A Pavan, I Segal… - 2008 - Citeseer
Abstract This paper examines the problem of how to design incentive-compatible
mechanisms in environments in which the agents' private information evolves stochastically
over time and in which decisions have to be made in each period. The environments we ...
A Pavan, I Segal… - 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: We examine the design of incentive-compatible screening mechanisms for
dynamic environments in which the agents' types follow a (possibly non-Markov) stochastic
process, decisions may be made over time and may affect the type process, and payoffs ...
K Kultti, T Takalo… - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
We develop an equilibrium search model of innovation with the possibility of multiple
independent discovery. We distinguish innovations from ideas, and we view patents as
probabilistic property rights that are constrained by the innovators' option to keep the ...
K Kultti, T Takalo… - The American economic review, 2006 - JSTOR
Multiple innovators can and do come up with the same invention independently. A famous
case is the telephone: two hours after Alexander Graham Bell filed a patent application for it,
another application for the same invention arrived at the patent office. Many scholars, such ...
Abstract. We consider repeated Bayesian two-player games in which the players' types
evolve according to an irreducible Markov chain, type transitions are independent across
players, and players have private values. The main result shows that, with communication, ...
K Kultti, T Takalo… - 2003 - econ.ku.dk
Abstract: We develop a general equilibrium search model of innovation, where innovators
invest in R&D, and the likelihood of making an innovation increases with the investment.
There is a possibility of multiple independent discovery, and the market behaviour is ...
J Toikka - Journal of Economic Theory, 2011 - Elsevier
I extend Myersonʼs [R. Myerson, Optimal auction design, Math. Oper. Res. 6 (1981) 58–73]
ironing technique to more general objective functions. The approach is based on a
generalized notion of virtual surplus which can be maximized pointwise even when the ...
[CITATION] nDynamic Mechanism Design: Incentive Com& patibility, Profit Maximization and Information Disclosureo
A Pavan, I Segal… - 2011 - mimeo Northwestern University and …
[CITATION] A folk theorem with markovian private information. 2009
J Escobar… - Unpublished working paper
I Segal… - 2007 - aida.econ.yale.edu
Abstract We consider the problem of designing incentive# compatible mechanisms in a
general dynamic environment in which agents receive serially correlated private in#
formation over time and decisions may be made over time. The private information is ...
K Kulttiy, T Takalo… - 2006 - takalo.net
Abstract Exchange of patents between firms increasingly influence competition. Such cross-
licensing deals have traditionally raised antitrust concerns, since they can be used to control
market shares and prices, and create entry barriers. We argue that cross-licensing is a ...
A Skrzypacz… - Unpublished manuscript, 2012 - stanford.edu
Abstract We study a repeated version of the Myerson-Satterthwaite bilateral bargaining
problem with serially correlated types and agents that can be informed not only about their
current type but also the evolution of their future types. We provide necessary and ...
J Toikka& - 2004 - eea-esem.com
Page 1. Patents Hinder Collusion Klaus Kultti' University of Helsinki Tuomas Takalo(
Bank of Finland and University of Toulouse Juuso Toikka& Helsinki School of
Economics and FDPE December 9, 2004 Abstract We argue ...
Abstract We study a repeated version of the Myerson-Satterthwaite bilateral bargaining
problem with serially correlated types. We show that effi cient, unsubsidized, and individually
rational trade is possible if and only if the expected dynamic virtual surplus from the effi ...
J Toikka, K Kultti… - 2009 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: Conflicting research exists regarding patents andintellectual property rights (IPRs).
To clarify previous research, thisstudy examines how the patent system and inventor secrecy
impact uponinnovation, information spreading, and welfare. A literature reviewregarding ...
J Toikka - 2004 - helda.helsinki.fi
In this thesis we analyze how patent policy affects the strategic behavior of firms. We
develop an infinite horizon model of innovation where each period firms are randomly
matched to ideas which can be developed into innovations. The model allows for ...
A Pavan, I Segal… - 2008 - cowles.econ.yale.edu
Abstract This paper examines the problem of how to design incentive $ compatible
mechanisms in environments in which the agentshprivate information evolves stochastically
over time and in which decisions have to be made in each period. The environments we ...
Create email alert
About Google Scholar - All About Google - My Citations
©2012 Google