My Citations
Scholar Home
  Advanced Scholar Search



Scholar      Create email alertResults 1 - 51 of 51. (0.17 sec) 

User profiles for author:"Navin Kartik"

Navin Kartik

Columbia University, Economics Department
Verified email at columbia.edu
Cited by 708

Strategic communication with lying costs

[PDF] from columbia.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
N Kartik - Review of Economic Studies, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
I study a model of strategic communication between an uninformed Receiver and an
informed but upwardly biased Sender. The Sender bears a cost of lying, or more broadly, of
misrepresenting his private information. The main results show that inflated language ...
Cited by 119 - Related articles - All 13 versions

Credulity, lies, and costly talk

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
N Kartik, M Ottaviani… - Journal of Economic theory, 2007 - Elsevier
This paper studies a model of strategic communication by an informed and upwardly biased
sender to one or more receivers. Applications include situations in which (i) it is costly for the
sender to misrepresent information, due to legal, technological, or moral constraints, or (ii) ...
Cited by 115 - Related articles - All 18 versions

Signaling character in electoral competition

[PDF] from caltech.edu
N Kartik… - The American economic review, 2007 - JSTOR
We study a one-dimensional Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition with the
following innovation: a fraction of candidates have" character" and are exogenously
committed to a campaign platform; this is unobservable to voters. Character is desirable, ...
Cited by 94 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - BL Direct - All 41 versions

Selecting Cheap‐Talk Equilibria

[PDF] from google.com
Full text - MIT Libraries
Y Chen, N Kartik… - Econometrica, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
There are typically multiple equilibrium outcomes in the Crawford–Sobel (CS) model of
strategic information transmission. This paper identifies a simple condition on equilibrium
payoffs, called NITS (no incentive to separate), that selects among CS equilibria. Under a ...
Cited by 70 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 19 versions

Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion

[PDF] from iae-csic.org
Full text - MIT Libraries
S Hurkens… - Experimental Economics, 2009 - Springer
Abstract This paper reinterprets the evidence on lying or deception presented in Gneezy
(Am. Econ. Rev. 95 (1): 384–394, 2005). We show that Gneezy's data are consistent with the
simple hypothesis that people are one of two kinds: either a person will never lie, or a ...
Cited by 65 - Related articles - All 14 versions

Information transmission with almost-cheap talk

[PDF] from nyu.edu
N Kartik - Unpublished Manuscript, University of California San …, 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Misrepresenting private information is often costly. This paper studies a model of
strategic information transmission based on Crawford and Sobel (1982)(CS), but with a
signaling dimension where there is a convex cost of misreporting. I identify a simple ...
Cited by 42 - Related articles - All 26 versions

Opinions as incentives

[PDF] from elcsoft.com
Full text - MIT Libraries
YK Che… - Journal of Political Economy, 2009 - works.bepress.com
Abstract We study a model where a decision maker (DM) must rely on an adviser for
information about the state of the world relevant for her decision. The adviser has the same
underlying preferences as the DM; he may differ, however, in his prior belief about the ...
Cited by 32 - Related articles - All 15 versions

[PDF] Social learning in elections

[PDF] from berkeley.edu
SN Ali… - Typescript, University of California, San Diego, 2008 - igs.berkeley.edu
Abstract Elections with sequential voting, such as presidential primaries, are widely thought
to feature social learning and momentum effects, where the choices of early voters influence
the behavior of later voters. Momentum may take time to build, and can depend on how ...
Cited by 18 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 22 versions

Opinion as Incentives

[PDF] from uni-muenchen.de
YK Che… - 2006 - mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
We study a model where a decision maker (DM) must select an adviser to advise her about
an unknown state of the world. There is a pool of available advisers who all have the same
underlying preferences as the DM; they differ, however, in their prior beliefs about the ...
Cited by 16 - Related articles - All 34 versions

A note on cheap talk and burned money

[PDF] from upi-yptk.ac.id
Full text - MIT Libraries
N Kartik - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
Austen-Smith and Banks [Cheap talk and burned money, J. Econ. Theory 91 (1)(2000) 1–16]
study how money burning can expand the set of pure cheap talk equilibria of Crawford and
Sobel [Strategic information transmission, Econometrica 50 (6)(1982) 1431–1451]. I ...
Cited by 19 - Related articles - All 11 versions

(When) Would I Lie to You? Comment on Deception: The Role of Consequences

[PDF] from recercat.net
JPM Hurkens… - 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper reconsiders the evidence on lying or deception presented in Gneezy
(2005, American Economic Review). We argue that Gneezy's data cannot reject the
hypothesis that people are one of two kinds: either a person will never lie, or a person will ...
Cited by 13 - Related articles - All 8 versions

[PDF] On the robustness of informative cheap talk

[PDF] from umontreal.ca
Y Chen, N Kartik… - Econometrica, forthcoming, 2007 - webdepot.umontreal.ca
Abstract There are typically multiple equilibrium outcomes in the Crawford-Sobel (CS) model
of strategic information transmission. This note identifies a simple condition on equilibrium
payoffs, called NITS, that selects among CS equilibria. Under a commonly used regularity ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 17 versions

Information aggregation in standing and ad hoc committees

[PDF] from caltech.edu
Full text - MIT Libraries
SN Ali, JK Goeree, N Kartik… - The American economic review, 2008 - JSTOR
In the last decade, Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat Marquis de Condorcet's (1785)
theory of committee decision making has emerged as a workhorse model in political
economy, par? ticularly voting theory. In its simplest modern formulation, the" Condorcet ...
Cited by 9 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 30 versions

[PDF] Observational Learning with Collective Preferences

[PDF] from ucsd.edu
SN Ali… - Manuscript, Columbia Univ, 2010 - dss.ucsd.edu
Abstract This paper studies a simple model of observational learning where agents care not
only about the information of others but also about their actions. We show that despite the
complex strategic considerations that arise from forward-looking incentives, herd behavior ...
Cited by 7 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 5 versions

[PDF] On Optimal Voting Rules under Homogeneous Preferences

[PDF] from columbia.edu
A Costinot… - 2007 - columbia.edu
Abstract This paper analyzes the choice of optimal voting rules under various theories of
voting behavior: strategic voting, informative or sincere voting, level-k or cognitive hierarchy
voting, and mixtures among all of these. We show that if preferences are homogeneous, ...
Cited by 7 - Related articles - View as HTML - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 3 versions

[PDF] Implementation with evidence: Complete information

[PDF] from ias.edu
N Kartik… - Unpublished Manuscript, 2009 - sss.ias.edu
Abstract. We study full-implementation in Nash equilibrium under complete information. We
generalize the canonical model (Maskin, 1977) by allowing agents to send evidence or
discriminatory signals. A leading case is where evidence is hard information that proves ...
Cited by 6 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 21 versions

Information aggregation, strategic voting, and institutional design

A Costinot… - 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: This paper discusses the implications of strategic voting for institutional design in
environments where the only role of elections is to aggregate information. We adopt a
mechanism design perspective, which assumes that prior to a standard voting game, a ...
Cited by 6 - Related articles

[PDF] On cheap talk and burned money

[PDF] from psu.edu
N Kartik - 2005 - Citeseer
Abstract Austen-Smith and Banks (Journal of Economic Theory, 2000) study how money
burning can expand the set of pure cheap talk equilibria of Crawford and Sobel
(Econometrica, 1982). This paper proves their conjecture on continuity of the equilibrium ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 3 versions

[PDF] A Theory of Momentum in Sequential Voting

[PDF] from northwestern.edu
S Ali… - 2006 - ksmb02.kellogg.northwestern.edu
Abstract Elections with sequential voting, such as presidential primaries, are widelythought
to possess momentum effects, where the choices of early voters influence the behavior of
later voters. Momentum may take time to build, and can depend on how candidates ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 26 versions

[PDF] Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria

[PDF] from columbia.edu
Y Chen, N Kartik… - forthcoming in Econometrica, 2007 - columbia.edu
Abstract There are typically multiple equilibrium outcomes in the Crawford-Sobel (CS) model
of strategic information transmission. This paper identifies a simple condition on equilibrium
payoffs, called NITS, that selects among CS equilibria. Under a commonly used regularity ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - View as HTML

[PDF] Implementation with evidence

[PDF] from econtheory.org
N Kartik… - at Theoretical Economics, 2011 - econtheory.org
Abstract. We generalize the canonical problem of Nash implementation by allowing agents
to voluntarily provide discriminatory signals, ie evidence. Evidence can either take the form
of hard information or, more generally, have differential but non-prohibitive costs in ...
Cited by 5 - Related articles - View as HTML - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 8 versions

[CITATION] Consistency, Decisiveness, and Sen's Paradox

N Kartik - 2001 - mimeo, Stanford University
Cited by 3 - Related articles

[CITATION] mSocial Learning in Elections, nmimeo

SN Ali… - University of California at San Diego, 2007
Cited by 3 - Related articles

[CITATION] J. Sobel,(2008): Selecting Cheap Talk Equilibria

Full text - MIT Libraries
Y Chen… - Econometrica
Cited by 3 - Related articles

[CITATION] mOn Optimal Voting Rules under Homogeneous Preferences, nmimeo

A Costinot… - University of California at San Diego, 2007
Cited by 3 - Related articles

[CITATION] lSignaling Character in Elec $ toral Competitionm

R McAfee Preston… - American Economic Review, forthcoming, 2007
Cited by 2 - Related articles

[PDF] A Theory of Information Cascades in Sequential Voting

[PDF] from ucla.edu
N Ali, N Kartik… - 2006 - levine.sscnet.ucla.edu
Abstract This paper develops an informational but rational theory of cascade behavior when
voting is sequential. We analyze a two-candidate election in which voters are uncertain
about the realization of a state variable that affects the utility of all voters. Voters vote in an ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 2 versions

A note on undominated Bertrand equilibria

[PDF] from psu.edu
N Kartik - Economics Letters, 2011 - Elsevier
Abstract This note shows that the conventional outcome associated with Bertrand
competition with homogenous products and different marginal costs is obtained in every
Nash equilibrium in which firms use undominated strategies. This strengthens an ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 6 versions

Herding with collective preferences

[PDF] from columbia.edu
SN Ali… - Economic Theory, 2011 - Springer
Abstract This paper studies a simple model of observational learning where agents care not
only about the information of others but also about their actions. We show that despite
complex strategic considerations that arise from forward-looking incentives, herd behavior ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 2 versions

[PDF] A Note on Mixed-Nash Implementation

[PDF] from columbia.edu
N Kartik… - 2009 - columbia.edu
Abstract This note considers (complete information) Nash-implementation when mixed
strategies are properly accounted for and the outcome space is infinite. We first construct an
example in which preferences over lotteries fail the Archemedian axiom and show that, ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 2 versions

[PDF] Special Interest Politics and the Quality of Governance

[PDF] from rochester.edu
BD Bernheim… - 2004 - wallis.rochester.edu
Abstract We develop a simple model to study the impact of special interest politics (SIP) on
the quality of politicians. The basic setting is a citizen-candidate model in which, following
the election, the chosen official interacts with lobby groups. Citizens differ along two ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 2 versions

[PDF] Selecting cheap-talk equilibria

[PDF] from escholarship.org
N Kartik, J Sobel… - Econometrica, 2008 - escholarship.org
Abstract: There are typically multiple equilibrium outcomes in the Crawford-Sobel (CS)
model of strategic information transmission. This paper identifies a simple condition on
equilibrium payoffs, called NITS (no incentive to separate), that selects among CS ...
Related articles - View as HTML - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 4 versions

[PDF] Information Revelation and (Anti-) Pandering in Elections

[PDF] from nyu.edu
N Kartik, F Squintani… - 2011 - econ.as.nyu.edu
Abstract We study a Downsian model where office-motivated candidates have policy-
relevant private information. A conventional view is that electoral competition will lead to
efficient information aggregation because policy positions reveal private information. A ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 4 versions

[CITATION] Information aggregation in standing and ad hoc committees (formerly: Information aggregation and equilibrium selection in committees)

SN Ali, JK Goeree, N Kartik… - Working Papers - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of
further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site ...
Cached - Get it from MIT Libraries - All 4 versions

[PDF] Supplementary Appendix for “Of Candidates and Character”

[PDF] from nber.org
BD Bernheim… - 2010 - nber.org
In this Supplementary Appendix, we formally study an infinitely repeated version of the
baseline model, in which insiders are infinite-lived and discount the future at the rate δ∈(0,
1). 1 We assume infinite repetitions for two reasons. First, the impact of a future opportunity ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 4 versions

[PDF] Supplementary Appendix for “Signaling Character in Electoral Competition”

[PDF] from mcafee.cc
N Kartik… - 2006 - vita.mcafee.cc
This supplementary appendix adds detail and formal results to the discussion in Section 5 of
Kartik and McAfee (forthcoming). For consistency with the main article, Theorems here are
numbered starting from 3 and equations starting from 4. References to Theorem 1 are to ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 8 versions

[PDF] Information Aggregation and Equilibrium Selection in Committees

[PDF] from caltech.edu
SN Ali, JK Goeree, N Kartik… - 2007 - hss.caltech.edu
Abstract This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment comparing voting behavior
and decision making efficiency in standing and ad hoc committees, where decisions are
made by unanimity rule. We also compare sequential and simultaneous (secret ballot) ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 9 versions

[PDF] Liberalism and Pareto Efficiency: Sen's Paradox

[PDF] from j-bradford-delong.net
N Kartik - Humane Studies Review, 2001 - j-bradford-delong.net
The Sen Paradox, also known as the Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, is a famous result in
the field of social choice theory. Loosely speaking, it alleges a conflict between the
principles of efficiency and liberalism. Since its original formulation over thirty years ago ...
Related articles - View as HTML

[PDF] Congested Observational Learning

[PDF] from essex.ac.uk
E Eyster, A Galeotti, N Kartik… - 2012 - essex.ac.uk
Abstract We study observational learning in environments with congestion costs: as more of
one's predecessors choose an action, the payoff from choosing that action decreases. If
congestion on either action can get so large that an agent would prefer to take the other ...
View as HTML

[PDF] Candidates, Character, and Corruption

[PDF] from columbia.edu
BD Bernheim… - 2012 - columbia.edu
Abstract We study the characteristics of self-selected candidates in corrupt political systems.
Potential candidates differ along two dimensions of unobservable character: public spirit
(altruism toward others) and honesty (the disutility suffered when selling out to special ...
Related articles - View as HTML

[PDF] SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 1280 1280R

[PDF] from caltech.edu
SNA Jacob, JK Goreree, N Kartik… - writing.caltech.edu
Abstract This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment comparing voting behavior
and decision making e? ciency in standing and ad hoc committees, where decisions are
made by unanimity rule. We also compare sequential and simultaneous (secret ballot) ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 5 versions

[PDF] Lecture Notes for 1st Year Ph. D. Game Theory

[PDF] from ucsd.edu
N Kartik - econ.ucsd.edu
Game theory is a formal methodology and a set of techniques to study the interaction of
rational agents in strategic settings.'Rational'here means the standard thing in economics:
maximizing over well-defined objectives;'strategic'means that agents care not only about ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 2 versions

[CITATION] A PHENOMENALISTIC APPROACH TO THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM

N Kartik - 1998
Related articles

[CITATION] Quasi-Kantianism and Ethical Egoism

N Kartik - 2000
Related articles - All 2 versions

[PDF] Simple Mechanisms and Preferences for Honesty

[PDF] from ens.fr
R Holden, N Kartik… - 2012 - pse.ens.fr
Abstract We consider full implementation in general environments when agents have an
arbitrarily small preference for honesty. We offer a condition called separable punishment
and show that when it holds and there are at least two agents, any social choice function ...
View as HTML

[CITATION] Extension of the Heckscher-Ohlin Model by Allowing for Non-Homogenous Production Functions and Demand Preferences between Countries.

N Kartik
Related articles

[CITATION] Effective communication in cheap-talk games

N Kartik… - Proceedings of the Behavioral and Quantitative …, 2010 - dl.acm.org
Abstract This paper studies cheap talk games by imposing a monotonicity condition on
Sender strategies and then applies iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies. This
procedure selects among Crawford and Sobel (1982) equilibria, typically selecting the ...

How Inconsistent is a Paretian Liberal?

N Kartik - 2005 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We revisit Sen's (1970) Paradox in its formulation for collective choice rules. It is
well-known that under unrestricted domain, binary liberalism (BL) and the global (resp.
binary) Weak Pareto principle (GWP/BWP) are incompatible with binary rejection ...
Related articles - All 3 versions

[PDF] IN THE HANDS OF ZOMBIES

[PDF] from stanford.edu
N KARTIK - philosophy.stanford.edu
Azombie IS quite simply a physical and functional duplicate of you or me, who differs from us
only in that she does not possess consciousness or phenomenological experience. 1 In
other words, we know what it is to feel pain, happiness, and anger; a zombie does not: she ...
Related articles - View as HTML - All 5 versions

Games and Information

Full text - MIT Libraries
N Kartik, DA Miller… - Econometrica, 1993 - ecsocman.hse.ru
This is an advanced Ph. D. course in game theory, intended both for students who are
interested in producing research in microeconomic theory, and for those who would like to
acquire a solid background in game theory to support their research in other areas such ...
Cached - All 2 versions

[CITATION] Essays in microeconomic theory

N Kartik… - 2004 - en.scientificcommons.org
Related articles - Cached - Library Search - All 3 versions

 Create email alert



 

About Google Scholar - All About Google - My Citations

©2012 Google