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Asset market equilibrium in infinite dimensional complete markets

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HHC Cheng - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1991 - Elsevier
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Ranking sealed high-bid and open asymmetric auctions

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H Cheng - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2006 - Elsevier
For an important family of asymmetric auctions, we show that the seller's expected revenue
is higher in the sealed high-bid auction than in the open auction. This is true for arbitrary
numbers of weak and strong buyers. We establish many interesting properties of the linear ...
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[CITATION] The principle of equivalence

HHC Cheng - Equilibrium Theory in Infinite Dimensional Spaces. …, 1991
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Asymmetric common-value auctions with applications to private-value auctions with resale

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HH Cheng… - Economic Theory, 2010 - Springer
Page 1. Econ Theory (2010) 45:253–290 DOI 10.1007/s00199-009-0505-6
SYMPOSIUM Asymmetric common-value auctions with applications to private-value
auctions with resale Harrison H. Cheng · Guofu Tan Received: 6 ...
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[PDF] Optimal auction design with discrete bidding

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H Cheng - KIER Working Papers, 2004 - kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp
Abstract We develop the theory of optimal auction design in a discrete bidding model.
Examples show that many of the equivalence results or other well-known results may fail in
an auction with discrete bidding. We show that the optimal auction problem, however, has ...
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Folk Theorem with One-Sided Moral Hazard: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions

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H Cheng - Review of Economic Dynamics, 2000 - Elsevier
A game with one-sided moral hazard is represented by a two-stage game. We give
necessary and sufficient conditions for the folk theorem to hold. Equilibrium payoffs are
generated by payoffs from pure strategy profiles which do not admit profitable ...
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Bertrand vs. Cournot equilibrium with risk averse firms and cost uncertainty

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H Cheng - Economic Theory, 2002 - Springer
Summary. In an oligopoly game with cost uncertainty and risk averse firms, we show that
Bertrand and Cournot equilibrium have different convergence properties when the market is
replicated. The Cournot equilibrium price converges to the competitive price. Under very ...
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[PDF] Asymmetric common value auctions with applications to auctions with resale

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H Cheng… - Unpublished manuscript, 2007 - ecore.be
Abstract We study a model of common value auctions in which bidders' private information
are independently and asymmetrically distributed. We provide two sufficient conditions
under which a first-price auction generates higher revenue than a second-price auction ( ...
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The coalitional approach to core theory

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HHC Cheng - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1987 - Elsevier
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Cournot outcome and optimal collusion: an example

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H Cheng - Economics letters, 2001 - Elsevier
We give an example of a repeated Cournot oligopoly game with price uncertainty in which
the optimal collusion is the Cournot outcome. Thus there is no advantage from dynamic
collusion. The example is quite robust with respect to probability specifications and the ...
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Auctions with resale and bargaining power

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H Cheng - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2011 - Elsevier
We show that when the weak bidder's bargaining power in the resale market is weakened,
the auctioneer's revenue from the first-price auction with resale is lower. Using the idea of
Coase Theorem, we show that when the resale market is a sequential bargaining model ...
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[CITATION] Managerial Autonomy in a Transition Economy–Determinants and Effects: Some Evidence from China's TVEs

H Cheng, C Hsiao, JB Nugent… - Annual Meeting of the International Society for …, 2000
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[CITATION] Arbitrage Theory and Equilibrium: The Case of Unconstrained Consumption

HHC Cheng - 1987 - MRG Working Paper M8719
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Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions

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H Cheng - Economics Letters, 2011 - Elsevier
We show by an example that in first-price IPV auctions, asymmetry in bidders' valuations
need not reduce the revenue compared to a benchmark symmetric model with the same
amount of social surplus. Asymmetry need not reduce competition in first-price auctions.
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Inefficiency in repeated Cournot oligopoly games

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H Cheng - IEPR Working Paper No. 05.12, 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: A widely accepted view says that Folk Theorem holds in the repeated Cournot
oligopoly games with imperfect price signals satisfying generic conditions. We show that this
view is not justified. We argue that maintaining asymptotic joint monopoly outcome is not ...
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Managerial Autonomy, Contractual Incentives and Productivity in a Transition Economy: Some Evidence from China's Town and Village Enterprises

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H Cheng, C Hsiao, JB Nugent… - Pacific Economic Review, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract. In advanced industrial economies it is accepted that efficiency requires aligning
managerial autonomy in decision-making with managerial incentives. Should this hold for
economies like that of rural China where (at least until very recently) managers might ...
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[CITATION] Managerial Autonomy, Contractual Incentives and Productivity in a Transition Economy: Some Evidence from China's TVEs

H Cheng, C Hsiao, JB Nugent… - Department of Economics, Univ. of Southern …, 2002
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Optimal partnership contracts: Foundation and duality

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H Cheng - International Journal of Economic Theory, 2005 - Wiley Online Library
1. This paper was written while I was visiting the Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto
University, Kyoto Japan. I am indebted to many over the years for this research. Special
thanks for the financial support from the Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University.
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[CITATION] HC (1991), Asset Market Equilibrium in Infinite Dimen# sional Complete Markets

H Cheng - Journal of Mathematical Economics
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[PDF] Private-Value Auctions, Resale, and Common Value

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H Cheng… - Los Angeles: Department of Economics, …, 2009 - economics.ucr.edu
Abstract We establish the bid% equivalence between an independent private% value (IPV)
first% price auction model with resale and a model of first% price common% value auctions.
The common value is defined by the transaction price when trade takes place. When there ...
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Futures markets, production and diversification of risk

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H Cheng… - Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, 1985 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper lays out a framework for the analysis of the risk transfer role of
speculators on futures markets and the impact of their trading on the production decisions of
firms. We show that when speculators diversify their portfolios over a large number of ...
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Promoting Township and Village Enterprises as a Growth Strategy in China

H Cheng, M Guitian… - … of a conference held in Beijing …, 1996 - books.google.com
Over the past 15 years, China's rural industries have grown at a rate of well over 20 percent
a year, their share in industrial production having risen from 3 percent in 1971 to 30 percent
in 1990 (see Perkins and Yusuf, 1984; and Byrd and Lin, 1990). China's township and ...
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Optimal Collusion in Repeated Cournot Oligopoly Games

H Cheng - atlas-conferences.com
We give a complete solution to the optimal collusion problem in repeated Cournot oligopoly
games with symmetric firms and constant cost of production. Moral hazard problems are due
to unobservable individual firm outputs, and the market price is the only observable signal ...
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[PDF] Optimal Collusion with Moral Hazards in Repeated Cournot Oligopoly Games

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H Cheng - 1999 - econ.ucsb.edu
Abstract We give a compete solution to the optimal collusion problem in repeated Cournot
oligopoly games with symmetric firms and constant cost of production. Moral hazard
problems are due to unobservable individual firm outputs, and the market price is the only ...
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Optimal Collusion and Dynamic Perfect Competition

H Cheng - atlas-conferences.com
We develop a theory of dynamic perfect competition with the breakdown of collusion due to
insufficient penalties. When there is constant cost of production, we show that the output per
firm will converge to the competitive output, the market price converges to the lowest cost ...
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[CITATION] Asian Economic Cooperation in the New Millennium: China's Economic Presence (review)

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H Cheng - China Review International, 2006 - en.scientificcommons.org
Publikationsansicht. 22359863. Asian Economic Cooperation in the New Millennium: China's
Economic Presence (review) (2007). Cheng, Harrison. Abstract. China Review International -
Volume 13, Number 1, Spring 2006. Details der Publikation. ...
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[PDF] Optimal Contracts with Imperfect Monitoring

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H Cheng - 2004 - wakame.econ.hit-u.ac.jp
Abstract We use the duality in linear programming to solve the problem of optimal contracts
with moral hazards. We show the importance of allowing the partners to throw away outputs
under some contingencies. A two-step procedure is used to find the optimal contracts. The ...
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[PDF] Private Contracts and Efficiency: An Example

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H Cheng… - KIER Working Papers, 2004 - kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp
Abstract We give an example to show that efficiency in the principalagent organization
depends on the public information nature of the wage contracts. When wage contracts are
private, the principal may have a moral hazard problem in deviating from some of the ...
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