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A structural model of government formation

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D Diermeier, H Eraslan… - Econometrica, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. Econometrica, Vol. 71, No. 1 (January, 2003), 27–70 A STRUCTURAL
MODEL OF GOVERNMENT FORMATION By Daniel Diermeier, Hülya Eraslan, and
Antonio Merlo1 In this paper we estimate a bargaining model ...
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Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron–Ferejohn model

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H Eraslan - Journal of Economic Theory, 2002 - Elsevier
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Majority rule in a stochastic model of bargaining

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H Eraslan… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2002 - Elsevier
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Bicameralism and government formation

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D Diermeier, H Eraslan… - 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: In this paper we present a structural approach to the study of government formation
in multi-party parliamentary democracies. The approach is based on the estimation of a
stochastic bargaining model which we use to investigate the effects of specific institutional ...
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Coalition governments and comparative constitutional design

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D Diermeier, H Eraslan… - European Economic Review, 2002 - Elsevier
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CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATIONS: ESTIMATES FROM A BARGAINING MODEL*

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HKK Eraslan - International Economic Review, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
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Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining

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H Eraslan… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We study a model of sequential bargaining in which, in each period before an
agreement is reached, the proposer's identity is randomly determined, the proposer
suggests a division of a pie of size one, each other agent either approves or rejects the ...
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Strategic voting over strategic proposals

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P Bond… - Review of Economic Studies, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
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Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures

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H Eraslan… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2004 - Elsevier
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[CITATION] Antonio Merlo, 2003.“A Structural Model of Government Formation,”

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D Diermeier… - Econometrica
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Information-based trade

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P Bond… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2010 - Elsevier
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[CITATION] Uniqueness of Asymmetric Equilibria in the Baron-Ferejohn Model

HKK Eraslan - 1998 - mimeo, University of Minnesota
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[BOOK] The effects of constitutions on coalition governments in parliamentary democracies

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D Diermeier, H Eraslan, A Merlo… - 2003 - papers.ssrn.com
Page 1. by http://ssrn.com/abstract=484363 Daniel Diermeier, Hülya Eraslan and
Antonio Merlo “The Effects of Constitutions on Coalition Governments” PIER Working
Paper 03-037 Penn Institute for Economic Research Department ...
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The anatomy of US personal bankruptcy under Chapter 13

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H Eraslan, W Li… - Federal Reserve Bank of …, 2007 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: By compiling a novel data set from bankruptcy court dockets recorded in Delaware
between 2001 and 2002, the authors build and estimate a structural model of Chapter 13
bankruptcy. This allows them to quantify how key debtor characteristics, including whether ...
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[PDF] Information, trade and common knowledge with endogenous asset values

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P Bond… - 2005 - bear.warrington.ufl.edu
Abstract We study the possibility of trade for purely informational reasons when the final
payoff of the object being traded depends in part on an action taken by its eventual owner. A
leading example is the trade of a controlling stake in a corporation. We establish ...
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[CITATION] Debt restructuring and voting rules

P Bond… - RODNEY L WHITE …, 2005 - RODNEY WHITE CENTER- …
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[CITATION] A Structural Model of Chapter 13 Personal Bankruptcy

H Eraslan, W Li… - 2007 - Working paper. Wharton School, …
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[CITATION] Antonio Merlo. 2002.“Coalition Governments and Comparative Constitutional Design.”

D Diermeier… - European Economic Review
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[CITATION] Information-based trade, forthcoming

P Bond… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2009
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[CITATION] Antonio Merlo, 2001.“Bicameralism and Government Formation.”

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D Diermeier… - Quarterly Journal of Political Science
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[PDF] Bargaining collectively

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P Bond… - The Wharton School, University of …, 2006 - economics.sas.upenn.edu
Page 1. Bargaining collectively ∗ Philip Bond Finance Department The Wharton School University
of Pennsylvania Philadelphia, PA 19104-6367 pbond@wharton.upenn.edu Hülya Eraslan
Finance Department The Wharton School University of Pennsylvania ...
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[PDF] Deliberation and Proposal Design in Bankruptcy

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HKK Eraslan… - 2004 - american.edu
Page 1. Deliberation and Proposal Design in Bankruptcy 1 Hülya KK Eraslan and Bilge Yılmaz
Finance Department Wharton School University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104
USA November 22, 2004 1PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE. ...
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The Dynamics of Chapter 13 Bankruptcy

H Eraslan, W Li… - 2006 Meeting Papers, 2006 - ideas.repec.org
The †œBankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005†makes
extensive changes to US consumer bankruptcy regulations. One of its most important
features is to prohibit debtors from filing under Chapter 7 when some or all of a debtor’ ...
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[PDF] Deliberation and Proposal Design with an Application to Bankruptcy

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HKK Eraslan… - 2003 - mfs.rutgers.edu
Page 1. Deliberation and Proposal Design with an Application to Bankruptcy 1 Hülya KK Eraslan
and Bilge Yılmaz Finance Department Wharton School University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia,
PA 19104 USA April 22, 2004 1PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE. ...
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[PDF] Debt restructuring and voting rules Preliminary and incomplete Comments welcome

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P Bond… - finance.wharton.upenn.edu
Page 1. The Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Debt Restructuring and
Voting Rules Philip Bond Hülya Eraslan 23-05 Page 2. Debt restructuring and voting
rules Preliminary and incomplete Comments welcome 1 ...
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[PDF] Rhetoric in Legislative Bargaining with Asymmetric Information

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Y Chen… - TÜSÝAD-Koç University Economic Research …, 2010 - econ2.jhu.edu
Page 1. Rhetoric in Legislative Bargaining with Asymmetric Information1 Ying Chen
Arizona State University yingchen@asu.edu Hülya Eraslan Johns Hopkins University
eraslan@jhu.edu November 4, 2011 1We thank John ...
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[PDF] Rhetoric in Legislative Bargaining with Asymmetric Information (Preliminary and Incomplete)

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Y Chen… - 2010 - server1.tepper.cmu.edu
Page 1. Rhetoric in Legislative Bargaining with Asymmetric Information (Preliminary and
Incomplete) Ying Chen Arizona State University yingchen@asu.edu Hülya Eraslan Johns
Hopkins University eraslan@jhu.edu March 19, 2010 Page 2. Abstract ...
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[CITATION] Essays in Bargaining Theory with an Application to Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganization

HKK Eraslan - 2001 - University of Minnesota

Bicameralism and Government Formation, Second Version

D Diermeier, H Eraslan… - PIER Working Paper No. 07- …, 2007 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: In this paper we present a structural approach to the study of government formation
in multi-party parliamentary democracies. The approach is based on the estimation of a
stochastic bargaining model which we use to investigate the effects of specific institutional ...
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[PDF] FNCE 932: Corporate Finance Fall 2003 Hülya Eraslan Office: 2342 SH-DH E-mail: eraslan@ wharton. upenn. edu

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H Eraslan - 2003 - finance.wharton.upenn.edu
Page 1. FNCE 932: Corporate Finance Fall 2003 Hülya Eraslan Office: 2342 SH-DH E-mail:
eraslan@wharton.upenn.edu In this course, we will examine financial distress, bankruptcy and
other restruc- turing methods used by financially distressed companies. ...
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Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in Coalitional Bargaining

A McLennan… - Economics Working Paper Archive, 2010 - ideas.repec.org
Downloadable! We study a model of sequential bargaining in which, in each period before an
agreement is reached, the proposer's identity (and whether there is a proposer) are randomly
determined; the proposer suggests a division of a pie of size one; each other agent either approves ...
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Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals, Second Version

P Bond… - PIER Working Paper No. 07-014, 2007 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Prior research on" strategic voting" has reached the conclusion that unanimity rule
is uniquely bad: it results in destruction of information, and hence makes voters worse off.
We show that this conclusion depends critically on the assumption that the issue being ...
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Bicameralism and Government Formation

A Merlo, D Diermeier… - Working Papers, 2004 - ideas.repec.org
... [Downloadable!]. Daniel Diermeier & Hulya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo, 2003. "A Structural Model
of Government Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 27-70, January. ...
[Downloadable!]; Daniel Diermeier & Hulya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo, 2003. ...
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[PDF] The Realities of US Personal Bankruptcy under

[PDF] from chicagofed.org
H Eraslan, W Li… - 2007 - chicagofed.org
Page 1. The Realities of US Personal Bankruptcy under Chapter 13 Hülya Eraslan
Wenli Li Pierre-Daniel Sarte∗ February 14, 2007 Abstract In this paper, we first
present three main findings on the performance of consumer ...
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[PDF] Topics in Corporate Finance Spring 2006

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P Bond… - Review of Economic Studies, 1996 - finlin.wharton.upenn.edu
Page 1. Topics in Corporate Finance Spring 2006 (Subject to change) Philip Bond and Hülya
Eraslan January 18, 2006 1 Course Overview Objectives We will cover a variety of topics within
corporate finance. Our aim is to teach a class that will generate research ideas. ...
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