P Bardhan… - The American Economic Review, 2000 - JSTOR
The literature on public choice and political economy is characterized by numerous
theoretical analyses of capture of the democratic process by special-interest groups. It is
surprising, therefore, that this literature rarely addresses the question of relative capture at ...
D Mookherjee - The Review of Economic Studies, 1984 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract The Grossman-Hart principal-agent model of moral hazard is extended to the
multiple agent case to explore the use of relative performance in optimal incentive
contracting. Under the assumption that the principal chooses incentive schemes to ...
D Mookherjee… - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1989 - JSTOR
In both market and planned economies, organizations rely on communication of information
about realized levels of performance or states of nature. For instance, lenders and insurers
rely on clients' reports of income; central planning bureaus rely on performance reports ...
D Mookherjee… - The Economic Journal, 1982 - JSTOR
Post war Britain has experienced a number of dramatic demographic and social changes
that have undoubtedly influenced the distribution of income. There has been a rise in the
number of pensioners, whose incomes are relatively low, a considerable increase in the ...
D Mookherjee… - The Economic Journal, 1995 - JSTOR
We study the optimal compensation policy for a corruptible inspector, charged with
monitoring pollution from a factory. Our utilitarian approach focuses on the trade-off among
corruption, pollution, and enforcement effort. Owing to the strategic interaction between ...
ND Melumad, D Mookherjee… - The Rand Journal of …, 1995 - JSTOR
Agents in a hierarchy are commonly delegated authority to communicate and contract with
agents at lower levels. While delegation reduces the burden of communication and
information processing on the principal, it also introduces additional incentive problems. ...
J Bendor… - The American Political Science Review, 1987 - JSTOR
Work by Axelrod, Hardin, and Taylor indicates that problems of repeated collective action
may lessen if people use decentralized strategies of reciprocity to induce mutual
cooperation. Hobbes's centralized solution may thus be overrated. We investigate these ...
D Mookherjee… - Review of Economic Studies, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
When human capital accumulation generates pecuniary externalities across professions,
and capital markets are imperfect, persistent inequality in utility and consumption is
inevitable in any steady state. This is true irrespective of the degree of divisibility in ...
M Dilip… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1994 - Elsevier
Abstract Two groups containing 10 pairs of players each playing a finitely repeated matching
pennies game were varied in terms of the information available to any player about past
choices and payoffs of its opponent. The data reveals that presentation of such information ...
ND Melumad… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1989 - JSTOR
In this article we study the value of delegating authority over income tax audit policy, arising
from the incompleteness of contracts. Consider a utilitarian government whose ability to
commit is limited to aggregate dimensions of its audit policy, as publicly verifiable ...
D Mookherjee… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1992 - Elsevier
Abstract A large literature on incentive mechanisms represents incentive constraints by the
requirement that truthful reporting be a Bayesian equilibrium. This paper identifies
mechanism design problems for which there is no loss in replacing Bayesian incentive ...
N Melumad, D Mookherjee… - Journal of Accounting and …, 1992 - Elsevier
Abstract We consider a principal-agent model to examine the effectiveness of responsibility
centers, in particular cost or profit centers. We show that rather than contracting with each
agent directly, the principal can create equally powerful incentives by setting up a ...
P Bardhan… - 2002 - escholarship.org
Abstract: A common presumption is that decentralization is prone to a potential pitfall owing
to the greater vulnerability of local governments to capture by local elites. We investigate the
determinants of relative capture of local and national governments theoretically, in the ...
D Mookherjee… - The American Economic Review, 1992 - JSTOR
Enforcement by monitoring cannot be conditioned on the severity of an offense while
enforcement by investigation can be. If some degrees of the offense are not adequately
reported or if investigation is too costly, the regulator must monitor and treat offenses of ...
D Mookherjee - Journal of Economic Literature, 2006 - JSTOR
Separation of ownership from management, multidivisional firm organizations, delegation of
production decisions to worker teams, delegation of pricing and advertising decisions to
retail franchisers, reliance on intermediaries in trade or finance, and distribution of ...
D Mookherjee… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1997 - Elsevier
Subjects played strategically similar 4× 4 and 6× 6 constant sum games under varying
payoff scales. Substantial divergences from equilibrium predictions were exhibited. The
dynamic pattern of play is best explained by a stimulus learning model whereby players ...
P Bardhan… - Journal of Public Economics, 2005 - Elsevier
We study the effects on accountability in government service delivery of decentralizing
administration of an antipoverty program. While governments at both central and local levels
are vulnerable to antipoor policy biases owing to political capture, centralized delivery ...
D McKenzie, D Mookherjee, G Castañeda… - Economia, 2003 - JSTOR
The supposed failure of privatization in Latin America has recently become the source of
street riots, protest demonstrations, and adverse news coverage. Riots in Arequipa, Peru,
erupted in June 2002 fol lowing the announcement of a proposal to privatize power plants, ...
P Bardhan… - The Economic Journal, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
This article extends the analysis in Part 2 of our earlier working paper titled 'Expenditure
Decentralisation and Delivery of Public Services in Developing Countries'. For financial
support we are grateful to the MacArthur Foundation. Mookherjee's research was ...
R Karandikar, D Mookherjee, D Ray… - Journal of Economic …, 1998 - Elsevier
A 2× 2 game is played repeatedly by two satisficing players. The game considered includes
the Prisoner's Dilemma, as well as games of coordination and common interest. Each player
has anaspirationat each date, and takes an action. The action is switched at the ...
P Bardhan… - Boston University-Institute for …, 1998 - ideas.repec.org
This two-part paper provides a theoretical framework for appraising trade-offs between
alternative methods of delegating authority over the delivery of public services, on the
targeting and cost-effectiveness of public spending programs in developing countries. ...
P Bardhan… - Economic Journal, 2000 - rrojasdatabank.info
Abstract Corruption and targeting failures in the delivery of public services in developing
countries has frequently been argued to result from absence of controls on the behavior of
central bureaucrats delegated authority over service delivery. This has motivated recent ...
A Banerjee, D Mookherjee, K Munshi… - Journal of Political …, 2001 - sws.bu.edu
This paper could not have been completed without the support and encouragement that we
received from Shivajirao Patil and Jamsheed Kanga. The staff of the Maharashtra State
Federation of Co-operative Sugar Factories, the Directorate of Economics and Statistics, ...
D Mookherjee… - Journal of Political Economy, 1994 - JSTOR
We characterize optimal enforcement in a setting in which individuals can select among
various levels of some activity, all of which are monitored at the same rate but may be
prosecuted and punished at varying rates. For less harmful acts, marginal expected ...
A Das-Gupta… - 1998 - lavoisier.fr
Livre: Incentives and institutional reform in tax enforcement an analysis of developing
country experience DAS-GUPTA Arindam, MOOKHERJEE Dilip.
D Mookherjee… - The American Economic Review, 2002 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: Can historical wealth distributions affect long-run output and inequality despite"
rational" saving, convex technology and no externalities? We consider a model of
equilibrium short-period financial contracts, where poor agents face credit constraints ...
J Bendor… - JL Econ & Org., 1990 - HeinOnline
In recent years, a large body of literature has explored the relative roles of bilateral
reciprocity and centralized authority in enforcing cooperative behavior. These are, of course,
the two most prominent institutional alternatives discussed since the time of Hobbes. More ...
S Bhattacharya… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1986 - JSTOR
We analyze the effects of a" winner-take-all" patent mechanism on the riskiness of the
research strategies chosen by competing firms, as well as on the firms' incentives to
duplicate research projects. Nash equilibrium choices are compared with the social ...
[CITATION] Credit rationing in developing countries: An overview of the theory
P Ghosh, D Mookherjee… - Readings in the theory of economic development, 2000
N Melumad, D Mookherjee… - Journal of Economics & …, 1997 - Wiley Online Library
In settings where the revelation principle applies, delegation arrangements are frequently
inferior to centralized decision making, and at best achieve the same level of performance.
This paper studies the value of delegation when organizations are constrained by a ...
P Bardhan… - Journal of Development Economics, 2006 - Elsevier
A commonly alleged pitfall of decentralization is that poverty, socio-economic inequality and
lack of political competition allow local elites to capture local governments. This hypothesis
is empirically examined using a longitudinal sample of 89 West Bengal villages ...
CM Kahn… - The Rand Journal of Economics, 1998 - JSTOR
We consider a common agency context where socially desired exclusive dealing clauses
cannot be enforced. Customers sequentially negotiate nonexclusive credit or insurance
contracts from multiple risk-neutral firms in a market with free entry. Each contract is ...
D Mookherjee, S Reichelstein - The Review of …, 1990 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract Consider the problem of Bayesian implementation, ie, of constructing mechanisms
with the property that all Bayesian equilibrium outcomes agree with a given choice rule. We
show that a general procedure is to start with an incentive-compatible revelation ...
P Bardhan… - International handbook on the …, 2006 - books.google.com
The impact of government decentralization on economic performance and growth is a hotly
contested issue. Waves of decentralization occurred in many developing countries over the
past few decades, following the demise of a development paradigm in which centralized ...
D Mookherjee - 1997 - sws1.bu.edu
Conclusion................................................................................................................…...... 36 Abstract
What major problems are likely to be encountered in designing and implementing pay-for-
performance mechanisms for public bureaucrats? This paper examines this question in ...
D Mookherjee… - Econometrica, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
In a one-principal two-agent model with adverse selection and collusion among agents, we
show that delegating to one agent the right to subcontract with the other agent always earns
lower profit for the principal compared with centralized contracting. Delegation to an ...
PK Bardhan… - 2006 - econpapers.repec.org
Over the past three decades the developing world has seen increasing devolution of
political and economic power to local governments. Decentralization is considered an
important element of participatory democracy and, along with privatization and ...
D Mookherjee… - 1995 - isid.ac.in
The institution of sharecropping tenancy and its inefficiency has long fascinated
development economists, especially following the famous footnotes on the subject in
Marshall (1920). 1 The tendency for a landlord to appropriate a fraction of the crop tilled by ...
P Bardhan… - Journal of Public Economics, 2000 - bdresearch.org
Abstract We provide a theoretical framework to study the effect of shifting responsibility over
delivery of antipoverty programs to local governments away from centralized bureaucracies.
While governments at both central and local levels are vulnerable to anti-poor policy ...
D Mookherjee… - Advances in Theoretical Economics, 2001 - degruyter.com
The internal organization of large firms as well as procurement and regulation contexts
frequently involve a hierarchical nexus of contracts, with substantial delegation of decision
making across layers. Such hierarchical delegation of decision making creates problems ...
D Mookherjee… - Journal of Accounting Research, 1997 - JSTOR
This paper develops a model of budgeting in hierarchical organizations. Each agent
(manager) in the hierarchy receives a budget for a task. Based on his own information, the
agent assigns tasks and budgets to his subordinates, who, in turn, do the same for their ...
AV Banerjee, R Bénabou… - 2006 - books.google.com
Understanding poverty and what to do about it, is perhaps the central concern of all of
economics. Yet the lay public almost never gets to hear what leading professional
economists have to say about it. This volume brings together twenty-eight essays by some ...
D Mookherjee… - The American Economic Review, 2002 - JSTOR
Economic inequality is of interest not only at some intrinsic level, but also for its close
connections to diverse variables, ranging from economic indicators such as growth rates to
sociopolitical outcomes such as collective action and conflict. It is only natural, then, to ...
[CITATION] Indian industry: policies and performance
D Mookherjee - 1995 - Oxford University Press, USA
P Bardhan… - Journal of Political Economy, 2003 - econ-pol.unisi.it
Abstract We examine determinants of political will of local governments to implement land
reforms in a longitudinal sample of 88 villages in the Indian state of West Bengal. The
evidence shows a inverted-U pattern between land reform and control of local ...
P Bardhan… - Economic and Political Weekly, 2004 - JSTOR
This paper examines poverty alleviation efforts of West Bengal panchayats, comprising
implementation of land reforms and pro-poor targeting of credit, agricultural minikits,
employment programmes and fiscal grants. The sample includes 89 villages and covers ...
A Banerjee, P Bardhan, K Basu… - Economic and Political …, 2002 - JSTOR
During the last two decades West Bengal has led the rest of the country with regard to
agricultural performance and implementation of panchayat institutions. But these
developments have begun to level out. At the same time the state has fallen behind in ...
D Mookherjee… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1991 - Elsevier
Abstract We consider the decision of a dominant firm to adopt a sequence of potential cost-
reducing innovations, where the latest technology adopted diffuses to a competitive fringe at
an exogenous rate. With price competition on the product market, the leader optimally ...
MA Meyer… - The Review of Economic …, 1987 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract Alternative wage structures under conditions of moral hazard are analysed from a
social welfare standpoint. It is argued that ex post equity judgements in an uncertainty
context should incorporate a preference for “positive correlation” of utilities of different ...
[CITATION] Readings in the theory of economic development
D Mookherjee - 2001 - Wiley-Blackwell
[CITATION] The economics of enforcement
D Mookherjee - Issues in economic theory and policy, …, 1997 - New Delhi: Oxford U. Press
D Mookherjee - Economic and Political Weekly, 2005 - JSTOR
Development economics is increasingly becoming an empirical discipline today. Where
theory reigned during the 1980s and early 1990s, in the last 10 years or so the primary
research concerns have become increasingly driven by empirical and policy issues. In this ...
D Mookherjee… - … Department of Economics-The institute for …, 2006 - econ.brown.edu
ABSTRACT A traditional view of markets with intergenerational bequests within dynasties is
that they equalize wealth across households. A more recent literature suggests that markets
are inherently disequalizing. A third viewpoint argues that initial history is crucial in ...
CM Kahn… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1995 - Elsevier
We extend the notion of Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium to a class of matching games with
private information. This solution concept is applied to an adverse selection insurance
economy and is shown to yield a unique allocation: the optimal allocation without cross- ...
A Das-Gupta, R Lahiri… - World Development, 1995 - Elsevier
Aggregate data are used to study determinants of income tax revenues and taxpayer
compliance in India during 1965–1966 to 1992–1993. The estimates show that both
revenues collected and compliance were significantly affected by tax structure (marginal ...
CM Kahn… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1992 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper provides techniques for using stable sets to characterize equilibria in
infinite games. We demonstrate the techniques by extending the definition of Coalition Proof
Nash Equilibrium. Our new definition reduces to the recursive definition of Bernheim, ...
D Mookherjee… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
A large literature on 'endogenous inequality'has argued that persistent differences in
macroeconomic performance across countries can be explained by historical inequality,
owing to indivisibilities in occupational choice and borrowing constraints. These models ...
D Mookherjee… - The Review of Economic Studies, 1991 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract Learning-by-doing and increasing returns are often perceived to have similar
implications for market structure and conduct. We analyse this in the context of an infinite-
horizon price-setting game. Learning is shown to not reduce the viability of market-sharing ...
JM Baland, P Bardhan, S Das, D Mookherjee… - … and cultural change, 2010 - JSTOR
Abstract We investigate determinants of household firewood collection in rural Nepal, using
1995-96 and 2002-3 World Bank Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) data. We
incorporate village fixed effects, endogenous censoring, measurement error in living ...
J Bendor, D Mookherjee… - Advances in Theoretical Economics, 2001 - sws1.bu.edu
Abstract We study long run implications of reinforcement learning when two players
repeatedly interact with one another over multiple rounds to play a finite action game. Within
each round, the players play the game many successive times with a fixed set of ...
A Das-Gupta… - Journal of Law, Economics, and …, 1996 - Oxford Univ Press
Abstract This article analyzes the effect of a one-time tax amnesty intended to induce private
citizens to voluntarily declare black assets accumulated from past tax evasion. In a dynamic
setting, we find that such an amnesty tends to enhance voluntary taxpayer compliance ...
D Mookherjee… - JL Econ & Org., 1990 - HeinOnline
Mirrlees, Sheshinski, Atkinson, Feldstein, Stern, Hellwig, and others have analyzed the balance
between redistribution and production of income in setting marginal tax rates. These studies
indicated that the trade-off would resolve to optimal marginal tax rates substantially below ...
D Mookherjee - Review of Development Economics, 1997 - Wiley Online Library
Comparative static effects of varying the wealth level of a risk-averse agent in a moral
hazard setting with limited liability constraints are investigated. There are two principal
opposing effects of increasing wealth: the incentive effect, which allows stronger ...
J Bendor, D Mookherjee… - 1994 - econpapers.repec.org
Related works: Working Paper: Aspirations, Adaptive Learning and Cooperation in Reapeted
Games (1994) This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the
same title. ... This site is part of RePEc and all the data displayed here is part of the ...
[CITATION] Inequality, control rights and efficiency: a study of sugar cooperatives in Western Maharashtra
A Banerjee, D Mookherjee, K Munshi… - Journal of Political Economy, 2001
[CITATION] Decentralization and local governments in developing countries: A comparative perspective
P Bardhan… - 2005 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
D Mookherjee - Session on Industrial Organization and Development …, 1999 - sws.bu.edu
In this paper I will be concerned with distinctive characteristics of firms and industry
structures in developing countries, stemming from asymmetric information and related
contracting impediments. These constraints are also frequently referred to as 'institutional' ...
P Bardhan… - … Challenges of Economic Policy Reform in …, 2006 - ase.tufts.edu
Abstract Since the late 1970s the West Bengal government has implemented a
comprehensive set of reforms of agrarian institutions involving land reform (land
redistribution, tenancy registration) and democratic decentralization (devolution of ...
PK Bardhan, D Mookherjee… - Journal of Globalization …, 2010 - degruyter.com
Political reservation for disadvantaged groups is believed to be a way of improving targeting
of publicly provided goods to those groups. This paper examines the impact of political
reservations for women and scheduled castes and tribe (SC/ST) candidates in local ...
D Mookherjee - The Review of Economic Studies, 1986 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract This paper critically examines the hypothesis that layoffs are involuntary in implicit
labour contracts because they are used by employers to punish inferior worker performance.
In repeated moral hazard situations, workers typically bear risk associated with whether ...
P Bardhan, S Mitra, D Mookherjee… - Boston: Department of …, 2008 - isical.ac.in
ABSTRACT This paper uses results of a household survey to study patterns of political
participation (turnout, awareness, attendance at political and civic meetings, involvement in
political campaigns, voting) and their relation to local governance in rural West Bengal, a ...
P Bardhan, D Mookherjee… - University of California at …, 2005 - 128.197.153.21
Abstract We examine effect of randomized reservations of Pradhan (chief executive)
positions in West Bengal local governments (panchayats) for women and members of
Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribes (SC/ST) following the 73rd and 74th Constitutional ...
C Kahn… - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1988 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We study a general equilibrium efficiency wage model characterized by fully
optimizing agents, flexible prices, and imperfect information. The model has a unique
competitive equilibrium with underemployment in a sector (called manufacturing) with ...
D Mookherjee - Boston University, manuscript, 2003 - bu.edu
Delegation is a pervasive phenomenon in firms, procurement contracting, financial and
regulatory institutions. Owners frequently delegate management of the firm to top level
managers, who in turn delegate management of divisions to middle level managers. In ...
P Bardhan… - 2006 - mitpress.mit.edu
The last two decades of the twentieth century witnessed a significant rise in the scope of
local democracy throughout the developing world, with increasing devolution of political,
economic, and administrative authority to local governments. Along with privatization and ...
A Banerjee, D Mookherjee, K Munshi… - Journal of Political, 1997 - bu.edu
Abstract This paper presents a theory of rent-seeking within farmer cooperatives in which
inequality of asset ownership affects relative control rights of different groups of members.
The two key assumptions are constraints on lumpsum transfers from poorer members and ...
D Mookherjee, D Ray… - Journal of the European …, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract This paper examines the steady states of an overlapping generations economy with
a given distribution of household locations over a one-dimensional interval. Parents decide
whether or not to educate their children. Educational decisions are affected by location: ...
P Bardhan… - Unpublished manuscript, Boston …, 2007 - emlab.berkeley.edu
Abstract We revisit the classical question of productivity implications of sharecropping
tenancy, in the context of tenancy reforms in the Indian state of West Bengal. To separate
partial equilibrium incentive effects from general equilibrium effects, we use a ...
AV Banerjee, P Bardhan, K Basu… - Economic and Political …, 2007 - JSTOR
If we are to learn the right lessons from the tragedy of Nandigram, then we must ensure that
the government is involved in the land acquisition process and that we correctly deal with
three sets of issues: the size and form of compensation, the eligibility for compensation ...
A Das-Gupta… - 1995 - bu.edu
Failure to impose sufficiently high penalties for tax offences is often cited as a cause of
widespread tax evasion, especially in developing countries. This view obtains support from
the theoretical analyses of Becker (1968) and Allingham and Sandmo (1972) which ...
JM Baland, P Bardhan, S Das… - World Development, 2010 - Elsevier
This paper assesses degradation of forests managed by local communities (Van
Panchayats (VPs)), relative to state protected and open access forests in the Indian state of
Uttaranchal. It is based on ground-level ecological measures of forest quality (including ...
J Bendor, D Mookherjee… - Quarterly Journal of Political …, 2006 - sws1.bu.edu
ABSTRACT We model political parties as adaptive decision-makers who compete in a
sequence of elections. The key assumptions are that winners satisfice (the winning party in
period t keeps its platform in t+ 1) while losers search. Under fairly mild assumptions about ...
P Bardhan, D Mookherjee… - Working Papers, 2009 - ipl.econ.duke.edu
Abstract We develop a theory of trading middlemen or entrepreneurs who finance and
market goods produced by workers. Brand-name reputations are necessary to overcome
product quality moral hazard problems; middlemen margins represent reputational ...
JM Baland, P Bardhan, S Das… - Inequality and …, 2007 - books.google.com
Dilip Mookherjee, and Rinki Sarkar 1 he state of the Himalayan forests has been a major
source of worry for the scientific community over the last decades. Deforestation and
environmental degradation have proceeded at an alarming pace over that period, with ...
CM Kahn… - Journal of Public Economics, 1995 - Elsevier
This paper compares full-information insurance markets (a) with markets where accident-
reducing effort levels are unverifiable but trades between every pair of agents are verifiable
and (b) with markets where neither effort nor trades are verifiable. Markets are ...
D Mookherjee - Recherche, 2004 - lavoisier.fr
Livre: The crisis in government acountability essays on governance reforms
and india's economic performance MOOKHERJEE Dilip.
D Mookherjee - Understanding poverty, 2006 - books.google.com
The experience of teaching the section on poverty in a public economics or development
economics course is usually quite a letdown. After admitting the great importance of the
topic, the typical course starts by devoting a substantial amount of discussion to different ...
HS Esfahani… - Journal of Development Economics, 1995 - Elsevier
This paper offers a theoretical explanation for the significant variations in labor productivity
over time and across countries that past empirical studies have failed to explain by
variations in measurable inputs alone. We argue that firms employ high-powered ...
D Mookherjee - 2001 - bu.edu
It is exactly one hundred years since the publication of Romesh Dutt's monumental
Economic History of India. As is well known, this treatise dealt principally with the role of
British colinial taxation, land and administrative policies on India's economic development. ...
[CITATION] Design and enforcement of personal income taxes in India
A Das-Gupta, D Mookherjee… - Public finance: Policy issues for India, 1997
P Bardhan… - The American Economic Review, 2010 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: We investigate political determinants of land reform implementation in the Indian
state of West Bengal. Using a village panel spanning 1974-1998, we do not find evidence
supporting the hypothesis that land reforms were positively and monotonically related to ...
[CITATION] Optimal Auditing
D Mookherjee… - Insurance, and Redistribution, 1989
P Bardhan, S Mitra, D Mookherjee… - University of California …, 2007 - 128.197.153.21
A critical aspect of successful functioning of a democracy is its capacity to induce elected
officials to be accountable to citizens. Accountability pressures however depend critically on
the pressures imposed on elected officials by citizens, through the way they vote, exercise ...
D Mookherjee - Economic and Political Weekly, 1992 - JSTOR
The government's economic reform programme adheres to an orthodox pattern associated
with the IMF, the World Bank, and the mainstream western macroeconomic profession. The
orthodoxy claims to be based on the experience of a large number of developing ...
D Mookherjee - Journal of Public Economics, 1986 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper aims to clarify different views on the validity of the little-Mirrlees border
price rule for project evaluation in a context where the Government chooses its controls
suboptimally in a systematic fashion. The rule is shown to be valid quite generally for ...
U von Lilienfeld-Toal, D Mookherjee… - … of Economics-The …, 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract It is generally presumed that strengthening the legal enforcement of lender rights
increases credit access for all borrowers, by expanding the set of incentive compatible loan
contracts. This presumption is based on an implicit assumption of infinitely elastic supply ...
[CITATION] Decentralization in West Bengal: Origins, Functioning, and Impact
P Bardhan… - Decentralization and local governance …, 2006 - The MIT Press
U von Lilienfeld-Toal… - American Economic …, 2010 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: What are the effects of restricting bonded labor clauses in tenancy or debt
contracts? While such restrictions reduce agents' ability to credibly commit ex ante to repay
principals in states where they default on their financial obligations, they also generate a ...
D Mookherjee… - American Economic Journal: …, 2010 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: This paper studies income distribution in an economy with borrowing constraints.
Parents leave both financial and educational bequests; these determine the occupational
choices of children. Occupational returns are determined by market conditions. If the span ...
[CITATION] Regulating Intergroup Conflict: Ascriptive versus Universalistic Norms
J Bendor… - 1998 - Working Paper, Boston University
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