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How social security and medicare affect retirement behavior in a world of incomplete markets

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J Rust… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1997 - JSTOR
This paper provides an empirical analysis of how the US Social Security and Medicare
insurance system affects the labor supply of older males in the presence of incomplete
markets for loans, annuities, and health insurance. We estimate a dynamic programming ( ...
Cited by 656 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - BL Direct - All 38 versions

Computing multi-period, information-constrained optima

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C Phelan… - The Review of Economic Studies, 1991 - JSTOR
This paper presents a detailed theoretical derivation and justification for methods used to
compute solutions to a multi-period (including infinite-period), continuum-agent, unobserved-
effort economy. Actual solutions are displayed illustrating cross-sectional variability in ...
Cited by 288 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 9 versions

[PDF] Explaining the fiscal theory of the price level

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N Kocherlakota… - Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis …, 1999 - Citeseer
Abstract Many traditional macroeconomic models do not have determinate predictions for
the path of inflation: even for a given specification of money supplies, many paths of inflation
are consistent with equilibrium. According to the fiscal theory of the price level, fiscal policy ...
Cited by 148 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 24 versions

Sequential equilibria in a Ramsey tax model

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C Phelan… - Econometrica, 2001 - Wiley Online Library
2. Abstract This paper presents a full characterization of the equilibrium value set of a
Ramsey tax model. More generally, it develops a dynamic programming method for a class
of policy games between the government and a continuum of households. By selectively ...
Cited by 132 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 28 versions

A recursive formulation for repeated agency with history dependence

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A Fernandes… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2000 - Elsevier
We present general recursive methods to handle environments where privately observed
variables are linked over time. We show that incentive compatible contracts are
implemented recursively with a threat keeping constraint in addition to the usual ...
Cited by 129 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 28 versions

[PDF] Reconsidering the costs of business cycles with incomplete markets

[PDF] from nber.org
A Atkeson… - 1994 - nber.org
In Models of Business Cycles, Robert Lucas (1987) puts forward a disarmingly simple
argument that the potential welfare gains from eliminating the fluctuations in aggregate
consumption associated with business cycles are, at best, extremely small. His argument ...
Cited by 126 - Related articles - View as HTML - Library Search - BL Direct - All 11 versions

Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment

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C Phelan - Journal of Economic Theory, 1995 - Elsevier
This paper considers a repeated unobserved endowment economy with a restriction that
agents can walk away from insurance contracts at the beginning of any period and contract
with another insurer (one-sided commitment). An equilibrium is derived characterized by a ...
Cited by 119 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 9 versions

Public trust and government betrayal

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C Phelan - Journal of Economic Theory, 2006 - Elsevier
This study presents a simple model of government reputation (in which government type
cannot be directly observed by households) with the variation that government type, rather
than being permanent, follows an exogenous Markov process. This formulation captures ...
Cited by 82 - Related articles - Library Search - All 24 versions

The aggregate effects of sectoral reallocations

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C Phelan… - Journal of Monetary Economics, 2000 - Elsevier
Can a one-time, permanent change in the fundamentals behind the sectoral composition of
the economy prompt an aggregate downturn? Can this downturn be non-negligible, even if
one uses US data to determine the relative size of gross vs. net job flows, and the ...
Cited by 59 - Related articles - All 8 versions

Opportunity and social mobility

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C Phelan - Review of Economic Studies, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
The fact that the children of rich parents have better economic prospects than the children of
poor parents (“unequal opportunity”) is generally thought to be one of the weak points of
modern capitalist societies. The ability of the descendants of poor families to eventually ...
Cited by 52 - Related articles - All 38 versions

Incentives and aggregate shocks

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C Phelan - The Review of Economic Studies, 1994 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract This paper presents an incentive-based theory of the dynamics of the distribution of
consumption in the presence of aggregate shocks. The paper builds on the models
concerning the distribution of income or consumption and incentive problems of Green ( ...
Cited by 48 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 6 versions

On the long run implications of repeated moral hazard

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C Phelan - Journal of Economic Theory, 1998 - Elsevier
This paper analyzes the effects of moral hazard on long-run consumption or utility. Given
exponential utility, it is shown that the utility of those with unobservable endowments
becomes arbitrarily negative as long as any positive fraction of otherwise identical agents ...
Cited by 45 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 19 versions

Tax riots

[PDF] from nber.org
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M Bassetto… - Review of Economic Studies, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
This paper considers an optimal taxation environment where household income is private
information, and the government randomly audits and punishes households found to be
underreporting. We prove that the optimal mechanism derived using standard mechanism ...
Cited by 24 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 15 versions

On the robustness of laissez-faire

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N Kocherlakota… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2009 - Elsevier
This paper considers a model economy in which agents are privately informed about their
type: their endowments of various goods and their preferences over these goods. While
preference orderings over observable choices are allowed to be correlated with an ...
Cited by 17 - Related articles - All 15 versions

Incentives, insurance, and the variability of consumption and leisure

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C Phelan - Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 1994 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper considers to what extent dynamic incentive models such as Green
(1987), Phelan and Townsend (1991), and Atkeson and Lucas (1992) can quantitatively
explain why some individuals consume (or work) more than others and why a typical ...
Cited by 16 - Related articles - All 4 versions

[CITATION] Subgame perfect equilibria in a Ramsey taxes model

C Phelan… - manuscript, Northwestern University, 1997
Cited by 11 - Related articles

[CITATION] US Social Security Policy: A Dynamic Analysis of Incentives and Self-Selection

C Phelan… - manuscript, University of Wisconsin, 1991
Cited by 10 - Related articles

[PDF] Inequality and fairness

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C Phelan - Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly …, 2002 - mpls.frb.org
Abstract This study uses John Rawls' behind-the-veil of ignorance device as a fairness
criterion to evaluate social policies and applies it to a contracting model in which the terms
equality of opportunity and equality of result are well defined. The results suggest that ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - View as HTML - BL Direct - All 17 versions

[CITATION] Opportunity and social mobility

C Phelan - Staff Report, 2005 - econpapers.repec.org
By Christopher Phelan; Abstract: This study argues that both unequal opportunity and social
mobility are necessary implications of an efficient. ... Opportunity and social mobility. Christopher
Phelan. No 323, Staff Report from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - Cached - All 3 versions

[PDF] Tax riots

[PDF] from nber.org
M Bassetto… - Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Working Paper, 2006 - nber.org
ABSTRACT This paper considers an optimal taxation environment where household income
is private information, and the government randomly audits and punishes households found
to be underreporting. We prove that the optimal mechanism derived using standard ...
Cited by 8 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 30 versions

[CITATION] nComputing Multi&period

C Phelan… - … $ Constrained Optima, oReview of Economic Studies, 1991
Cited by 8 - Related articles

[CITATION] Incentives, insurance, and the variability of consumption and leisure

CJ Phelan - 1990 - getcited.org
An academic directory and search engine.
Cited by 7 - Related articles - Cached - All 2 versions

[BOOK] On the irrelevance of the maturity structure of government debt without commitment

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C Phelan… - 2000 - Citeseer
ABSTRACT This paper shows that if the timing of debt auctions within a period is sufficiently
unfettered, any stochastic outcome path of real economic variables which can be achieved
as an equilibrium of a game where a government has access to a rich debt structure can ...
Cited by 7 - Related articles - View as HTML - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 22 versions

Beliefs and private monitoring

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C Phelan… - The Review of Economic …, 2012 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract This paper develops new recursive, set based methods for studying repeated
games with private monitoring. For any finite state strategy profile, we find necessary and
sufficient conditions for whether there exists a distribution over initial states such that the ...
Cited by 8 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 13 versions

[CITATION] Optimal sectoral shifts

C Phelan… - UFAE and IAE Working Papers, 1995 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks.
Optimal Sectoral Shifts. Christopher Phelan and A. Trejos. ...
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[CITATION] Labor markets with repeated agency and one-sided commitment

C Phelan - Working papers, 1993 - ideas.repec.org
No abstract is available for this item. ... To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three options: 1. Check below under "Related
research" whether another version of this item is available online. 2. Check on the ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - Cached - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 4 versions

[CITATION] Anticipation effects of looming public-pension reforms: A comment

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C Phelan - Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public …, 1999 - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to
view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are
not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Cited by 5 - Related articles - Cached - All 5 versions

[BOOK] Private monitoring with infinite histories

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C Phelan, A Skrzypacz… - 2006 - mpls.frb.org
ABSTRACT This paper develops new recursive methods for studying stationary sequential
equilibria in games with private monitoring. We first consider games where play has
occurred forever into the past and develop methods for analyzing a large class of ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - View as HTML - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 23 versions

[PDF] A simple model of bank employee compensation

[PDF] from minneapolisfed.org
C Phelan - University of Minnesota and Federal Reserve Bank …, 2009 - minneapolisfed.org
This paper considers the question, Does the limited liability associated with banking make it
necessary for a government to regulate bank employee compensation? It attempts to shed
light on this question by considering a mechanism design framework. In it, a single ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 8 versions

[PDF] Incentive compensation in the banking industry: insights from economic theory

[PDF] from synygy.com
C Phelan… - … Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Economic Policy …, 2009 - synygy.com
ABSTRACT How can banks and similar institutions design optimal compensation systems?
Would such systems conflict with the goals of society? This paper considers a theoretical
framework of how banks structure job contracts with their employees to explore three ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 7 versions

[CITATION] jTax Riots, kReview of Economic Studies, 75 (3)

M Bassetto… - $669, 2008
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[CITATION] Inequality of opportunity

C Phelan - … . Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of …, 2002
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A defense of rational expectations/general equilibrium analysis against Austrian objections

C Phelan - Critical Review, 1987 - Taylor & Francis
102 Critical Review• Fall beach and the goals of the hot dog vendors in order to infer their
behaviors. By" underlying characteristics" we mean some representation of preferences
such that given any two outcomes we know which one each person would prefer, the ...
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[CITATION] Exploring the quantitative implications of Dynamic, incentive-constrained optima

C Phelan - Manuscript, University of Chicago, October, 1989
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[CITATION] Political Extremism and the Role of Inertia

CJ Phelan - Working papers, 1991 - ideas.repec.org
... Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics. Author Info.
Phelan, CJ. Additional information is available for the following registered author(s): Christopher
Phelan. Abstract. No abstract is available for this item. Download Info. ...
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Dynamic Optimal Taxation: A Robust Analysis

N Kocherlakota… - 2006 Meeting Papers, 2006 - ideas.repec.org
Following the seminal work of Mirrlees (REStud, 1971), there has been a large amount of
work on how to design an optimal tax system when agents' skills are private information.
This literature makes a strong assumption: it assumes that the data generation process for ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - Cached - All 4 versions

[CITATION] Incentive, Inequality and Business Cycle

C Phelan - Working papers, 1992 - econpapers.repec.org
... Please update your bookmarks. Incentive, Inequality and Business Cycle. Christopher Phelan.
Working papers from Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems. Keywords: consumption; economic
models (search for similar items in EconPapers) Date: 1992 Track citations by RSS feed. ...
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[PDF] Sequential Equilibria with Infinite Histories

[PDF] from stanford.edu
C Phelan… - 2006 Meeting Papers, 2006 - gsb.stanford.edu
ABSTRACT This paper develops recursive methods for considering stationary sequential
equilibria in games with private actions and signals (private monitoring games), where play
is assumed not only to continue forever into the future, but is also assumed to have ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 15 versions

Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review

P Christopher, E Senior - ukpmc.ac.uk
This study uses John RawIs' behind-the-veil of ignorance device as a fairnesscriterion to
evaluate social policies and applies it to a contracting model inwhich the terms equality of
opportunity and equality of result are well defined.
Cached

NORTH AMERICAN SUMMER MEETING OF THE ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY ANNOUNCEMENT

D Acemoglu, F Alvarez, A Casella, VV Chari… - …, 1999 - Wiley Online Library
The program will include invited lectures and both invited and contributed papers. For
additional information and updated information about the meetings, see announcements in
subsequent issues of Econometrica or on the Internet at the following address: http: rrwww ...
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[CITATION] of Business Cycles

A Atkeson… - 1994
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[CITATION] The Optimal Unemployment Insurance Contract

R Zhao, KM Fernandez, C Phelan… - 2000
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[CITATION] Nber Macroeconomics Annual 1994, Volume 9: Reconsidering the Costs of Business Cycles with Incomplete Markets

A Atkeson… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
In Models of Business Cycles, Robert Lucas (1987) puts forward a disarmingly simple
argument that the potential welfare gains from eliminating the fluctuations in aggregate
consumption associated with business cycles are, at best, extremely small. His argument ...
Related articles

[CITATION] Recursive Optimal Mechanisms with History-Dependent, Privately-Observed Shocks

C Phelan - Working papers, 1991 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks.
Recursive Optimal Mechanisms with History-Dependent, Privately-Observed Shocks.
Christopher Phelan. Working papers from Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems. ...
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Tax Riots

C Phelan… - 2004 Meeting Papers, 2004 - ideas.repec.org
This paper considers the existence of bad equilibria in a random auditing tax model with
limits on the number of households which can be audited. Specifically, we present sufficient
conditions for a tax-audit mechanism which has truth telling as one equilibrium to have ...
Cached - All 5 versions

[CITATION] Anticipation effects of looming public-pension reforms

C Phelan - Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public …, 2004 - Elsevier Science
Get it from MIT Libraries

[CITATION] Reputation and Capital Controls

C Phelan - 2005 Meeting Papers, 2005 - econpapers.repec.org
... Please update your bookmarks. Reputation and Capital Controls. Christopher Phelan. No 800,
2005 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics. Keywords: reputation (search for
similar items in EconPapers) Date: 2005 Track citations by RSS feed. ...
Cached - All 4 versions

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