U Gneezy… - J. Legal Stud., 2000 - HeinOnline
Abstract The deterrence hypothesis predicts that the introduction of a penalty that leaves
everything else unchanged will reduce the occurrence of the behavior subject to the fine. We
present the result of a field study in a group of day-care centers that contradicts this ...
U Gneezy… - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2000 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract Economists usually assume that monetary incentives improve performance, and
psychologists claim that the opposite may happen. We present and discuss a set of
experiments designed to test these contrasting claims.
U Gneezy,
M Niederle… - The Quarterly Journal of …, 2003 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract Even though the provision of equal opportunities for men and women has been a
priority in many countries, large gender differences prevail in competitive high-ranking
positions. Suggested explanations include discrimination and differences in preferences ...
J Benhabib… - Journal of Economic Growth, 1996 - Springer
Despite the predictions of the neoclassical theory of economic growth, we observe that poor
countries have invested at lower rates and have not grown faster than rich countries. To
explain these empirical regularities we provide a game-theoretic model of conflict ...
F Maccheroni, M Marinacci… - Econometrica, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
We characterize, in the Anscombe–Aumann framework, the preferences for which there are
a utility functionu on outcomes and an ambiguity indexc on the set of probabilities on the
states of the world such that, for all acts f and g,
A Rustichini, MA Satterthwaite… - Econometrica: Journal of the …, 1994 - JSTOR
A model of trade with m buyers and m sellers is considered in which price is set to equate
revealed demand and supply. In a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, each trader acts not as a
price-taker, but instead misrepresents his true demand/supply to influence price in his ...
U Gneezy… - The American Economic Review, 2004 - JSTOR
Gender gaps in income and social position are widespread. For example, Marianne
Bertrand and Kevin Hallock (2001) studied data on the five highest-paid executives of a
large group of US firms over the period 1992-1997. They found that only 2.5 percent of the ...
D Checchi, A Ichino… - Journal of Public Economics, 1999 - Elsevier
A centralised and egalitarian school system reduces the cost of education for poor families,
and so it should reduce income inequality and make intergenerational mobility easier. In this
paper we provide evidence that Italy, compared to the USA, displays less income ...
E Dekel, BL Lipman… - Econometrica, 2001 - Wiley Online Library
2. Abstract We extend Kreps'(1979) analysis of preference for flexibility, reinterpreted by
Kreps (1992) as a model of unforeseen contingencies. We enrich the choice set,
consequently obtaining uniqueness results that were not possible in Kreps' model. We ...
M Boldrin… - Review of Economic Dynamics, 2000 - Elsevier
We model pay-as-you-go social security systems as the outcome of majority voting within a
overlapping generations model with production. When voting, individuals make two choices,
pay the elderly their pensions or default, which amount to promise themselves next period. ...
E Dekel, BL Lipman… - Econometrica, 1998 - JSTOR
ONE ASPECT OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY with important economic implications is
unawareness of various possibilities. For example, unforeseen contingencies could prevent
agents from writing the kinds of contracts our models predict. In this paper we explore the ...
M Boldrin… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1994 - JSTOR
We study the indeterminacy of equilibria in infinite horizon capital accumulation models with
technological externalities. Our investigation encompasses models with bounded and
unbounded accumulation paths, and models with one and two sectors of production. ...
J Benhabib… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1991 - Elsevier
Abstract We study the dynamics of growth and investment in a continuous time model with
vintage capital. Vintage capital models may be characterized by non-exponential rates of
depreciation and technical change and can incorporate “gestation lags” as well as “ ...
G Charness,
L Rigotti… - 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: People who are members of a group and identify with it behave differently from
people who perceive themselves as isolated individuals. This difference depends on two
main factors. First, preferences over outcomes change with the degree of identification ...
S Modica… - Theory and Decision, 1994 - Springer
This is the first of two papers where we present a formal model of unawareness. We contrast
unawareness with certainty and uncertainty. A subject is certain of something when he
knows that thing; he is uncertain when he does not know it, but he knows he does not: he ...
A Prat… - Econometrica, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
We introduce a game of complete information with multiple principals and multiple common
agents. Each agent makes a decision that can affect the payoffs of all principals. Each
principal offers monetary transfers to each agent conditional on the action taken by the ...
S Modica… - Games and economic Behavior, 1999 - Elsevier
We claim first that simple uncertainty is not an adequate model of a subject's ignorance,
because a major component of it is the inability to give a complete description of the states of
the world, and we provide a formal model of unawareness. In Modica and Rustichini ( ...
E Hoelzl… - The Economic Journal, 2005 - Wiley Online Library
We thank Elisabeth Himmer for her help in data collection, and two anonymous reviewers for
constructive comments. Part of this paper was prepared while the first author was visiting
scholar at Carnegie Mellon University, funded by the Erwin-Schroedinger-Fellowship ...
F Maccheroni, M Marinacci… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2006 - Elsevier
We introduce and axiomatize dynamic variational preferences, the dynamic version of the
variational preferences we axiomatized in [F. Maccheroni, M. Marinacci, A. Rustichini,
Ambiguity aversion, robustness, and the variational representation of preferences, Mimeo, ...
PK Dutta,
S Lach… - Journal of Economics & …, 1995 - Wiley Online Library
After the initial breakthrough in the research phase of R&D, a new product undergoes a
process of change, improvement, and adaptation to market conditions. We model the
strategic behavior of firms in this development phase. We emphasize that a key dimension ...
E Dekel, BL Lipman… - Review of Economic …, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
What behaviour can be explained using the hypothesis that the agent faces temptation but is
otherwise a “standard rational agent”? In earlier work, Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) use a set
betweenness axiom to restrict the set of preferences considered by Dekel, Lipman and ...
J Benhabib… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1994 - Elsevier
Abstract The papers in this symposium demonstrate the theoretical as well as the empirical
plausibility of indeterminacy and of sunspots in equilibrium models with infinitely lived
agents. They depart from the standard competitive framework because of the presence of ...
E Dekel, BL Lipman… - European Economic Review, 1998 - Elsevier
Many writers have suggested that the nature of contracting, firm structure, and political constitutions
cannot be well understood without taking account of the role of unforeseen contingencies –
loosely, possibilities that the agent does not `think about' at the time he makes a decision. ...
SV Burks, JP Carpenter,
L Goette… - Proceedings of the …, 2009 - National Acad Sciences
Abstract Economic analysis has so far said little about how an individual's cognitive skills
(CS) are related to the individual's economic preferences in different choice domains, such
as risk taking or saving, and how preferences in different domains are related to each ...
J Benhabib… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1997 - Elsevier
In the problem of optimal taxation in an economy with labor and capital, the optimal solution
when the government can commit to a sequence of tax rates entails that the tax on capital
tends to zero in the limit, with all the tax burden on labor. It is well known, however, that ...
J Dickhaut, K McCabe, JC Nagode… - Proceedings of the …, 2003 - National Acad Sciences
Abstract In this study we examine how the introduction of a reference lottery with nonrandom
outcomes alters the way in which choices among pairs of lotteries are made, even if it does
not alter the choices. We use different domains (some of the lotteries produce gains, other ...
F Maccheroni, M Marinacci, A Rustichini… - Mathematical …, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
We propose a portfolio selection model based on a class of monotone preferences that
coincide with mean-variance preferences on their domain of monotonicity, but differ where
mean-variance preferences fail to be monotone and are therefore not economically ...
JM Coates, M Gurnell… - Proceedings of the …, 2009 - National Acad Sciences
Abstract Prenatal androgens have important organizing effects on brain development and
future behavior. The second-to-fourth digit length ratio (2D: 4D) has been proposed as a
marker of these prenatal androgen effects, a relatively longer fourth finger indicating ...
[CITATION] Indeterminacy of equilibria in models with infinitely-lived agents and external effects
A Rustichini - Games and economic Behavior, 2005 - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to
view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are
not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
E Dekel, BL Lipman, A Rustichini… - Econometrica, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001)(henceforth DLR) axiomatically characterized three
representations of preferences that allow for a desire for flexibility and/or commitment. In one
of these representations (ordinal expected utility), the independence axiom is stated in a ...
D Easley… - Econometrica, 1999 - Wiley Online Library
We provide an axiomatic foundation for decision making in a complex environment. We do
not assume that the decision maker has complete structural knowledge of the environment.
Instead the agent knows the set of actions he can take, he formulates preferences directly ...
A Rustichini - Games and Economic Behavior, 1999 - Elsevier
A procedure is a specific way of making this association; a procedure is optimal if the
sequence of choices it generates converges to the action that maximizes the expected
payoff. The information available to the agent has crucial importance. An individual ...
P Reichlin… - Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 1998 - Elsevier
The standard neoclassical model cannot explain persistent migration flows and lack of cross-
country convergence when capital and labor are mobile. Here we present a model where
both phenomena may take place. Assuming increasing returns and perfect capital mobility ...
A Rustichini, J Dickhaut, P Ghirardato… - Games and Economic …, 2005 - Elsevier
We study the behavior of subjects facing choices between certain, risky, and ambiguous
lotteries. Subjects' choices are consistent with the economic theories modeling ambiguity
aversion. Our results support the conjecture that subjects face choice tasks as an ...
A Rustichini, JA Schmilz - Journal of Monetary Economics, 1991 - Elsevier
Abstract Governments have long subsidized both the development of knowledge (research)
and the acquisition of knowledge (imitation). This raises some interesting questions. Why
subsidize both activities? And if both activities are to be supported, how should subsidy ...
A Rustichini… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1991 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper contains the following results for economies with infinite dimensional
commodity spaces.(i) We establish a core-Walras equivalence theorem for economies with
an atomless measure space of agents and with an ordered separable Banach commodity ...
G Kirchsteiger,
L Rigotti… - Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 2006 - Elsevier
We test the effect of mood on behavior in a gift-exchange game. To induce a 'bad mood',
second movers watched a sad movie before playing the game; to induce a 'good mood', they
watched a funny movie. Mood induction was effective: subjects who saw the funny movie ...
Organization in hierarchical dominance structures is prevalent in animal societies, so a
strong preference for higher positions in social ranking is likely to be an important motivation
of human social and economic behavior. This preference is also likely to influence the way ...
A Rustichini, A Wolinsky - Journal of economic Dynamics and Control, 1995 - Elsevier
This paper studies the problem of a monopoly who is uncertain about the demand it faces
and learns about it over time through its pricing experience. The demand curve facing the
monopoly is not constant—it changes over time in a Markovian fashion. We characterize ...
S Modica, A Rustichini… - Economic Theory, 1998 - Springer
Summary. We present a consistent pure-exchange general equilibrium model where agents
may not be able to foresee all possible future contingencies. In this context, even with
nominal assets and complete asset markets, an equilibrium may not exist without ...
PK Dutta… - Economic Theory, 1993 - Springer
Summary In this paper, the pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria of a general class of
stopping time games are studied. It is shown that there always exists a natural class of
Markov Perfect Equilibria, called stopping equilibria. Such equilibria can be computed as ...
A Rustichini - Journal of Economic Theory, 1998 - Elsevier
Several problems in economic theory can be formulated as a dynamic programming
problem, plus an additionalincentive compatibilityconstraint. This constraint requires the
continuation value along the chosen sequence, at any point in time, to be larger than ...
A Rustichini - Games and Economic Behavior, 1999 - Elsevier
In repeated games with differential information on one side, the labelling “general case”
refers to games in which the action of the informed player is not known to the uninformed,
who can only observe a signal which is the random outcome of his and his opponent's ...
J Benhabib… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1990 - Elsevier
Abstract A misinterpretation of turnpike theorems suggests that persistent cyclic behavior in
optimal growth models is only possible with large discount rates. This paper shows that for
any positive discount rate there exists a large family of standard Cobb-Douglas ...
J Benhabib, A Rustichini… - 1991 - kellogg.northwestern.edu
Abstract In this paper we study the relationship between wealth, income distribution and
growth in a game-theoretic context in which property rights are not completely enforcable.
We consider equilibrium paths of accumulation which yield players utilities that are at least ...
I Levy, J Snell, AJ Nelson… - Journal of …, 2010 - Am Physiological Soc
Abstract Risk and ambiguity are two conditions in which the consequences of possible
outcomes are not certain. Under risk, the probabilities of different outcomes can be
estimated, whereas under ambiguity, even these probabilities are not known. Although ...
A Rustichini - Science, 2005 - sciencemag.org
Summary Recent research in economic theory has provided a model of ambiguity aversion
that predicts and explains why people have a more conservative behavior when they
perceive their assessment of risk as imprecise. In his Perspective, Rustichini discusses the ...
J Benhabib… - Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 1994 - Elsevier
Abstract We provide exact solutions for a class of stochastic dynamic programming problems
in growth theory involving pairs of constant relative risk aversion utility functions and CES
technologies. This generalizes the solutions for the well-known case of logarithmic utility ...
J Benhabib… - General Equilibrium, Growth and Trade. II …, 1993 - econ.nyu.edu
ABSTRACT An equilibrium vintage model is proposed to study the volatility of investment
expenditures. In a stochastic framework it is shown that the existence of vintage effects
results in the smoothing of output and, in contrast to adjustment-cost models, in ...
[CITATION] What is perfect competition?
A Rustichini, NC Yannelis… - 1990 - College of Commerce and Business …
M Boldrin… - Nº.: UC3M Working Paper. Economics; …, 1995 - e-archivo.uc3m.es
We model pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social sucurity systems as the outcome of majority voting
within a standard OLG model with production and an exogenous population growth rateo At
each point in time individuals work, save, consume and invest by taking the social security ...
F Maccheronia, M Marinaccia… - The Review of …, 2012 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We study the behavioral foundation of interdependent preferences, where the
outcomes of others affect the welfare of the decision maker. These preferences are taken as
given, not derived from more primitive ones. Our aim is to establish an axiomatic ...
F Palomino,
L Rigotti… - … of 8th World Congress of the …, 2000 - arno.uvt.nl
Abstract Sports provide a natural experiment on individual choices in games with high
stakes. We study soccer with a gameMtheoretic model of a match, and then evaluate the
ability of this model to explain actual behavior with data from 2885 matches among ...
[CITATION] Ambiguity aversion, malevolent nature, and the variational representation of preferences
F Maccheroni, M Marinacci… - preprint, 2004
A Prat, A Rustichini… - 1998 - arno.uvt.nl
Abstract In a common agency game a set of principals promises monetary transfers to an
agent which depend on the action he will take. The agent then chooses the action, and is
paid the corresponding transfers. Principals announce their transfers simultaneously. This ...
[CITATION] Executive versus teachers: Gender, competition and self-selection
U Gneezy… - 2005 - November 2005, working paper
JH Dreze… - Handbook of Utility Theory: Extensions, 2004 - books.google.com
Section 1 gives a technical summary of the paper. Section 2 gives a more extensive and
more intuitive summary. Readers may skip either (or both!) at first reading. Readers having
skipped Section 1 may still find it useful as a final summary.(i) In games against nature ...
A Rustichini… - Economic Theory, 2008 - Springer
Abstract We model economies of adverse selection as Arrow–Debreu economies. In the
spirit of Prescott and Townsend (Econometrica 52 (1), 21–45, 1984a), we identify the
consumption set of the individuals with the set of lotteries over net transfers. Thus, prices ...
U Gneezy… - Advances in behavioral economics, 2004 - tinbergen.nl
The received view in economic reasoning is that an increase in the financial incentives
provided for an activity is expected to generate an increase in performance. Quite
symmetrically, a punishment of any soit, such as a fine or a detention, is expected to result ...
SV Burks, JP Carpenter,
L Goette… - 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Well-calibrated judgments about one's abilities are important in many economic decisions.
However, evidence from psychology and economics suggests that individuals may have
excessive confidence in their abilities. This excessive confidence may be absolute ( ...
PK Dutta… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1995 - Elsevier
We study a class of two-player continuous time stochastic games in which agents can make
(costly) discrete or discontinuous changes in the variables that affect their payoffs. It is
shown that in these games there are Markov-perfect equilibria of the two-sided (s, S) rule ...
A Rustichini - Economic Theory, 1992 - Springer
In a dynamic game the payoffs at equilibrium for the players will not in general be on the
efficiency frontier. It is therefore important to determine if a constrained efficiency can be
achieved: ie if there exist equilibria of the game which give efficient outcomes over the ...
J Berg, M Marsili, A Rustichini… - 2001 - Taylor & Francis
Traders in a market typically have widely different, private information on the return of an
asset. The equilibrium price of the asset may reflect this information more accurately if the
number of traders is large enough compared to the number of the states of the world that ...
M Ali Khan… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1993 - Elsevier
Abstract In this paper we present a formalization of anonymous games with uncertainty and
with incomplete but symmetric information. We show the existence of Cournot-Nash
equilibria for such games and also investigate how the equilibrium correspondence ...
A Rustichini - Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 2008 - Springer
Abstract In recent years, a lively debate in neuroeconomics has focused on what appears to
be a fundamental question: Is the brain a unitary or a dual system? We are still far from a
consensus view. The accumulating evidence supports both sides of the debate. A reason ...
A Rustichini - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1998 - Elsevier
Some recent work on dynamic incentive constraints poses the question of existence and
regularity of Lagrange multipliers in optimization problems in infinite dimension with infinitely
many-side constraints, which may not be concave. We provide sufficient conditions for ...
J Benhabib, A Rustichini… - Working Papers, 1996 - ideas.repec.org
We consider a representative agent, infinite-horizon economy where production requires
private and public capital. The supply of public capital is financed through distortionary
taxation. The optimal (second best) tax policy of a benevolent government is time ...
A Rustichini, J Dickhaut… - Games and …, 2002 - responsiblegamblingcanada.org
Abstract We study the behavior of subjects facing choices between certain, risky, partially
ambiguous, and ambiguous lotteries in an experimentally controlled environment. Our
observations are the choice behavior, the response time, and the brain activations of the ...
[CITATION] General equilibrium in economies with adverse selection
A Rustichini… - 2002 - mimeo
A Ichino, D CHECCHI… - Journal of public economics, 1999 - cadmus.eui.eu
A centralised and egalitarian school system reduces the cost of education for poor families,
and so it should reduce income inequality and make intergenerational mobility easier. In this
paper we provide evidence that Italy, compared to the USA, displays less income ...
A Rustichini… - Manuscript, Columbia University, 2003 - aida.econ.yale.edu
Abstract In economies with asymmetric information agents have private information on
economically relevant variables: on individual states (economies with private information),
on the action taken (moral hazard), on their type (adverse selection). We analyze ...
U Gneezy, A Rustichini… - Unpublished Manuscript, 2007 - vostroknutov.com
Abstract We study experimentally how subjects plan ahead when they make sequential
decisions. We use a simple combinatorial game of perfect information, with two players
alternating, and with a winner and a loser. Subjects in the early stages follow the forward ...
A Rustichini - Economic Theory, 2002 - Springer
Summary. We consider the extension of the classical problem of preference for flexibility to
many periods. Preferences are defined over sets of infinite paths of choices. The main result
provides a set of axioms on preferences that yield an additive representation over a ...
A Rustichini, PW Glimcher, C Camerer… - … Decision making and …, 2008 - books.google.com
We provide here a link between the formal theory of decision making and the analysis of the
decision process as developed in neuroscience, with the final purpose of showing how this
joint analysis can provide explanation of important elements of economic behavior.
A Rustichini, A Ichino… - CEPR Discussion Paper …, 1996 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: A state school system should be expected to reduce income inequality and to make
intergenerational mobility easier. It is therefore somewhat surprising to observe that Italy, in
comparison to the United States, displays less inequality between occupational incomes ...
U Gneezy, A Rustichini… - Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 2010 - Elsevier
We study experimentally how subjects learn to plan ahead when they make sequential
decisions. The task is the Race game. This game is played on a finite set of m possible
positions occupied by a marker, which is initially in the first position. Two players alternate ...
A Rustichini, M Satterthwaite… - Northwestern …, 1990 - kellogg.northwestern.edu
Abstract An independent private values model of trade with m buyers and m sellers is
considered in which price is chosen to equate revealed demand and supply. In every
symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium, each trader does not act as a price-taker, but ...
G Kirchsteiger,
L Rigotti… - 2001 - escholarship.org
Abstract: We test the effect of players' moods on their behavior in a gift-exchange game. In
the first stage of the game, player 1 chooses a transfer to player 2. In the second stage,
player 2 chooses an effort level. Higher effort is more costly for player 2, but it increases ...
[CITATION] Unawareness: A formal theory of unforeseen contingencies
S Modica, A Rustichini… - 1993 - Center for Operations Research & …
A Rustichini… - Economic Theory, 1996 - Springer
Summary This paper provides a theory of intertemporal pricing in a small market with
differential information about the realizations of a stochastic process which determines
demand. We study the sequential equilibria in stationary strategies of the stochastic game ...
A Rustichini - Journal of the European Economic Association, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract We propose and test two possible explanations of envy and its opposite, gloating.
One explanation views them as a learning process, just as regret and rejoice are in the
private domain: envy is the social correspondent of regret. The other explanation traces ...
[CITATION] A Fine is a Price, 29 J
U Gneezy… - Legal Stud, 2000
SV Burks, J Carpenter,
L Götte, K Monaco, K Porter… - 2008 - nber.org
The Truckers and Turnover Project is a statistical case study of a single large trucking firm
and its driver employees. The cooperating firm operates in the largest segment of the for-hire
trucking industry in the United States, the “full truckload”(TL) segment, in which ...
G Coricelli, A Rustichini - … of the Royal …, 2010 - rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org
Abstract Emotions like regret and envy share a common origin: they are motivated by the
counterfactual thinking of what would have happened had we made a different choice.
When we contemplate the outcome of a choice we made, we may use the information on ...
EJ Balder… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1994 - Elsevier
Abstract Balder (Math. Oper. Res. 13 (1988), 265-276) gave an existence result for a Nash
equilibrium in a game with incomplete information. This game had finitely many players.
Here it is shown that his analysis can be extended to deal with infinitely many players. ...
BP Elchanan, D Eddie… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1993 - Elsevier
Abstract The paper examines the relationship between the mutation rate and the rate of
growth of the population when the environment is changing. It is shown that while the global
maximum of the growth rate is attained at a non-zero mutation rate, zero is always a local ...
PK Dutta,
S Lach… - 1990 - kellogg.northwestern.edu
Abstract: Econo;":: theory has primarily viewed an innovation as a single, discontinuous ch-
rge. Historical and empirical evidence, on the other hand, shows that a major pnt of
economic development has come from a cumulation of small improvements to original ...
J Benhabib, A Rustichini… - Review of Economic Design, 2001 - Springer
Abstract. We consider a representative agent, infinite-horizon economy where production
requires private and public capital. The supply of public capital is financed through
distortionary taxation. The optimal (second best) tax policy of a benevolent government is ...
A Rustichini - Current opinion in neurobiology, 2009 - Elsevier
Neuroeconomics is an interdisciplinary field, crossing boundaries between Economics,
Psychology, and Neuroscience. Its original program was to provide a test for a large number
of competitive theories of decision making. It has in part realized this program, and we ...
[CITATION] A variational formula for the relative Gini concentration index
F Maccheroni, M Marinacci, A Rustichini… - 2004 - mimeo
PK Dutta… - Discussion Papers, 1990 - ideas.repec.org
We study a class of two-player continuous time stochastic games in which agents can make
(costly) discrete or discontinuous changes in the variables that affect their payoffs. It is
shown that in these games there are Markov perfect equilibria of the two-sided (s, S) rule ...
U Gneezy… - Tilburg CentER Research Discussion Paper, 1998 - arno.uvt.nl
Abstract: Economics seems largely based on the assumption that monetary incentives
improve performance. By contrast, a large literature in psychology, including a rich tradition
of experimental work, claims just the opposite. In this paper we present and discuss a set ...
LP Hansen, P Maenhout, A Rustichini… - Journal of Economic …, 2006 - Elsevier
Journal of Economic Theory 128 (2006) 1–3 www.elsevier.com/locate/jet Introduction to model
uncertainty and robustness Lars Peter Hansen a , Pascal Maenhout b , Aldo Rustichini c , Thomas
J. Sargent d,∗ , Marciano M. Siniscalchi ea Department of Economics, University of ...
A Rustichini - Economic Theory, 1993 - Springer
Summary We prove that a probability measure over a space of functions induces a measure
over the product space of the image and range of these functions. As an application, we
show that the equilibrium of large anonymous games with uncertainty completely ...
JH Drèze… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1999 - Elsevier
Conditional Expected Utility Theory (CEUT) provides an axiomatic foundation for a theory of
decision under uncertainty which allows agents to choose which event in a given partition of
the state space will occur. Here, we provide an alternative axiomatization of this situation. ...
J Anderson, S Burks, J Carpenter,
L Goette… - 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We use a sequential prisoner's dilemma game to measure the other-regarding
behavior in samples from three related populations in the upper Midwest of the United
States: 100 college students, 94 non-student adults from the community surrounding the ...
S Modica… - CORE Discussion Papers, 1994 - ideas.repec.org
No abstract is available for this item. ... To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three options: 1. Check below under "Related
research" whether another version of this item is available online. 2. Check on the ...
J Anderson, S Burks,
C DeYoung… - … . Presented at the IZA …, 2011 - cogsci.umn.edu
Abstract We propose steps towards a theory of economic decision making based on the
integration of classical decision theory and personality theory. The premise for the theory is
the study of the correlation structure between experimental and empirical measures of ...
A Rustichini… - Economic Theory, 2004 - Springer
Summary. We investigate the relation between lotteries and sunspot allocations in a
dynamic economy where the utility functions are not concave. In an intertemporal
competitive economy, the household consumption set is identified with the set of lotteries, ...
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