E Pastorino - 2005 - repository.upenn.edu
Abstract This dissertation considers the determinants of individual careers within firms and it
is articulated into two chapters. The first chapter analyzes a learning model in which a firm
and a worker can acquire information about the worker's ability by observing his ...
B Camargo… - Textos para discussão, 2010 - econpapers.repec.org
We analyze a dynamic principal–agent model where an infinitely-lived principal faces
asequence of finitely-lived agents who differ in their ability to produce output. The ability of
anagent is initially unknown to both him and the principal. An agent's effort affects the ...
[CITATION] Learning in labor markets and job mobility
E Pastorino - … manuscript, Department of Economics, University of …, 2009
E Pastorino - Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer …, 2004 - repec.org
Abstract The paper studies a learning model in which information about a worker's ability
can be acquired symmetrically by the worker and a firm in any period by observing the
worker's performance on a given task. Productivity at different tasks is assumed to be ...
E Pastorino - 2004 - eea-esem.com
Abstract This paper develops and structurally estimates a dynamic model of learning in
which a firm can acquire information about a worker's ability by observing his performance
over time. Ability determines both the profitability of a job and the job-dependent ...
B Camargo… - 2010 - um.edu.uy
Abstract We introduce human capital accumulation in a life–cycle model of career concerns
and analyze its implications for the optimal provision of incentives. We first show that human
capital accumulation increases implicit incentives, but that these incentives disappear ...
B Camargo… - 2007 - economics.uwo.ca
Abstract We analyze commitment to employment in an environment in which an infinitely–
lived firm faces a sequence of finitely–lived workers who differ in their ability to produce
output. The ability of a worker is initially unknown to both him and the firm and a worker's ...
Abstract In this paper we propose a model of price discrimination to rationalize the pricing
patterns of common food items in rural Mexico and Colombia, in particular the presence of
'quantity discounts' in the form of unit prices declining in quantity. In doing so, we are able ...
E Pastorino… - 2005 Meeting Papers, 2005 - ideas.repec.org
We analyze a dynamic principal-agent model where an infinitely-lived principal faces a
sequence of finitely-lived agents who differ in their ability to produce output. The ability of an
agent is initially unknown to both him and the principal. An agent's effort affects the ...
B Camargo, E Pastorino… - 2011 - eea-esem.com
Abstract We introduce human capital accumulation, in the form of learning–by–doing, in a
life–cycle model of career concerns and analyze how human capital acquisition affects
implicit incentives for performance. We show that standard results from the career ...
[CITATION] Job Design and Career Dynamics in Firms Under Uncertainty
E Pastorino - 2004
E Pastorino - 2010 - bibliotecadigital.fgv.br
We analyze a dynamic principal–agent model where an infinitely-lived principal faces a
sequence of finitely-lived agents who differ in their ability to produce output. The ability of an
agent is initially unknown to both him and the principal. An agent's effort affects the ...
B Camargo… - 2007 - iza.org
Abstract This paper provides a rationale for the use of up-or-out contracts. We consider a
learning game in which a firm and a worker commonly observe noisy performance signals
about the worker's ability. A worker's choice of effort affects the accuracy of the inference ...
Abstract In this paper we propose a model of price discrimination to rationalize the pricing
patterns of common food items in rural Mexico and Colombia, in particular the presence of
quantity discounts in the form of unit prices declining in quantity. In doing so, we are able ...
[CITATION] OPTIMAL EFFORT IN MULTI-YEAR CONTRACTS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
HJ PAARSCH, E PASTORINO…
B Camargo… - 2004 - repec.org
Abstract This paper provides a rationale for the use of up-or-out contracts as a mechanism to
induce workers to invest in generating nonverifiable information about their ability. The
model consists of a learning game in which a firm and a worker can commonly observe ...
E Pastorino - 2011 - bibliotecadigital.fgv.br
We introduce human capital accumulation, in the form of learning {by {doing, in a life cycle
model of career concerns and analyze how human capital acquisition a ects implicit
incentives for performance. We show that standard results from the career concerns ...
ME Pastorino - 1993 - orton.catie.ac.cr
... Facultad de Agronomía; Título: Transferencia y adopción de tecnología en el complejo
agroindustrial de tomate industria^cMaría Elena Pastorino, Mercedes Silva. Notas: Incluye
bibliografías.Contiene resúmen al final de cada capítulo. Grado acad.: Ing.Agr. ...
Create email alert
About Google Scholar - All About Google - My Citations
©2012 Google