V Krishna - 2009 - books.google.com
Vijay Krishna's 2e of Auction Theory improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter
on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes.
Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna's ability to reveal ...
JP Benoit… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1985 - JSTOR
We study subgame perfect equilibria of finitely repeated games. We prove a limit" folk
theorem" for these games. Under weak conditions, any feasible and individually rational
payoff vector of the one-shot game can be approximated by the average payoff in a perfect ...
V Krishna… - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2001 - qje.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We study a model in which perfectly informed experts offer advice to a decision
maker whose actions affect the welfare of all. Experts are biased and thus may wish to pull
the decision maker in different directions and to different degrees. When the decision ...
V Krishna… - journal of economic theory, 1997 - Elsevier
We study the war of attrition and the all-pay auction when players' signals are affiliated and
symmetrically distributed. We (a) find sufficient conditions for the existence of symmetric
monotonic equilibrium bidding strategies and (b) examine the performance of these ...
V Krishna… - The Review of Economic Studies, 1996 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We study a multilateral bargaining procedure that extends Rubinstein's alternating
offer game to the case of n players. The procedure captures the notion of consistency in the
sense familiar in cooperative game theory and we use it to establish links to the axiomatic ...
V Krishna, RW Rosenthal… - Games and economic …, 1996 - ratio.huji.ac.il
Abstract Motivated by recent auctions of licenses for the radio-frequency spectrum, we
consider situations where multiple objects are auctioned simultaneously by means of a
second-price, sealed-bid auction. For some buyers, called global bidders, the value of ...
V Krishna - American Political Science Association, 2001 - Cambridge Univ Press
Abstract We reexamine the major tenets of the informational theory of legislative rules,
focusing on the informational efficiency of rules with varying degrees of restrictiveness.
When committees are heterogeneous, full efficiency is attainable under the unrestrictive ...
JP Benoit… - The Review of Economic Studies, 1987 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract We study a dynamic model of duopoly in which firms choose both prices and
quantities. If quantity (capacity) choices are relatively inflexible, firms generally carry excess
(idle) capacity in equilibrium. Because of this enforcement cost, firms are unable to ...
JP Benoît… - Review of Economic Studies, 2001 - Wiley Online Library
A seller with two objects faces a group of bidders who are subject to budget constraints. The
objects have common values to all bidders but need not be identical, and may be either
complements or substitutes. In a simple complete information setting we show:(1) if the ...
V Krishna… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2004 - Elsevier
We examine the strategic interaction between an informed expert and an uninformed
decision maker, extending the analysis of Crawford and Sobel (Econometrica 50 (1982)
1431). We modify their model to allow for more extensive communication between the two ...
V Krishna… - Econometrica, 2001 - Wiley Online Library
THIS PAPER ESTABLISHES A GENERAL FORM of the ''payoff equivalence''result in
mechanism design theory: under certain conditions, the utility of any type in an incentive-
compatible mechanism is determined up to an additive constant by the allocation rule ...
I Hafalir… - 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We study equilibria of first-and second-price auctions with resale in a model with
independent private values. With asymmetric bidders, the resulting inefficiencies create a
motive for post-auction trade. In our basic model, resale takes place via monopoly pricing- ...
JP Benoit… - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1993 - JSTOR
Perfect equilibria of finitely repeated games may be vulnerable to the possibility of
renegotiation among players. We study the limiting properties of the set of payoffs from
equilibria that are immune to renegotiation. Our main result is that the limit of the set of ...
[CITATION] Learning in games with strategic complementarities
V Krishna - 1992 - Harvard Business School
V Krishna… - Mathematics of Operations Research, 1998 - JSTOR
We study the Brown-Robinson fictitious play process for non-zero sum games. We show
that, in general, fictitious play cannot converge cyclically to a mixed strategy equilibrium in
which both players use more than two pure strategies.
JP Benoit… - International Journal of Game Theory, 1987 - Springer
At least since the extensive discussion by Luce and Raiffa (1957), it has been well known that
if the classic prisoners' dilemma (Example 1 below) is played a finite num- ber of times, the unique
Nash equilibrium outcome path of the repeated game involves playing the unique Nash ...
V Krishna - Journal of Economic Theory, 2003 - Elsevier
This paper studies equilibria of the n-bidder single-object English, or open ascending price,
auction in a setting with interdependent values and asymmetric bidders. Maskin (in: H.
Siebert (Ed.), Privatization, Institut fur Weltwirtschaften der Universität Kiel, Kiel, 1992, pp. ...
V Krishna… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
1. This research was supported by the National Science Foundation (SES-0095639). We are
grateful to Ernesto Dal Bó, Massimo Morelli, as well as various seminar participants for
helpful comments. We also owe special thanks to two referees and the editor for their ...
V Krishna… - Advances in applied …, 1998 - faculty.haas.berkeley.edu
The idea that an employee's compensation should, at least to some extent, be based on his
or her performance relative to that of others is a familiar one. It is almost an axiom that by
spurring competition among workers such compensation schemes have beneficial ...
[CITATION] Auction theory. 2002
V Krishna - Academic Press
R Vijay Krishna - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
We study the effect of communication in two-person games of incomplete information. We
show that for any two-player game of incomplete information, any rational mediated
communication mechanism outcome (satisfying a Nash domination condition) can be ...
JP Benoit… - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1991 - Elsevier
Abstract We study a model with sequential capacity choice and entry by firms into an
industry. Post-entry competition is long term and firms compete by choosing prices. The
complex role played by the capacity choice of the first mover is highlighted. In contrast to ...
V Krishna… - International Journal of Game Theory, 1995 - Springer
We study the set of subgame perfect equilibria associated with then-person noncooperative
bargaining mechanism proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1992). Our results pertain to
transferable utility games. The set of perfect equilibria depends on the parameter ...
JP Benoīt, V Krishna… - 1996 - 129.3.20.41
Abstract We present a synthesis of the various folk theorems for repeated games using a
model that accommodates both finitely and infinitely repeated games with discounting. We
derive a central result for this model and show that the various folk theorems follow as a ...
N Chalofsky… - Advances in Developing Human …, 2009 - adh.sagepub.com
Abstract The problem and the solution. The work motivation literature suggests the existence
of a level of motivation that goes beyond the commonly known typologies of intrinsic and
extrinsic motivation. The purpose of this article is to explore that deeper level of intrinsic ...
[CITATION] Voluntary voting: costs and benefits
V Krishna… - 2008 - working paper
[CITATION] (Anti-) Competitive Effects of Joint Bidding and Bidder Restrictions
V Krishna… - 1997 - Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton …
K Chatterjee… - American Economic Journal: …, 2009 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: We consider the following two-period problem of self-control. In the first period, an
individual has to decide on the set of feasible choices from which she will select one in the
second period. In the second period, the individual might choose an alternative that she ...
V Krishna… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2002 - faculty.haas.berkeley.edu
Abstract We examine the strategic interaction between an informed expert and an
uninformed decision maker, extending the analysis of Crawford and Sobel (1982). We
modify their model to allow for more extensive communication between the two parties ...
V Krishna… - The New Palgrave Dictionary of …, 2008 - pubmail.dklevine.com
In the context of games of incomplete information, the term hcheap talkirefers to direct and
costless communication among players. Cheap# talk models should be con# trasted with
more standard signalling models. In the latter, informed agents commu# nicate private ...
K Chatterjee… - American Economic Journal: …, 2007 - econ.la.psu.edu
Abstract We consider the following two-period problem of self-control. In the first period, an
individual has to decide on the set of feasible choices from which she will select one in the
second period. In the second period, the individual might choose an alternative that she ...
I Hafalir… - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2009 - Elsevier
We study first-price auctions in a model with asymmetric, independent private values.
Asymmetries lead to inefficient allocations, thereby creating a motive for resale after the
auction is over. In our model, resale takes place via monopoly pricing—the winner of the ...
V Krishna… - … , and Optimality: Essays in Honor of …, 1990 - grizzly.la.psu.edu
The dual approach to demand theory is based on the fact that preferences can be
represented in two forms other than the utility function; these are the expenditure function
and the indirect utility function. Let U: R~.........; R+ be an upper semi-continuous ...
V Krishna… - 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We study a model in which voters choose between two candidates on the basis of
both ideology and competence. While the ideology of the candidates is commonly known,
voters are imperfectly informed about competence. Voter preferences, however, are such ...
[CITATION] Menu Choice, Environmental Cues and Temptation: A
K Chatterjee… - Multiple Selves” Approach to Self-control,” working …, 2005
[CITATION] The Revenue Equivalence Principle
V Krishna - Auction Theory, San Diego, California, Elsevier …, 2002
[CITATION] The folk theorems for repeated games
V Krishna - Harvard Business School Working, 1989
[CITATION] VThe art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi $ stage communicationV
V Krishna… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2004
[CITATION] Auction theory
K Vijay - 2002 - Academic Press, San Diego, CA
[CITATION] Institute Quality in management Education
V Krishna - Indian Management, 2000
V Krishna… - 2005 - businessinnovation.berkeley.edu
There has been recent interest in the limit properties of voter turnout in costly voting models
(see, for instance Taylor and Yildirim (2005)). However, the focus of this work has been on
the so" called hprivate valuesicasek voters privately know which candidate they prefer and ...
V Krishna… - 2008 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We study strategic voting in a Condorcet type model in which voters have identical
preferences but differential information. Voters incur private costs of going to the polls and
may abstain if they wish; hence voting is voluntary. We show that under majority rule with ...
K Chatterjee… - Economic Theory, 2011 - Springer
Abstract Models with subjective state spaces have been extremely useful in capturing novel
psychological phenomena that consist of both a preference for flexibility and for commitment.
Interpreting the utility representations of preferences as capturing these phenomena ...
V Krishna… - 1990 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract The authors study a multilateral bargaining procedure that extends A. Rubinstein's
(1982) alternating offer game to the case of n players. The procedure captures the notion of
consistency in the sense familiar in cooperative game theory and they use it to establish ...
[CITATION] What They Should be Teaching at Business School
V Krishna - Indian Management, 1998
[CITATION] Repeated games with incomplete information
RJ Aumann, MB Maschler… - Journal of …, 1997 - Nashville [etc.]: American Economic …
RV Krishna… - 2011 - duke.edu
Abstract We consider a decision maker who is uncertain about his future consumption utility.
This uncertainty leaves him with a preference for flexibility when choosing between menus
containing alternatives for future choice. In order to address dynamic decision situations ...
JP Benoit… - 1987 - en.scientificcommons.org
[CITATION] Sincere voting with endogeneous participation
V Krishna… - 2007 - mimeo
[CITATION] hAn Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All# Pay Auctioni
K Vijay… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1997
[CITATION] Flowers in Indian textile design
V Krishna - Journal of Indian Textile History, 1967
[CITATION] Games of strategy: An introduction
V Krishna - Harvard Business School, 1992
[CITATION] (Anti-) Competitive Effects of Joint Bidding and Bidder Restrictions," working paper, Penn State University and Princeton University
V Krishna… - 1997
[CITATION] (Anti-) Competitive Effects of Joint Bidding and Bidder Restrictions,” Mimeo, Penn State University and Princeton University
V Krishna… - 1997
[CITATION] A Model of Expertise
J Morgan… - Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2001
[CITATION] John Morgan. 1997
V Krishna - Anti-) Competitive effects of joint bidding and bidder …
K Chatterjee… - Economics Letters, 2008 - Elsevier
Let (X) be a topological vector space and C⊂X be metrisable. Typical elements of C will be denoted
by x, y, z and p, q, r etc. The zero vector in (X) will be denoted by θ and let d be a metric generating
the topology. We are interested in preference relations on C, ie binary relations ≽ ⊂ C × ...
D Gurr, T Nolan, J Warren… - … Journal of Knowledge …, 2007 - topkinisis.com
Monitoring of school performance is not a recent phenomenon. In England, the external
inspection of schools began in 1839, conducted by a group called Her Majesty's Inspectors
(HMI) to determine how to improve schools and how the money invested was spent. ...
[CITATION] An Alternative Equilibrium under the Open Rule
V Krishna… - Princeton University. Typescript, 2001
V Krishna - 2008 - books.google.com
The overarching research question that guided this study was," do employee perceptions of
organizational learning as measured by actions in the four organizational learning
subsystems, namely, environmental interface, action/reflection, meaning and memory, and ...
[CITATION] Efficient mechanism design. Game theory and information
V Krishna… - Economics Working Paper Archive at WUSTL, 1998
D Dimitrov… - International Journal of Diversity in …, 2005 - ijd.cgpublisher.com
Danielle Dimitrov is a graduate of Sofia University Bulgaria, University of North Carolina at
Greensboro, and a doctoral candidate at the George Washington University. She has been
responsible for various training programs in the hospitality industry both in the US and ...
[CITATION] Auction Theory. 2002. ISBN: 0-12-426297-X
V Krishna - Academic Press/Elsevier Science
[CITATION] Multiple Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders
B Jean-Pierre… - forthcoming, Review of Economic Studies, 2000
[CITATION] Voter clustering and the theory of spacial voting with entry
RV Krishna - Unpublished Draft, 2001
K Chatterjee… - 2006 - econ.psu.edu
The Expected Utility Theorem is the cornerstone of axiomatic choice under uncertainty. However
traditional proofs rely mostly on the algebraic properties induced by the Inde- pendence and
von Neumann-Morgenstern continuity axioms (see, for instance, Kreps, 1988, pp. 66). We ...
RV Krishna - Economics Bulletin, 2005 - unc.edu
Abstract The main justification for cash− in− advance (CIA) equilibria when there are
multiple assets is a Shapley− Shubik trading− post model where the agents coordinate on a
particular medium of exchange. Of course, there are other equilibria. We introduce a ...
…, R Vijay Krishna - Mathematical Social Sciences, 2011 - Elsevier
We consider concave and Lipschitz continuous preference functionals over monetary
lotteries. We show that they possess an envelope representation, as the minimum of a
bounded family of continuous vN-M preference functionals. This allows us to use an ...
V Krishna… - Online Submission, 2008 - eric.ed.gov
Abstract: Despite considerable research on organizational commitment, a clear
understanding of the process through which commitment develops has remained elusive.
While there has been discussion in the literature about the possible relationship between ...
[CITATION] Multilateral Bargaining
V Krishna - 1993 - Brown University, Department of …
V Krishna, R Chuang… - International Communication …, 1997 - gaz.sagepub.com
Abstract This article investigates the differences in Taiwanese television advertisements for
local and global products with regard to the degree of informativeness, type of cues and
product class. The sample included advertisements that appeared on the three major ...
V Krishna - Human Resource Development International, 2009 - Taylor & Francis
Many organizations today operate globally and employ a significant number of bicultural
employees. Consequently, it is extremely important to conduct research that furthers our
understanding of bicultural employees in an organizational context. In addition, research ...
RV Krishna… - 2010 - pubmail.dklevine.com
Abstract Following Kreps (1979), we consider a decision maker who is uncertain about her
future taste for immediate consumption. This uncertainty leaves the decision maker with a
preference for flexibility: When choosing among menus containing alternatives for future ...
V Krishna - Harvard Business School, 1986 - en.scientificcommons.org
Publikationsansicht. 32235093. Strategic informational equilibrium. (1983). Krishna, Vijay.
Abstract. Thesis (Ph.D.)--Princeton University, 1983.. Includes bibliographies. Details
der Publikation. Download, http://worldcat.org/oclc/84588089. ...
V KRISHNA - American Political Science Review, 2001 - edegan.com
We reexamine the major tenets of the informational theory of legislative rules, focusing on
the informational efficiency of rules with varying degrees of restrictiveness. When
committees are heterogeneous, full efficiency is attainable under the unrestrictive open ...
V Krishna… - 2003 - escholarship.org
Abstract: We study optimal contracts between a decison maker and an expert where the
decison maker can commit to make transfer to the expert contingent on his advice but cannot
commit to take an action contingent on advice. We show that optimal contracts never entail ...
V Krishna… - 2012 - bcep.haas.berkeley.edu
Abstract Majority rule is known to be at odds with utilitarianism–majority rule follows the
preferences of the median voter whereas a utilitarian planner would follow the preferences
of the mean voter. In this paper, we show that when voting is costly and voluntary, turnout ...
VK Sukhavasi - 2011 - scholar.lib.vt.edu
Abstract Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) have been instrumental in building a reliable
and robust Power System. Recent blackouts have increased the importance of PMUs and
PMUs from various manufacturers are being installed in the in large quantities in the North ...
W Baumol, K Arrow, S Athey, J Baker, C Bazelon… - 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: The signatories to this document are economists who have studied
telecommunications, auctions, and competition policy. While we may disagree about the
stimulus package, we believe that it is important to implement mechanisms that make ...
V Krishna… - Online Submission, 2007 - eric.ed.gov
Abstract: Organizational commitment has been explored extensively over the past 40 years
because of its benefits to individuals and the organization. Action learning, in turn, has been
used by companies worldwide to develop leaders, teams and organizations. No study, ...
RV Krishna… - unc.edu
Abstract We consider agents who have a dynamic preference for flexibility, as in Krishna and
Sadowski [2012](KS). Such agents are uncertain about their future utilities. We first consider
a version of the Lucas tree economy, where the representative agent behaves as in KS ...
V Krishna - 1988 - capcp.psu.edu
Office Address: Department of Economics Penn State University University Park, PA 16802
Tel: (814) 863&8543 Fax: (814) 863&4775 E&mail: vkrishna@psu.edu ... Home Address: 102
West Willowood Court Port Matilda, PA 16870 ... Education: BA Mathematics, Delhi ...
V Krishna - 1994 - en.scientificcommons.org
V Krishna… - 2007 - isites.harvard.edu
Abstract We study strategic voting in a Condorcet type model in which voters have identical
preferences but differential information. Voters incur private costs of go, ing to the polls and
may abstain if they wish; hence voting is voluntary. We show that in large supermajority ...
P Sadowski… - Levine's Working Paper Archive, 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Following Kreps (1979), we consider a decision maker who is uncertain about her
future taste for immediate consumption. This uncertainty leaves the decision maker with a
preference for flexibility: When choosing among menus containing alternatives for future ...
V Krishna… - idisk.mac.com
Abstract Cheap-talk models address the question of how much information can be credibly
transmitted when communication is direct and costless. When a single informed expert, who
is biased, gives advice to a decision maker, only noisy information can be credibly ...
PK Yadav, KV Krishna… - eDITOR'S nOTE tHE tEAM - iimc-finclub.com
Executive Summary Climate change has recently emerged as an unintended global
negative externality problem derived from a relentless pursuit of economic development.
There is no sphere of the competitive market place that will remain unaffected by Climate ...
V Krishna - 2009 - econ.northwestern.edu
1. independent private values model 2. Dutch descending # first(price auction (FPA) 3. English
ascending # second(price auction (SPA) 4. equilibrium of FPA (example) 5. revenue equivalence
(example) 6. asymmetric first(price auctions (example) 7. multi(unit Vickrey auction
RV Krishna - 2004 - etda.libraries.psu.edu
Abstract Game Theory plays a fundamental role in the social sciences. In this dissertation,
we present three essays—the first two dealing with the pure theory of games and the third
with an application of game theory to political economy. In the first essay, we consider the ...
WR King, DM Gurr, T Nolan, J Warren… - International Journal of … - ijm.cgpublisher.com
Wilma King has taught at O'More College of Design, Franklin, TN, Texas Southern
University, and the Art Institute of Houston, Houston, TX and Benedict College, Columbia,
SC. Her work began in advertising and marketing with Bobbin magazine and La Bobina, ...
V Krishna - 2000 - econ.psu.edu
Abstract We present a synthesis of the various folk theorems for repeated games using a
model that accommodates both finitely and infinitely repeated games with discounting. We
derive a central result for this model and show that the various folk theorems follow as a ...
[CITATION] Empirical studies of a spreadsheet maintenance experiment
VB Krishna - 2001 - Oregon State University
L Martie, VK Palepu,
H Sajnani… - ics.uci.edu
Abstract—Studying vast volumes of bug and issue discussions can give an understanding of
what the community has been most concerned about, however the magnitude of documents
can overload the analyst. We present an approach to analyze the development of the ...
RV Krishna, G Lopomo… - Working Papers, 2010 - econ.ku.dk
Abstract A principal contracts optimally with an agent to operate a firm over an infinite time
horizon when the agent is liquidity constrained and has access to private information about
the sequence of cost realizations. We formulate this mechanism design problem as a ...
VK Sirigiri - 2011 - etd.ohiolink.edu
RV Krishna - gtcenter.org
The Revelation Principle is the cornerstone of the theory of mechanism design. It shows that
seemingly complex problems can be viewed as programming problems with constraints that
give the agent the right incentives to truthfully reveal his private information. Needless to ...
C Taylor, G Lopomo… - 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: A principal contracts optimally with an agent to operate a firm over an infinite time
horizon when the agent is liquidity constrained and has access to private information about
the sequence of cost realizations. We formulate this mechanism design problem as a ...
K Chatterjee… - The BE Journal of Theoretical …, 2012 - degruyter.com
In a model of decision making over sets of alternatives, we consider an agent who conceives
of the different utilities she will receive (depending on the state of mind she is in, her
subjective state) when she finally makes a choice from the set. Her uncertainty is ...
[CITATION] Contracting for Information (Preliminary and Incomplete)
V Krishna… - 2003
[CITATION] Standard Philatelic Dictionary: An Up-to-date Guide to the Words and Phrases in Common Use Among Stamp Collectors...
V Krishna - 1950 - Abhay-Vinay publications
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