F Gul, H Sonnenschein… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1986 - Elsevier
Abstract Subgame-perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller
quotes a price each period. Assume zero costs, positive interest rate, continuum of buyers,
and some technical conditions. If buyers' valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique ...
H Sonnenschein - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1972 - JSTOR
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the structure of the class of market excess
demand functions which can be generated by aggregating individual utility maximizing
behavior. Among the results are:(i) in a region of the relative price domain an arbitrary ...
H Sonnenschein - Journal of Economic Theory, 1973 - ideas.repec.org
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view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of
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W Shafer… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1975 - Elsevier
Abstract We extend a theorem of G. Debreu on the existence of equilibrium in a generalized
N-person game ('A Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem'). Applying standard techniques
the result can be used to prove the existence of equilibrium in economies with ...
S Barbera, H Sonnenschein… - Econometrica: Journal of the …, 1991 - JSTOR
Problems of social choice frequently take the following form. There are n voters and a set
K={1, 2, ldots, k} of objects. The voters must choose a subset of K. We define a class of
voting schemes called voting by committees. The main result of the paper is a ...
W Novshek… - The Bell Journal of Economics, 1982 - JSTOR
This article studies the fulfilled expectations equilibrium for a Cournot duopoly model in
which firms acquire information about uncertain linear demand. Several propositions are
established concerning the incentives to acquire and release information in this duopoly ...
J Roberts… - Econometrica: journal of the Econometric …, 1977 - JSTOR
Available theorems establishing the existence of general equilibrium in models
incorporating imperfectly competitive firms rely on the assumption that reaction curves are
continuous functions (or convex-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondences). ...
MA Satterthwaite… - The Review of Economic Studies, 1981 - JSTOR
Consider allocation mechanisms that are single valued and where each agent's strategy
space is a set of a priori admissible utility functions. Such an allocation mechanism is
strategy-proof if, for each agent, faithfully reporting his true utility function is a dominant ...
A Mas-Colell… - The Review of Economic Studies, 1972 - JSTOR
We assume that all n-tuples of individual preference orderings are admissible and that the
number of individuals is at least three. A SDF-Q is a SDF which has only quasitransitive
range elements, and a weak dictator is an individual whose preference for any x over any ...
W Shafer… - Handbook of mathematical economics, 1982 - Elsevier
... Chapter 14 Market demand and excess demand functions. Wayne Shafer, Hugo Sonnenschein.
University of Southern California. Princeton University. Available online 4 February 2005. Excerpt.
Note: This is a one-page preview only. Click here to download preview. ...
[CITATION] Demand theory without transitive preferences, with applications to the theory of competitive equilibrium
H Sonnenschein - Preferences, utility and demand. New York: Harcourt …, 1971
F Gul… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1988 - JSTOR
Recently, attention has been given to a model of two-person bargaining in which the parties
alternate making offers and there is uncertainty about the valuation of one party. The
purpose of the analysis has been to identify delay to agreement with a screening process, ...
J Neelin, H Sonnenschein… - The American Economic Review, 1988 - JSTOR
A great deal of attention has recently been devoted to providing noncooperative game
theory foundations to bargaining problems,(compare Ingolf Stahl, 1972, and Ariel
Rubinstein, 1982). This approach has produced sharp predictions about the way surplus ...
W Novshek… - 1978 - books.google.com
This paper unifies the two leading classical concepts of equilibrium for an economy: Walras
equilibrium and Cournot equilibrium. The theory pro-vides a fresh setting for the study of
competitive markets, and leads to a description of economic equilibrium which differs in ...
H Sonnenschein - The Journal of Political Economy, 1968 - JSTOR
The observation that two theories share the same formal structure, that is, differ only in the
interpretation placed on symbols, can almost always be used to simplify a body of
knowledge. The purpose of this communication is to demonstrate that Cournot's theories ...
R Kihlstrom, A Mas-Colell… - Econometrica: Journal of the …, 1976 - JSTOR
In this paper we provide a statement of the relationship between the weak axiom of revealed
preference (WA) and the negative semidefiniteness of the matrix of substitution terms (NSD).
As a corollary we determine the relation between WA and the strong axiom of revealed ...
E Foster… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric …, 1970 - JSTOR
We study a standard n-commodity model in which equilibrium positions are characterized by
specified inequalities between society's marginal rates of transformation in production and a
single consumer's marginal rates of substitution in consumption; these inequalities are ...
MO Jackson… - Econometrica, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. Econometrica, Vol. 75, No. 1 (January, 2007), 241–257 NOTES AND
COMMENTS OVERCOMING INCENTIVE CONSTRAINTS BY LINKING
DECISIONS1 BY MATTHEW O. JACKSON AND HUGO F. SONNENSCHEIN2 ...
J Roberts… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1976 - ideas.repec.org
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view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of
further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site ...
H Sonnenschein - Economic Inquiry, 1973 - Wiley Online Library
Market demand functions are defined as the sum of the demand functions of utility
maximizing individuals. It is common to reduce the number of variables which explain
market demand by assuming that a community income variable is shared among all ...
RM Anderson… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1982 - Elsevier
Abstract We prove a theorem on the existence of rational expectations general economic
equilibrium when agents condition on prices as well as on private information, and maximize
the expectation of a state-dependent utility function. The key to the result is a new ...
A McLennan… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric …, 1991 - JSTOR
The following characterization of Walrasian allocations is proved: an allocation for an
exchange economy with C 1 preferences is Walrasian if there is a set of net trades that (i)
contains all sums of elements of itself,(ii) contains the negation of any net trade that would ...
D Duffie… - Journal of Economic Literature, 1989 - JSTOR
THE GREATEST ACHIEVEMENTS of economic theory concern the determination of value in
competitive markets and the extent to which competitive markets lead to an efficient
allocation of resources. Kenneth J. Arrow's contribution has been central. The purpose of ...
AO Krueger… - International Economic Review, 1967 - JSTOR
THE CURRENT STATE of knowledge with regard to the welfare implications of international
price changes appears to be the following:(la) some trade is better than no trade, and, if a
country is a price taker, free trade is optimal if all other optimality conditions are met ...
W Novshek… - Journal of Economic Literature, 1987 - JSTOR
The essay is dedicated to the memory of Tjalling Koopmans (1910-1985). Our purpose has
been to communicate to the nonspecialist an aspect of mathematical economics that has
been developed since Koopman's masterful exposition of general equilibrium theory ( ...
[CITATION] Two proofs of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem on the possibility of a strategy-proof social choice function
D Schmeidler… - Decision theory and social ethics, issues in social …, 1978
W Novshek… - The Journal of Political Economy, 1979 - JSTOR
We extend the neoclassical theory of demand so that marginal consumers play a significant
role in the determination of the elasticity of aggregate demand. Price-induced demand
changes are decomposed into three effects: an aggregate substitution effect, an ...
H Sonnenschein - The American Economic Review, 1982 - JSTOR
...[I] f the selling price of a product exceeds the cost of the productive services for certain
firms and a profit results, entrepreneurs will flow towards this branch of production or expand
their output, so that the quantity of the product (on the market) will increase, its price will ...
S Barberá… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1978 - Elsevier
Abstract We show that every binary and Paretian method for passing from preference
profiles to lotteries over preferences is associated with a subadditive function on the set of
coalitions of individuals. This function gives the power of each coalition to secure its ...
W Novshek… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1983 - Elsevier
Abstract We examine the connection between Walrasian equilibria of a limit economy (with
infinitesimal firms) and noncooperative (Cournot) equilibria of approximating finite
economies (with significant firms). Nonconvex production sets, decreasing returns in the ...
H Sonnenschein - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1965 - JSTOR
In this paper the relationship between transitive preference and the structure of the space on
which preference is defined is studied in detail. The main results give conditions under
which the transivity of indifference is sufficient to prove the transitivity of preference.
W Shafer… - International Economic Review, 1976 - JSTOR
IN THIS PAPER WE investigate sufficient conditions for the existence of competitive
equilibrium in economies with a taxing authority and externalities. The theorem extends a
result of Sontheimer [13](and is related to issues explored in Diamond-Mirrlees [5], ...
W Shafer… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1975 - Elsevier
Abstract The purpose of this paper is to point out a relationship between theorems on the
existence of competitive equilibrium in economies with externalities, and recent results
(pioneered by A. Mas-Colell) on the existence of equilibrium for economies in which ...
M Spiegel, J Currie, H Sonnenschein… - Games and Economic …, 1994 - econ.ucla.edu
Abstract Non—cooperative game theory produces sharp predictions about the way surplus
will be divided in alternating offer games with discounting. Experiments that have attempted
to test these predictions have produced conflicting results. Taken together, they support ...
W Novshek… - 1979 - princeton.edu
We are concerned with a formal description of perfect competition in which small efficient
scale and the entry of firms occupy a central role. The set of aggregate technological
possibilities for the economy is obtained by summing the production sets of a very large ...
H Sonnenschein - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1974 - JSTOR
THE STANDARD MODEL of the price mechanism occupies a very special place in the body
of economic knowledge, and the precise description of that mechanism during the past thirty
years by Lange, Arrow, Debreu, Koopmans, and Aumann represents one of the most ...
D Schmeidler… - The Center For …, 1974 - kellogg.northwestern.edu
THE POSSIBILITY OF A CHEAT PROOF SOCIAL CHOICE FUNCTION: A THEOREM OF A. GIBBARD
AND M. SATTERTHWAITE by David Schmeidler, Tel Aviv University and the Foerder Institute
- Hugo Sonnenschein; Northwestern University Revised: May 1974 We prove a result ...
RM Anderson… - The Review of …, 1985 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We prove the existence of general economic equilibrium under uncertainty when
agents form econometric models of the relationship among their private information, prices,
and the state of the environment. The functional form of each agent's model is specified in ...
H Sonnenschein - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1981 - ideas.repec.org
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H Sonnenschein - ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY MONOGRAPHS, 1998 - books.google.com
I am honored to have been asked to present the first Nancy L. Schwartz Memorial Lecture.
This invitation was extended without any suggestion of how I might most fittingly pay tribute
to Nancy's memory. The only orders were that I present a public lecture, rather than a ...
[CITATION] Fairness and strategic behavior in two-person, alternating-offer games: Results from bargaining experiments
M Spiegel, J Currie, H Sonnenschein… - … on the Foundation and Applications of …, 1990
MM Opp, HF Sonnenschein… - Journal of International …, 2009 - Elsevier
... 6. “Reverse Rybczynski” was first established by Hugo Sonnenschein using an elementary
version of the Sonnenschein–Mantel–Debreu theorem and it was improved by Marcus Opp
and Hugo Sonnenschein in the first submitted version of this paper. ...
V Krishna… - … , and Optimality: Essays in Honor of …, 1990 - grizzly.la.psu.edu
The dual approach to demand theory is based on the fact that preferences can be
represented in two forms other than the utility function; these are the expenditure function
and the indirect utility function. Let U: R~.........; R+ be an upper semi-continuous ...
[CITATION] Oligopoly and game theory
H Sonnenschein - The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 1988
MO Jackson… - manuscript, California Institute of …, 2003 - najecon.org
Page 1. The Linking of Collective Decisions and Efficiency by Matthew O. Jackson
and Hugo F. Sonnenschein ∗ Revision: March 28, 2003 Abstract For groups that
must make several decisions of similar form, we define a simple ...
[CITATION] Uncertainty does not cause delay
F Gul… - 1981 - mimeo
MO Jackson… - manuscript, California Institute of …, 2003 - Citeseer
Page 1. Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Matthew O. Jackson and Hugo F. Sonnenschein ∗
This Draft: November 24, 2003 † Abstract Consider an arbitrary Bayesian decision problem
in which the preferences of each agent are private information. ...
S Barbera… - Econometric Research Program, …, 1977 - getcited.org
An academic directory and search engine.
[CITATION] One-Sided Uncertainty Does Not Cause Delay
F Gul… - Miaeo, Stanford University, Graduate School of …, 1985
[CITATION] Models of economic dynamics: proceedings of a workshop held at the IMA, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, USA, October 24-28, 1983
H Sonnenschein - 1986 - Springer
J Dow… - Prices, competition and equilibrium, 1986 - books.google.com
In his paper'Social Indifference Curves'(Samuelson 1956), Samuelson presented a now
classic theorem which states that if a government continuously redistributes income so as to
maximise a Bergsonian social welfare function, then community demand is utility- ...
[CITATION] On the lower semicontinuity of utility functions derived from demand data
HF Sonnenschein - Preferences, utility, and demand, 1971
[CITATION] Sequential bargaining, simple markets, and perfect competition
A McLENNAN… - 1987 - mimeo, University of Minnesota
[CITATION] Market Demand Functions and Excess Demand Functions
W SHAFER… - Handbook of Mathematical Economics
W Shafer… - 1974 - kelloggexecutives.com
I. Introduction The purpose of this paper is to present a generalization of the Arrow—Debreu
lemma on the existence of equilibrium in a generalized N—person game (Debreu [3] L
called here as in [1] an abstract economy. Applying standard techniques the result can be ...
RM Anderson… - 1981 - princeton.edu
Abstract: We prove the existence of general economic equilibrium under uncertainty when
agents form linear models of the relation between their private information, prices, and the
state of the environment. Equilibrium requires not only that markets clear, but also that ...
[CITATION] Recent Results on the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium When Efficient Scale Is Small Relative to Demand
H Sonnenschein - Advances in economic theory, 1982 - Cambridge University Press
[CITATION] Linking Decisions
M Jackson… - 2003 - Social Science Working Paper
[CITATION] forthcoming,“Linking Decisions”
M Jackson… - Econometrica
S Barberà… - UFAE and IAE Working Papers, 1988 - ideas.repec.org
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H Sonnenschein… - Econometrica, 1980 - dpf.nccu.edu.tw
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of Use, available at http://www. jstor. org/about/terms. html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions
of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not ...
[CITATION] Reply to" A Note on Orderings"
H Sonnenschein - Econometrica, Journal of the Econometric Society, 1967 - JSTOR
W Novshek… - Economics Letters, 1979 - Elsevier
Abstract For economies with a large number of small firms, price induced changes in supply
are decomposed into substitution and entry effects. Marginal firms (those earning zero profit)
play a significant role in the determination of the slope of aggregate supply.
[CITATION] Foundations of Dynamic Oligopoly and the Coase Conjecture'
F Gul, H Sonnenschein… - … , Calif.: Stanford University, Graduate School of …, 1985
[CITATION] nMarket Demand and Excess Demand Func $ tions, oin Arrow, KJ and MD Intriligator, eds, Handbook of Mathematical Ecoonomics, Vol. II
W Schafer… - 1982 - New York, North Holland
H Sonnenschein - Discussion Papers, 1975 - ideas.repec.org
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[CITATION] Social Goals and Social Organization
L Hurwitz, D Schmeidler… - 1985 - Cambridge
HF Sonnenschein - 1963 - DTIC Document
A transitive preference relation defined on some commodity space X is often included in the theory
of consumer's choice. In this paper the transitivity of preference can be deduced from purely
topological assumptions on certain sets, defined by preference, in the commodity space ...
MA Satterthwaite… - Discussion Papers, 1979 - ideas.repec.org
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MA Satterthwaite… - Discussion Papers, 1979 - kellogg.northwestern.edu
Lemma 2 was reported by Satterthwaite [16]; it provided the starting point for the present
analysis. We are greatly indebted to Donald Brown who suggested that the serial
dictatorship of binary and Pareto Arrow social welfare functions (see Luce and Raiffa [10, ...
H Sonnenschein - 1963 - DTIC Document
*ECONOMICS.
H Sonnenschein - 2005 - uchicago.edu
Fifty years ago TM Rybczynski [3] published a frequently referenced note in which he
inaugurated a systematic investigation of the comparative statics associated with a change
in the endowment of a factor. The questions that he posed are broad and fundamental: ...
W Hildenbrand… - Handbook of Mathematical Economics, 1991 - Elsevier
... Introduction to volume IV. Werner Hildenbrand, Hugo Sonnenschein. University of Bonn. Princeton
University. Available online 2 March 2005. Excerpt. Note: This is a one-page preview only. Click
here to download preview. Enable JavaScript for PDF Excerpt to view it inline. ...
[CITATION] On the existence of Cournot equilibrium without concave profit functions: Acknowledgment
J Roberts… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1977 - Elsevier
[CITATION] A Simple Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Cheatproof Social Choice Theorem
D Schmeidler, H Sonnenschein… - 1974 - Foerder Institute for Economic …
HF Sonnenschein… - uchicago.edu
Page 1. 1 A Reversal of Rybczynski's Comparative Statics via “Anything Goes” * Hugo
F. Sonnenschein a and Marcus M. Opp b a Department of Economics, University of
Chicago, 1126 E. 59th Street, Chicago, IL 60637 h-sonnenschein ...
[CITATION] Hugo Sonnenschein, Distinguished Fellow 2005
H Sonnenschein - The American Economic …, 2006 - American Economic Association
[CITATION] Journal of mathematical economics
KJ Arrow, W Hildenbrand… - 1991 - North Holland
H Sonnenschein - 1981 - princeton.edu
* I wish to acknowledge the generous assistance of several colleagues. Philippe Artzner
raised the interesting question of whether the adjustment process considered here" is in
some sense a gradient"; this is the basis for Section IV. Menachem Sternberg was the ...
[CITATION] 8 Theory and Method-Second-Generation Perspective: An Interview
H Sonnenschein - Arrow and the ascent of modern economic theory, 1987 - Macmillan
H Sonnenschein - 1979 - execed.kellogg.northwestern.edu
* Lemma 2 was reported by Satterthwaite [l6]; it provided the starting point for the present
analysis. We are greatly indebted to Donald Brown who suggested that the serial
dictatorship of binary and Pareto Arrow social welfare functions (see Luce and Raiffa [10, ...
HF Sonnenschein, BD Meltzer, GR Ford… - The University of …, 2000 - JSTOR
Page 1. The University of Chicago Law Review Volume 67 Fall 2000 Number 4 ?
2000 by The University of Chicago In Memoriam: Edward H. Levi (1912-2000) The
editors of The University of Chicago Law Review respectfully ...
S BARBERA, H SONNENSCHEIN… - 1988 - pareto.uab.es
Problems of social choice frequently take the following form. There are n voters anda set
K=(1, 2 k] of issues. Society must choose (adopt) a subset of the set of issues. Assume that
each voter has a linear order of the 2fc possible subsets that can be adopted. A voting ...
MO Jackson… - SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish …, 2011 - Springer
... There, Salvador, and his co-authors Hugo Sonnenschein and Lin Zhou, showed that certain
quota-based voting methods, where a candidate is elected if a given number of votes are cast
in the candidates favor, are the only anonymous voting systems that are strongly immune ...
[CITATION] New Webster's Law for Everyone
H Sonnenschein - 1980 - Delair Consolidated
[CITATION] Research Universities and the Future of the Academic Disciplines: Proceedings from the Centennial Meeting of the Association of American Universities, …
Association of American Universities. Centennial … - 2001 - The Association
[CITATION] 10 Demand Theory
HF SONNENSCHEIN - Preferences, utility, and …, 1971 - Houghton Mifflin Harcourt P
MA Satterthwaite, M Schmundt… - 1974 - 129.105.97.149
This result, which is reminescent of Arrow's general possibility theorem for social welfare
functions [l], suggests a second question. What is the relationship between the requirement
for voting procedures Of strategy-proofness and Arrow's requirements [l] for social welfare ...
[CITATION] German historical school
H Sonnenschein - The McGraw-Hill encyclopedia of …, 1994 - McGraw-Hill Companies
[CITATION] Law for the Layman: A Concise Encyclopedia
H Sonnenschein - 1974 - English Language Institute of …
W Shafer… - Discussion Papers, 1976 - econpapers.repec.org
By Wayne Shafer and Hugo F. Sonnenschein; Equilibrium with Externalities.
[CITATION] Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase Conjecture* Faruk Gul University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104
H Sonnenschein… - Bargaining with incomplete information, 1992 - Academic Pr
[CITATION] SUBMISSION OF MANUSCRIPTS TO ECONOMETRICA
H Sonnenschein - Econometrica: journal of the …, 1983 - Econometric Society, the University …
MA Satterthwaite, M Schmundt… - 1974 - kellogg.northwestern.edu
This result, which is reminescent of Arrow's general possibility theorem for social welfare
functions [1], suggests a second question. What is the relationship between the requirement
for voting procedures of strategy-proofness and Arrow's requirements [1] for social welfare ...
HF Sonnenschein - STICERD-Theoretical Economics Paper …, 1982 - econpapers.repec.org
By Hugo F. Sonnenschein; Price Dynamics Based on the Adjustment of Firms (Now
published in The American Economic Review, vol.72, No.5 (December.
H Sonnenschein - execed.kellogg.northwestern.edu
Discussion Paper No. 89 THE POSSIBILITY OF A CHEAT PROOF SOCIAL CHOICE
FUNCTION. A THEOREM OF A. GIBBARD AND M. SATTERTHWAITE by David Schneidler and
Hugo Sonnenschein Revised: May l974 * Tel Aviv University and the Foerder Institute ** ...
[CITATION] 400 Recent Developments in Experimental Economics II
W Krelle, DM Kreps, H Kuhn… - Recent developments …, 1993 - E. Elgar Pub.
H Sonnenschein, J Neelin… - The American Economic …, 1986 - dspace.princeton.edu
This note reports the results of an experiment which was designed to test Rubinstein's
(1982) theory of bargaining. We were particularly interested in how it would compare with
the hypothesis that bargainers tend to split a pie 50-50. We duplicated Binmore, Shaked ...
H Sonnenschein… - PRICE ADJUSTMENT, QUANTITY …, 1984 - ima.umn.edu
During the week of October 24-28, 1983, a group of mathematicians and economists met at
the Institute for Mathematics and it Applications at the University of Minnesota. The workshop
dealt with economic models in which time plays an essential role, and both the description ...
R Kihlstrom, A Mas-Colell… - 1974 - kellogg.northwestern.edu
ABSTRACT In this paper we provide a statement of the relationship between the weak
axiom of revealed preference (WA) and the negative semideiiniteness of the matrix of
substitution terms (NSD), As a corollary we determine the relation between WA and the ...
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