<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>48</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=JEL&volume=48&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Civil War</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Christopher</gnm><snm>Blattman</snm><aff>Yale U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Edward</gnm><snm>Miguel</snm><aff>U CA, Berkeley</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>3</ppf>
<ppl>57</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Most nations have experienced an internal armed conflict since 1960. Yet while
civil war is central to many nations' development, it has stood at the periphery of
economics research and teaching. The past decade has witnessed a long overdue
explosion of research into war's causes and consequences. We summarize progress,
identify weaknesses, and chart a path forward. Why war? Existing theory is provocative
but incomplete, omitting advances in behavioral economics and making
little progress in key areas, like why armed groups form and cohere, or how more
than two armed sides compete. Empirical work finds that low per capita incomes
and slow economic growth are both robustly linked to civil war. Yet there is little
consensus on the most effective policies to avert conflicts or promote postwar
recovery. Cross-country analysis of war will benefit from more attention to causal
identification and stronger links to theory. We argue that micro-level analysis and
case studies are also crucial to decipher war's causes, conduct, and consequences.
We bring a growth theoretic approach to the study of conflict consequences to highlight
areas for research, most of all the study of war's impact on institutions. We
conclude with a plea for new and better data. ( JEL D72, D74, O17)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.48.1.3</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.48.1.3</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>48</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=JEL&volume=48&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Renee B.</gnm><snm>Adams</snm><aff>U Queensland and ECGI</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Benjamin E.</gnm><snm>Hermalin</snm><aff>U CA, Berkeley</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Michael S.</gnm><snm>Weisbach</snm><aff>OH State U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>58</ppf>
<ppl>107</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper is a survey of the literature on boards of directors, with an emphasis on
research done subsequent to the Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael S. Weisbach
(2003) survey. The two questions most asked about boards are what determines
their makeup and what determines their actions? These questions are fundamentally
intertwined, which complicates the study of boards because makeup and actions are
jointly endogenous. A focus of this survey is how the literature, theoretical as well as
empirical, deals -- or on occasions fails to deal -- with this complication. We suggest
that many studies of boards can best be interpreted as joint statements about both the
director-selection process and the effect of board composition on board actions and
firm performance. (JEL G34, L25)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.48.1.58</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.48.1.58</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>48</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=JEL&volume=48&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>A Review of Scott E. Page's The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Yannis M.</gnm><snm>Ioannides</snm><aff>Tufts U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>108</ppf>
<ppl>122</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This assessment of Scott Page's The Difference (Princeton University Press, 2007)
emphasizes the depth and breadth of the book's coverage and arguments and checks
them against existing empirical evidence, when available. It argues that the book
navigates artfully between being a "manifesto" for diversity and rigorous science
writing while at the same time marketing economic science in new ways. The review
welcomes the book's popularization of richer aspects of everyday decision making,
individual and collective, and its making an excellent case for the social significance
of abstract economic theorizing, especially about problem solving. It praises the
book's lively interpretations of statistical tools of decision making by means of enticing
narratives. The book's rhetoric urges us to move beyond accepting diversity as a
matter of taste, or even because of its beneficial effects on the "production function,"
and ultimately adopts its powerful logic. It speculates that the book's true impact
will likely come after thorough empirical research. In empirical endeavors, issues of
definition, especially of identity and of measurement, and evaluation of policies that
would enhance diversity would be decisive. In democratic societies, policies may
pose new dilemmas as they benefit from public interest in overcoming the accumulation
of past disadvantages. (JEL D23, Z13)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.48.1.108</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.48.1.108</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>48</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=JEL&volume=48&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Forum on the Role of the Federal Reserve</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>How Central Should the Central Bank Be?</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Alan S.</gnm><snm>Blinder</snm><aff>Princeton U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>123</ppf>
<ppl>133</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>The nature and scope of the Federal Reserve's authority and the structure of its decision
making are now "on the table" to an extent that has not been seen since 1935, and
the Fed's vaunted independence is under some attack. This essay asks what the Federal
Reserve should -- and shouldn't -- do, leaning heavily on the concept of economies of
scope. In particular, I conclude that the central bank should monitor and regulate systemic
risk because preserving financial stability is (a) closely aligned with the standard
objectives of monetary policy and (b) likely to require lender of last resort powers. I
also conclude that the Fed should supervise large financial institutions because that
function is so closely to regulating systemic risk. However, several other functions now
performed by the Fed could easily be done elsewhere. ( JEL E52, E58, G21, G28)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.48.1.123</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.48.1.123</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>48</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=JEL&volume=48&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Forum on the Role of the Federal Reserve</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>What Powers for the Federal Reserve?</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Martin</gnm><snm>Feldstein</snm><aff>Harvard U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>134</ppf>
<ppl>145</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>In this essay, I explain my reasons for the following policy recommendations: (1) The
Fed should continue to manage monetary policy as it has in the past, should act as
the nation's lender of last resort, should fully supervise the large bank holding companies
and their subsidiary banks, and should be given resolution authority over the
institutions that it supervises. (2) While a council of supervisors and regulators can
play a useful role in dealing with macro prudential risks, it should not replace the
central role of the Federal Reserve. (3) The virtually unlimited lending powers that
the Fed has recently exercised in creating credit and helping individual institutions
should be restricted in duration and subjected to formal Treasury approval backed
by Congressional preauthorization of funds. (4) The Fed's capital rules for commercial
banks need to be strengthened by replacing the existing risk-based capital
approach with a broader definition of risk and the introduction of contingent capital.
(5) Subjecting mortgage lending to a broader range of Federal Reserve regulations
and allowing the Fed to deal with nonbank creators of mortgage products would
be better than the creation of a new consumer financial protection organization.
(JEL E52, E58, G21, G28)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.48.1.134</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.48.1.134</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>48</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=JEL&volume=48&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Book Reviews</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Book Reviews</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>146</ppf>
<ppl>185</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.48.1.146</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.48.1.146</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>48</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=JEL&volume=48&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Annotated Listing of New Books</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Annotated Listing of New Books</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>186</ppf>
<ppl>263</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.48.1.186</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.48.1.186</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>48</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=JEL&volume=48&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>JEL Classification System</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>JEL Classification System</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>264</ppf>
<ppl>277</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.48.1.264</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.48.1.264</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>48</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=JEL&volume=48&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Front Matter</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>i</ppf>
<ppl>ii</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.48.1.i</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.48.1.i</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>



