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User profiles for author:"William Sandholm"

William H. Sandholm

Professor of Economics, University of Wisconsin
Verified email at ssc.wisc.edu
Cited by 1299

Potential games with continuous player sets

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WH Sandholm - Journal of Economic Theory, 2001 - Elsevier
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[BOOK] Population games and evolutionary dynamics

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WH Sandholm… - 2010 - ssc.wisc.edu
Page 1. Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics William H. Sandholm September 9,
2009 1 3 4 Chaos under the replicator dynamic Page 2. ii Page 3. CONTENTS IN BRIEF Preface
xv 1 Introduction 1 I Population Games 19 2 Population Games 21 ...
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On the global convergence of stochastic fictitious play

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J Hofbauer… - Econometrica, 2002 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. Econometrica, Vol. 70, No. 6 (November, 2002), 2265–2294 ON THE
GLOBAL CONVERGENCE OF STOCHASTIC FICTITIOUS PLAY By Josef Hofbauer
and William H. Sandholm1 We establish global convergence ...
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Evolutionary implementation and congestion pricing

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WH Sandholm - Review of Economic Studies, 2002 - Wiley Online Library
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Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs

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J Hofbauer… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
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Negative externalities and evolutionary implementation

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WH Sandholm - Review of Economic Studies, 2005 - Wiley Online Library
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Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation

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WH Sandholm - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
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Evolution and equilibrium under inexact information

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WH Sandholm - Games and Economic Behavior, 2003 - Elsevier
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Evolution in Bayesian games I: theory

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JC Ely… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2005 - Elsevier
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Excess payoff dynamics and other well-behaved evolutionary dynamics

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WH Sandholm - Journal of Economic Theory, 2005 - Elsevier
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Stable games and their dynamics

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J Hofbauer… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2009 - Elsevier
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Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics

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J Hofbauer… - Theoretical Economics, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. Theoretical Economics 6 (2011), 341–377 1555-7561/20110341 Survival of dominated
strategies under evolutionary dynamics Josef Hofbauer Department of Mathematics, University
of Vienna William H. Sandholm Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin ...
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Pairwise comparison dynamics and evolutionary foundations for Nash equilibrium

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WH Sandholm - Games, 2009 - mdpi.com
Page 1. Games 2010, 1, 3-17; doi:10.3390/g1010003 OPEN ACCESS games ISSN
2073-4336 www.mdpi.com/journal/games Article Pairwise Comparison Dynamics and
Evolutionary Foundations for Nash Equilibrium William H. Sandholm ...
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Preference evolution, two-speed dynamics, and rapid social change

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WH Sandholm - Review of Economic Dynamics, 2001 - Elsevier
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Cultural integration and its discontents

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T Kuran… - Review of Economic Studies, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
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The projection dynamic and the geometry of population games

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R Lahkar… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2008 - Elsevier
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Simple and clever decision rules for a model of evolution

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WH Sandholm - Economics Letters, 1998 - Elsevier
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The projection dynamic and the replicator dynamic

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WH Sandholm, E Dokumacı… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2008 - Elsevier
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Evolution in Bayesian games II: Stability of purified equilibria

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WH Sandholm - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
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Orders of limits for stationary distributions, stochastic dominance, and stochastic stability

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WH Sandholm - Theoretical Economics, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. Theoretical Economics 5 (2010), 1–26 1555-7561/20100001 Orders of limits
for stationary distributions, stochastic dominance, and stochastic stability William H.
Sandholm Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin ...
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Large population potential games

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WH Sandholm - Journal of Economic Theory, 2009 - Elsevier
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Evolution, population growth, and history dependence

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WH Sandholm… - Games and economic behavior, 1998 - Elsevier
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Decompositions and potentials for normal form games

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WH Sandholm - Games and Economic Behavior, 2010 - Elsevier
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Robust permanence and impermanence for stochastic replicator dynamics

M Benaïm, J Hofbauer… - Journal of Biological …, 2008 - Taylor & Francis
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Simple formulas for stationary distributions and stochastically stable states

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WH Sandholm - Games and Economic Behavior, 2007 - Elsevier
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[BOOK] Evolution and learning in games with randomly disturbed payoffs

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J Hofbauer, WH Sandholm… - 2001 - homepage.univie.ac.at
Page 1. WORKING PAPERS Josef Hofbauer and William H. Sandholm Evolution and
Learning in Games with Randomly Disturbed Payoffs March 2001 Working Paper No:
0205 DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA ...
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[PDF] Schelling redux: an evolutionary dynamic model of residential segregation

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E Dokumacı… - Observatory, 2007 - gtcenter.org
Page 1. Schelling Redux: An Evolutionary Dynamic Model of Residential Segregation ∗† Emin
Dokumacı and William H. Sandholm ‡ June 19, 2007 Abstract Schelling (1971) introduces a
seminal model of the dynamics of residential segre- gation in an isolated neighborhood. ...
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Cultural integration and its discontents

[PDF] from psu.edu
T Kuran… - 2002 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: A community's culture is defined by the preferences and equilibrium behaviors of
its members. Contacts among communities alter individual cultures through two
mechanisms: behavioral adaptations driven by payoffs to coordination and preference ...
Cited by 8 - Related articles - All 36 versions

Local stability under evolutionary game dynamics

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WH Sandholm - Theoretical Economics, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. Theoretical Economics 5 (2010), 27–50 1555-7561/20100027 Local stability
under evolutionary game dynamics William H. Sandholm Department of Economics,
University of Wisconsin We prove that any regular evolutionarily ...
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[CITATION] Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics (Series on Economic Learning and Social Evolution)

WH Sandholm - 2011 - MIT Press
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[PDF] Stochastic imitative game dynamics with committed agents

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WH Sandholm - Unpublished paper, University of Wisconsin.[3], 2009 - ssc.wisc.edu
Page 1. Stochastic Imitative Game Dynamics with Committed Agents ∗ William H.
Sandholm† January 16, 2012 Abstract We consider models of stochastic evolution in
two-strategy games in which agents employ imitative decision rules. ...
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[BOOK] Simple and Clever Decision Rules in Single Population Evolutionary Models

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WH Sandholm… - 1996 - Citeseer
Page 1. Discussion Paper No. 1158 Simple and Clever Decision Rules in Single Population
Evolutionary Models† by William H. Sandholm§ First Version: June 7, 1995 This Version: June
20, 1996 Abstract This paper compares two decision rules available to myopic players ...
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[PDF] Evolution and learning in games: overview

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WH Sandholm - The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2009 - ssc.wisc.edu
Page 1. Evolution and Learning in Games: Overview ∗ William H. Sandholm† January 19, 2007
1. Introduction The theory of evolution and learning in games provides models of disequilibrium
behavior in strategic settings. Much of the theory focuses on whether and when dis- ...
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Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection

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D Oyama, W Sandholm… - 2012 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We consider a model of evolution in games in which a revising agent observes the
actions of a random number of randomly sampled opponents and then chooses a best
response to the distribution of actions in the sample. We provide a condition on the ...
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History-independent prediction in evolutionary game theory

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WH Sandholm - Rationality and Society, 1998 - rss.sagepub.com
Page 1. Rationality and Society http://rss.sagepub.com/ HISTORY-INDEPENDENT
PREDICTION IN EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY William H. Sandholm Rationality
and Society 1998 10: 303 DOI: 10.1177/104346398010003002 ...
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[CITATION] Population games and evolutionary dynamics

WH Sandholm - 2005 - ideas.repec.org
Downloadable! No abstract is available for this item.
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[CITATION] The evolution of preferences and rapid social change

WH Sandholm - Working papers, 1998 - ideas.repec.org
Downloadable! No abstract is available for this item.
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[PDF] Deterministic evolutionary dynamics

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W Sandholm - New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2008 - ess-routing.googlecode.com
Deterministic evolutionary dynamics for games first appeared in the mathematical biology
literature, where Taylor and Jonker (1978) introduced the replicator dynamic to provide an
explicitly dynamic foundation for the static evolutionary stability concept of Maynard Smith ...
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[CITATION] Evolutionary justification of Nash equilibrium

WH Sandholm - Northwestern University, 1998 - en.scientificcommons.org
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Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics: Foundations, Deterministic Approximation, and Equilibrium Selection

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WH Sandholm - 2010 - ams.org
Page 1. Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics: Foundations, Deterministic Approximation,
and Equilibrium Selection∗ William H. Sandholm† October 31, 2010 Abstract We present a
general model of stochastic evolution in games played by large populations of agents. ...
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Large deviations and multinomial probit choice

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E DokumacI… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2011 - Elsevier
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[CITATION] Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs

J Hofbauer… - … , University College London …, 2004 - en.scientificcommons.org
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[CITATION] Evolution in Bayesian games II: stability of purified equilibria.(English)

WH Sandholm

[PDF] Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games by Ross Cressman

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WH Sandholm - ssc.wisc.edu
Page 1. –1– Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games† by Ross Cressman
Reviewed by William H. Sandholm* Noncooperative game theory is one of a handful
of fundamental frameworks used for economic modeling. ...
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[PDF] The Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics & Manasement Sciences

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W Sandholm - 1996 - kellogg.northwestern.edu
Abstract This paper compares two decision rules available to myopic players who are
repeatedly randomly matched to play a 2 x 2 symmetric game. Players using the simple
decision ride evaluate the strategies by comparing their current payoffs to those of an ...
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[PDF] Large Deviations, Reversibility, and Equilibrium Selection under Evolutionary Game Dynamics

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WH Sandholm - ssc.wisc.edu
Page 1. ...
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[CITATION] H. Peyton Young, Strategic Learning and Its Limits, Oxford Univ. Press (2004) 165 pages

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WH Sandholm - Games and Economic Behavior, 2008 - ideas.repec.org
Downloadable (with restrictions)! No abstract is available for this item.
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Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics

WH Sandholm… - Theoretical Economics, 2011 - ideas.repec.org
Downloadable! We prove that any deterministic evolutionary dynamic satisfying four mild
requirements fails to eliminate strictly dominated strategies in some games. We also show that
existing elimination results for evolutionary dynamics are not robust to small changes in the ...
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[CITATION] Education resources available to the community of Truro, Iowa, 1954

WS Sandholm - 1955 - Drake University
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[PDF] Strategic Learning and Its Limits by H. Peyton Young

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WH Sandholm - 2007 - ssc.wisc.edu
Page 1. Strategic Learning and Its Limits by H. Peyton Young ∗ William H.
Sandholm†‡ November 6, 2007 While the cardinal role of game theory in economic
analysis is no longer challenged, a fundamental question about ...
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[CITATION] Ross Cressman, Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA (2003)

WH Sandholm - International Review of Economics & …, 2006 - econpapers.repec.org
By William H. Sandholm; Ross Cressman, Evolutionary Dynamics and
Extensive Form Games, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA (2003).
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Martin J. Osborne, Department of Economics, University of Toronto, martin. osborne@ utoronto. ca

J Hörner, BL Lipman, D Ray, S Athey, T Bergstrom… - Wiley Online Library
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Dec from 10-12 GMT for monthly maintenance. ...

[CITATION] Reviews and Comments

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WH Sandholm - Games and Economic Behavior, 2008

[PDF] Syllabus–Economics 806 Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics

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WH Sandholm - 2010 - ssc.wisc.edu
Page 1. Prof. William H. Sandholm Department of Economics University of Wisconsin Spring
2010 Syllabus – Economics 806 Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics Course
Description This course will survey the theory of population games and evolutionary dynamics. ...
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