 | Professor of Economics, Stanford University Verified email at stanford.edu Cited by 2043 |
Competitive high ranking positions are largely occupied by men, and women remain scarce
in engineering and sciences. Explanations for these occupational differences focus on
discrimination and preferences for work hours and field of study. We examine if absent ...
U Gneezy,
M Niederle… - The Quarterly Journal of …, 2003 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract Even though the provision of equal opportunities for men and women has been a
priority in many countries, large gender differences prevail in competitive high-ranking
positions. Suggested explanations include discrimination and differences in preferences ...
The entry-level market for American gastroenterologists was organized by a centralized
clearinghouse from 1986 to 1996. Before, and since, it has been conducted via a
decentralized market in which appointment dates have unraveled to well over a year ...
Y Bereby-Meyer… - Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 2005 - Elsevier
We consider new three player games to test existing models of fairness. Our games consist
of a proposer who offers an allocation of 10betweentwoplayers,eitherhimselfandtheresponderortherespond...
.Ineachcase,therespondereitheracceptsorrejectsthisalloc....Incaseofarejection, ...
Recent research documents that while men are eager to compete, women often shy away
from competitive environments. A consequence is that few women enter and win
competitions. Using experimental methods we examine how affirmative action affects ...
We examine whether women and men of the same ability differ in their decisions to seek
challenges. In the laboratory, we create an environment in which we can measure a
participants performance level (high or low), where a high performance level participant ...
M Niederle… - The Journal of Economic …, 2010 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: The mean and standard deviation in performance on math test scores are only
slightly larger for males than for females. Despite minor differences in mean performance,
many more boys than girls perform at the right tail of the distribution. This gender gap has ...
We are helping a task force of the American Gastroenterology Association to evaluate the
current state of the (decentralized) market for gastroenterology fellows, and to assess the
prospects of reorganizing it via a suitably designed centralized clearinghouse, a" match." ...
Many markets have organizations that influence or try to establish norms concerning when
offers can be made, accepted and rejected. Examining a dozen previously studied markets
suggests that markets in which transactions are made far in advance are markets in which ...
Abstract Competitive high ranking positions are largely occupied by men, and women
remain scarce in engineering and sciences. Explanations for these occupational differences
focus on discrimination and preferences for work hours and field of study. We explore an ...
Abstract: Many markets encounter difficulty maintaining a thick marketplace because they
experience transactions made at dispersed times. To address such problems, many markets
try to establish norms concerning when offers can be made, accepted, and rejected. ...
G Kirchsteiger,
M Niederle… - European Economic Review, 2005 - Elsevier
We study experimental two-sided markets in which the information structure is endogenous.
When submitting an offer, a trader decides which other traders will be informed about the
offer. This setup allows both a decentralized bargaining market (Chamberlin, J. Polit. Econ ...
A recent antitrust lawsuit against the National Residency Matching Program renewed
interest in understanding the effects of a centralized match on wages of medical residents.
Bulow and Levin (forthcoming) propose a simple model of the NRMP, in which firms set ...
Abstract. We study a simple model of a decentralized market game in which firms make
directed offers to workers. We identify three components of the market game that are key in
determining whether stable matches can arise as equilibrium outcomes. The first is related ...
P Coles… - 2007 - idea.uab.es
Abstract We evaluate the effect of costless preference signaling in two% sided matching
markets between firms and workers. We consider a game of incomplete information with firm
segments. Workers agree on the ranking of firms across segments, but have idiosyncratic ...
C Featherstone… - 2008 - nber.org
Criteria for evaluating school choice mechanisms are first, whether truth-telling is sometimes
punished and second, how efficient the match is. With common knowledge preferences,
Deferred Acceptance (DA) dominates the Boston mechanism by the first criterion and is ...
Abstract We study the structure of markets when traders are given the opportunity to create
their own market, as on the internet. On the internet, public exchanges have in many cases
been replaced by private exchanges. We use experiments to investigate possible reasons ...
M Niederle… - Negotiation Journal, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
Negotiating in a highly competitive environment may prove particularly challenging for
women. We describe three experimental studies that investigated and documented differences
in the competitive behaviors of men and women. The first study examined gender ...
Many labor markets share three stylized facts: employers cannot give full attention to all
candidates, candidates are ready to provide information about their preferences for
particular employers, and employers value and are prepared to act on this information. In ...
P Coles,
J Cawley, PB Levine… - The Journal of …, 2010 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: This paper, written by the members of the American Economic Association (AEA)
Ad Hoc Committee on the Job Market, provides an overview of the market for new Ph. D.
economists. It describes the role of the AEA in the market and focuses in particular on two ...
We study a simple model of a decentralized market game in which firms make directed offers
to workers. We focus on markets in which agents have aligned preferences. When agents
have complete information or when there are no frictions in the economy, there exists an ...
Abstract: Many markets encounter difficulty establishing or maintaining sufficient thickness to
allow participants to consider many possible transactions, and in restoring such thickness
once it has been lost. Often this is because transactions are made quickly and at ...
[CITATION] How costly is diversity? affirmative action in competitive environments
M Niederle, C Segal… - NBER Working Paper, 2008
[CITATION] The effects of a central clearinghouse on job placement, wages, and hiring practices
M Niederle, AE Roth - Labor Market …, 2009 - The University of Chicago Press
MM Mobius,
M Niederle, P Niehaus… - 2011 - nber.org
Evidence from social psychology suggests that agents process information about their own
ability in a biased manner. This evidence has motivated exciting research in behavioral
economics, but has also garnered critics who point out that it is potentially consistent with ...
J Asker, B Grosskopf, CN McKinney… - The Journal of Economic …, 2004 - JSTOR
The authors present an experimental design used to teach concepts in the economics of
auctions and implications for e-Business procurement. The experiment is easily
administered and can be adapted to many different treatments. The chief innovation is that ...
A Ivanov, D Levin… - Econometrica, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
We use a second-price common-value auction, called the maximal game, to experimentally
study whether the winner's curse (WC) can be explained by models which retain best-
response behavior but allow for inconsistent beliefs. We compare behavior in a regular ...
C Featherstone… - Harvard Business School, …, 2011 - people.hbs.edu
Abstract Criteria for evaluating school choice mechanisms are first, whether truth% telling is
sometimes punished and second, how effi cient the match is. With common knowledge
preferences, Deferred Acceptance (DA) dominates the Boston mechanism by the first ...
Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to
competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for
workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms are ...
[CITATION] Do roses speak louder than words? signaling in internet dating markets
S Lee, M Niederle, HR Kim… - Unpublished paper, 2009
Muriel Niederle: Stanford University and NBER, www. stanford. edu/~ niederle. Alvin E.
Roth: Harvard University and NBER, www. economics. harvard. edu/~ aroth/alroth. html. Part
of this work was supported by the National Science Foundation. We owe a special debt to ...
[CITATION] Manipulation in school choice mechanisms
C Featherstone… - 2008 - Working paper, Stanford U
MM Möbius,
M Niederle, P Niehaus… - 2007 - trosenblat.nber.org
... 1 / 50 Gender Differences in Incorporating Performance Feedback Markus M. M¨obius Harvard
University and NBER Muriel Niederle Stanford University and NBER Paul Niehaus Harvard
University Tanya Rosenblat Wesleyan University February 20, 2007 Page 2. ...
The large literature on costly signaling and the somewhat scant literature on preference
signaling had varying success in showing the effectiveness of signals. We use a field
experiment to show that even when everyone can send a signal, signals are free and the ...
Abstract: Many markets encounter difficulty establishing or maintaining sufficient thickness to
allow participants to consider many possible transactions. Often this is because transactions
are made quickly and at dispersed times, sometimes inefficiently early. To address such ...
[CITATION] Forthcoming.“Competitive Wages in a Match with Ordered Contracts.”
M Niederle - American Economic Review
[CITATION] Self-confidence management: theory and experimental evidence
MM Mobius, M Niederle, P Niehaus… - Work. Pap., Stanford Univ, 2011
From 1986 through 1997 the entry-level market for American gastroenterologists was
organized by a centralized clearinghouse. Before, and since, it has been conducted via a
decentralized market in which appointment dates have unraveled to well over a year ...
... Muriel Niederle Stanford University and NBER Lise Vesterlund University of Pittsburgh ... Gneezy,
Uri, Muriel Niederle, and Aldo Rustichini, “Performance in Competitive Environments: Gender
Differences,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXVIII, August 2003, 1049 – 1074. ...
[CITATION] H.(2008) Gender differences in seeking challenges: The role of institutions
M Niederle… - NBER Working Paper
[CITATION] Markets With Endogenous Matching Structures
G Kirchsteiger, M Niederle… - Tilburg CentER for Economic Research …, 2001
[CITATION] Matching
M Niederle, AE Roth… - The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2008
G Kirchsteiger,
M Niederle… - 1998 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We study an experimental market in which the structure of the information flows is
endogenized. When making an offer, traders choose not only the price at which they are
prepared to trade, but also the subset of traders they want to inform about the offer. This ...
[CITATION] vDo Women Shy away from Competition
M Niederle… - Do Men, 2007
Abstract Markets sometimes unravel in time, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often
this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply. However
this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms are willing to make ...
[CITATION] forthcoming.“The Job Market for New Economists: A Market Design Perspective”
P Coles, J Cawley, PB Levine, M Niederle, AE Roth… - Journal of Economic Perspectives
C Featherstone… - National Bureau of Economic Research, 2008 - eric.ed.gov
Abstract: Criteria for evaluating school choice mechanisms are first, whether truth-telling is
sometimes punished and second, how efficient the match is. With common knowledge
preferences, Deferred Acceptance (DA) dominates the Boston mechanism by the first ...
[CITATION] Lessons from the collapse of a medical labor market
N McKinney,
M Niederle… - 2003 - Working paper. Stanford, Calif.: …
G Kirchsteiger,
M Niederle… - Vienna Economics Papers, 2000 - ideas.repec.org
We study an experimental market with an endogenous institution. In particular, the
information and matching structure of the market is determined by the decisions of the
individual traders. We examine the effects of the imposition of exogenous transaction ( ...
Almost all the entry level positions in the market for new doctors in the United States are
mediated by a clearinghouse called the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP).
Many other more advanced medical positions use similar clearinghouses, as do medical ...
[CITATION] Aldo Rustichini. Aug 2003.“Performance in Competitive Environments: Gender Differences.”
U Gneezy… - The Quarterly Journal of Economics
A Roth… - American Economic Review, 2005 - dash.harvard.edu
We are helping a task force of the American Gastroenterology Association to evaluate the current
state of the (decentralized) market for gastroenterology fellows, and to assess the pros- pects
of reorganizing it via a suitably designed centralized clearinghouse, a “match.” This mar- ...
PA Coles, CR Featherstone, JW Hatfield,
F Kojima… - scottkom.com
Historic precedent and economic principles suggest that the Supplemental Offer and
Acceptance Program (SOAP) proposed for the NRMP Scramble will lead to unsatisfactory
outcomes by forcing participants to make unnecessarily difficult decisions and giving them ...
The market for almost all entry level positions (called residencies) for new doctors in the
United States is mediated by a clearinghouse called the National Resident Matching
Program (NRMP). Many other more advanced medical positions (called fellowships, ...
K Daniel, J Horowitz, S Morris, M Design… - …, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
The 2003 Far Eastern Meeting of the Econometric Society will be held in Seoul, Korea, from
July 4th to July 6th on the campus of Yonsei University. The program will consist of invited
and contributed papers. The meeting is open to all economists including those who are ...
A Roth… - Levine's Bibliography, 2007 - econpapers.repec.org
By Alvin Roth and Muriel Niederle; Making Markets Thick:
Designing Rules for Offers and Acceptances.
G Jasso, M Niederle, M Tertilt, D Moore… - meyersson.com
In order to address the specific issues that affect women and families in countries
undergoing political, economic and social transition, the Center on Democracy,
Development and the Rule of Law at the Stanford Institute for International Studies is ...
Publikationsansicht. 34073480. Information transmission and market design / (2002). Niederle,
Muriel. Abstract. Thesis (Ph. D., Dept. of Economics)--Harvard University, 2002.. Includes
bibliographical references (leaves 131-136). Details der Publikation. ...
Abstract Gender differences in psychological attributes, specifically gender differences in
competitiveness and risk aversion are often discussed as potential explanations for gender
differences in labor market outcomes. We assess the extent to which educational choices ...
L Vesterlund… - Econometric Society 2004 North …, 2004 - ideas.repec.org
Despite sustained efforts of equal opportunities for men and women, large gender
differences prevail in competitive high ranking positions. Possible explanations include
discrimination, differences in human capital and preferences, which overall may make ...
R Kerschbamer,
M Niederle… - Econometric Society World …, 2000 - ideas.repec.org
A competitive market for an experience good is considered where high quality is enforced by
repeated game trigger strategies. The goods are demanded by long run (LR) and short run
(SR) customers, the former buying repeatedly, the latter only once. SR buyers can free ...
Abstract Practical problems of income tax enforcement are characterized by the fact that
auditing of tax payers has to be done by employees of the enforcement authority who may
not be motivated to act in it's best interest. We study a form of auditor moral hazard, where ...
M Niederle, G Frechette… - Econometric Society 2004 …, 2004 - ideas.repec.org
Scores of experimental studies in two player bargaining games have shown the importance
of fair outcomes in complete information environments. However, the case of complete
information may be a special case, both in terms of the amount of information the players ...
Abstract A competitive market for an experience good is considered where high quality is
enforced by repeated game trigger strategies, as eg in Klein and Leffier (1981). The good is
demanded by two types of customers, long run (LR) and short run (SR), the former buying ...
[CITATION] Heterogeneity and Aggregation: Implications for Labor-Market Fluctuations By Yongsung Chang and Sun-Bin Kim We demonstrate that aggregate …
We consider a market for an experience good where firms face a moral hazard problem in
providing high quality. The firms are infinitely lived, and buyers either live forever (long run
buyers) or just for one period (short run buyers). Quality is not verifiable, hence ...
M Summer… - Issues in positive political economy, 2002 - books.google.com
Income tax policy in most countries is implemented and enforced by a procedure
thatrequires taxpayerstoreporttheirincome ina preliminaryroundofinformation transmission. Basedonthisinformationsomereportsarethen...
are applied to detected evaders. The tax compliance problem has attracted much ...
Abstract This article presents an experimental design we use to teach concepts in the
economics of auctions, and implications for e-Business procurement. The experiment is
easily administered and can be adapted to many different treatments. The chief innovation ...
S Durlauf, JV Rios-Rull, E Tamer, J Abbring… - Wiley Online Library
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