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[PDF] Discrete Bids and Empirical Inference in Divisible Good Auctions

[PDF] from lunarmania.com
J Kastl - Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming, 2006 - evan.lunarmania.com
Abstract I examine a model of a uniform price auction of a perfectly divisible good with
private information in which the bidders submit discrete bidpoints, and hence step functions,
rather than continuous downward sloping demand functions. I prove equilibrium existence ...
Cited by 27 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 30 versions

The 2007 Subprime Market Crisis Through the Lens of European Central Bank Auctions for Short-Term Funds

[PDF] from vanderbilt.edu
N Cassola, A Hortaçsu… - 2009 - nber.org
In this paper we study European banks' demand for short-term funds (liquidity) during the
summer 2007 subprime market crisis. We use bidding data from the European Central
Bank's auctions for one-week loans, their main channel of monetary policy implementation ...
Cited by 16 - Related articles - Library Search - All 50 versions

[PDF] On the properties of equilibria in private value divisible good auctions with constrained bidding

[PDF] from stanford.edu
J Kastl - 2008 - stanford.edu
Abstract I analyze a model of a private value divisible good auction with different payment
rules, standard rationing rule pro-rata on-the-margin and both with and without a restriction
on the number of bids (steps) bidders can submit. I provide characterization of equilibrium ...
Cited by 14 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 4 versions

Discrete bids and empirical inference in divisible good auctions

Full text - MIT Libraries
J Kastl - The Review of Economic Studies, 2011 - restud.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract I examine a model of a uniform price auction of a perfectly divisible good with
private information in which the bidders submit discrete bidpoints rather than continuous
downward sloping demand functions. I characterize necessary conditions for equilibrium ...
Cited by 13 - Related articles - All 7 versions

Delegation and r&d incentives: Theory and evidence from Italy

J Kastl, D Martimort… - Centre for Studies in …, 2008 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract We use data from the Italian manufacturing industry to document the positive
relationship between delegation of decisions within organizations and innovation incentives.
In order to obtain the causal effect, we build a contract theory model with asymmetric ...
Cited by 10 - Related articles - Cached - All 4 versions

[PDF] Do Bidders in Canadian Treasury Bill Auctions Have Private Values?

[PDF] from psu.edu
A Hortaçsu… - 2008 - Citeseer
Abstract We exploit a unique feature of data from Canadian treasury bill auctions, in which
some bidders have information about rivals' bids, to develop a test if values are private.
Information about a rival's bid causes a bidder to bid differently when she has a private ...
Cited by 8 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 7 versions

[PDF] Testing for Common Valuation in the Presence of Bidders with Informational Advantage

[PDF] from ucdavis.edu
A Hortascu… - V working paper presented at the Penn …, 2008 - econ.ucdavis.edu
Abstract We develop a test for common values in auctions in which some bidders possess
information about rivals' bids. Information about a rival's bid causes a bidder to bid differently
when she has a private value than when her value depends on rivals' information. In a ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 24 versions

[CITATION] The 2007 Subprime Market Crisis Through the Lens of ECB Auctions for Short-Term Funds

N Cassola, A Hortaçsu… - NBER Working Paper, 2009
Cited by 5 - Related articles

[PDF] Informational Advantage and Information Structure: An Analysis of Canadian Treasury Auctions

[PDF] from mcc.ac.uk
A Hortaçsu… - Discussion Papers, 2010 - netec.mcc.ac.uk
Several important auction settings, including treasury auctions in Canada and the US, have
the feature that some bidders (dealers) observe the bids of a subset of other bidders
(customers). Quantifying the economic advantage that informationally advantaged bidders ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 7 versions

[CITATION] Effects of the Subprime Market Crisis on the Primary Market for Liquidity

N Cassola, A Hortacsu… - 2008 - Stanford Unviversity, Economics …
Cited by 4 - Related articles

[PDF] Delegation and R&D Spending: Evidence from Italy

[PDF] from psu.edu
J Kastl, D Martimort… - CSEF Working Papers, 2009 - Citeseer
Abstract Delegation of decision-making has important implications for firms' performance.
We build a simple model predicting that decentralized firms are more involved in R&D, and
use data from the Italian manufacturing industry to document a positive correlation ...
Cited by 3 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 10 versions

[CITATION] Discrete Bids and Empirical Evidence in Divisible Good Auctions

J Kastl - 2006 - mimeo, Northwestern
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[PDF] Vertical Hierarchies as a Collusive Device

[PDF] from eea-esem.com
J Kastl… - Northwestern University, Chicago, mimeo, 2003 - eea-esem.com
Abstract In this paper we try to answer the following question: Why do we observe vertical
structures? The usual justification for vertical organization is that the agents (retailers or
dealers) posses better knowledge of the relevant retail market, thus they can better sell the ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 2 versions

[PDF] Testing for Common Values in Canadian Treasury Bill Auctions

[PDF] from stanford.edu
A Hortaçsu… - Discussion Papers, 2008 - www-siepr.stanford.edu
Abstract We develop a test for common values in auctions in which some bidders possess
information about rivals' bids. Information about a rival's bid causes a bidder to bid differently
when she has a private value than when her value depends on rivals' information. In a ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 6 versions

Wily welfare capitalist: Werner von Siemens and the pension plan

[PDF] from stanford.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
J Kastl… - Cliometrica, 2010 - Springer
Abstract The German firm of Siemens and Halske introduced many enterprising features of
what later came to be known as welfare capitalism in the mid-nineteenth century. Profit
sharing, annual bonuses, a pension fund, a reduction in work hours, and an annual party ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - All 8 versions

[PDF] " When Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?": New Insights from Asymmetric Information

[PDF] from stanford.edu
J Kastl, D Martimort… - Center for Studies in Economics and …, 2009 - stanford.edu
Abstract We study a specific model of competing manufacturer-retailer pairs where adverse
selection and moral hazard are coupled with non-market externalities at the downstream
level. In this simple framework we show that a “laissezfaire” approach towards vertical ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 7 versions

Essays in auctions and vertical contracting

J Kastl - 2006 - gradworks.umi.com
Abstract: In the first part of this dissertation I examine a model of a divisible good auction with
private values from theoretical and empirical perspective, with emphasis on discreteness of
bidding which is a central part of most multiunit auctions in practice. Chapter 1 offers an ...
Cached - All 3 versions

Analyzing Default Risk and Liquidity Demand during a Financial Crisis: The Case of Canada

[PDF] from publications.gc.ca
J Allen, J Kastl… - 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper explores the reliability of using prices of credit default swap contracts
(CDS) as indicators of default probabilities during the 2007/2008 financial crisis. We use
data from the Canadian financial system to show that these publicly available risk ...
Related articles - All 8 versions

“When Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?”: New Insights from Asymmetric Information when Supply Chains Compete

[PDF] from idei.fr
Full text - MIT Libraries
J Kastl, D Martimort… - Journal of Economics & …, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
We study a model of competing manufacturer/retailer pairs where adverse selection and
moral hazard are coupled with promotional externalities at the downstream level. In contrast
to earlier models mainly focusing on a bilateral monopoly setting, we show that with ...
Related articles - All 9 versions

[PDF] 'When Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?': New Insights from Asymmetric Information and Non-Market Externalities when Supply Chains Compete

[PDF] from idei.fr
J Kastl, D Martimort… - 2009 - idei.fr
Abstract We study a model of competing manufacturer/retailer pairs where adverse selection
and moral hazard are coupled with non-market externalities at the downstream level. In
contrast to earlier models mainly focusing on a bilateral monopoly setting, we show that ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 2 versions

[CITATION] Price Dynamics In Virtual World Auctions

EL Marks… - 2009
Related articles

[PDF] Crisis Management: Analyzing Default Risk and Liquidity Demand during Financial Stress

[PDF] from stanford.edu
J Allen, A Hortaçsu… - 2011 - stanford.edu
Abstract This paper shows that strategies in, and reliance on the payments system as well as
special liquiditysupplying tools provided by the central bank are important indicators of
distress of individual banks. We conclude that central banks can benefit from using high- ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML

Collusive Effects of Vertical Restraints under Asymmetric Information

J Kastl… - CSEF Working Papers, 2004 - ideas.repec.org
This paper points out that vertical delegation, implemented through the design of quantity
discount contracts, may allow upstream producers, as well as downstream retailers, to
achieve profits higher than those obtained under vertical integration or contracts based on ...
Cached - All 4 versions

[PDF] The 2007 Subprime Market Crisis in the EURO Area Through the Lens of ECB Repo Auctions

[PDF] from nber.org
N Cassola, A Hortaçsu… - 2009 - nber.org
Abstract We study the sudden change in bidding behavior in primary auctions of liquidity run
by the European Central Bank which followed the spillover of the subprime market crisis in
August 2007 to the EURO area. A direct analysis of changes in the bidding patterns ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 5 versions

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