S Ghosh - 2007 - sws1.bu.edu
Abstract I consider a reputation game with perfect monitoring and multiple longlived
opponents indexed 1, 2,ยทยทยท, n. Player 0, who attempts to build reputation, could be either the
normal type (maximising the discounted sum of payoffs) or one of many commitment types ...
S Ghosh, S Mukhopadhyay, K Sarkar… - Indian journal of …, 2008 - ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
Objective: To identify the sociodemographic characteristics, degree and cause of visual
disability among certified visually disabled individuals in a rural district of West Bengal, India
and to identify possible lacunae, if any, in the existing certification system. Materials and ...
G Sambuddha, M Subhalakshmi… - Indian Journal of …, 2008 - doaj.org
Abstract: Objective: To identify the sociodemographic characteristics, degree and cause of
visual disability among certified visually disabled individuals in a rural district of West
Bengal, India and to identify possible lacunae, if any, in the existing certification system. ...
S Ghosh - 2008 - economics.smu.edu.sg
Abstract I consider a reputation game with perfect monitoring and multiple (two or more) long-
lived opponents indexed 1, 2..., n. Player 0, who attempts to build reputation, could be of one
of many types. The normal type of player 0 and players 1, 2,..., n maximise the discounted ...
S Ghosh… - 2012 - economics.mcmaster.ca
Abstract Competing mechanism games involve multiple principals contracting with one or
more agents. This paper extends the static model of Epstein and Peters (1999) to the
repeated setting, allowing agents' types to evolve over time according to a Markov process ...
B Bachi, S Ghosh… - 2010 - fakultaetsseminar.uni-mannheim.de
Abstract When players in a game can communicate they may learn each other's strategy. It is
then natural to define a player's strategy as a mapping from what he has learned about the
other players' strategies into actions. In this paper we investigate the consequences of this ...
S Ghosh - 2009 - princeton.edu
Abstract The first chapter of my thesis is the first attempt in the game theory literature to study
the impact of reputation in a game with an arbitrary number of non-myopic players, not just
two. I consider a reputation game with perfect monitoring and multiple long-lived ...
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