Replication data for: Moral Hazard and Claims Deterrence in Private Disability Insurance

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Project Citation:

Autor, David, Duggan, Mark, and Gruber, Jonathan. Replication data for: Moral Hazard and Claims Deterrence in Private Disability Insurance. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2014. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113903V1

Project Description

Summary: Exploiting within-firm, over-time variation in plan parameters for nearly 10,000 Long Term Disability (LTD) policies held by US employers, we present the first empirical analysis of the determinants of private LTD spells. We find that a shorter waiting period and a higher replacement rate increase the incidence of LTD spells. Sixty percent of the latter effect is due to the mechanical censoring of shorter spells, with the remainder due to the deterrence of spells that would have continued beyond the waiting period. Deterrence is driven primarily by a reduction in the incidence of shorter duration spells and less severe disabilities.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
      G22 Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
      J28 Safety; Job Satisfaction; Related Public Policy
      J32 Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions

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Published Versions

V1 [2019-10-12]

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