F Khalil - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1997 - JSTOR
I study the optimal contract when a principal cannot commit to an audit policy. The contract
must provide incentives for the agent to comply as well as for the principal to audit. The key
tradeoff is efficiency versus noncompliance instead of the familiar rent versus efficiency. ...
J Crémer… - The American Economic Review, 1992 - JSTOR
After being offered a contract, an agent has the possibility to observe the state of nature. This
enables him to refuse the contract in unfavorable states but burdens him with an observation
cost. We show that the principal offers a contract in which the agent has no incentive to ...
J Crémer, F Khalil… - Games and Economic Behavior, 1998 - Elsevier
We modify a standard Baron–Myerson model by assuming that, instead of knowing the state
of nature, the agent has to incur a cost γ to learn it. Under these conditions, the principal will
offer contracts that, depending on the value of γ, try to induce the agent to gather or not to ...
J Cremer, F Khalil… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1998 - Elsevier
In a Baron–Myerson setup, we study a situation where an agent is initially uninformed, but
can, at a cost, acquire information about the state of nature before the principal offers him a
contract. For intermediate values of the cost of acquiring information, the agent's ...
F Khalil… - The American Economic Review, 1995 - JSTOR
In the last 15 years, principal-agent theory has been applied to a diverse set of topics such
as industrial organization, macroeconomics, regulation, finance, accounting, corporate
governance, and so forth. This theory has become the mainstay for modeling ...
F Khalil… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1995 - Elsevier
We observe that residual claimancy can be a source of rent in a principal-agent relationship.
We show that the choice between input or output monitoring will be chiefly determined by
the identity of the residual claimant of the principal-agent relationship. The principal will ...
F Khalil, D Martimort… - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
Multiple principals want to obtain income from a privately informed agent and design their
contracts non-cooperatively. The degree of coordination between principals shapes the
contracts and affects the amount of monitoring. Equity-like contracts and excessive ...
F Khalil… - International Economic Review, 1998 - JSTOR
We model risky lending with costly state verification, but without commitment to an audit
strategy. The borrower under-reports with a positive probability in the successful state, and
the lender audits with a positive probability after a report of failure. Under lack of ...
F Khalil… - The Journal of Industrial Economics, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
In the absence of commitment to auditing, we study the optimal auditing contract when collusion
between an agent and an auditor is possible. We show that the auditor can be totally useless
if the auditor's independence can be compromised with relative ease. Even very stiff ...
J Crémer… - European Economic Review, 1994 - Elsevier
Focusing on a Baron-Myerson model with two states of nature, in the first part of the paper,
we study the contract that a principal would offer to an agent when he does not know
whether the agent is informed or not about the state of nature. In the second, we ...
F Khalil, D Kim… - Journal of Economics & Management …, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
Integrating planning and implementation, by having one agent perform both tasks, may be
effective in encouraging planning activity whose outcome is not observable. Emphasizing its
information-generating role, we find that planning activity is best encouraged by partially ...
F Khalil… - Journal of Public Economics, 2001 - Elsevier
In a principal-agent model with multiple performance measures, we show that the principal
benefits by choosing ex post which variables will be monitored. If it is too costly for one type
of agent to mimic all performance measures expected from another type, the principal can ...
F Khalil, J Lawarrée… - Presented at CESifo Area …, 2007 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Rewards to prevent supervisors from accepting bribes create incentives for
extortion. This raises the question whether a supervisor who can engage in bribery and
extortion can still be useful in providing incentives. By highlighting the role of team work in ...
M Chalkley… - Journal of health economics, 2005 - Elsevier
Health care provision is almost universally characterised by third party purchasing in which
the provider of health services is reimbursed by an agency (public or private insurer), rather
than the patient. We show how a purchaser can manage the incentives that patient choice ...
F Khalil… - Working Papers, 2000 - econpapers.repec.org
... EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks. On
Commitment and Collusion in Auditing. Fahad Khalil and Jacques Lawarree. ...
J Stiglitz, R Schmalensee, R Willig, FJ Ledesma… - 1989 - en.scientificcommons.org
deutsch english. Publikationsansicht. 1010641. Imperfect information in the product market.
Handbook of Industrial Organization. Stiglitz, Joseph E.,; R. Schmalensee,; R. Willig.
Details der Publikation. Download, http://www.sciencedirect ...
[CITATION] ee, 1995, Collusive Auditors
F Khalil… - American Economic Review
F Khalil - Discussion Papers in Economics at the …, 1992 - en.scientificcommons.org
Abstract I study the optimal contract when a principal cannot commit to an audit. The contract
must provide incentives for the agent to comply as well as for the principal to audit. The key
tradeoff is efficiency versus noncompliance instead of the familiar rent versus efficiency. ...
M Chalkley… - 2001 - discovery.dundee.ac.uk
The Outcomes Movement, also referred to as the “third revolution in medical care” has
focused attention and resources on assessing the effectiveness of medical treatments.
Outcomes research aims at determining the nature of effective treatment regimes for ...
F Khalil, J Lawarrée… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
Both bribery and extortion weaken the power of incentives, but there is a trade-off in fighting
the two because rewards to prevent supervisors from accepting bribes create incentives for
extortion. Which is the worse evil? A fear of inducing extortion may make it optimal to ...
[CITATION] Commitment in Auditing
F Khalil - 1990 - mimeo, Department of Economics, …
F Khalil… - 2001 - tiche.decon.unipd.it
Abstract We construct a model in which ex ante screening of loan applicants and ex-post
auditing are ways in which banks reduce the risk that loans are not reimbursed. When the
loan size is small with respect to the audit cost as in consumer credit, lenders may have ...
[CITATION] Jean $ Charles Rochet (1998a): mContracts and Productive Information Gathering, nGames and Economic Behavior, 25
J Cremer… - $193
[CITATION] mGathering Information before Signing a Con $ tract, nAmerican Economic Review, 82
J Cremer… - $578, 1992
[CITATION] Jean $ Charles Rochet (1998b), mStrategic Information Gathering before a Contract is Offered, nJournal of Economic Theory, 81
J Cremer… - $200
K Fahad… - Journal of Economic Theory, 1995 - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of
further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site ...
F Khalil, J Lawarree… - cesifo-group.de
Abstract When the information used by a principal to monitor an agent is private, ie, non-
verifiable by a third party, the principal has a credibility issue. The principal must convince
the agent that she will not distort the private information. This requirement may lead to an ...
F Khalil, D Kim… - Working Papers, 2008 - Citeseer
“In the days leading up to September 30, the federal government is Cinderella, courted by
legions of individuals and organizations eager to get grants and contracts from the
unexpended funds still at the disposal of each agency. At midnight on September 30, the ...
F Khalil, J Lawarrée… - 2006 - rieb.kobe-u.ac.jp
Abstract Rewards to prevent enforcement agents from accepting bribes create incentives for
extortion. We present a model where a supervisor who can engage in bribery and extortion
can still be useful in providing incentive. We show that bribery may be allowed, but ...
[CITATION] Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment," in the" Journal of Industrial Economics"(2006)
F Khalil… - Working Papers - University of Washington, …
FA Khalil - 1991 - scholar.lib.vt.edu
Title page for ETD etd-02012006-141718. Type of Document, Dissertation. Author, Khalil, Fahad
Ahmed. URN, etd-02012006-141718. Title, Essays on information gathering in principal-agent
contracts. Degree, Ph. D. Department, Economics. Advisory Committee, Advisor Name ...
F Khalil - cesifo-group.de
Abstract Rewards to prevent enforcement agents from accepting bribes create incentives for
extortion. We present a model where a supervisor who can engage in bribery and extortion
can still be useful in providing incentives. We show that bribery may be allowed, but ...
A Finkle, F Khalil… - 2004 - en.scientificcommons.org
F Khalil, D Kim… - 2011 - ergonline.org.bd
Abstract We examine the power of incentive schemes in bureaucracies by studying contracts
offered by a bureaucrat to her agent. The bureaucrat operates under a fixed budget and can
engage in policy drift, which we define as inversely related to her intrinsic motivation. We ...
F Khalil, J Lawarree… - Working Papers, 2011 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: When the information used by a principal to monitor an agent is private, ie, non-
verifiable by a third party, the principal has a credibility issue. The principal must convince
the agent that she will not distort the private information. This requirement may lead to an ...
F Khalil, J Lawarree… - ecares.org
Abstract When the information used by a principal to monitor an agent is private, ie, non-
verifiable by a third party, the principal has a credibility issue. The principal must convince
the agent that she will not distort the private information. This requirement may lead to an ...
[CITATION] An introduction to game theory
F Khalil
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