S Lauermann - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper presents a new characterization result for competitive allocations in
quasilinear economies. This result is informed by the analysis of non-cooperative dynamic
search and bargaining games. Such games provide models of decentralized markets with ...
S Lauermann - 2008 - econstor.eu
Abstract This paper studies a decentralized, dynamic matching and bargaining market:
buyers and sellers are matched into pairs. Traders exit the market at a constant rate,
inducing search costs (frictions). All price offers are made by sellers. Despite the fact that ...
[CITATION] VWhen Less Information is Good for Effi ciency: Pri $ vate Information in Bilateral Trade and in Markets
S Lauermann - 2006 - V Mimeo, University of Michigan
S Lauermann… - Presentation at the Midwest …, 2008 - sites.google.com
Abstract This paper analyzes a search model with asymmetric information of the common
values variety. The basic features of this environment resemble those of a common values
(procurement) auction, except that the searcher in our model, who is the counterpart of the ...
S Lauermann - 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This note extends previous convergence results for dynamic matching and
bargaining games to asymmetric information and extreme bargaining power. In a decentral
market heterogeneous traders are pairwise matched and sellers make take-it-or-leave-it ...
[CITATION] Failures of the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property in Auctions with a Stochastic Number of Bidders
S Lauermann… - University of Bonn Discussion paper, 2006
[CITATION] VPrice Setting in a Decentralized Market and the Com $ petitive Outcome, V MPI Collective Goods Preprint
S Lauermann - 2008 - No. 6, Mimeo, Bonn
S Lauermann… - 2006 - socialpolitik.de
Abstract We consider a dynamic auction game in which many units of the same good are
sold sequen0 tially and buyers live for more than one period. The value buyers place on
winning an auction depends on their valuation of the good and on the option value of ...
[CITATION] Private Information in Bilateral Trade and in Markets
S Lauermann - 2008 - Mimeo, University of Michigan
S Lauermann… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We study auctions with outside options determined through bargaining in an
outside market. We show that auctions with less information revelation to bidders may yield
higher revenues. It is never optimal for the auctioneer to reveal information after the ...
S Lauermann - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: I consider a simple bilateral trading game between a seller and a buyer who have
private valuations for an indivisible good. The seller makes a price offer which the buyer can
either accept or reject. If the seller can observe the valuation of the buyer (if information is ...
S Lauermann - 2005 - tagung05.uni-bonn.de
Abstract This note extends previous convergence results for dynamic matching and
bargaining games to asymmetric information and extreme bargaining power. In a decentral
market heterogeneous traders are pairwise matched and sellers make take-it-or-leave-it ...
S Lauermann - 2006 - sfu.ca
Abstract We consider a simple bilateral trading game between a seller and a buyer who
have private valuations for an indivisible good. The seller makes a price offer which the
buyer can either accept or reject. If the seller can observe the valuation of the buyer (if ...
S Lauermann - 2007 - nbn-resolving.de
Abstract" Nature makes no jumps," according to a famous saying-but what about
economies? Is economic welfare continuous in the size of the frictions of trading and do the
welfare theorems hold approximately when frictions are small? We will look at a specific ...
S Lauermann, G Virag… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We develop a dynamic matching and bargaining game with aggregate uncertainty
about the relative scarcity of a commodity. We use our model to study price discovery in a
decentralized exchange economy: Traders gradually learn about the state of the market ...
S Lauermann - 2007 - hss.ulb.uni-bonn.de
VNature makes no jumps, V according to a famous saying & but what about economies? Is
economic welfare continuous in the size of the frictions of trading and do the welfare the&
orems hold approximately when frictions are small? We will look at a specific institution & ...
[CITATION] A Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Game with Asymmetric Information and Price Offers
S Lauermann - 2006
S Lauermann, W Merzyn… - 2009 - webmeets.com
Abstract We present an equilibrium search model with learning about an important
characteristic of the aggregate market, tightness. In a steady state dynamic matching and
bargaining game, the inflow of new buyers (" Demand") can be either high or low, ...
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