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A measure of segregation based on social interactions

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F Echenique… - The Quarterly Journal of …, 2007 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We develop an index of segregation based on two premises:(1) a measure of
segregation should disaggregate to the level of individuals, and (2) an individual is more
segregated the more segregated are the agents with whom she interacts. We present an ...
Cited by 102 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 24 versions

A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets

[PDF] from econtheory.org
F Echenique… - Caltech SS Working Paper No. 1185, 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give
conditions under which the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be
approached through an algorithm. The usual core may be empty. The setwise-stable set ...
Cited by 67 - Related articles - All 41 versions

Comparative statics by adaptive dynamics and the correspondence principle

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F Echenique - Econometrica, 2002 - Wiley Online Library
The intuition behind comparative statics results is usually dynamic in nature. The economic
explanation for why differences in endogenous variables result from variations in exogenous
variables often takes the form of some sequential adjustment process. For example, ...
Cited by 62 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 32 versions

Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements

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AS Edlin… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2004 - works.bepress.com
... Available at: http://works.bepress.com/aaron_edlin/39 Page 2. Journal of Economic
Theory 118 (2004) 61–79 Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic
complements Federico Echenique a and Aaron Edlin b,Ã a Humanities ...
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Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods

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F Echenique… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2004 - Elsevier
We characterize the core many-to-one matchings as fixed points of a map. Our
characterization gives an algorithm for finding core allocations; the algorithm is efficient and
simple to implement. Our characterization does not require substitutable preferences, so it ...
Cited by 37 - Related articles - All 19 versions

A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues

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F Echenique… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2007 - Elsevier
We study many-to-one matchings, such as the assignment of students to colleges, where the
students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. It is
well known that the core of this model may be empty, without strong assumptions on ...
Cited by 36 - Related articles - All 32 versions

Is school segregation good or bad?

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F Echenique, RG Fryer… - The American economic review, 2006 - JSTOR
Fifty years after the landmark Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education, racial
disparities in achievement are a robust empirical reality. Black children enter kindergarten
lagging behind white children, and these differences grow throughout the school years ( ...
Cited by 30 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 26 versions

A characterization of strategic complementarities

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F Echenique - Games and Economic Behavior, 2004 - Elsevier
I characterize games for which there is an order on strategies such that the game has
strategic complementarities. I prove that, with some qualifications, games with a unique
equilibrium have complementarities if and only if Cournot best-response dynamics has no ...
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Supermodularity and preferences

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CP Chambers… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2009 - Elsevier
We uncover the complete ordinal implications of supermodularity on finite lattices under the
assumption of weak monotonicity. In this environment, we show that supermodularity is
ordinally equivalent to the notion of quasisupermodularity introduced by Milgrom and ...
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What matchings can be stable? The testable implications of matching theory

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F Echenique - Mathematics of Operations Research, 2008 - authors.library.caltech.edu
This paper studies the falsifiability of two-sided matching theory when agents' preferences
are unknown. A collection of matchings is rationalizable if there are preferences for the
agents involved so that the matchings are stable. We show that there are ...
Cited by 18 - Related articles - All 21 versions

Are stabilization programs expansionary?

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F Echenique… - Estudios económicos, 2000 - JSTOR
La evidencia empírica que se presenta en este trabajo pone en duda la idea generalmente
aceptada, de que los programas de estabilización del tipo de cambio son expansionistas.
Aunque estos programas fueron asociados a expansiones macroeconómicas, no se ...
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Testing models with multiple equilibria by quantile methods

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F Echenique… - Econometrica, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
This paper proposes a method for testing complementarities between explanatory and
dependent variables in a large class of economic models. The proposed test is based on the
monotone comparative statics (MCS) property of equilibria. Our main result is that MCS ...
Cited by 15 - Related articles - All 13 versions

Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities

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F Echenique - Games and Economic Behavior, 2004 - Elsevier
I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form
games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a nonempty,
complete lattice—in particular, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria exist. For this purpose I ...
Cited by 15 - Related articles - Library Search - All 24 versions

Strong comparative statics of equilibria

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F Echenique… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2003 - Elsevier
Some results in the monotone comparative statics literature tell us that if a parameter
increases, some old equilibria are smaller than some new equilibria. We give a sufficient
condition such that at a new parameter value every old equilibrium is smaller than every ...
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Mixed equilibria in games of strategic complementarities

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F Echenique - Economic Theory, 2003 - Springer
Summary. The literature on games of strategic complementarities (GSC) has focused on
pure strategies. I introduce mixed strategies and show that, when strategy spaces are one-
dimensional, the complementarities framework extends to mixed strategies ordered by first ...
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The equilibrium set of two-player games with complementarities is a sublattice

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F Echenique - Economic Theory, 2003 - Springer
Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Mi˜nones 2177, C1428ATG Buenos Aires, ARGENTINA, and
Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República, Montevideo, URUGUAY
(e-mail: fechenique@utdt.edu) ... Summary. I prove that the equilibrium set in a ...
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Finding all equilibria in games of strategic complements

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F Echenique - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
I present a simple and fast algorithm that finds all the pure-strategy Nash equilibria in games
with strategic complementarities. This is the first non-trivial algorithm for finding all pure-strategy
Nash equilibria. ... [1] AV Aho, JE Hopcroft and JD Ullman, The Design and Analysis of ...
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[PDF] Aggregate matchings

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F Echenique, SM Lee… - Caltech SS Work, 2010 - nber.org
Abstract This paper characterizes the testable implications of stability for aggregate
matchings. We consider data on matchings where individuals are aggregated, based on
their observable characteristics, into types, and we know how many agents of each type ...
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Counting combinatorial choice rules

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F Echenique - Games and Economic Behavior, 2007 - Elsevier
I count the number of combinatorial choice rules that satisfy certain properties: Kelso–
Crawford substitutability, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. The results are
important for two-sided matching theory, where agents are modeled by combinatorial ...
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[PDF] Comparative Statics, English Auctions, and the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem

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F Echenique… - Documentos de Trabajo (working papers), 2003 - Citeseer
Abstract. We introduce a comparative-statics observation; we prove that the English auction
is efficient in a model with interdependent valuations and n bidders; we generalize the
Stolper-Samuelson Theorem to the case of more than 2 goods and factors of production ...
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Contracts vs. Salaries in Matching

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F Echenique - 2010 - authors.library.caltech.edu
Firms and workers may sign complex contracts that govern many aspects of their
interactions. I show that when firms regard contracts as substitutes, bargaining over
contracts can be understood as bargaining only over wages. Substitutes is the assumption ...
Cited by 7 - Related articles - All 12 versions

Information is not about measurability

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J Dubra… - Mathematical Social Sciences, 2004 - Elsevier
We present a simple example where the use of σ-algebras as a model of information leads
to a paradoxical conclusion: a decisionmaker prefers less information to more. We then
explain that the problem arises because the use of σ-algebras as the informational content ...
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[PDF] Mixed equilibria in games of strategic complements are unstable

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F Echenique… - 2002 - escholarship.org
Author: Echenique, Federico, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, and Facultad de Ciencias
Sociales, Universidad de la Republica Edlin, Aaron S., School of Law and Economics Dept.,
University of California, Berkeley ... Publication Info: Competition Policy Center, Institute ...
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Monotone preferences over information

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J Dubra… - 2003 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We consider preference relations over information that are monotone: more
information is preferred to less. We prove that, if a preference relation on information about
an uncountable set of states of nature is monotone, then it is not representable by a utility ...
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The core matchings of markets with transfers

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CP Chambers… - 2008 - authors.library.caltech.edu
We characterize the structure of the set of core matchings of an assignment game (a two-
sided market with transfers). Such a set satisfies a property we call consistency. Consistency
of a set of matchings states that, for any matching ν, if, for each agent i there exists a ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - All 18 versions

You won't harm me if you fool me

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F Echenique… - 2007 - authors.library.caltech.edu
A decision maker faces a new theory of how certain events unfold over time. The theory
matters for choices she needs to make, but possibly the theory is a fabrication. We show that
there is a test which is guaranteed to pass a true theory, and which is also conservative: A ...
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English auctions and the Stolper–Samuelson theorem

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J Dubra, F Echenique… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2009 - Elsevier
We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may
have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result
for environments where it has not been previously obtained. We also prove two versions ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - All 20 versions

[BOOK] Measurability is not about Information

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J Dubra, F Echenique… - 2001 - Citeseer
Abstract We comment on the relation between models of information based on
signals/partitions, and those based on σ-algebras. We show that more informative signals
need not generate finer σ-algebras, hence that Blackwell's theorem fails if information is ...
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A weak correspondence principle for models with complementarities

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F Echenique - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2004 - Elsevier
To fix ideas, consider a collection of functions, indexed by , f t :[0,1]→[0,1], t∈T. Here f t is the
reduced form of a model, for example the best-response function of a game, and the fixed points
of f t are the equilibria of the model. I shall impose that endogenous variables are ...
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A revealed preference approach to computational complexity in economics

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F Echenique, D Golovin… - 2010 - authors.library.caltech.edu
One of the main building blocks of economics is the theory of the consumer, which
postulates that consumers are utility maximizing. However, from a computational
perspective, this model is called into question because the task of utility maximization ...
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Implications of Pareto efficiency for two-agent (household) choice

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F Echenique… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2011 - Elsevier
ABSTRACT: We study when two-member household choice behavior is compatible with
Pareto optimality. We ask when an external observer of household choices, who does not
know the individuals' preferences, can rationalize the choices as being Pareto-optimal. ...
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Cohesion, insurance and redistribution

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F Echenique… - Quarterly Journal of Political …, 2007 - authors.library.caltech.edu
Governments use redistributive policies to favor relatively unproductive economic sectors.
Traditional economic wisdom teaches that the government should instead buy out the
agents in these sectors, and let them relocate to more productive sectors. We show that ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - All 15 versions

[PDF] When does aggregation reduce risk aversion?

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CP Chambers… - 2009 - hss.caltech.edu
Abstract We study the problem of risk sharing within a household or syndicate. A household
shares risky prospects using a social welfare function. We characterize the social welfare
functions such that the household is collectively less risk averse than each member, and ...
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[CITATION] Aaron S

F Echenique - Edlin-Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic …, 2002
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[PDF] Testable implications of Bargaining Theories

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C Chambers… - manuscript, Caltech, 2011 - hss.caltech.edu
Abstract We develop the testable implications of well-known theories of bargaining over
money. Given a finite data set of bargaining outcomes, where utility functions are unknown,
we ask if a given theory could have generated the observations. When the data come with ...
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A test for monotone comparative statics

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F Echenique… - 2007 - authors.library.caltech.edu
In this paper we design an econometric test for monotone comparative statics (MCS) often
found in models with multiple equilibria. Our test exploits the observable implications of the
MCS prediction: that the extreme (high and low) conditional quantiles of the dependent ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - All 19 versions

The axiomatic structure of empirical content

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CP Chambers, F Echenique… - 2010 - authors.library.caltech.edu
In this paper, we provide a formal framework for studying the empirical content of a given
theory. We define the falsifiable closure of a theory to be the least weakening of the theory
that makes only falsifiable claims. The falsifiable closure is our notion of empirical content. ...
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On behavioral complementarity and its implications

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CP Chambers, F Echenique… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2010 - Elsevier
We study the behavioral definition of complementary goods: if the price of one good
increases, demand for a complementary good must decrease. We obtain its full implications
for observable demand behavior (its testable implications), and for the consumer's ...
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The Money Pump as a Measure of Revealed Preference Violations

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F Echenique, S Lee… - Journal of Political Economy, 2011 - JSTOR
We introduce a measure of the severity of violations of the revealed preference axioms, the
money pump index (MPI). The MPI is the amount of money one can extract from a consumer
who violates the axioms. It is also a statistical test for the hypothesis that a consumer is ...
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[CITATION] Essays in monotone comparative statics and the theory of games with strategic complementarities

FM Echenique - 2000 - University of California, Berkeley
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Profit maximization and supermodular technology

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CP Chambers… - Economic Theory, 2009 - Springer
Abstract A dataset is a list of observed factor inputs and prices for a technology; profits and
production levels are unobserved. We obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for a
dataset to be consistent with profit maximization under a monotone and concave revenue ...
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[PDF] The Revealed Preference Theory of Stable and Extremal Stable Matchings

[PDF] from caltech.edu
F Echenique, SM Lee, M SHUM… - 2011 - hss.caltech.edu
Abstract. We investigate the testable implications of the theory of stable matchings. We
provide a characterization of the data that are rationalizable as a stable matching when
agents' preferences are unobserved. The characterization is a simple nonparametric test ...
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When does aggregation reduce uncertainty aversion?

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CP Chambers… - 2009 - authors.library.caltech.edu
We study the problem of uncertainty sharing within a household:" risk sharing," in a context
of Knightian uncertainty. A household shares uncertain prospects using a social welfare
function. We characterize the social welfare functions such that the household is ...
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General Revealed Preference Theory

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CP Chambers, F Echenique… - 2010 - authors.library.caltech.edu
We provide general conditions under which an economic theory has a universal
axiomatization: one that leads to testable implications. Roughly speaking, if we obtain a
universal axiomatization when we assume that unobservable parameters (such as ...
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[CITATION] La teoría del consumo. Un análisis empírico para datos de Uruguay

F Echenique - 1995 - orton.catie.ac.cr
SIDALC - Servicio de Informacion y Documentacion Agropecuaria de las Americas.
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[TXT] This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software …

[TXT] from caltech.edu
F Echenique - 2002 - authors.library.caltech.edu
Copyright (C) 2002 Federico Echenique This program is free software; you can redistribute it
and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free
Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. ...
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Revealed Preference Tests using Supermarket Data: the Money Pump

[PDF] from caltech.edu
F Echenique, SM Lee… - 2010 - authors.library.caltech.edu
We use a money pump argument to measure deviations from the revealed preference
axioms. Using a panel data set of food expenditures, we find a large number of violations of
the weak axiom of revealed preference. The money pump costs are small, which indicate ...
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Implications of Pareto Eciency for Two-Agent (Household) Choice

[PDF] from caltech.edu
F Echenique… - 2009 - authors.library.caltech.edu
We study when two-member household choice behavior is compatible with Pareto
optimality. We ask when an external observer of household choices, who does not know the
individuals' preferences, can rationalize the choices as being Pareto-optimal. Our main ...
Related articles - All 2 versions

[PDF] ARE STABILIZATION PROGRAMS EXPANSIONARY? Estudios Económicos, enero-junio, año/vol. 15, número 001 El Colegio de México, AC Distrito Federal, …

[PDF] from uaemex.mx
Á Forteza… - redalyc.uaemex.mx
Resumen: La evidencia empírica que se presenta en este trabajo pone en duda la idea
generalmente aceptada, de que los programas de estabilización del tipo de cambio son
expansionistas. Aunque estos programas fueron asociados a expansiones ...
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[PDF] Finding a walrasian equilibrium is easy for a fixed number of agents

[PDF] from caltech.edu
F Echenique… - 2011 - hss.caltech.edu
Abstract In this work, we study the complexity of finding a Walrasian equilibrium. Our main
result gives an algorithm which can compute an approximate Walrasian equilibrium in an
exchange economy with general, but well-behaved utility functions, in time that is ...
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[PDF] Efficiency and Bargaining Power in the Interbank Loan Market

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J Allen, J Chapman, F Echenique… - 2012 - hss.caltech.edu
Abstract We use data on interbank loans and the core equilibrium concept to examine the
efficiency of an overnight interbank lending market, and the bargaining power of its
participants. In the specific case of Canada's Large-Value Transfer System, we show that ...
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[PDF] A Test For Monotone Comparative Statics

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I Komunjer… - 2007 - escholarship.org
Abstract. In this paper we design an econometric test for monotone comparative statics
(MCS) often found in models with multiple equilibria. Our test exploits the observable
implications of the MCS prediction: that the extreme (high and low) conditional quantiles of ...
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Information is Not About Measurability

D Juan, E Federico - ukpmc.ac.uk
We present a simple example where the use of r-algebras as a model of information leads to
aparadoxical conclusion: a decisionmaker prefers less information to more. We then explain
that theproblem arises because the use of r-algebras as the informational content of a ...
Cached

[PDF] Complexity and Economics: computational constraints may not matter

[PDF] from caltech.edu
F ECHENIQUE, D GOLOVIN… - users.cms.caltech.edu
Recent results in complexity theory suggest that various economic theories require agents to
solve intractable problems. However, such results assume the agents are optimizing explicit
utility functions, whereas the economic theories merely assume the agents are rational, ...
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Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets

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E Boyle… - Social Choice and Welfare, 2009 - Springer
Abstract We study sequential bargaining in many-to-one matching markets. We show that
there is an advantage to entering late in the market, and that the last agent to enter the
market will receive his or her best partner in a stable matching, extending the results of ...
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[PDF] Testable Implications of Gross Substitutes in Demand

[PDF] from caltech.edu
CP Chambers, F Echenique… - 2009 - hss.caltech.edu
... Christopher P. Chambers California Institute of Technology Federico Echenique California Institute
of Technology Eran Shmaya ... September 2009 Page 2. Testable Implications of Gross Substitutes
in Demand Christopher P. Chambers Federico Echenique Eran Shmaya Abstract ...
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[CITATION] SS 211c: Advanced Economic Theory

F Echenique
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[PDF] DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

[PDF] from caltech.edu
CP Chambers… - 2006 - writing.caltech.edu
Abstract We study the ordinal content of assuming supermodularity, including conditions
under which a binary relation can be represented by a supermodular function. When applied
to revealed-preference relations, our results imply that supermodularity is some times not ...
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[PDF] Strategic Complementarities and Mixed Equilibria

[PDF] from lacea.org
F Echenique - 2000 - lacea.org
Abstract I address two questions: Do the results on pure-strategy equilibria in games of
strategic complementarities (GSC) hold for the full set of Nash equilibria? Are there reasons
to believe that properly mixed equilibria are worse predictions in GSC than in other ...
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[CITATION] A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets

J Oviedo… - 2005 Meeting Papers, 2005 - econpapers.repec.org
Related works: Working Paper: A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets
(2004) Working Paper: A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets (2003) Working
Paper: A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets (2003) Journal Article: A ...
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[CITATION] Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic

C are Unstable, F Echenique… - 2000
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[PDF] An explanation of inefficient redistribution: Transfers insure cohesive groups

[PDF] from caltech.edu
F Echenique… - Working Papers, 2005 - hss.caltech.edu
Abstract Redistributive policies often sustain inefficient economic sectors. Economists
routinely argue that governments should let the sectors collapse, and compensate the
affected agents. We explain why governments may instead prefer the inefficient ...
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Excellence in Refereeing Award

VV Acharya, SN Ali, J Apesteguia, P Arcidiacono… - 209.197.108.139
The American Economic Association would like to congratulate its 2010 American Economic
Review Excellence in Refereeing Award recipients. The award recognizes the outstanding
work of those referees whose service and dedication have contributed to the high quality ...
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[PDF] SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 1244R

[PDF] from caltech.edu
F Echenique… - 2005 - wordsmatter.caltech.edu
Abstract This paper proposes a method for testing complementarities between explanatory
and dependent variables in a large class of economic models. The proposed test is based
on the monotone comparative statics (MCS) property of equilibria. Our main result is that ...
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Testable Implications of Gross Substitutes in Demand for Two Goods

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CP Chambers, F Echenique… - American Economic …, 2011 - ingentaconnect.com
* Chambers: Department of Economics, University of California, San Diego, 9500 Gilman
Dr., La Jolla, CA 92093 (e-mail: chambers@hss.caltech.edu); Echenique: Division of the Humanities
and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125 (e-mail: ...
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[PDF] La teoría del consumo, un análisis empírico para datos de Uruguay: Estimación de ecuaciones de Euler

[PDF] from unirioja.es
F Echenique - Revista de economía, 1996 - dialnet.unirioja.es
RESUMEN Se derivan ecuaciones de Euler bajo no separabilidad en el tiempo y se testean
para datos de consumo de Uruguay utilizando el método generalizado de los momentos de
Hansen. Se encuentra evidencia acerca de la presencia de restricciones de liquidez. En ...
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