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Toward a theory of discounted repeated games with imperfect monitoring

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D Abreu, D Pearce… - Econometrica: Journal of the …, 1990 - JSTOR
This paper investigates pure strategy sequential equilibria of repeated games with imperfect
monitoring. The approach emphasizes the equilibrium value set and the static optimization
problems embedded in extremal equilibria. A succession of propositions, central among ...
Cited by 923 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 32 versions

Psychological games and sequential rationality

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J Geanakoplos, D Pearce… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1989 - Elsevier
Abstract In psychological games the payoff to each player depends not only on what every
player does but also on what he thinks every player believes, and on what he thinks they
believe others believe, and so on. In equilibrium, beliefs are assumed to correspond to ...
Cited by 622 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 18 versions

Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring

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D Abreu, D Pearce… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1986 - Elsevier
Abstract There exist optimal symmetric equilibria in the Green-Porter model [4, 8] having an
elementary intertemporal structure. Such an equilibrium is described entirely by two subsets
of price space and two quantities, the only production levels used by firms in any ...
Cited by 561 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 26 versions

How (not) to sell nuclear weapons

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P Jehiel, B Moldovanu… - The American Economic Review, 1996 - JSTOR
We consider situations where a sale affects the ensuing interaction between potential
buyers. These situations are modeled by assuming that an agent who does not acquire the
object for sale incurs an identity-dependent externality. We construct a revenue- ...
Cited by 275 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - BL Direct - All 19 versions

Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes

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F Gul… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1999 - Elsevier
We study economies with indivisibilities that satisfy the gross substitutes (GS) condition. The
simplest example of GS preferences are unit demand preferences. We prove that the set of
GS preferences is the largest set containing unit demand preferences for which the ...
Cited by 268 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 19 versions

Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities

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P Jehiel, B Moldovanu… - Journal of economic theory, 1999 - Elsevier
In an auction with externalities, a buyer's type is multidimensional and specifies the payoff
he would get for each of theN+ 1 possible outcomes: the seller keeps the object or buyeri (i=
1,…, N) gets the object. We provide a characterization of multidimensional incentive ...
Cited by 210 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 20 versions

The English auction with differentiated commodities

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F Gul… - Journal of Economic theory, 2000 - Elsevier
We study economies (with indivisibilities) that satisfy the gross substitutes (GS) condition.
We define an excess demand set with the property that increasing the prices of all goods in
excess demand eventually leads to the smallest Walrasian prices. This procedure is a ...
Cited by 189 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 13 versions

Sequential equilibria in a Ramsey tax model

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C Phelan… - Econometrica, 2001 - Wiley Online Library
2. Abstract This paper presents a full characterization of the equilibrium value set of a
Ramsey tax model. More generally, it develops a dynamic programming method for a class
of policy games between the government and a continuum of households. By selectively ...
Cited by 132 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 28 versions

The interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency

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DG Pearce… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1998 - Elsevier
In a repeated principal–agent model in which the agent's actions are observable to the
principal but not verifiable in court, the agent's incentives derive both from salary payments
based on verifiable signals and from implicit promises by the principal of bonuses for good ...
Cited by 105 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 11 versions

[BOOK] Generalized median voter schemes and committees

[PDF] from upenn.edu
S Barberà, F Gul, E Stacchetti… - 1992 - ssc.upenn.edu
We define 21 multidimensional analogue of a single-peaked preference and generalize the
notion of a median voter scheme. Every onto strategy-proof social choice function on a
single—peaked domain is 21 generalized median voter scheme. Since a single-peaked ...
Cited by 100 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - BL Direct - All 9 versions

Technology (and policy) shocks in models of endogenous growth

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LE Jones, RE Manuelli… - 1999 - nber.org
Is there a trade-off between fluctuations and growth? The empirical evidence is mixed, with
some studies (Kormendi and Meguire (1985)) finding a positive relationship, while others
(Ramey and Ramey (1995)) finding the a negative one. Our objective in this paper is to ...
Cited by 87 - Related articles - Library Search - BL Direct - All 24 versions

Renegotiation and symmetry in repeated games

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D Abrea, D Pearce… - 1993 - deepblue.lib.umich.edu
The paper derives a theory of renegotiation-proofness in symmetric repeated games based
on a notion of" equal bargaining power." According to consistent bargaining equilibrium a
player can mount a credible objection to a continuation equilibrium in which he receives a ...
Cited by 71 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - BL Direct - All 14 versions

Fluctuations in convex models of endogenous growth, I: Growth effects

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LE Jones, RE Manuelli, HE Siu… - Review of Economic …, 2005 - Elsevier
Is there a trade-off between fluctuations and growth? The empirical evidence is mixed, with
some studies finding a positive relationship, while others find a negative one. Our objectives
are to understand how fundamental uncertainty affects the long run growth rate and to ...
Cited by 49 - Related articles - All 20 versions

A bound on the proportion of pure strategy equilibria in generic games

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F Gül, D Pearce… - Mathematics of Operations Research, 1993 - JSTOR
1. Introduction. In this paper we prove the following result: if a generic n-per- son game F has
a > 1 Nash equilibria in pure strategies, then the total number of Nash equilibria of F is at least
2a - 1. In other words, at least a - 1 equilibria involve some randomization by some ...
Cited by 40 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - BL Direct - All 20 versions

Strategic pricing when electricity is storable

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A Garcia, JD Reitzes… - Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2001 - Springer
In this paper, we develop a simplified oligopoly model where hydro generators engage in
dynamic Bertrand competition. Each player uses a Markov strategy based on the state of
water reservoirs at the beginning of each period. The replenishing of water reservoirs, ...
Cited by 37 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 12 versions

Walrasian equilibrium without complementarities

F Gul… - Papers, 1997 - ideas.repec.org
In this paper we study the problem of ecient production and allocation of indi-visible objects
among a set of consumers. We assume that the agents' preferences depend on the bundle
of objects and the quantity of money they consume. Further-more, we assume that ...
Cited by 26 - Related articles - Cached - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 4 versions

The Interaction of Implicit and Explicit Contracts in Repeated Agency

DG Pearce… - Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, 1988 - ideas.repec.org
Traditional agency theory assumes that the principal has no more information about the
agent's actions than the enforcement authorities have. This is unrealistic in many settings,
and in repeated models, additional information possessed by the principal changes the ...
Cited by 22 - Related articles - Cached - All 5 versions

[PDF] Auction design for the colombian electricity market

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E Stacchetti - University of Michigan, 1999 - webmanager.cl
Abstract Colombia deregulated its electricity sector and created a new market for electricty in
July 1995. The spot market price is determined by a daily auction among the producers.
Though the auction is designed to foment price competition, water scarcity constraints and ...
Cited by 17 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 7 versions

Investment dynamics in electricity markets

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A Garcia… - Economic Theory, 2011 - Springer
Abstract We investigate the incentives for investments in capacity in a simple strategic
dynamic model with random demand growth. We construct non-collusive Markovian
equilibria where the firms' decisions depend on the current capacity stock only. The firms ...
Cited by 17 - Related articles - All 26 versions

Time consistent taxation by a government with redistributive goals

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D Pearce… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1997 - Elsevier
In a dynamic economy whose government is interested in both equity and efficiency, time
consistency problems arise even if the government has access to nondistortionary tax
instruments. Moral hazard in production leads to a nondegenerate distribution of income, ...
Cited by 16 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 15 versions

Aspirational bargaining

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L Smith… - Ann Arbor, 2002 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper offers a noncooperative behaviourally-founded solution of the complete
information bargaining problem where two impatient individuals wish to divide a unit pie. We
formulate the game in continuous time, with unrestricted timing and content of offers. ...
Cited by 15 - Related articles - All 23 versions

Emergence of endogenous legal institutions: Property rights and community governance in the Italian alps

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M Casari, D Abreu, D Pearce… - Journal of …, 2007 - Cambridge Univ Press
This article examines changes in institutions that protected property rights in the Alps
between the thirteenth and the nineteenth century and, in particular, alternative
management systems adopted for the common pastures and forests in about 200 ...
Cited by 15 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 24 versions

[BOOK] Renegotiation and symmetry in repeated games

[PDF] from yale.edu
D Abreu, D Pearce, E Stacchetti… - 1989 - cowles.econ.yale.edu
ABSTRACT It seems reasonable to suppose that in repeated games in which
communication is possible, play is determined through a process of negotiation and
renegotiation as events unfold. In the absence of a satisfying theory of players' bargaining ...
Cited by 12 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - Library Search - All 9 versions

[CITATION] English auctions with multiple goods

F Gul… - unpublished paper, Northwestern University, 1995
Cited by 12 - Related articles

[CITATION] Subgame perfect equilibria in a Ramsey taxes model

C Phelan… - manuscript, Northwestern University, 1997
Cited by 11 - Related articles

Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities

P Jehiel, B Moldovanu… - Sonderforschungsbereich …, 1997 - ideas.repec.org
In our framework, when a buyer does not obtain the auctioned object, he is no longer
indifferent about the identity of the winner (ie, eyternal effects are present). Buyer i's
preferences are characterized by an N-dimensional vector t^ i=(t1^ i, t2^ i,.., tN^ i). The ...
Cited by 8 - Related articles - Cached - Library Search - All 6 versions

Analysis of a dynamic, decentralized exchange economy

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E Stacchetti - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1985 - Elsevier
Abstract A model of a dynamic exchange economy is presented. Similarly to the Walrasian
equilibrium problem, each consumer is characterized by a feasible set and by an
instantaneous demand function, that depends on the price vector, time, and the ...
Cited by 7 - Related articles - Library Search - All 14 versions

Insider Trading With a Random Deadline

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R Caldentey… - Econometrica, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
We consider a model of strategic trading with asymmetric information of an asset whose
value follows a Brownian motion. An insider continuously observes a signal that tracks the
evolution of the asset's fundamental value. The value of the asset is publicly revealed at a ...
Cited by 6 - Related articles - All 15 versions

[CITATION] Optimal Cartel Equilibria with

D Abreu, D Pearce… - 1986
Cited by 5 - Related articles

[PDF] Obsolescence of durable goods and optimal consumption

[PDF] from yale.edu
E Stacchetti… - Econometric Society 2004 North …, 2004 - cowles.econ.yale.edu
Abstract We study a model with a durable good subject to periodic obsolescence, and
characterize analytically the optimal purchasing policy. The key result is that consumers
optimally synchronize new purchases with the innovation cycle. Consequently, some ...
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Insider trading with stochastic valuation

[PDF] from nyu.edu
R Caldentey… - 2007 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper studies a model of strategic trading with asymmetric information of an
asset whose value follows a Brownian motion. An insider continuously observes a signal
that tracks the evolution of the asset fundamental value. At a random time a public ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - All 11 versions

[CITATION] Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees for Generalized Single Peaked Domains

Full text - MIT Libraries
F Gul… - Economic Theory, 1993
Cited by 3 - Related articles

[CITATION] VToward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring,) Econometrica, 58.5

D Abreu, D Pearce… - 1990 - September
Cited by 3 - Related articles

[CITATION] Walrasian Equilibrium without Consumption Complementarities

F Gul… - 1997 - working paper, Princeton University
Cited by 3 - Related articles

[CITATION] Technology and policy Shocks in Models of Endogenous Growth Working Paper

L JONES, R MANUELLI… - 1997
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[CITATION] Stochastic growth

LE Jones, RE Manuelli… - 1993 - working paper
Cited by 2 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries

[CITATION] Obsolescence of Durables and Optimal Consumption

E Stacchetti… - 2007 - working paper, University of …
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[CITATION] Time Consistent Taxation by a Government with Redistributive Goals

E Stacchetti… - Working Papers, 1993 - econpapers.repec.org
Related works: Journal Article: Time Consistent Taxation by a Government with Redistributive
Goals (1997) This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the
same title. ... This site is part of RePEc and all the data displayed here is part of the ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - Cached - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 4 versions

Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games

DG Pearce, D Abreu… - Cowles Foundation Discussion …, 1989 - ideas.repec.org
It seems reasonable to suppose that in repeated games in which communications is
possible, play is determined through a process of negotiation and renegotiation as events
unfold. In the absence of a satisfying theory of players' bargaining power, it is unclear how ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - Cached - All 4 versions

[PDF] ONE-SIDED UNCERTAINTY AND DELAY IN REPUTATIONAL BARGAINING

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D Abreu, D Pearce… - 2011 - files.nyu.edu
Abstract. A two-person infinite-horizon bargaining model where one of the players may have
either of two discount factors, has a multiplicity of perfect Bayesian equilibria. Introducing the
slightest possibility that either player may be one of a rich variety of stationary behavioral ...
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[PDF] RENEGOTIATION AND SYMMETRY Ш REPEATED GAMES

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D Abreu, D Pearce… - 1989 - dido.wss.yale.edu
ABSTRACT It seems reasonable to suppose that in repeated games in which
communication is possible, play is determined through a process of negotiation and
renegotiation as events unfold. In the absence of a satisfying theory of players' bargaining ...
Related articles - All 2 versions

[PDF] Renegotiation in Repeated Games: An Experimental Study

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M Embrey, G Fréchette… - 2011 - eea-esem.com
Abstract Preliminary draft: please do not cite. With the aim of understanding the role
renegotiation concerns might play in supporting cooperative equilibria, a repeated
partnership game with a simple public imperfect monitoring environment is implemented ...
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NORTH AMERICAN SUMMER MEETING OF THE ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY ANNOUNCEMENT

D Acemoglu, F Alvarez, A Casella, VV Chari… - …, 1999 - Wiley Online Library
The program will include invited lectures and both invited and contributed papers. For
additional information and updated information about the meetings, see announcements in
subsequent issues of Econometrica or on the Internet at the following address: http: rrwww ...
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[CITATION] Growth With Fluctuations I: Growth Effects

LE Jones, RE Manuelli, HE Siu… - 2003
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Obsolescence of Durable Goods and Optimal Consumption

D Stolyarov… - Econometric Society 2004 Latin …, 2004 - ideas.repec.org
We study a model with a durable good subject to abrupt, periodic obsolescence, and
characterize the optimal purchasing policy. Consumers optimally synchronize new
purchases with the arrival of new durable models. Hence, some agents use a" flexible" ...
Cached - All 4 versions

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