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User profiles for author:"Andreas Blume"

Andreas Blume

Professor of Economics, University of Pittsburgh
Verified email at pitt.edu
Cited by 913

The effects of costless pre-play communication: Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria

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A Blume… - Journal of Economic theory, 2007 - Elsevier
Cheap talk is shown to facilitate coordination on the unique efficient equilibrium in
experimental order-statistic games. This result is roughly consistent with theoretical
predictions according to which cheap talk promotes efficient Nash play. The evidence ...
Cited by 128 - Related articles - All 22 versions

[CITATION] Evolutionary stability in games of communication

Full text - MIT Libraries
A Blume, K Yong-Gwan… - Games and Economic …, 1993 - econpapers.repec.org
Related works: Working Paper: Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication (2010) Working
Paper: Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication (1992) Working Paper: Evolutionary
Stability in Games of Communication (1993) This item may be available elsewhere in ...
Cited by 89 - Related articles - Cached - Library Search - All 6 versions

Experimental evidence on the evolution of meaning of messages in sender-receiver games

Full text - MIT Libraries
A Blume, DV DeJong, YG Kim… - The American Economic …, 1998 - JSTOR
This paper experimentally investigates the evolution of message meanings when talk is
cheap. We consider communication between a privately informed sender and a receiver
when the sender's message does not affect payoffs directly. Sender-receiver games, ...
Cited by 78 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 11 versions

Evolution of communication with partial common interest

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A Blume, DV DeJong, YG Kim… - Games and Economic …, 2001 - Elsevier
We experimentally investigate communication in sender-receiver games with imperfect
incentive alignment. We consider both a priori meaningless messages and messages with
pre-established meanings. Under four canonical incentive conditions, we get ...
Cited by 55 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 13 versions

All equilibria of the Vickrey auction

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A Blume… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2004 - Elsevier
This paper characterizes the set of Nash equilibria in the second-price sealed-bid auction with
independent private values and three or more bidders. In addition, we show that any effective
reserve price implies uniqueness. ... [1] S. Bikhchandani, PH Haile and JG Riley, ...
Cited by 47 - Related articles - All 12 versions

Communication, risk, and efficiency in games

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A Blume - Games and Economic Behavior, 1998 - Elsevier
This paper uses curb sets to study the evolution of effective pre-play communication in
games where a single communication round precedes a simultaneous-move, complete-
information game. It is shown that the effectiveness of one-sided pre-play communication ...
Cited by 42 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 14 versions

Coordination and learning with a partial language

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A Blume - Journal of Economic Theory, 2000 - Elsevier
This paper explores how efficiency promotes the use of structure in language. It starts from
the premise that one of language's central characteristics is to provide a means for saying
novel things about novel circumstances, its creativity. It is reasonable to expect that in a ...
Cited by 39 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 12 versions

An experimental investigation of optimal learning in coordination games

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A Blume… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2000 - Elsevier
This paper presents an experimental investigation of optimal learning in repeated
coordination games. We find evidence for such learning when we limit both the cognitive
demands on players and the information available to them. We also find that uniqueness ...
Cited by 35 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 33 versions

Bertrand without fudge

Full text - MIT Libraries
A Blume - Economics Letters, 2003 - Elsevier
This paper reexamines Bertrand competition with homogeneous products and different
marginal costs. It is shown that the conventional outcome is supported by an equilibrium in
the original game under the standard rationing rule.
Cited by 35 - Related articles - All 7 versions

Private monitoring in auctions

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A Blume… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2006 - Elsevier
We study infinitely repeated first-price auctions in which a bidder only learns whether or not
he won the object. While repetition of the stage-game equilibrium is the unique Nash
equilibrium in public strategies, with patient bidders there are simple Nash equilibria in ...
Cited by 34 - Related articles - Library Search - All 27 versions

[PDF] Modeling Tacit Collusion in Auctions

[PDF] from psu.edu
A Blume… - University of Pittsburgh and Social Science …, 2002 - Citeseer
Abstract We study tacit collusion in repeated auctions in which bidders can only observe
past winners and not their bids. We adopt a stringent interpretation of tacit collusion as
collusion without communication about strategies that we model as a symmetry restriction ...
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Communication-proof equilibria in cheap-talk games

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A Blume… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1995 - Elsevier
We define communication-proof equilibria in simple games of communication. These
equilibria satisfy a stability condition guaranteeing that they would not be affected if new
opportunities to communicate arose. We look for partitions of possible equilibria into sets ...
Cited by 25 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 9 versions

Intraplay communication in repeated games

Full text - MIT Libraries
B Andreas - Games and Economic Behavior, 1994 - Elsevier
Abstract The paper examines repeated games where players have the (possibly costly)
option of initiating bargaining over continuation payoffs between plays of the stage game. A
solution concept for these augmented games, renegotiation perfectness, is used to ...
Cited by 25 - Related articles - All 6 versions

Equilibrium refinements in sender-receiver games

Full text - MIT Libraries
B Andreas - Journal of Economic Theory, 1994 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper examines the effectiveness of perturbation refinements in sender-
receiver games. It is shown that babbling equilibria are always perfect and even proper.
However, they need not be strategically stable. An example is given where the only ...
Cited by 24 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 8 versions

[PDF] Intentional vagueness

[PDF] from psu.edu
A Blume… - unpublished paper, University of, 2009 - Citeseer
Abstract This paper analyzes communication with a language that is vague in the sense that
identical messages do not always result in identical interpretations. It is shown that strategic
agents frequently add to this vagueness by being intentionally vague, ie they deliberately ...
Cited by 23 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 24 versions

On the geography of conventions

[PDF] from econometricsociety.org
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A Blume… - Economic Theory, 2003 - Springer
Summary. We study an evolutionary model in which heterogenous boundedly rational
agents interact locally in order to play a coordination game. Agents differ in their mobility
with mobile agents being able to relocate within a country. We find that mobile agents ...
Cited by 14 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 12 versions

Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games

[PDF] from virginia.edu
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A Blume… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2004 - Elsevier
We study learning in communication games. Our main finding is that a simple forward-
looking learning rule leads to communication in a large class of games. This class is
characterized by a partial-common-interest condition. In contrast, we show that a variety of ...
Cited by 13 - Related articles - All 10 versions

Modeling tacit collusion in auctions

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A Blume… - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical …, 2008 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: We study tacit collusion, which we interpret as collusion without communication
about strategies, in repeated auctions in which bidders can only observe past winners and
not their bids. Strategies cannot discriminate among initially nameless bidders until they ...
Cited by 10 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 6 versions

Learning and communication in sender‐receiver games: an econometric investigation

[PDF] from banaan.org
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A Blume, DV DeJong… - Journal of Applied …, 2002 - Wiley Online Library
This paper compares stimulus response (SR) and belief-based learning (BBL) using data from
experiments with sender–receiver games. The environment, extensive form games played in
a population setting, is novel in the empirical literature on learning in games. Both the SR ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 13 versions

[PDF] Cognitive forward induction and coordination without common knowledge: Theory and evidence

[PDF] from psu.edu
A Blume… - University of Pittsburgh and Technion working …, 2001 - Citeseer
Abstract This paper investigates optimal play in coordination games where cognition plays
an important role. The standard approach to games of incomplete information, which
assumes common knowledge of the structure, fails in such games. We develop a theory ...
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Neighborhood stability in sender-receiver games

Full text - MIT Libraries
A Blume - Games and Economic Behavior, 1996 - Elsevier
This paper characterizes robust outcomes in sender–receiver games. An equilibrium (a
retract) isperturbed message persistent (PMP) if it is the limit (Hausdorff limit) of persistent
equilibria (persistent retracts) in perturbed games. In strict common interest games ...
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[CITATION] Board, and Kohei Kawamura. 2007.“Noisy Talk.”

A Blume… - Theoretical Economics
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Decentralized learning from failure

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A Blume… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
We study decentralized learning in organizations. Decentralization is captured through
Crawford and Haller's [Learning how to cooperate: optimal play in repeated coordination
games, Econometrica 58 (1990) 571–595] attainability constraints on strategies. We ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - All 19 versions

Contract Renegotiation with Time‐Varying Valuations

Full text - MIT Libraries
A Blume - Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1998 - Wiley Online Library
The paper characterizes optimal renegotiation-proof rental contracts in a model with adverse
selection and hidden information. It generalizes the work of Hart and Tirole (1988) to the
case of time-varying valuations. The paper considers a durable-goods monopolist who ...
Cited by 8 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 5 versions

Decentralized Organizational Learning: An Experimental Investigation

[PDF] from socionet.ru
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A Blume, J Duffy… - The American Economic …, 2009 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: We experimentally study decentralized organizational learning. Our objective is to
understand how learning members of an organization cope with the confounding effects of
the simultaneous learning of others. We test the predictions of a stylized, rational agent ...
Cited by 8 - Related articles - All 22 versions

Cognitive forward induction and coordination without common knowledge: An experimental study

[PDF] from psu.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
A Blume… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2010 - Elsevier
This paper investigates optimal play in coordination games in which cognition plays an
important role. In our game logically omniscient players would be able to identify a distinct
coordination opportunity from other obvious facts. Real players may be unable to make ...
Cited by 7 - Related articles - All 19 versions

All equilibria of the multi-unit Vickrey auction

Full text - MIT Libraries
A Blume, P Heidhues, J Lafky, J Münster… - Games and Economic …, 2009 - Elsevier
This paper completely characterizes the set of equilibria of the Vickrey auction for multiple
identical units when buyers have non-increasing marginal valuations and there are at least
three potential buyers. There are two types of equilibria: In the first class of equilibria there ...
Cited by 6 - Related articles - All 6 versions

A learning-efficiency explanation of structure in language

Full text - MIT Libraries
A Blume - Theory and decision, 2004 - Springer
This paper proposes a learning-efficiency explanation of modular structure in language. An
optimal grammar arises as the solution to the problem of learning a language from a minimal
number of observations of instances of the use of the language. Agents face symmetry ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - All 10 versions

[PDF] Language Barriers

[PDF] from pitt.edu
A Blume… - 2009 - pitt.edu
Abstract Private information about language competence drives a wedge between the
indicative meanings of messages, the sets of states indicated by those messages, and their
imperative meanings, the actions induced by those messages. When sender and receiver ...
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[CITATION] A Learning–Efficiency Explanation of Structure in Communication

A Blume - 1999 - working paper
Cited by 4 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries

[CITATION] German-Chinese Economic Relations from a Macro and Micro Perspective: A Practitioner's View'

A Blume - German-Chinese Relations: Trade Promotion Plus …, 2005
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[BOOK] Learning and communication in sender-receiver games: an econometric investigation

[PDF] from psu.edu
A Blume, D DeJong, G Neumann, NE Savin… - 2000 - Citeseer
Learning plays an important role in coordinating activities be it a market or an organization.
Communication goes hand in hand with learning when addressing problems of
coordination. Game theory has made a significant contribution to our understanding and ...
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[CITATION] KY-G., and J. Sobel (1993):“Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication,”

A Blume - Games and Economic Behavior
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[CITATION] Bargaining with Randomly Changing Valuations

A Blume - 1990 - Working Paper 90-22, University of …
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Tacit collusion in repeated auctions

A Blume… - CIG Working Papers, 2001 - ideas.repec.org
We study tacit collusion in repeated auctions in which bidders can only observe pastwinners
and not their bids. We adopt a stringent interpretation of tacit collusion ascollusion without
communication about strategies that we model as a symmetryrestriction on repeated ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - Cached - All 6 versions

[HTML] Security needs and the performance of the defense industry

[HTML] from repec.org
A Blume… - CIG Working Papers, 2000 - ideas.repec.org
Today, leading defense firms are concentrated into just two distinct blocs-those based in the
US and those in Western Europe. All US defense firms and most European ones are private.
Market structure may thus play an important role in determining procurement levels as ...
Cited by 8 - Related articles - Cached - Library Search - All 11 versions

[CITATION] Communication-proof equilibria in cheap-talk games

A Blume… - Working Papers, 1991 - econpapers.repec.org
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. ...
Related works: Journal Article: Communication-Proof Equilibria in Cheap-Talk Games
(1995) This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - Cached - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 4 versions

[PDF] All Nash Equilibria of the Multi-Unit Vickrey Auction

[PDF] from ipbo.de
A Blume, P Heidhues, J Lafky, J Münster… - Discussion Papers, 2006 - ipbo.de
Abstract This paper completely characterizes the set of Nash equilibria of the Vickrey auction
for multiple identical units when buyers have non-increasing marginal valuations and there
at least three potential buyers. There are two types of equilibria: In the first class of ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 21 versions

[PDF] Learning strategic sophistication

[PDF] from uvt.nl
A Blume, D DeJong… - 2003 - arno.uvt.nl
We experimentally investigate coordination games in which cognition plays an important
role, ie where outcomes are affected by the agents' level of understanding of the game and the
beliefs they form about each others' understanding. We ask whether and when repeated ...
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[CITATION] Y ong-Gwan Kim and Geoffrey B. Sprinkle, 2001

A Blume… - Evolution of Communication with Partial Common …
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The Effect of Message Space Size on Learning and Outcomes in Sender–Receiver Games

A Blume, DV DeJong… - Handbook of Experimental …, 2008 - Elsevier
This chapter uses experiments to investigate learning and outcomes in sender–receiver
games with imperfect incentive alignment. In sender–receiver games, the sender sends a
message to a receiver who then takes an action that affects the payoffs of both players. ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - All 8 versions

Cognition in spatial dispersion games

[PDF] from uvt.nl
A Blume, D DeJong… - Experimental Business Research, 2005 - Springer
Incommon-interest spatial-dispersion gamesthe agents? common goal is to choose distinct
locations. We experimentally investigate the role of cognition in such games and compare it
with the role of cognition in spatial matching games. In our setup cognition matters ...
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[PDF] Quid pro Quo: Dynamic Strategic Information Exchange

[PDF] from csef.it
A Blume… - 2010 - csef.it
Abstract. This paper studies a model in which two agents at any point in time have the
opportunity to disclose information to each other. In equilibrium the incentive for doing so is
provided by the implicit promise that information will be returned in exchange for ...
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[CITATION] Erratum to" Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games":[Games Econ. Behav. 46 (2004) 240-259]

Full text - MIT Libraries
A Blume… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2004 - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to
view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are
not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Cached - All 5 versions

[CITATION] Renting and selling: Higher Profits from Renegotiation-Proof Rental Contracts

A Blume - Working Papers, 1990 - ideas.repec.org
No abstract is available for this item. ... To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three options: 1. Check below under "Related
research" whether another version of this item is available online. 2. Check on the ...
Cached - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 4 versions

[PDF] Organizational Coordination with Decentralized Costly Communication

[PDF] from cmu.edu
PH Kriss, A Blume… - 2012 - contrib.andrew.cmu.edu
Abstract Prior experimental evidence finds decentralized pre-play communication to
facilitate efficient coordination among interdependent agents. However, the kind of
communication in these experiments is unrealistic for most organizational contexts, as it ...
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[PDF] Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh March 31, 2006

[PDF] from gtcenter.org
A Blume… - equilibrium, 2006 - gtcenter.org
We examine the possibilities for communication between agents with divergent preferences
in a noisy environment. Taking Crawford and Sobel's [1](noiseless) communication game as
a reference point, we study a model in which there is a probability∈[0, 1) that the received ...
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[BOOK] Learning, Experimentation, and Long-Run Behavior in Games

[PDF] from uvt.nl
A Blume… - 1995 - arno.uvt.nl
Abstract This paper investigates a class of population-learning dynamics. In every period
agents either adopt a best reply to the current distribution of actual play, or a best reply to a
sample, taken with replacement, from the distribution of intended play (the strategies ...
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Intentional Vagueness

O Board… - Working Papers, 2008 - ideas.repec.org
This paper analyzes communication with a language that is vague in the sense that identical
messages do not always result in identical interpretations. It is shown that strategic agents
frequently add to this vagueness by being intentionally vague, ie they deliberately choose ...
Cached - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 4 versions

[CITATION] Three essays on renegotiation in games

A Blume - 1989 - University of California, San Diego, …
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[PDF] Pre-Play Communication with Forgone Costly Messages: Experimental Evidence on Forward Induction

[PDF] from pitt.edu
A Blume, PH Kriss… - 2012 - pitt.edu
... Experimental Evidence on Forward Induction Andreas Blume Department of Economics,
University of Pittsburgh and Institute for Advanced Study Peter H. Kriss Department
of Social and Decision Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University ...
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[CITATION] Settlement and Litigation with Multiple Defendants: the Auditor and Manager

A Blume… - Working Papers, 1992 - ideas.repec.org
No abstract is available for this item. ... To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three options: 1. Check below under "Related
research" whether another version of this item is available online. 2. Check on the ...
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[CITATION] The Dog That Did Not Bark: Pre-Play Communication with Foregone Costly Messages

A Blume - 2011 - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to
view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are
not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Cached

[PDF] Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions

[PDF] from cepr.org
ABP Heidhues - temporaryaddress.cepr.org
Abstract We study tacit collusion in repeated auctions in which bidders can only observe
past winners and not their bids. We adopt a stringent interpretation of tacit collusion as
collusion without communication about strategies that we model as a symmetry restriction ...
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Coordination, efficiency and pre-play communication with forgone costly messages

P Kriss, A Blume… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We examine communication in a two-player coordination game with Pareto-ranked
equilibria. Prior research demonstrates that efficient coordination is difficult without
communication but obtains regularly with (mandatory) costless pre-play messages. In a ...
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[CITATION] Learning behavior in capital accumulation models

A Blume - 1984 - University of Georgia
Library Search

[CITATION] Learning, Experimentation, and Long-Run

A Blume - 1994

Language Barriers

O Board… - Working Papers, 2009 - ideas.repec.org
Private information about language competence drives a wedge between the indicative
meanings of messages, the sets of states indicated by those messages, and their imperative
meanings, the actions induced by those messages. When sender and receiver have ...
Cached - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 4 versions

Self-organized criticality in a dynamic game

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Full text - MIT Libraries
A Blume, J Duffy… - Journal of Economic Dynamics and …, 2010 - Elsevier
We investigate conditions under which self-organized criticality (SOC) arises in a version of
a dynamic entry game. In the simplest version of the game, there is a single location—a pool—
and one agent is exogenously dropped into the pool every period. Payoffs to entrants are ...
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China's accession to the World Trade Organization from the viewpoint of the new political economy of protectionism

A Blume - 2002 - opengrey.eu
Abstract: Musste die Zentralregierung beim Beitrittsprozess Chinas zur WTO auf
innerchinesische Partikularinteressen Ruecksicht nehmen? Welchen bremsenden Einfluss
nahmen die Funktionaere, die die international nicht konkurrenzfaehigen Staatsbetriebe ...
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Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication

Full text - MIT Libraries
B Andreas, K Yong-Gwan… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1993 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper identifies evolutionarily stable outcomes in games in which one player
has private information and the other takes a payoff-relevant action. The informed player can
communicate at little cost. Outcomes satisfying a set-valued evolutionary stability condition ...
All 2 versions

[PDF] The Dog That Did Not Bark: Pre-Play Communication with Forgone Costly Messages

[PDF] from pitt.edu
PH Kriss, A Blume… - 2010 - pitt.edu
Pareto-ranked equilibria in pure strategies. Past research demonstrates that efficient
coordination is difficult when communication is not allowed but that costless pre-play
communication (cheap talk) can reliably produce coordination on the efficient equilibrium. ...
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Dynamic Tariff games With Imperfect Observability

A Blume… - Problems of Coordination in Economic Activity, 1994 - Springer
As observable tariffs come down, hidden protection becomes increasingly important. There
is strong intuition that imperfect observability of actions eg, in the form of hidden protection,
may impede the attainment of efficiency in trade between countries even if the trading ...
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[CITATION] Contract Renegotiation with Adverse Selection and Hidden Information

A Blume - Working Papers, 1993 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks. Contract
Renegotiation with Adverse Selection and Hidden Information. Andreas Blume. ...
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Learning and Communication in Sender-Reciever Games: An Economic Investigation

A Blume, DV DeJong, G Neumann… - Discussion Paper, 2000 - ideas.repec.org
This paper compares the performance of stimulus response (SR) and belief-based learning
(BBL) using data from game theory experiments. The environment, extensive form games
played in a population setting, is novel in the empirical literature on learning in games. ...
Cached - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 6 versions

Excellence in Refereeing Award

VV Acharya, SN Ali, J Apesteguia, P Arcidiacono… - 209.197.108.139
The American Economic Association would like to congratulate its 2010 American Economic
Review Excellence in Refereeing Award recipients. The award recognizes the outstanding
work of those referees whose service and dedication have contributed to the high quality ...
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Organizational Learning: An Experimental Study

A Franco, A Blume… - Econometric Society 2004 North …, 2004 - ideas.repec.org
In this paper we experimentally investigate decentralized, organizational learning. The main
objective is to understand how learning members of an organization cope with the
confounding effects of the simultaneous learning of others. We use versions of a simple" ...
Cached - All 4 versions

Organizational Learning: An Experimental Investigation

A Blume… - 2004 Meeting Papers, 2004 - ideas.repec.org
We propose to experimentally study decentralized organization learning. Our objective is to
understand how learning members of an organization cope with the confounding effects of
the simultaneous learning of other agents. An important distinction of our approach is that ...
Cached - All 4 versions

[RTF] Faktoren für den „Durchbruch “bei den bilateralen WTO-Verhandlungen der VR China mit den USA und der EU aus chinesischer Perspektive

[RTF] from asienkunde.de
A Blume - asienkunde.de
Chinas Beitritt zur WTO, zur letzten Key International Organization neben Weltbank und IWF,
denen China bereits 1980 beigetreten ist, gestaltet sich besonders schwierig. Über 14 Jahre
zieht sich dieser Beitrittsprozess nun schon hin. Trotz optimistischer Prognosen scheint ...
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