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User profiles for author:"Francesco Decarolis"

Francesco Decarolis

Verified email at uchicago.edu
Cited by 138

[PDF] When the highest bidder loses the auction: theory and evidence from public procurement

[PDF] from nber.org
F Decarolis - 2009 - nber.org
Abstract When bids do not represent binding commitments, the use of a first price sealed bid
auction favors those bidders who are less penalized from reneging on their bids. These
bidders are the most likely to win but also the most likely to default on their bid. In this ...
Cited by 28 - Related articles - View as HTML - Library Search - All 26 versions

[CITATION] Collusion in Average Bid Auctions

TG Conley… - 2010 - mimeo
Cited by 5 - Related articles

[PDF] Detecting Bidders Groups in Collusive Auctions

[PDF] from wisc.edu
TG Conley… - 2011 - ssc.wisc.edu
Abstract This paper studies entry and bidding in procurement auctions were contracts are
awarded to the bid closest to a trimmed average bid. We characterize equilibrium under
competition and show that it is weak due to strong incentives for cooperation. We present ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 8 versions

[PDF] Economic Effects of Democracy. An Empirical Analysis

[PDF] from wisc.edu
F Decarolis - Rivista di Politica Economica, 2003 - ssc.wisc.edu
The idea that there is a relation between democracy and economic development is very old.
The formulation of the principle according to which democracy is a political system that
works only in countries that have reached a certain level of development is generally ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - BL Direct - All 10 versions

The awarding of public works in Italy: an analysis of the mechanisms for the selection of contractors

F Decarolis, C Giorgiantonio… - Questioni di Economia e …, 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Despite successive reforms, public procurement in Italy is still highly fragmented
and vulnerable to collusion, corruption and ex-post renegotiation. Other defects are found in
the planning stages of the works. These problems are due in part to the regulations on the ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - All 4 versions

[PDF] Syllabus-Economics 761

[PDF] from wisc.edu
F Decarolis - 2011 - ssc.wisc.edu
Economics 761 is a topics course in Industrial Organization and Market Design. The course
will mostly deal with the analysis of auctions from an empirical perspective. The first aim of
the course is to present the recent advances in the structural estimation approach to ...
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[PDF] Questioni di economia e finanza Bank of Italy Occasional Papers n. 83, December 2010

[PDF] from wisc.edu
F Decarolis, C Giorgiantonio… - ssc.wisc.edu
Abstract Despite successive reforms, public procurement in Italy is still highly fragmented
and vulnerable to collusion, corruption and ex-post renegotiation. Other defects are found in
the planning stages of the works. These problems are due in part to the regulations on the ...
Related articles - View as HTML

[PDF] Auctions that are too good to be true

[PDF] from ufl.edu
F Decarolis… - 2011 - warrington.ufl.edu
Auctions are supposed to procure the best deal money can buy. Yet, practitioners who
procure complex contracts by auction are well aware of some basic pitfalls. One concern is
that winning bids may not reflect the quality of the bidder but strategic behavior like low- ...
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Our Referees for the Year 2005

F Altissimo, C Antonelli, G Ardizzi, V Atella… - RIVISTA DI POLITICA …, 2006 - faronet.it
The papers submitted for publication in the Rivista di Politica Economica are evaluated by
two anonymous referees who do not know the identity of the authors. The role of these
experts is fundamental to ensure the quality of the papers that will then be published in the ...
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