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Extendable cooperative games

[PDF] from tau.ac.il
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Y Azrieli… - Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
A (TU) cooperative game is extendable if every core allocation of each subgame can be
extended to a core allocation of the game. It is strongly extendable if any minimal vector in
the upper core of any of its subgames can be extended to a core allocation. We prove that ...
Cited by 20 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 13 versions

Market games in large economies with a finite number of types

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Y Azrieli… - Economic Theory, 2007 - Springer
Abstract We study market games derived from an exchange economy with a continuum of
agents, each having one of finitely many possible types. The type of agent determines his
initial endowment and utility function. It is shown that, unlike the well-known Shapley– ...
Cited by 11 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 14 versions

Categorization generated by extended prototypes—An axiomatic approach

[PDF] from tau.ac.il
Y Azrieli… - Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 2007 - Elsevier
We suggest a model of categorization based on prototypes. A set of entities, identified with
some finite dimensional Euclidian space, is partitioned into a finite number of categories.
Such a categorization is said to be generated by extended prototypes if there is a set of ...
Cited by 11 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 8 versions

The value of a stochastic information structure

[PDF] from tau.ac.il
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Y Azrieli… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2008 - Elsevier
Upon observing a signal, a Bayesian decision maker updates her probability distribution
over the state space, chooses an action, and receives a payoff that depends on the state and
the action taken. An information structure determines the set of possible signals and the ...
Cited by 8 - Related articles - All 18 versions

An axiomatic foundation for multidimensional spatial models of elections with a valence dimension

[PDF] from uni-muenchen.de
Y Azrieli - 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Recent works on political competition incorporate a valence dimension into the
standard spatial model. The analysis of the game between candidates in these models is
typically based on two assumptions about voters' preferences. One is that valence scores ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - All 9 versions

Categorizing others in a large game

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Y Azrieli - Games and Economic Behavior, 2009 - Elsevier
We study the efficiency of categorization of other agents as a way of saving cognitive
resources in the settings of a large normal-form game. We assume that, when an agent
categorizes (partitions) her opponents, she only has information about the average ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - All 10 versions

[PDF] A note on the concavification of a cooperative game

[PDF] from tau.ac.il
Y Azrieli… - 2005 - math.tau.ac.il
Abstract A (TU) cooperative game v is viewed as a real valued function v defined on a finite
set of points in the unit simplex. The concavification of v on the simplex, denoted cavv, is the
minimal concave function on the simplex which is greater than or equal to v. cavv is a ...
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Thinking categorically about others: A conjectural equilibrium approach

[PDF] from uni-muenchen.de
Y Azrieli - 2007 - mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
Inspired by the social psychology literature, we study the implications of categorical thinking
on decision making in the context of a large normal form game. Every agent has a
categorization (partition) of her opponents and can only observe the average behavior in ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - All 8 versions

Characterization of multidimensional spatial models of elections with a valence dimension

[PDF] from uni-muenchen.de
Y Azrieli - 2009 - mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
Spatial models of political competition are typically based on two assumptions. One is that
all the voters identically perceive the platforms of the candidates and agree about their score
on a" valence" dimension. The second is that each voter's preferences over policies are ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - All 7 versions

[PDF] Pareto Efficiency and Weighted Majority Rules

[PDF] from ubc.ca
Y Azrieli… - unpublished, Ohio State University, 2011 - faculty.arts.ubc.ca
Abstract. We consider a Bayesian environment with independent private values and two
possible alternatives. It is shown that a social choice function is interim incentive efficient if
and only if it is a weighted majority rule. Keywords: Pareto efficiency; Incentive ...
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[PDF] A bank runs model with a continuum of types

[PDF] from ohio-state.edu
Y Azrieli… - 2011 - econ.ohio-state.edu
Abstract. We consider a bank runs modela la Diamond and Dybvig (1983) with a continuum
of agent types, indexed by the degree of patience. Much of our understanding based on the
two-type model must be modified. The endogenous determination of a cutoff type is ...
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On pure conjectural equilibrium with non-manipulable information

Full text - MIT Libraries
Y Azrieli - International Journal of Game Theory, 2009 - Springer
Abstract An information structure in a non-cooperative game determines the signal that each
player observes as a function of the strategy profile. Such information structure is called non-
manipulable if no player can gain new information by changing his strategy. A Conjectural ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - All 8 versions

Uncertainty aversion and equilibrium existence in games with incomplete information

[PDF] from uni-muenchen.de
Y Azrieli… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2011 - Elsevier
We consider games with incomplete information à la Harsanyi, where the payoff of a player
depends on an unknown state of nature as well as on the profile of chosen actions. As
opposed to the standard model, playersʼ preferences over state-contingent utility vectors ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 19 versions

Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions

[PDF] from missouri.edu
Y Azrieli… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2011 - Elsevier
We consider second-price common-value auctions with an increasing number of bidders.
We define a strategy of bidder i to be (ex-post, weakly) asymptotically dominated if there is
another strategy for i that does, in the limit, as well against any sequence of strategies of ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 9 versions

[CITATION] Three Essays on Steady States of Recurring Non-cooperative Games

Y Azrieli - 2008 - Tel Aviv University
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Pure self-confirming equilibrium

[PDF] from uni-muenchen.de
Y Azrieli - 2007 - mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
In a Self-Confirming Equilibrium (Fudenberg and Levine, 1993A) every player obtains partial
information about other players' strategies and plays a best response to some conjecture
which is consistent with his information. Two kinds of information structures are ...
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[PDF] ELICITING MULTIPLE CHOICES: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF INCENTIVES IN EXPERIMENTS

[PDF] from ucsd.edu
Y AZRIELI, CP CHAMBERS… - econ.ucsd.edu
ABSTRACT. Experiments elicit choices from a given set of decision problems. When multiple
decision problems are offered in the same experiment, behavior in one decision problem
may be distorted by the choices made in others; incentive compatibility of the experiment ...
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[CITATION] DOMINANCE SOLVABILITY OF LARGE k-PRICE AUCTIONS

Y AZRIELI… - 2011
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[CITATION] A UTILITARIAN, NON-COOPERATIVE RATIONALE FOR (WEIGHTED) MAJORITY RULE

Y AZRIELI… - 2011
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[PDF] PURE EQUILIBRIA IN NON-ANONYMOUS LARGE GAMES

[PDF] from gtcenter.org
Y AZRIELI… - 2010 - gtcenter.org
Abstract. Recent literature shows that pure approximate Nash equilibria exist in anonymous
and continuous large finite games. Here we study continuous but non-anonymous games.
Call the impact of a game to the maximal difference in some player's payoff when one ...
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