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User profiles for author:"Yeon-Koo Che"

Yeon-Koo Che

Columbia Univeresity
Verified email at columbia.edu
Cited by 3767

Design competition through multidimensional auctions

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YK Che - rand Journal of Economics, 1993 - works.bepress.com
This article studies design competition in government procurement by developing a model of
two-dimensional auctions, wherejirms bid on both price and quality, and bids are evaluated
by a scoring rule designed by a buyer. Three auction schemes-first score, second score, ...
Cited by 563 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 14 versions

Cooperative investments and the value of contracting

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YK Che… - American Economic Review, 1999 - works.bepress.com
Recent articles have shown that contracts can support the efficient outcome for bilateral
trade, even in the face of specific investments and incomplete contracting. These studies
typically considered''selfish''investments that benefit the investor (eg, the seller's ...
Cited by 499 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 20 versions

Optimal incentives for teams

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
YK Che… - Forthcoming in American Economic Review, 1996 - works.bepress.com
Much of the existing theory of incentives describes a static relationship that lasts for just one
transaction. This static assumption is not only unrealistic, but the resulting predictions
appear to be at odds with many work organizations. The current paper introduces possible ...
Cited by 371 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 28 versions

Caps on political lobbying

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YK Che… - American Economic Review, 1998 - works.bepress.com
The cost of political campaigns in the United States has risen substantially in recent years.
For example, real spending on congressional election campaigns doubled between 1976
and 1992 (Steven D. Levitt, 1995). There are many reasons why increased campaign ...
Cited by 231 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 22 versions

Standard auctions with financially constrained bidders

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YK Che… - The Review of Economic Studies, 1998 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We develop a methodology for analyzing the revenue and efficiency performance of
auctions when buyers have private information about their willingness to pay and ability to
pay. We then apply the framework to scenarios involving standard auction mechanisms. In ...
Cited by 202 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 16 versions

Optimal design of research contests

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YK Che… - American Economic Review, 2003 - works.bepress.com
Procurement of an innovation often requires substantial effort by potential suppliers.
Motivating effort may be difficult if the level of effort and quality of the resulting innovation are
unverifiable, if innovators cannot benefit directly by marketing their innovations, and if the ...
Cited by 170 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 21 versions

Decoupling liability: optimal incentives for care and litigation

[PDF] from columbia.edu
AM Polinsky… - 1993 - nber.org
A" decoupled" liability system is one in which the award to the plaintiff differs from the
payment by the defendant. The optimal system of decoupling makes the defendant's
payment as high as possible. Such a policy allows the award to the plaintiff to be lowered, ...
Cited by 135 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 15 versions

Competitive procurement with corruption

[PDF] from columbia.edu
R Burguet… - RAND Journal of Economics, 2004 - JSTOR
We study competitive procurement administered by a corrupt agent who is willing to
manipulate his evaluation of contract proposals in exchange for bribes. With complete
information and no corruption, the efficient firm will win the contract for sure. If the agent is ...
Cited by 116 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - BL Direct - All 13 versions

The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer

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YK Che… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2000 - Elsevier
This paper finds an optimal mechanism for selling a good to a buyer who may be budget-
constrained. We consider a seller with one unit of a good facing a buyer with a quasilinear
utility function. If the buyer does not face a binding budget constraint, textbook monopoly ...
Cited by 107 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 18 versions

Contract damages and cooperative investments

[PDF] from columbia.edu
YK Che… - The Rand Journal of Economics, 1999 - JSTOR
We study alternative breach remedies in the presence of specific investments that generate
a direct benefit to the investor's trading partner (referred to as" cooperative investments"). We
find that (i) expectation damages perform very poorly, inducing no cooperative investment; ...
Cited by 92 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - BL Direct - All 14 versions

A dynamic theory of holdup

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YK Che… - Econometrica, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
The holdup problem arises when parties negotiate to divide the surplus generated by their
relationship specific investments. We study this problem in a dynamic model of bargaining
and investment which, unlike the stylized static model, allows the parties to continue to ...
Cited by 82 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 26 versions

Robustly Collusion‐Proof Implementation

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YK Che… - Econometrica, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
A contract with multiple agents may be susceptible to collusion. We show that agents'
collusion imposes no cost in a large class of circumstances with risk neutral agents,
including both uncorrelated and correlated types. In those circumstances, any payoff the ...
Cited by 79 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 30 versions

Revolving doors and the optimal tolerance for agency collusion

[PDF] from columbia.edu
YK Che - The Rand journal of economics, 1995 - JSTOR
In this article, I study how the presence of a revolving door and potential collusion between a
regulator and a regulated firm affect the regulator's performance incentives. Contrary to the
conventional wisdom, these seemingly undesirable features of the regulatory system may ...
Cited by 77 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - BL Direct - All 11 versions

Customer return policies for experience goods

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YK Che - The Journal of Industrial Economics, 1996 - JSTOR
This paper studies the economic rationale for customer return policies, by focusing on the"
experience goods" aspect of many products. Return policies allow consumers to defer their
purchasing decisions until after they gain some experience with goods. In so doing, they ...
Cited by 69 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 9 versions

Rent dissipation when rent seekers are budget constrained

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YK Che… - Public Choice, 1997 - Springer
In the original Tullock (1975, 1980) game, an individual bidder's probability of winning with a
bid b is proportional to b R, where the exponent reflects economies of scale in rent seeking.
Different interpretations can be given to these probabilities. First, one may view R as a ...
Cited by 59 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 9 versions

Difference-form contests and the robustness of all-pay auctions

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YK Che… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2000 - Elsevier
In much of the existing literature on rent-seeking games, the outcome of the contest is either
infinitely sensitive or relatively insensitive to contestants' efforts. The current paper presents
a family of contest games that permit characterization of equilibrium for all levels of ...
Cited by 58 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 15 versions

Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints

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YK Che… - Economics Letters, 1996 - Elsevier
We show that all-pay auctions dominate first-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders face
budget constraints. This ranking is explained by the fact that budget constraints bind less
frequently in the all-pay auctions, which leads to more aggressive bidding in that format.
Cited by 47 - Related articles - All 7 versions

Joint liability and peer monitoring under group lending

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YK Che - Contributions in Theoretical Economics, 2002 - degruyter.com
This paper studies an incentive rationale for the use of group lending as a method of
financing liquidity-constrained entrepreneurs. The joint liability feature associated with group
lending lowers the liquidity risk of default but creates a free-riding problem. In the static ...
Cited by 40 - Related articles - All 13 versions

Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: An experiment

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J Andreoni, YK Che… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2007 - Elsevier
This paper studies experimentally how information about rivals' types affects bidding
behavior in first-and second-price auctions. The comparative static hypotheses associated
with information about rivals enables us to test the relevance of such information as well ...
Cited by 39 - Related articles - Library Search - All 23 versions

Equilibrium formation of class action suits

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YK Che - Journal of Public Economics, 1996 - Elsevier
In large class litigation, courts often award judgments or make important decisions on the
basis of the aggregate merit of the entire class and not upon the individual merit of each
member. This so-called damage averaging practice provides different incentives to victims ...
Cited by 39 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 7 versions

Optimal collusion-proof auctions

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YK Che… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2009 - Elsevier
We study an optimal collusion-proof auction in an environment where subsets of bidders
may collude not just on their bids but also on their participation. Despite their ability to
collude on participation, informational asymmetry facing the potential colluders can be ...
Cited by 37 - Related articles - All 25 versions

Opinions as incentives

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YK Che… - Journal of Political Economy, 2009 - works.bepress.com
Abstract We study a model where a decision maker (DM) must rely on an adviser for
information about the state of the world relevant for her decision. The adviser has the same
underlying preferences as the DM; he may differ, however, in his prior belief about the ...
Cited by 32 - Related articles - All 15 versions

Asymptotic equivalence of probabilistic serial and random priority mechanisms

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YK Che… - Econometrica, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
The random priority (random serial dictatorship) mechanism is a common method for
assigning objects. The mechanism is easy to implement and strategy-proof. However, this
mechanism is inefficient, because all agents may be made better off by another ...
Cited by 28 - Related articles - All 53 versions

Section 365, mandatory bankruptcy rules and inefficient continuance

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YK Che… - Journal of Law, Economics, and …, 1999 - Oxford Univ Press
Abstract Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits enforcement of the once
common'ipso facto clause.'The clause excuses the solvent party from performance of the
contract when the other party becomes insolvent. We show that the ability of insolvent ...
Cited by 26 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 13 versions

The economics of collective negotiation in pretrial bargaining

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YK Che - International Economic Review, 2002 - JSTOR
This article studies the strategic use of collective negotiation in multiplaintiff litigation.
Compared with one-on-one negotiation, collective negotiation can change the distribution of
per-plaintiff damages in a manner that influences the defendant's bargaining incentive. ...
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Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The'Boston'Mechanism Reconsidered

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A Abdulkadiroglu, YK Che… - 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: The Boston mechanism is among the most popular school choice procedures in
use. Yet, the mechanism has been criticized for its poor incentive and welfare performances,
which led the Boston Public Schools to recently replace it with Gale and Shapley's ...
Cited by 25 - Related articles - All 9 versions

[CITATION] Financial constraints in auctions: Effects and antidotes

YK Che… - Advances in applied microeconomics, 1996
Cited by 23 - Related articles

Contractual remedies to the hold-up problem: a dynamic perspective

[PDF] from ed.ac.uk
YK Che… - American Law & Economics Association …, 2007 - law.bepress.com
Abstract An important theme of modern contract theory is the role contracts play to protect
parties from the risk of hold up and thereby encouraging their relationship specific
investments. While this perspective has generated valuable insights about various ...
Cited by 20 - Related articles - Library Search - All 17 versions

Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions

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J Kim… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2004 - Elsevier
We study auctions in which bidders may know the types of some rival bidders but not others.
This asymmetry in bidders' knowledge about rivals' types has different effects on the two
standard auction formats. In a second-price auction, it is weakly dominant to bid one's ...
Cited by 19 - Related articles - All 12 versions

Expanding “choice” in school choice

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
A Abdulkadiroglu, YK Che… - Duke University, Columbia …, 2008 - works.bepress.com
Abstract: Truthful revelation of preferences has emerged as a desideratum in the design of
school choice programs. Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance mechanism is strategy-proof
for students but limits their ability to communicate their preference intensities. This results ...
Cited by 19 - Related articles - All 60 versions

[CITATION] Eliciting Multi-Dimensional Care through Liability and Regulation

YK Che - CEPR Technical Paper, 1990
Cited by 18 - Related articles

[CITATION] Litigations with Multiple Plaintiffs: The Case of Effort Externality

YK Che… - CEPR Technical Paper, 1990
Cited by 17 - Related articles

Opinion as Incentives

[PDF] from uni-muenchen.de
YK Che… - 2006 - mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
We study a model where a decision maker (DM) must select an adviser to advise her about
an unknown state of the world. There is a pool of available advisers who all have the same
underlying preferences as the DM; they differ, however, in their prior beliefs about the ...
Cited by 16 - Related articles - All 34 versions

Can a contract solve hold-up when investments have externalities? A comment on De Fraja (1999)

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YK Che - Games and economic behavior, 2000 - Elsevier
This comment finds an error in De Fraja (1999), the correction of which overturns its main
result. In contrast to his claim, under a mild condition, the suggested contract is not only
unable to solve the hold-up problem but it can provide almost no incentive for specific ...
Cited by 15 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 8 versions

[CITATION] Incentive Regulation of Nuclear Electric Facilities

YK Che… - CEPR Technical Paper, 1991
Cited by 15 - Related articles

[CITATION] Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation, 22 RAND J

AM Polinsky… - Econ, 1991
Cited by 14 - Related articles

Optimal use of information in litigation: should regulatory information be withheld to deter frivolous suits?

[PDF] from columbia.edu
YK Che… - The Rand Journal of Economics, 1997 - JSTOR
We examine the value of incorporating regulatory information into the court liability decision
and making it publicly available, when the causality of harm is uncertain. Public access to
regulatory information, coupled with its use in a liability decision, not only improves the ...
Cited by 14 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - BL Direct - All 13 versions

Buyer alliances and managed competition

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YK Che… - Journal of Economics & Management …, 1997 - Wiley Online Library
In a health insurance market, a large employer or an organized “buyer alliance” is in a
position to influence the design of plans offered to its members. We study how the sponsors
of buyer alliances manage competition among insurance firms by focusing on their ...
Cited by 13 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 8 versions

Exploiting Plaintiffs Through Settlement: Divide and Conquer

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YK Che… - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical …, 2008 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: This paper considers settlement negotiations between a single defendant and N
plaintiffs when there are fixed costs of litigation. When making simultaneous take-it-or-leave-
it offers to the plaintiffs, the defendant adopts a divide-and-conquer strategy. Plaintiffs ...
Cited by 11 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 23 versions

Strategic judgment proofing

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YK Che… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
A liquidity-constrained entrepreneur raises capital to finance a business activity that may
harm bystanders. The entrepreneur raises senior (secured) debt to shield assets from the
tort victims in bankruptcy. For a fixed level of borrowing, senior debt creates better ...
Cited by 10 - Related articles - Library Search - All 65 versions

Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types

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YK Che… - Theoretical Economics, 2006 - works.bepress.com
This paper develops a methodology for characterizing expected revenue from auctions
when bidders' types come from an arbitrary distribution. In particular, types may be
multidimensional, and there may be mass points in the distribution. One application ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - All 35 versions

[PDF] Collusion-proof implementation of optimal mechanisms

[PDF] from psu.edu
YK Che… - University of Wisconsin, 2004 - Citeseer
Abstract: A contract with multiple agents may be susceptible to collusion. We show that
agents' collusion can be prevented at no cost in a large class of circumstances with risk
neutral agents—virtually all circumstances with uncorrelated types and a broad set of ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - View as HTML - Library Search - All 11 versions

The role of lockups in takeover contests

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YK Che… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
We examine breakup fees and stock lockups as devices for prospective target firms to
encourage bidder participation in takeover contests. Unless bidding costs for the first bidder
are too high, breakup fees provide for the socially desirable degree of competition and ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 18 versions

[PDF] Asymptotic Equivalence of Random Priority and Probabilistic Serial Mechanisms

[PDF] from tkfd.or.jp
YK Che… - Econometrica, forthcoming, 2008 - tkfd.or.jp
There is a fixed set of types of goods O, plus the null good (receiving no good) ø. Let O=
O∪{ø}. Each agent i has strict preferences πi over O. A q-economy is composed of q copies
of each (real) good and infinite copies of ø, and Set of agents: we only assume (number of ...
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[CITATION] VA Dynamic Theory of Holdup

YK Che… - V Economet $ rica, 2004
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[PDF] Bidding with securities: comment

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YK Che… - American Economic Review, 2010 - academiccommons.columbia.edu
Abstract Peter DeMarzo, Ilan Kremer and Andrzej Skrzypacz (2005, henceforth DKS)
analyzed auctions in which bidders compete in securities. They show that a steeper security
leads to a higher expected revenue for the seller, and also use this to establish the ...
Cited by 7 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 13 versions

How to Divide the Possession of a Football?

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YK Che… - Economics Letters, 2008 - Elsevier
The current National Football League overtime rule favors the team starting on offense.
Auctioning off or dividing-and-choosing the starting possession can potentially restore ex
post fairness. We find auctions to provide a better outcome when teams have asymmetric ...
Cited by 7 - Related articles - All 19 versions

[PDF] Beyond the Coasian irrelevance: Asymmetric information

[PDF] from columbia.edu
YK Che - Unpublished notes, Columbia University.[110, 114], 2006 - columbia.edu
Page 1. Beyond the Coasian Irrelevance: Asymmetric Information Yeon-Koo Che Columbia
University http://www.as.huji.ac.il/schools/econ17/reading/che User ID: econ17 Password: huji123
My papers also available in http://www.columbia.edu/˜ yc2271 Page 2. I. Introduction ...
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Mechanism design with a liquidity constrained buyer: The 2× 2 case

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YK Che… - European Economic Review, 1999 - Elsevier
This paper studies the implications of buyers' liquidity constraints for the optimal selling
strategy. The possibility that a buyer faces a binding liquidity constraint affects the seller's
strategy in a nontrivial way. Specifically, when a seller has one unit of a good to sell to a ...
Cited by 7 - Related articles - All 7 versions

Market versus non-market assignment of ownership

[PDF] from columbia.edu
YK Che… - Discussion Papers, 2009 - works.bepress.com
Abstract: We compare different methods of assigning ownership of a good when some
agents are wealth-constrained. When a good is sold at the marketclearing price, a high-
wealth individual may buy it but a low-wealth (or illiquid) individual may not, even if the ...
Cited by 6 - Related articles - All 6 versions

Performance-Based Pricing for Nucleaer Power Plants

Full text - MIT Libraries
YK Che… - The Energy Journal, 1995 - ideas.repec.org
State public utility commissions in the United States have implemented incentive regulations
to promote the operating efficiency of nuclear power plants. This paper surveys these
incentive programs, focusing on the perfomance-based pricing approach. Our findings ...
Cited by 6 - Related articles - Cached - BL Direct - All 8 versions

The optimal mechanism for selling to budget-constrained consumers

YK Che… - Working papers, 1996 - ideas.repec.org
This paper finds an optimal mechanism for selling an indivisible good to consumers who
may be budget-constrained. Unlike the case where buyers are not budget constrained, a
single posted price is not typically optimal. An optimal mechanism generally consists of a ...
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Lawyer Advising in Evidence Disclosure

[PDF] from uni-muenchen.de
YK Che… - MPRA Paper, 2007 - works.bepress.com
Abstract: This paper examines how the advice that lawyers provide to their clients affects the
disclosure of evidence and the outcome of adjudication, and how the adjudicator should
allocate the burden of proof in light of these effects. Despite lawyers' expertise in ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - All 14 versions

Economic Consequences of Speculative Side Bets: The Case of Naked Credit Default Swaps

[PDF] from columbia.edu
YK Che… - 2010 - works.bepress.com
Abstract We examine the effects of “naked” credit default swaps on equilibrium debt
contracts, pro ject choice, and the likelihood of default when investors have heterogeneous
beliefs about the future revenues of the borrower. Although such contracts are zero sum ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - All 3 versions

[CITATION] Incomplete Contracts and Cooperative Investments

YK Che… - Working papers, 1995 - econpapers.repec.org
By Yeon-Koo Che and Tai-Yeong Chung; Incomplete Contracts and Cooperative Investments.
Cited by 5 - Related articles - Cached - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 4 versions

[CITATION] Expanding

A Abdulkadiroglu, YK Che… - Choice” in School Choice,” PER Discussion …, 2008
Cited by 5 - Related articles

[CITATION] Cooperative investments and the value of contracting: Coase vs

YK Che… - Williamson" University of Wisconsin working paper, 1996
Cited by 4 - Related articles

[PDF] The role of lockups in takeover contests

[PDF] from duke.edu
YK Che… - RAND Journal of Economics, …, 2003 - faculty.fuqua.duke.edu
Abstract This paper examines breakup fees and stock lockups as devices for prospective
target firms to encourage bidder participation in takeover contest. We show that, unless
bidding costs for the first bidder are too high, breakup fees provide for the socially ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 17 versions

[CITATION] Auctions with Nonlinear Payoffs and Multidimensional Types

YK Che… - University of Wisconsin and Georgetown mimeo, 2002
Cited by 4 - Related articles

[CITATION] Auctions with Financially-Constrained Bidders

YK Che, IL Gale… - 1994 - Social Systems Research Institute, …
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[CITATION] Caps on Political Lobbying, 88 AM

YK Che… - Econ. Rev, 1998
Cited by 2 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries

[PDF] requirements pertaining to sales of goods and the rights of the buyer versus the obligation of the seller are taken into immediate consideration. 4 Case law …

[PDF] from writerighteam.com
YK Che, TY Chung, C Investments - Economics, 1999 - writerighteam.com
In cases of international trade/international sale of goods, contracts tend to be governed by
the terms set forth by both the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (CISG) and Incoterms, while the actual carriage of the goods from one port ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles

Market versus non-market assignment of initial ownership

[PDF] from uni-muenchen.de
YK Che - American Law & Economics Association Annual …, 2007 - law.bepress.com
Abstract: We study the assignment of initial ownership of a good when agents differ in their
ability to pay. Selling the good at the market-clearing price favors the wealthy in the sense
that they may acquire the good instead of poor buyers who value it more highly. Non- ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - All 27 versions

[CITATION] Market versus Non-Market Assignment

YK Che, I Gale… - Unpublished mimeo, 2011
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[CITATION] Procurement, forthcoming The New Palgrave

YK Che - Dictionary of Economics (S. Durlauf and L. Blume, Eds) …, 2006
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Shrink-Wraps: Who Should Bear the Cost of Communicating Mass-Market Contract Terms?

[PDF] from duke.edu
YK Che… - University of Virginia Legal Working Paper …, 2009 - law.bepress.com
Abstract The paper examines the equilibrium quality of mass market contract terms, such as
those in end user license agreements, when consumers can read and search for a better set
of terms. Firms compete over price and quality of the terms. They can also choose to ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - All 22 versions

[CITATION] Sales to Budget-Constrained Buyers: The Gains from Using Multiple-Player Mechanisms

YK Che… - 1994 - Working Paper, University of …
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[CITATION] Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments, 30 RAND J

YK Che… - ECON, 1999
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[CITATION] Asymptotic Equivalence of the Random Priority and Probabilistic Serial Mechanisms.” forthcoming

YK Che… - Econometrica, 2008
Cited by 2 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries

[PDF] The Role of Priorities in Assigning Indivisible Objects: A Characterization of Top Trading Cycles

[PDF] from columbia.edu
A Abdulkadiroglu, YK Che… - 2010 - columbia.edu
Abstract The Top Trading Cycles mechanism emerges as a desirable solution in various
market design applications. Yet recommendations are made without any rigorous foundation
for the role priorities play in assignment. We explain that role by recursive individual ...
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[CITATION] Eliciting Multi-dimensional Care through Liability and Regulation, Center for Economic Policy Research, Stanford, Working Paper 199 (1990) and Michael …

YK Che - Intl Rev L & Econ, 1997
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[PDF] Optimal Design of Research Contests

[PDF] from columbia.edu
CHE YEoN-Koo… - 2003 - columbia.edu
Procurement of an innovation often requires substantial eflort by potential suppliers.
Motivating ejfort may be diflicult if the level of efiort and quality of the resulting innovation are
unverifiable, if innovators cannot benefit directly by marketing their innovations, and if the ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles

[PDF] Assigning Resources to Budget-Constrained Agents

[PDF] from lse.ac.uk
YK Che, I Gale… - Unpublished mimeo, 2011 - sticerd.lse.ac.uk
Abstract: This paper studies different methods of assigning a good to budgetconstrained
agents. Schemes that assign the good randomly and allow resale may outperform the
competitive market in terms of Utilitarian efficiency. The socially optimal mechanism ...
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An Experimental Study of Sponsored-Search Auctions

[PDF] from umich.edu
YK Che, S Choi… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
allocating online search advertising–experimentally, considering both the static environment
assumed by the prevailing theory and a dynamic game capturing the salient aspects of real-
world search advertising auctions. We find that subjects tend to overbid in both treatments ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - All 7 versions

[CITATION] The Economics of Collective Negociation: Consolidation of Claims by Multiple Plaintiffs

YK Che - Working papers, 1992 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks. The
Economics of Collective Negociation: Consolidation of Claims by Multiple Plaintiffs. Yeon-Koo
Che (). Working papers from Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems. ...
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Buy-in through goldplating:: The effect of defense profit policy on quality determination

Full text - MIT Libraries
YK Che - Economics Letters, 1994 - Elsevier
Abstract Bower and Osband (RAND Journal of Economics, 1991, 22, 107–119) recognized
the role of the defense profit policy as a 'handicapping device 'that induces low cost firms to
aggressively buy in for future profits. When designs are variable and actively competed in ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - All 5 versions

[CITATION] Entry Fees vs. Reserve Prices in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions

YK Che… - Working papers, 1995 - econpapers.repec.org
By YK Che and Ian Gale; Entry Fees vs. Reserve Prices in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions.
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[PDF] Allocating Resources to Wealth Constrained Agents

[PDF] from columbia.edu
YK Che… - Dept. of Economics, Columbia University, 2006 - columbia.edu
Abstract: Governments have a profound impact on the allocation of many goods, services
and rights. We study individuals who differ in their valuations and in their wealth. In
particular, some individuals have binding wealth constraints, which inhibit voluntary ...
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The NFL Should Auction Possession in Overtime Games

Full text - MIT Libraries
YK Che… - The Economists' Voice, 2009 - en.scientificcommons.org
... Abstract. Overtimes can ruin great football games, according to Yeon-Koo Che of Columbia
and Terry Hendershott of Berkeley, but auctions could come to the rescue.. D1, D2, D23,
D44, auctions, tie breaking, football. Details der Publikation. ...
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[CITATION] Revenue Non-Equivalence of Auctions with Budget-Constrained Buyers

YK Che… - Working papers, 1993 - econpapers.repec.org
By YK Che and Ian Gale; Revenue Non-Equivalence of Auctions with Budget- Constrained Buyers.
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[PDF] Weak Cartels and Collusion-Proof Auctions

[PDF] from webmeets.com
YK Che, D Condorelli… - 2010 - webmeets.com
Abstract We study the problem of collusion in private value auctions under the following
restrictions: First, the collusive bidders cannot exchange monetary transfers among
themselves or the cartel is 'weak'; Second, the seller's auction mechanism is required to ...
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Credit Spreads and Monetary Policy

A Abdulkadiroðlu, YK Che… - Discussion Papers, 2009 - ideas.repec.org
The Boston mechanism is among the most popular school choice pro-cedures in use. Yet,
the mechanism has been criticized for its poor incentive and welfare performances, which
led the Boston Public Schools to recently replace it with Gale and Shapley's deferred ...
Cached - All 4 versions

[PDF] Financially Constrained Bidders

[PDF] from columbia.edu
YKOO CHE - 1998 - columbia.edu
We develop a methodology for analyzing the revenue and efficiency perfonnance of
auctions when buyers have private information about their willingness to pay and ability to
pay. We then apply the framework to scenarios involving standard auction mechanisms. In ...
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[CITATION] CONTESTS WITH DISCONTINUOUS SUCCESS FUNCTIONS

YK Che… - Contests, 1998 - Jai Pr
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[PDF] Optimal Voting Mechanisms

[PDF] from ens.fr
YK Che… - 2003 - adres.ens.fr
Consider an economics department which must choose between two job candidates, a
theorist and an econometrician. Everyone has a certain amount of information regarding the
relative abilities of the two candidates. Everyone in the department wants to hire the better ...
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Comments of 71 Concerned Economists: Using Procurement Auctions to Allocate Broadband Stimulus Grants

[PDF] from stanford.edu
W Baumol, K Arrow, S Athey, J Baker, C Bazelon… - 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: The signatories to this document are economists who have studied
telecommunications, auctions, and competition policy. While we may disagree about the
stimulus package, we believe that it is important to implement mechanisms that make ...
All 12 versions

[PDF] Efficient Assignment with Interdependent Values

[PDF] from columbia.edu
YK Che, J Kim… - 2012 - columbia.edu
Abstract: We study the “house allocation” problem in which n agents are assigned n objects,
one for each agent, when the agents have interdependent values. We show that there exists
no mechanism that is Pareto efficient and ex post incentive compatible, and the only ...
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[CITATION] 2004 Far Eastern Meeting of the Econometric Society (2003, Vol. 29, No. 37.)

YK Che, S Chen, S Fukuda, J Hahn, UC Horioka…

[PDF] Lawyer-Advised Disclosure

[PDF] from severinov.com
YK Che… - 2009 - severinov.com
Abstract: This paper examines how the advice that lawyers provide to their clients affects the
disclosure of evidence and the outcome of adjudication, and how the adjudicator should
allocate the burden of proof in light of these effects. Despite lawyers' expertise in ...
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[PDF] DISCUSSION OF “MATCHING MARKETS: THEORY AND PRACTICE”

[PDF] from columbia.edu
YKOO CHE - 2011 - columbia.edu
Market design seeks to offer practical solutions to various resource allocation problems. Still
at its relative infancy, the field has already enjoyed impressive successes in applying
economics tools and insights to improve the methods for allocating government resources ...
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Do breakup fees lead to efficient takeover?

[PDF] from elcsoft.com
Full text - MIT Libraries
YK Che, J Kim… - Economics Letters, 2010 - Elsevier
We examine the use of breakup fees as a device for target firms to recruit white knights in
response to a hostile takeover bid. When bidders have interdependent valuations of the
target, the possible use of a breakup fee to subsidize entry of a subsequent bidder ...
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Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types

[PDF] from 142.150.190.46
C Yeon-Koo, G Ian - 2006 - 142.150.190.46
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory. org/] This paper
develops a methodology for characterizing expected revenue from auctions when bidders'
types come from an arbitrary distribution. In particular, types may be multidimensional, and ...
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[PDF] Expanding “Choice” in School Choice

[PDF] from ucla.edu
YKCY Yasuda - 2008 - levine.sscnet.ucla.edu
Abstract: Truthful revelation of preferences has emerged as a desideratum in the design of
school choice programs. Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance mechanism is strategy-proof
for students but limits their ability to communicate their preference intensities. This results ...
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[PDF] KDI SCHOOL WORKING PAPER SERIES

[PDF] from kdischool.ac.kr
YKCHER SETHI - 2011 - kdischool.ac.kr
Abstract We examine the effects of “naked” credit default swaps on equilibrium debt
contracts, project choice, and the likelihood of default when investors have heterogeneous
beliefs about the future revenues of the borrower. Although such contracts are zero sum ...
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[CITATION] Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure. Comment

Full text - MIT Libraries
YK Che - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics ( …, 2008 - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of
further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site ...
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[CITATION] On the Value of Legal Advice.

YK Che… - 2005
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[PDF] Lawyer Advice and Evidence Disclosure

[PDF] from eea-esem.com
YK Che… - 2007 - eea-esem.com
Abstract: This paper examines how the advice that lawyers provide to their clients affects the
disclosure of evidence and the outcome of adjudication, and how the adjudicator should
allocate the burden of proof in light of the effect. Despite lawyers' expertise in assessing ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 4 versions

[BOOK] Auctions with budget-constrained buyers: a nonequivalence result

[PDF] from 199.169.201.130
YK Che, I Gale… - 1994 - 199.169.201.130
Abstract Anecdotal evidence of concern about the limited financial resources of small firms
abounds in government auctions. Recent empirical work also provides evidence of the
importance of capital constraints. In this paper, we show that the first-price sealed-bid ...
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[PDF] How Should Property Rights Be Allocated?

[PDF] from usc.edu
YK Che… - 2006 - usc.edu
Abstract: We study the allocation of property rights to individuals who may differ in their
valuations of those rights and in their abilities to pay. Agents' limited abilities to pay prevent
them from achieving allocative efficiency through voluntary negotiation, so initial allocation ...
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THE ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY ANNUAL REPORTS ECONOMETRICA REFEREES JULY 1999JUNE 2000

[PDF] from econometricsociety.org
K Abadir, J Abbring, J Abrevaya… - …, 2001 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. Ž . Econometrica, Vol. 69, No. 1 January, 2001 THE ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY ANNUAL
REPORTS ECONOMETRICA REFEREES JULY 1999JUNE 2000 A Abadir, K. Abbring, J.
Abrevaya, J. Acemoglu, D. Adda, J. Ahlin, C. Ai, C. Ait-Sahalia, Y. Al-Najjar I. Nabil ...
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