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User profiles for author:"Dirk Bergemann"

Dirk Bergemann

Professor of Economics, Yale University
Verified email at yale.edu
Cited by 2263

Venture capital financing, moral hazard, and learning

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D Bergemann… - Journal of Banking & Finance, 1998 - Elsevier
We consider the provision of venture capital in a dynamic agency model. The value of the
venture project is initially uncertain and more information arrives by developing the project.
The allocation of the funds and the learning process are subject to moral hazard. The ...
Cited by 499 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 26 versions

Robust mechanism design

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D Bergemann… - Econometrica, 2005 - Wiley Online Library
We ask when ex post implementation is equivalent to interim (or Bayesian) implementation
for all possible type spaces. The equivalence holds in the case of separable environments;
examples of separable environments arise (1) when the planner is implementing a social ...
Cited by 265 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 46 versions

Information acquisition and efficient mechanism design

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D Bergemann… - Econometrica, 2002 - Wiley Online Library
We consider a general mechanism design setting where each agent can acquire (covert)
information before participating in the mechanism. The central question is whether a
mechanism exists that provides the efficient incentives for information acquisition ex-ante ...
Cited by 172 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 43 versions

Learning and strategic pricing

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D Bergemann… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric …, 1996 - JSTOR
We consider the situation where a single consumer buys a stream of goods from different
sellers over time. The true value of each seller's product to the buyer is initially unknown.
Additional information can be gained only by experimentation. For exogeneously given ...
Cited by 156 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - BL Direct - All 19 versions

Information structures in optimal auctions

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D Bergemann… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
A seller wishes to sell an object to one of multiple bidders. The valuations of the bidders are
privately known. We consider the joint design problem in which the seller can decide the
accuracy by which bidders learn their valuation and to whom to sell at what price. We ...
Cited by 115 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 36 versions

Dynamic common agency

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D Bergemann… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2003 - Elsevier
A general model of dynamic common agency with symmetric information is considered. The
set of truthful Markov perfect equilibrium payoffs is characterized and the efficiency
properties of the equilibria are established. A condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium ...
Cited by 86 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 28 versions

Market diffusion with two-sided learning

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D Bergemann… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1997 - JSTOR
We analyze the diffusion of a new product of uncertain value in a duopolistic market. Both
sides of the market, buyers and sellers, learn the true value of the new product from
experiments with it. Buyers have heterogeneous preferences over the products and ...
Cited by 65 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - BL Direct - All 19 versions

Experimentation in markets

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D Bergemann… - Review of Economic Studies, 2000 - Wiley Online Library
We present a model of entry and exit with Bayesian learning and price competition. A new
product of initially unknown quality is introduced in the market, and purchases of the product
yield information on its true quality. We assume that the performance of the new product is ...
Cited by 62 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 27 versions

The financing of innovation: learning and stopping

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D Bergemann… - RAND Journal of Economics, 2005 - JSTOR
We consider the financing of a research project under uncertainty about the time of
completion and the probability of eventual success. We distinguish between two financing
modes, namely relationship financing, where the allocation decision of the entrepreneur is ...
Cited by 61 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - BL Direct - All 24 versions

[CITATION] Dynamic venture capital financing, learning and moral hazard

Full text - MIT Libraries
D Bergemann… - Journal of Banking and Finance, 1998
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Efficient dynamic auctions

[PDF] from helsinki.fi
D Bergemann… - 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We consider the truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in a
dynamic private value environment in which agents receive private information over time.
We show that a suitable generalization of the Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism, based on ...
Cited by 48 - Related articles - All 14 versions

The dynamic pivot mechanism

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D Bergemann… - Econometrica, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
We consider truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in an independent
private-value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We
propose a suitable generalization of the pivot mechanism, based on the marginal ...
Cited by 46 - Related articles - All 39 versions

Dynamic pricing of new experience goods

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D Bergemann… - Journal of Political Economy, 2006 - JSTOR
We develop a dynamic model of experience goods pricing with independent private
valuations. We show that the optimal paths of sales and prices can be described in terms of
a simple dichotomy. In a mass market, prices are declining over time. In a niche market, ...
Cited by 42 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 22 versions

Robust monopoly pricing

[PDF] from yale.edu
D Bergemann… - 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We consider a robust version of the classic problem of optimal monopoly pricing
with incomplete information. In the robust version, the seller faces model uncertainty and
only knows that the true demand distribution is in the neighborhood of a given model ...
Cited by 38 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 34 versions

Ex post implementation

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D Bergemann… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2008 - Elsevier
We analyze the problem of fully implementing a social choice set in ex post equilibrium. We
identify an ex post monotonicity condition that is necessary and—in economic environments—
sufficient for full implementation in ex post equilibrium. We also identify an ex post ...
Cited by 38 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 29 versions

Belief free incomplete information games

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D Bergemann… - Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, 2007 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We consider the following belief free solution concepts for games with incomplete
information:(i) incomplete information rationalizability,(ii) incomplete information correlated
equilibrium and (iii) ex post equilibrium. We present epistemic foundations for these ...
Cited by 26 - Related articles - All 12 versions

Targeting in advertising markets: implications for offline versus online media

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D Bergemann… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
We develop a model with many advertisers (products) and many advertising markets
(media). Each advertiser sells to a different segment of consumers, and each medium is
targeting a different audience. We characterize the competitive equilibrium in the ...
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Robust implementation in direct mechanisms

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D Bergemann… - Review of Economic Studies, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the
process of iteratively eliminating strictly dominated messages lead to outcomes that agree
with the social choice function for all beliefs at every type profile. In an interdependent- ...
Cited by 24 - Related articles - All 20 versions

Pricing without priors

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D Bergemann… - Journal of the European Economic …, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract We consider the problem of pricing a single object when the seller has only minimal
information about the true valuation of the buyer. Specifically, the seller only knows the
support of the possible valuations and has no further distributional information. The seller ...
Cited by 21 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 15 versions

Dynamic Auctions

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D Bergemann… - Wiley Encyclopedia of Operations …, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
Many important economic problems have been studied with the tools of auction theory and
mechanism design more generally. Much of the literature, however, studies a static, one-
time decision. In many problems of interest, more than a single decision needs to be made ...
Cited by 21 - Related articles - All 30 versions

The financing of innovation: Learning and stopping

D Bergemann… - Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No …, 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper considers the financing of a research project under uncertainty about
the time of completion and the probability of eventual success. The uncertainty about future
success gradually diminishes with the arrival of additional funding. The entrepreneur ...
Cited by 17 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 10 versions

Dynamic marginal contribution mechanism

[PDF] from helsinki.fi
D Bergemann… - Cowles Foundation Discussion …, 2007 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We consider truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in a dynamic
private value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We
propose a suitable generalization of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, based on the ...
Cited by 17 - Related articles - All 27 versions

Dynamic price competition

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D Bergemann… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2006 - Elsevier
We consider the model of price competition for a single buyer among many sellers in a
dynamic environment. The surplus from each trade is allowed to depend on the path of
previous purchases, and as a result, the model captures phenomena such as learning by ...
Cited by 17 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 20 versions

Entry and vertical differentiation

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D Bergemann… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2002 - Elsevier
This paper analyzes the entry of new products into vertically differentiated markets where an
entrant and an incumbent compete in quantities. The value of the new product is initially
uncertain and new information is generated through purchases in the market. We derive ...
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Stationary multi-choice bandit problems

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D Bergemann… - Journal of Economic dynamics and Control, 2001 - Elsevier
This note shows that the optimal choice of k simultaneous experiments in a stationary multi-
armed bandit problem can be characterized in terms of the Gittins index of each arm. The
index characterization remains equally valid after the introduction of switching costs.
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Venture capital and sequential investments

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D Bergemann, U Hege… - 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We present a dynamic model of venture capital financing, described as a
sequential investment problem with uncertain outcome. Each venture has a critical, but
unknown threshold beyond which it cannot progress. If the threshold is reached before the ...
Cited by 14 - Related articles - All 41 versions

Robust implementation in general mechanisms

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D Bergemann… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2011 - Elsevier
A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space
achieves outcomes consistent with it. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is
necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation. Robust ...
Cited by 14 - Related articles - All 35 versions

[BOOK] Monopoly pricing of experience goods

[PDF] from helsinki.fi
D Bergemann, J Valimaki… - 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We develop a dynamic model of experience goods pricing with independent
private valuations. We show that the optimal paths of sales and prices can be described in
terms of a simple dichotomy. In a mass market, prices are declining over time. In a niche ...
Cited by 10 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - BL Direct - All 13 versions

Market experimentation and pricing

D Bergemann… - Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, 1996 - ideas.repec.org
We present a continuous-time model of Bayesian learning in a duopolistic market. Initially
the value of one product offered is unknown to the market. The market participants learn
more about the true value of the product as experimentation occurs over time. Firms set ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - Cached - BL Direct - All 5 versions

[BOOK] The value of benchmarking

[PDF] from lse.ac.uk
D Bergemann, U Hege… - 2002 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We consider the provision of venture capital in a dynamic model with multiple
research stages, where time and investment needed to meet each benchmark are unknown.
The allocation of funds is subject moral hazard. The optimal contract provides for incentive ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - BL Direct - All 33 versions

Rationalizable implementation

[PDF] from princeton.edu
D Bergemann, S Morris… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2011 - Elsevier
We consider the implementation of social choice functions under complete information in
rationalizable strategies. A strict version of the monotonicity condition introduced by Maskin
is necessary under the solution concept of rationalizability. Assuming the social choice ...
Cited by 8 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 33 versions

An Ascending Auctions for Independent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty

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D Bergemann… - The American economic review, 2007 - JSTOR
The important role of dynamic auctions, in particular ascending price auctions, for the
revelation of private information has been recognized for a long time. The advantage of
sequential procedures is the ability to reveal and communicate private information in ...
Cited by 7 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 29 versions

[PDF] Optimal pricing policy with recommender systems

[PDF] from psu.edu
D Bergemann… - Proceedings of P2PEcon 2004, 2004 - Citeseer
Abstract We look at one of the informational novelties introduced by the existence of internet
market, namely" the recommender systems". A recommender system is a system employed
by some internet sellers, which collects data from all previous customers about their ...
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Information acquisition in interdependent value auctions

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D Bergemann, X Shi… - Journal of the European …, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract We consider an auction environment with interdependent values. Each bidder can
learn her payoff type through costly information acquisition. We contrast the socially optimal
decision to acquire information with the equilibrium solution in which each agent has to ...
Cited by 6 - Related articles - All 22 versions

Strategic buyers and privately observed prices

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D Bergemann… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2002 - Elsevier
A model of finitely repeated price competition between two sellers with differentiated goods
and a large buyer is analyzed. The set of pure strategy sequential equilibria is investigated
under public and private monitoring. With private monitoring, ie, when prices are not ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 27 versions

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

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D Bergemann, S Morris… - 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: A universal type space of interdependent expected utility preference types is
constructed from higher-order preference hierarchies describing (i) an agent's
(unconditional) preferences over a lottery space;(ii) the agent's preference over Anscombe ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - All 45 versions

Flexibility as an instrument in digital rights management

[PDF] from yale.edu
D Bergemann, T Eisenbach… - COWLES …, 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We consider the optimal design of flexible use in a digital-rights-management
policy. The basic model considers a single distributor of digital goods and a continuum of
consumers. Each consumer can acquire the digital good either as a licensed product or ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 42 versions

[CITATION] Targeting in Advertising Markets: Implications for Offline vs

D Bergemann… - 2010 - Online Media), Working Paper, …
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[PDF] Towards an economic analysis of trusted systems

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D Bergemann, J Feigenbaum, S Shenker… - third Annual Workshop …, 2004 - Citeseer
Trusted-platform initiatives such as Microsoft's Next-Generation Secure-Computing Base
(NGSCB) and the industry-wide Trusted-Computing Group (TCG) effort are the subject of
significant research and development now. The goal of these initiatives is to change a ...
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[CITATION] Multiple Tasks in the Principal Agent Model: A Generalised Portfolio Problem

D Bergemann - 1992 - CARESS Working Paper
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Information Acquisition in Interdependent Value Auctions

[PDF] from helsinki.fi
D Bergemann, J Valimaki… - 2007 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We consider an auction environment with interdependent values. Each bidder can
learn her payoff type through costly information acquisition. We contrast the socially optimal
decision to acquire information with the equilibrium solution in which each agent has to ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - All 30 versions

The role of the common prior in robust implementation

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D Bergemann… - Journal of the European Economic …, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract We consider the role of the common prior for robust implementation in an
environment with interdependent values. Specifically, we investigate a model of public good
provision which allows for negative and positive informational externalities. In the ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 25 versions

Dynamic Price Competition

[PDF] from yale.edu
D Bergemann… - 2003 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We consider the model of price competition for a single buyer among many sellers
in a dynamic environment. The surplus from each trade is allowed to depend on the path of
previous purchases, and as a result, the model captures phenomena such as learning by ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - All 11 versions

[PDF] Targeting in Advertising Markets: Implications for New and Old Media

[PDF] from nyu.edu
D Bergemann… - 2009 - people.stern.nyu.edu
Abstract We consider a model with many advertising markets (media) and many products
(advertisers). A continuum of buyers is distributed across the media markets. The advertisers
purchase advertising messages separately on each market. The concentration of similar ...
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[PDF] Dynamic Efficient Auctions!

[PDF] from psu.edu
D Bergemann… - 2007 - Citeseer
ABSTRACT (Extended Abstract) We consider the truthful implemen# tation of the socially effi
cient allocation in a dynamic pri# vate value environment in which agents receive private in#
formation over time. We show that a suitable generaliza# tion of the Vickrey# Clark# ...
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[CITATION] VBandit Problems, V in Steven Durlauf and Larry Blume (eds), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

D Bergemann… - 2006 - Macmil $ lan Press
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[CITATION] Dynamic Agency and Renegotiation

D Bergemann… - 1997 - mimeo
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[CITATION] Robust monopoly pricing. 2008

D Bergemann… - Cowles Foundation, 1992
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Should Auctions Be Transparent?

[PDF] from yale.edu
D Bergemann… - 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
This Discussion Paper is issued under the auspices of the Centre's research programme in INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION and PUBLIC POLICY. Any opinions expressed here are those of the
author(s) and not those of the Centre for Economic Policy Research. Research ...
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[CITATION] Efficient dynamic auctions. Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1584, Cowles Foundation, Yale University

D Bergemann… - 2006 - October
Cited by 2 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries

[CITATION] alim† aki. Dynamic common agency

D Bergemann… - 1998 - Cowles foundation working paper, …
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[CITATION] Market Experimentation and Pricing

B Dirk… - 1996 - Cowles Foundation Discussion …
Cited by 2 - Related articles

Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

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D Bergemann… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We analyze games of incomplete information and offer equilibrium predictions
which are valid for all possible private information structures that the agents may have. Our
characterization of these robust predictions relies on an epistemic result which establishes ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - All 44 versions

Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information

[PDF] from yale.edu
D Bergemann… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We define a notion of correlated equilibrium for games with incomplete information
in a general setting with finite players, finite actions, and finite states, which we call Bayes
correlated equilibrium. The set of Bayes correlated equilibria of a fixed incomplete ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - All 15 versions

Entry and Innovation in Vertically Differentiated Markets

[PDF] from 128.36.236.35
D Bergemann… - 1999 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper analyzes the optimal entry into experience goods markets with vertically
differentiated buyers. We consider the case where the value of the new product is
imperfectly known, but common to all buyers (common values) as well as the case where ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 14 versions

[CITATION] YEfficient Dynamic Auctions,(Cowles Foun

D Bergemann… - Disc. Paper, 2006
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[CITATION] V.. alim.. aki

D Bergemann - Juuso" Learning and Strategic Pricing," emph …, 1996
Cited by 2 - Related articles

Mechanism Design with Limited Information: The Case of Nonlinear Pricing

D Bergemann, J Shen, Y Xu… - Cowles Foundation …, 2010 - ideas.repec.org
We analyze the canonical nonlinear pricing model with limited information. A seller offers a
menu with a finite number of choices to a continuum of buyers with a continuum of possible
valuations. By revealing an underlying connection to quantization theory, we derive the ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - Cached - All 3 versions

Robust monopoly pricing

[PDF] from yale.edu
D Bergemann… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2011 - Elsevier
We consider a robust version of the classic problem of optimal monopoly pricing with
incomplete information. In the robust version, the seller faces model uncertainty and only
knows that the true demand distribution is in the neighborhood of a given model ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 8 versions

[PDF] Robust Mechanism Design

[PDF] from princeton.edu
S Morris… - Yale School of Management Working …, 2004 - princeton.edu
PGame theory has a great advantage in explicitly analyzing the consequences of trading
rules that presumably are really common knowledge (it is deficient to the extent that it
assumes other features to be common knowledge, such as one agentOs probability ...
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Experimentation in Markets

J Valimaki… - 2000 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We present a model of entry and exit with Bayesian learning and price competition.
A new product of initially unknown quality is introduced in the market, and purchases of the
product yield information on its true quality. We assume that the performance of the new ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles

Pricing under the Threat of Piracy: Flexibility and Platforms for Digital Goods

[PDF] from yale.edu
D Bergemann, T Eisenbach, J Feigenbaum… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We consider the optimal design of flexible use in a digital-rights-management
policy for a digital good subject to piracy. Consumers can acquire the digital good either as a
licensed product or as an unlicensed copy. The ease of access to unlicensed copies is ...
Related articles - All 7 versions

[PDF] Microeconomic Theory (501b) Problem Set 10. Signalling and Insurance Markets

[PDF] from yale.edu
D Bergemann - econ.yale.edu
1. Informed Principal. Consider the problem we discussed at the end of the class on
Tuesday. Suppose the timing is given as follows:(i) nature determines the ability of the
worker,(ii) the worker offers a menu of wages as a function of the education level to the ...
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[PDF] Microeconomic Theory (501b)

[PDF] from yale.edu
D Bergemann - aida.econ.yale.edu
1. First Price Auction. Consider the first price auction in a symmetric environment with binary
valuations, ie the value of bidder i is given by vi &) vi, vh* with#! vi< vh<%. The prior
probability is given by &* vi% vh!% a for all i.(a) Characterize the equilibrium in the first ...
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Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types

[PDF] from yale.edu
D Bergemann, S Morris… - 2012 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We consider the efficient allocation of a single good with interdependent values in
a quasi-linear environment. We present an approach to modelling interdependent
preferences distinguishing between" payoff types" and" belief types" and report a ...
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[CITATION] Report of the Editor American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

K Bagwell, D Bergemann, D Duffie, L Einav, F Gul…
All 11 versions

[PDF] Advanced Microeconomic Theory: Selected Topics

[PDF] from dufe.cn
D Gerardi… - 2008 - superv4.dufe.cn
Required texts. There is no textbook for this course, however the following books should be
in the library of every (micro () economist: Mas (Collel, Whinston, and Green (1995),
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), Myerson (1991) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1994). ...
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[PDF] Microeconomic Theory (521b) Problem Set 1. The Email Game

[PDF] from yale.edu
D Bergemann - aida.econ.yale.edu
the game in which the players are involved is Gβ; with probability 1 p it is Ga. In both Ga and
Gβ it is mutually beneficial for the players to choose the same action, but the action that is
best depends on the game: in Ga the outcome (A, A) is best, while in game Gβ the ...
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[PDF] Advanced Microeconomic Theory 521B

[PDF] from yale.edu
D Bergemann… - Lecture Notes 521b April, 2008 - aida.econ.yale.edu
Abstract The following notes contain the main material of the second part of 521b 2008. ... Information
/ Knowledge / Uncertainty There are two important contributions in the literature ... 1. Harsanyi
(1967-68) Models without common knowledge are transformed into games of incomplete ...
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[CITATION] Are Americans Saving “Optimally” for Retirement? Are Americans Saving “Optimally” for Retirement?(pp. 607-643) Contains supplements

JK Scholz, A Seshadri, S Khitatrakun… - Journal of Political …, 2006 - JSTOR
Get it from MIT Libraries

Microeconomic Theory (521b) Problem Set 2. Dynamic Revenue Maximization

D Bergemann - dirkbergemann.commons.yale.edu
3. Optimal Dynamic Regulation. In the dicussion of (Baron and Besanko 1984), we
described in class how the informativeness of the private signal in period 0 enters period 1.
Extend the informativeness to a regulation problem with finitely many period T> 2. Present ...
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Microeconomic Theory (521b) Problem Set 4. Implementation

D Bergemann - econ.yale.edu
FcON" R#'{a\ Vb GA,!{i\ aRib}^!{i\ bRia}}" iii# the Borda count correspondence, in which each
individual assigns to each of the m alternatives points, m points to his favorite alternative, m
$ points to the next favorite alternative and so on until the least favorite alternative ...
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DP7989 Should Auctions Be Transparent?

D Bergemann… - 2010 - cepr.org
We investigate the role of market transparency in repeated first-price auctions. We consider
a setting with private and independent values across bidders. The values are assumed to be
perfectly persistent over time. We analyze the first-price auction under three distinct ...
Cached - All 3 versions

[PDF] Economics and Computation

[PDF] from yale.edu
D Bergemann… - zoo.cs.yale.edu
• The set of objects/items is given by K={1,..., K}. The set of possible bundles that can be
formed from K is denoted by the power-set 1 2K. An arbitrary bundle is denoted by S∈ 2K.
Observe that the cardinality of 2K, ie the number of elements in the set 2K, is given by 2K.
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[PDF] Microeconomic Theory (521b) Problem Set 1. Revelation Principle

[PDF] from yale.edu
D Bergemann - econ.yale.edu
1. Revelation Principle. Carefully state and then establish the revelation principle# that we
stated in class for the notion of a dominant strategy equilibrium# for the Bayesian Nash
equilibrium notion. Generalize the ar# gument in class by allowing for mixed strategy ...
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[PDF] Microeconomic Theory (501b) Problem Set 12. Moral Hazard

[PDF] from yale.edu
D Bergemann - aida.econ.yale.edu
1. Consider the regular moral hazard model with a risk $ neutral principal and a risk averse
agent. The agent can choose between two effort levels, ai!# a, a $ with associated cost ci!# c,
c $%##, c $, with c>#. Each action generates stochastically one of two possible profit ...
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Hatton, Timothy J. Ageing Dellis, Arnaud Agglomeration Economies Ono, Yukako

Y Kinoshita, A Shevchenko, B Caillaud, A Bequest… - Cambridge Univ Press
This section contains an index of cun-ent working papers by author-supplied keyword. The keyword
is followed by the name of the primary author. Long keywords have been truncated. A complete
bibliographic listing can be found by consulting the corresponding entry for the primary ...

[PDF] Microeconomic Theory (501b) Problem Set 10. Adverse Selection

[PDF] from yale.edu
D Bergemann - aida.econ.yale.edu
2. Competition with Nonlinear Pricing. Suppose now that there are a large (infinite) number
of sellers who can offer nonlinear pricing con# tracts! q, t! q"" to the customer. The contracts
are offered simultaneously and each firm seeks to maximize the expected revenue from its ...
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Microeconomic Theory Problem Set 2. Dynamic Revenue Maximizing Mechanism

D Bergemann - 2009 - econ.yale.edu
3. Consider now the extension of the single allocation problem to a sequential allocation
problem. The value of consumption of the object to agent i after k previous consumptions is
given by: v θ,..., θk!% k Σ i" θi where each θi!# &#, $'and l and l'are independent random ...
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[CITATION] Three Essays on Learning and Intertemporal Incentives

D Bergemann - 1994 - … of Arts and Sciences, University of …
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The value of benchmarking

U Hege… - Les Cahiers de Recherche, 2002 - ideas.repec.org
We consider the provision of venture capital in a dynamic model with multiple research
stages, where time and investment needed to meet each benchmark are unknown. The
allocation of funds is subject moral hazard. The optimal contract provides for incentive ...
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[PDF] Microeconomic Theory (521b) Problem Set 2. Nonlinear Pricing and Optimal Auctions

[PDF] from yale.edu
D Bergemann - econ.yale.edu
1. Revelation Principle. We discuss the revelation principle in the con# text of a single agent
model. The statement of the revelation principle (implictly) guaranteed that every type θ G
could send all reports, ie M! θ"% for all. We now consider the direct mechanism and allow ...
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[HTML] DP1757 Enterprise Break-ups and Performance During the Transition

[HTML] from cepr.org
L Lizal, M Singer, J Svejnar, DP Wage… - 1997 - cepr.org
Discussion Papers 1997. DP1757, Enterprise Break-ups and Performance
During the Transition. Publication Date: December 1997. ...
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[PDF] Should I Stay or Should I Go? Search without Priors

[PDF] from gtcenter.org
D Bergemann… - 2011 - gtcenter.org
Abstract Sequential search without recall is typically accompanied by substantial
uncertainty. Classic models reduce this uncertainty to risk by considering a prior over the
underlying distributions. We show how to search among a finite number of alternatives ...
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DP7988 Targeting in Advertising Markets: Implications for Offline vs. Online Media

D Bergemann… - 2010 - cepr.org
We develop a model with many advertisers (products) and many advertising markets
(media). Each advertiser sells to a different segment of consumers, and each medium has a
different ability to target advertising messages. We characterize the competitive ...
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DP2991 Information Structures in Optimal Auctions

D Bergemann… - 2001 - cepr.org
A seller wishes to sell an object to one of multiple bidders. The valuations of the bidders are
privately known. We consider the joint design problem in which the seller can decide the
accuracy by which bidders learn their valuation and to whom to sell at what price. We ...
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Review of Economic Growth by RJ Barro and X. Sala-i-Martin

Full text - MIT Libraries
G Bellettini… - Metroeconomica, 1998 - Wiley Online Library
Beginning with pionering contributions by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988), endogenous
growth theory has become one of the most popular areas of research in modern
macroeconomics. The new growth theory extends the horizon of traditional neoclassical ...
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2007):\ Robust Monopoly Pricing

D Bergemann… - Economics, Yale University - Citeseer
Abstract We consider a robust version of the classic problem of optimal monopoly pricing
with incomplete information. In the robust version, the seller faces model uncertainty and
only knows that the true demand distribution is in the neighborhood of a given model ...
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DP1738 Venture Capital Financing, Moral Hazard and Learning

D Bergemann… - 1997 - cepr.org
We consider the provision of venture capital in a dynamic agency model. The value of the
venture project is initially uncertain and more information arrives by developing the project.
The allocation of funds and the learning process are subject to moral hazard. The optimal ...
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[PDF] Microeconomic Theory (501b) Problem Set 10. Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

[PDF] from yale.edu
D Bergemann - econ.yale.edu
is suffi cient to consider the case with finitely many types.(c) Consider the finite model for the
product case u θ, q!% θ q and solve the optimal quality provision problem of the seller. i. As
a first intermediate step describe the net utility that each type gets after you replaced the ...
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Mechanism Design with Limited Information: The Case of Nonlinear Pricing

YC Submitter, D Bergemann, J Shen, Y Xu… - 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We analyze the canonical nonlinear pricing model with limited information. A seller
offers a menu with a finite number of choices to a continuum of buyers with a continuum of
possible valuations. By revealing an underlying connection to quantization theory, we ...
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Microeconomic Theory (521b) Problem Set 3. Optimal Auctions and Implementation

D Bergemann - econ.yale.edu
1. (Mas#Collel, Whinston, and Green 1995) 23.D.2. and then 23.E.1. Bilat# eral Trade with Budget
Balance and Participation Constraints ... 2. (Mas#Collel, Whinston, and Green 1995) 23.E.6.
Bilateral Trade and Dis# solution of a Partnership ... 3. (Mas#Collel, Whinston, and Green ...
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DP2763 The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping

D Bergemann… - 2001 - temporaryaddress.cepr.org
This Paper considers the financing of a research project under uncertainty about the time of
completion and the probability of eventual success. The uncertainty about future success
diminishes gradually with the arrival of additional funding. The entrepreneur controls the ...
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[PDF] Information Economics

[PDF] from yale.edu
D Bergemann - 2009 - econ.yale.edu
Game theory is the study of multi&person decision problems. The focus of game theory is
interdependence, situations in which an entire group of people is affected by the choices
made by every individual within that group. As such they appear frequently in economics. ...
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Microeconomic Theory (521b) Problem Set 3. Dynamic Auctions

D Bergemann - aida.econ.yale.edu
2. Consider now the extension of the single allocation problem to a sequential allocation
problem. The value of consumption of the object to agent i after k previous consumptions is
given by: v (θ,..., θk) 2 k Σ i" θi where each θi!#[0, 1] and l and l'are independent random ...
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Dynamic Auctions: Uniqueness and Robustness to Private Information

D Bergemann… - Levine's Bibliography, 2007 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract Dynamic Auctions Uniqueness and Robustness Private Information Dirk
Bergemann and Stephen Morris The important role dynamic auctions particular ascending
price auctions for the revelation private information has long been recognized The ...
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Pricing in Matching Markets

D Bergemann… - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Different markets are cleared by different types of prices-a universal price for all
buyers and sellers in some markets, seller-specific prices that are uniform across buyers in
others, and personalized prices tailored to both the buyer and the seller in yet others. We ...

[PDF] Idiosyncratic Learning in Monopoly

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
D Bergemann… - wcas.northwestern.edu
Abstract In this paper, we develop a model of experience goods pricing with indepedent
private valuations. We show that the optimal paths of sales and prices take qualitatively
different shapes for different products. If the buyers are initially pessimistic, then the prices ...
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[PDF] Learning and Commitment in Incentive Contracts1

[PDF] from yale.edu
D Bergemann - Intellectual property rights and …, 1995 - dirkbergemann.commons.yale.edu
Partnerships between economic agents commonly endure many periods. The commitment
of the partners is documented in a contract, which may exist only implicitly or may be written
explicitly. Contracts typically don't cover the entire life-span of the partnership. Insurance ...
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[PDF] Microeconomic Theory (521b) Problem Set 1. Dynamic Allocation Indices and Information Disclosure

[PDF] from yale.edu
D Bergemann - econ.yale.edu
Claim: 1: In any optimal solution the arm 1 is used. Proof of Claim 1: Otherwise by definition
and assumption that indexes are decreasing the problem must yield a value strictly lower
than v $. But then starting with arm 1 for r* i times is a profitable deviation.
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