MR Baye, G Tian… - The Review of Economic …, 1993 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract This paper characterizes pure-strategy and dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium in
non-cooperative games which may have discontinuous and/or non-quasiconcave payoffs.
Conditions called diagonal transfer quasiconcavity and uniform transfer quasiconcavity ...
G Tian - The Review of Economic Studies, 1989 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract This paper considers the problem of designing mechanisms whose Nash
allocations coincide with the Lindahl allocations for public goods economies with more than
one private good. Unlike previous mechanisms, the mechanism presented here has a ...
G Tian - Journal of Comparative Economics, 2000 - Elsevier
This paper offers a rationale for gradual privatization in transitional economies through
studying property rights structures and the nature of Chinese collective enterprises. First, we
pose a puzzle for existing theories of property rights, and then we provide a theoretical ...
G Tian - Journal of Economic Theory, 1990 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper deals mainly with the problem of designing mechanisms whose Nash
allocations coincide with the Lindahl allocations. It goes beyond the previously existing
literature in that it uses outcome functions that are individually feasible, balanced, and ...
G Tian - Social Choice and Welfare, 1992 - Springer
This paper consideres the problem of designing “better” mechanisms whose Nash
allocations coincide with constrained Walrasian allocations for non-neoclassical economies
under the minimal possible assumptions. We show that no assumprions on preferences ...
G Tian - The Review of Economic Studies, 1993 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract This paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of greatest
and maximal elements of weak and strict preferences, and unifies two very different
approaches used in the related literature (the convexity and acyclicity approaches). ...
T Guoqiang - Economic Research Journal, 2005 - en.cnki.com.cn
The paper discusses the basic analytical framework that is typically used to study particular
economic issues and questions that economists are interested in. The analytical framework
usually consists of five steps:(1) characterizing economic environments,(2) specifying ...
G Tian - Economics Letters, 1990 - Elsevier
Abstract The purpose of this note is to prove the existence of an equilibrium for abstract
economies with a non-compact infinite-dimensional strategy space, a countably infinite
number of agents and without ordered preferences. We do so by generalizing the result of ...
G Tian - Journal of Economic Theory, 1994 - iclass.shufe.edu.cn
In this paper we investigate incentive aspects of the Linear Cost Share Equilibrium principle
by designing mechanisms whose Nash allocations coincide with Linear Cost Share
equilibrium allocations. The mechanisms presented here allow not only preferences but ...
G Tian - Economics Letters, 1988 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper establishes conditions on preferences under the constrained Walrasian
correspondence W c, the constrained Lindahl correspondence L c, and the weak Lindahl
correspondence L w that is introduced in this paper are subcorrespondences of the (weak ...
G Tian - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1993 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper investigates the problem of designing mechanisms whose Nash
allocations coincide with Lindahl allocations for public goods economies when initial
endowments are private information and unreported endowments are consumed ( ...
G Tian - Economic Theory, 1999 - Springer
Summary. This paper considers double implementation of Walrasian allocations and
Lindahl allocations in Nash and strong Nash equilibria for both private and public goods
economies when preferences, initial endowments, production technologies, and coalition ...
T Guoqiang… - Economic Research Journal, 2006 - en.cnki.com.cn
This paper studies the happiness-income paradox: average happiness levels do not
increase as countries grow wealthier. We do so by giving a formal and rigorous economic
theory of reference group/aspiration for happiness studies from the perspective of social ...
G Tian - Journal of Public Economics, 1991 - Elsevier
Abstract The purpose of this paper is to present a mechanism the Nash allocations of which
coincide with the Lindahl allocations even when preferences are nontransitive or nontotal.
This extension to include nontotal–nontransitive preferences is potentially very important ...
G Tian - Games and Economic Behavior, 1996 - iclass.shufe.edu.cn
The incentives problem is a basic problem that a social organization, and particularly an
economic organization, must consider. Since agents have private information, they may find
it advantageous to distort the information they reveal, and thus they may use such ...
G Tian… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1995 - Elsevier
In this paper we construct a completely feasible and continuous mechanism whose Nash
allocations coincide with Lindahl allocations when both preferences and initial endowments
are unknown to the designer and unreported endowments are withheld. This mechanism ...
G Tian - International Economic Review, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
This article investigates the informational requirements of resource allocation processes in
pure exchange economies with consumption externalities. It is shown that the distributive
Lindahl mechanism has a minimal informational size of the message space, and thus it is ...
G Tian - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1994 - Elsevier
Abstract In this paper, we investigate the informational efficiency and incentive aspects of the
Generalized Ratio Equilibrium (GRE) rule in public goods economies with general variable
returns and by-product technologies. We extend Hurwicz's (1979a) results to the cases of ...
G Tian - Games and economic behavior, 2000 - Elsevier
In this paper we deal with the problem of incentive mechanism design which yields efficient
allocations for general mixed ownership economies when preferences, individual
endowments, and coalition patterns among individuals are unknown to the planner. We ...
Q Li, S Nakamura… - International Economic Review, 1995 - JSTOR
This paper considers the problem of designing" well-behaved" mechanisms whose Nash
allocations coincide with Lindahl allocations in the presence of decreasing returns to scale
(DRS) technologies. The mechanism presented here is individually feasible, balanced, ...
G Tian - Journal of Public Economics, 2000 - Elsevier
This paper considers the incentive aspect of the Balanced Linear Cost Share Equilibrium
(BLCSE), which yields an endogenous theory of profit distribution for public goods
economies with convex production technologies. We do so by presenting an incentive ...
G Tian - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1992 - Elsevier
Abstract This paper proves the equilibrium existence for abstract economies with non-
compact infinite-dimensional strategy spaces, infinitely many agents, and discontinuous
payoff (utility) functions by using the quasi-variational inequality approach. The ...
G Tian - Economics Letters, 1996 - Elsevier
The existence of optimal dominant strategy mechanisms has been shown only for quadratic
valuation functions. This paper shows that non-trivial Pareto-efficient and truth-dominant
mechanisms exist for a slightly larger set of valuation functions.
[CITATION] Micro Economic Theory
G Tian - Lecture Notes, Department of Economics, Texas A&M …, 2006
L Liu… - Review of Economic Design, 1999 - Springer
Abstract. This paper provides two theorems which characterize the domains of valuation
functions for which there exist Pareto efficient and truth dominant strategy mechanisms
(balanced Groves mechanisms). Theorem 1 characterizes the existence of balanced ...
G Tian - Social Choice and Welfare, 1999 - Springer
Abstract. This paper considers Bayesian and Nash implementation in exchange economic
environments with state dependent preferences and feasible sets. We fully characterize
Bayesian implementability for both diffuse and non-diffuse information structures. We ...
G Tian - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics …, 2001 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: This paper develops a theoretical model that determines the optimal ownership
arrangement in an imperfect market and government institutional environment, especially in
transitional economies. It studies the interdependence of institutional environments and ...
G Tian - Social Choice and Welfare, 2000 - Springer
Abstract. This paper considers the issue of designing mechanisms whose Nash allocations
and strong Nash allocations coincide with Lindahl allocations for public goods economies
when coalition patterns, preferences, and endowments are unknown to the designer. It will ...
JS Chipman… - Economic Theory, 2012 - Springer
Abstract This paper, which builds on Chipman (The economist's vision. Essays in modern
economic perspectives, 131–162, 1998), analyzes a simple model formulated by Hurwicz
(Jpn World Econ 7: 49–74, 1995) of two agents—a polluter and a pollutee—and two ...
X Cao… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2010 - Elsevier
This paper characterizes the equilibria of first price auctions with participation costs in the
independent private values environment. Bidders use cutoff strategies to decide whether
they will participate in the auction. It is shown that, when bidders are homogeneous, there ...
G Tian… - Economic Theory, 2009 - Springer
Abstract This paper investigates the problem of obtaining Pareto efficient allocations in the
presence of negative consumption externalities. In contrast to the conventional wisdom, we
show that even if consumers' preferences are monotonically increasing in their own ...
G Tian - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2003 - Elsevier
This paper considers the problem of incentive mechanism design that results in efficient
allocations for economies with consumption externalities when preferences, individual
endowments, and coalition patterns among individuals are unknown to the planner. We ...
X Cao… - Texas A&M University, working paper, 2008 - iclass.shufe.edu.cn
Abstract This paper studies equilibria of second price auctions with differentiated
participation costs. We consider equilibria in economic environments where bidders' entry
costs are common knowledge while valuations are private information. We identify two ...
[CITATION] Nash-implementation of social choice correspondences by completely feasible continuous outcome functions
G Tian - 2007
T Guoqiang - Economic Research Journal, 2007 - en.cnki.com.cn
This paper studies the inherence consistency and compatibility between the construction of
harmonious society and the establishment of a modern market economic system from the
point of review of modern economics. The paper first discusses basic features of a ...
G Tian - Social Choice and Welfare, 2006 - Springer
Abstract The purpose of this paper is to investigate the informational requirements of
resource allocation processes for convex production economies. First, we establish a lower
bound of the message space of an informationally decentralized mechanism that realizes ...
W Yijiang… - Economic Research Journal, 2004 - en.cnki.com.cn
This paper explains the relationship between a strong government and banks, and
discusses the reason and resolution of banks' non-perform loans and the contents of bank
governance structure through the comparison among Korean, Japanese and Chinese ...
G Tian - Mathematical Social Sciences, 2005 - Elsevier
In this paper, we investigate incentive aspects of a general price-setting equilibrium principle
in production economies with increasing returns or more general types of non-convexities.
We do so by introducing the notion of generalized mechanism. We allow preferences and ...
G Tian… - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1995 - Elsevier
In this paper, we formalize an informationally efficient and implementable mixed-ownership
economic institutional framework by using the Ratio-Lindahl equilibrium that yields Pareto-
efficient and individually rational allocations for public goods economies with general ...
G Tian - The Reformability of China's State Sector, Singapore, …, 1997 - econweb.tamu.edu
222 However, with the deeper development of reform and the accelera- tion of the transition
process, the difficulty of reform increases. There are many fundamental problems that must be
solved so that they do not block or slow down the transition process. Some of these ...
R Nessah… - School of Management of Lille, IESEG WP Series, 2008 - lem.cnrs.fr
Abstract This paper investigates the existence of pure strategy, dominant-strategy, and
mixed strategy Nash equilibria in discontinuous and/or nonconvex games. We introduce a
new notion of very weak continuity, called weak transfer quasi-continuity, which is weaker ...
G Tian - Games and Economic Behavior, 2009 - Elsevier
This paper deals with the problem of incentive mechanism design in non-convex production
economies when production sets and preferences both are unknown to the designer. We
consider Nash-implementation of loss-free, average cost, marginal cost, voluntary trading, ...
S Ling… - Economic Research Journal, 2009 - en.cnki.com.cn
Urban-rural disparity is an important source of income inequality in China. This paper
investigates the demand-side effect of income inequality on economic growth. Income
inequality can be measured by the population share of the rural residents and their ...
[CITATION] A Theory of Endogenous Ownership Arrangements in Imperfect Market and Transitional Economies
G Tian - 1995 - mimeo
X Cao… - 2009 - mpacc.sjtu.edu.cn
Abstract This paper studies equilibria of second price auctions when values and
participation costs are both privation information and are drawn from general distribution
functions. We consider the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. It is shown that there ...
[CITATION] On the informational requirements of decentralized pareto-satisfactory mechanisms in economies with increasing returns
G Tian - 2006 - October
G Tian… - Texas A&M University, Department of …, 2007 - iclass.shufe.edu.cn
Abstract This paper develops a formal economic theory that is mainly proposed to explain
and study the Easterlin paradox—a puzzle at the heart of our lives: average happiness
levels do not increase as countries grow wealthier. This theory provides a foundation for ...
JS Chipman… - Economic Theory, 1992 - Springer
Summary This paper develops a very general (general-equilibrium) intertemporal model of a
country engaged in international trade which can be used to address a wide variety of
issues of interest—in particular, econometric application—under the assumption that ...
J Li… - 2002 - econweb.tamu.edu
Abstract This paper develops a reputation strategic model of monetary policy with a
continuous finite or infinite time horizon. By using the optimal stopping theory and
introducing the notions of sequentially weak and strong rational equilibria, we give the ...
R Nessah… - 2010 - econweb.tamu.edu
Abstract This paper investigates the existence of pure strategy, dominant strategy, and
mixed strategy Nash equilibria in discontinuous games. We introduce a new notion of weak
continuity, called weak transfer quasi-continuity, which is weaker than most known weak ...
R Nessah… - Working Papers, 2009 - lem.icl-lille.fr
Abstract This paper investigates the existence of strong Nash equilibria (SNE) in continuous
and convex games. We show that the concavity and an additional condition on payoff
functions, together with the compactness of strategy space, permit the existence of strong ...
J Li, Y Liu… - Journal of Macroeconomics, 2009 - Elsevier
This paper develops a reputation strategic model of monetary policy with a continuous finite
or infinite time horizon. By using the optimal stopping theory and introducing the notions of
sequentially weak and strong rational expectation equilibria, we show that the time ...
[CITATION] A formal theory of reference group for well-being studies: a solution to the happiness-income puzzle
G Tian… - Texas A&M University, 2005
[CITATION] Breaking Up is Hard to Do: The Theory of Property Rights in Transitional Economics
G Tian… - 1997 - International Exchange Committee, …
[CITATION] Economic Mechanism Theory: Efficiency and Incentive Mechanism Design [J]
T Guoqiang - China Economic Quarterly, 2003
G Tian - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2009 - Elsevier
This paper considers Nash implementation and double implementation of Pareto efficient
allocations for production economies. We allow production sets and preferences are
unknown to the planner. We present a well-behaved mechanism that fully implements ...
D Meng… - 2008 - econweb.tamu.edu
Abstract This paper considers the screening problem faced by a monopolist of a network
good in a general setting. We demonstrate that the joint presence of asymmetric information
and network externalities revise the “no distortion on the top” and “one-way distortion” ...
C Sun, G Tian… - 2011 - mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
This paper realizes the Melitz-Pareto model using firm-level data from 40 Chinese
manufacturing industries from 1998 and 2007. Under the hypothesis that the productivity of
firms in each industry follows a Pareto distribution, we show that the domestic sales of non ...
G Tian - Frontiers of Economics in China, 2011 - Springer
Abstract China's economy is currently at a crossroad leading to two different directions. One
is to further deepen the reform, concentrate on crucial aspects and relax control over details,
govern by non-intervention and let the market play an increasing role and lead the ...
X Cao… - Texas A&M University, working paper, 2008 - econwebb.tamu.edu
Abstract This paper studies equilibria of first price auctions with participation costs in the
independent private values environment. We focus on the cutoff strategies in which each
bidder participates and submits a bid if his value is greater than or equal to a critical value, ...
G Tian… - 2009 - econweb.tamu.edu
Abstract This paper investigates the cutoff strategies and the effects of sequential and costly
participation in Vickrey auctions with independent private value settings. It demonstrates a
Stackelberg version of participation decision in auctions, while simultaneous participation ...
G Tian… - 2008 - econweb.tamu.edu
Abstract This paper develops a formal economic theory to explain the Easterlin paradox—
average happiness levels do not necessarily increase as countries grow wealthier. The
theory analyzes the different roles of income and non-income factors in promoting ...
[CITATION] Endogenous Information Acquisition on Opponents' Valuations in Multidimensional Sealed-Bid Auctions
G Tian… - 2007 - mimeo, Texas A&M University
G Tian - Review of Economic Design, 2010 - Springer
Abstract This paper considers implementation of marginal cost pricing equilibrium
allocations with transfers for production economies with increasing returns to scale. We
present a mechanism whose Nash equilibrium allocations coincide with the set of ...
III Parts… - 2003 - econweb.tamu.edu
Incentive problems arise when a principal wants to delegate a task to an agent with private
information. The exact opportunity cost of this task, the precise technology used, and how
good the matching is between the agent's intrinsic ability and this technology are all ...
D Meng… - 2010 - econweb.tamu.edu
Abstract This paper provides a new explanation for the dominance of the low-powered
incentive contract over the high-powered incentive contract using a mixed model of moral
hazard and adverse selection. We first show that the power of incentives in the second- ...
MR Baye, G Tian… - 1990 - econpapers.repec.org
Related works: Working Paper: THE EXISTENCE OF PURE -STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIUM
IN GAME WITH PAYOFFS THAT ARE NOT QUASICONCAVE (1990) This item may be available
elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
D Meng, G Tian… - Internet and Network Economics, 2008 - Springer
This paper considers the screening problem faced by a monopolist of a network good in a
general setting. We fully characterize the optimal contracts in the joint presence of network
externalities and asymmetric information about agents' types. We find that the pattern of ...
T Guoqiang… - iclass.shufe.edu.cn
Abstract This paper investigates the problem of achieving Pareto efficient allocations in the
presence of negative consumption externalities. In contrast to the conventional wisdom, we
show that, even if consumers' preferences are monotonically increasing in their own ...
[CITATION] A Unique Informationally E±cient Allocation Mechanism in Economies with Consumption Preference Externalities¤
T Guoqiang
G Tian - iclass.shufe.edu.cn
Abstract This paper considers the problem of implementing constrained Walrasian
allocations for exchange economies with innitely many commodities and nitely many agents.
The mechanism we provide is a feasible and continuous mechanism whose Nash ...
T Guoqiang… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1995 - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to
view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are
not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
T Guoqiang - iclass.shufe.edu.cn
Abstract Proceeding from the viewpoint that the parameters to be estimated should be
uniquely determined, we define the concepts of the distinction and identification of vectors
such that under the basic assumptions of quite general nature, study the identification ...
T Guoqiang… - iclass.shufe.edu.cn
Economic globalization is one of the hottest topics among academics, government agencies
and other concerned organizations. In the past half-century, the barriers to international
trade and international investment have virtually been removed in developed countries, ...
X Cao… - econweb.tamu.edu
Abstract This paper studies equilibria of second price auctions in independent private value
environments with different participation costs. Two types of equilibria are identified:
monotonic equilibria in which a higher participation cost results in a higher cutoff for ...
T Guoqiang - resource, 1972 - cenet6.nsd.edu.cn
Abstract The purpose of this paper is to investigate the informational requirements of
resource allocation processes for convex production economies. First, we establish a lower
bound of the message space of an informationally decentralized mechanism that realizes ...
[CITATION] Dissolving Partnership Efficiently with Asymmetric Private Values
G Tian… - 2008
T Guoqiang… - econweb.tamu.edu
Abstract This paper investigates the problem of achieving Pareto efficient allocations in the
presence of externalities. In contrast to the conventional wisdom, we show that, even if
consumers' preferences are monotonically increasing in their own consumption, one may ...
G Aharonovitz, B Allen, M Bhiladwalla, W Bossert… - Economic Design, 1997 - Springer
Dr. Fikret Adaman of Bogazici University has asked to be relieved from his duty as
Administrator of our Editorial Office, a duty which he has cheerfully and effectively carried
from the inception of the journal. Economic Design thanks Dr. Adaman for all his help so ...
[CITATION] The Competitive Mechanism is the Unique Informationally E±cient Process for Economies with Production¤
T Guoqiang
JSCG TIAN - Advances in econometrics and modelling, 1989 - econweb.tamu.edu
ABSTRACT. From the point of view of consumer demand theory the linear expenditure
system (LES) provides a convenient model for representing consumer response to price and
income and its linearity is one of its most attractive features. But when estimation problems ...
G Tian - econweb.tamu.edu
Abstract This paper studies the time inconsistency problem on monetary policy for central
banks using a unified approach that combines reputation forces and contracts. We first
characterize the conditions for reputation forces to eliminate the inflation bias of ...
T Guoqiang - aisixiang.com
Abstract In this paper, we study the problem of the incentive mechanism design for non-
convex production economies. We do so by considering implementation of various most
often considered price equilibrium principles by using well-behaved and simple ...
D Meng… - 2011 - se.sufe.edu.cn
Abstract In this paper, we discuss the issue of pricing and advertising strategy of a
monopolist who provide an experience good with unknown quality to the consumers. We
find that when a minimum consumption is required, the firm's ability of signaling his quality ...
T Guoqiang - iclass.shufe.edu.cn
Abstract This paper investigates the informational requirements of resource allocation
processes in public goods economies with any number of firms and commodities. We show
that the Lindahl mechanism is informationally efficient in the sense that it uses the smallest ...
T Guoqiang - Academic Monthly, 2011 - en.cnki.com.cn
China's economy is currently at a crossroad leading to two different directions. One is to
further deepen the reform, concentrate on crucial aspects and neglect details, govern by non-
intervention and let the market play an increasing role and lead the economy, while the ...
T Guoqiang - bb.shufe.edu.cn
Abstract This paper considers Nash implementation and double implementation of Pareto
efficient allocations for production economies. We allow production sets and preferences are
unknown to the planner. We present a well-behaved mechanism that fully implements ...
[CITATION] Auction Theory
T Guoqiang
[CITATION] A Unique Informationally E±cient Allocation Mechanism in Economies with Consumption Externalities¤
G Tian
T Guoqiang - bb.shufe.edu.cn
Abstract The purpose of this paper is to investigate the informational requirements of
resource allocation processes for convex production economies. First, we establish a lower
bound of the message space of an informationally decentralized mechanism that realizes ...
C Sun… - gsgl.shufe.edu.cn
Abstract This article investigates the relationship among a final-good producer's
organizational choices, his productivity level and the uncertainty of his demand in a two-
country, two-factor general equilibrium framework with monopolistic competition, ...
[CITATION] A Unique Informationally E±cient Allocation Mechanism in Economies with Public Goods¤
T Guoqiang
C Sun… - 2011 - mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
This paper investigates how firms' demand uncertainty with capacity constraints and their
productivity heterogeneity affect their making-or-buying organizational choices in a general
equilibrium framework with incomplete contracts. It shows that a final-good producer may ...
C Sun, S Ma… - shift.edu.cn
Abstract This article estimates the Melitz model based on the statistical database of Chinese
industrial enterprises above designated size (CIEDS in short) in 34 manufacturing industries
within 1998 and 2007. Under the hypothesis that the productivity of firms in each industry ...
T Guoqiang - 2004 - cenet.org.cn
Abstract In this paper, we study the problem of the incentive mechanism design for non-
convex production economies by introducing the notion of generalized mechanism in which
one agent's feasible message domain may depend on the other agents' messages. We ...
T Guoqiang - 2004 - h.handlers.cn
In this chapter, we will explore the essential features of modern consumer theory—a bedrock
foundation on which so many theoretical structures in economics are build, and it is also
central to the economists' way of thinking. A consumer can be characterized by many ...
T Guoqiang - 2004 - cenet.org.cn
Abstract This paper investigates the dimension requirements of informationally
decentralized Paretosatisfactory processes in production economies with increasing returns
to scale or more general types of non-convexities. We show that the marginal cost pricing ( ...
G Tian… - 2008 - econweb.tamu.edu
Abstract This paper investigates bidder's covert behavior of endogenous information
acquisition on her opponents' valuations in first price auction model with independent
private values. Such an information acquisition setting leads to bidimensional type space ...
T Guoqiang - 2004 - cenet6.nsd.edu.cn
Abstract This paper considers implementation of marginal cost pricing equilibrium
allocations with transfers for production economies in the presence of increasing returns to
scale when production sets, preferences and individual endowments are all unknown to ...
T Guoqiang - cenet.org.cn
Abstract This paper considers the problem of incentive mechanism design that results in
e±cient allocations for economies with consumption externalities when preferences,
individual endowments, and coalition patterns among individuals are unknown to the ...
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