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Belief‐Free Equilibria in Repeated Games

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JC Ely, J Hörner… - Econometrica, 2005 - Wiley Online Library
We introduce a class of strategies that generalizes examples constructed in two-player
games under imperfect private monitoring. A sequential equilibrium is belief-free if, after
every private history, each player's continuation strategy is optimal independently of his ...
Cited by 94 - Related articles - Library Search - All 20 versions

The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost‐Perfect Monitoring

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J Hörner… - Econometrica, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games under private, almost-perfect
monitoring. Our result covers all finite, n-player games that satisfy the usual full-
dimensionality condition. Mixed strategies are allowed in determining the individually ...
Cited by 79 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 30 versions

Informal communication

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W Olszewski - Journal of Economic Theory, 2004 - Elsevier
The typical sender–receiver game studied in the literature assumes that receiver is
uninformed. I analyze a model where receiver has private information and sender cares to
be perceived as honest. If sender's honesty concerns are strong enough, the model ...
Cited by 53 - Related articles - All 10 versions

Preferences over sets of lotteries

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W Olszewski - The Review of Economic Studies, 2007 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract This paper studies a model in which in period 1, a decision-maker chooses a set of
lotteries and in period 2, Nature chooses a lottery from the set chosen by the decision-maker
and the decision-maker consumes the lottery chosen by Nature. Larger sets are ...
Cited by 49 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 25 versions

A non-differentiable approach to revenue equivalence

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KS Chung… - Theoretical Economics, 2007 - econtheory.org
Abstract We give a sufficient condition on the type space for revenue equivalence when the
set of social alternatives consists of probability distributions over a finite set. Types are
identified with real-valued functions that assign valuations to elements of this finite set, ...
Cited by 28 - Related articles - All 17 versions

A nonmanipulable test

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W Olszewski… - The Annals of Statistics, 2009 - projecteuclid.org
Abstract A test is said to control for type I error if it is unlikely to reject the data-generating
process. However, if it is possible to produce stochastic processes at random such that, for
all possible future realizations of the data, the selected process is unlikely to be rejected, ...
Cited by 23 - Related articles - All 8 versions

Manipulability of Future‐Independent Tests

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W Olszewski… - Econometrica, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
The difficulties in properly anticipating key economic variables may encourage decision
makers to rely on experts' forecasts. Professional forecasters, however, may not be reliable
and so their forecasts must be empirically tested. This may induce experts to forecast ...
Cited by 23 - Related articles - All 20 versions

Strategic manipulation of empirical tests

[PDF] from harvard.edu
W Olszewski… - CMS-EMS discussion paper, 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Theories can be produced by experts seeking a reputation for having knowledge.
Hence, a tester could anticipate that theories may have been strategically produced by
uninformed experts who want to pass an empirical test. We show that, with no restriction ...
Cited by 19 - Related articles - All 38 versions

Politically determined income inequality and the provision of public goods

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W Olszewski… - Journal of Public Economic …, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract Political processes may bring about Pareto improvements by increasing income
inequality in a society that produces a public good by voluntary contributions. Proportional
taxation funds a “governing agent.” The most endowed agent is the Condorcet winner for ...
Cited by 15 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 10 versions

Folk Theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring

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GJ Mailath… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2011 - Elsevier
We prove the perfect-monitoring folk theorem continues to hold when attention is restricted
to strategies with bounded recall and the equilibrium is essentially required to be strict. As a
consequence, the perfect monitoring folk theorem is shown to be behaviorally robust ...
Cited by 13 - Related articles - All 36 versions

How robust is the Folk Theorem?

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J Hörner… - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2009 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract The folk theorem of repeated games has established that cooperative behavior can
be sustained as an equilibrium in repeated settings. Early papers on private monitoring and
a recent paper of Cole and Kocherlakota (Games and Economic Behavior, 53 [2005], 59– ...
Cited by 12 - Related articles - All 6 versions

Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods

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W Olszewski - Games and Economic Behavior, 2004 - Elsevier
I study coalition strategy-proof implementation in public goods environments where agents
may be excluded from enjoying the public good. I characterize individually rational, coalition
strategy-proof mechanisms with the Equal Treatment of Equals property and prove that ...
Cited by 11 - Related articles - All 6 versions

[PDF] How Robust is the Folk Theorem?

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
J Hörner… - forthcoming in the Quarterly …, 2008 - faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu
Abstract The folk theorem of repeated games has established that cooperative behavior can
be sustained as an equilibrium in repeated settings. Early papers on private monitoring and
a recent paper of Cole and Kocherlakota (2005) challenge the robustness of this result, by ...
Cited by 11 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 10 versions

Contracts and uncertainty

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W Olszewski… - Theoretical Economics, 2007 - econtheory.org
Abstract A decision maker, named Alice, wants to know if an expert has significant
information about payoff-relevant probabilities of future events. The expert, named Bob,
either knows this probability almost perfectly or knows nothing about it. Hence, both Alice ...
Cited by 10 - Related articles - All 17 versions

Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal

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D Fudenberg… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2011 - Elsevier
We consider a long-run player facing a sequence of short-run opponents who receive noisy
signals of the long-run player's past actions. We modify the standard, synchronous-action,
model by supposing that players observe an underlying public signal of the opponent's ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - All 8 versions

A simple and general solution to King Solomon's problem

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W Olszewski - Games and Economic Behavior, 2003 - Elsevier
An indivisible object is to be allocated at no cost to the agent who values it most. We provide
a simple two-stage mechanism, which implements the desired outcome when it is common
knowledge that the agent who values the object most knows that. At each stage of the ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 5 versions

[PDF] A Simple Exposition of Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games

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W Olszewski - Economics Bulletin, 2007 - accessecon.com
Abstract Recently, there has been made a substantial progress in the analysis of repeated
games with private monitoring. This progress began with introducing a new class of
sequential equilibrium strategies, called belief-free equilibria, that can be analyzed using ...
Cited by 8 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 11 versions

Falsifiability

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W Olszewski… - The American Economic Review, 2011 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: We examine Popper's falsifiability within an economic model in which a tester hires
a potential expert to produce a theory. Payments are contingent on the performance of the
theory vis-à-vis data. We show that if experts are strategic, falsifiability has no power to ...
Cited by 7 - Related articles - All 13 versions

[PDF] Counterfactual predictions

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W Olszewski… - manuscript, Northwestern …, 2006 - cs112-b.cs.yale.edu
Abstract The difficulties in properly anticipating key economic variables may encourage
decision makers to rely on experts' forecasts. The experts' forecasts, however, may not be
accurate. So, their forecasts must be empirically tested. This may induce experts to ...
Cited by 7 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 9 versions

[PDF] Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games

[PDF] from psu.edu
JC Ely, J Hörner… - Econometrica, forthcoming, 2004 - Citeseer
Abstract We introduce a class of strategies which generalizes examples constructed in two-
player games under imperfect private monitoring. A sequential equilibrium is belief-free if,
after every private history, each player's continuation strategy is optimal independently of ...
Cited by 6 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 41 versions

The principal-agent approach to testing experts

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W Olszewski… - American Economic Journal: …, 2011 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: Recent literature on testing experts shows that it is often impossible to determine
whether an expert knows the stochastic process that generates data. Despite this negative
result, we show that there often exist contracts that allow a decision maker to attain the first ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - All 23 versions

Perfect folk theorems. Does public randomization matter?

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W Olszewski - International Journal of Game Theory, 1998 - Springer
I consider two player games, where player 1 can use only pure strategies, and player 2 can
use mixed strategies. I indicate a class of such games with the property that under public
randomization both the discounted and the undiscounted finitely repeated perfect folk ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 7 versions

A welfare analysis of arbitration

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W Olszewski - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2011 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: The paper compares conventional and final-offer arbitration. One party is supposed
to make a payment to another party, whose amount depends on a state. Under one
scenario, parties obtain signals about the state, which cannot be recognized by the ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - All 22 versions

Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria

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W Olszewski - Journal of Economic Theory, 2006 - Elsevier
I formalize the notion of equilibrium language, define the relation of having a richer
language, and show the existence of equilibria with maximally rich language. I also study
the stability of equilibria with respect to inflows of messages that can enrich their language ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - All 8 versions

Manipulability of comparative tests

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W Olszewski… - Proceedings of the National …, 2009 - National Acad Sciences
Abstract Multiple self-proclaimed experts claim that they know the probabilities of future
events. A tester does not know the odds of future events and she also does not know
whether, among the multiple experts, there are some who do know the relevant ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - All 11 versions

A model of consumption-dependent temptation

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W Olszewski - Theory and decision, 2011 - Springer
Abstract The paper characterizes axiomatically a class of temptation-driven preferences. The
key (but not the only) novelty of the paper is the idea that the alternative which tempts when
an item x is consumed may not be the same as the alternative which tempts when another ...
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[CITATION] How robust is the folk theorem with imperfect public monitoring

J Horner… - 2006 - Working Paper
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[CITATION] VA Model of Consumption&Dependent TemptationV mimeo

O Wojciech - 2008
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[CITATION] nA Welfare Analysis of Arbitration. oworking paper

W Olszewski - Northwestern Uni& versity, 2006
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Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests

A Sandroni… - PIER Working Paper Archive, 2008 - ideas.repec.org
Theories can be produced by experts seeking a reputation for having knowledge. Hence, a
tester could anticipate that theories may have been strategically produced by uninformed
experts who want to pass an empirical test. We show that, with no restriction on the ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - Cached - All 4 versions

[CITATION] Endogenous, Almost Necessary Conditions for Revenue Equivalence Theorem

KC Chung… - 2006 - mimeo
Cited by 1 - Related articles

Effective Persuasion

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Y Chen… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Do elementary statistics or equilibrium theory deliver any rules of thumb regarding how we should
argue in debates? We suggest a framework for normative analysis of debates. In our
framework, each discussant wants the audience to believe that the actual state coin- ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - All 3 versions

[PDF] A Model of Consumption-Dependent Temptation

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
W Olszewski - leA, 2009 - faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu
Abstract The paper characterizes axiomatically a class of temptation-driven preferences. The
key (but not the only) novelty of the paper is the idea that the alternative which tempts when
an item x is consumed may not be the same as the alternative which tempts when another ...
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[CITATION] Reviews and CommentsWith the intent of stimulating discussion, this section is reserved for book reviews, comments, and letters; your input is welcome. …

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W Olszewski - Games and Economic Behavior, 2007 - Elsevier Science

[CITATION] Report of the Editor American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

K Bagwell, D Bergemann, D Duffie, L Einav, F Gul…
All 11 versions

Strategic Commitment Versus Flexibility in a Duopoloy with Entry and Exit

J Ely, J Horner… - Discussion Papers, 2003 - ideas.repec.org
We introduce a class of strategies which generalizes examples constructed in two-player
games under imperfect private monitoring. A sequential equilibrium is belief-free if, after
every private history, each player. s continuation strategy is optimal independently of his ...
Cached - All 4 versions

[PDF] The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost# Perfect Monitoring

[PDF] from yale.edu
JHW Olszewski - 2005 - econ.yale.edu
Abstract We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games under private, almost#
perfect monitoring. Our result covers all finite, n# player games satisfying the usual full#
dimensionality condition. Mixed strategies are allowed in determining the individually ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 13 versions

[PDF] Chip Strategies in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information

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W Olszewski… - faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu
Abstract We study chip strategies in repeated oligopoly games, in which… rms privately
observe their costs of production. The simplest form of chip strategies allows the… rms with
the lowest costs to charge a lower price and serve the entire market. In exchange, the… ...
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[CITATION] Rural communities and emerging national identities in Central Europe in the 19th and 20th c.

W Olszewski - Exploring home, neighbouring …, 2008 - Instytut Etnologii i Antropologii …
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Martin J. Osborne, Department of Economics, University of Toronto, martin. osborne@ utoronto. ca

JC Ely, EJ Green, BL Lipman, D Ray, S Athey… - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. ...

[PDF] Team selection problem

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W Olszewski… - 2012 - faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu
Abstract We study the optimal formation of a team of individuals whose output is influenced
by the presence of others on the team. We assume the characteristics of available agents
are known to the principal and the provision of incentives is not an issue, and we study the ...
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[CITATION] George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson, Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships, Oxford University Press, New York, NY (2006) ISBN …

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W Olszewski - Games and Economic Behavior, 2007 - econpapers.repec.org
By Wojciech Olszewski; George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson, Repeated Games and
Reputations: Long-Run Relationships, Oxford University Press,. ... Wojciech Olszewski. Games
and Economic Behavior, 2007, vol. 59, issue 2, pages 408-410. ...
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[CITATION] Around the Theory and Politics of Cultural Identity. The Ethnologist's Dilemma at the Beginning of the 21st Century

W Olszewski - … tradition and postmodernity: Polish ethnography at the …, 2003 - Dig

[PDF] GAME THEORY, ECONOMICS, SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

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M Aoyagi, V Bali, JS Banks, S Barbera… - lib.uoi.gr
Belen kiı, AS Cooperative games of choosing partners and forming coalitions in the
marketplace.(English summary) 2003k: 91018 Bergantinos, Gustavo (with Sánchez, Estela)
Weighted Shapley values for games in generalized characteristic function form.(English ...
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[PDF] The Market for Narcotics. Is there a Case for Regulatory Policy?

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
W Olszewski - 1998 - faculty.econ.northwestern.edu
Abstract I study a theoretical model of the market for narcotics, consistent with available
evidence and other studies, where there is a case for regulatory policy. Namely, a ceiling for
the price at which addicted consumers can buy drugs is an example of such a policy. I ...
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Martin J. Osborne, Department of Economics, University of Toronto, martin. osborne@ utoronto. ca

J Hörner, BL Lipman, D Ray, S Athey, T Bergstrom… - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. Wiley Online Library will be disrupted 3
Dec from 10-12 GMT for monthly maintenance. ...

[CITATION] Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests Mathematics of Operations Research 2009 34: 57-70; published online before print January 27, 2009, doi: …

W Olszewski… - basam-news.info
... Full Text (PDF) Research Article: Wojciech Olszewski and; Alvaro Sandroni. Strategic
Manipulation of Empirical Tests Mathematics of Operations Research 2009 34:57-70;
published online before print January 27, 2009, doi:10.1287/moor.1080.0347. ...
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Ludwik Krzywicki

W Olszewski - Journal of classical sociology, 2006 - jcs.sagepub.com
Abstract Ludwik Krzywicki, a classical author of Polish sociology, is generally known and
presented as a Marxist and evolutionary theorist. The present article analyses the past major
presentations and historical reception contexts of Krzywicki's work, and finds that this ...
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