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Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders

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A Agrawal… - Journal of Financial and …, 1996 - Cambridge Univ Press
Page 1. JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS VOL. 31, NO. 3, SEPTEMBER
1996 Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and
Shareholders Anup Agrawal and Charles R. Knoeber ∗ Abstract ...
Cited by 1659 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 19 versions

Do some outside directors play a political role?

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A Agrawal… - 2000 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: A substantial number of outside directors have experience in politics or
government and in the private practice of law. We argue that, in part, these directors play a
political role by providing advice and insight into the workings of government (or perhaps, ...
Cited by 359 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 16 versions

Golden parachutes, shark repellents, and hostile tender offers

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CR Knoeber - The American Economic Review, 1986 - JSTOR
Page 1. Golden Parachutes, Shark Repellents, and Hostile Tender Offers By
CHARLES R. KNOEBER* The tender offer has recently become a popular way to
change control over the as- sets of a firm.' Unlike the more traditional ...
Cited by 245 - Related articles - All 7 versions

Testing the theory of tournaments: An empirical analysis of broiler production

[PDF] from umd.edu
CR Knoeber… - Journal of Labor Economics, 1994 - JSTOR
Page 1. Testing the Theory of Tournaments: An Empirical Analysis of Broiler
Production Charles R. Knoeber, North Carolina State University Walter N. Thurman,
North Carolina State University Broiler chickens are raised by ...
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Real Game of Chicken: Contracts, Tournaments, and the Production of Broilers, A

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CR Knoeber - JL Econ. & Org., 1989 - HeinOnline
Page 1. A Real Game of Chicken: Contracts, Tournaments, and the Production of Broilers
CHARLES R. KNOEBER North Carolina State University Chickens raised for meat are called
broilers. The production of broilers has three remarkable characteristics. ...
Cited by 145 - Related articles - All 10 versions

“Don't Count Your Chickens...”: Risk and Risk Shifting in the Broiler Industry

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CR Knoeber… - American Journal of …, 1995 - ajae.oxfordjournals.org
Page 1. "Don't Count Your Chickens...": Risk and Risk Shifting in the Broiler Industry Charles
R. Knoeber and Walter N. Thurman The contracts used to reward growers of broiler chickens
in the United States base pay on a grower's performance relative to other growers. ...
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Managerial compensation and the threat of takeover

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A Agrawal… - Journal of Financial Economics, 1998 - Elsevier
Page 1. ELSEVIER Journal of Financial Economics 47 (1998) 219 239 JOURNAL
OF Financia ECONOMICS Managerial compensation and the threat of takeover
Anup Agrawal*, Charles R. Knoeber College of Management. ...
Cited by 115 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 20 versions

Taxes, failure costs, and optimal industry capital structure: An empirical test

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D Flath… - The Journal of Finance, 1980 - JSTOR
Page 1. THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE * VOL. XXXV, NO 1 * MARCH 1980 Taxes,
Failure Costs, and Optimal Industry Capital Structure: An Empirical Test DAVID FLATH
and CHARLES R. KNOEBER SINCE 1958 WHEN FRANCO ...
Cited by 80 - Related articles - All 7 versions

Are outsiders handicapped in CEO successions?

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A Agrawal, CR Knoeber… - Journal of Corporate Finance, 2006 - Elsevier
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Alternative Mechanism to Assure Contractual Reliability, An

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CR Knoeber - J. Legal Stud., 1983 - HeinOnline
Page 1. AN ALTERNATIVE MECHANISM TO ASSURE CONTRACTUAL RELIABILITY
CHARLES R. KNOEBER* X arties to a contract may not always be reliable. A party
may simply choose not to perform the contract, thereby ...
Cited by 56 - Related articles - All 2 versions

Understanding retained patronage refunds in agricultural cooperatives

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CR Knoeber… - American Journal of …, 1983 - ajae.oxfordjournals.org
Page 1. Understanding Retained Patronage Refunds in Agricultural Cooperatives Charles R.
Knoeber and David L. Baumer The share of patronage refunds retained by an agricultural
cooperative is modeled as arising from the portfolio decision of its median member. ...
Cited by 32 - Related articles - All 3 versions

Outside directors, politics, and firm performance

A Agrawal… - 1998 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: A substantial number of outside directors have experience in non-business arenas,
especially in government and in the private practice of law. Moreover, for most of these
directors, the entirety of their experience is outside of business. We propose a political role ...
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Contests to become CEO: incentives, selection and handicaps

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T Tsoulouhas, CR Knoeber… - Economic Theory, 2007 - Springer
... Polytechnic Institute. T. Tsoulouhas (B) · CR Knoeber Department of Economics, North
Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC 27695-8110, USA E-mail: fanis tsoulouhas@
ncsu.edu; charles knoeber@ncsu.edu A. Agrawal Culverhouse ...
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[CITATION] CEO succession: insiders versus outsiders

A Agrawal, CR Knoeber… - University of Alabama. College of …, 2000
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[CITATION] Land and livestock contracting in agriculture: A principal agent perspective

CR Knoeber - Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, United Kingdom: …, 2000
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Manager shareholding, the market for managers, and the end-period problem: evidence from the US whaling industry

LA Craig… - JL Econ. & Org., 1992 - HeinOnline
Page 1. JLEO. V8 N3 607 Manager Shareholding, the Market for Managers, and the End-Period
Problem: Evidence from the US Whaling Industry Lee A. Craig North Carolina State University,
Duke University and National Bureau of Economic Research ...
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Explaining state bans on corporate farming

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CR Knoeber - Economic Inquiry, 1997 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. EXPLAINING STATE BANS ON CORPORATE FARMING CHARLES R. KNOEBER* State
laws banning corporate farming present a puzzle for a rent-seeking explana- tion of political
outcomes since familyfarmer proponents may receive no direct benefit from these bans. ...
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Contests, grand prizes, and the Hot Hand

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TA McFall, CR Knoeber… - Journal of Sports …, 2009 - jse.sagepub.com
Page 1. Contests, Grand Prizes, and the Hot Hand Todd A. McFall Welch Consulting
Charles R. Knoeber Walter N. Thurman North Carolina State University Awarding
a grand prize to the player who wins most often in a series ...
Cited by 10 - Related articles - All 8 versions

[CITATION] Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency

A Agrawal… - 1996
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Managerial shareholding

D Flath… - The Journal of Industrial Economics, 1985 - JSTOR
Page 1. THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 0022-1821 $2.00 Volume XXXIV
September 1985 No. 1 MANAGERIAL SHAREHOLDING DAVID FLATH AND CHARLES
R. KNOEBER The extent of a manager's shareholdings ...
Cited by 7 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 7 versions

Penalties and Compensation for Auto Accidents

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CR Knoeber - The Journal of Legal Studies, 1978 - JSTOR
... On both points see Charles Knoeber, Legal Penalties and Compensation for Auto Accidents
(1976) (unpub- lished Ph.D. dissertation at the Univ. of Calif., Los Angeles). ... 17 For a discussion
of justice as an additional goal of auto accident law see Charles Knoeber, supra note 14. ...
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[PDF] CEO Succession: Handicapping the Choice Between Insiders and Outsiders

[PDF] from clemson.edu
A Agrawal, CR Knoeber… - 2001 - hubcap.clemson.edu
Page 1. CEO Succession: Handicapping and the Choice between Insiders and Outsiders Anup
Agrawal University of Alabama Culverhouse College of Business Tuscaloosa, AL 35487-0224
(205) 348-8970 aagrawal@cba.ua.edu http://www.cba.ua.edu/xeaa.html ...
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Security and Penalty in Debt Contracts

[PDF] from uh.edu
JD Hess… - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics ( …, 1987 - JSTOR
Page 1. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) Zeitschrift ür die
gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 143 (1987), 149-167 Security and Penalty in Debt
Contracts by James D. Hess and Charles R. Knoeber Security ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 11 versions

Contests to Become CEO

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T Tsoulouhas, A Agrawal… - 2000 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Firms tend to promote insiders to the CEO position rather than to hire outsiders.
This paper explains this phenomenon by developing a framework in which firms value the
incentive that the contest to become CEO provides to current employees, but also want the ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - All 10 versions

Accounting choice: The role of monitoring costs

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CR Knoeber… - Managerial and Decision …, 1991 - Wiley Online Library
Page 1. MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, VOL. 12, 353-360 (1991) Accounting
Choice: The Role of Monitoring Costs Charles R. Knoeber and A. James McKee Jr North Carolina
State University, Raleigh, NC, USA College of Charleston, Charleston, SC, USA ...
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[CITATION] Contract Production in US Agriculture: A Characterization of Current Empirical Research

CR Knoeber - Economics Department, North Carolina State …, 1998
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[CITATION] Tenalties and Compensation for Auto Accidents'(1978) 7

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CR Knoeber - Journal of Legal Studies
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Guaranteeing a Market and the Contracts of Bargaining Cooperatives

CR Knoeber… - Journal of Agricultural Cooperation, 1986 - ideas.repec.org
Downloadable! One important function of bargaining cooperatives is alleged to be guaranteeing
a market for their members. We characterize this function as deterring opportunistic behavior
by producers and processors operating under forward contracts. We then examine actual ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - Cached - All 8 versions

[CITATION] Outside Directors

A Agrawal… - Politics and Firm Performance: Working Paper, Current …, 1999
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Why do corporations contribute to the Nature Conservancy?

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JJ Griffith… - Public Choice, 1986 - Springer
Page 1. Public Choice 49:69-77 (1986). © 1986 Martinus NijhoffPublishers, Dordrecht.
Printed in the Netherlands. Why do corporations contribute to the Nature Conservancy?*
JAMES J. GRIFFITH Department of Forest Engineering ...
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[CITATION] Managerial compensation and the threat of takeover (Mimeo, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC)

A Agrawal… - 1997
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[CITATION] Legal penalties and compensation for auto accidents

CR Knoeber - 1976
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Improving the behavior of public officials: Changing the method of compensation and changing officials

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CR Knoeber - Public Choice, 1982 - Springer
Page 1. Improving the behavior of public officials: Changing the method of
compensation .and changing officials CHARLES R. KNOEBER North Carolina State
University 1. Introduction In 1964, Roland McKean I suggested that ...
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The demand for government transfers: A look at the recipients

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CR Knoeber - Public Choice, 1977 - Springer
Page 1. GOVERNMENT TRANSFERS 39 Articles THE DEMAND FOR GOVERNMENT
TRANSFERS: A LOOK AT THE RECIPIENTS Charles R. Knoeber* In an important
1969 article, Hochman and Rogers established the fact ...
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[PDF] An assessment of price volatility in recyclables markets and market mechanisms to stabilize prices

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J Kusa, MA Barlaz, ED Brill Jr, B Green… - 1954 - people.engr.ncsu.edu
Page 1. AN ASSESSMENT OF PRICE VOLATILITY IN RECYCLABLES MARKETS AND
MARKET MECHANISMS TO STABILIZE PRICES Final Report by Jonathan Kusa, Morton
A. Barlaz, and E. Downey Brill, Jr. Department of Civil Engineering ...
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Incomplete Information and Rent Dissipation in Deterministic Contests

C Knoeber, T Tsoulouhas - 2011 - contesttheory.org
Abstract In a deterministic contest or all-pay auction, all rents are dissipated when
information is complete and contestants are identical. As one contestant becomes" stronger",
that is, values the prize more, total expenditures are known to decrease monotonically. ...
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Azzam, Azzeddine M., and Allen C. Wellman (1992). Packer Integration into Hog Production: Current Status and Likely Impacts of Increased Vertical Control on Hog …

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CR Knoeber… - American Journal of Agricultural …, 1990 - ers.usda.gov
Page 1. References Azzam, Azzeddine M., and Allen C. Wellman (1992). Packer
Integration into Hog Production: Current Status and Likely Impacts of Increased
Vertical Control on Hog Prices and Quantities. Research Bulletin ...
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[CITATION] Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders (Digest Summary)

A Agrawal… - CFA Digest, 1997 - CFA Institute

[PDF] between Managers and Shareholders\

[PDF] from upenn.edu
A Agrawal… - 1996 - knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu
Page 1. FIRM PERFORMANCE AND MECHANISMS TO CONTROL AGENCY
PROBLEMS BETWEEN MANAGERS AND SHAREHOLDERS by Amip Agrawal Charles
R. Knoeber 8-96 RODNEY L. WHITE CENTER FOR FINANCIAL ...
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The Contest Winner: Gifted or Venturesome?

C Knoeber, T Tsoulouhas - 2011 - contesttheory.org
Abstract The paper examines the chance of winning a Tullock-contest when participants
differ in both their talent and their attitude towards risk. For the case of CARA preferences, it
is shown that the winning probability may be higher for a low-skilled agent with a low ...
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Understanding Retained Patronage Refunds in Agricultural Cooperatives: Reply

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CR Knoeber… - American Journal of …, 1985 - ajae.oxfordjournals.org
Page 1. Understanding Retained Patronage Refunds in Agricultural Cooperatives: Reply Charles
R. Knoeber and David L. Baumer In his comment on our paper, Ratchford makes two broad points.
First, our model is "naive" and un- suited to explaining cooperative behavior. ...
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Getting Tough: Why Was the Adelphia Perp Walk Particularly Bad News For Foreign Firms?

CR Knoeber… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Page 1. Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1783612 Getting Tough:
Why Was the Adelphia Perp Walk Particularly Bad News for Foreign Firms? * Charles
R. Knoeber a and Mark D. Walker ab March 2011 Abstract ...
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[CITATION] Tournaments, Contests and Relative Performance Evaluation (2007, Vol. 29, No. 21.)

C Knoeber, T Tsoulouhas…

[CITATION] Managerial Compensation and the Threat of Takeover (Revision of 9-96)

A Agrawal… - Rodney L. White Center for Financial … - econpapers.repec.org
By Anup Agrawal and Charles R. Knoeber; Managerial Compensation
and the Threat of Takeover (Revision of 9-96).
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Clausewitz on Auctions

C Knoeber, T Tsoulouhas - 2011 - contesttheory.org
Abstract A multi-stage model on the course of war is presented: Individual battles are
modeled as private value all-pay auctions with asymmetric combatants of two opposing
teams. These auctions are placed within a multi-stage framework with a tug-of-war ...
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Employees and Corporate Governance, edited by Blair, MM and Roe, MJ Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999, v+ 362 pp., $39.95 (cloth)

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CR Knoeber - Managerial and Decision Economics, 2000 - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. ...
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[PDF] Guaranteeing a Market and

[PDF] from nationalaglawcenter.org
CR Knoeber… - nationalaglawcenter.org
Page 1. University of Arkansas School of Law NatAgLaw@uark.edu $ (479) 575-7646
An Agricultural Law Research Article Guaranteeing a Market and the Contracts of
Bargaining Cooperatives by Charles R. Knoeber & David L. Baumer ...
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Incentive contracts under product market competition and R&D spillovers

C Knoeber, T Tsoulouhas - 2011 - contesttheory.org
Abstract This paper studies incentive contracting in a market with R&D spillovers and
Cournot competition. It examines the effect of spillovers on contractual choices and
addresses the question of whether the standard result that profits are higher under full ...
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[PDF] Corporate Governance and Firm Performance

[PDF] from ua.edu
A Agrawal… - 2012 - bama.ua.edu
Page 1. Corporate Governance and Firm Performance Anup Agrawal and Charles R. Knoeber*
January 2012 Chapter 26 in Thomas, Christopher R. and William F. Shughart II, eds., Oxford
Handbook in Managerial Economics, 2012, Oxford University Press, New York, NY. ...
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Skilled or Just Overconfident? Field Experimental Evidence on the Effect of Overconfidence on Promotion Probability

C Knoeber, T Tsoulouhas - 2011 - contesttheory.org
Abstract This project aims to find out whether the most skilled candidates receive promotion
proposals in promotion tournaments or in fact the most overconfident ones. Up to now this
question has only been answered theoretically: Several models predict that ...
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[PDF] Understanding Retained Refunds in Agricultural

[PDF] from nodak.edu
CR Knoeber… - 1983 - ag.ndsu.nodak.edu
Page 1. Understanding Retained Refunds in Agricultural Cooperatives Charles R. Knoeber
and David L. Baumer The share of patronage refunds retained by an agricultural cooperative
is modeled as arising from Hie portfolio decision of its median member. ...
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The Equilibrium Order of Games in Best-of-Three Contests

C Knoeber, T Tsoulouhas - 2011 - contesttheory.org
Abstract We study a best-of-three all-pay contest with two teams in which the first team to win
two games wins the contest. Each team has a value of winning the contest as well as a value
of winning a single game. It is assumed that a team's value of winning a game in its home ...
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The nature of the farm: contracts, risk, and organization in agriculture, by Allen, DW and Lueck, D. MIT Press: Cambridge and London, 2002, viii+ 258 pp., USD 35.00 ( …

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CR Knoeber - Managerial and Decision Economics, 2005 - Wiley Online Library
Skip to Main Content. ...
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[CITATION] Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders (Revision of 29-94)

A Agrawal… - Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research … - ideas.repec.org
No abstract is available for this item.
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