<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>45</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>September 2007</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=45&issue=3&issue_date=September 2007</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Regular Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Annotated Listing of New Books</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>779</ppf>
<ppl>869</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=45&issue=3&article=7&issue_date=September 2007</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.45.3.779</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>45</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>September 2007</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=45&issue=3&issue_date=September 2007</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Regular Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>JEL Classification System</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>870</ppf>
<ppl>882</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=45&issue=3&article=8&issue_date=September 2007</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.45.3.870</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>45</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>September 2007</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=45&issue=3&issue_date=September 2007</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Regular Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>A Review of Avner Greif’s <i>Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade</i></ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Gregory</gnm><snm>Clark</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>725</ppf>
<ppl>741</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Avner Greif's <i>Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from
Medieval Trade</i> (Cambridge University Press, 2006) is a major work in the ongoing
project of many economists and economic historians to show that institutions are the
fundamental driver of all economic history and of all contemporary differences in economic
performance. This review outlines the contribution of this book to the project
and the general status of this long standing ambition.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=45&issue=3&article=5&issue_date=September 2007</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.45.3.725</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>45</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>September 2007</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=45&issue=3&issue_date=September 2007</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Book Review</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Book Reviews</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>742</ppf>
<ppl>778</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=45&issue=3&article=6&issue_date=September 2007</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.45.3.742</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>45</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>September 2007</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=45&issue=3&issue_date=September 2007</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Regular Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>A Review of the <i>Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change</i></ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Martin L.</gnm><snm>Weitzman</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>703</ppf>
<ppl>724</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>The <i>Stern Review</i> calls for immediate decisive action to stabilize greenhouse gases
because "the benefits of strong, early action on climate change outweighs the costs."
The economic analysis supporting this conclusion consists mostly of two basic strands.
The first strand is a formal aggregative model that relies for its conclusions primarily
upon imposing a very low discount rate. Concerning this discount-rate aspect, I am
skeptical of the <i>Review</i>'s formal analysis, but this essay points out that we are actually
a lot less sure about what interest rate should be used for discounting climate
change than is commonly acknowledged. The <i>Review</i>'s second basic strand is a more
intuitive argument that it might be very important to avoid possibly large uncertainties
that are difficult to quantify. Concerning this uncertainty aspect, I argue that it
might be recast into sound analytical reasoning that might justify some of the
<i>Review</i>'s conclusions. The basic issue here is that spending money to slow global
warming should perhaps not be conceptualized primarily as being about consumption
smoothing as much as being about how much insurance to buy to offset the small
change of a ruinous catastrophe that is difficult to compensate by ordinary savings.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=45&issue=3&article=4&issue_date=September 2007</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.45.3.703</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>45</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>September 2007</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=45&issue=3&issue_date=September 2007</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Regular Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Francine</gnm><snm>Lafontaine</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Margaret</gnm><snm>Slade</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>629</ppf>
<ppl>685</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Since Ronald H. Coase's (1937) seminal paper, a rich set of theories has been developed
that deal with firm boundaries in vertical or input–output structures. In the last
twenty-five years, empirical evidence that can shed light on those theories also has
been accumulating. We review the findings of empirical studies that have addressed
two main interrelated questions: First, what types of transactions are best brought
within the firm and, second, what are the consequences of vertical integration decisions
for economic outcomes such as prices, quantities, investment, and profits.
Throughout, we highlight areas of potential cross-fertilization and promising areas
for future work.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=45&issue=3&article=2&issue_date=September 2007</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.45.3.629</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>45</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>September 2007</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=45&issue=3&issue_date=September 2007</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Regular Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>A Review of the <i>Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change</i></ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>William D.</gnm><snm>Nordhaus</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>686</ppf>
<ppl>702</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>How much and how fast should we react to the threat of global warming? The <i>Stern
Review</i> argues that the damages from climate change are large, and that nations
should undertake sharp and immediate reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. An
examination of the <i>Review</i>'s radical revision of the economics of climate change
finds, however, that it depends decisively on the assumption of a near-zero time discount
rate combined with a specific utility function. The <i>Review</i>'s unambiguous conclusions
about the need for extreme immediate action will not survive the
substitution of assumptions that are consistent with today's marketplace real interest
rates and savings rates.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=45&issue=3&article=3&issue_date=September 2007</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.45.3.686</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>45</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>September 2007</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=45&issue=3&issue_date=September 2007</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Regular Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>W. Bentley</gnm><snm>MacLeod</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>595</ppf>
<ppl>628</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>When the quality of a good is at the discretion of the seller, how can buyers assure that
the seller provides the mutually efficient level of quality? Contracts that provide a
bonus to the seller if the quality is acceptable or impose a penalty on the seller if quality
is unacceptable can, in theory, provide efficient incentives. But how are such contracts
enforced? While the courts can be used, doing so involves high real costs.
Informal enforcement, involving a loss of reputation and future access to the market
for any party that defaults on a contract, may often be a better alternative. This paper
explores the use of both formal and informal enforcement mechanisms, provides a
rationale for a variety of observed market mechanisms, and then generates a number
of testable hypotheses.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=45&issue=3&article=1&issue_date=September 2007</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.45.3.595</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


