WB MacLeod… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric …, 1989 - JSTOR
This paper considers the enforceability of employment contracts when employees'
performance cannot be verified in court so that piece-rate contrasts are not legally
enforceable. Part I shows that there exists a not legally enforceable. Part I shows that there ...
WB MacLeod… - The American Economic Review, 1993 - JSTOR
We analyze incomplete contracts to induce efficient investment. With exogenous switching
costs, fixed-price contracts are efficient, generate some rigidity in prices, are renegotiated
intermittently by possibly small amounts, and when inflation is positive, generate ...
MW Bentley - The American Economic Review, 2003 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: This paper extends the standard principal-agent model to allow for subjective
evaluation. The optimal contract results in more compressed pay relative to the case with
verifiable performance measures. Moreover, discrimination against an individual implies ...
WB MacLeod… - American Economic Review, 1998 - JSTOR
Many workers receive pay based on subjectively assessed performance, yet the shirking
model of efficiency wages excludes it. This paper incorporates such pay, with the following
results. Performance pay is more efficient than efficiency wages when the costs of having ...
T Lemieux, WB MacLeod… - The Quarterly Journal of …, 2009 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract An increasing fraction of jobs in the US labor market explicitly pay workers for their
performance using bonus pay, commissions, or piece-rate contracts. Using data from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we show that compensation in performance-pay jobs is ...
WB MacLeod… - The Journal of Political Economy, 1988 - JSTOR
The employment relationship with employees' ability and their actions both private
information (thus combining adverse selection with moral hazard) is modeled as a repeated
game with self-enforcing contracts being perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria. Under ...
WB MacLeod, D Parent… - 1998 - emeraldinsight.com
Employers use a variety of compensation systems to motivate workers, including piece rates,
bonus pay, profit sharing, promotion and delayed compensation.'In addition to these explicit
reward mechanisms, fixed hourly or weekly wages usually require the worker to perform ...
HL Carmichael… - International Economic Review, 1997 - JSTOR
Gift giving is a practice common to many societies. In an evolutionary model the social
custom of giving gifts at the beginning of a relationship can lead to trust and cooperation.
The evolutionary approach makes predictions about the character of the goods that can ...
WB MacLeod - Journal of economic literature, 2007 - JSTOR
When the quality of a good is at the discretion of the seller, how can buyers assure that the
seller provides the mutually efficient level of quality? Contracts that provide a bonus to the
seller if the quality is acceptable or impose a penalty on the seller if quality is ...
HL Carmichael… - The Economic Journal, 1993 - JSTOR
In the developed world the benefits of technical progress are widespread and obvious. New
and better products have been introduced, older ones are produced more cheaply, and
overall wealth and living standards are at unprecedented levels. Even so, there is a large ...
[CITATION] Equity, efficiency, and incentives in cooperative teams
WB MacLeod - Advances in the Economic Analysis of Participatory …, 1988
F Flatters… - International Tax and Public Finance, 1995 - Springer
Administrative corruption, whereby taxpayers and collectors collude to reduce remissions, is
central to tax evasion in developing countries. A framework is developed for the analysis of
such corruption, based on imperfect information concerning true tax liabilities. Some ...
WB MacLeod, G Norman… - International Journal of Industrial …, 1988 - Elsevier
Modern theories of monopolistic competition have borrowed extensively from techniques
developed in location theory and the theory of spatial pricing: the monopolistically
competitive firm is assumed to choose a 'location'and price for its product. A subject that ...
J Arlen… - NYUL Rev., 2003 - HeinOnline
* Norma Z. Paige Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. Ph.D. (Eco- nomics),
1992, New York University Graduate School of Arts & Sciences; JD, 1986, New York University
School of Law; BA, 1982, Harvard University. ** Professor of Economics and Law, ...
J Currie… - 2006 - nber.org
We examine the impact of tort reforms using US birth records for 1989-2001. We make four
contributions: First, we develop a model that analyzes the incentives created by specific tort
reforms. Second, we assemble new data on tort reform. Third, we examine a range of ...
T Lemieux… - Journal of Public Economics, 2000 - Elsevier
This paper presents results from a 1971 natural experiment carried out by the Canadian
government on the unemployment insurance system. At that time, the generosity of the UI
system was increased dramatically. We find some evidence that the propensity to collect ...
L Carmichael… - Journal of law, economics, and …, 2003 - Oxford Univ Press
Abstract Economics students need to be taught that opportunity costs are important for
optimal decision making but that sunk costs are not. Why should this be? Presumably these
students have been making optimal decisions all their lives, and the concepts should be ...
Y Kanemoto… - Journal of Labor Economics, 1992 - JSTOR
Workers in a long-term relationship often have an incentive to hide their ability early in the
relationship to avoid having the firm increase the level of output expected from them in the
future. We show that competition for older workers will permit the implementation of ...
J Brandts… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1995 - Elsevier
This paper presents the results of experimental games with multiple Nash equilibria in which
subjects were given suggestions for their play. This procedure allows for a direct test of the
self-enforcement condition implicit in the Nash equilibrium concept. The results show that ...
J Bergin… - International Economic Review, 1993 - JSTOR
In this paper we develop a model of strategic behaviour in continuous time games of
complete information, which includes conventional repeated games in discrete time as a
special case. The model developed here admits a very large class of strategies, that ...
WB MacLeod - European Economic Review, 1985 - Elsevier
In this paper the 'rationality'of conscious parallelism is studied within the context of a
dynamic oligopoly model. The doctrine of conscious parallelism is modelled as the outcome
of a signalling game in which the rules of response are specified axiomatically. This will ...
WB MacLeod… - European Economic Review, 1993 - Elsevier
The standard shirking model of efficiency wages is essentially a continuous-time, repeated
prisoners' dilemma game. Thus, to sustain an equilibrium with employment requires
sufficient gains from future co-operation. Each division of these gains corresponds to ...
B James… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1993 - Elsevier
Abstract In this paper we present a general framework for the discussion of renegotiation in
repeated games, provide a new concept of" renegotiation-proof" equilibrium, and show how
the framework clarifies and unifies existing work. We define an agreement as a sequence ...
HL Carmichael… - Journal of Labor Economics, 2000 - ideas.repec.org
Workers paid by the piece should be happy to introduce new techniques that increase
output, but firms always seem to reduce the piece rate when workers start earning too much
money. Workers respond by restricting output and keeping good new ideas to themselves. ...
WB MacLeod… - 2009 - nber.org
Friedman (1962) argued that a free market in which schools compete based upon their
reputation would lead to an efficient supply of educational services. This paper explores this
issue by building a tractable model in which rational individuals go to school and ...
A Falk, D Huffman… - 2008 - nber.org
We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions--dismissal barriers, and
bonus pay--affect contract enforcement behavior in a market with incomplete contracts and
repeated interactions. Dismissal barriers are shown to have a strong negative impact on ...
WB MacLeod… - Discussion Paper Series In …, 1992 - econpapers.repec.org
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.
soton. ac. uk/socsci/economics/research/papers/documents/1992/9228. pdf [301 Moved
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WB MacLeod… - Canadian Journal of Economics, 1995 - JSTOR
This paper reviews a recent literature that extends the Rubinstein/Stahl bargaining model to
the case of contract bargaining. Theoretical issues, such as the appropriate game form,
existence, and uniqueness of equilibria, are discussed. The paper finishes with a brief ...
WB MacLeod - Canadian Journal of Economics, 1996 - JSTOR
This essay illustrates that if Savage's small world assumption is relaxed, one can construct a
theory of bounded rationality that incorporates some of the insights from recent work in
cognitive psychology. The theory can be used to explain why contracts are incomplete ...
…, W Bentley MacLeod - Journal of the Japanese and …, 1989 - Elsevier
Abstract The market for human capital is incomplete and therefore specific institutions must
be designed to deal with this problem. An example of such an institution is lifetime
employment (LTE), as observed in Japan. LTE coupled with an agreed-upon total wage ...
WB MacLeod - American Law & Economics Association Annual …, 2006 - law.bepress.com
Abstract This paper discusses the literature on the enforcement of incomplete contracts. It
compares legal enforcement to enforcement via relationships and reputations. A number of
mechanisms, such as the repeat purchase mechanism (Klein and Le# er (1981)) and ...
[CITATION] the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts
WB MacLeod… - 2006 - May
S Chakravarty… - 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Most contracts that individuals enter into are not written from scratch; rather, they
depend upon forms and terms that have been successful in the past. In this paper, we study
the structure of form construction contracts published by the American Institute of ...
…, W Bentley MacLeod - Journal of the Japanese and …, 1992 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper studies the relationship between incentive contracts and firm reputation.
One of the important elements of the Japanese production system is its ability to foster
cooperative behavior among its employees. This behavior is sustained by the explicit ...
WB MacLeod - Regional Science and Urban Economics, 1985 - Elsevier
Abstract It is sometimes suggested that the non-existence of an equilibrium in the Hotelling
spatial model pointed out by d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) is due to demand
discontinuity. In this paper we first show that demand continuity is a natural property in ...
WB MacLeod - Contributions in Economic Analysis & Policy, 2002 - degruyter.com
This paper explores the use of heuristic search algorithms for modeling human decision
making. It is shown that this algorithm is consistent with many observed behavioral
regularities, and may help explain deviations from rational choice. The main insight is that ...
WB MacLeod - Canadian Journal of Economics, 1987 - JSTOR
Typically, models that study the role of sunk costs suppose that incumbent firms face entry by
a single firm each period. In this paper the set of equilibrium market structures that result
when all firms are free to enter or exit and set prices each period is characterized. The ...
WB MacLeod - The American economic review, 2007 - JSTOR
For several decades, a growing body of research has shown that humans do not always
choose to maximize material payoffs. Following the lead of psychologists Daniel Kahneman
and Amos Tversky (1979) and Matthew Rabin (1993), economists have built on this ...
B MacLeod - Journal of Comparative Economics, 1987 - Elsevier
Abstract In this paper a new way of distinguishing between cooperative and noncooperative
organizations is introduced. This distinction is based on well-known solution concepts and is
applied to the problem of organizing production teams in a firm. My first result ...
J Currie, M Farsi… - 2003 - nber.org
This paper uses data from the 1990s to examine changes in the wages, employment, and
effort of nurses in California hospitals following takeovers by large chains. The market for
nurses has been described as a classic monopsony, so that one might expect increases in ...
T Lemieux, WB MacLeod, B Ui - 1995 - Citeseer
... Cached. Download as a PDF. Download Links. [www11.sdc.gc.ca]. Save to List; Add to Collection;
Correct Errors; Monitor Changes. by Thomas Lemieux , W. Bentley Macleod , Behaviour Ui ,
Thomas Lemieux , W. Bentley Macleod , Université De Montréal. Citations: 3 - 0 self. ...
WB MacLeod… - The Economic Journal, 1987 - JSTOR
The primary purpose of this paper is to examine the potential for tacit collusion under free
entry conditions. The issue is a relevant one for a number of reasons. In particular, it is
widely recognised that oligopolists would prefer to collude than compete, and this ...
WB MacLeod - Journal of Economic Literal//redassi li cation …, 1993 - teaching.ust.hk
Lin (1990) suggests that the denial of exit rights during the period of collectivization in China
caused the large fall in agricultural productivity in the period 1959—1961. His article makes
an important contribution by persuasively arguing that the large productivity fall and ...
WB MacLeod… - The Economic Journal, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
The extent of government in private contractual relationships is a vexing public policy issue.
This article explores, both theoretically and empirically, the degree to which such
intervention may enhance employment. Economists traditionally have held that ...
S Chakravarty… - The RAND Journal of …, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
Economic models of contract typically assume that courts enforce obligations based on
verifiable events (corresponding to the legal rule of specific performance). As a matter of law,
this is not the case. This leaves open the question of optimal contract design given the ...
Y Kanemoto… - Managerial and Decision …, 1991 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract Labor management practices in Japan are quite different from those in the United
States. We begin with the assumption that markets are incomplete, and use recent
developments in contract theory to develop a conceptual framework to understand why ...
WB MacLeod, JM Malcomson… - Journal of Labor Economics, 1994 - JSTOR
Wage and unemployment responses to changes in economic environment are compared for
efficiency wage and frictional models. Changes in aggregate demand, persistence of job-
specific shocks, cost of living, and unemployment benefits are considered. Wages and ...
HL Carmichael… - Journal of Public Economic …, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract Economists use the standard rational model to predict behavior after a policy
change and to determine the policy's welfare implications. Recent experimental
observations are casting doubt on the predictive accuracy of the standard model, but the ...
WB MacLeod… - 1998 - cirano.qc.ca
Le CIRANO est un organisme sans but lucratif constitué en vertu de la Loi des compagnies du
Québec. Le financement de son infrastructure et de ses activités de recherche provient des cotisations
de ses organisations-membres, d=une subvention d=infrastructure du ministère de l= ...
S Chakravarty… - University of Southern California, 2004 - law.bepress.com
Abstract Most contracts that individuals enter into are not written from scratch but depend
upon forms and terms that have been successful in the past. In this paper we study the
structure of the form construction contracts published by the American Institute of ...
WB MacLeod - Boston College Working Papers in Economics, 1997 - ideas.repec.org
This paper introduces a model of contract incompleteness and bounded rationality based on
the multi-tasking model of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). It is shown that the trade-off
between the use of an employment relationship versus and explicit state contingent ...
J Arlen… - University of Southern California, 2005 - law.bepress.com
Abstract To be efficient, tort liability rules governing organizations' liability for torts by their
agents must ensure that organizations want their agents to take optimal precautions and
benefit from using cost-effective mechanisms to regulate agents. Vicarious liability, the ...
H Dawid… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2008 - Elsevier
The purpose of this paper is to explore the evolution of bargaining norms in a simple
production problem with two-sided relationship specific investments and competition. The
puzzle we wish to address is why efficient bargaining norms do not evolve even though ...
[CITATION] Fair Territory: Preferences, Bargaining, and the Endowment Effect. 97-15 Ronald A. Cass, Richard D. Boltuck, Seth T. Kaplan and Michael S. Knoll, …
HL Carmichael… - Southern California Law Review, 1997
JH Hamilton, WB MacLeod… - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1991 - JSTOR
In a classic paper Hotelling [1929] introduces a simple spatial model of two firms selling a
homogeneous product to a continuum of consumers located on a line segment. The firms
simultaneously choose locations and then simultaneously choose prices. D'Aspremont et ...
LA Kornhauser… - 2010 - nber.org
Contract law and the economics of contract have, for the most part, developed
independently of each other. In this essay, we briefly review the notion of a contract from the
perspective of lawyer, and then use this framework to organize the economics literature on ...
WB MacLeod - CESifo Economic Studies, 2005 - CESifo Group
Abstract Regulation of the employment contract is both wide spread and diverse. The
diversity of regulation is surprising because it suggests that there is little consensus
regarding optimal intervention into the labor market. This paper discusses several ...
HL Carmichael… - Boston College Working Papers in …, 1997 - ideas.repec.org
We examine an evolutionary model of preferences in a society where resources are finite.
Agents who develop better strategies for bargaining and trading will grow to dominate the
population. We show that successful agents will have preferences that exhibit the" ...
T Lemieux, WB MacLeod… - University of British Columbia, April, 2005 - Citeseer
Abstract An increasing fraction of jobs in the US labor market pay workers a bonus in
addition to regular wages and salaries. In this paper, we look at the effect of the growing
incidence of bonus pay on wage inequality. The basic premise of the paper is that jobs ...
J Bergin… - Working Papers, 1989 - ideas.repec.org
This paper introduces a general framework for the discussion of renegotiation in repeated
games, provides a new concept of" renegotiation proof" equilibrium, and shows how this
model clarifies and unifies existing work in this area. The procedure involves restricting ...
WB Macleod… - Working Papers, 1986 - ideas.repec.org
In this paper the set of bilateral wage contracts in a dynamic model with observable effort is
characterized. Our first result demonstrates that bond payments and severance pay do not
increase the size of the set of incentive compatible contracts. Second, we show that ...
WB MacLeod… - Trends in Business Organization, 2001 - files.uniteddiversity.com
Abstract This paper begins with a review of the different forms of evidence on incentives in
organizations. It is argued that it is not possible to understand modern organizations using
one kind of data or empirical model. There is a need to combine standard regression ...
WB MacLeod - USC CLEO Research Paper, 2003 - people.hbs.edu
Abstract Using Arrow (1958)'s distinction between a “choice” and a “decision”, this paper
illustrates how the explicit introduction of planning costs into a model of decision making
under uncertainty can result is a theory of learning by doing that is empirically ...
J Greene, T Loveless, WB MacLeod, T Nechyba… - Brookings …, 2010 - eric.ed.gov
Abstract: Choice is most frequently realized within the public sector using the mechanisms of
residence, magnet schools, and open enrollment systems, whereas the voucher-like
systems applauded by choice advocates and feared by opponents are extremely rare. ...
WB MacLeod… - Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, 1995 - JSTOR
This paper studies the implications of our recent work on two labour market imperfections for
the cyclical properties of wages and employment. One of these imperfections is turnover
costs. We explore the implications of the interaction of turnover costs with investment ...
WB Macleod… - 1989 - econpapers.repec.org
Related works: Working Paper: EFFICIENT SPECIFIC INVESTMENTS, INCOMPLETE
CONTRACTS, AND THE ROLE OF MARKET ALTERNATIVES (1989) This item may be available
elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
WB Macleod - The Review of Economic Studies, 1985 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract In practice one does not expect conflicting agents to move instantaneously to an
equilibrium. Instead the final equilibrium is often the consequence of “disequilibrium
dynamics”. This paper, through the use of local game theory, introduces a general ...
WB MacLeod… - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2005 - Elsevier
We explore how a discrete change in the level of “aspiration uncertainty” affects the quality
of a decision and the willingness to search for an improved decision. We find knowing what
is attainable improves decision performance, especially when luck places the decision- ...
S Chakravorty… - 2004 - weblaw.usc.edu
Abstract Most contracts are not written from scratch but depend upon forms and terms that
have been successful in the past. In this paper we study the structure of the form construction
contracts published by the American Institute of Architects. We show that these contracts ...
[CITATION] Markets and Motivation
B MacLeod… - American Economic Review, 1998
WB MacLeod - Handbook of Labor Economics, 2011 - Elsevier
Abstract This chapter reviews the literature on employment and labor law. The goal of the
review is to understand why every jurisdiction in the world has extensive employment law,
particularly employment protection law, while most economic analysis of the law suggests ...
[CITATION] Expanding choice in elementary and secondary education
J Greene, T Loveless, WB MacLeod, T Nechyba… - Washington, DC: Brookings, 2010
[CITATION] Efficiency and Renegotiation in Repeated Games
J Bergin, WB MacLeod, W Bentley… - 1991 - … de Montréal, Centre de recherche et …
[CITATION] ''Motivations and Markets.''
J Malcomson… - American Economic Review, 1998
WB Macleod - Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment …, 1989 - Citeseer
Abstract It is well known that contract incompleteness can arise from the impossibility of
planning for all future contingencies in a relationship (eg Williamson (1975)). In this paper it
is shown that whether or not such incompleteness constrains the efficiency of the contract ...
WB MacLeod - 1985 - ideas.repec.org
This paper studies the effect of information and sunk costs on the set of equilibria for a
dynamic oligopoly model that incorporates price and entry/exit decisions. Contrary to the
accepted view, sunk costs do not act as a barrier to entry, but in general cause excessive ...
HL Carmichael… - Queen's University mimeo, 2002 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Economists use the standard rational model to predict behaviour under a new
policy regime and to evaluate the policy according to its impact on the welfare of the people
affected. Experimental observation of behaviour casts some doubt on the predictive ...
[CITATION] Gomme (1994) Labor turnover and the natural rate of unemployment: efficiency wage versus frictional unemployment
WB MacLeod… - Journal of Labor Economics
[CITATION] XReputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incom. plete Contracts.'
WB MacLeod - American Law & Economics Association Annual …, 2006
WB MacLeod - Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
This note discusses and contrasts the different perspectives that the law, empirical labor
economics and contract theory bring to the study of the employment relationship.
Understanding the reasons for these different perspectives should give rise to a better ...
Y Kanemoto, WB MacLeod, W Bentley… - 1990 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract Workers in a long-term relationship often have an incentive to hide their ability early
in the relationship to avoid having the firm increase the level of output expected from them in
the future. The authors show that competition for older workers will permit the ...
MALW Bentley - Journal of Comparative Economics, 1993 - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of
further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site ...
[CITATION] Employment and Bonus Pay in the US
T Lemieux, B MacLeod… - 2006 - Working Paper
[CITATION] VConstruction Contracts (or: How to Get the Right Building at the Right Price?) V IZA Discsussion Paper No. 2125
S Chakravarty… - 2006
WB MacLeod… - Discussion Paper Series In …, 1993 - econpapers.repec.org
By W. Bentley Macleod and James Malcomson; Motivation, Markets and Dual Economies.
[CITATION] June 1992." Firm Reputation and Self-Enforcing Labor Contracts."
Y Kanemoto… - Journal of the Japanese and International Economies …
J Bergin… - Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, 1989 - JSTOR
In this paper we examine the relationship between sunk costs, market structure and welfare
in a dynamic duopoly model. We consider a model in which two firms make sequential
capacity choices and then play a continuous time game in outputs. It is assumed that the ...
T Lemieux, WB Macleod… - 2009 - economics.unimelb.edu.au
Abstract Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we study the impact of local
labor market shocks on wages, hours of work and employment under different contrac% tual
arrangements. We divide jobs on the basis of whether they pay for performance, and ...
WB MacLeod - Working Papers, 1984 - ideas.repec.org
This paper studies the effect of sunk cost on equilibria for a dynamic oligopoly with entry.
Sunk costs are a hysteresis effect that cannot be adequately modelled in a static framework.
When sunk costs are added to a dynamic model they do not act as a barrier to entry, ...
D Carvell, J Currie… - 2009 - nber.org
Reforms to the Joint and Several Liability rule (JSL) are one of the most common tort reforms
and have been implemented by most US states. JSL allows plaintiffs to claim full recovery
from one of the defendants, even if that defendant is only partially responsible for the tort. ...
WB MacLeod - Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1999 - Oxford Univ Press
In this article Professor Williamson extends his seminal contributions on transaction costs
economics to the problem of public versus private provision of services. Specifically he
provides a new and insightful analysis of why the State Department is not privatized using ...
[CITATION] Competition and Collusion in the North-American Fur Trade: 1804-1821
AT Enders… - 1984 - unpublished manuscript, Queen's …
B Macleod - The Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue …, 1989 - JSTOR
Robert Cairns's comment on my paper states that I reverse the central assumptions of
contestability theory and that my analysis of the game is incomplete. These points highlight
the many difficult and unresolved issues that arise when one tries to model the strategic ...
J Bergin… - Working Papers, 1989 - ideas.repec.org
This paper develops a model of strategic behaviour in continuous time games of complete
information. This model bridges the gap between the differential formulation of a continuous
time game and the procedure of taking limits with respect to discrete time games. The ...
WB MacLeod - Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2006 - Cambridge Univ Press
Abstract The target article by Ceci et al. provides some interesting results regarding how
faculty might react to difficult social dilemmas, but it has little to say about tenure and its
effect upon academic freedom. This comment discusses briefly what we know about ...
WB Macleod… - Cahiers de recherche, 1991 - econpapers.repec.org
Related works: Working Paper: Contracts Bargaining for Flows of Goods and Services in Finite
Terms (1991) This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the
same title. ... This site is part of RePEc and all the data displayed here is part of the ...
[CITATION] Daniel Parent (2007), Performance pay and Wage Inequality
T Lemieux… - NBER Working Paper
WB MacLeod… - 2011 - nber.org
Abstract. The ability of firms to acquire reputations for quality is a key ingredient for the
efficient provision of complex commodities in a market economy. We build a model in which
students with different innate abilities acquire skills as a function of the productivity of the ...
WB Macleod, G Norman… - 1984 - ideas.repec.org
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Y Kanemoto… - Working Papers, 1987 - ideas.repec.org
This paper studies the effect that a labour market for older workers will have on the ratchet
effect. Even though we assume that the information on worker type that a firm obtains will not
be transmitted to the other firms, the presence of the ex post labour market eliminates the ...
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