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Policy burdens, accountability, and the soft budget constraint

[PDF] from ccer.edu.cn
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JY Lin… - The American Economic Review, 1999 - JSTOR
In a socialist economy, when a state-owned enterprise (SOE) incurs losses, the government
often provides it with additional funding, cuts its taxes, and offers other compensations.
Coincidentally, the managers of an SOE also expect to receive financial assistance from ...
Cited by 182 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 29 versions

The economics of hubs: The case of monopoly

[PDF] from usc.edu
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K Hendricks, M Piccione… - The Review of …, 1995 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract In this paper, we study the optimization problem of an unregulated air carrier which
is given the exclusive right to satisfy demand for air travel between any pair of cities. It
chooses a network of connections and a set of prices to maximize profits. Thus, both ...
Cited by 142 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 15 versions

Entry and exit in hub-spoke networks

[PDF] from usc.edu
K Hendricks, M Piccione… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1997 - JSTOR
We offer an explanation for why regional carriers may not survive in hub-spoke networks.
When a regional carrier and a hub operator compete in a spoke market, both will suffer
losses in that market. But if the hub operator exits in the spoke market, its profits in ...
Cited by 113 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - BL Direct - All 16 versions

Entry and R & D in procurement contracting

Full text - MIT Libraries
G Tan - Journal of Economic Theory, 1992 - Elsevier
Abstract A model of competitive procurement and contracting is presented in this paper. The
key features of the model include precontract R & D, an endogenous number of
homogeneous firms, and sealed-bid auction rules. Both diminishing and constant returns ...
Cited by 100 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 8 versions

Equilibria in networks

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K Hendricks, M Piccione… - Econometrica, 1999 - Wiley Online Library
We study a model in which two carriers choose networks to connect cities and compete for
customers. We show that if carriers compete aggressively (eg, Bertrand-like behavior), one
carrier operating a single hub-spoke network is an equilibrium outcome. Competing hub- ...
Cited by 74 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 19 versions

The Affiliation Effect in First‐Price Auctions

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J Pinkse… - Econometrica, 2005 - Wiley Online Library
We study the monotonicity of the equilibrium bid with respect to the number of bidders n in
affiliated private-value models of first-price sealed-bid auctions and prove the existence of a
large class of such models in which the equilibrium bid function is not increasing in n. We ...
Cited by 67 - Related articles - All 17 versions

Equilibria in second price auctions with participation costs

[PDF] from upi-yptk.ac.id
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G Tan… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2006 - Elsevier
We investigate equilibria of sealed-bid second price auctions with bidder participation costs
in the independent private values environment. We focus on equilibria in cutoff strategies
(participate and bid the valuation iff it is greater than the cutoff), since if a bidder finds it ...
Cited by 47 - Related articles - All 22 versions

[PDF] Hidden reserve prices with risk averse bidders

[PDF] from usc.edu
H Li… - University of British Columbia Working Paper, 2000 - www-rcf.usc.edu
Abstract In this paper, we provide an alternative explanation for why aucM tioneers often
keep the reserve price hidden or secret. We consider a standard independent private values
environment in which the buyM ers are riskMaverse and the seller has private information ...
Cited by 37 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 2 versions

Cost-reducing investment, optimal procurement and implementation by auctions

[PDF] from usc.edu
M Piccione… - International Economic Review, 1996 - JSTOR
We analyze a model in which potential suppliers invest in research and development (R &
D) and then compete for a procurement contract from a buyer. If the buyer is able to commit
to a procurement mechanism before the investment stage, the full-information solution can ...
Cited by 35 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - BL Direct - All 11 versions

Strategic incentives of divestitures of competing conglomerates

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G Tan… - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2003 - Elsevier
We provide an alternative theory of divestiture that relies on product-line complementarities
and product market competition. We show that in equilibrium competing conglomerates with
complementary product lines have incentives to divest and that such divestitures increase ...
Cited by 27 - Related articles - All 12 versions

[CITATION] Infanticide and family planning in late imperial China: The price and population history of rural Liaoning, 1774-1873

J Lee, C Campbell, G Tan - Chinese …, 1992 - University of California Press …
Cited by 24 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries

Bidding rings and the winner's curse: The case of federal offshore oil and gas lease auctions

[PDF] from lse.ac.uk
K Hendricks, R Porter… - 2003 - nber.org
This paper extends the theory of legal cartels to affiliated private value and common value
environments, and applies the theory to explain joint bidding patterns in US federal
government offshore oil and gas lease auctions. We show that efficient collusion is always ...
Cited by 21 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 37 versions

Optimal selling strategies for oil and gas leases with an informed buyer

[PDF] from usc.edu
K Hendricks, RH Porter… - The American Economic Review, 1993 - JSTOR
From 1954 to 1990, the US Department of Interior auctioned mineral rights to 12,288 tracts
on federal offshore lands in a succession of lease sales. Each sale consisted of the
simultaneous auction of many (usually 100 or more) tracts. The auction format was first- ...
Cited by 21 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - BL Direct - All 13 versions

[CITATION] Fewer Bidders can Increase Price in First-Price Auctions with Affiliated Private Values

J Pinkse… - University of British Columbia mimeograph, 2000
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Optimal procurement mechanisms for an informed buyer

G Tan - Canadian Journal of Economics, 1996 - JSTOR
This paper studies a buyer (eg, a government agency) offering a procurement contract to a
number of privately informed suppliers. The buyer has private information about her demand
for the product to be procured. The optimal mechanisms for all types of the buyer are ...
Cited by 19 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - BL Direct - All 5 versions

[CITATION] Foreign direct investment and international fragmentation of production

LK Cheng, LD Qiu… - Fragmentation: New Production Patterns in the World …, 2001
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[PDF] A simple model of expert and non-expert bidding in first-price auctions

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M Piccione… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1996 - www-bcf.usc.edu
This paper studies the equilibrium bidding behavior in a first-price sealed-bid auction when
the number of informed bidders is not common knowledge. Both the independent private
values and the common value cases are analyzed, under the assumption that a``neutral'' ...
Cited by 17 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 17 versions

Bidding rings and the winner's curse

Full text - MIT Libraries
K Hendricks, R Porter… - The RAND Journal of …, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
1. We received helpful comments from Susan Athey, Jacques Cremer, Glenn Ellison, Paul
Klemperer, the referees, and participants in a number of seminars. David Barth and Heng Ju
provided capable research assistance. Hendricks and Tan received financial support from ...
Cited by 17 - Related articles - All 7 versions

Foreign direct investment and international trade in a continuum Ricardian trade model

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LK Cheng, LD Qiu… - Journal of Development Economics, 2005 - Elsevier
We develop a continuum Ricardian trade model to capture both North–South trade and
technology transfer via foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational enterprises (MNEs).
We show that there is a unique range of products produced in the South by MNEs. In the ...
Cited by 15 - Related articles - All 10 versions

[BOOK] Endogenous coalition formation in rivalry

[PDF] from queensu.ca
G Tan… - 1997 - qed.econ.queensu.ca
Abstract This paper studies endogenous coalition formation in an environment where
continuing conflict exists. A number of players compete for an indivisible prize and the
probability of winning for a player depends on his initial resource as well as the ...
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Ratifiability of efficient collusive mechanisms in second-price auctions with participation costs

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G Tan… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2007 - Elsevier
We investigate whether efficient collusive bidding mechanisms are affected by potential
information leakage from bidders' decisions to participate in them within the independent
private values setting. We apply the concept of ratifiability introduced by Cramton and ...
Cited by 10 - Related articles - All 26 versions

External threat and collective action

[PDF] from indiana.edu
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E Niou… - Economic Inquiry, 2005 - Wiley Online Library
This article studies how players allocate their endowed resources between productive and
conflictual activities in the context of rivalry between two groups. We show that the
suboptimality and exploitation propositions established by Olson (1965) do not ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - All 16 versions

Asymmetric common-value auctions with applications to private-value auctions with resale

[PDF] from ku.edu
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HH Cheng… - Economic Theory, 2010 - Springer
Abstract We study a model of common-value auctions with two bidders in which bidders'
private information are independently and asymmetrically distributed. We present sufficient
and necessary conditions, respectively, under which the expected revenues from first- ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - All 23 versions

An arbitration game and the egalitarian bargaining solution

Full text - MIT Libraries
W Bossert… - Social Choice and Welfare, 1995 - Springer
We analyze a simple arbitration procedure which is a multi-stage variant of Nash's demand
game. In the absence of discounting, all Nash equilibria of the game yield the egalitarian
solution in the first stage. The crucial feature of our arbitration procedure is that, in the ...
Cited by 6 - Related articles

The market for sweepstakes

[PDF] from ust.hk
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SH Chew… - Review of Economic Studies, 2005 - Wiley Online Library
This paper studies the market for monopolistically supplied sweepstakes. We derive
equilibrium demands for fixed-prize and variable-prize sweepstakes and determine the profit-
maximizing prize level and pay-out ratio respectively. It can be profitable to offer each type ...
Cited by 6 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 11 versions

An analysis of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's self-assessment scheme for land taxation

[PDF] from duke.edu
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EMS Niou… - Public Choice, 1994 - Springer
Dr. Sun Yat-sen 1 proposed a method of self-assessment of land value in 1905. Under his
scheme, each owner submits his own valuation but the state reserves the right to purchase
the land at the self-assessed value. Sun claimed that this scheme would deter landowners ...
Cited by 6 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 11 versions

Joint Bidding in Federal Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions

K Hendricks, R Porter… - Econometric Society World …, 2000 - ideas.repec.org
This paper provides an explanation for why cartels are not observed frequently in mineral-
rights auctions even though it was not illegal for them to form. We use the techniques of
mechanism design to characterize the efficient, incentive compatible cartel and show that ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - Cached - All 4 versions

[PDF] Asymmetric common value auctions with applications to auctions with resale

[PDF] from ecore.be
H Cheng… - Unpublished manuscript, 2007 - ecore.be
Abstract We study a model of common value auctions in which bidders' private information
are independently and asymmetrically distributed. We provide two sufficient conditions
under which a first-price auction generates higher revenue than a second-price auction ( ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 12 versions

[PDF] The economic theory of vertical restraints

[PDF] from competitionbureau.gc.ca
G Tan - documento de trabajo elaborado para el …, 2001 - competitionbureau.gc.ca
1. Abstract Vertical relationships between manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers often
involve complex contracting arrangments. These arrangements are broadly referred to as
vertical restraints. This report provides a selective review of the economic theory on a ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 8 versions

[CITATION] Taiwanese Investment in Mainland China as a Policy Tool

EMS Niou, PC Ordeshook… - ISSUES AND …, 1992 - INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL …
Cited by 3 - Related articles - BL Direct

[PDF] Technology Transfer, Foreign Direct Investment and International Trade

[PDF] from psu.edu
LK Cheng, LD Qiu… - … of Economics, Hong Kong University of …, 2000 - Citeseer
Abstract By developing a Ricardian trade model that features technology transfer via foreign
direct investment (FDI), we show that technology transfer via multinational enterprises
(MNEs) increases world output and trade in goods and services. When there are many ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 8 versions

The Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints

T Guofu - Review of Industrial Economics, 2004 - en.cnki.com.cn
Vertical relationships between manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers often in-volve
complex contracting arrangements. These arrangements are broadly referred to as vertical
restraints. This report provides a selective review of the economic theory on a subset of ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - Cached

[CITATION] Cost-Reducing Investment, Incentives, and Procurement Contracts

M Piccione… - University of British Columbia, Cambridge, MA, 1993
Cited by 3 - Related articles

[CITATION] Incentive Procurement Contracts With Costly R&D

G Tan - Working Papers, 1989 - econpapers.repec.org
By Guofu. Tan; Incentive Procurement Contracts with Costly R&D.
Cited by 3 - Related articles - Cached - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 5 versions

China's Anti-Monopoly Law: What is the Welfare Standard?

P Shan, G Tan, SJ Wilkie… - Review of Industrial Organization, 2012 - Springer
Abstract China's Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) sets forth the country's antitrust enforcement
policies. We investigate the welfare standard that the AML seeks to maximize by examining
both its stated language and, via revealed preference, the antitrust actions taken by the ...
Cited by 2 - Get it from MIT Libraries

[CITATION] Active asset markets, divestitures and divisional cross-subsidization

S Dasgupta, V Goyal… - 1999 - Hong Kong University of Science & …
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Active asset markets, divestitures and divisional cross-subsidization

[PDF] from ust.hk
S Dasgupta, V Goyal… - 2000 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper develops a model which shows that when divestiture activity takes
place in the backdrop of an active asset market, divisional cross-subsidies emerge even in
the absence of agency problems between managers and shareholders. In our model, the ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - All 4 versions

[CITATION] Policy Burdens

JY Lin… - Accountability and the Soft Budset Constraint [J J. …, 1999
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[PDF] The Affiliation Effect in First-Price Auctions: Supplementary Material

[PDF] from econometricsociety.org
J Pinkse… - Econometrica Supplementary Material, …, 2004 - econometricsociety.org
In Pinkse and Tan (2005) we show the existence of a new effect called the affiliation effect,
which can cause equilibrium bids to be decreasing in the number of bidders in first-price
auctions with conditionally independent private values. Here we analyze what happens ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 3 versions

[BOOK] Entry and Exit in Hub-Spoke Networks

K Hendricks, M Piccione, G Tan… - 1995 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract We offer an explanation for why regional carriers may not survive in hub-spoke
networks. When a regional carrier and a hub operator compete in a spoke market, both will
suffer losses in that market. But if the hub operator exists in the spoke market, its profits in ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - Cached - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 5 versions

[CITATION] The pre-emptive Nature of Brand-name firm introduction of Generics with Random Entry

A Ching… - Work-in-progress, Department of Economics, The Ohio …, 2002
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[CITATION] Applicatien and Development of Computer Technologies in Measuring Coal Mine Quality

XYMBD Guangfu… - Journal of Jixi University, 2004 - en.cnki.com.cn
The article discusses how to deal with statistics and charts in measuring coal mine quality
with com-puters, and how to replace traditional methods by collecting, sorting out, making
Charts and making forms with com-puters to be speedy, accurate, standard, easy to be ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - Cached

[CITATION] Entry and R&D Costs In Competitive Procurements and Contracting

G Tan - Working Papers, 1989 - econpapers.repec.org
By Guofu. Tan; Entry and R&D Costs in Competitive Procurements and Contracting.
Cited by 1 - Related articles - Cached - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 4 versions

[PDF] Private-Value Auctions, Resale, and Common Value

[PDF] from ucr.edu
H Cheng… - Los Angeles: Department of Economics, …, 2009 - economics.ucr.edu
Abstract We establish the bid% equivalence between an independent private% value (IPV)
first% price auction model with resale and a model of first% price common% value auctions.
The common value is defined by the transaction price when trade takes place. When there ...
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[CITATION] Complements, substitutes and strategic divestitures

G Tan… - 1997 - Hong Kong University of Science & …
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[CITATION] External threats, incentive schemes, and defense budget sharing: a collective-good model

EMS Niou… - 1997 - Hong Kong University of Science & …
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[CITATION] The market for sweepstakes

SH Chew… - 1999 - Hong Kong University of Science & …
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[CITATION] A Moral Hazard Trap to Growth: a Reconsideration

W Schworm, G Tan… - 1994 - Dept. of Economics, University of …
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[CITATION] Auctioning Procurement Contracts by an Informed Buyer

G Tan - UBC Departmental Archives, 1991 - ideas.repec.org
No abstract is available for this item. ... To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three options: 1. Check below under "Related
research" whether another version of this item is available online. 2. Check on the ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - Cached - Library Search - All 5 versions

[CITATION] Taiwanese Investment in Mainland China as a Tool of Foreign Policy

EMS Niou, PC Ordeshook… - 1992 - Duke University Program in Political …
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[CITATION] Optimal procurement and contracting with research and development

G Tan - 1990 - California Institute of Technology

[CITATION] Recent Developments in Industrial Economics: A Selective Review

G Tan
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[PDF] DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

[PDF] from caltech.edu
G Tan - 1989 - hss.caltech.edu
ABSTRACT This paper provides a model of both R&D and production in procurement
processes where firms invest in R&D and compete for a government procurement contract.
The optimal incentive procurement contract is characterized to maximize the government's ...
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China's Anti-Monopoly Law: What is the Welfare Standard?

[PDF] from usc.edu
P Shan, G Tan, M Williams - University of Southern California, 2011 - law.bepress.com
Abstract China's Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) sets forth the country's antitrust enforcement
policies. We investigate what welfare standard the AML seeks to maximize by examining
both its stated language and, via revealed preference, the antitrust actions taken by the ...
Related articles - All 5 versions

The Market for Sweepstakes

[PDF] from usc.edu
CS Hong… - 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract. This paper studies the market for monopolistically supplied sweepstakes. We
derive equilibrium demands for fixed-prize and variable-prize sweepstakes and determine
the profit maximizing prize level and payout ratio respectively. It can be profitable to offer ...
Related articles - All 12 versions

[PDF] On Bargaining Problems Admitting a Unique Nash Bargaining Solution

[PDF] from pku.edu.cn
CZ Qin, S Shi… - 2008 - gsm.pku.edu.cn
Abstract We completely characterize a class of bargaining problems on which three of Nash
axioms uniquely characterize the Nash bargaining solution up to specifications of
bargaining powers. We show that this class includes noconvex bargaining problems ...
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[CITATION] Infanticide and family planning in rural Liaoning, 1774-1873 TITLE

J Lee, C Campbell, T Guofu… - Chinese History in … - University of California Press …

[PDF] Competition, Calling Prices and Settlement Rates in International Telephone Markets

[PDF] from ucsb.edu
H Ju… - 2010 - econ.econ.ucsb.edu
Abstract A unique feature of international telephone markets is the bilateral interaction
between telephone carriers from two distinct countries: Access to a foreign carrier's network
is an essential and complementary input for a domestic carrier in a country to provide ...
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[PDF] Joint Bidding in Federal O® shore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions

[PDF] from econometricsociety.org
K Hendricks, R Porter… - 2000 - econometricsociety.org
Abstract This paper provides an explanation for why cartels are not observed frequently in
mineral-rights auctions even though it was not illegal for them to form. We use the
techniques of mechanism design to characterize the e±cient, incentive compatible cartel ...
View as HTML - All 5 versions

[CITATION] Monopoly Provision of Product Warranties

G Tan - Working Papers, 1989 - econpapers.repec.org
By Guofu. Tan; Monopoly Provision of Product Warranties.
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[CITATION] The Demand for Sweepstakes

G Tan, SH Chew… - 1998 - School of Economics and Finance, …
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[CITATION] 2003 Canadian economic theory conference (2002, Vol. 29, No. 46.)

G Celik, P Ghosh, Y Halevy, A Shneyerov, G Tan…

The editors would like to express their sincere thanks for the generous support and helpful advice given by its referees. The continued success of Defence and Peace …

R ALEXANDER, C ANDERTON, J ANTON… - Taylor & Francis
The editors would like to express their sincere thanks for the generous support and helpful advice
given by its referees. The continued success of Defence and Peace Economicsdepends on the
support of these referees:- ... ALEXANDER, Robert ANDERTON, Charles ANTON, James ...

[CITATION] Endogenous Coalition Formation in Rivalry [computer File]

Queen's University (Kingston, Ont.). Institute for … - 1997 - Institute for Economic Research, …
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[PDF] Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority

[PDF] from psu.edu
S Barbera, MO Jackson, J Snyder, G Tan… - 2000 - Citeseer
Abstract We consider the endogenous choice of a voting rule, characterized by the majority
size needed to elect change over the status quo, by a society who will use the rule to make
future decisions. Under simple assumptions on the uncertainty concerning the future ...
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The Market for Sweepstakes

G Tan… - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper studies the market for monopolistically supplied sweepstakes. We
derive equilibrium demands for fixed-prize and variable-prize sweepstakes and determine
the profit maximizing prize level and payout ratio respectively. It can be profitable to offer ...

[PDF] Competition, the Proportional Return Rule and Settlement Rates in International Telephone Markets

[PDF] from xmu.edu.cn
H Ju… - 2007 - wise.xmu.edu.cn
Abstract The provision of international telephone calls requires a settlement arrangement
between countries in their traffic exchanges. A call-termination charge, or “settlement rate”, is
paid from the call-initiating country to the terminating country. Around 1980, the US ...
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[CITATION] A Strategic Justification of the Egalitarian Bargaining Solution.

W Bossert… - 1992 - socionet.ru
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[PDF] 产业经济学暑期研讨班

[PDF] from shufe.edu.cn
Full text - MIT Libraries
Z Chen, PM Competition… - Journal of Economics - gsgl.shufe.edu.cn
2009 年7 月1 日—4 日 July1st – 4th, 2009 ... 上海财经大学 Shanghai University of Finance and
Economics ... 7 月1 日(星期三) July 1st, Wednesday 谭国富教授:垄断与占优企业的价格策略 Professor
Guofu Tan: Pricing Theory of Dominant Firms 7 月2 日(星期四) July 2nd, Thursday
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[PDF] Théorie économique des restrictions verticales

[PDF] from ic.gc.ca
G Tan - ic.gc.ca
Résumé Les relations verticales entre fabricants, grossistes et détaillants sont souvent
régies par des accords complexes. On désigne généralement ces ententes par l'expression
«restrictions verticales». Dans ce rapport, nous faisons un examen sélectif des principes ...
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