Replication data for: The Compromise Game: Two-Sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory

Name	File Type	Size	Last Modified
AEJmicro-2007-0039_ReadMe_data.txt	text/plain	1.1 KB	10/12/2019 06:10:PM
AEJmicro-2007-0039_all_data.xls	application/vnd.ms-excel	227 KB	10/12/2019 06:10:PM
LICENSE.txt	text/plain	14.6 KB	10/12/2019 06:10:PM

Project Citation:

Carrillo, Juan D., and Palfrey, Thomas R. Replication data for: The Compromise Game: Two-Sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2009. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114312V1

Project Description

Summary: We analyze a game of two-sided private information where players have privately known "strengths" and can decide to fight or compromise. If either chooses to fight, the stronger player receives a high payoff and the weaker player receives a low payoff. If both choose to compromise, each player receives an intermediate payoff. The only equilibrium is for players to always fight. In our experiment, we observe frequent compromise, more fighting the lower the compromise payoff and less fighting by first than second movers. We explore several theories of cognitive limitations in an attempt to understand these anomalous findings. (JEL C91, D82)

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
C91 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

Related Publications

Download this project

Published Versions

V1 [2019-10-12]

Export Metadata

Dublin Core

DDI 2.5

Report a Problem

Found a serious problem with the data, such as disclosure risk or copyrighted content? Let us know.

This material is distributed exactly as it arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.