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Optimal contracts when enforcement is a decision variable

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S Krasa… - Econometrica, 2000 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. Ž . Econometrica, Vol. 68, No. 1 January, 2000 , 119134 OPTIMAL
CONTRACTS WHEN ENFORCEMENT IS A DECISION VARIABLE BY STEFAN KRASA
AND ANNE P. VILLAMIL 1 This paper analyzes choice-theoretic ...
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Monitoring the monitor: An incentive structure for a financial intermediary

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S Krasa… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1992 - Elsevier
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Market power in oral double auctions

CA Holt, LW Langan… - Economic Inquiry, 1986 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. MARKET POWER IN ORAL DOUBLE AUCTIONS CHARLES A. HOLT, LOREN W.
LANGAN, and ANNE P. VILLAMIL' This paper reports the results of a series of
oral-double-auction experiments in which some traders possess market power. ...
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A theory of optimal bank size

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S Krasa… - Oxford Economic Papers, 1992 - JSTOR
Page 1. Oxford Economic Papers 44 (1992), 725-749 A THEORY OF OPTIMAL BANK
SIZE By STEFAN KRASA and ANNE P. VILLAMIL* 1. Introduction RECENT research
has studied how the structure of the financial system ...
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Optimal multilateral contracts

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S Krasa… - Economic Theory, 1994 - Springer
Page 1. Econ. Theory 4, 167-187 (1994) Econom/c Theory O Springer-Verlag 1994 Research articles
Optimal multilateral contracts* Stefan Krasa and Anne P. Viilamil Department of Economics,
University of Illinois, 1206 South Sixth Street, Champaign, IL 61820, USA ...
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Optimal inflation tax and structural reform

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V Tiago, V Cavalcanti… - Macroeconomic …, 2003 - Cambridge Univ Press
Page 1. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 7, 2003, 333–362. Printed in the United States of
America. DOI: 10.1017.S1365100502020096 OPTIMAL INFLATION TAX AND
STRUCTURAL REFORM TIAGO V. DE V. CAVALCANTI Universidade ...
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The effect of financial repression and enforcement on entrepreneurship and economic development

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A Antunes, T Cavalcanti… - Journal of Monetary Economics, 2008 - Elsevier
A general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents (with respect to wealth and ability)
shows that differences across countries in intermediation costs and enforcement generate
differences in occupational choice, firm size, credit, output and income inequality. ...
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Demand deposit contracts, suspension of convertibility, and optimal financial intermediation

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AP Villamil - Economic theory, 1991 - Springer
Page 1. Econ Theory (1991) 1:277-288 Economic Theory 9 Springer-Verlag 1991 Demand deposit
contracts, suspension of convertibilfty, and optimal financial intermediation AP Villamil University
of Illinois, Department of Economics, Champaign, IL 61820, USA ...
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Price discriminating monetary policy:: A nonuniform pricing approach

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AP Villamil - Journal of Public Economics, 1988 - Elsevier
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A laboratory experiment with a single-person cobweb

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CA Holt… - Atlantic Economic Journal, 1986 - Springer
Page 1. A Laboratory Experiment With A Single-Person Cobweb CHARLES A. HOLT
AND ANNE P. VILLAMIL* Introduction Among economists, one of the least fashion-
able theories of price adjustment is the "cob- web theorem ...
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Government borrowing using bonds with randomly determined returns: Welfare improving randomization in the context of deficit finance

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BD Smith… - Journal of Monetary Economics, 1998 - Elsevier
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[PDF] Bankruptcy and firm finance

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S Krasa, T Sharma… - University of Illinois, Urbana- …, 2004 - econ.uiuc.edu
Page 1. Bankruptcy and Firm Finance Stefan Krasa ∗ Tridib Sharma† Anne P. Villamil
‡ September 10, 2004 Abstract This paper analyzes how an enforcement mechanism
that resembles a court affects firm finance. The court ...
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Imperfect enforcement, foreign investment, and foreign aid

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E Asiedu… - Macroeconomic Dynamics, 2002 - Cambridge Univ Press
Page 1. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 6, 2002, 476–495. Printed in the United States
of America. DOI: 10.1017.S1365100501010070 IMPERFECT ENFORCEMENT,
FOREIGN INVESTMENT, AND FOREIGN AID ELIZABETH ASIEDU ...
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Bankruptcy and firm finance

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S Krasa, T Sharma… - Economic Theory, 2008 - Springer
Page 1. Economic Theory (2008) 36:239–266 DOI 10.1007/s00199-007-0267-y
RESEARCH ARTICLE Bankruptcy and firm finance Stefan Krasa · Tridib Sharma ·
Anne P. Villamil Received: 4 October 2006 / Revised: 13 June ...
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Discount factors and thresholds: Foreign investment when enforcement is imperfect

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E Asiedu… - Macroeconomic Dynamics, 2000 - Cambridge Univ Press
Page 1. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 4, 2000, 1–21. Printed in the United States of
America. ARTICLES DISCOUNT FACTORS AND THRESHOLDS: FOREIGN
INVESTMENT WHEN ENFORCEMENT IS IMPERFECT ELIZABETH ...
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Optimal contracts when enforcement is a decision variable: A reply

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S Krasa… - Econometrica, 2003 - JSTOR
Page 1. Econometrica, Vol. 71, No. 1 (January, 2003), 391-393 OPTIMAL
CONTRACTS WHEN ENFORCEMENT IS A DECISION VARIABLE: A REPLY BY
STEFAN KRASA AND ANNE P. VILLAMIL1 1. INTRODUCTION IN A ...
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Small firms in the SSBF

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N Herranz, S Krasa… - Annals of Finance, 2009 - Springer
Page 1. Ann Finance (2009) 5:341–359 DOI 10.1007/s10436-008-0118-2 SYMPOSIUM
Small firms in the SSBF Neus Herranz · Stefan Krasa · Anne P. Villamil Received: 15
October 2008 / Accepted: 17 December 2008 / Published ...
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Intertemporal pricing in markets with differential information

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A Rustichini… - Economic Theory, 1996 - Springer
Page 1. Economic Theory 8, 21 t-227 (1996) Econom/c Theory 9 Springer-Verlag 1996
Intertemporal pricing in markets with differential information* Aldo Rustichini 1 and
Anne P. Villamil 2 CORE, Universit~ Catholique de Louvain ...
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[PDF] Supracompetitive Prices and Market Power in Posted-Offer Experiments,”

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D Davis, CA Holt… - University of Illinois BBER …, 1990 - acrobatplanet.com
Page 1. Supra-competitive Prices and Market Power in Posted-Offer Experiments Douglas
Davis, Charles A. Holt, and Anne P. Villamil* April 11, 2001 Abstract This paper reports the
results of a posted-offer market experiment designed to examine the ...
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[PDF] The modigliani-miller theorem

[PDF] from illinois.edu
AP Villamil - forthcoming in The New Palgrave Dictionary of …, 2008 - econ.illinois.edu
Page 1. The Modigliani-Miller Theorem The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
Anne P. Villamil, University of Illinois The Modigliani-Miller Theorem is a cornerstone
of modern corporate finance. At its heart, the theorem ...
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Debt contracts and cooperative improvements

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S Krasa, T Sharma… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2005 - Elsevier
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Computing general equilibrium models with occupational choice and financial frictions

[PDF] from eprg.org.uk
A Antunes, T Cavalcanti… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2008 - Elsevier
This paper establishes the existence of a stationary equilibrium and a procedure to compute
solutions to a class of dynamic general equilibrium models with two important features. First,
occupational choice is determined endogenously as a function of heterogeneous agent ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 9 versions

[PDF] The impact of entrepreneur characteristics and bankruptcy rules on firm performance

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N Herranz, S Krasa… - University of Illinois (2007, …, 2007 - anasramadan.com
Abstract How important for firm performance are differences in owner's personal
characteristics (risk tolerance or optimism) versus the institutional environment in which the
firm operates (bankruptcy institutions, access to credit or return distributions)? To answer ...
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Credit rationing by loan size in commercial loan markets

SL Schreft… - Economic Review, 1992 - ideas.repec.org
Downloadable! The authors present a theoretical model in which a profit-maximizing lender may
ration credit to businesses by restricting loan size. Such credit rationing occurs despite the
absence of differences across borrowers in default risk or loan administration costs. Moreover ...
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[PDF] The effect of enforcement on firm finance

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S Krasa, T Sharma… - 2003 - econ.uiuc.edu
Page 1. The Effect of Enforcement on Firm Finance Stefan Krasa ∗ Tridib Sharma†
Anne P. Villamil ‡ August 7, 2003 Abstract This paper analyzes how an enforcement
mechanism that resembles a court af- fects firm finance. ...
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The effect of financial repression & enforcement on entrepreneurship and economic development

[PDF] from eastasiaforum.org
A Antunes, T Cavalcanti… - 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper studies the effect of financial repression and contract enforcement on
entrepreneurship and economic development. We construct and solve a general equilibrium
model with heterogeneous agents, occupational choice and two financial frictions: ...
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The use of laboratory experiments in economics: An introductory survey

CA Holt… - Laboratory Market Research, 1986 - people.virginia.edu
Abstract: Until recently, economists have relied on data from markets that exist naturally in
the economy to construct empirical tests of economic theories. Chamberlin (1948) was the
first person to establish a market for the purpose of testing a theory. Chamberlin's work ...
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[PDF] Entrepreneurs, legal institutions and firm dynamics

[PDF] from manchester.ac.uk
N Herranz, S Krasa… - … for Growth and …, 2009 - socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk
Abstract This paper assesses quantitatively the impact of legal institutions on
entrepreneurial firm dynamics. Owners choose firm size, financial structure and default to
manage risk. We find:(i) Less risk averse entrepreneurs run bigger firms and it is optimal ...
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[CITATION] Measuring Consumer Demand for Functional Foods and the Impact of Health Labelling Regulation

LJ Unnevehr, AP Villamil… - FAMC Conference on New Approaches to …, 1999
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[PDF] Intermediation costs, investor protection and economic development

[PDF] from bportugal.pt
A Antunes, T Cavalcanti… - Manus., Department of …, 2005 - bportugal.pt
Abstract This paper studies the effect of financial repression and contract enforcement on en
trepreneurship and economic development. We construct and solve a general equilibrium
model with heterogeneous agents, occupational choice and two financial frictions: interme ...
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[CITATION] nImperfect Enforcement

E Asiedu… - For% eign Investment, and Foreign Aid, …, 2002
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[CITATION] Supra-Competitive Prices and Market Power in Posted-Offer Experiments

D Douglas, CA Holt… - 1990 - May
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[CITATION] Equilibrium price stickiness

A Rustichini, AP Villamil… - 1992 - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for …
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Intertemporal pricing in laboratory posted offer markets with differential information

A Rustiehini… - Advances in Experimental Markets, 2001 - Springer
Page 1. Intertemporal pricing in laboratory posted offer markets with differential
information * Aldo Rustichini1 and Anne P. Villamil2 1 Department of Economics, Boston
University, Boston, MA 02215, USA 2 Department of Economics ...
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Entrepreneurship, finance and employment

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M De Nardi… - Annals of Finance, 2009 - Springer
Despite the vast existing literature on entrepreneurship, much remains to be learned. This
special issue starts with a review article surveying the previous studies on entrepreneurship
and macroeconomics. It then moves to empirical papers that use various data sets to ask ...
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[BOOK] Computing general equilibrium models with occupational choice and financial frictions

[PDF] from eastasiaforum.org
A Antunes, T Cavalcanti… - 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Page 1. Computing General Equilibrium Models with Occupational Choice and
Financial Frictions∗ António Antunes† Tiago Cavalcanti‡ Anne Villamil§ forthcoming
in the Journal of Mathematical Economics April 26, 2006 Abstract ...
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[CITATION] The Effect of Market Power on the Direction of Convergence in Oral Double Auctions

CA Holt… - Econometric Society Winter Meeting, Dallas, 1984
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[CITATION] Optimal Contarcts with Costly State Verification: The Multilateral Case

S Krasa, AP Villamil… - 1992 - University of Illinois at Urbana- …
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The Modigliani–Miller theorem and entrepreneurial firms: an overview

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AP Villamil - Strategic Change, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. Strat. Change 19: 3–7 (2010) Published online in Wiley Interscience
(interscience.wiley.com) DOI: 10.1002/jsc.854 INTRODUCTION Copyright © 2010 John
Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strategic Change: Briefings in Entrepreneurial Finance ...
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[CITATION] Promoting Efficient Institutions and Providing Insurance Services: A Dual Role for Multilateral Organizations

E Asiedu… - 2003 - University of Kansas Working Paper. …
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[PDF] On Welfare and Distributional Implications of Intermediation Costs

[PDF] from anpec.org.br
T Cavalcanti… - … , Ill, Department of Economics, University of …, 2005 - anpec.org.br
Abstract This paper studies the distributional implications of intermediation costs. We built a
“Bewley” model economy where individuals experience uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks on
labor productivity and financial intermediation is costly. Individuals smooth consumption ...
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Do lack of transparency and enforcement undermine international risk-sharing?

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E Asiedu, Y Jin… - Annals of Finance, 2006 - Springer
Page 1. Annals of Finance (2006) 2: 123–140 DOI 10.1007/s10436-005-0032-9
RESEARCH ARTICLE Elizabeth Asiedu · Yi Jin · Anne P. Villamil Do lack of
transparency and enforcement undermine international risk-sharing? ...
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[PDF] Imperfect Enforcement and Foreign Investment: A Rationale for Multilateral Organizations

[PDF] from ku.edu
E Asiedu… - 1999 - ku.edu
Page 1. Imperfect Enforcement and Foreign Investment: A Rationale for Multilateral Organizations
Elizabeth Asiedu Department of Economics, University of Kansas Anne P. Villamil Department
of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana−Champaign March 1999 Abstract ...
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[CITATION] Efficiency, randomization, and commitment in government borrowing

BD Smith, AP Villamil… - 1993 - University of Illinois at Urbana- …
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[PDF] Financial Contracts and Enforcement

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AP Villamil - 2005 - econ.uiuc.edu
Page 1. Financial Contracts and Enforcement Anne P. Villamil ∗ March 2010 Outline of
Part 2: Enforcement 1. Main Approaches to Enforcement 2. Costly Enforcement Model:
Krasa and Villamil [9] (a) (Limited) Commitment and renegotiation ...
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Intermediation Costs, Investor Protection, and Economic Development

AP Villamil, AÃ Antunes… - 2005 Meeting Papers, 2005 - ideas.repec.org
... listing, contact: (Christian Zimmermann). Related research. Keywords: Financial
frictions; Occupational choice; Development; Other versions of this item: António
R. Antunes & Tiago V. de V. Cavalcanti & Anne Villamil, 2005. ...
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[CITATION] Time Consistent Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable

S Krasa, AP Villamil… - 1995 - University of Illinois at Urbana- …
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[PDF] Risky Banking: Optimal Loan Quantity and Portfolio Quality Choices

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P Elosegui… - 2002 - cdi.mecon.gov.ar
Page 1. Risky Banking: Optimal Loan Quantity and Portfolio Quality Choices Pedro
Elosegui Anne P. Villamil * May 22, 2002 Abstract In this paper we construct a model
of a \risky bank." The bank faces excess demand in the ...
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[CITATION] The Direction of Price Convergence in Oral Double Auctions,”

CA Holt, F Solis-Soberon… - 1990 - working paper, University if Illinois
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THE EFFECT OF FINANCIAL ENFORCEMENT ON ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND DEVELOPMENT IN A 'GROWTH MIRACLE'*

[PDF] from manchester.ac.uk
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D Joo… - The Manchester School, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
JOO, D. and VILLAMIL, A.(2011), THE EFFECT OF FINANCIAL ENFORCEMENT ON
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND DEVELOPMENT IN A 'GROWTH MIRACLE'. The Manchester
School, 79: 567–593. doi: 10.1111/j. 1467-9957.2010. 02200. x
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[CITATION] Introduction to capital accumulation and allocation in economic growth

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A Villamil - The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 2003 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks.
Introduction to capital accumulation and allocation in economic growth. Anne Villamil (). The
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 2003, vol. 43, issue 4, pages 583-591. ...
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[PDF] Costly Intermediation & Consumption Smoothing

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A Antunes, T Cavalcanti… - 2011 - tippieweb.iowa.uiowa.edu
Abstract This paper studies quantitatively how intermediation costs affect household
consumption loans and welfare. Agents face uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks to labor
productivity in a production economy with costly financial intermediation and a natural ...
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[CITATION] Equilibrium Price Stickiness--Revised

A Rustichini, AP Villamil… - 1992 - University of Illinois at Urbana- …
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[PDF] Financial Contracts and the Theory of Debt

[PDF] from nus.edu.sg
AP Villamil - 2005 - ims.nus.edu.sg
Page 1. Financial Contracts and the Theory of Debt Anne P. Villamil ∗ Uncertainty and Information
in Economics Singapore June 14, 2005 Outline of Part 1 1. Introduction 2. Finance in GE 3.
Overview of the Literature 4. Debt Contracts (a) Risk Sharing is not Enough ...
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[CITATION] Financial Contracts and Credit Rationing

AP Villamil - 2004
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[PDF] Contract Model Applications: Bankruptcy

[PDF] from wustl.edu
AP Villamil - 2007 - artsci.wustl.edu
Page 1. Contract Model Applications: Bankruptcy Anne P. Villamil ∗ Washington
University - St. Louis April 2007 Contract Model Application to Bankruptcy 1. Consumer
Bankruptcy: Livshits, MacGee and Tertilt, AER, March 2007 ...
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[PDF] Price Discrimination Analysis of Monetary Policy: An Extension

[PDF] from umn.edu
AP Villamil - 1985 - conservancy.umn.edu
Page 1. PRICE DISCRIMINATION ANALYSIS OF MONETARY POLICY: AN EXTENSION by
Anne P. Villamil Discussion Paper No. 222, September 1985 Department of Economics 1035
Mgmt and Economics University of Minnesota Minneapolis, Minn 55455 ...
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[CITATION] Measuring the Monitor: An Incentive Structure for a Financial Intermediary

S Krasa, AP Villamil… - 1991 - University of Illinois at Urbana- …
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[PDF] The Effects of Credit Subsidies on Development

[PDF] from st-andrews.ac.uk
A Antunes, T Cavalcanti… - 2011 - st-andrews.ac.uk
Abstract This paper studies the effects of interest rate credit subsidies on economic
development in a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents, occupational
choice and financial frictions. There are two financial frictions: a cost to intermediate loans ...
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Edward C. Prescott's contributions to economics: guest editors' introduction

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SL Parente… - Economic Theory, 2007 - Springer
He has been a co-Editor of Economic Theory since its inception, and an important
contributor to Economic Theory having published numerous papers within its pages,
including one paper with Finn Kydland in the inaugural issue in 1991. Thus it gives us ...
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[CITATION] Singapore Centre for Applied and Policy Economics

A Antunes, T Cavalcanti… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2006
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[CITATION] Supra-competitive Prices and Market Prices in Posted-offer Experiments

DD Davis, CA Holt, AP Villamil… - 1990 - College of Commerce and Business …
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[PDF] THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ASYMMETRIES

[PDF] from apforum.org
X Dassiou, D Glycopantis, M Arbex… - Journal of Economic …, 2009 - apforum.org
The idea that inflation is a tax is long-standing. The desirability of this particular tax from a
welfare perspective, however, depends on the alternatives. Friedman (1969) argues that
when lump sum taxes are available, the optimal inflation tax is zero (ignoring output ...
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Voluntary firm restructuring: why do firms sell or liquidate their subsidiaries?

[PDF] from hubrussel.be
AP Villamil - 2010 - lirias.hubrussel.be
Page 1. Ann Finance (2011) 7:449–476 DOI 10.1007/s10436-010-0154-6
SYMPOSIUM Voluntary firm restructuring: why do firms sell or liquidate their
subsidiaries? Alain Praet Received: 17 September 2008 / Accepted: 5 April ...
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[CITATION] Liquidity preference, costly state verification, and optimal financial intermediation/1593

[PDF] from illinois.edu
AP Villamil - 1989 - ideals.illinois.edu
Page 1. Page 2. Page 3. ST> BEBR FACULTY WORKING PAPER NO. 89-1593
Liquidity Preference, Costly State Verification and Optimal Financial Intermediation
A. P.Villamil College of Commerce and Business Aoministration ...
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[CITATION] Intertemporal contracts and a theory of optimal auditing/93-122

[PDF] from illinois.edu
S Krasa… - ideals.illinois.edu
Page 1. Page 2. Page 3. Faculty Working Paper 93-0122 330 B385 1993:122 COPY
2 STX Intertemporal Contracts and a Theory of Optimal Auditing Th« Library of the
MAY 3 1993 University of Illinois of Urtana-CtampalQn Stefan ...
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[CITATION] Supra-competitive prices and market prices in posted-offer experiments/1648

[PDF] from illinois.edu
DD Davis, CA Holt… - 1990 - ideals.illinois.edu
Page 1. Page 2. Page 3. 330 3385 |0. 1643 COPY 2 ;TX BEBR FACULTY WORKING PAPER
NO. 90-1648 Supra-Competitive Prices and Market Power in Posted-Offer Experiments Douglas
D. Davis Charles A. Holt Anne P. Villamil The Library of tne APR 2 4 iQ9rj Untorstt,- ./? ...

[PDF] On the Welfare and Distributional Implications of Intermediation Costs

[PDF] from eea-esem.com
A Antunes, T Cavalcanti… - 2006 - eea-esem.com
Abstract This paper studies the distributional implications of intermediation costs. We built a
“Bewley” model economy where individuals experience uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks on
labor productivity and financial intermediation is costly. Individuals smooth consumption ...
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Promoting Efficient Institutions and Providing Insurance Services: A Dual Role for Multilateral Agencies

E Asiedu… - 2003 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper uses a Costly State Verification model to analyze risk-sharing
arrangements between a coalition of countries when there is uncertainty about the
realization of a key performance variable. The realization of the performance variable is a ...
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[CITATION] Symposium on Entrepreneurship, Finance and Employment

M De Nardi… - 2009 - Springer
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[CITATION] Monitoring the monitor: an incentive structure for a financial intermediary/1690

[PDF] from illinois.edu
S Krasa… - 1991 - ideals.illinois.edu
Page 1. Page 2. UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LIBRARY AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN BOOKSTACKS
Page 3. Page 4. Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with funding from University of Illinois
Urbana-Champaign http://www.archive.org/details/monitoringmonito1690kras Page 5 ...
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[CITATION] Capital Accumulation and Allocation in Economic Growth

A Villamil - 2003 - Elsevier Science
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Computing General Equilibrium Models with Occupational Choice and Financial Frictions

A Villamil - Macroeconomics Working Papers, 2006 - ideas.repec.org
This paper establishes the existence of a stationary equilibrium and a procedure to compute
solutions to a class of dynamic general equilibrium models with two important features. First,
occupational choice is determined endogenously as a function of heterogeneous agent ...
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[CITATION] Enforcement and Renegotiation

AP Villamil - 2004
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[CITATION] Equilibrium price stickiness/91-162

[PDF] from illinois.edu
A Rustichini… - 1991 - ideals.illinois.edu
Page 1. Page 2. UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LIBRARY AT URBANA-CHAMPAiGN BOOKSTACKS
Page 3. Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with funding from University of Illinois
Urbana-Champaign http://www.archive.org/details/equilibriumprice91162rust Page 4. ( t ...
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[PDF] Insurance, Verification, and Enforcement Services: A Role for Multilateral Organizations

[PDF] from psu.edu
E Asiedu… - 1999 - Citeseer
Page 1. Insurance, Verification, and Enforcement Services: A Role for Multilateral Organizations *
Elizabeth Asiedu Department of Economics, University of Kansas Anne P. Villamil Department
of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana−Champaign June 1999 Abstract ...
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[CITATION] Insurance and Verification Services: A Role for Multilateral Organizations

E Asiedu… - 2001
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[CITATION] Efficiency, randomization, and commitment in government borrowing/93-143

[PDF] from illinois.edu
BD Smith… - 1993 - ideals.illinois.edu
Page 1. Page 2. UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LIBRARY AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN BOOKSTACKS
Page 3. Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with funding from University of Illinois
Urbana-Champaign http://www.archive.org/details/efficiencyrandom93143smit Page 4. Page ...
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Risky banking and credit rationing

P Elosegui… - 2007 - ideas.repec.org
Downloadable! In this paper a bank faces excess demand in the loan market, can sort loan
applicants by an observable measure of quality, and faces a small but positive probability of default.
The bank uses two policies to allocate credit: (i) tighten restrictions on loan quality; (ii) limit ...
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Enforcement and Firm Finance

A Villamil, S Krasa… - 2004 Meeting Papers, 2004 - ideas.repec.org
The power to enforce rights and obligations in a society is essential. For simplicity,
economists have focused on two extreme forms of enforcement: perfect ex-post enforcement
of contracts by an exogenous un-modeled authority (a``court'') or contracts that are``self- ...
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[CITATION] Intertemporal Contracts and a Theory of Optimal Auditing

S Krasa, AP Villamil… - 1993 - University of Illinois at Urbana- …
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The Effect of Financial Repression & Enforcement on Entrepreneurship and Economic Development

A Villamil - Development Economics Working Papers, 2006 - ideas.repec.org
This paper studies the effect of financial repression and contract enforcement on en-
trepreneurship and economic development. We construct and solve a general equilibrium
model with heterogeneous agents, occupational choice and two financial frictions: ...
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[CITATION] Essays on imperfect information and monetary economics

AP Villamil - 1988 - en.scientificcommons.org
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