The politics of coalition--the very heart of the political process in most European countries--
can be analyzed either theoretically or empirically. Multiparty Government reconciles these
approaches. It gives students of European politics access to the insights of contemporary ...
N Schofield - The Review of Economic Studies, 1978 - JSTOR
Kramer's condition if true at a point is not sufficient o guarantee intransitivity of social
preference. Suppose for example that individuals {1, 2, 3} have preferences as above, and
three individuals {4, 5, 6} have preferences identical to individual 1. Assuming that {1, 4, 5, ...
G Miller… - American Political Science Review, 2003 - Cambridge Univ Press
In this paper, we contend that party realignments occur due to the interaction of candidates
and activists. We examine independent party candidates who are motivated primarily to win
elections but who use activist contributions to increase vote shares. In a two-dimensional ...
RD McKelvey… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric …, 1987 - JSTOR
Previous analyses have shown that if a point is to be a core of a majority rule voting game in
Euclidean space, when preferences are smooth, then the utility gradients at the point must
satisfy certain restrictive symmetry conditions. In this paper, these results are generalized ...
N Schofield - The Review of Economic Studies, 1983 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Majority rule voting with smooth preferences on a smooth policy space W is examined. It is shown
that there is an integer w(n), which is 2 when the size of the society n is odd and 3 when n is
even such that (i) when the dimension of W is at least win) then, for almost preference ...
N Schofield… - 2006 - books.google.com
This book adapts a formal model of elections and legislative politics to study party politics in
Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Britain, and the United States. The approach uses the idea of
valence, that is, the party leader's non-policy electoral popularity, and employs survey ...
N Schofield - European Journal of Political Research, 1993 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract. Many previous theoretical analyses of multiparty coalition behaviour have been
based either on a one-dimensional policy model or on a constant-sum game interpretation.
For theoretical and empirical reasons this paper focusses on a competitive two- ...
NJ Schofield - 1985 - getcited.org
An academic directory and search engine.
N Schofield… - British Journal of Political Science, 1985 - Cambridge Univ Press
Coalition formation has been the subject of much theoretical and empirical work in the past
decade or so. The theories that have been tested all rest, one way or another, upon
assumptions about the ways in which the payoff accruing to a particular coalition is ...
RD McKelvey… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1986 - Elsevier
Abstract Let σ be a q-rule, where any coalition of size q, from the society of size n, is
decisive. Let w (n, q)= 2q-n+ 1 and let W be a smooth 'policy space'of dimension w. Let U
(W) N be the space of all smooth profiles on W, endowed with the Whitney topology. It is ...
N Schofield - Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2003 - jtp.sagepub.com
Abstract The mean voter theorem of the stochastic spatial electoral model provides no
explanation as to why multi-party systems under proportional representation display such
diversity. Here, we extend the spatial model to include valence. Valence may be either a ...
N Schofield - Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2004 - jtp.sagepub.com
Abstract It has been a standard result of the stochastic, or probabilistic, spatial model of
voting that vote maximizing candidates, or parties, will converge to the electoral mean (the
origin). This conclusion has appeared to be contradicted by empirical studies.
N Schofield - Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1995 - jtp.sagepub.com
Abstract Although there are well-developed theories of two-party competition in a one-
dimensional policy space, it has proven extremely difficult to construct a model of multi-party
competition (with three or more parties) in two or more dimensions. One difficulty with ...
N Schofield - Public Choice, 1986 - Springer
This essay shows that, for any non-collegial voting rule, s, there exists an integer, s (s), with
this property: if the policy space, W, has dimension no greater than s (s), then there exists a
profile of smooth utilities on W, such that the core for s at this profile is non-empty and ' ...
N Schofield, B Grofman… - The American political science review, 1988 - JSTOR
The core of a voting game is the set of undominated outcomes, that is, those that once in
place cannot be overturned. For spatial voting games, a core is structurally stable if it
remains in existence even if there are small perturbations in the location of voter ideal ...
N Schofield - Social Choice and Welfare, 1985 - Springer
The problem of collective action is concerned with the analysis of whether common goals of
a group of individuals may be attained when the individuals behave rationally with respect to
their own varied preferences. Olson's book on the logic of Collective Action [14] published ...
N Schofield - Journal of Economic Theory, 1984 - Elsevier
Abstract One proof of existence of general equilibrium assumes convexity and continuity of a
preference correspondence on a compact convex feasible set W. Here the existence of a
local equilibrium for a preference field which satisfies, not convexity, but the weaker local ...
N Schofield… - European Journal of Political Research, 2005 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract. The formal stochastic model of voting should be the theoretical benchmark against
which empirical models can be gauged. A standard result in the formal model is the 'mean
voter theorem'stating that parties converge to the electoral center. Empirical analysis ...
N Schofield - Review of Economic Studies, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
Formal models of elections have emphasized the convergence of party leaders towards the
centre of the electoral distribution. This paper attempts to resolve the apparent disparity
between the formal result and the perception of political divergence by considering a ...
N Schofield, G Miller… - Political Studies, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
The sequence of US presidential elections from 1964 to 1972 is generally regarded as
heralding a fundamental political realignment, during which time civil rights became as
important a cleavage as economic rights. In certain respects, this realignment mirrored the ...
N Schofield, I Sened… - Annals of Operations Research, 1998 - Springer
Abstract Theoretical spatial models of electoral voting tend to predict either convergence to
an electoral mean (when voting is probabilistic) or chaos (when voting is deterministic).
Here, we construct an empirical model of voting for the Israeli Knesset in 1992 (based on ...
N Schofield… - British Journal of Political Science, 2005 - Cambridge Univ Press
Formal models of voting usually assume that political agents, whether parties or candidates,
attempt to maximize expected vote shares.'Stochastic'models typically derive the 'mean voter
theorem'that each agent will adopt a 'convergent'policy strategy at the mean of the ...
N Schofield… - … Economy of Institutions, Democracy and Voting, 2011 - Springer
Modern Political Economy cannot be understood without considering the work of two pre-eminent
scholars, Douglass C. North and William H. Riker. The work by North1 gave a boost to the New
Institutional Economics (Coase 1984), and institutions have become an important ...
N Schofield - … , Competition and Representation” eds WA Barnett …, 1993 - books.google.com
Proportional representation generally results in a political system with three or more parties,
where governments comprise coalitions of some of the parties. Such an electoral system in
principle has the virtue of permitting representation of a wide range of electoral ...
N Schofield - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1980 - Elsevier
Abstract Methods of transversality theory are introduced to determine the generic properties
of a simple non-collegial preference function σ, whose domain is the class of ordinal utility
profiles on a smooth manifold W of policy alternatives. When the dimension of W is ...
N Schofield - Review of Economic Design, 2006 - Springer
Abstract Stochastic models of elections typically indicate that all parties, in equilibrium, will
adopt positions at the electoral center. Empirical analyses discussed in this paper suggest
that convergence of this kind is rarely observed. Here we examine a stochastic electoral ...
N Schofield - Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1975 - jcr.sagepub.com
Abstract Olson has argued that rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve
their common goal or to satisfy their collective interests. Hardin interpreted the argument in
terms of the classical prisoner's dilemma and offered a solution whereby the majority ...
N Schofield - Collective decision-making: social choice and …, 1996 - books.google.com
Arrovian classification results applied to voting theory have created a serious obstacle to
constructing a rational choice theory of representative politics. A natural framework within
which to work is one where the electorate has preferences that can be described in terms ...
G Miller… - Perspectives on Politics, 2008 - Cambridge Univ Press
Because the space of policies is two-dimensional, parties in the United States are coalitions
of opposed interests. The Republican Party contains both socially conservative and socially
liberal groups, though both tend to be pro-business. The increasing dominance of the ...
N Schofield - Electoral Studies, 2005 - Elsevier
Formal stochastic models of voting have concluded that vote maximizing parties will
converge to the mean of the electoral distribution. Much empirical evidence has concluded
that such a situation is non-generic. This paper presents an electoral theorem for the ...
N Schofield… - Annals of Operations Research, 2002 - Springer
We present a model of multi-party,“spatial” competition under proportional rule with both
electoral and coalitional risk. Each party consists of a set of delegates with heterogeneous
policy preferences. These delegates choose one delegate as leader or agent. This agent ...
N Schofield - 2008 - books.google.com
Using unique and cutting-edge research, Schofield a prominent author in the US for a
number of years, explores the growth area of positive political economy within economics
and politics. The first book to explain the spatial model of voting from a mathematical, ...
N Schofield - Journal of Economic Theory, 1977 - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of
further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site ...
N Schofield - 2004 - books.google.com
In recent years, the usual optimisation techniques have been extended to incorporate more
powerful topological and differential methods, and these methods have led to new results on
the qualitative behaviour of general economic and political systems. The progression of ...
N Schofield - Social Choice and Strategic Decisions, 2005 - Springer
This article uses the notion of a “Local Nash Equilibrium”(LNE) to model a vote maximizing
political game that incorporates valence (the electorally perceived quality of the political
leaders). Formal stochastic voting models without valence typically conclude that all ...
N Schofield - British Journal of Political Science, 2002 - Cambridge Univ Press
Abstract An 'analytic narrative'is the presentation of crucial historical events, using the
intuitions of rational choice theory, to clarify the motivations and beliefs of the principal
actors. This article attempts to understand a dilemma embedded in the Declaration of ...
[CITATION] Multiparty electoral politics
NJ Schofield - 1994 - School of Business, Washington …
N Schofield - Mathematics of operations research, 1984 - JSTOR
Existence of equilibrium of a continuous preference relation p or correspondence P on a
compact topological space W can be proved either by assuming acyclicity or convexity (no
point belongs to the convex hull of its preferred set). Since both properties may well be ...
N Schofield - European Journal of Political Economy, 1987 - Elsevier
Abstract The duration and type of coalition governments in twelve European countries in the
period 1945–1986 are considered. It is argued that the distribution of party size, on a one-
dimensional policy dimension, gives an indication of the qualitative features of the ...
N Schofield… - American Journal of Political Science, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
2. We appreciate the support of the Weidenbaum Center at Washington University and the
National Science Foundation (under grant SES 0241732). We received very helpful
comments from two anonymous referees. Figure 1 is adapted from Schofield and Sened ( ...
N Schofield - Public Choice, 1976 - Springer
This paper attempts to analyze the process of coalition formation in the European
parliamentary democracies in terms of existing concepts from game theory. The game theory
approach rests first of all on the assumption of individual, or actor, optimizing behavior in ...
N Schofield - Critical Review, 1995 - Taylor & Francis
The purpose of rational choice is to provide a grand theoretical framework for designing
human institutions. Once theoretical work had shown how markets optimally aggregated
preferences, attempts were made to extend the theory from markets to politics. Attempts by ...
N Schofield… - Mathematical Social Sciences, 2000 - elmu.umm.ac.id
Abstract In the model presented here, n parties choose policy positions in a space Z of
dimension at least two. Each party is represented by a ''principal''whose true policy
preferences on Z are unknown to other principals. In the first version of the model the party ...
N Schofield - Social Choice and Welfare, 2007 - Springer
Abstract After an election, when party positions and strengths are known, there may be a
centrally located large party at the core position. Theory suggests that such a core party is
able to form a minority government and control policy. In the absence of a core party, ...
N Schofield… - Mathematical Social Sciences, 2007 - Elsevier
The mean voter theorem suggests that all parties should rationally converge to the electoral
center. Typically this leads to an outcome which is unattractive to the rich. This paper
develops a general stochastic model of elections in which the electoral response is ...
[CITATION] Equilibria in simple dynamic games
N Schofield… - 1980 - University of Essex, Department of …
N Schofield - Social Choice and Welfare, 1984 - Springer
A classification theorem for voting rules on a smooth choice space W of dimension w is
presented. It is shown that, for any non-collegial voting rule, s, there exist integers v*(s),
w*(s)(with v*(s)< w*(s)) such that (i) structurally stable s-voting cycles may always be ...
N Schofield - Handbook of social choice and welfare, 2002 - Elsevier
Abstract Social Choice traditionally employs the preferences of voters or agents as
primitives. However, in most situations of constitutional decision-making the beliefs of the
members of the electorate determine their secondary preferences or choices. Key choices ...
[CITATION] The theory of dynamic games
N Schofield… - 1980 - University of Essex, Department of …
N Schofield… - 1996 - books.google.com
This volume is intended to provide a broad perspective on collective decision-making,
presenting economic and political aspects from both a theoretical and empirical viewpoint.
The four chapters in the first section of the book give new results in Social Choice Theory, ...
N Schofield - 2009 - polisci.wustl.edu
A major theme in the pronouncements of the Reagan administration in the United States and
of the Thatcher government in Britain during the 1980's was that Keynesian economic theory
provided an excuse for the previous governments of these countries to intervene in their ...
N Schofield - Mathematical Social Sciences, 1982 - Elsevier
Abstract Various bargaining set theories are compared as predictors of coalition government
portfolio distribution. While the kernel and B 1-bargaining set are known to exist in voting
games with side payments, it is argued that the kernel, and thus B 1, are poor predictors. ...
N Schofield - British Journal of Political Science, 1972 - Cambridge Univ Press
In this paper we extend the probability model of voting which was first considered by Rae.
We consider a voting body presented with issues on which decisions have to be made, and
we seek the decision rule which maximizes in some sense the correspondence between ...
S Norman - Annual Review of Political Science, 2000 - annualreviews.org
▪ Abstract Rational choice theory has typically used either noncooperative game theory or
cooperative, social choice theory to model elections, coalition bargaining, the prisoner's
dilemma, and so on. This essay concentrates on the ideas of William Riker and Douglass ...
N Schofield - Social Choice and Welfare, 2001 - Springer
Abstract. This review of William Riker's work suggests that his interest in rational choice
theory was based on his desire to understand profound constitutional transformation in US
political history. Although he argued that “anything can happen in politics,” his use of the ...
[CITATION] Generic instability of voting games
N Schofield - Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, New …, 1978
B Brooks… - World Class Design to Manufacture, 1995 - emeraldinsight.com
Abstract: Contends that, while the importance of time to product development processes has
been underscored by many commentators, it is not until “time” is divided into component
elements that the scope for improvement becomes manifest. Since time equals money, ...
N Schofield, C Claassen, U Ozdemir… - Social Choice and …, 2011 - Springer
Abstract This article presents an electoral model where activist groups contribute resources
to their favored parties. These resources are then used by the party candidates to enhance
the electoral perception of their quality or valence. We construct an empirical model of the ...
N Schofield - Social Choice and Welfare, 1999 - Springer
Abstract. This paper defines a fine C 1-topology for smooth preferences on a “policy space”,
W, and shows that the set of convex preference profiles contains open sets in this topology. It
follows that if the dimension (W)≤ v (?)− 2 (where v (?) is the Nakamura number of the ...
N Schofield - Social Choice and Welfare, 2003 - Springer
Abstract. Mancur Olson's book, The Rise and Decline of Nations [45], used ideas from his
earlier Logic of Collective Action [44] to argue that entrenched interest groups in a polity
could induce economic sclerosis, or slow growth. These ideas seemed relevant to the ...
[CITATION] Multiparty government: the politics of coalition in Europe
N Schofield… - 1990 - Oxford: Oxford University Press
N Schofield… - Public Choice, 2010 - Springer
Abstract In this paper we consider the nature of local Nash equilibrium (LNE) for a model of
the 2007 Duma election in Russia, using estimates of valence obtained from
sociodemographic variables. We then extend this sociodemographic valence model by ...
[CITATION] A topological model of international relations
NJ Schofield - Peace Research Society, Papers, 1972
[CITATION] Multiparty government: the politics of coalition in Europe
L Michael… - 1990 - Oxford University Press
N Schofield, M Gallego, U Ozdemir… - Social Choice and …, 2011 - Springer
Abstract Models of elections tend to predict that parties will maximize votes by converging to
an electoral center. There is no empirical support for this prediction. In order to account for
the phenomenon of political divergence, this paper offers a stochastic electoral model ...
[CITATION] Factor endowments, democracy and trade policy divergence
S Galiani, N Schofield… - Typescript, Washington Univer'sity in St. Louis, 2010
N Schofield - Public Choice, 1977 - Springer
The purpose of this paper is to study the class of games where there appears to be a
contradiction between individual and collective rationality. Consider the problem of
collective action over the provision of public goods. Olson's (1965) analysis of the problem ...
N Schofield - Politics and Society, 1999 - polisci.wustl.edu
We all live out our lives within some system of social rules. For those of us in the developed
political economies, many of these rules are founded in a constitution, whether formally
written down, as in the United States, or implicit and based on precedent and practice, as ...
[CITATION] Democratic stability
N Schofield - Explaining Social Institutions, 1995 - Ann Arbor: Michigan University …
N Schofield, C Claassen, M Gallego… - Political Economy of …, 2011 - Springer
This chapter develops a general stochastic model of elections in which the electoral
response is affected by the valence (or quality) of the candidates. In an attempt to explain
non-convergence of candidate positions in the 2000 and 2004 Presidential elections, a ...
[CITATION] Madison and the founding of the two-party system
N Schofield - James Madison: The Theory and Practice of …, 2003
N Schofield - Behavioral Science, 1980 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract This article discusses decision making at the level of the society. Although voting
games by rational actors are known to be highly unstable, it has been argued that only
minimal winning coalitions should form. The bargaining set is presented as an empirically ...
N Schofield… - politics, philosophy & economics, 2008 - ppe.sagepub.com
Abstract In the past few years, a body of ideas based on political economy theory has been
built up by North and Weingast, Olson, Przeworski, and Acemoglu and Robinson. One
theme that emerges from this literature concerns the transition to democracy: why would ...
[CITATION] A comparison of majoritarian and proportional electoral systems based on spatial modeling and 'rational'politicians
N Schofield - conference on constitutional issues in modern …, 1997
N Schofield - Politics & Society, 2002 - pas.sagepub.com
Abstract The key theoretical idea underlying this article is that an institutional equilibrium in
the economic domain can be destroyed or transformed by rapid belief changes in the
political domain. Events circa 1776, 1787, and 1860 in the United States are all examined ...
[CITATION] Reflections: Coalition politics and representative democracy
N Schofield - European Journal of Political …, 1997 - KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS …
[CITATION] Parliamentary elections
AN Schofield - 1955 - Shaw
N Schofield - Quality & Quantity, 1980 - Springer
A fundamental question that we may ask of a political, economic or social process is whether
it is responsive to the wishes of the members of the society, and, if so, whether it can
aggregate the conflicting preferences of the individuals in a way which is somehow" ...
N Schofield - politics, philosophy & economics, 2003 - ppe.sagepub.com
Abstract In his book on Liberalism against Populism, William Riker argued that Lincoln's
success in the 1860 election was the culmination of a long progression of strategic attempts
by the Whig coalition of commercial interests to defeat theJeffersonian-Jacksonian' ...
[CITATION] Bargaining Theory and Cabinet Stability in European Coalition Governments 1945-1983
N Schofield… - The Logic of Multiparty Systems, 1987 - Dordrecht: Martinus-Nijhoff
N Schofield - Social Choice and Welfare, 2005 - Springer
Abstract Condorcet has often been thought of as a dreamer, and a mathematician without
much influence on social thought. I shall argue here that Condorcet's “Jury Theorem” had an
influence on Madison, in the crucial Federal decision of 1787. There are two possible ...
[CITATION] Local government elections
AN Schofield - 1970 - Not Avail
[CITATION] Political equilibrium in multiparty democracies
N Schofield, I Sened… - 1998 - Washington University, Center in …
[CITATION] Instability and Development in the Political Economy
N Schofield - Political Equilibrium, 1982
J Alt… - Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 1978 - Taylor & Francis
The Harary‐Ross clique detection algorithm has often been neglected in analyses of
symmetric graphs and tolerance relations because of presumed storage and computation
problems. This paper presents a modification of the original algorithm which overcomes ...
N Schofield - Social Choice and Welfare, 2010 - Springer
Abstract This review discusses the stability of social orders in light of the recent work
Violence and Social Orders by Douglass North, John Wallis and Barry Weingast (hereafter
NWW). The purpose of this book was to understand the two great transitions that have ...
[CITATION] The Politics of Coalition in Western Europe
M Laver… - 1990 - Oxford: Oxford University Press
[CITATION] Political fragmentation and the stability of coalition governments in Western Europe
N Schofield - Coalitions and collective action. Wurzburg: Physica …, 1984
[CITATION] Bargaining in the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan
J Wada… - Collective decision-making: Social choice and political …, 1996
N Schofield - Social Choice and Welfare, 2000 - Springer
Abstract. For over forty years, Douglass North has sought in his work to determine those
conditions that favor economic growth. In his most recent writings he has emphasized the
institutional innovations of the state and how these are often preceded, or accompanied, ...
[CITATION] Coalitions in West European democracies: 1945-1986
N Schofield - St. Louis: Washington University, 1987
[CITATION] G. and A. Martin (2003), Critical Elections and Political Realignment in the US: 1860'2000
N Schofield… - Political Studies
N Schofield - Working Papers, 1992 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks. A Theory
of Coalition Government in a Spatial Model of Voting. Norman Schofield (). ...
K Dixon… - Homo Oeconomicus, 2000 - ideas.repec.org
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N Schofield - Social Choice and Welfare, 1998 - Springer
Abstract. Suppose p is a smooth preference profile (for a society, N) belonging to a domain P
N. Let σ be a voting rule, and σ (p)(x) be the set of alternatives in the space, W, which is
preferred to x. The equilibrium E (σ (p)) is the set {x∈ W: σ (p)(x) is empty}. A sufficient ...
N Schofield, M Gallego… - Electoral Studies, 2011 - polisci.wustl.edu
Abstract Discussion of the relationship between parties and the electorate is often based on
the notion of partisan constituencies, that parties adopt policy positions that correspond to
the average position of the party sup (porters. In contrast, the Downsian sspatial ...
N Schofield, SE Satchell, M Chatterji… - 1986 - getcited.org
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NA Schofield… - International Journal of …, 1980 - emeraldinsight.com
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N Schofield - Homo Oeconomicus, 2008 - polisci.wustl.edu
Abstract Tis paper uses a formal electoral model as the basis for discussion of various
political episodes in British and US history and to evaluate the logic of Madison's argument
about the republican scheme of government. Tis leads to the inference that political choice ...
N Schofield… - 1984 - getcited.org
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