Online Appendix to "*Can Informed Public Deliberation Overcome Clientelism? Experimental Evidence from Benin*"

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1. List of Sample Villages

Table A1 provides a list of sample villages, with their experimental and dominant candidates.

2. Results by Commune/Stratum

Table A2.1-A2.3 presents the results by individual commune/stratum.

3. Survey Questions and the Clientelism Index

Table A3.1 provides the estimates for each individual component of the clientelism index, while Table A3.2 details the questions used in the index.

4. Treatment Effects on Candidate Vote Shares

Table A4 provides the treatment effect on each individual candidate vote share.

5. Estimates Excluding Communes where Yayi is the EC

Table A5 reports results from estimations that drop the six communes where Yayi is the EC. Panel A provides estimates analogous from those of Table 2, while Panels B and C report estimates that are similar to those of Table 3. The point estimates are remarkably similar to the original ones, even though half the sample has been dropped (which explains why some have a slight reduction in significance).

6. Estimates Including the Commune of Toffo

Due to missing survey data, all the estimates presented in the main paper exclude the commune of Toffo, the only one where Amoussou is the EC. However, electoral data for this commune is available. This allows us to re-estimate the electoral data-based treatment effects including the commune. Table A6.1 re-estimates the results presented on Panel B of Table 2. The qualitative results remain the same. Most point estimates are slightly attenuated, with some of them losing significance. This is likely explained by the fact that Amoussou did not receive many votes in this commune (his vote share in control villages is 14%). In line with the results presented in the main paper, including the commune in the subsample where the EC is not dominant does not change the qualitative results (Table A6.2). The large and significant effect of treatment on EC vote share in this subsample remains, and the effect on vote share of top candidates continues to be insignificant.

Table A1: List of Participating Villages

Commune	Exper. Cand.	Dom. Cand.	Treated Village	Control Villages		
				Surveyed	Not Surveyed	
Abomey-Calavi	S	Y	Tokan	Djigbo	Ahouato	Adjogansa^
Bembereke	Y	Y	Mani	Gando-Borou	Goua	Guere*
Come	Y	A	Gadome^	Sivame	Kpodji	Tokan
Dangbo I	H	H	Lake	Djigbe	Hozin	Tokpa-Koudjota
Dangbo II	H	H	Mitro	Agbonou	Dame	Sodji
Dangbo III	H	H	Mondotokpa	Glahounsa	Hetin sota	Kodonon
Kandi	Y	Y	Thya	Koutakroukou	Pade*	Lolo*
Kouande	Y	Y	Orou-Kayo	Papatia	Tikou	Boro
Ouesse	Y	Y	Yaoui	Kemon-Ado	Challa-Ogoi	Wla
So-Ava	S	H	Lokpodji	Ahomey-Gblon^	Gbegodo^	Sokomey
Tanguieta	Y	Y	Taiacou^	Batia	Tora	Tchaeta^
Zagnanado	S	S	Tohoue^	Sowe	Dove^	Kpoto
Not included in estimations						
Save	Yayi	-	Okounfo	Djabata	Ayedjoko	Monka
Toffo	Amoussou	-	Agon	Adjaho	Bossouvi	Kpoka

* Missing data on electoral results. Legend: A=Amoussou, H=Houngbedji, S=Soglo, Y=Yayi. The dominant candidate in the commune is the top candidate in all villages, except for those marked with a ^.

Table A2.1: Vote Share of Top Candidate – Treatment and Control Averages by Strata

		Treated Village (1)	Surveyed Control (2)	All Controls (3)	(1) - (2)	(1) - (3)
Abomey-Calavi	Soglo	0.484	0.404	0.533	0.080	-0.049
Bembereke	Yayi	0.637	0.678	0.728	-0.042	-0.092
Come	Yayi	0.551	0.523	0.605	0.028	-0.053
Dangbo I	Houngbedji	0.759	0.746	0.729	0.013	0.030
Dangbo II	Houngbedji	0.553	0.827	0.848	-0.274	-0.295
Dangbo III	Houngbedji	0.620	0.801	0.720	-0.181	-0.099
Kandi	Yayi	0.748	0.810	0.810	-0.062	-0.062
Kouande	Yayi	0.562	0.719	0.816	-0.158	-0.254
Ouesse	Yayi	0.733	0.815	0.705	-0.083	0.028
So-Ava	Soglo	0.529	0.442	0.545	0.087	-0.016
Tanguieta	Yayi	0.613	0.540	0.567	0.073	0.046
Zagnanado	Soglo	0.317	0.329	0.373	-0.012	-0.056
Average (Treat. Effect)					**-0.044**	**-0.073**

Table A2.2: Vote Share of Exp. Candidate – Treatment and Control Averages by Strata

		Treated Village (1)	Surveyed Control (2)	All Controls (3)	(1) - (2)	(1) - (3)
Abomey-Calavi	Soglo	0.209	0.076	0.055	0.133	0.153
Bembereke	Yayi	0.637	0.678	0.728	-0.042	-0.092
Come	Yayi	0.551	0.369	0.259	0.183	0.292
Dangbo I	Houngbedji	0.759	0.746	0.729	0.013	0.030
Dangbo II	Houngbedji	0.553	0.827	0.848	-0.274	-0.295
Dangbo III	Houngbedji	0.620	0.801	0.720	-0.181	-0.099
Kandi	Yayi	0.748	0.810	0.810	-0.062	-0.062
Kouande	Yayi	0.562	0.719	0.816	-0.158	-0.254
Ouesse	Yayi	0.733	0.815	0.705	-0.083	0.028
So-Ava	Soglo	0.065	0.014	0.007	0.052	0.058
Tanguieta	Yayi	0.140	0.540	0.447	-0.400	-0.308
Zagnanado	Soglo	0.112	0.329	0.221	-0.217	-0.109
Average (Treat. Effect)					**-0.086**	**-0.055**

Table A2.3: Clientelism Index – Treatment and Control Averages by Strata

		Treated Village (1)	Surveyed Control (2)	All Controls (3)	(1) - (2)	
Abomey-Calavi	Soglo	-0.092	0.008	-	-0.101	-
Bembereke	Yayi	-0.715	-0.741	-	0.025	-
Come	Yayi	0.329	0.896	-	-0.568	-
Dangbo I	Houngbedji	-0.838	-0.449	-	-0.389	-
Dangbo II	Houngbedji	-0.513	-0.627	-	0.115	-
Dangbo III	Houngbedji	-0.283	0.137	-	-0.420	-
Kandi	Yayi	-0.486	-0.170	-	-0.316	-
Kouande	Yayi	-0.246	-0.097	-	-0.150	-
Ouesse	Yayi	-0.482	-0.791	-	0.309	-
So-Ava	Soglo	-0.448	0.133	-	-0.582	-
Tanguieta	Yayi	0.572	0.862	-	-0.291	-
Zagnanado	Soglo	0.477	0.837	-	-0.359	-
Average (Treat. Effect)					**-0.227**	-

Appendix Table A3.1. Treatment Effects on Components of Clientelism Index

	Control Mean (1)	Treat. - Control (2)	Std. Error (3)	Randomization Inference p-value (4)
Discuss Politics with Someone	0.726	0.025	(0.020)	0.280
Discuss Politics with Members of Other Ethnic Groups	0.250	0.041	(0.028)	0.163
Number of Candidates Known	4.869	0.320	(0.227)	0.190
Knows Platform of One Candidate	0.631	0.047	(0.043)	0.302
Found Platform Convincing	0.514	0.031	(0.042)	0.464
Found Campaign Informative	0.572	0.057	(0.031)	0.109
Campaign Informed of Candidate Qualifications	0.439	0.076	(0.026)**	0.020**
Campaign Informed of Country's Problems	0.344	0.051	(0.035)	0.183
Received Cash from Campaign	0.216	-0.044	(0.028)	0.166

Column (1) reports the mean of the corresponding variable for the control group. Column (2) reports the difference in means between treatment and control group (β from equation 1). Column (3) reports its robust standard error. Randomization strata dummies are included in all regressions. Column (4) reports the p-values based on a two-sided randomization inference test statistic that the placebo coefficients are larger than the actual. The p-values were computed based on 1000 random draws.

Sample includes only surveyed villages (n=24).

See text and Table A3.2 for more information on the variables.

* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.

Appendix Table A3.2. Definition of Variables of Clientelism and Information Index

Discuss Politics with Someone	A series of five questions: "Do you discuss politics with… i) household members, ii) people in their community, iii) people outside their neighborhood, iv) people from their own ethnicity, and v) people from outside their ethnicity."	=1 if answer is "yes" to any question.
Discuss Politics with Members of Other Ethnic Groups		=1 if answer is "yes" to (v).
Number of Candidates Known	"In the last presidential election, which candidates did you know?" Followed by a list of the 26 candidates and "yes" or "no" question.	Number of "yes" answers.
Knows Platform of One Candidate	"Do you know the political platform of one of the candidates listed above?"	=1 if answer is "yes."
Found Platform Convincing	"This platform convinced you to the point of influencing your choice of candidate?"	=1 if answer is "yes."
Received Cash from Candidate	"During the campaign, did you receive any gifts or cash transfers? If so, did you receive it in the form of cash?"	=1 if answer is "yes."
Found Campaign Informative	"What did you think about the last presidential campaign? Was it informative, not informative, or neither?"	=1 if answer is "informative."
Campaign Informed of Candidate Qualifications	"Did the campaign bring you information about the candidate qualifications?"	=1 if answer is "yes."
Campaign Informed of Country's Problems	"Did the campaign bring you information about the country's problems?"	=1 if answer is "yes."

Unless specified, possible answers to questions were "yes" or "no." Non-responses were discarded from computations, but had a negligible frequency in all cases. All variables enter negatively in the clientelism index, with the exception of "received some gift" and "received cash" from candidates.

Appendix Table A4: Treatment Effects on Candidate Vote Shares

	Control Mean	Treat. - Control	Std. Error	Randomization Inference p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Boni Yayi	0.423	-0.037	(0.046)	0.464
Adrien Houngbedji	0.290	0.007	(0.051)	0.881
Bruno Amoussou	0.103	0.001	(0.027)	0.979
Lehady Soglo	0.031	0.005	(0.018)	0.856
Antoine Dayori	0.026	0.002	(0.011)	0.951
K Antoine Idji	0.023	-0.011	(0.007)	0.204
Lazare Sehoueto	0.017	0.001	(0.010)	0.947
Janvier Yahouedehou	0.015	0.013	(0.011)	0.181
Luc Gnacadja	0.010	-0.004	(0.004)	0.522
Severin Adjovi	0.010	-0.004	(0.003)	0.433
Kamarou Fassassi	0.010	0.013	(0.013)	0.110
Richard Senou	0.008	0.011	(0.008)	0.073
Daniel Tawema	0.005	-0.001	(0.001)	0.471
Lionel Agbo	0.004	-0.001	(0.002)	0.516
Zul Kifl Salami	0.004	-0.002	(0.002)	0.397
Soule Dankoro	0.004	0.003	(0.002)	0.134
Idrissou Ibrahima	0.003	0.004	(0.004)	0.261
Gatien Houngbedji	0.003	-0.0002	(0.001)	0.809
Richard Adjaho	0.002	0.0001	(0.001)	0.897
Adolphe D Hodonou	0.002	-0.001	(0.001)	0.198
Marie Elise Gbedo	0.002	0.002	(0.0009)*	0.060*
Marcel Gbaguidi	0.002	-0.001	(0.001)	0.299
Celestine Zanou	0.001	0.001	(0.001)	0.413
Leandre Djagoue	0.001	0.0001	(0.001)	0.899
Raphiou Toukourou	0.001	-0.0001	(0.001)	0.835
Galiou Soglo	0.001	0.0001	(0.0004)	0.754

Column (1) reports the mean of the corresponding variable for the control group. Column (2) reports the difference in means between treatment and control group (β from equation 1). Column (3) reports its robust standard error. Randomization strata dummies are included in all regressions. Column (4) reports the p-values based on a two-sided randomization inference test statistic that the placebo coefficients are larger than the actual. The p-values were computed based on 1000 random draws.

Number of observations is 45. Variables are the village-level vote shares of each of the 26 presidential candidates.

* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.

	Control Mean (1)	Treat. - Control (2)	Std. Error (3)	Randomization Inference p-value (4)
Panel A: Entire Sample (excludes communes where EC is Yayi)				
Turnout/Registered Voters	0.832	-0.069	(0.076)	0.293
Residual Votes/Turnout	0.072	0.004	(0.022)	0.892
Vote Share – Experimental Candidate	0.430	-0.044	(0.058)	0.396
Vote Shares, by candidate position in the village				
1st Place	0.624	-0.081	(0.044)*	0.110
2nd Place	0.198	0.033	(0.022)	0.269
3d Place	0.065	0.051	(0.022)**	0.024**
4th Place	0.040	0.020	(0.025)	0.301
5th and lower placed	0.073	-0.022	(0.017)	0.253
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index	0.479	-0.085	(0.054)	0.121
Panel B: Subsample where EC is dominant (excludes communes where EC is Yayi)				
Vote Share – 1st Place	0.667	-0.105	(0.060)	0.106
Vote Share – Experimental Candidate	0.629	-0.118	(0.062)*	0.090*
Panel C: Subsample where EC is not dominant (excludes communes where EC is Yayi)				
Vote Share – 1st Place	0.538	-0.032	(0.051)	0.745
Vote Share – Experimental Candidate	0.031	0.106	(0.036)**	0.064*

Column (1) reports the mean of the corresponding variable for the control group. Column (2) reports the difference in means between treatment and control group (β from equation 1). Column (3) reports its robust standard error. Randomization strata dummies are included in all regressions. Column (4) reports the p-values based on a two-sided randomization inference test statistic that the placebo coefficients are larger than the actual. The p-values were computed based on 1000 random draws.

Number of observations is 24 (Panel A), 16 (Panel B), and 8 (Panel C).

See text for more information on the variables.

* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.

Table A6.1: Treatment Effects Including Toffo Commune (Amoussou EC)

	Control Mean	Treat. - Control	Std. Error	Randomization Inference p-value
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**
Turnout/Registered Voters	0.814	0.014	(0.054)	0.775
Residual Votes/Turnout	0.068	-0.007	(0.012)	0.568
Vote Share – Experimental Candidate	0.499	-0.044	(0.047)	0.329
Vote Shares, by candidate position in the village				
1st Place	0.640	-0.054	(0.034)	0.135
2nd Place	0.163	0.033	(0.014)**	0.081*
3d Place	0.067	0.029	(0.015)*	0.016**
4th Place	0.041	0.009	(0.013)	0.422
5th and lower placed	0.088	-0.017	(0.014)	0.259
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index	0.490	-0.071	(0.038)*	0.079*

Column (1) reports the mean of the corresponding variable for the control group. Column (2) reports the difference in means between treatment and control group (β from equation 1). Column (3) reports its robust standard error. Randomization strata dummies are included in all regressions. Column (4) reports the p-values based on a two-sided randomization inference test statistic that the placebo coefficients are larger than the actual. The p-values were computed based on 1000 random draws.

Number of observations is 49.

See text for more information on the variables.

* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.

Table A6.2. Treatment Effects by Dominance of Candidates, Including Toffo (Amoussou EC)

	Control Mean (1)	Treat. - Control (2)	Std. Error (3)	Randomization Inference p-value (4)
Subsample where experimental candidate is not dominant				
Vote Share – 1st Place	0.507	0.011	(0.053)	0.892
Vote Share – Experimental Candidate	0.107	0.147	(0.046)***	0.001***
Vote Share of EC, by candidate				
Yayi	0.259	0.293	(0.075)***	0.254
Soglo	0.031	0.106	(0.038)**	0.069*
Amoussou	0.141	0.083	(0.014)***	0.254

Column (1) reports the mean of the corresponding variable for the control group. Column (2) reports the difference in means between treatment and control group (β from equation 1). Column (3) reports its robust standard error. Randomization strata dummies are included in all regressions. Column (4) reports the p-values based on a two-sided randomization inference test statistic that the placebo coefficients are larger than the actual. The p-values were computed based on 1000 random draws. Number of observations is 16.

See text for more information on the variables.

* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.