A Brandenburger… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1996 - JSTOR
The stock market has opinions as to what choices firms should make. We show that concern
for current share prices may lead managers to make these choices rather than those
suggested by their own superior information. Even when arbitrarily many privately ...
S Grant, A Kajii… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1998 - Elsevier
Suppose agents value information not only to make contingent plans but also intrinsically.
How are such attitudes toward information related to attitudes toward risk? We generalize
the Kreps–Porteus recursive expected utility model, dropping both recursivity and ...
M Buchinsky… - Journal of Economic History, 1993 - Cambridge Univ Press
Was eighteenth-century London's financial market linked to domestic real capital markets?
When did English capital markets cease to be regionally segmented? We compare London
interest rates with annual registered property transactions in Middlesex and in West ...
S Baliga… - Review of Financial Studies, 2004 - Soc Financial Studies
Abstract We use a moral hazard model to compare monitored (nontraded) bank loans and
traded (nonmonitored) bonds as sources of external funds for industry. We contrast the
theoretical conditions that favor each system with the historical conditions prevailing when ...
S Grant,
S King… - Journal of Economic Surveys, 1996 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract. We survey recent theoretical research on the effects of short-term share-price
based managerial incentive schemes. Such schemes can induce inefficient managerial
behaviour in both hidden action and hidden type contexts. These problems arise from ...
A Metrick… - Economic Theory, 1994 - Springer
Summary This paper provides a new proof of Miyasawa's (1961) result showing the
convergence of fictitious play in 2× 2 games. The novelty of the approach used here is that it
rests entirely on the geometric properties of the best-response correspondence. The ...
S Grant, A Kajii… - Econometrica, 2000 - Wiley Online Library
Ž. KREPS AND PORTEUS'1978 recursive expected utility model allows an agent to care
intrinsically about the timing of the resolution of uncertainty. For example, an anxious agent
may prefer early resolution while a hopeful agent may prefer late. Recursive expected ...
C List… - Journal of economic theory, 2010 - Elsevier
This introduces the symposium on judgment aggregation. The theory of judgment
aggregation asks how several individuals' judgments on some logically connected
propositions can be aggregated into consistent collective judgments. The aim of this ...
S Grant, A Kajii… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1992 - Elsevier
Abstract Without the Independence Axiom, a weaker substitution axiom,“ADI”, is necessary
for the preferences over money lotteries induced by the money metric utility function to be
well behaved. Given ADI, the agent's preferences over many-good lotteries can be ...
B Polak - Econometrica, 1999 - Wiley Online Library
Ž. their rationality is mutually known, their beliefs or ''conjectures''about other players' actions
are commonly known and they have a common prior, then, for each player j, the conjectures
of all the other players about j's action agree and the n-tuple of such Ž. conjectures one ...
S Baliga… - COWLES FOUNDATION …, 1995 - madrid-cls-holder.wss.yale.edu
Abstract. We use a simple, graphical moral hazard model to compare monitored bank
lending versus non—monitored bond issues as sources of external funds for industry. We
contrast the conditions that theoretically favour each system, such as the size and number ...
[CITATION] Free love, fragile fidelity, and forgiveness: Rival social conventions under hidden information
J Lindsey, B Polak… - Unpublished manuscript, Economics …, 2001
S Grant, A Kajii… - Theory and Decision, 2000 - Springer
We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a dynamically consistent agent always to
prefer more informative signals (in single-agent problems). These conditions do not imply
recursivity, reduction or independence. We provide a simple definition of dynamically ...
S Grant, A Kajii… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2000 - Elsevier
Savage motivated his sure–thing principle by arguing that, whenever an act would be
preferred if an event obtains and preferred if that event did not obtain, it should be preferred
overall. The ability to decompose and recompose decision problems in this way has ...
S Grant, A Kajii… - Economics Letters, 2001 - Elsevier
We discuss three notions of disappointment aversion, due to Gul [1991, Econometrica 59,
667-686], Grant and Kajii [1998, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 37, 277-
290] and Skiadas [1997, Journal of Economic Theory 76, 242-271; 1997, Econometrica 65 ...
B Polak… - Policy Research Working Paper Series, 1991 - ideas.repec.org
Pessimists say industrialization increased poverty; optimists say it did not. The authors argue
that how much industrialization eradicates poverty depends on the form industrialization
takes. It is not economic growth by itself, but the processes and policies associated with ...
B Moselle… - STICERD-Theoretical Economics Paper …, 1997 - ideas.repec.org
We provide a model of a primitive state whose rulers extort taxes for their own ends. This'
predatory'state can result in lower levels of both output and popular welfare than either
organized banditry or anarchy. The predatory state may provide public goods, such as ...
S Grant, A Kajii… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1992 - Elsevier
Abstract What can be inferred, without assuming the Independence axiom, about an agent's
preferences over many-good lotteries from knowledge that the agent is income risk averse?
We show that income risk aversion corresponds to an intuitive substitution property of the ...
S Grant, A Kajii… - Economics Letters, 2001 - Elsevier
In two-outcome strictly competitive games, equilibrium mixed strategies do not depend on
ultimate prizes. Dixit and Skeath [Games of Strategy (1999) Norton, New York] find this
'counter-intuitive'. We show this invariance comes from reduction, not independence; and ...
S Grant… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2006 - Elsevier
Machina and Schmeidler show that the probabilistic sophistication can be obtained in an
Anscombe–Aumann setting without imposing expected utility by maintaining stochastic
monotonicity and adding a new axiom loosely analogous to Savage's P4. This analogous ...
S Grant, A Kajii, B Polak… - Cowles Foundation DP, 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We provide an axiomatization of generalized utilitarian social welfare functions in
the context of Harsanyi's impartial observer theorem. To do this, we reformulate Harsanyi's
problem such that lotteries over identity (accidents of birth) and lotteries over outcomes ( ...
S Grant, A Kajii… - Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, 1996 - ideas.repec.org
What is the relationship between an agent's attitude towards information, and her attitude
towards risk? If an agent always prefers more information, does this imply that she obeys the
independence axiom? We provide a substitution property on preferences that is ...
[CITATION] Poverty, policy, and industrialization in the past
B Polak… - 1989 - Cambridge, Harvard University, …
[CITATION] Anarchy, organized crime and extortion: A cynical theory of the state
B Moselle… - Conference on Political Violence, Princeton University, …, 1999
S Grant, B Polak… - 2009 - economics.harvard.edu
Page 1. Second-Order Expected Utility Simon Grant ∗ Ben Polak † Tomasz Strzalecki ‡
Preliminary version: November 2009 Abstract We present two axiomatizations of the
Second-Order Expected Utility model in the context of the standard models of choice under ...
S Grant, A Kajii, B Polak… - Econometrica, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
Harsanyi's impartial observer must consider two types of lotteries: imaginary identity lotteries
(“accidents of birth”) that she faces as herself and the real outcome lotteries (“life chances”)
to be faced by the individuals she imagines becoming. If we maintain a distinction ...
S Grant, A Kajii… - STICERD-Theoretical Economics Paper …, 1997 - ideas.repec.org
Savage motivated his Sure-Thing Principle by arguing that, whenever an act would be
preferred if an event obtains and preferred if an event did not obtain, then it should be
preferred overall. The idea that it should be possible to decompose and recompose ...
LMB Cabral… - DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES-CENTRE …, 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We provide a simple framework to analyze the effect of firm dominance on
incentives for R&D. An increase in firm dominance, which we measure by a premium in
consumer valuation, increases the dominant firm's incentives and decreases the rival ...
[CITATION] Information externalities, shareprice based incentives and management behavior
S Grant, S King… - 1995 - Cowles Foundation Discussion …
S Grant… - 2008 - gsb.stanford.edu
In a beautiful paper, Maccheroni, Marinacci & Rustichini (2006a)(hereafter MMR) define and
axiomatize what they call variational preferences. Consider an Anscombe-Aumann setting
with a finite state space S where each act f maps each state s 4 S to lotteries over ...
[CITATION] Dynamic consistency and preference for information
S Grant, A Kajii… - 1997 - Faculty of Economics & Commerce, …
[CITATION] Free Love, Fragile Fidelity, and Forgiveness: Social Conventions and Trust under Hidden Information
J Lindsey, B Polak… - Manuscript, Yale, 1999
S Grant, A Kajii, B Polak… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2011 - Elsevier
Abstract We provide an axiomatization of expected equally-distributed equivalent-utility
social welfare functions in the context of Harsanyi modifier letter apostrophe s impartial
observer theorem. For this family of social welfare functions, we show what additional ...
[CITATION] The Emergence of a National Capital Market in Britain, 1710–1880
B Moshe… - This JOURNAL, 1993
[CITATION] Absolute Ambiguity Aversion and Mean-Dispersion Preferences
S Grant… - 2007 - mimeo
[CITATION] Game Theory. 2008.–URL h ttp
B Polak - oyc. yale. edu/economics/game-theory.–[Open Yale …
[CITATION] Ex Post Egalitarianism and Harsanyi's Impartial Observer Theorem
S Grant, A Kajii, B Polak… - Manuscript, Rice Univ, 2010
S Grant, A Kajii… - Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, 1998 - ideas.repec.org
We compare the Skiadas approach with the standard Savage framework of choice under
uncertainty. At first glance, properties of Skiadas" conditional preferences" such as
coherence and disappointment seem analogous to similarly motivated notions of ...
B Polak - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics ( …, 1998 - JSTOR
Perhaps this is true. Certainly, Calomiris [1998] ably captures some of the excitement that
now surrounds the once-dull American banking sector. Indeed, Calomiris comes close to
doing for merchant banking what Monty Python once tried to do for chartered accountancy ...
1 See Peter Solar's dissertation for a discussion of 19th century trade statistics sources, and
a construction of various agricultural trade series. Solar has also constructed trade series for
the linen industry; it is most important that this work be continued for other industries by ...
B Polak - STICERD-Theoretical Economics Paper Series, 1997 - ideas.repec.org
We show that, in games of complete information, the Aumann-Brandenburger (1995)
sufficient conditions for Nash equilibrium in beliefs also imply common knowledge of
rationality. We then consider beliefs held in games of incomplete information, especially ...
S Grant, A Kajii, B Polak… - Social Choice and Welfare, 2011 - Springer
Abstract We provide an axiomatization of an additively separable social welfare function in
the context of Harsanyi's impartial observer theorem. To do this, we reformulate Harsanyi's
setting to make the lotteries over the identities the observer may assume independent of ...
RG Chambers, S Grant, B Polak… - 2011 - uq.edu.au
Abstract The idea of representing choice under uncertainty as a trade-off between mean
returns and some measure of risk or uncertainty is fundamental to the analysis of investment
decisions. In this paper, we show that preferences can be characterized in this way, even ...
J Atack, I Berend, K Biddick, A Carlos, G Clark… - Cambridge Univ Press
The Editors and the Association wish to thank the following individuals who were chairs or discussants
at the 1993 Economic History Association meetings. Their comments helped the authors prepare
their final drafts and provided invaluable advice to the Editors.
B Polak - 1995 - Citeseer
Abstract We survey recent theoretical research on the effects of short—terrn shareprice
based managerial incentive schemes. Such schemes can induce inefficient managerial
behaviour in both hidden action and hidden type contexts. These problems arise from ...
[CITATION] When Managers Cover Their Posteriors: A Simple Model in which" efficient Markets" Have Inefficient Consequences
A Brandenburger… - 1992 - Division of Research, Graduate …
We provide a simple framework to analyse the effect of firm dominance on incentives for
R&D. An increase in firm dominance, which we measure by a premium in consumer
valuation, increases the dominant firm's incentives and decreases the rival firm's ...
S Grant, A Kajii… - DISCUSSION PAPER-OSAKA …, 2003 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We confront two common objections to Harsanyi's impartial observer theorem; one
to do with'fairness', and the other to do with different individuals' having different attitudes
toward risk. Both these objections can be accommodated if we drop the reduction axiom; ...
S Grant,
S King, S Peterson… - Economics Letters, 1991 - Elsevier
Economics Letters 37 (1991) 223227 223 NorthHolland Implementing the core of a twoperson
pure allocation game without free disposal or integer games Simon Grant, Stephen King, Steven
Peterson and Ben Polak Haruard University, Cambridge, MA 02738, USA Received 1 ...
[CITATION] The following articles are among those newly accepted for publication in the Journal of Economic Theory. They are listed alphabetically by the first
S Grant, A Kajii… - Journal of economic theory, 1991 - Academic Press.
SGS King… - dido.wss.yale.edu
Abstract We survey recent theoretical research on the effects of short-term shareprice based
managerial incentive schemes. Such schemes can induce inefficient managerial behaviour
in both hidden action and hidden type contexts. These problems arise from informational ...
B Adler, B Polak, ASR Consumer, J Arlen… - THE JOURNAL OF …, 2003 - JSTOR
Abbott, Kenneth W., and Duncan Snidal. Values and Interests: Interna- tional Legalization in
the Fight against Corruption 31:S141 Adler, Barry E. An Equity-Agency Solution to the
Bankruptcy-Priority Puzzle 22:73 Adler, Barry, Ben Polak, and Alan Schwartz. Regulating ...
S Grant, A Kajii… - Papers, 1999 - ideas.repec.org
In strictly competitive games, equilibrium mixed strategies are invariant to changes in the
ultimate prizes. Dixit & Skeath (1999) argue that this seems counter-intuitive. We show that
this invariance is robust to dropping the independence axiom, but is removed if we drop ...
[CITATION] Regulating Consumer Bankruptcy: A Theoretical Inquiry Regulating Consumer Bankruptcy: A Theoretical Inquiry (pp. 585-613)
B Adler, B Polak, A Schwartz, D Lichtman… - The Journal of Legal …, 2000 - JSTOR
Abstract: We provide a simple framework to analyze the effect of rm dominance on
incentives for R& D. An increase in firm dominance, which we measure by a premium in
consumer valuation, increases the dominant firm's incentives and decreases the rival ...
S Baliga, B Polak… - 1998 - europealumni.kellogg.northwestern. …
Abstract We use a simple graphical moral hazard model to compare monitored (non-traded)
bank loans versus traded (non-monitored) bonds as sources of external funds for industry.
We contrast the conditions that theoetically favour each system, such as the size and ...
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