Y Azrieli… - Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
A (TU) cooperative game is extendable if every core allocation of each subgame can be
extended to a core allocation of the game. It is strongly extendable if any minimal vector in
the upper core of any of its subgames can be extended to a core allocation. We prove that ...
Y Azrieli… - Economic Theory, 2007 - Springer
Abstract We study market games derived from an exchange economy with a continuum of
agents, each having one of finitely many possible types. The type of agent determines his
initial endowment and utility function. It is shown that, unlike the well-known Shapley– ...
Y Azrieli… - Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 2007 - Elsevier
We suggest a model of categorization based on prototypes. A set of entities, identified with
some finite dimensional Euclidian space, is partitioned into a finite number of categories.
Such a categorization is said to be generated by extended prototypes if there is a set of ...
Y Azrieli… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2008 - Elsevier
Upon observing a signal, a Bayesian decision maker updates her probability distribution
over the state space, chooses an action, and receives a payoff that depends on the state and
the action taken. An information structure determines the set of possible signals and the ...
Y Azrieli - 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Recent works on political competition incorporate a valence dimension into the
standard spatial model. The analysis of the game between candidates in these models is
typically based on two assumptions about voters' preferences. One is that valence scores ...
Y Azrieli - Games and Economic Behavior, 2009 - Elsevier
We study the efficiency of categorization of other agents as a way of saving cognitive
resources in the settings of a large normal-form game. We assume that, when an agent
categorizes (partitions) her opponents, she only has information about the average ...
Y Azrieli… - 2005 - math.tau.ac.il
Abstract A (TU) cooperative game v is viewed as a real valued function v defined on a finite
set of points in the unit simplex. The concavification of v on the simplex, denoted cavv, is the
minimal concave function on the simplex which is greater than or equal to v. cavv is a ...
Y Azrieli - 2007 - mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
Inspired by the social psychology literature, we study the implications of categorical thinking
on decision making in the context of a large normal form game. Every agent has a
categorization (partition) of her opponents and can only observe the average behavior in ...
Y Azrieli - 2009 - mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
Spatial models of political competition are typically based on two assumptions. One is that
all the voters identically perceive the platforms of the candidates and agree about their score
on a" valence" dimension. The second is that each voter's preferences over policies are ...
Y Azrieli… - unpublished, Ohio State University, 2011 - faculty.arts.ubc.ca
Abstract. We consider a Bayesian environment with independent private values and two
possible alternatives. It is shown that a social choice function is interim incentive efficient if
and only if it is a weighted majority rule. Keywords: Pareto efficiency; Incentive ...
Y Azrieli… - 2011 - econ.ohio-state.edu
Abstract. We consider a bank runs modela la Diamond and Dybvig (1983) with a continuum
of agent types, indexed by the degree of patience. Much of our understanding based on the
two-type model must be modified. The endogenous determination of a cutoff type is ...
Y Azrieli - International Journal of Game Theory, 2009 - Springer
Abstract An information structure in a non-cooperative game determines the signal that each
player observes as a function of the strategy profile. Such information structure is called non-
manipulable if no player can gain new information by changing his strategy. A Conjectural ...
Y Azrieli… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2011 - Elsevier
We consider games with incomplete information à la Harsanyi, where the payoff of a player
depends on an unknown state of nature as well as on the profile of chosen actions. As
opposed to the standard model, playersʼ preferences over state-contingent utility vectors ...
Y Azrieli… - Games and Economic Behavior, 2011 - Elsevier
We consider second-price common-value auctions with an increasing number of bidders.
We define a strategy of bidder i to be (ex-post, weakly) asymptotically dominated if there is
another strategy for i that does, in the limit, as well against any sequence of strategies of ...
[CITATION] Three Essays on Steady States of Recurring Non-cooperative Games
Y Azrieli - 2008 - Tel Aviv University
Y Azrieli - 2007 - mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
In a Self-Confirming Equilibrium (Fudenberg and Levine, 1993A) every player obtains partial
information about other players' strategies and plays a best response to some conjecture
which is consistent with his information. Two kinds of information structures are ...
Y AZRIELI, CP CHAMBERS… - econ.ucsd.edu
ABSTRACT. Experiments elicit choices from a given set of decision problems. When multiple
decision problems are offered in the same experiment, behavior in one decision problem
may be distorted by the choices made in others; incentive compatibility of the experiment ...
[CITATION] DOMINANCE SOLVABILITY OF LARGE k-PRICE AUCTIONS
Y AZRIELI… - 2011
[CITATION] A UTILITARIAN, NON-COOPERATIVE RATIONALE FOR (WEIGHTED) MAJORITY RULE
Y AZRIELI… - 2011
Y AZRIELI… - 2010 - gtcenter.org
Abstract. Recent literature shows that pure approximate Nash equilibria exist in anonymous
and continuous large finite games. Here we study continuous but non-anonymous games.
Call the impact of a game to the maximal difference in some player's payoff when one ...
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