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In economics, most noncooperative game theory has focused on equilibrium in games,
especially Nash equilibrium and its refinements. The traditional explanation for when and
why equilibrium arises is that it results from analysis and introspection by the players in a ...
D Fudenberg… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1986 - JSTOR
When either there are only two players or a" full dimensionality" condition holds, any
individually rational payoff vector of a one-shot game of complete information can arise in a
perfect equilibrium of the infinitely-repeated game if players are sufficiently patient. In ...
D Fudenberg… - The American Economic Review, 1984 - JSTOR
The idea that strategic considerations may provide firms an incentive to" overinvest"
in'capital" to deter the entry or expansion of rivals is by now well understood. However, in
some circumstances, increased investment may be a strategic handicap, because it may ...
D Fudenberg… - The Review of Economic Studies, 1985 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We study the adoption of a new technology to illustrate the effects of preemption in
games of timing. We show that the threat of preemption equalizes rents in a duopoly, but that
this result does not extend to the general oligopoly game. If the gain to preemption is ...
We study repeated games in which players observe a public outcome that imperfectly
signals the actions played. We provide conditions guaranteeing that any feasible,
individually rational payoff vector of the stage game can arise as a perfect equilibrium of ...
G Ellison… - The Quarterly Journal of …, 1995 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract This paper studies the way that word-of-mouth communication aggregates the
information of individual agents. We find that the structure of the communication process
determines whether all agents end up making identical choices, with less communication ...
G Ellison… - Journal of Political Economy, 1993 - JSTOR
This paper studies agents who consider the experiences of their neighbors in deciding
which of two technologies to use. We analyze two learning environments, one in which the
same technology is optimal for all players and another in which each technology is better ...
D Fudenberg, B Holmstrom… - Journal of economic theory, 1990 - Elsevier
Abstract Long-term contracts are valuable only if optimal contracting requires commitment to
a plan today that would not otherwise be adopted tomorrow. We show that commitments are
unnecessary, and hence short-term contracts are sufficient if (1) all public information can ...
D Fudenberg, R Gilbert, J Stiglitz… - European Economic Review, 1983 - Elsevier
This paper investigates when patent races will be characterized by vigorous competition and
when they will degenerate into a monopoly. Undersome conditions, a firm with an arbitrarily
small headstart can preempt its rivals. Such 'ϵ-preemption'is shown to depend on whether ...
D Fudenberg… - The American Economic Review, 2006 - JSTOR
We propose that a simple" dual-self" model gives a unified explanation for several empirical
regularities, including the apparent time inconsistency that has motivated models of quasi-
hyperbolic discounting and Rabin's paradox of risk aversion in the large and small. The ...
D Fudenberg… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric …, 1993 - JSTOR
In a self-confirming equilibrium, each player's strategy is a best response to his beliefs about
the play of his opponents, and each player's beliefs are correct along the equilibrium path of
play. Thus, if a self-confirming equilibrium occurs repeatedly, no player ever observes play ...
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 5, 320-367 (1993) Learning Mixed Equilibria* Drew Fudenberg
Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138 AND David
M. Kreps Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305, ...
D Fudenberg… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1990 - JSTOR
Previous analyses of principal-agent problems with moral hazard assume the parties can
commit to a contract that will not be renegotiated. We allow the contract to be renegotiated
after the agent's choice of action and before the observation of the action's consequences. ...
D Fudenberg… - The Review of Economic Studies, 1983 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract This paper describes a simple two-person, two-period bargaining game, and solves
it using the concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium, in which the actions of each player
convey information which is used by his opponent. The paper examines the effects of ...
D Fudenberg… - Journal of Political Economy, 1995 - JSTOR
" Income smoothing" is the process of manipulating the time profile of earnings or earnings
reports to make the reported income stream less variable. This paper builds a theory of
income smoothing based on the managers' concern about keeping their position or ...
D Fudenberg… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1986 - JSTOR
We propose a new theory of predation based on" signal-jamming." In our model the
predator's characteristics are common knowledge, while the entrant is uncertain of his own
future profitability. The entrant uses his current profit to decide whether to remain in the ...
D Fudenberg… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric …, 1989 - JSTOR
A single long-run player plays a simultaneous-move stage game against a sequence of
opponents who play only once, but observe all previous play. Let the" Stackelberg strategy"
be the pure strategy to which the long-run player would most like to commit himself. If ...
D Fudenberg… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1991 - Elsevier
Abstract We introduce a formal definition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) for multi-
period games with observed actions. In a PBE,(P) the strategies form a Bayesian equilibrium
for each continuation game, given the specified beliefs, and (B) beliefs are updated from ...
D Fudenberg… - The Bell Journal of Economics, 1983 - JSTOR
This article studies the implications of learning-by-doing for market conduct and
performance. We use a general continuous-time model to show that output increases over
time in the absence of strategic interactions, and that a monopolist learns too slowly, ...
In economics, most noncooperative game theory has focused on equilibrium in games,
especially Nash equilibrium and its refinements. The traditional explanation for when and
why equilibrium arises is that it results from analysis and introspection by the players in a ...
D Fudenberg… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1986 - JSTOR
We develop a duopoly model in which exit occurs because of the existence of fixed costs or
opportunity costs. Each firm enters the market knowing its own cost, but not that of its
opponent. As times goes on, each firm becomes increasingly pessimistic about the cost of ...
Firms sometimes try to" poach" the customers of their competitors by offering them
inducements to switch. We analyze duopoly poaching under both short-term and long-term
contracts assuming either that each consumer's brand preferences are fixed over time or ...
A Banerjee… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2004 - Elsevier
This paper analyzes a model of rational word-of-mouth learning, in which successive
generations of agents make once-and-for-all choices between two alternatives. Before
making a decision, each new agent samples N old ones and asks them which choice they ...
D Fudenberg… - The Review of Economic …, 1992 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract This paper studies reputation effects in games with a single long-run player whose
choice of stage-game strategy is imperfectly observed by his opponents. We obtain lower
and upper bounds on the long-run player's payoff in any Nash equilibrium of the game. If ...
D Fudenberg… - Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 1995 - Elsevier
We study a variation of fictitious play, in which the probability of each action is an
exponential function of that action's utility against the historical frequency of opponents' play.
Regardless of the opponents' strategies, the utility received by an agent using this rule is ...
D Fudenberg… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1983 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper analyzes how an early entrant in a market can exploit its head start by
strategic investment. The analysis is based on Spence's paper, Investment strategy and
growth in a new market,(Bell J. Econ., 10 (1979), 1–19). We frist study the investment ...
D Fudenberg… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1998 - JSTOR
We study monopoly pricing of overlapping generations of a durable good. We consider two
sorts of goods: those with an active secondhand market and anonymous consumers, such
as textbooks, and those with no secondhand market and consumers who can prove that ...
THIS MONOGRAPH surveys some recent work on dynamic oligopoly. While we have tried to
cover a selection of topics that is a fairly representative sample of current research, these
notes are not intended as an exhaustive survey of the field. As will become clear, we have ...
Abstract A key aspect of human behaviour is cooperation 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. We tend to help
others even if costs are involved. We are more likely to help when the costs are small and
the benefits for the other person significant. Cooperation leads to a tension between what ...
D Fudenberg… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1992 - Elsevier
Abstract We study the evolution of the continuous-time replicator dynamics when payoffs are
subject to aggregate shocks that take the form of a Wiener process. In the absence of
“mutation”, the system need not have an ergodic distribution. With mutation, the system ...
D Fudenberg… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1983 - Elsevier
Abstract We show that subgame-perfect equilibria of infinite-horizon games arise as limits,
as the horizon grows long and epsilon small, of subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibria of
games which are truncated after a finite horizon. A number of applications show that this ...
P Diamond… - Journal of Political Economy, 1989 - JSTOR
We examine the rational expectations equilibrium paths of the model of search and barter in
Diamond's" Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium." For some initial
positions, there are two equilibrium paths converging to different steady states, with the ...
D Fudenberg… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric …, 1993 - JSTOR
We study the steady states of a system in which players learn about the strategies their
opponents are playing by updating their Bayesian priors in light of their observations.
Players are matched at random to play a fixed extensive-form game, and each player ...
D Fudenberg… - photocopy, Department of …, 1988 - economics.harvard.edu
In recent years, noncooperative game theory, and especially Nash equilibrium analysis, has
been used in the study of many economic situations. Along with the many and varied
applications has come persistent criticism: Why (or when) is equilibrium analysis ...
E Dekel… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1990 - Elsevier
Abstract The iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies has been advanced as a
necessary requirement for “rational” play. However, this requirement relies on the
assumption that the players have no doubts about their opponents' payoffs. We show that ...
D Fudenberg, DM Kreps… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1988 - Elsevier
Abstract The philosophy of equilibrium refinements is that the analyst, if he knows things
about the structure of the game, can reject some Nash equilibria as unreasonable. The word
“know” in the preceding sentence deserves special emphasis. If in a fixed game the ...
D Fudenberg… - The Journal of Industrial Economics, 2000 - Wiley Online Library
2. Abstract This paper develops a model of pricing to deter entry by a sole supplier of a
network good. We show that the installed user base of a network good can serve a
preemptive function similar to that of an investment in capacity if the entrant's good is ...
D Fudenberg, DM Kreps… - The Review of …, 1990 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract This paper studies the set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with long-and
short-run players and little discounting. Because the short-run players are unconcerned
about the future, each equilibrium outcome is constrained to lie on their static reaction ( ...
We present a general algorithm for computing the limit, as 5-> 1, of the set of payoffs of
perfect public equilibria of repeated games with long-run and short-run players, allowing for
the possibility that the players' actions are not observable by their opponents. We illustrate ...
Abstract The public goods game is the classic laboratory paradigm for studying collective
action problems. Each participant chooses how much to contribute to a common pool that
returns benefits to all participants equally. The ideal outcome occurs if everybody ...
LA Imhof,
D Fudenberg… - Proceedings of the …, 2005 - National Acad Sciences
Abstract The main obstacle for the evolution of cooperation is that natural selection favors
defection in most settings. In the repeated prisoner's dilemma, two individuals interact
several times, and, in each round, they have a choice between cooperation and defection. ...
Abstract This paper shows that larger auctions are more efficient than smaller ones, but that
despite this scale effect, two competing and otherwise identical markets or auction sites of
different sizes can coexist in equilibrium. We find that the range of equilibrium market ...
E Dekel,
D Fudenberg… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2004 - Elsevier
This paper discusses the implications of learning theory for the analysis of games with a
move by Nature. One goal is to illuminate the issues that arise when modeling situations
where players are learning about the distribution of Nature's move as well as learning ...
G Ellison… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2000 - JSTOR
We examine two reasons why a monopoly supplier of software may introduce more
upgrades than is socially optimal when the upgrade is backward but not forward compatible,
so users who upgrade reduce others' network benefits. One explanation involves a ...
D Fudenberg - Journal of Economic Literature, 2006 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: This essay discusses the field of behavioral economics, with a focus on the papers
in Advances in Behavioral Economics. These papers show that there is a body of"
behavioral facts" that is both economically significant and regular enough to be modeled. ...
D Fudenberg… - The Review of Economic …, 1987 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract Imagine that one player, the “incumbent” competes with several “entrants”. Each
entrant competes only with the incumbent, but observes play in all contests. Previous work
shows that, as more and more entrants are added, the incumbent's reputation may ...
D Fudenberg… - The American Economic Review, 1987 - JSTOR
Game theory has had a deep impact on the theory of industrial organization, in a similar (but
less controversial) way as the rational expectations revolution in macroeconomics. The
reason it has been embraced by a majority of researchers in the field is that it imposes ...
D Fudenberg… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1999 - Elsevier
Players choose an action before learning an outcome chosen according to an unknown and
history-dependent stochastic rule. Procedures that categorize outcomes, and use a
randomized variation on fictitious play within each category are studied. These ...
D Fudenberg… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1986 - Elsevier
Abstract We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for equilibria of a game to arise as
limits of ε-equilibria of games with smaller strategy spaces. As the smaller games are
frequently more tractable, our result facilitates the characterization of the set of equilibria.
D Fudenberg… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1995 - Elsevier
A group of individuals repeatedly plays a fixed extensive-form game, using past play to
forecast future actions. Each (asymptotically) maximizes his own immediate expected payoff,
believing that others' play corresponds to the historical frequencies of past play. Because ...
G Ellison… - The Quarterly Journal of …, 2003 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract This paper studies whether agents must agglomerate at a single location in a class
of models of two-sided interaction. In these models there is an increasing returns effect that
favors agglomeration, but also a crowding or market-impact effect that makes agents ...
Non-cooperative game theory is a way of modelling and analyzing situations in which each
player's optimal decisions depend on his beliefs or expectations about the play of his
opponents. The distinguishing aspect of the theory is its insistence that players should not ...
D Fudenberg… - Handbook on economics and …, 2006 - books.google.com
Abstract When firms are able to recognize their previous customers, they may be able to use
their information about the consumers' past purchases to offer different prices and/or
products to consumers with different purchase histories. This article surveys the literature ...
D Fudenberg… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1991 - Elsevier
Abstract We show that any feasible, individually rational payoffs of an infinitely repeated
game can arise as subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs if the discount factor is close enough
to one even if mixed strategies are not observable and public randomizations are not ...
WE CONSIDER A GAME between a patient player 1 and a nonmyopic but less patient
opponent, player 2. As usual in reputation models, we suppose that the patient player's type
is private information, and that he may be a" commitment ype" who is locked into playing a ...
D Fudenberg… - European economic review, 1998 - Elsevier
This essay discusses some recent work onlearning in games'. We explore non-equilibrium
theories in which equilibrium emerges as the long-run outcome of a dynamic process of
adjustment or learning. We focus on individual level models, and more specifically on ...
E Dekel,
D Fudenberg… - Theoretical Economics, 2007 - econtheory.org
Abstract This paper proposes the solution concept of interim correlated rationalizability, and
shows that all types that have the same hierarchies of beliefs have the same set of interim-
correlated-rationalizable outcomes. This solution concept characterizes common certainty ...
In traditional reputation models, the ability to build a reputation is good for the long-run
player. In [Ely, J., Valimaki, J., 2003. Bad reputation. NAJ Econ. 4, 2; http://www. najecon.
org/v4. htm. Quart. J. Econ. 118 (2003) 785–814], Ely and Valimaki give an example in ...
Abstract We consider two kinds of “outside opportunity” that a seller of an indivisible good
might have: selling to a different buyer and consuming the good herself. In both models the
seller is uncertain about the buyer's valuation, and becomes more pessimistic over time. ...
D Fudenberg - Advances in Economic Theory: Sixth World …, 1992 - books.google.com
Repeated games models have been one of the main tools for understanding the effects of
long-run interactions, and in particular how long-run interactions make possible forms of
trust and commitment that can be advantageous to some or all of the players. The most ...
D Fudenberg… - Games and economic behavior, 1999 - Elsevier
Forecasts are said to be calibrated if the frequency predictions are approximately correct.
This is a refinement of an idea first introduced by David Blackwell in 1955. We show that “K-
initialized myopic strategies” are approximately calibrated when K is large. These ...
D Fudenberg… - The Quarterly Journal of …, 1997 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract In some experiments rational players who understand the structure of the game
could improve their payoff. We hound the size of the observed losses in several such
experiments, lb do this, we suppose that observed play resembles an equilibrium because ...
D Fudenberg… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2006 - Elsevier
This note characterizes the impact of adding rare stochastic mutations to an “imitation
dynamic,” meaning a process with the properties that absent strategies remain absent, and
non-homogeneous states are transient. The resulting system will spend almost all of its ...
D Fudenberg… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1991 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper studies repeated games in which players are imperfectly informed about
the uncertain consequences of their opponents stage game actions. We show that if the
game is informationally connected, the set of sequential equilibrium payoffs includes the ...
D Fudenberg, M Mobius… - Journal of Economic theory, 2007 - Elsevier
We show the existence of a pure strategy, symmetric, increasing equilibrium in double
auction markets with correlated, conditionally independent private values and many
participants. The equilibrium we find is arbitrarily close to fully revealing as the market size ...
E Dekel,
D Fudenberg… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1999 - Elsevier
In a self-confirming equilibrium, each player correctly forecasts the actions that opponents
will take along the equilibrium path, but may be mistaken about the way that opponents
would respond to deviations. This paper develops a refinement of self-confirming ...
D Fudenberg… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1988 - Elsevier
Abstract If players are small, one might expect that optimal reactions to one-player
deviations are negligible, so that the open-and closed-loop equilibria are approximately the
same. We investigate the circumstances in which this is true.
G Ellison… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2000 - Elsevier
We examine the local stability of mixed equilibria in a smoothed fictitious play model. Our
model is easy to analyze and yields the same conclusions as other models in 2× 2 games.
We focus on 3× 3 games. Contrary to some previous suggestions, learning can sometimes ...
Our empirical analysis builds on the work of Ashenfelter and Johnson (1967) and Farber
(1978). The purpose of their research was, in part, to test bargaining theories of industrial
disputes. À central issue in such theories, as we note above, has been whether strikes are ...
We examine games played by a single large player and a large number of opponents who
are small, but not anonymous. If the play of the small players is observed with noise, and if
the number of actions the large player controls is bounded as the number of small players ...
LA Imhof,
D Fudenberg… - Journal of theoretical biology, 2007 - Elsevier
Abstract The repeated Prisoner's Dilemma is usually known as a story of tit-for-tat (TFT). This
remarkable strategy has won both of Robert Axelrod's tournaments. TFT does whatever the
opponent has done in the previous round. It will cooperate if the opponent has cooperated ...
Page 1. '^!mmf working paper department of economics MIT LIBRARIES DUPLl 3 =1060 00582641
Q PREDATION WITHOUT REPUTATION by D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole 1 No. 377 May 1985 |
1 massachusetts institute of technology 50 memorial drive Cambridge, mass. 02139 ...
We provide a characterization of the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs of repeated
games with imperfect public monitoring as the discount factor goes to one. Our result covers
general stage games including those that fail a “full-dimensionality” condition that had ...
[CITATION] Lectures on Learning and Equilibrium in Strategic Form Games
[CITATION] Game Theory MIT Press
D Fudenberg… - Cambridge, MA, 1991
[CITATION] The theory of learning in games (economic learning and social evolution)
D Fudenberg… - 1998 - MIT Press, Cambridge
[CITATION] Discounted Repeated Games with Unobservable Actions, I: One-sided Moral Hazard
D Fudenberg, E Maskin… - 1986 - Harvard Institute of Economic …
D Fudenberg… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
We show that the use of communications to coordinate equilibria generates a Nash-threats
folk theorem in two-player games with “almost public” information. The results generalize to
the n-person case. However, the two-person case is more difficult because it is not ...
D Fudenberg… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2008 - Elsevier
We analyze a class of imitation dynamics with mutations for games with any finite number of
actions, and give conditions for the selection of a unique equilibrium as the mutation rate
becomes small and the population becomes large. Our results cover the multiple-action ...
D Fudenberg… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2011 - Elsevier
This paper introduces stochastic games with imperfect public signals. It provides a sufficient
condition for the folk theorem when the game is irreducible, thus generalizing the results of
Dutta (1995)[5] and Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994)[9]. To do this, the paper ...
D Fudenberg… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1990 - Elsevier
Abstract The “perfect Folk Theorem” for discounted repeated games establishes that the sets
of Nash and subgame-perfect equilibrium payoffs are equal in the limit as the discount factor
δ tends to one. We provide conditions under which the two sets coincide before the limit is ...
Abstract: We examine mechanism design with transferable utility and budget balance, using
techniques we developed for the study of repeated games. We show that with independent
types, budget balance does not limit the set of social choice functions that can be ...
E Dekel,
D Fudenberg, S Morris… - 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper proposes the solution concept of interim rationalizability, and shows that
all type spaces that have the same hierarchies of beliefs have the same set of interim
rationalization outcomes. This solution concept characterizes common knowledge of ...
D Fudenberg… - The Quarterly Journal of …, 2009 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We study repeated games with frequent actions and frequent imperfect public
signals, where the signals are aggregates of many discrete events, such as sales or tasks.
The high-frequency limit of the equilibrium set depends both on the probability law ...
D Fudenberg… - Review of Economic Dynamics, 2007 - Elsevier
In a repeated game with imperfect public information, the set of equilibria depends on the
way that the distribution of public signals varies with the players' actions. Recent research
has focused on the case of “frequent monitoring,” where the time interval between periods ...
M Casari, D Abreu, D Pearce… - Journal of …, 2007 - Cambridge Univ Press
This article examines changes in institutions that protected property rights in the Alps
between the thirteenth and the nineteenth century and, in particular, alternative
management systems adopted for the common pastures and forests in about 200 ...
The standard practice in economic applications of game theory is to assume that observed
behavior in the situation being modeled will correspond to one of the Nash equilibria of the
game. Yet Nash equilibrium supposes that all players have correct and independent ...
D Fudenberg… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2011 - Elsevier
We study the perfect type-contingently public ex-post equilibrium (PTXE) of repeated games
where players observe imperfect public signals of the actions played, and both the payoff
functions and the map from actions to signal distributions depend on an unknown state. ...
D Fudenberg… - … of Economics, Washington University in St …, 2009 - dklevine.com
Page 1. Self Control, Risk Aversion, and the Allais Paradox Drew Fudenberg and David
K. Levine August 1, 2006 Page 2. 1 Introduction J risk preferences and self-control
problems are linked and should have a unified explanation ...
E Dekel,
D Fudenberg… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2002 - Elsevier
In order to model the subjective uncertainty of a player over the behavior strategies of an
opponent, one must consider the player's beliefs about the opponent's play at information
sets that the player thinks have probability zero. This corregendum uses “trembles” to ...
D Fudenberg… - Econometrica, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
This paper studies repeated games with imperfect public monitoring where the players are
uncertain both about the payoff functions and about the relationship between the distribution
of signals and the actions played. We introduce the concept of perfect public ex post ...
D Fudenberg… - Journal of Public Economics, 2010 - Elsevier
Costly punishment can facilitate cooperation in public-goods games, as human subjects will
incur costs to punish non-cooperators even in settings where it is unlikely that they will face
the same opponents again. Understanding when and why it occurs is important both for ...
D Fudenberg, J Tirole… - DISCUSSION …, 1999 - economics.harvard.edu
Abstract This paper develops a model of pricing to deter entry by a sole supplier of a network
good. We show that the installed user base of a network good can serve a preemptive
function similar to that of an investment in capacity if the entrant's good is incompatible ...
F Drew… - 1998 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract In economics, most noncooperative game theory has focused on equilibrium in
games, especially Nash equilibrium and its refinements. The traditional explanation for
when and why equilibrium arises is that it results from analysis and introspection by the ...
[CITATION] Evolution and repeated games
D Fudenberg… - Harvard University, 1993
D Fudenberg… - Cuadernos de economía, 2005 - SciELO Chile
The idea of speculation as trading based on information differences is a widespread one both
inside and outside of economics. Such phenomenon as betting on horse races, not to speak
of speculation in the stock market, are difficult to imagine in a world in which everyone ...
Abstract: We study experimental play of the repeated prisoner's dilemma when actions are
implemented with noise. When cooperation is an equilibrium, subjects cooperate
substantially more than in treatments without cooperative equilibria, and cooperative ...
D Fudenberg… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2009 - Elsevier
We examine the role of off-path “superstitions” in macro-economics, and show how a false
belief about off-path play is the key element underlying both the Lucas Critique and the
game-theoretic concept of self-confirming equilibrium. However, the impact of false beliefs ...
D Fudenberg… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2011 - Elsevier
We consider a long-run player facing a sequence of short-run opponents who receive noisy
signals of the long-run player's past actions. We modify the standard, synchronous-action,
model by supposing that players observe an underlying public signal of the opponent's ...
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