C Davidson… - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2007 - Elsevier
We consider the impact of horizontal mergers in the presence of free entry and exit. In
contrast to much of the previous literature on mergers, our model yields predictions that
seem intuitively reasonable: with only moderate cost synergies mergers of a small number ...
A Mukherjee… - European Economic Review, 2006 - Elsevier
This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that exclusive owners of an advanced
technology are always better off when producing as a monopolist than when competing
against another firm. Competition against a less-efficient firm weakens the power that a ...
S Marjit, V Mukherjee… - European Journal of Political …, 2000 - Elsevier
This paper introduces 'harassment'in a model of bribery and corruption. We characterize the
harassment equilibrium and show that taxpayers, with all possible levels of income,
participate in such equilibrium. Harassment has a regressive bias. Harassment costs as ...
A Mukherjee - Economic Theory, 2001 - Springer
Summary. This paper considers technology transfer in a duopoly where the firms have two
types of commitment strategies: incentive delegation and capacity installation. It turns out
that the possibility of technology transfer significantly differs under these two types of ...
A Mukherjee… - Research in Economics, 2001 - Elsevier
This paper considers technology transfer in a Cournot-duopoly market where the firms
produce horizontally differentiated products. The patent licensing contract consists of up-
front fixed fee and per-unit output royalty for products of neither close substitutes nor ...
A Mukherjee - The Economic Journal, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
I thank two anonymous referees of this J ournal, the editor (Leonardo Felli), the seminar
participants of the University of Nottingham and the conference participants of the
conferences 'Institutions, trade, industry and finance–some emerging issues in the ...
A Mukherjee… - Review of International Economics, 2001 - Wiley Online Library
As ceilings on foreign shareholdings are withdrawn during liberalization, multinationals
enter through fully owned subsidiaries that compete with their own joint ventures, unless
local partners permit them to raise their stakes. In a framework of quantity competition, this ...
A Mukherjee - Research in Economics, 2005 - Elsevier
This paper complements that of Cellini et al.(Cellini, R., Lambertini, L., Ottaviano, GIP, 2004.
Welfare in a differentiated oligopoly with free entry: A cautionary note. Research in
Economics, 58: 125–33.), which shows that Cournot competition may generate higher ...
A Mukherjee - Northwestern University, 2005 - wcas.northwestern.edu
Abstract Sequential contracting with multiple employers is a common feature of modern
labor markets. Employment relations often terminate due to raids. When a worker is raided,
the initial employer may enjoy an informational advantage over the raiders, as she is likely ...
T Kabiraj… - Journal of Economics, 2000 - Springer
Abstract The paper analyzes, in a model of quantity-setting three firms, the interaction
between cooperation decisions at the R&D stage and merger decisions at the production
stage. We assume that only two of the three firms are capable of doing cost-reducing ...
S Marjit… - Review of International Economics, 1998 - Wiley Online Library
Technology transfer to the developing nations has been predominantly characterized by
technology collaborations between the multinationals and the local firms of these
developing countries. When a multinational offers a new technology to a local firm, the ...
A Mukherjee… - Oxford Economic Papers, 2004 - Oxford Univ Press
Abstract Newly developed technologies run the risk of being imitated when patents are long
and imitation cost is low. This paper shows that the innovator has the incentive to postpone
technology adoption when imitation is a credible threat but imitation cost is not below a ...
A Mukherjee… - European Economic Review, 2009 - Elsevier
Recent evidence shows that developing countries and transition economies are increasingly
privatizing their public firms and at the same time experiencing rapid growth of inward
foreign direct investment (FDI). We show that there is a two-way causality between ...
S Marjit… - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical …, 2001 - ingentaconnect.com
Abstract: Technological collaboration coupled with equity participation improves the quality
of transacted technology relative to a situation characterised by a pure technology licensing
agreement. Such a result is proved in a model of a signalling game with asymmetric ...
A Mukherjee… - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2009 - Elsevier
Open Science is a dynamic system of knowledge production that depends on the disclosure
of knowledge by researchers as an input into knowledge production by future researchers.
To analyze the conditions supporting Open Science, we develop an overlapping ...
A Mukherjee - International Economic Review, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
Raiders may suffer from information disadvantage since the current employer is often better
informed about his workers' quality. When workers have career concerns and matching
influences productivity, the initial employer can strategically disclose information to ...
S Marjit… - Review of International Economics, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
We would like to thank an anonymous referee and the editor (E. Kwan Choi) of this journal
for helpful comments and suggestions. The initial version of this paper was completed when
Arijit Mukherjee was visiting the City University of Hong Kong in 2005. Arijit Mukherjee ...
A Mukherjee - The Manchester School, 2005 - Wiley Online Library
In this paper we show the effect of licensing on innovation and social welfare. We show that
firms always do non-cooperative research and development (R&D) when there is licensing
after R&D, while firms do cooperative R&D in the absence of licensing if cost reduction ...
P Roy, T Kabiraj… - Journal of Economic Integration, 1999 - Sejong University
We consider a framework where initially a foreign firm and a few domestic firms are
competing in a homogenous product local market. The foreign firm has a lower marginal
cost of production relative to the domestic firms. We study then possibility of a bilateral ...
M Goltsman… - Journal of Labor Economics, 2011 - JSTOR
Workers competing in a tournament for a prize (eg, a promotion) often perform sequentially
in multiple stages. When the firm is privately informed about the workers' performance, it can
sharpen incentives by strategically disclosing the intermediate results. But the policies that ...
A Mukherjee - Oxford Economic Papers, 2002 - Oxford Univ Press
Abstract The strategic trade literature has mainly examined the importance of per‐unit
subsidies or taxes. Unlike the earlier works, a fixed amount of subsidy has been considered
in this paper. This paper shows that even if this subsidy policy does not affect the marginal ...
A Mukherjee, U Broll… - Journal of Economics, 2008 - Springer
We show that a monopolistic final goods producer may find it profitable to create competition
by licensing its technology if the input market is imperfectly competitive. With a centralized
union, we show that licensing by a monopolist is profitable under both uniform and ...
A Mukherjee… - The Manchester School, 2005 - Wiley Online Library
We show the effects of entry of a foreign firm on domestic welfare in the presence of
licensing. If the entrant is technologically inferior to the incumbent, foreign entry increases
domestic welfare for intermediate (sufficiently large) technological differences between the ...
T Kabiraj, A Mukherjee - Pacific Economic Review, 2000 - Wiley Online Library
The paper studies the profitability of technology transfer and horizontal merger between two
asymmetric firms in a multifirm Cournot oligopoly. If there is only one technologically
advanced firm and one or many technologically backward firm (s), a profitable technology ...
ME Haque… - Economics Letters, 2005 - Elsevier
In a recent paper Mujumder [Mujumder, S., 2004, Revenue implications of trade
liberalization under imperfect competition, Economics Letters, 82: 83-89] argued that only if
the industry is a monopoly, we could be certain that the government could use profit tax to ...
A Mukherjee - Economics Bulletin, 2007 - accessecon.com
Abstract Empirical evidences show that technology licensing contracts differ significantly and
may consist of only up-front fixed-fee, only output royalty or the combinations of fixed-fee and
output royalty. We explain these possibilities under international technology transfer. The ...
S Marjit, A Mukherjee… - Journal of economic behavior & …, 2001 - Elsevier
This paper provides an insurance based argument behind patent infringement agreements
(PIA). Such agreements constitute a form of 'cooperation'in an otherwise non-cooperative
environment. We develop a model where firms initially hold certain patents and undertake ...
M Goltsman… - 2006 - economics.uwo.ca
Abstract. Two agents participate in a tournament that has two stages: intermediate and final.
The results of the intermediate stage are privately observed by the principal who or $
ganizes the tournament. Prizes for the winner and the loser are exogenously given, but ...
A Mukherjee… - The Manchester School, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
We show that, in the presence of technology licensing, entry in an industry with Cournot
competition may lead to a socially insufficient, number of firms. Insufficient entry occurs if the
own marginal cost of the entrant is sufficiently high. Hence, the justification for ...
S Marjit, V Mukherjee… - European Journal of Political …, 2003 - Elsevier
Saha (2003) wants to conceive the game such that the threat of overvaluation of income and
the bribery offer take place simultaneously. We set out the game sequentially: the auditor first
overvalues taxpayer's income and then offers to be bribed in exchange for undervaluation ...
A Mukherjee - The Manchester School, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
If firms with asymmetric costs can engage in technology licensing, we show that welfare may
be higher under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition. Under fixed-fee
licensing, consumer surplus and welfare are higher under Cournot competition if the ...
S Marjit… - Discussion Paper Serie A, 1996 - Citeseer
Abstract This paper introduces 'harassment'in a simple model of bribery and corruption. With
fixed costs of 'harassment', people belonging to the higher income group enjoy more benefit
relative to the poorer section of the society. An equilibrium is likely where the poor favor a ...
A Mukherjee - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
Firms often augment career concerns incentives with implicit incentive contracts. I formalize
the interaction between these two incentives, and highlight its implications on a firm's
decision to disclose its workers' productivity information. Disclosure enhances career ...
S Mukhopadhyay, T Kabiraj… - International Review of …, 1999 - Elsevier
This article examines the possibility of a profitable technology transfer deal in a duopoly. We
show that under a fixed fee contract, technology transfer will be always profitable if the
products are sufficiently differentiated or the firms behave sufficiently cooperatively or both ...
A Mukherjee - Economics Letters, 2006 - Elsevier
We show the effect of patent protection on R&D investment in the presence of 'inventing
around'(or 'non-infringing'imitation) and technology licensing. Though the 'tournament
effect'under patent protection may reduce R&D investment, we show that the effect of ...
[CITATION] Bilateral Merger-A Note on Salant-Switzer-Reynolds Model
T Kabiraj, A Mukherjee - Journal of …, 2003 - THE INDIAN ECONOMETRIC …
A Mukherjee… - GEP Research Paper Series, 2007 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: It is often argued that if the substitutability between workers is sufficiently high,
labour is better off under a centralised labour union than under decentralised unions. We
show that this may not be the case in an open economy with foreign direct investment as ...
A Mukherjee - 2003 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: The literature on technology licensing has ignored the importance of market power
of the input supplier. In this paper we examine the incentive for licensing in the downstream
industry when the firms in the upstream industry have market power. We show that ...
A Mukherjee… - The Manchester School, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
It has been argued that a monopolist input supplier may find it profitable to create an outside
source for its input if it reduces product price and attracts buyers (Farrell and Gallini,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 103 (1988), pp. 673–694). We consider a monopolist ...
A Mukherjee… - Review of International Economics, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
We show that cost reduction by a domestic firm may reduce domestic welfare if it changes a
foreign firm's production strategy from foreign direct investment to export. Domestic cost
reduction can be welfare reducing when the domestic market is sufficiently small and ...
A Mukherjee - Labour Economics, 2010 - Elsevier
In an economy with unionized labor market, we show that the payoff of an outside innovator
may be higher under royalty licensing than under fixed-fee licensing and auction, if
bargaining power of the labor union is sufficiently high. This result holds for both ...
A Mukherjee - Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 2010 - Springer
Abstract Empirical evidence suggests that many industries are characterized by external
economies of scale, yet the literature on the welfare effects of entry has ignored this aspect.
We show that entry can be insufficient instead of excessive in the presence of external ...
A Mukherjee… - 2002 - Citeseer
Abstract Previous literature has mostly considered R&D and licensing activities separately.
In this paper we examine the effect of licensing on R&D and social welfare. We show that the
effect of licensing on the incentive for doing R&D is ambiguous and depends on the costs ...
A Mukherjee - 2003 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Many developing countries are liberalizing their economies to allow higher equity
participation by the foreign firms. We argue that the possibility of joint venture can reduce the
number of technology transfers. Hence, joint venture can reduce the welfare of a host- ...
A Mukherjee… - Journal of Economics, 2007 - Springer
Abstract We compare the effects of two types of foreign direct investment (FDI)(viz., FDI for
trade cost saving and FDI for signaling foreign cost of production) on consumer surplus,
profit of the host-country firm and host-country welfare. We show that the effects are ...
A Mukherjee… - Group Decision and Negotiation, 2004 - Springer
Abstract In this paper we consider a Cournot duopoly model to examine the effects of
licensing on R&D organization. When firms do cooperative R&D to share the cost of R&D,
possibility of licensing can influence the decision on R&D organization. But, if the firms do ...
A Mukherjee… - … Institute Discussion Paper No. TI 05- …, 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Taking technological differences between firms as given, we show that the
technologically advanced firm has a stronger incentive for technology licensing under a
decentralized unionization structure than with centralized wage setting. Furthermore, We ...
A Mukherjee… - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2011 - Elsevier
We show the effects of the unionization structure (viz., decentralized and centralized unions)
on a firm's incentive for technology licensing and innovation. The incentive for technology
licensing is stronger under decentralized unions. We identify circumstances under which ...
A Mukherjee - Economics Letters, 2003 - Elsevier
In this paper we show how the size of innovation can affect the incentive for cooperative
R&D and social welfare. When cost difference between large and small innovations is not
sufficiently large then social welfare can be more under small innovation compared to ...
A Mukherjee - University of Nottingham Research Paper No. 2004 …, 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We consider the preferences of a foreign firm and a welfare maximizing host
country government for foreign direct investment through direct entry and acquisition in
presence of innovation by the firms. We find that relatively superior technology is always ...
A Mukherjee… - GEP Research Papers2003/37, the …, 2003 - finntrack.co.uk
Abstract: This paper considers investment strategies of a foreign firm in a host country. The
foreign firm apprehends that knowledge spillover will encourage entry in the host country.
We show that foreign firm delays its investment for sufficiently lower threat of entry. If threat ...
T Kabiraj… - 2001 - Citeseer
Abstract In an oligopoly industry of k rms (k> 2) with linear demand and identical (constant)
average cost of production, a bilateral merger is never protable when all rms choose their
quantities simultaneously. In this paper we reexamine the issue when some rms have rst- ...
A Mukherjee… - Discussion Paper Series, 2007 - rieb.kobe-u.ac.jp
Abstract: We examine the effects of unionization in the host country on a firm's choices of
entry mode when serving a foreign market, ie, its incentives for exporting, green-field FDI
and merger. If, due to government regulations the merged firm must operate a plant in the ...
ME Haque… - University of Nottingham Research …, 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We examine whether the market under free entry with a certain entry cost can
recover the revenue loss following tariff reduction on an intermediate input. We show that
there are four possible ranges of entry cost, from high to low, with four different revenue ...
[CITATION] lCareer Concerns
A Mukherjee - Matching, and Optimal Disclosure Policy, m …, 2008
A Mukherjee - Discussion Papers, 2008 - 149.132.120.83
Abstract: In a bilateral oligopoly, Ghosh and Morita ('Social desirability of free entry: a
bilateral oligopoly analysis, 2007, IJIO) show that entry is always socially insufficient if the
upstream agents have sufficiently strong bargaining power. We show that this conclusion ...
A Mukherjee - The Journal of Policy Reform, 2001 - Taylor & Francis
This paper develops a model of foreign entry strategy and examines welfare of the host-
country under two situations-(i) where host-country government commits to the tax policy,(ii)
where host-country government does not commit to the tax policy. It turns out that under ...
A Mukherjee - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
The observability of history is crucial for the sustenance of implicit (or relational) contracts.
When a firm hires a sequence of short-lived workers, turnover adversely affects the
observability of history—the old worker may leave the firm before communicating the ...
S Marjit, A Mukherjee… - Research in Economics, 2004 - Elsevier
In this paper we describe a scenario where joint venture (JV) formation between a domestic
firm and a foreign firm is absolutely motivated by the future expected gain. We show that
incomplete information about the host-country policy and foreign technology along with ...
A Mukherjee - Keele Economics Research Papers, 2002 - 129.3.20.41
Abstract This paper compares profits and consumer surplus under non-cooperation and
collusion in the product market when the firms have the option for R&D before production.
We show that whether R&D investment would be higher under noncooperation or product ...
A Mukherjee - Economics Bulletin, 2006 - accessecon.com
Abstract We consider the welfare effect of cross-border merger in presence of international
RDcompetition. Cross-border merger increases domestic welfare if the bargaining power of
the foreign firm and the slope of the marginal cost of RDare sufficiently low. Otherwise, ...
A Mukherjee… - The Manchester School, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
We show that international outsourcing may reduce welfare of the outsourcing country by
deterring market entry, thus showing a new effect which is different from the employment and
the quality effects creating negative impacts of outsourcing. Entry deterrence under ...
A Mukherjee… - Economics of Innovation and New …, 2007 - Taylor & Francis
We consider the effects of product and process patents on profits and welfare. In a duopoly
model, we show that if the cost of imitation is not very large, prisoner's dilemma occurs under
process patent, thus creating lower profit of each firm under process patent than under ...
A Mukherjee - 2002 - papers.ssrn.com
uncertain R&D process. We find that strong patent protection increases R&D investment of at
least one firm but whether both firms' R&D investment will be more under strong patent
protection is ambiguous. While ex-ante welfare is more likely to be higher under strong ...
A Mukherjee, U Broll… - Journal of Economics, 2009 - Springer
Abstract In a successive Cournot oligopoly, we show the welfare effects of entry in the final
goods market with no scale economies but with cost difference between the firms. If the input
market is very concentrated, entry in the final goods market increases welfare. If the input ...
D Maiti… - Univ. of Nottingham Research Paper 2010/ …, 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We develop a simple framework to show the effects of trade cost reduction on
unionized wage, employment and domestic welfare when a domestic firm strategically
chooses the amount of formal in-house production and subcontracting to the informal ...
A Mukherjee… - 2007 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Open Science is a dynamic system of knowledge production that depends on the
disclosure of knowledge by researchers as an input into knowledge production by future
researchers. This paper develops an overlapping generations model of cumulative ...
A Mukherjee… - Economics Bulletin, 2009 - accessecon.com
Abstract The theoretical prediction of Head and Ries ('Heterogeneity and the FDI versus
export decision of Japanese manufacturers', 2003, Journal of the Japanese and
International Economies, 17: 448-67) is that if the foreign plant is not used to serve the ...
A Mukherjee - Economics Bulletin, 2007 - driver-support.eu
Abstract: This paper considers welfare effects of entry when the incumbent firm behaves like
a Stackelberg leader in the product market. In contrast to previous work (Klemperer, 1988,
Journal of Industrial Economics), we show that entry may always increase welfare. Using ...
S Marjit… - The Journal of International Trade & …, 2008 - Taylor & Francis
Recent empirical evidence shows a negative relationship between international outsourcing
and profitability. This paper provides a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon. We
show that, in an oligopolistic market, firms earn lower profits in the outsourcing equilibrium ...
A Mukherjee - Discussion Papers, 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We offer a new perspective to the unionised wage effects of unilateral trade
liberalisation by considering endogenous domestic market structure. Hence, in contrast to
the existing works, which focus on the short-run effects of trade liberalisation on unionised ...
A Mukherjee - 2003 - amukherjee.net
Abstract. Firm specific skill acquisition involves dual moral hazard problem. Existing
literature suggests that explicit incentive through promotion offer can solve this problem
under some conditions. But these solutions necessarily yield inefficiency. In a repeated ...
A Mukherjee… - 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We show that, in the case of a vertical technology transfer, if there is imperfect
knowledge spillover under a weak patent protection, the strong patent protection in the
developing country increases the profit of the developed-country firm if there is a uniform ...
A Mukherjee - Leverhulme Research Paper, 2003 - repec.org
Abstract: This paper considers production strategy of a foreign firm when the input market in
the host-country is imperfectly competitive and production requires nontradable inputs. We
show that the foreign firm's strategic choice about export and foreign direct investment ( ...
[CITATION] Licensing under Asymmetric information
M Arijit - Keele Economics Research Papers, 2002
BR Dijkstra, AJ Mathew… - Review of International …, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
Empirical evidence has so far failed to confirm that lenient environmental regulation attracts
investment from polluting firms. In a Cournot duopoly with a foreign firm and a domestic firm,
we show that the foreign firm may want to relocate to the domestic country with stricter ...
A Mukherjee… - Journal of Economics, 2009 - Springer
Abstract We show that uncertainty in patent approvals may induce the firms to do
cooperative R&D. With an exogenous probability of success in patent application, we show
that, if all firms apply for patents under non-cooperative R&D, the firms prefer cooperative ...
B Dijkstra, A Mathew… - 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Empirical evidence has so far failed to find firm support for the Pollution Haven
Hypothesis that lenient environmental regulation attracts investment from polluting firms. We
show that a firm may want to relocate to a country with stricter environmental regulation, ...
A Mukherjee - Economics Bulletin, 2007 - accessecon.com
Abstract Common wisdom suggests that firms with higher productivities earn higher profits
and the higher productivities of the firms benefit consumers by increasing outputs. We show
that productivity difference may not matter for outputs and profits in presence of wage bill ...
[CITATION] Skill acquisition under implicit contract
M Arijit - 2004 - Northwestern University (Ame.) …
S Marjit… - Discussion Papers, 2010 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We show the welfare effects of international trade cost reduction under
endogenous domestic market structure. If the domestic labour market is competitive, there is
no integer constraint and the trade cost represents transportation cost, a reduction in the ...
S Marjit… - 2009 - dspace.cigilibrary.org
This paper considers the effect of outsourcing on R&D of the contracting firm. We show that
outsourcing increases (decreases) R&D investment in a declining (booming) industry. If
outsourcing reduces potential R&D investment, it may also make the consumers worse off. ...
A Mukherjee… - DISCUSSION …, 2003 - driver-support.eu
Abstract: This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a horizontally
differentiated duopoly market with non-tournament R&D competition. We consider that
success in R&D is uncertain. We show that whether firms invest more under Cournot ...
A Guariglia, A Mukherjee… - GEP Research Paper, 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We consider the plant location decision of a multinational corporation (MNC),
which has the option to invest in a more or in a less technologically lagging country, and
which aims to use its foreign plant as an export-platform. We show that the plant location ...
[CITATION] Open Science: Disclosure, Research Investment and Cumulative Knowledge Production
A Mukherjee… - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2009
S Marjit… - … of Nottingham GEP Working Paper No. …, 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Recent empirical evidences show negative relationship between outsourcing and
profitability. This paper provides a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon. In an
oligopoly model, we show that firms earn lower profits in the outsourcing equilibrium ...
A Mukherjee - 2006 - gradworks.umi.com
Abstract: This dissertation consists of three essays analyzing the optimal disclosure of
information in different settings related to economics of organization. Chapter I focuses on
sequential contracting with multiple employers. When a worker is raided, the initial ...
A Mukherjee, S Mukherjee… - DISCUSSION …, 2003 - nottinghamenterprise.com
Abstract: This paper shows that technology licensing may be socially undesirable. Possibility
of licensing increases the incentive for entry and thus, increases competition. If technology of
the incumbent and entrant is sufficiently close, licensing-induced entry reduces social ...
S Marjit, V Mukherjee, A Mukherjee… - 1999 - ifo-geschaeftsklima.info
Abstract This paper introduces “harassment “in a model of bribery and corruption. We
characterize the harassment equilibrium and show that taxpayers with all possible levels of
income participate in such an equilibrium. Harassment has a regressive bias. Harassment ...
A Mukherjee… - DISCUSSION PAPERS IN …, 2003 - beta.nottingham.ac.uk
Abstract: This paper shows that the possibility of licensing can significantly alter the effects of
entry on social welfare. We find that while licensing with output royalty always raises welfare
due to entry, licensing with up-front fixed-fee reduces the possibility of lower welfare ...
A Mukherjee, U Broll, S Mukherjee… - DISCUSSION …, 2004 - nottingham.ac.uk
Abstract: This paper considers the effects of entry in the final goods market when the input
market is imperfectly competitive. We show that entry of a new firm may increase profit of the
incumbent if the technology of the entrant is sufficiently inferior to that of the incumbent. ...
A Mukherjee - Discussion Papers, 2007 - ideas.repec.org
Whether higher productivity of the foreign firm increases host country welfare depends on
whether the reason for foreign direct investment (FDI) is to save the trade cost or to get the
advantage of cheap labor. We show that, if the reason for FDI is to get the advantage of ...
A Mukherjee - in BA Everett and NL Trijillo (Eds.), Technology …, 2010 - works.bepress.com
Join My Mailing List. Arijit Mukherjee. The University of Nottingham. Search the Selected Works
of Arijit Mukherjee. Search All Sites. RSS Feed. Print this page. Bookmark. ... Licensing in a vertical
structure. Arijit Mukherjee, University of Nottingham. Suggested Citation. Arijit Mukherjee ...
A Mukherjee - 2005 - nottingham.ac.uk
Abstract: We show the effects of Bertrand and Cournot competition on R&D investment and
social welfare in a duopoly with R&D competition where success in R&D is probabilistic. We
show that R&D investments are higher under Bertrand (Cournot) competition when R&D ...
A Mukherjee… - University of Nottingham Research …, 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper provides a theoretical analysis of product and process patent regimes in
the context of North-South trade. For some parametric configurations, we show that Northern
government would favor the product patent regime in the South, although the Northern ...
H Beladi… - Discussion Papers, 2008 - nottingham.ac.uk
Abstract: We provide a theoretical justification for bi-sourcing, which refers to the situation
where a final goods producer buys an input from an outside supplier and also produces it in-
house. Bi-sourcing occurs if the marginal cost of producing the input inhouse is higher ...
RS Higgins… - Public Choice, 2010 - Springer
Abstract We demonstrate that deregulation in the form of vertical separation of network
components into natural monopoly and potentially competitive markets does not truly
represent a lessening of regulatory burdens. That is, vertical separation is not ...
Abstract: We consider a persuasion game where multiple experts with potentially conflicting
self-interests attempt to persuade a decision-maker, or, a judge. The judge prefers to take an
action that is most appropriate given the true state of the world but the experts' preferences ...
S Banerjee… - International Review of Economics & Finance, 2010 - Elsevier
We explain the rationale for share adjustment in an international joint venture (JV) and
opening up of a wholly owned subsidiary by the foreign JV partner. If the cost difference
between the JV and other firms is small, the foreign firm opens a wholly owned subsidiary ...
A Mukherjee… - Mimeo, 2005 - csh-delhi.com
Abstract: It is believed process patent in the South allows the Southern firms to imitate the
technologies of the Northern firms, which reduces the Northern firms' return from innovation,
and makes the argument for extending product patent to the South. We show that the ...
Create email alert
About Google Scholar - All About Google - My Citations
©2012 Google