MI Kamien… - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1986 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We compare how much profit an owner of a patented cost-reducing invention can
realize by licensing it to an oligopolistic industry producing a homogeneous product, by
means of a fixed fee or a per unit royalty. Our analysis is conducted in terms of a ...
MI Kamien, SS Oren… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1992 - Elsevier
Abstract We analyze licensing of a cost reducing innovation to an oligopolistic industry, and
extend previous work by Kamien and Tauman (1986) and Katz and Shapiro (1986) in two
directions. First, our analysis applies to a wider class of demand functions than linear ones ...
MI Kamien… - 1984 - financialtrustindex.org
A patent serves two purposes. The first is to provide an incentive for innovation by conferring
an exclusive property right to the inventor of a new product or method of production. Without
the patent the invention could be imitated, preventing the inventor from directly realizing a ...
MI Kamien… - The Manchester School, 2002 - Wiley Online Library
In this paper we compare and contrast the most profitable modes of licensing a cost-
reducing invention by an inventor who is an industry incumbent with one who is not. We find
that an industry incumbent favors licensing by means of a royalty per unit of output to ...
LJ Mirman… - Mathematics of Operations Research, 1982 - JSTOR
We propose here a new approach for equitable cost sharing pricing based upon the
Shapley value for nonatomic games. However, it is shown that the proposed price
mechanism can be justified on economic terms since it is uniquely determined by a set of ...
D Sen… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2007 - Elsevier
Optimal combinations of upfront fees and royalties are considered for a cost-reducing
innovation in a Cournot oligopoly for both outside and incumbent innovators. It is shown that
for any nondrastic innovation (a) the license is practically sold to all firms, ensuring full ...
[CITATION] The Aumann-Shapley prices: a survey
Y Tauman - The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. …, 1988
D Samet… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1982 - JSTOR
This paper presents a set of axioms which characterize a family of price mechanisms for
consumption goods, including marginal cost prices and Aumann-Shapley prices. By
strengthening one of the axioms, marginal cost prices are characterized and by requiring ...
MI Kamien, Y Tauman… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1990 - Elsevier
Abstract We consider a situation in which an agent M (the “maven”) possesses information
relevant to the players of an n-person game in which he is not a participant. We define the
“inducible set” as the set of all outcomes which can be made unique Nash equilibria of a ...
Y Tauman… - Journal of Labor Economics, 1987 - JSTOR
The paper examines whether unionization by workers discourages the adoption of labor-
saving techniques. This is done in the context of an oligopolistic industry with a small
number of firms, some of which are unionized. We find that unionization can actually ...
D Samet, Y Tauman… - Mathematics of Operations Research, 1984 - JSTOR
The Aumann-Shapley (AS) prices are axiomatically determined on certain classes of
piecewise continuously differentiable cost functions. One of these classes consists of all cost
functions derived from the transportation problems and some of their generalizations. ...
LJ Mirman, D Samet… - The Bell Journal of Economics, 1983 - JSTOR
We study the allocation of fixed costs to the outputs of a multiproduct firm. First we allocate
short-run fixed costs through AS prices which allocate the long-run costs. Long-run cost
functions do not generally contain a fixed cost component. We show what part of the AS ...
MI Kamien, Y Tauman… - Mathematical Social Sciences, 1988 - Elsevier
Abstract We compare how much profit an inventor of a patented new 'superior'product can
realize by licensing its manufacture, for a fixed fee, to an oligopolistic industry producing an
'inferior'substitute. Our analysis is conducted in terms of a three stage noncooperative ...
Y Tauman… - Economic Theory, 2007 - Springer
Abstract We consider a game in characteristic form played by firms and an outside patent
holder of a cost-reducing innovation. The worth of a coalition of players is the total Cournot
profit the coalition can guarantee to obtain when it operates an optimal number of its firms ...
R Aoki… - Economics Letters, 2001 - Elsevier
We study the effect of spillover on extent of licensing of a process innovation. With spillover,
increasing the number of licenses makes non-licensees more efficient in addition to
increasing competition among licensees. Despite these effects, a patentee of a significant ...
R Orzach, PB Overgaard… - RAND Journal of Economics, 2002 - JSTOR
We reexamine the role of prices and advertising expenditures as signals of quality.
Consumers are either" fastidious" or" indifferent." Fastidious individuals value high quality
more and low quality less than do indifferent individuals. Then a sensible and robust ...
CH Liao… - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2002 - Elsevier
We focus on price competition between several multiproduct firms which produce
differentiated systems, each consisting of two complementary products. Firms offer their
products separately and/or as a bundle. Consumers are homogeneous but assign ...
A Neyman… - Mathematics of Operations Research, 1979 - JSTOR
The partition value is a new approach to the value concept. It links together the asymptotic
and the axiomatic approach. Using this approach we prove the existence of a continuous
value on each of the following spaces: bv′ NA, A, A* bv′ NA, A* bv′ NA* bv′ NA and ...
LJ Mirman, Y Tauman… - The Rand Journal of Economics, 1985 - JSTOR
This article studies the relationships among the concepts of subsidy-free prices,
anonymously equitable prices, supportability, and sustainability. In particular, we set out
conditions under which these concepts are not vacuous. Several new sets of conditions ...
T Doganoglu… - The Manchester School, 2002 - Wiley Online Library
This paper presents a model of two competing local telecommunications networks which are
mandated to interconnect. After negotiating the access charges, the companies engage in
price competition. Given the prices, each consumer selects a network and determines the ...
D Sen… - SUNY, Stony Brook, 2002 - Citeseer
Abstract Two general forms of standard licensing policies are considered for a non-drastic
cost-reducing innovation:(a) combination of an upfront fee and uniform linear royalty, and (b)
combination of auction and uniform linear royalty. It is shown that in an oligopoly, the total ...
LJ Mirman, Y Tauman… - International Journal of Industrial …, 1986 - Elsevier
Abstract We study the relationship between sustainable and average cost prices in the
multiproduct case. It is shown that for the case where costs are separable only average cost
prices can be sustainable even if demands are interdependent. As for the non-separable ...
Y Tauman, A Urbano… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1997 - Elsevier
We provide a simple model of price competition in a multiproduct oligopoly market. The
products are of general nature. We find that a pure strategy equilibrium exists and every
equilibrium consumption maximizes the total social surplus. Consumers are characterized ...
LJ Mirman, Y Tauman… - Issues in Contemporary …, 1984 - financialtrustindex.org
The theory of perfectly contestable markets and sustainable ww H o KID m summarized in
Baumol, Panzar and Willig (3982) is an extension of the ideas of Bain (1956) in which
potential competition, unencumbered by frictions, entry or exit costs, affect an incumbent ...
G Stamatopoulos… - Mathematical Social Sciences, 2008 - Elsevier
We study the licensing of a quality-improving innovation in a duopoly model with
heterogeneous consumers. Firms compete in prices facing a logit demand framework. The
innovator is an outsider to the market and sells licenses via up front fee (determined in an ...
R Orzach… - International Economic Review, 1996 - JSTOR
The case of a strong contestant who has no direct way to demonstrate its strength and may
have to send a costly signal to prove it appears frequently in the signalling literature. We
examine what occurs in signalling models with two or more contestants. The receiver of ...
CL Chen… - Economic Theory, 2006 - Springer
Summary. Most of the literature on collusive behavior in auctions ignores two important
issues that make collusion difficult to sustain at least in one-shot interactions: the detection of
cheating and the verification of bids. Colluding bidders may deceive each other by using ...
S Hart… - The Journal of Business, 2004 - JSTOR
It is shown that market crashes and bubbles can arise without external shocks. Sudden
changes in behavior coming after a long period of stationarity may be the result of
endogenous information processing. Except for the daily observation of the market, there ...
A Jelnov… - Mathematical Social Sciences, 2009 - Elsevier
We consider a game in coalitional form played by the firms of a Cournot industry and an
outside patent holder of a cost-reducing innovation. The worth of a coalition of players is the
total Cournot profit of the active firms within this coalition. The number of firms that a ...
A Neyman… - Mathematics of Operations Research, 1976 - JSTOR
The question of whether or not the diagonal property is a consequence of the axioms
defining the axiomatic value is answered in the negative by means of a counter-example: a
space and an axiomatic value on it are introduced not possessing the diagonal property.
R Orzach… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2005 - Elsevier
Following Spence, this note provides an education signaling model to explain the
phenomenon of gifted entrepreneurs who acquire less education than ordinary individuals.
Two types of individuals, ordinary and gifted, are considered. Each one of them can either ...
N Watanabe… - 2003 - gtcenter.org
Abstract We study the asymptotic properties of the Shapley value of patent licensing games
with the Cournot competition, shedding light on its relations to the nucleolus, core and
bargaining set. The Shapley value of the outside patentee of a non-drastic cost-reducing ...
A Kats… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1985 - Elsevier
Journal of Mathematical Economics 14 (1985) 19-42. North-Holland COALITION PRODUCTION
ECONOMIES WITH DIVISIBLE AND INDIVISIBLE INPUTS Asymptotic Results* Amoz KATS Virginia
Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA 24061, USA Yair TAUMAN** ...
Y Tauman - Games and Economic Behavior, 2002 - ms.cc.sunysb.edu
Abstract Under complete information, for k⩾ 3, a seller of a single-unit k-price auction
obtains higher revenue than in a first or second price auction when the valuations and the
bids are discrete and no bidder is using a (weakly) dominated strategy. 2002 Elsevier ...
S Hart, Y Tauman… - 1996 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: It is shown here that market crashes and bubbles can arise without external
shocks. Sudden changes in behavior may be the result of endogenous information
processing. Except for the daily observation of the market, there is no new information, no ...
LJ Mirman, J Ranaan… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1982 - Elsevier
Abstract Let f be a continuous, non-decreasing function on E m+ which has only finite
number of kinks along the line segment [0, e], where e=(1, 1…, 1). We show that if f (0)= 0
then the non-atomic game ƒ ring operator μ belongs to the space pNAD for each vector μ ...
E Cárceles-Poveda… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2011 - Elsevier
We study a two stage game in which a transnational terrorist organization interacts with an
arbitrary number of countries that may differ in their political or economic power, their military
effectiveness, the benefit from cooperating against terrorism and the value they assign to ...
[CITATION] A Characterization of Price Mechanisms and the Determination of Marginal-Cost Prices Under a Set of Axioms
D Samet… - 1980 - Everyman's University
S David… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1994 - Elsevier
Abstract This work was motivated by a problem regarding a group of public utilities located
in relatively close proximity to each other. Some of these utilities are confronted by a
shortage of capacity while others have excess capacity. The buyers cooperate to ...
[CITATION] Strategic Dropouts
R Orzach… - 1996 - Tel Aviv University, Faculty of …
G Kivetz… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2010 - Elsevier
The paper demonstrates that collusion in a private value first price auction is likely to occur
even in a one shot interaction. The strategies of the colluding parties must be mixed since
agreeing to submit a bid equal to the reservation price of the seller provides the incentive ...
A Kats, Y Tauman… - 1982 - kelloggexecutives.com
1 1. Introduction _ The use of the model of cooperative games in characteristic function form
to formulate economic situations is quite wide. Competitive markets were modeled in this way
by, among many others, Shapley (1964), Shapley and Shubik (1969) and Aumann (1964, ...
LJ Mirman… - Cahiers du Séminaire d'Économétrie, 1981 - JSTOR
On propose ici une nouvelle approche de la répartition équitable des coûts de production
fondée sur la valeur de Shapley des jeux non-atomiques. On démontre que le mécanisme
de prix proposé peut être justifié en termes économiques puisqu'il est uniquement ...
[CITATION] Market Crashes without External Shocks
…, J Yair Tauman - Forthcoming in Journal of Business, 2002
YE Orgler… - Management science, 1986 - JSTOR
Many firms use lock boxes serviced by local depository banks in an attempt to reduce
collection float. Likewise, an increasing number of large firms use controlled disbursing to
pay their bills, in order to increase and control their disbursement float. Almost all the ...
D Biran… - 2008 - sites.google.com
Yair Tauman amty21@gmail.com Department of Economics SUNY at Stony Brook Stony
Brook, NY 11794-4384, USA and The Leon Recanati Graduate School of Business Administration
Tel Aviv University, Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel ... The Role of Intelligence in ...
CH Liao… - The Manchester School, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
We show that a welfare maximizing planner in a Cournot oligopoly can easily implement the
socially optimal outcome by offering the firms a per unit subsidy in return for upfront fees.
The planner announces a subsidy and auctions it off to a limited number of firms. It is ...
LJ Mirman, Y Tauman… - Mathematical Social Sciences, 1991 - Elsevier
Abstract We study the merger of firms producing a homogeneous product in a competitive
environment. We consider an industry in which the producing agents consist of a set of
identical competitive firms, and another set of firms endowed with inputs (characteristics), ...
[CITATION] Shelving and Licensing of Innovations
Y Tauman, Y Weiss… - 1986 - Tel Aviv University, Faculty of …
A Sengupta… - Department of Economics Working …, 2004 - sites.google.com
Abstract We consider a Cournot Oligopoly market of firms possessing increasing returns to
scale technologies. It is shown that an external regulating agency can increase total social
welfare without running a deficit. It offers to subsidize one firm an amount which depends ...
A Gavious… - 1995 - tad.colman.ac.il
ABSTRACT We consider a multi-division firm engaged in several independent projects.
Each project involves several but not all divisions, and a division may be involved in more
than one project. We find that there exists an efficient transfer-pricing mechanism that is ...
CH Liao… - Mathematical Social Sciences, 2004 - Elsevier
This paper shows that there is a simple way for a financial institution to make a positive
profit, free of risk, under imperfect competition. The institution plays a very limited role. It
offers firms in the industry a per-unit subsidy in return for a predetermined upfront fee. It ...
Y Tauman… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2000 - Elsevier
The paper provides an axiomatic approach to mechanisms which determine the individuals'
contributions' to the total welfare of society, for every finite pure exchange economy and for
every allocation of the total resources. An efficient allocation is acceptable if it induces ...
Y Tauman… - Discussion Paper Series, 2006 - ideas.repec.org
We consider a bargaining problem where one of the players, the bureaucrat, has the power
to dictate any outcome in a given set. The other players, the agents, negotiate with him
which outcome to be dictated. In return, the agents transfer some part of their payoffs to the ...
Y Tauman… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2010 - Elsevier
We consider a bargaining problem where one of the players, the intellectual property rights
owner (IPRO) can allocate licenses for the use of this property among the interested parties
(agents). The agents negotiate with him the allocation of licenses and the payments of the ...
A Urbano, G Olcina… - 1996 - ideas.repec.org
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to
do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential
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AU Salvador, J Watanabe… - Working Papers. Serie AD, 1996 - ideas.repec.org
Strategic interaction in oligopolistic markets has been extensively studied in the literature.
This literature deals mostly with the case of multiple firms which produce a homogeneous
good or goods that are perfect substitutes. In this paper we provide a simple model of ...
[CITATION] Licensing of Cost-reducing Innovation
SS Oren… - 1986 - Israel Institute of Business Research
D Samet… - 1981 - 129.105.97.149
ABSTRACT This paper presents a set of axioms which characterizes a family of price
mechanisms for consumption goods. Among these prices are marginal—cost prices and
Aumann—Shapley prices. Using this characterization one can uniquely determine ...
A Gavious, Y Tauman… - 1996 - tad.colman.ac.il
Abstract: We consider a model where division managers in a decentralized firm are not
informed about their own production costs. They become informed sequentially during the
production process. It turns out that the Grove mechanism applied step by step does not ...
Y Tauman… - Economics Letters, 2011 - Elsevier
We show that an outside innovator has a higher incentive to innovate than an incumbent
innovator, by auctioning off his patent rights exclusively to an incumbent firm. For significant
innovations this is also superior to selling licenses directly.
[CITATION] Market Crashes without External Shocks Market Crashes without External Shocks (pp. 1-8) Free Content
S Hart, Y Tauman, A Dittmar, C Chang, X Yu… - The Journal of …, 2004 - JSTOR
Y Tauman - Discussion Papers, 1981 - ideas.repec.org
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view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are
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P Dubey, E Maskin… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2010 - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of
further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site ...
A Anagnostopoulos, E Cárceles-Poveda… - 2011 - ms.cc.sunysb.edu
Abstract. Social optimization problems are often used in economics to study important
issues. In a social optimization problem, the sum of individual weighted utilities is maximized
over all feasible allocations that satisfy certain constraints. In this paper, we provide a ...
G Stamatopoulos… - 2006 - economics.ryerson.ca
Abstract This paper considers the licensing of a quality-improving innovation. We analyze a
duopoly model with heterogeneous firms and consumers. Firms compete in prices and face
logit demand functions. The innovator is an outsider to the market and his set of licensing ...
A Urbano, J Watanabe… - Working Papers. Serie AD, 1996 - econpapers.repec.org
Strategic interaction in oligopolistic markets has been extensively studied in the literature.
This literature deals mostly with the case of multiple firms which produce a homogeneous
good or goods that are perfect substitutes. In this paper we provide a simple model of ...
MI Kamieri, Y Tauman… - 1987 - kellogg.northwestern.edu
We define the value of information as the profit that can be realized by its sole holder when
facing the individuala involved in a strategic conflict affected by the information he
possesses. The key requirement implied by this definition of the value of information is that ...
A Sengupta… - Mathematical Social Sciences, 2011 - Elsevier
We consider a Cournot oligopoly market of firms possessing increasing returns to scale
technologies (which may not be identical). It is shown that an external regulating agency can
increase total social welfare without running a deficit by offering to subsidize one firm an ...
[CITATION] RAMSEY PRICES, AVERAGE COST PRICES AND PRICE SUSTAINABILITY Leonard J. MIRMAN* University of Illinois, Champaign, IL 61820, USA
Y TAUMAN… - International journal of industrial organization, 1986
MI Kamien… - 1983 - kellogg.northwestern.edu
A patent serves two purposes. The first is to provide an incentive for innovation by conferring
an exclusive property right to the inventor of a new product or method of production. Without
the patent the invention could be imitated, preventing the inventor from directly realizing a ...
CH Liao, D Sen… - 2002 - econ.tau.ac.il
Abstract Two general forms of standard licensing policies are considered for a non-drastic
cost-reducing innovation:(a) combination of an upfront fee and uniform linear royalty, and (b)
combination of auction and uniform linear royalty. It is shown that in an oligopoly, the total ...
Y Tauman - econ.tau.ac.il
ABSTRACT The paper considers an innovation which reduces the fixed cost for somegood
currently produced by an incumbent monopoly. The innovator who owns a patent to the
innovation can license it either to the recumbent or for new entrants. If the incumbent gets ...
A Kats… - Discussion Papers, 1982 - econpapers.repec.org
... Please update your bookmarks. Cores and Values of Monopolistic Market Games: Asymptotic
Results. Amoz Kats and Yair Tauman. No 523, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University,
Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. ...
[CITATION] Sequential Mechanism in the Transfer Pricing Problems: Finders Keepers: Not in Tender Offers!
A Gavious… - 1997 - Tel Aviv University, Faculty of …
Y Tauman… - 1983 - kellogg.northwestern.edu
In the case of a multiproduct firm the notions of subsidy free prices and anonymously
equitable prices (see Fanlhabe''(1975). Faulhabei and Levinson (1981) and ten Eaa (1982))
as well as the notions of supportability (see Sharkey and Telser (1978)) and sustainability ...
A Gavious… - 1997 - tad.colman.ac.il
THE TRANSFER-PRICING PROBLEM: A MIXED MECHANISM APPROACH by Arieh Gaviousl
Yair Taumanz Working Paper No 31/97 October 1997 'Ben Gurion University, Faculty of Engineering
Sciences, School of Industrial Engineering and Management, PO Box 653, Beer-Sheva ...
Y Tauman, JJ Sempere Monerris… - XIII Jornadas de …, 1998 - dialnet.unirioja.es
Información del artículo On the strategic choice of the numbers retailers.
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