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The armed peace: a punctuated equilibrium theory of war

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Full text - MIT Libraries
B Leventoğlu… - American Journal of Political …, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
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Does Private Information Lead to Delay or War in Crisis Bargaining?*

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B Leventoğlu… - International Studies Quarterly, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
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Public Commitment in Crisis Bargaining

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A Tarar… - International Studies Quarterly, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
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Social mobility and political transitions

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B Leventoğlu - Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2005 - jtp.sagepub.com
Page 1. SOCIAL MOBILITY AND POLITICAL TRANSITIONS Bahar Leventog˘lu
ABSTRACT I address the role of social mobility in political transitions. I develop a
political economy model of regime transitions that incorporates ...
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[PDF] Minorities and Democratization1

[PDF] from sunysb.edu
D Epstein, B Leventoglu… - 2004 - ms.cc.sunysb.edu
With apologies to EE Schattschneider, the flaw in the democratic heaven is that the heavenly
chorus sings with a strong majoritarian accent. Transitions to democracy, in particular, can
be painful to smaller ethnic groups, as democratically elected governments have ...
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[CITATION] Nd “Bargaining and Signaling in International Crises.”

A Tarar… - Draft manuscript
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[PDF] Bargaining and Signaling in International Crises

[PDF] from yale.edu
A Tarar… - 2008 - cowles.econ.yale.edu
Abstract How leaders can credibly signal their private information in international crises,
thereby avoiding costly war, is a core topic in the study of international conflict. Existing
game-theoretic works that examine this issue use indivisible-good models, despite the fact ...
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[PDF] Public Commitment and Endogenous Crisis Initiation

[PDF] from duke.edu
A Tarar… - 2008 - duke.edu
Abstract A growing literature argues that democratic leaders are advantaged in their ability
to make credible international commitments, thus leading to increased international
cooperation. We show how one of these credible commitment mechanisms, namely public ...
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[CITATION] Habit Formation and Bargaining

B Leventoglu - 2011

[PDF] Technical Supplement (proofs of propositions) to “Does Private Information Lead to Delay or War in Crisis Bargaining?”

[PDF] from tamu.edu
B Leventoglu… - 2008 - www-polisci.tamu.edu
The following proposition characterizes SPE in a generalization of Powell's (1996a, 1996b,
1999: Chapter 3) model in which D and S are allowed to have different discount factors, δD
and δS. The SPE that Powell (1996a, 263) characterizes is the one in which δS= δD and ...
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[CITATION] Elites dance with society: a game-theoretic approach to the politics of democratization

B Leventoglu - 2001 - University of Rochester. Dept. of …

[PDF] Public Commitments in International Crises: Credible Signaling or Coercion?

[PDF] from tamu.edu
A Tarar… - 2011 - www-polisci.tamu.edu
Abstract A number of game-theoretic analyses examine how public commitments that
generate audience costs for backing down can allow leaders to credibly signal their private
information in international crises. These models generally consider settings in which ...
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