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Equilibrium of affiliated value second price auctions with financially constrained bidders: the two-bidder case

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H Fang, SO Parreiras - Games and Economic Behavior, 2002 - Elsevier
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On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders

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H Fang, SO Parreiras - Journal of Economic Theory, 2003 - Elsevier
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Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents

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SO Parreiras - Journal of Economic Theory, 2005 - Elsevier
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[PDF] Contests with Many Heterogeneous Agents

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S Parreiras… - 2006 - unc.edu
Abstract We study tournaments with many ex-ante asymmetric contestants. The asymmetry
is either with respect to the agents' distribution of valuations for the prize or with respect their
risk-aversion (CARA) parameter. We characterize equilibria in monotone strategies and ...
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Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents

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SO Parreiras… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2010 - Elsevier
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Affiliated common value auctions with differential information: the two bidder case

SO Parreiras - The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2006 - ideas.repec.org
Downloadable! <p>I study affiliated, pure common-value auctions with ex-ante asymmetric buyers.
For the two-buyer case I characterize and prove uniqueness of the equilibrium of hybrid auctions
where the payment is a weighted average of the highest and second-highest bids. ...
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[PDF] Affiliated Common Value Auctions with Differential Information: The Two Buyer Case

[PDF] from unc.edu
S Parreiras - forthcoming in the BE Journals in Theoretical …, 2006 - unc.edu
Abstract I study affiliated, pure common-value auctions with ex-ante asymmetric buyers. For
the two-buyer case I characterize and prove uniqueness of the equilibrium of hybrid auctions
where the payment is a weighted average of the highest and second-highest bids. A ...
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[PDF] On the Failure of the Linkage Principle with Financially Constrained Bidders: An Example

[PDF] from unc.edu
H Fang, SO Parreiras - 2000 - unc.edu
Page 1. On the Failure of the Linkage Principle with Financially Constrained Bidders: An Example∗
Hanming Fang† Sérgio O. Parreiras‡ September 3, 2001 Abstract The linkage principle may fail
when bidders are financially constrained. The intuition is as follows. ...
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Contests with heterogeneous agents

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S Parreiras… - 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We study tournaments with many ex-ante asymmetric contestants, whose
valuations for the prize are independently distributed. First, we characterize the equilibria in
monotone strategies, second, we provide sufficient conditions for the equilibrium ...
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Affiliated Common Value Auctions with Differential Information: The Two Bidder Case

SO Parreiras - Contributions in Theoretical Economics, 2007 - degruyter.com
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Contributions to Theoretical Economics

SO Parreiras - degruyter.com
Page 1. Contributions to Theoretical Economics Volume 6, Issue 1 2006 Article 12 Affiliated
Common Value Auctions with Differential Information: The Two Bidder Case Sergio O. Parreiras ∗
∗University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, sergiop@unc.edu Page 2. ...

Essays on auctions with inter-dependent valuations

SO Parreiras - 2001 - repository.upenn.edu
Auctions that generate a significant revenue—high stakes auctions—have the common feature
that the buyers' valuations share a significant common-value component. This is certainly true
for spectrum license rights, privatization and oil drilling rights auctions. Nonetheless, even ...
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[PDF] Asymmetric Contests under Incomplete Information with Many Participants

[PDF] from queensu.ca
SO Parreiras, A Rubinchik—Pessach - 2005 - qed.econ.queensu.ca
Page 1. Asymmetric Contests under Incomplete Information with Many Participants
Sérgio O. Parreiras∗ Anna Rubinchik—Pessach† October 2005 Abstract We
reconcile the experimental evidence documenting “race-to-the ...
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[PDF] Equilibrium of Affiliated Value Vickery Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders: Existence and Uniqueness

[PDF] from duke.edu
H Fang, SO Parreiras - 2000 - econ.duke.edu
Page 1. Equilibrium of Affiliated Value Vickery Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders:
Existence and Uniqueness∗ Hanming Fang† Sérgio O. Parreiras* October 24, 2000 Abstract
We study an affiliated value Vickery auction model with two financially constrained bid- ...
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Fighting Back “Backlash”

S Parreiras - Journal of Progessive Human Services, 2002 - Taylor & Francis
One may say that the United States is the land of opportunity and people from many
countries want to come here in order to achieve prosperity, but given the conditions that
many immigrants face, the dream often turns into despair. Over the last five years I have ...
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