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Signalling with many signals

M Engers - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1987 - JSTOR
This paper examines a market with asymmetric information where there are many signals
available and where both the costs of signalling and product value may depend on many
privately known characteristics. Under a weak condition on the relationship between the ...
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LONG‐TERM CARE AND FAMILY BARGAINING*

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M Engers… - International Economic Review, 2002 - Wiley Online Library
We present a structural model of how families decide who should care for elderly parents.
We use data from the National Long-Term Care Survey to estimate and test the parameters
of the model. Then we use the parameter estimates to simulate the effects of the existing ...
Cited by 112 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 16 versions

Stackelberg versus Cournot oligopoly equilibrium

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SP Anderson… - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1992 - Elsevier
Abstract We compare an m-firm Cournot model with a hierarchical Stackelberg model where
m Firms choose outputs sequentially. The Stackelberg equilibrium price is lower, so output
and total surplus are higher; total profits are lower. While the first mover in a Stackelberg ...
Cited by 94 - Related articles - All 5 versions

Why referees are not paid (enough)

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M Engers… - The American Economic Review, 1998 - JSTOR
Referees for journals are often paid nothing for their work. Even those journals that do offer
something for timely review (eg, The American Economic Review) typically pay considerably
less than referees can receive for their time spent elsewhere (such as consulting, for ...
Cited by 58 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 15 versions

First-author conditions

Full text - MIT Libraries
M Engers, JS Gans, S Grant… - Journal of Political Economy, 1999 - JSTOR
This paper provides a theoretical explanation for the persistent use of alphabetical name
ordering on academic papers in economics. In a context in which market participants are
interested in evaluating the relative individual contribution of authors, it is an equilibrium ...
Cited by 56 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 8 versions

Strategic investment and timing of entry

SP Anderson… - International Economic Review, 1994 - JSTOR
We introduce competition over entry time into a sequential output choice model to show how
profit differences will be dissipated. This resolves a problem in the standard Stackelberg
model that the order of moves is exogenously specified yet an earlier position in the order ...
Cited by 57 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - BL Direct - All 7 versions

CHARITY AUCTIONS*

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M Engers… - International Economic Review, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
In a charity auction the public-goods nature of auction revenue affects bidding incentives.
We compare equilibrium bidding and revenue in first-price, second-price, and all-pay charity
auctions. Bidding revenue typically varies by selling format. First-price auctions are less ...
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Sanctions: some simple analytics

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J Eaton… - The American Economic Review, 1999 - JSTOR
Governments often seek influence beyond their borders. One way is through what Thomas
Schelling (1960, 1966) calls" brute force," taking direct physical control. Less extreme
methods are to promise rewards for taking desired actions, or to threaten punishments for ...
Cited by 49 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 9 versions

Market equilibrium with hidden knowledge and self-selection

M Engers… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1987 - JSTOR
The problems of the existence of a competitive equilibrium in models with hidden knowledge
and self-selection are well-known (Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), Wilson (1977), Riley
(1979). Recent analyses of such models argue for a particular outcome--the Pareto- ...
Cited by 47 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 7 versions

Intertemporal price competition

J Eaton… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1990 - JSTOR
We develop a model of alternating price competition between firms selling differentiated
products to nonhomogeneous consumers. Subgame perfect equilibria exist that support
quite collusive prices even though each firm's price depends only upon its rival's current ...
Cited by 32 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 10 versions

Spatial competition with price-taking firms

SP Anderson… - Economica, 1994 - JSTOR
We consider a price-taking equilibrium in the spatial setting. A (unique) pricing equilibrium is
shown to exist for any set of firm locations. This equilibrium is then used to examine
locational incentives in the two-stage process in which firms first choose locations ...
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Are lemons really hot potatoes?

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M Engers, M Hartmann… - International Journal of Industrial …, 2009 - Elsevier
We model the hazard rate for car ownership spells. Our model allows us to distinguish
among different types of adverse selection effects by observing the type of unobserved
heterogeneity across owners of the same car. Our empirical results strongly suggest that ...
Cited by 19 - Related articles - All 8 versions

Preemptive entry in differentiated product markets

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SP Anderson… - Economic Theory, 2001 - Springer
Summary. Models of spatial competition are typically static, and exhibit multiple free-entry
equilibria. Incumbent firms can earn rents in equilibrium because any potential entrant
expects a significantly lower market share (since it must fit into a niche between incumbent ...
Cited by 19 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 16 versions

Charity auctions

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M Engers… - 2002 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We present a model of charity auctions in which all bidders receive a benefit from
the host charity raising revenue. Bidding behavior reflects two conflicting incentives: Bids
may be inflated because of private benefits from charitable giving, or bids could be ...
Cited by 18 - Related articles - All 9 versions

[CITATION] The existence and uniqueness of signalling equilibria

MP Engers - 1984 - University of California, Los Angeles …
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Participation games: Market entry, coordination, and the beautiful blonde

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SP Anderson… - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2007 - Elsevier
We find the Nash equilibria for monotone n-player symmetric games where each player
chooses whether to participate. Examples include market entry games, coordination games,
and the bar-room game depicted in the movie “A Beautiful Mind”. The symmetric Nash ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 10 versions

[PDF] A Beautiful Blonde: a Nash coordination game

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SP Anderson… - Virginia Economics Online Papers, 2002 - dse.univr.it
Abstract In a memorable scene from the… lm” A Beautiful Mind,” John Nash explains to his
friends how to direct their attentions to women in a bar. Game theorists who have seen the…
lm point out that the proposed solution is not a Nash equilibrium. Here we determine the ...
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Annual miles drive used car prices

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M Engers, M Hartmann… - Journal of Applied …, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
This paper investigates whether the net benefits from owning a vehicle, proxied by annual
miles driven, explain the price declines observed over a vehicle's life. We first model the
household decision on how much to drive each of its vehicles. Then we empirically ...
Cited by 7 - Related articles - All 11 versions

[CITATION] Mileage and Used Car Prices

M Engers, M Hartmann… - B Unpublished manuscript, 2004
Cited by 6 - Related articles

[PDF] Automobile maintenance costs, used cars, and adverse selection

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M Engers, M Hartmann… - Î University of Virginia …, 2004 - people.virginia.edu
Since Akerlof's (1970) foundational work on lemons markets, economists have been
investigating how differences in information about product quality can interfere with markets
for durable goods. Engers, Hartmann, and Stern (2009b)(EHSb) finds, in a dynamic ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 9 versions

R&D policy with layers of economic integration

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M Engers… - European Economic Review, 2006 - Elsevier
This paper examines whether the optimal unilateral R&D policy for an open economy is a
subsidy or a tax. It constructs a general equilibrium model with three successive layers of
international integration:(a) trade in goods,(b) trade in technologies with international R&D ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - All 8 versions

[CITATION] Signalling Equilibria Based on Sensible Beliefs: Limit Pricing Under Incomplete Information

MP Engers… - 1984 - US Department of Justice, Antitrust …
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[CITATION] ÔAre Lemons Really Hot Potatoes

M Engers, M Hartmann… - Î University of Virginia manuscript, 2005
Cited by 3 - Related articles

[CITATION] Equilibrium with Asymmetric Information

M Engers - Unpublished dissertation UCLA, 1984
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Threats and Promises

J Eaton… - 1994 - nber.org
Global environmental concerns have increased the sensitivity of governments and other
parties to the actions of those outside their national jurisdiction. Parties have tried to extend
influence extraterritorially both by promising to reward desired behavior and by ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 9 versions

[CITATION] Shopping, Shipping, and Spatial Competition with Price-Taking Firms

SP Anderson… - 1992 - Center for Economic Research and …
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[PDF] A Dynamic, Empirical Model of Adverse Selection in The Used Car Market

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M Engers, M Hartmann… - 2002 - people.virginia.edu
Let the period t utility for person i of owning car к of brand/age combination (type) j be ñï äãå]
vï äã K ωï å K εï äå (1) where vï äã is a component observable by all (and possibly further
decomposed into a benefit and cost term), ωï å is a 0lemons1 term observed if and only if i ...
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[PDF] An Equilibrium Model of Adverse Selection in the Used Car Market

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M Engers, M Hartmann… - 2004 - people.virginia.edu
We follow Engers, Hartmann, and Stern (2004a) and add some minor modificaM tions. A car
is characterized by a brand index b, an age t, a privately observed condition (net of age) eï,
and an observable carMspecific condition ξQ. Q The utility one receives from owning a ...
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[PDF] Spatial competition without excessive differentiation

[PDF] from unsw.edu.au
SP Anderson… - 2006 - wwwdocs.fce.unsw.edu.au
Abstract The workhorse model of location choice (with endogenous prices) forces
equilibrium locations that are more differentiated than the optimum. InM deed, they are more
extreme than any consumerGs desired specification! This paper provides an extension ...
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Why Referees Don't Get Paid (Enough)

J Gans… - 1996 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper examines why referees for academic journals and grant applications
are often not paid for their work. We postulate that referees are motivated by a non-monetary
concern for journal quality and also by monetary considerations. Increasing pay is, ...
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DP5241 Participation Games: Market Entry, Coordination and the Beautiful Blonde

SP Anderson… - 2005 - cepr.org
We find the Nash equilibria for monotone n-player symmetric games where each player
chooses whether to participate. Examples include market entry games, coordination games,
and the bar-room game depicted in the movie'A Beautiful Mind'. The symmetric Nash ...
Cached - All 3 versions

12. First~ Author Conditions

M Engers, JS Guns, S Grant… - … economics: analyses of …, 2000 - books.google.com
Abstract: This paper provides a theoretical explanation for the persistent use of alphabetical
name orderings on academic papers in economics. In a context in which market participants
are interested in evaluating the relative individual contribution of authors, it is an ...
Related articles - All 2 versions

[PDF] Mileage Drives Used Car Prices

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M Engers, M Hartmann… - 2005 - mrflip.com
The net benefits provided by a vehicle can be viewed as the value of transI portation
services provided minus the maintenance and repair costs incurred. Suppose that the stock
of accumulated mileage shows how much of the vehicleNs working life is left.! If annual ...
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[CITATION] Date posted: June 29, 2004; Last revised: December 12, 2008 Suggested Citation

J Eaton… - NBER Working Paper, 1990 - papers.ssrn.com
ABSTRACT Sanctions are measures chat one party (the sender) takes to influence che
acciona of another (the target), Sanctions, or the threat a£ sanctions, have been used, for
example, by creditors to get a foreign sovereign to repay debt, or by one government to ...
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