S Krasteva… - 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: The preference between public and private negotiations for a buyer who
sequentially visits two suppliers is examined. It is shown that the buyer weakly prefers to
conduct private negotiations in order to create strategic uncertainty about the trade history. ...
S Krasteva - 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We present a model of process innovation that offers an explanation for the
negative relationship between patent strength and R&D investment. We show that under the
popularly used damage rule of reasonable royalties, the innovator might favor imitation. ...
S Krasteva… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Evidence suggests that donors have little demand for information before giving to
charity. To understand this behavior and its policy implications, we present a model in which
each individual can acquire costly information about her true value of charity. We observe ...
S Krasteva… - 2008 - econ.vt.edu
Abstract A bargaining situation in which one “buyer” engages in bilateral negotiations with
two “suppliers” is examined. In addition to players' ability to make an offer in each
negotiation, the buyer controls the information flow between negotiations and chooses ...
S Krasteva… - 2006 - econ.duke.edu
Abstract We depart from the traditionally viewed role of advertisement as a marketing device
and instead focus on its role as a disclosure and commitment mechanism. We allow for
heterogeneity among suppliers and show that given product homogeneity and buyer's ...
S Krasteva - 2009 - dukespace.lib.duke.edu
This work analyzes the impact of regulation policies in two distinct settings. Chapter 1
provides an overview of the existing theoretical literature on innovation and
entrepreneurship. It summarizes some of the main findings of the effect of various means ...
S Krasteva… - 2011 - econweb.tamu.edu
Abstract We study the problem faced by a firm when choosing its support for the exploration
of new ideas. Innovation consists of two stages: exploration and development, resulting in a
new product that may substitute or complement the firm's existing offerings. The firm's ...
S Krasteva… - 2008 - public.econ.duke.edu
Abstract The preference between public and private negotiations for a buyer who
sequentially visits two suppliers is examined. It is shown that the buyer weakly prefers to
conduct private negotiations in order to create strategic uncertainty about the trade history. ...
S Krasteva… - Levine's Working Paper Archive, 2011 - public.econ.duke.edu
Abstract This paper investigates the sequencing choice of a buyer who negotiates with the
sellers of two complementary objects with uncertain payoffs. We show that the sequencing
matters to the buyer only when equilibrium trade can be inefficient. In this case, the buyer ...
S Krasteva - 2008 - public.econ.duke.edu
During my time at Duke, I have not only had the opportunity to serve as a teaching assistant
for a core course in Intermediate Microeconomics and a summer Game Theory course, but I
was also the sole instructor for Intermediate Microeconomics in Summer 2008. This class ...
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