D Bernhardt - The Review of Economic Studies, 1995 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract Within a hierarchical firm structure, this paper details how the composition of a
worker's skills and the non-observability of a worker's ability affect wage and promotion
paths. Promotion-based compensation schemes derive naturally from the worker's ...
H Lloyd‐Ellis… - Review of Economic Studies, 2000 - Wiley Online Library
We characterize an equilibrium development process driven by the interactionof the
distribution of wealth with credit constraints and the distributionof entrepreneurial skills.
When efficient entrepreneurs are relativelyabundant, a “traditional” development process ...
J Slive… - Canadian Journal of Economics, 1998 - JSTOR
This paper explains why a software manufacturer may permit limited piracy of its software.
Piracy can be viewed as a form of price discrimination in which the manufacturer sells some
of the software at a price of zero. In the presence of significant network externalities for the ...
D Bernhardt… - The American economic review, 1994 - JSTOR
This note explores multiobject, sequential, private-value auctions. Orley Ashenfelter (1989),
Ashenfelter and David Genesove (1992), and R. Preston McAfee and Daniel Vincent (1993)
document a puzzling" declining-price anomaly": in sequential auctions, mean sale prices ...
D Bernhardt… - The American Economic Review, 1993 - JSTOR
This paper examines the strategic promotion and wage decisions of employers when
employees may be more valuable to competing firms. Competing employers must incur a
cost to learn the quality of their match with a manager. Promotion signals that workers are ...
J Zabojnik… - The Review of Economic …, 2001 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract This paper provides a possible explanation for the empirically observed size-wage
effect and inter-industry wage differences. It develops a model in which incentives for
workers to accumulate general human capital are provided by corporate tournaments, ...
D Bernhardt, M Campello… - Journal of Financial Economics, 2006 - Elsevier
This paper develops a test for herding in forecasts by professional financial analysts that is
robust to (a) correlated information amongst analysts;(b) common unforecasted industry-
wide earnings shocks;(c) information arrival over the forecasting cycle;(d) the possibility ...
D Bernhardt, S Krasa… - Journal of Public Economics, 2008 - Elsevier
We develop a model in which profits of media firms depend on their audience ratings, and
maximizing profits may involve catering to a partisan audience by suppressing information
that the partisan audience does not like hearing. While voters are rational, understand the ...
D Bernhardt… - Review of Financial Studies, 1997 - Soc Financial Studies
Abstract A standard presumption of market microstructure models is that competition
between risk-neutral market makers inevitably leads to price schedules that leave market
makers zero expected profits conditional on the order flow. This article documents an ...
D Bernhardt, B Hollifield… - Review of Financial …, 1995 - Soc Financial Studies
Abstract We study insider trading in a dynamic setting. Rational, but uninformed, traders
choose between investment projects with different levels of insider trading. Insider trading
distorts investment toward asset with less private information. However, when investment ...
N Massoud… - Rand journal of Economics, 2002 - JSTOR
We develop a spatial model in which we endogenize both the pricing of ATM services by
banks and the choice of home bank and ATM use by consumers. The equilibrium delivers
the empirical regularities: Banks set high bank account fees for their own customers but do ...
D Scoones… - Journal of Labor Economics, 1998 - ideas.repec.org
This article explores human capital acquisition decisions when job placement helps
determine competition for a worker. With asymmetric information, workers may invest in firm-
specific capital without long-term contracts. Specific investment increases promotion ...
D Bernhardt, S Dubey… - Journal of Public Economics, 2004 - Elsevier
We develop a dynamic model of democratic politics in which both potential office holders
and the electorate have heterogeneous ideologies. Voters have incomplete information
about candidate ideologies, so they must use information from previous positions taken in ...
D Bernhardt, V Dvoracek… - Review of Financial …, 2005 - Soc Financial Studies
Abstract We argue that competition between dealers in a classic dealer market is
intertemporal: A trader identifies a particular dealer and negotiates a final price with only the
intertemporal threat to switch dealers imposing pricing discipline on the dealer. In this kind ...
D Bernhardt - Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 1984 - Elsevier
Abstract Domestic demand uncertainty in the presence of adjustment costs can cause profit-
maximizing firms to sell output abroad at a loss. Firms may dump output at prices below long-
run marginal and average productions costs with probability arbitrarily close to one. The ...
M Engineer… - Journal of Political Economy, 1991 - JSTOR
We examine a decentralized monetary economy in which households can use a means of
exchange (barter or gold) other than fiat money. The alternative means of exchange may
drive out money even if monetary exchange Pareto dominates. Legal restrictions ...
J Bergin… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1992 - Elsevier
Abstract In this paper we extend a result of Jovanovic and Rosenthal (Anonymous
sequential games, Journal of Mathematical Economics 17, 1988) on the existence of
equilibrium in Anonymous Sequential Games. Jovanovic and Rosenthal prove existence ...
D Bernhardt… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1996 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper incorporates institutional features of trading markets including the
discrete nature of the price grid and determines the consequences for prices and strategic
behavior. Interactions between market makers is complex: because equilibrium prices are ...
D Bernhardt, A Douglas… - Journal of Empirical Finance, 2005 - Elsevier
This paper exploits a key monotonicity property common to dividend signaling models—the
greater the rate that dividend income is taxed relative to capital gains income, the greater the
value of information revealed by a particular dividend yield—to distinguish the hypothesis ...
D Bernhardt - The Review of Economic Studies, 1989 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract Agents expect to trade with each other infinitely often, but face a temporal absence
of a coincidence of wants when they meet. Only loans and/or money can facilitate exchange.
In small close-knit economies, enduring trade relationships are valued and loans are ...
D Bernhardt, J Duggan… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2007 - Elsevier
This paper formulates and analyzes a general model of elections in which candidates
receive private signals about voters' preferences prior to committing to political platforms. We
fully characterize the unique pure-strategy equilibrium: After receiving her signal, each ...
D Bernhardt… - Review of Finance, 2007 - rof.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract This paper examines whether firms manage analyst forecasts and the associated
value consequences. We find that earnings forecasts tend to grow pessimistic over the
forecast horizon and these forecast changes and their timing are key determinants of ...
D Bernhardt… - Economics Letters, 2005 - Elsevier
Carhart et al. (2002) show that funds earn tremendous short-run returns near the end of an evaluation
period, when trading behavior has the greatest impact on performance. This is especially so
for small-cap funds, which trade less liquid stocks. Carhart et al. find that 80% of funds ...
D Bernhardt - The American Economic Review, 2000 - JSTOR
Here, f is a classical production technology, p is a possibly stochastic price or productivity
shock, and e is a possibly stochastic, mean zero, earnings, or cost shock. The entrepreneur
requires external finance for the capital investment, k, and it is assumed that the project is ...
D Bernhardt… - The Journal of Finance, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
This paper characterizes informed trade when speculators can acquire distinct signals of
varying quality about an asset's value at different dates. The most reasonable
characterization of private information about stocks is that while information is long-lived, ...
J Bergin… - Economic Theory, 1995 - Springer
Summary In this paper we consider Anonymous Sequential Games with Aggregate
Uncertainty. We prove existence of equilibrium when there is a general state space
representing aggregate uncertainty. When the economy is stationary and the underlying ...
D Bernhardt… - The Journal of Finance, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
In practice, heterogeneously informed speculators combine private information about
multiple stocks with information in prices, taking into account how their trades influence the
inferences of other speculators via prices. We show how this speculation causes prices to ...
D Bernhardt,
Q Liu… - European Economic Review, 2007 - Elsevier
The advent of the Internet has revolutionized the way companies advertise, develop and
distribute products. Firms can now customize their advertising messages and products to the
particular characteristics and needs of customers. Customers themselves can create their ...
J Bergin… - International Economic Review, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
We study economic environments in which agents make choices on the basis of relative
performance criteria and call the associated class of dynamic adjustment rules comparative
dynamics. We distinguish two classes of learning behavior: learning from the population ...
D Bernhardt, J Duggan… - … Political Science Review, 2009 - Cambridge Univ Press
Abstract Electoral platform convergence is perceived unfavorably by both the popular press
and many academic scholars. Arguably, to paraphrase,“it does not provide enough choice”
between candidates. This article provides a formal account of the perceived negative ...
D Bernhardt… - European Economic Review, 2002 - Elsevier
We develop and test a structural asymmetric information transaction model to characterize
the price impact of information when markets are thin. Since orders are accepted
individually, the model allows for transaction costs and brokerage fees. Equilibrium ...
[CITATION] Endogenous ATM Location and Pricing
N Massoud… - 2002 - … Paper, Dept. of Finance, School of …
D Bernhardt, J Duggan… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2009 - Elsevier
We study elections in which two candidates poll voters about their preferred policies before
taking policy positions. In the essentially unique equilibrium, candidates who receive
moderate signals adopt more extreme platforms than their information suggests, but ...
D Bernhardt… - The Journal of Finance, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
Chapter 11 structures complex negotiations between creditors and debtors that are
overseen by a bankruptcy court. We identify conditions where the court should sometimes
err in determining which firms should be liquidated. Such errors affect actions by both ...
D Bernhardt, M Campello… - … University, Department of …, 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: In a recent paper, Bernhardt et al.(2004) developed a non-parametric test for bias
in forecasts by professional financial analysts that is robust to correlated information
amongst analysts and information arrival over the forecasting cycle. The tests show that ...
D Bernhardt… - Canadian Journal of Economics/ …, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract We develop a model of mutual fund manager investment decisions near the end of
quarters. We show that when investors reward better performing funds with higher cash
flows, near quarter-ends a mutual fund manager has an incentive to distort new ...
D Bernhardt… - Journal of Labor Economics, 1990 - JSTOR
When creditors do not honor human capital as collateral, firms can mediate financially by
offering workers long-term wage contracts. The optimal contract specifies a wage consisting
of a spot general skill component plus a component equal to the expected time-averaged ...
D Bernhardt, P Seiler… - Economic Theory, 2010 - Springer
Abstract We develop a method for solving for equilibrium outcomes in stationary strategic
settings in which speculators are informationally large and understand how their actions
affect the information content of prices. This allows us to characterize speculation by ...
D Bernhardt… - Annals of Finance, 2006 - Springer
Abstract We characterize equilibrium outcomes in a Kyle demand-submission market model
of speculative trade. This market design mirrors that used at open on most exchanges, as
well as the auction format used for many IPOs. We contrast equilibrium outcomes with ...
D Bernhardt… - Journal of Labor Economics, 1990 - JSTOR
We introduce borrowing constraints into the life-cycle theory of labor supply and show that
they account for observed profiles in consumption, earnings, and hours worked. They can
also account for differences in occupational choice across individuals who differ in initial ...
D Bernhardt, L Campuzano, F Squintani… - Games and Economic …, 2009 - Elsevier
We study the role of parties in a citizen-candidate repeated-elections model in which voters
have incomplete information. We first identify a novel “party competition effect” in a setting
with two opposing parties. Compared with “at large” selection of candidates, party ...
D Bernhardt… - Manuscript. University of Illinois, 2004 - econ.uiuc.edu
Abstract This paper investigates basic issues in contracting and information acquisition for
entrepreneurial finance. Specifically, we determine how the nature and quality of the
information acquired by a financier, the equilibrium contracting terms, and the allocation of ...
R Mahani… - The Journal of Finance, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
We develop an equilibrium model of learning by rational traders to reconcile several
empirical regularities: Cross sectionally, most individual speculators lose money; large
speculators outperform small speculators; past performance positively affects subsequent ...
N Massoud… - Journal of Financial Markets, 1999 - Elsevier
In the Kyle (1985) finite horizon model of stock market dynamics with a trader who holds
long-lived information, informed trading intensities rise with time, and the slopes of the
equilibrium price schedules fall. This paper shows that this result depends crucially on the ...
H Lloyd-Ellis, D Bernhardt… - 1995 - qed.econ.queensu.ca
Abstract We characterize an equilibrium development process driven by the interaction of
the distribution of wealth with credit constraints and the distribution of entrepreneurial skills.
When efficient entrepreneurs are relatively abundant, a ''traditional''development process ...
D Bernhardt, E Hughson… - The American economic review, 2006 - JSTOR
This paper investigates how noisy evaluation of worker skills affects human capital
investments and hiring. Individuals distort investments toward skills that most managers can
evaluate. Dynamically, when workers become managers, managerial expertise can ...
D Bernhardt, O Câmara… - The Review of …, 2011 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We develop a dynamic repeated election model in which citizen candidates are
distinguished by both their ideology and valence. Voters observe an incumbent's valence
and policy choices but only know the challenger's party. Our model provides a rich set of ...
D Bernhardt… - 2005 - econ.uiuc.edu
Abstract We develop and implement a method to characterize equilibrium outcomes in a
multi-asset stock market in which speculators are informationally large, combine private
information about the asset with information in prices, and internalize how their trades ...
[CITATION] Smart fund managers
D Bernhardt, R Davies… - Stupid money, 2007
J Bergin… - Queen's University, Canada, mimeo, 2001 - eea-esem.com
Abstract We study repeated interaction over time and explore long-run behavior when
individuals imitate successful past performers, selecting actions with better than average
historical performance. In many environments it is know that such behavior leads to low ...
E Kutsoati, D Bernhardt… - 1999 - ssc.wisc.edu
Abstract This paper derives and tests the implications of relative performance incentives for
the forecasts of financial analysts. If, in addition to compensation for absolute forecast
accuracy, analysts are compensated on the basis of how their forecasts compare with ...
K Alexander-Cook, D Bernhardt… - Journal of Public Economics, 1998 - Elsevier
This paper looks at the incentives to free-ride on the information signaling of others and
shows how this can lead to delay in productive activity and to a cascade of activity once
information is signaled. In the presence of increasing returns to scale to a profitable ...
D Bernhardt… - Economics Letters, 2007 - Elsevier
Using an asset pricing model under asymmetric information, we show that asymmetric lead-
lag patterns in stock returns cannot be solely explained by information asymmetry.
Additional frictions are necessary to produce asymmetry in return cross-autocorrelations.
D Bernhardt… - University of Illinois, Champaign, 2001 - business.uiuc.edu
Abstract This paper derives and tests the implications of relative performance incentives for
security analysts. If, in addition to compensation for absolute forecast accuracy, analysts are
compensated on the basis of how their forecasts compare with those of other analysts, ...
D Bernhardt… - Working Papers, 1993 - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of
further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site ...
E Hughson… - 1991 - ideas.repec.org
We develop and test a structural asymmetric information transaction model to characterize
the price impact of information on the NYSE. Unlike previous literature, we allow for mixed
entry strategies on the part of informed traders and obtain an equilibrium where trades are ...
D Bernhardt… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
We show how profit sharing by firms with workers facilitates collusion among firms in a
dynamic oligopoly environment with uncertain demand. We first show that firm profits can
always be increased by tying wages to market conditions. The optimal agreement takes ...
D Bernhardt, RJ Davies… - Unpublished Paper, University …, 2005 - gresi-cetai.hec.ca
Abstract This paper investigates the driving forces underlying lead-lag cross-
autocorrelations in daily portfolio returns. By contrasting autocorrelation patterns using
portfolio returns based on trade prices before an arbitrary point in the trading day with ...
[CITATION] Endogenous ATM location and pricing
D Bernhardt… - 2002 - mimeo
[CITATION] Money, Barter, and the Optimality of legal Restictions
D Bernhardt… - Journal of Political Economy, 1991
J Bergin… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2009 - Elsevier
This paper characterizes long-run outcomes for broad classes of symmetric games, when
players select actions on the basis of average historical performance. Received wisdom
suggests that when agent's interests are partially opposed, behavior is excessively ...
[CITATION] The Dynamics of earnings management and analyst forecast errors
D Bernhardt… - 2001 - mimeo University of Illinois
M Engineer… - Journal of Monetary Economics, 1992 - Elsevier
Abstract We characterize the set of equilibrium transfers between overlapping generations
when transfer institutions are endogenous. In stationary economies, Pareto-improving
transfers require institutions cost as much to construct as they convey—even if less costly ...
D Bernhardt… - Economic Inquiry, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
Point shaving is the practice by favored teams of attempting to win by less than the point
spread to yield profits for gamblers who bet on the underdog. Consistent with point shaving,
strong favorites are anomalously likely to win by less than the spread. To distinguish ...
E Portniaguina, D Bernhardt… - Journal of Financial Markets, 2006 - Elsevier
This paper shows how the tick size affects equilibrium outcomes in a hybrid stock market
such as the NYSE that features both a specialist and a limit order book. Reducing the tick
size facilitates the specialist's ability to step ahead of the limit order book, resulting in a ...
D Bernhardt… - Canadian Journal of Economics, 1995 - JSTOR
An entrepreneur wishes to communicate private information to investors to secure a
desirable financial contract. The entrepreneur can signal project type through its choice of
capital structure, or can directly reveal sufficient information so that its type is known. ...
D Bernhardt… - 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We develop a novel spatial model in which we endogenize the choice by banks of
both (i) how to price banking services, and (ii) how many ATMs to provide. The feature of the
spatial model that makes it possible to solve for equilibrium pricing and location choices is ...
D Bernhardt, V Dvoracek, E Hughson… - 1999 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: On the NYSE and exchanges that feature open limit order books, larger orders
receive worse prices. Accordingly, market microstructure theory has focused on developing
consistent models. However, on exchanges such as the London Stock Exchange, ...
D Bernhardt - 1989 - ideas.repec.org
Within a hierarchical firm structure, the paper details how the composition of a worker's skills
and the (non) observability of a worker's ability affect wage and promotion paths. Promotion
takes place over time and is not efficient, as employers seek to exploit their inside ...
M Shadmehr… - American Political Science …, 2011 - Cambridge Univ Press
How can one analyze collective action in protests or revolutions when individuals are
uncertain about the relative payoffs of the status quo and revolution? We model a “calculus
of protest” of individuals who must either submit to the status quo or support revolt based ...
J Bergin… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
We study the dynamics of an industry subject to aggregate demand shocks where the productivity
of a firm's technology evolves stochastically over time. To characterize the intertemporal evolution
of the distribution of firms, we discuss in particular how exit decisions, aggregate output, ...
D Bernhardt… - Working Papers, 1993 - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of
further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site ...
[CITATION] Dividend signaling: fact or fiction
D Bernhardt… - 2001 - Working paper
D Bernhardt… - Discussion Papers Series, …, 1999 - econpapers.repec.org
By Dan Bernhardt and Edward Kutsoati; Can Relative Performance
Compensation Explain Analysts' Forecasts of Earnings?
D Bernhardt… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2008 - Elsevier
We integrate a monopolist dual trader into a dynamic model of speculation. In static
settings,[J.-C. Rochet, J.-L. Vila, Insider trading without normality, Rev. Econ. Stud. 61
(1994), 131–152] establish an irrelevance result—expected equilibrium outcomes are the ...
J Bergin… - Institute for Economic Research …, 1999 - qed.econ.queensu.ca
Abstract This paper develops a dynamic evolutionary model in which agents make choices
on the basis of relative performance criteria. We distinguish two classes of learned behavior:
imitative dynamics and a new class of dynamics," introspective dynamics." Under imitative ...
J Bergin… - 2000 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We develop a theoretical model of the dynamics of an industry over the business
cycle. We characterize the intertemporal evolution of the distribution of firms, where firms are
distinguished by their capital in place and the productivity of their technology. We contrast ...
[CITATION] Francesco Squintani.“Electoral Competition with Privately-Informed Candidates.”
D Bernhardt… - 2004 - Mimeo, 2004. 2 3One can show that …
[CITATION] Corporate Tournaments, Human Capital Acquisition, and the Firm Size-Wage Relation
D Bernhardt… - Review of Economic Studies, 2001
D Bernhardt… - 2008 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: It has been widely debated how much nonsynchronous trading drives asymmetric
portfolio cross-autocorrelations: lagged returns on a portfolio of larger-capitalization stocks
are far more heavily correlated with current returns on a portfolio of smaller-capitalization ...
D Bernhardt… - University of Illinois and University of …, 2007 - mail.eaer.org
Abstract Point shaving is the practice by favored teams of attempting to win basketball
games by less than the point spread in order to yield profits for gamblers who bet on the
underdog. Consistent with extensive point shaving, favorites are anomalously more likely ...
J Thomas… - Working Papers, 1991 - ideas.repec.org
This paper develops theories of multi-sector search by unemployed workers. The paper then
attempts to distinguish empirically whether unemployed workers target their job search
efforts exclusively on a particular sector at any point in time, or whether they search in a' ...
D Bernhardt… - 2004 - econ.uiuc.edu
Abstract Within a general model of speculative trade in stock markets, we characterize how
aggregate outcomes are affected when informed speculators are dual traders who process
retail liquidity trades as well as trade on their own account. We prove that information ...
D Bernhardt… - 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: The paper derives two analytical consequences of informed finance: Equity leads
to under-financing, while debt leads to over-financing. We show that our model can explain
key qualitative and quantitative features of informed venture capital finance in the United ...
B Taub, D Bernhardt… - 14th Annual Utah Winter Finance …, 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: In most contexts in which agents possess long-lived private information about a
firm's value, they will also have repeated access to new information over time. We develop a
method for analyzing informed trade in such environments. We exploit the stationary ...
D Bernhardt, J Duggan… - Typescript. University of …, 2003 - unina.stidue.net
Abstract We consider a model of elections in which two office-motivated candidates receive
private signals about the median voter's location prior to taking policy positions. When a
pure strategy equilibrium exists, it is unique: after receiving a signal each candidate ...
D Bernhardt… - 1993 - ideas.repec.org
We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model of economic development with altruism in
which the evolution of the extent of entrepreneurship, the rate of rural-urban migration, the
scale and structure of production, and the degree of income and wealth inequality are ...
J Bergin, D Bernhardt… - 1996 - irserver.ucd.ie
Abstract: We develop a theoretical model of the dynamics of an industry over the business
cycle. In the economy, both aggregate demand and the productivity of a firm's technology
evolve stochastically. Each period, firms must choose whether to produce or to exit and ...
[CITATION] Costly Institutions and Time Consistent Transfers Between Generations
M Engineer… - Typescript. Guelph University, 1989
D Bernhardt - International Economic Review, 1993 - JSTOR
This paper details the implications of costly price adjustment for strategic firm interaction and
the time series of prices. Such frictions introduce multiple equilibrium strategies which, in
turn, help facilitate collusion among firms. Collusive opportunities improve as product ...
D Tambanis… - 1998 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We extend the classic static adverse selection models of equity issue (eg Myers
and Majluf (1984)) to a dynamic context. Assets in place are the sum of a private value
component known only by management and a time--varying, stochastic public information ...
D Bernhardt… - 2000 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper considers a financier contemplating a venture capital investment in a
firm whose true value is unknown. The financier must make information-gathering and
investment decisions on an ongoing basis to decide whether to undertake the investment ...
[CITATION] Cladistics asset pricing
D Bernhardt, T Taub… - 2004 - Working paper, University
[CITATION] Investment, adverse selection, and insider trading
D Bernhardt, B Hollifield… - 1990 - Working paper, Carnegie Mellon …
[CITATION] Werner, Ingrid. 2002. Why do large orders receive discounts on the london stock exchange
D Bernhardt, V Dvoracek… - working paper
D Bernhardt, J Spicer… - 2000 - qed.econ.queensu.ca
Abstract This paper characterizes how the short-lived nature of derivative securities, such as
option and futures contracts, affects trading behavior and pricing. Specifically, the paper
explores strategic trade in short-lived derivative securities by agents that possess long- ...
[CITATION] «Pirated for Profit»(1998) 31 Can
J Slive… - J. of Econ
[CITATION] Strategic Information Flows In Stock Markets," 2005
D Bernhardt… - Work
D Bernhardt… - Journal of International Economics, 1989 - Elsevier
Abstract We consider a symmetric N-country competitive general equilibrium endowment
economy in which countries select quotas in a stsic Nash game to maximize the welfare of
representative citizens. Unlike tariffs, quota revenues need not accrue solely to the quota- ...
[CITATION] On Collective Action with Uncertain Payoffs: Punishment Dilemmas, Public Signals, and Communication
M Shadmehr… - UIUC typescript, 2010
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