledge and learning is
costly. It shows that the endogenous decision to collect information before taking an action
creates a systematic and testable bias in the aggregate behaviour of agents in the ...
I Brocas - imbs.uci.edu
Abstract I consider a model where a principal decides whether to produce one unit of an
indivisible good (eg a private school) and which characteristics (emphasis on language or
science) it will contain. Agents (parents) are differentiated along two dimensions: a vertical ...
I Brocas… - 2007 - cepr.org
Building on evidence from neurobiology and neuroscience, we model the physiological
limitations faced by individuals in the process of decision-making that starts with sensory
perception and ends in action selection. The brain sets a neuronal threshold, observes ...
I Brocas - www-rcf.usc.edu
Abstract A seller decides whether to allocate an item among two potential buyers. The seller
and buyer 1 interact ex post in such a way that each of them suffers a negative externality if
the other possesses the item. We show that the optimal allocation rule favors buyer 2, who ...
I Brocas - Revue d'économie politique, 2003 - cairn.info
Nous créons de nouvelles institutions comme nous découvrons de nouvelles technologies.
Les innovateurs politiques découvrent de meilleures façons d'entreprendre une action
collective tout comme les scientifiques et les ingénieurs découvrent de meilleures façons ...
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